diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/CREDITS b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/CREDITS
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..eaf105a91
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/CREDITS
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> - Creator of SSH
+
+Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
+Theo de Raadt, and Dug Song - Creators of OpenSSH
+
+Ahsan Rashid <arms@sco.com> - UnixWare long passwords
+Alain St-Denis <Alain.St-Denis@ec.gc.ca> - Irix fix
+Alexandre Oliva <oliva@lsd.ic.unicamp.br> - AIX fixes
+Andre Lucas <andre@ae-35.com> - new login code, many fixes
+Andreas Steinmetz <ast@domdv.de> - Shadow password expiry support
+Andrew McGill <andrewm@datrix.co.za> - SCO fixes
+Andrew Morgan <morgan@transmeta.com> - PAM bugfixes
+Andrew Stribblehill <a.d.stribblehill@durham.ac.uk> - Bugfixes
+Andy Sloane <andy@guildsoftware.com> - bugfixes
+Aran Cox <acox@cv.telegroup.com> - SCO bugfixes
+Arkadiusz Miskiewicz <misiek@pld.org.pl> - IPv6 compat fixes
+Ben Lindstrom <mouring@eviladmin.org> - NeXT support
+Ben Taylor <bent@clark.net> - Solaris debugging and fixes
+Bratislav ILICH <bilic@zepter.ru> - Configure fix
+Charles Levert <charles@comm.polymtl.ca> - SunOS 4 & bug fixes
+Chip Salzenberg <chip@valinux.com> - Assorted patches
+Chris Adams <cmadams@hiwaay.net> - OSF SIA support
+Chris Saia <csaia@wtower.com> - SuSE packaging
+Chris, the Young One <cky@pobox.com> - Password auth fixes
+Christos Zoulas <christos@zoulas.com> - Autoconf fixes
+Chun-Chung Chen <cjj@u.washington.edu> - RPM fixes
+Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com> - Cygwin support
+Chad Mynhier <mynhier@interstel.net> - Solaris Process Contract support
+Dan Brosemer <odin@linuxfreak.com> - Autoconf support, build fixes
+Darren Hall <dhall@virage.org> - AIX patches
+Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> - AIX BFF package scripts
+David Agraz <dagraz@jahoopa.com> - Build fixes
+David Del Piero <David.DelPiero@qed.qld.gov.au> - bug fixes
+David Hesprich <darkgrue@gue-tech.org> - Configure fixes
+David Rankin <drankin@bohemians.lexington.ky.us> - libwrap, AIX, NetBSD fixes
+Dag-Erling Sm�rgrav <des at freebsd.org> - Challenge-Response PAM code.
+Dhiraj Gulati <dgulati@sco.com> - UnixWare long passwords
+Ed Eden <ede370@stl.rural.usda.gov> - configure fixes
+Garrick James <garrick@james.net> - configure fixes
+Gary E. Miller <gem@rellim.com> - SCO support
+Ged Lodder <lodder@yacc.com.au> - HPUX fixes and enhancements
+Gert Doering <gd@hilb1.medat.de> - bug and portability fixes
+HARUYAMA Seigo <haruyama@unixuser.org> - Translations & doc fixes
+Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@ecei.tohoku.ac.jp> - IPv6 and bug fixes
+Hiroshi Takekawa <takekawa@sr3.t.u-tokyo.ac.jp> - Configure fixes
+Holger Trapp <Holger.Trapp@Informatik.TU-Chemnitz.DE> - KRB4/AFS config patch
+IWAMURO Motonori <iwa@mmp.fujitsu.co.jp> - bugfixes
+Jani Hakala <jahakala@cc.jyu.fi> - Patches
+Jarno Huuskonen <jhuuskon@hytti.uku.fi> - Bugfixes
+Jim Knoble <jmknoble@pobox.com> - Many patches
+Jonchen (email unknown) - the original author of PAM support of SSH
+Juergen Keil <jk@tools.de> - scp bugfixing
+KAMAHARA Junzo <kamahara@cc.kshosen.ac.jp> - Configure fixes
+Kees Cook <cook@cpoint.net> - scp fixes
+Kenji Miyake <kenji@miyake.org> - Configure fixes
+Kevin Cawlfield <cawlfiel@us.ibm.com> - AIX fixes.
+Kevin O'Connor <kevin_oconnor@standardandpoors.com> - RSAless operation
+Kevin Steves <stevesk@pobox.com> - HP support, bugfixes, improvements
+Kiyokazu SUTO <suto@ks-and-ks.ne.jp> - Bugfixes
+Larry Jones <larry.jones@sdrc.com> - Bugfixes
+Lutz Jaenicke <Lutz.Jaenicke@aet.TU-Cottbus.DE> - Bugfixes
+Marc G. Fournier <marc.fournier@acadiau.ca> - Solaris patches
+Mark D. Baushke <mdb@juniper.net> - bug fixes
+Martin Johansson <fatbob@acc.umu.se> - Linux fixes
+Mark D. Roth <roth+openssh@feep.net> - Features, bug fixes
+Mark Miller <markm@swoon.net> - Bugfixes
+Matt Richards <v2matt@btv.ibm.com> - AIX patches
+Michael Steffens <michael_steffens at hp.com> - HP-UX fixes
+Michael Stone <mstone@cs.loyola.edu> - Irix enhancements
+Nakaji Hiroyuki <nakaji@tutrp.tut.ac.jp> - Sony News-OS patch
+Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin.dahyabhai@pobox.com> - PAM environment patch
+Nate Itkin <nitkin@europa.com> - SunOS 4.1.x fixes
+Niels Kristian Bech Jensen <nkbj@image.dk> - Assorted patches
+Pavel Kankovsky <peak@argo.troja.mff.cuni.cz> - Security fixes
+Pavel Troller <patrol@omni.sinus.cz> - Bugfixes
+Pekka Savola <pekkas@netcore.fi> - Bugfixes
+Peter Kocks <peter.kocks@baygate.com> - Makefile fixes
+Peter Stuge <stuge@cdy.org> - mdoc2man.awk script
+Phil Hands <phil@hands.com> - Debian scripts, assorted patches
+Phil Karn <karn@ka9q.ampr.org> - Autoconf fixes
+Philippe WILLEM <Philippe.WILLEM@urssaf.fr> - Bugfixes
+Phill Camp <P.S.S.Camp@ukc.ac.uk> - login code fix
+Rip Loomis <loomisg@cist.saic.com> - Solaris package support, fixes
+Robert Dahlem <Robert.Dahlem at siemens.com> - Reliant Unix fixes
+Roumen Petrov <openssh@roumenpetrov.info> - Compile & configure fixes
+SAKAI Kiyotaka <ksakai@kso.netwk.ntt-at.co.jp> - Multiple bugfixes
+Simon Wilkinson <sxw@dcs.ed.ac.uk> - PAM fixes, Compat with MIT KrbV
+Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com> - many patches and technical assistance
+Svante Signell <svante.signell@telia.com> - Bugfixes
+Thomas Neumann <tom@smart.ruhr.de> - Shadow passwords
+Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net> - Portability & SCO fixes
+Tobias Oetiker <oetiker@ee.ethz.ch> - Bugfixes
+Tom Bertelson's <tbert@abac.com> - AIX auth fixes
+Tor-Ake Fransson <torake@hotmail.com> - AIX support
+Tudor Bosman <tudorb@jm.nu> - MD5 password support
+Udo Schweigert <ust@cert.siemens.de> - ReliantUNIX support
+Wendy Palm <wendyp at cray.com> - Cray support.
+Zack Weinberg <zack@wolery.cumb.org> - GNOME askpass enhancement
+
+Apologies to anyone I have missed.
+
+Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+
+$Id: CREDITS,v 1.81 2006/08/30 17:24:41 djm Exp $
+
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/ChangeLog b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/ChangeLog
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0e0dd8787
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/ChangeLog
@@ -0,0 +1,9133 @@
+commit e91346dc2bbf460246df2ab591b7613908c1b0ad
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Aug 21 14:49:03 2015 +1000
+
+    we don't use Github for issues/pull-requests
+
+commit a4f5b507c708cc3dc2c8dd2d02e4416d7514dc23
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Aug 21 14:43:55 2015 +1000
+
+    fix URL for connect.c
+
+commit d026a8d3da0f8186598442997c7d0a28e7275414
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Aug 21 13:47:10 2015 +1000
+
+    update version numbers for 7.1
+
+commit 78f8f589f0ca1c9f41e5a9bae3cda5ce8a6b42ed
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Aug 21 03:45:26 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    openssh-7.1
+    
+    Upstream-ID: ff7b1ef4b06caddfb45e08ba998128c88be3d73f
+
+commit 32a181980c62fce94f7f9ffaf6a79d90f0c309cf
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Aug 21 03:42:19 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    fix inverted logic that broke PermitRootLogin; reported
+     by Mantas Mikulenas; ok markus@
+    
+    Upstream-ID: 260dd6a904c1bb7e43267e394b1c9cf70bdd5ea5
+
+commit ce445b0ed927e45bd5bdce8f836eb353998dd65c
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Aug 20 22:32:42 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Do not cast result of malloc/calloc/realloc* if stdlib.h
+     is in scope ok krw millert
+    
+    Upstream-ID: 5e50ded78cadf3841556649a16cc4b1cb6c58667
+
+commit 05291e5288704d1a98bacda269eb5a0153599146
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Aug 20 19:20:06 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    In the certificates section, be consistent about using
+     "host_key" and "user_key" for the respective key types.  ok sthen@ deraadt@
+    
+    Upstream-ID: 9e037ea3b15577b238604c5533e082a3947f13cb
+
+commit 8543d4ef6f2e9f98c3e6b77c894ceec30c5e4ae4
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Aug 19 23:21:42 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Better compat matching for WinSCP, add compat matching
+     for FuTTY (fork of PuTTY); ok markus@ deraadt@
+    
+    Upstream-ID: 24001d1ac115fa3260fbdc329a4b9aeb283c5389
+
+commit ec6eda16ebab771aa3dfc90629b41953b999cb1e
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Aug 19 23:19:01 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    fix double-free() in error path of DSA key generation
+     reported by Mateusz Kocielski; ok markus@
+    
+    Upstream-ID: 4735d8f888b10599a935fa1b374787089116713c
+
+commit 45b0eb752c94954a6de046bfaaf129e518ad4b5b
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Aug 19 23:18:26 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    fix free() of uninitialised pointer reported by Mateusz
+     Kocielski; ok markus@
+    
+    Upstream-ID: 519552b050618501a06b7b023de5cb104e2c5663
+
+commit c837643b93509a3ef538cb6624b678c5fe32ff79
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Aug 19 23:17:51 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    fixed unlink([uninitialised memory]) reported by Mateusz
+     Kocielski; ok markus@
+    
+    Upstream-ID: 14a0c4e7d891f5a8dabc4b89d4f6b7c0d5a20109
+
+commit 1f8d3d629cd553031021068eb9c646a5f1e50994
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Aug 14 15:32:41 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    match myproposal.h order; from brian conway (i snuck in a
+     tweak while here)
+    
+    ok dtucker
+    
+    Upstream-ID: 35174a19b5237ea36aa3798f042bf5933b772c67
+
+commit 1dc8d93ce69d6565747eb44446ed117187621b26
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Aug 6 14:53:21 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    add prohibit-password as a synonymn for without-password,
+     since the without-password is causing too many questions.  Harden it to ban
+     all but pubkey, hostbased, and GSSAPI auth (when the latter is enabled) from
+     djm, ok markus
+    
+    Upstream-ID: d53317d7b28942153e6236d3fd6e12ceb482db7a
+
+commit 90a95a4745a531b62b81ce3b025e892bdc434de5
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Aug 11 13:53:41 2015 +1000
+
+    update version in README
+
+commit 318c37743534b58124f1bab37a8a0087a3a9bd2f
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Aug 11 13:53:09 2015 +1000
+
+    update versions in *.spec
+
+commit 5e75f5198769056089fb06c4d738ab0e5abc66f7
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Aug 11 13:34:12 2015 +1000
+
+    set sshpam_ctxt to NULL after free
+    
+    Avoids use-after-free in monitor when privsep child is compromised.
+    Reported by Moritz Jodeit; ok dtucker@
+
+commit d4697fe9a28dab7255c60433e4dd23cf7fce8a8b
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Aug 11 13:33:24 2015 +1000
+
+    Don't resend username to PAM; it already has it.
+    
+    Pointed out by Moritz Jodeit; ok dtucker@
+
+commit 88763a6c893bf3dfe951ba9271bf09715e8d91ca
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Mon Jul 27 12:14:25 2015 +1000
+
+    Import updated moduli file from OpenBSD.
+
+commit 55b263fb7cfeacb81aaf1c2036e0394c881637da
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Mon Aug 10 11:13:44 2015 +1000
+
+    let principals-command.sh work for noexec /var/run
+
+commit 2651e34cd11b1aac3a0fe23b86d8c2ff35c07897
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Aug 6 11:43:42 2015 +1000
+
+    work around echo -n / sed behaviour in tests
+
+commit d85dad81778c1aa8106acd46930b25fdf0d15b2a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Aug 5 05:27:33 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    adjust for RSA minimum modulus switch; ok deraadt@
+    
+    Upstream-Regress-ID: 5a72c83431b96224d583c573ca281cd3a3ebfdae
+
+commit 57e8e229bad5fe6056b5f1199665f5f7008192c6
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Aug 4 05:23:06 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    backout SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE increase for this
+     release; problems spotted by sthen@ ok deraadt@ markus@
+    
+    Upstream-ID: d0bd60dde9e8c3cd7030007680371894c1499822
+
+commit f097d0ea1e0889ca0fa2e53a00214e43ab7fa22a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Aug 2 09:56:42 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    openssh 7.0; ok deraadt@
+    
+    Upstream-ID: c63afdef537f57f28ae84145c5a8e29e9250221f
+
+commit 3d5728a0f6874ce4efb16913a12963595070f3a9
+Author: chris@openbsd.org <chris@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jul 31 15:38:09 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Allow PermitRootLogin to be overridden by config
+    
+    ok markus@ deeradt@
+    
+    Upstream-ID: 5cf3e26ed702888de84e2dc9d0054ccf4d9125b4
+
+commit 6f941396b6835ad18018845f515b0c4fe20be21a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Jul 30 23:09:15 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    fix pty permissions; patch from Nikolay Edigaryev; ok
+     deraadt
+    
+    Upstream-ID: 40ff076d2878b916fbfd8e4f45dbe5bec019e550
+
+commit f4373ed1e8fbc7c8ce3fc4ea97d0ba2e0c1d7ef0
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Jul 30 19:23:02 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    change default: PermitRootLogin without-password matching
+     install script changes coming as well ok djm markus
+    
+    Upstream-ID: 0e2a6c4441daf5498b47a61767382bead5eb8ea6
+
+commit 0c30ba91f87fcda7e975e6ff8a057f624e87ea1c
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Jul 30 12:31:39 2015 +1000
+
+    downgrade OOM adjustment logging: verbose -> debug
+
+commit f9eca249d4961f28ae4b09186d7dc91de74b5895
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Jul 30 00:01:34 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Allow ssh_config and sshd_config kex parameters options be
+     prefixed by a '+' to indicate that the specified items be appended to the
+     default rather than replacing it.
+    
+    approach suggested by dtucker@, feedback dlg@, ok markus@
+    
+    Upstream-ID: 0f901137298fc17095d5756ff1561a7028e8882a
+
+commit 5cefe769105a2a2e3ca7479d28d9a325d5ef0163
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jul 29 08:34:54 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    fix bug in previous; was printing incorrect string for
+     failed host key algorithms negotiation
+    
+    Upstream-ID: 22c0dc6bc61930513065d92e11f0753adc4c6e6e
+
+commit f319912b0d0e1675b8bb051ed8213792c788bcb2
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jul 29 04:43:06 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    include the peer's offer when logging a failure to
+     negotiate a mutual set of algorithms (kex, pubkey, ciphers, etc.) ok markus@
+    
+    Upstream-ID: bbb8caabf5c01790bb845f5ce135565248d7c796
+
+commit b6ea0e573042eb85d84defb19227c89eb74cf05a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Jul 28 23:20:42 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    add Cisco to the list of clients that choke on the
+     hostkeys update extension. Pointed out by Howard Kash
+    
+    Upstream-ID: c9eadde28ecec056c73d09ee10ba4570dfba7e84
+
+commit 3f628c7b537291c1019ce86af90756fb4e66d0fd
+Author: guenther@openbsd.org <guenther@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jul 27 16:29:23 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Permit kbind(2) use in the sandbox now, to ease testing
+     of ld.so work using it
+    
+    reminded by miod@, ok deraadt@
+    
+    Upstream-ID: 523922e4d1ba7a091e3824e77a8a3c818ee97413
+
+commit ebe27ebe520098bbc0fe58945a87ce8490121edb
+Author: millert@openbsd.org <millert@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jul 20 18:44:12 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Move .Pp before .Bl, not after to quiet mandoc -Tlint.
+     Noticed by jmc@
+    
+    Upstream-ID: 59fadbf8407cec4e6931e50c53cfa0214a848e23
+
+commit d5d91d0da819611167782c66ab629159169d94d4
+Author: millert@openbsd.org <millert@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jul 20 18:42:35 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Sync usage with SYNOPSIS
+    
+    Upstream-ID: 7a321a170181a54f6450deabaccb6ef60cf3f0b7
+
+commit 79ec2142fbc68dd2ed9688608da355fc0b1ed743
+Author: millert@openbsd.org <millert@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jul 20 15:39:52 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Better desciption of Unix domain socket forwarding.
+     bz#2423; ok jmc@
+    
+    Upstream-ID: 85e28874726897e3f26ae50dfa2e8d2de683805d
+
+commit d56fd1828074a4031b18b8faa0bf949669eb18a0
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Mon Jul 20 11:19:51 2015 +1000
+
+    make realpath.c compile -Wsign-compare clean
+
+commit c63c9a691dca26bb7648827f5a13668832948929
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jul 20 00:30:01 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    mention that the default of UseDNS=no implies that
+     hostnames cannot be used for host matching in sshd_config and
+     authorized_keys; bz#2045, ok dtucker@
+    
+    Upstream-ID: 0812705d5f2dfa59aab01f2764ee800b1741c4e1
+
+commit 63ebcd0005e9894fcd6871b7b80aeea1fec0ff76
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Jul 18 08:02:17 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    don't ignore PKCS#11 hosted keys that return empty
+     CKA_ID; patch by Jakub Jelen via bz#2429; ok markus
+    
+    Upstream-ID: 2f7c94744eb0342f8ee8bf97b2351d4e00116485
+
+commit b15fd989c8c62074397160147a8d5bc34b3f3c63
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Jul 18 08:00:21 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    skip uninitialised PKCS#11 slots; patch from Jakub Jelen
+     in bz#2427 ok markus@
+    
+    Upstream-ID: 744c1e7796e237ad32992d0d02148e8a18f27d29
+
+commit 5b64f85bb811246c59ebab70aed331f26ba37b18
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Jul 18 07:57:14 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    only query each keyboard-interactive device once per
+     authentication request regardless of how many times it is listed; ok markus@
+    
+    Upstream-ID: d73fafba6e86030436ff673656ec1f33d9ffeda1
+
+commit cd7324d0667794eb5c236d8a4e0f236251babc2d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jul 17 03:34:27 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    remove -u flag to diff (only used for error output) to make
+     things easier for -portable
+    
+    Upstream-Regress-ID: a5d6777d2909540d87afec3039d9bb2414ade548
+
+commit deb8d99ecba70b67f4af7880b11ca8768df9ec3a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jul 17 03:09:19 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    direct-streamlocal@openssh.com Unix domain foward
+     messages do not contain a "reserved for future use" field and in fact,
+     serverloop.c checks that there isn't one. Remove erroneous mention from
+     PROTOCOL description. bz#2421 from Daniel Black
+    
+    Upstream-ID: 3d51a19e64f72f764682f1b08f35a8aa810a43ac
+
+commit 356b61f365405b5257f5b2ab446e5d7bd33a7b52
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jul 17 03:04:27 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    describe magic for setting up Unix domain socket fowards
+     via the mux channel; bz#2422 patch from Daniel Black
+    
+    Upstream-ID: 943080fe3864715c423bdeb7c920bb30c4eee861
+
+commit d3e2aee41487d55b8d7d40f538b84ff1db7989bc
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Fri Jul 17 12:52:34 2015 +1000
+
+    Check if realpath works on nonexistent files.
+    
+    On some platforms the native realpath doesn't work with non-existent
+    files (this is actually specified in some versions of POSIX), however
+    the sftp spec says its realpath with "canonicalize any given path name".
+    On those platforms, use realpath from the compat library.
+    
+    In addition, when compiling with -DFORTIFY_SOURCE, glibc redefines
+    the realpath symbol to the checked version, so redefine ours to
+    something else so we pick up the compat version we want.
+    
+    bz#2428, ok djm@
+
+commit 25b14610dab655646a109db5ef8cb4c4bf2a48a0
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jul 17 02:47:45 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    fix incorrect test for SSH1 keys when compiled without SSH1
+     support
+    
+    Upstream-ID: 6004d720345b8e481c405e8ad05ce2271726e451
+
+commit df56a8035d429b2184ee94aaa7e580c1ff67f73a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jul 15 08:00:11 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    fix NULL-deref when SSH1 reenabled
+    
+    Upstream-ID: f22fd805288c92b3e9646782d15b48894b2d5295
+
+commit 41e38c4d49dd60908484e6703316651333f16b93
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jul 15 07:19:50 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    regen RSA1 test keys; the last batch was missing their
+     private parts
+    
+    Upstream-Regress-ID: 7ccf437305dd63ff0b48dd50c5fd0f4d4230c10a
+
+commit 5bf0933184cb622ca3f96d224bf3299fd2285acc
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jul 10 06:23:25 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Adapt tests, now that DSA if off by default; use
+     PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes and PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes to test DSA.
+    
+    Upstream-Regress-ID: 0ff2a3ff5ac1ce5f92321d27aa07b98656efcc5c
+
+commit 7a6e3fd7b41dbd3756b6bf9acd67954c0b1564cc
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Jul 7 14:54:16 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    regen test data after mktestdata.sh changes
+    
+    Upstream-Regress-ID: 3495ecb082b9a7c048a2d7c5c845d3bf181d25a4
+
+commit 7c8c174c69f681d4910fa41c37646763692b28e2
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Jul 7 14:53:30 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    adapt tests to new minimum RSA size and default FP format
+    
+    Upstream-Regress-ID: a4b30afd174ce82b96df14eb49fb0b81398ffd0e
+
+commit 6a977a4b68747ade189e43d302f33403fd4a47ac
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jul 3 04:39:23 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    legacy v00 certificates are gone; adapt and don't try to
+     test them; "sure" markus@ dtucker@
+    
+    Upstream-Regress-ID: c57321e69b3cd4a3b3396dfcc43f0803d047da12
+
+commit 0c4123ad5e93fb90fee9c6635b13a6cdabaac385
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jul 1 23:11:18 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    don't expect SSH v.1 in unittests
+    
+    Upstream-Regress-ID: f8812b16668ba78e6a698646b2a652b90b653397
+
+commit 3c099845798a817cdde513c39074ec2063781f18
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jun 15 06:38:50 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    turn SSH1 back on to match src/usr.bin/ssh being tested
+    
+    Upstream-Regress-ID: 6c4f763a2f0cc6893bf33983919e9030ae638333
+
+commit b1dc2b33689668c75e95f873a42d5aea1f4af1db
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jul 13 04:57:14 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Add "PuTTY_Local:" to the clients to which we do not
+     offer DH-GEX. This was the string that was used for development versions
+     prior to September 2014 and they don't do RFC4419 DH-GEX, but unfortunately
+     there are some extant products based on those versions.  bx2424 from Jay
+     Rouman, ok markus@ djm@
+    
+    Upstream-ID: be34d41e18b966832fe09ca243d275b81882e1d5
+
+commit 3a1638dda19bbc73d0ae02b4c251ce08e564b4b9
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jul 10 06:21:53 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Turn off DSA by default; add HostKeyAlgorithms to the
+     server and PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes to the client side, so it still can be
+     tested or turned back on; feedback and ok djm@
+    
+    Upstream-ID: 8450a9e6d83f80c9bfed864ff061dfc9323cec21
+
+commit 16db0a7ee9a87945cc594d13863cfcb86038db59
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Jul 9 09:49:46 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    re-enable ed25519-certs if compiled w/o openssl; ok djm
+    
+    Upstream-ID: e10c90808b001fd2c7a93778418e9b318f5c4c49
+
+commit c355bf306ac33de6545ce9dac22b84a194601e2f
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jul 8 20:24:02 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    no need to include the old buffer/key API
+    
+    Upstream-ID: fb13c9f7c0bba2545f3eb0a0e69cb0030819f52b
+
+commit a3cc48cdf9853f1e832d78cb29bedfab7adce1ee
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jul 8 19:09:25 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    typedefs for Cipher&CipherContext are unused
+    
+    Upstream-ID: 50e6a18ee92221d23ad173a96d5b6c42207cf9a7
+
+commit a635bd06b5c427a57c3ae760d3a2730bb2c863c0
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jul 8 19:04:21 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    xmalloc.h is unused
+    
+    Upstream-ID: afb532355b7fa7135a60d944ca1e644d1d63cb58
+
+commit 2521cf0e36c7f3f6b19f206da0af134f535e4a31
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jul 8 19:01:15 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    compress.c is gone
+    
+    Upstream-ID: 174fa7faa9b9643cba06164b5e498591356fbced
+
+commit c65a7aa6c43aa7a308ee1ab8a96f216169ae9615
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jul 3 04:05:54 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    another SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE that needed
+     cranking
+    
+    Upstream-ID: 9d8826cafe96aab4ae8e2f6fd22800874b7ffef1
+
+commit b1f383da5cd3cb921fc7776f17a14f44b8a31757
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jul 3 03:56:25 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    add an XXX reminder for getting correct key paths from
+     sshd_config
+    
+    Upstream-ID: feae52b209d7782ad742df04a4260e9fe41741db
+
+commit 933935ce8d093996c34d7efa4d59113163080680
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jul 3 03:49:45 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    refuse to generate or accept RSA keys smaller than 1024
+     bits; feedback and ok dtucker@
+    
+    Upstream-ID: 7ea3d31271366ba264f06e34a3539bf1ac30f0ba
+
+commit bdfd29f60b74f3e678297269dc6247a5699583c1
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jul 3 03:47:00 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    turn off 1024 bit diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 key
+     exchange method (already off in server, this turns it off in the client by
+     default too) ok dtucker@
+    
+    Upstream-ID: f59b88f449210ab7acf7d9d88f20f1daee97a4fa
+
+commit c28fc62d789d860c75e23a9fa9fb250eb2beca57
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jul 3 03:43:18 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    delete support for legacy v00 certificates; "sure"
+     markus@ dtucker@
+    
+    Upstream-ID: b5b9bb5f9202d09e88f912989d74928601b6636f
+
+commit 564d63e1b4a9637a209d42a9d49646781fc9caef
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jul 1 23:10:47 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Compile-time disable SSH v.1 again
+    
+    Upstream-ID: 1d4b513a3a06232f02650b73bad25100d1b800af
+
+commit 868109b650504dd9bcccdb1f51d0906f967c20ff
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jul 1 02:39:06 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    twiddle PermitRootLogin back
+    
+    Upstream-ID: 2bd23976305d0512e9f84d054e1fc23cd70b89f2
+
+commit 7de4b03a6e4071d454b72927ffaf52949fa34545
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jul 1 02:32:17 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    twiddle; (this commit marks the openssh-6.9 release)
+    
+    Upstream-ID: 78500582819f61dd8adee36ec5cc9b9ac9351234
+
+commit 1bf477d3cdf1a864646d59820878783d42357a1d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jul 1 02:26:31 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    better refuse ForwardX11Trusted=no connections attempted
+     after ForwardX11Timeout expires; reported by Jann Horn
+    
+    Upstream-ID: bf0fddadc1b46a0334e26c080038313b4b6dea21
+
+commit 47aa7a0f8551b471fcae0447c1d78464f6dba869
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jul 1 01:56:13 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    put back default PermitRootLogin=no
+    
+    Upstream-ID: 7bdedd5cead99c57ed5571f3b6b7840922d5f728
+
+commit 984b064fe2a23733733262f88d2e1b2a1a501662
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jul 1 01:55:13 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    openssh-6.9
+    
+    Upstream-ID: 6cfe8e1904812531080e6ab6e752d7001b5b2d45
+
+commit d921082ed670f516652eeba50705e1e9f6325346
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jul 1 01:55:00 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    reset default PermitRootLogin to 'yes' (momentarily, for
+     release)
+    
+    Upstream-ID: cad8513527066e65dd7a1c16363d6903e8cefa24
+
+commit 66295e0e1ba860e527f191b6325d2d77dec4dbce
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Jul 1 11:49:12 2015 +1000
+
+    crank version numbers for release
+
+commit 37035c07d4f26bb1fbe000d2acf78efdb008681d
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Jul 1 10:49:37 2015 +1000
+
+    s/--with-ssh1/--without-ssh1/
+
+commit 629df770dbadc2accfbe1c81b3f31f876d0acd84
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Jun 30 05:25:07 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    fatal() when a remote window update causes the window
+     value to overflow. Reported by Georg Wicherski, ok markus@
+    
+    Upstream-ID: ead397a9aceb3bf74ebfa5fcaf259d72e569f351
+
+commit f715afebe735d61df3fd30ad72d9ac1c8bd3b5f2
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Jun 30 05:23:25 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Fix math error in remote window calculations that causes
+     eventual stalls for datagram channels. Reported by Georg Wicherski, ok
+     markus@
+    
+    Upstream-ID: be54059d11bf64e0d85061f7257f53067842e2ab
+
+commit 52fb6b9b034fcfd24bf88cc7be313e9c31de9889
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Jun 30 16:05:40 2015 +1000
+
+    skip IPv6-related portions on hosts without IPv6
+    
+    with Tim Rice
+
+commit 512caddf590857af6aa12218461b5c0441028cf5
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jun 29 22:35:12 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    add getpid to sandbox, reachable by grace_alarm_handler
+    
+    reported by Jakub Jelen; bz#2419
+    
+    Upstream-ID: d0da1117c16d4c223954995d35b0f47c8f684cd8
+
+commit 78c2a4f883ea9aba866358e2acd9793a7f42ca93
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jun 26 05:13:20 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Fix \-escaping bug that caused forward path parsing to skip
+     two characters and skip past the end of the string.
+    
+    Based on patch by Salvador Fandino; ok dtucker@
+    
+    Upstream-ID: 7b879dc446335677cbe4cb549495636a0535f3bd
+
+commit bc20205c91c9920361d12b15d253d4997dba494a
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Jun 25 09:51:39 2015 +1000
+
+    add missing pselect6
+    
+    patch from Jakub Jelen
+
+commit 9d27fb73b4a4e5e99cb880af790d5b1ce44f720a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jun 24 23:47:23 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    correct test to sshkey_sign(); spotted by Albert S.
+    
+    Upstream-ID: 5f7347f40f0ca6abdaca2edb3bd62f4776518933
+
+commit 7ed01a96a1911d8b4a9ef4f3d064e1923bfad7e3
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jun 24 01:49:19 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Revert previous commit.  We still want to call setgroups
+     in the case where there are zero groups to remove any that we might otherwise
+     inherit (as pointed out by grawity at gmail.com) and since the 2nd argument
+     to setgroups is always a static global it's always valid to dereference in
+     this case.  ok deraadt@ djm@
+    
+    Upstream-ID: 895b5ac560a10befc6b82afa778641315725fd01
+
+commit 882f8bf94f79528caa65b0ba71c185d705bb7195
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jun 24 01:49:19 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Revert previous commit.  We still want to call setgroups in
+     the case where there are zero groups to remove any that we might otherwise
+     inherit (as pointed out by grawity at gmail.com) and since the 2nd argument
+     to setgroups is always a static global it's always valid to dereference in
+     this case.  ok deraadt@ djm@
+    
+    Upstream-ID: 895b5ac560a10befc6b82afa778641315725fd01
+
+commit 9488538a726951e82b3a4374f3c558d72c80a89b
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jun 22 23:42:16 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Don't count successful partial authentication as failures
+     in monitor; this may have caused the monitor to refuse multiple
+     authentications that would otherwise have successfully completed; ok markus@
+    
+    Upstream-ID: eb74b8e506714d0f649bd5c300f762a527af04a3
+
+commit 63b78d003bd8ca111a736e6cea6333da50f5f09b
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jun 22 12:29:57 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Don't call setgroups if we have zero groups; there's no
+     guarantee that it won't try to deref the pointer.  Based on a patch from mail
+     at quitesimple.org, ok djm deraadt
+    
+    Upstream-ID: 2fff85e11d7a9a387ef7fddf41fbfaf566708ab1
+
+commit 5c15e22c691c79a47747bcf5490126656f97cecd
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Jun 18 15:07:56 2015 +1000
+
+    fix syntax error
+
+commit 596dbca82f3f567fb3d2d69af4b4e1d3ba1e6403
+Author: jsing@openbsd.org <jsing@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jun 15 18:44:22 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    If AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand is specified, however
+     AuthorizedPrincipalsFile is not (or is set to "none"), authentication will
+     potentially fail due to key_cert_check_authority() failing to locate a
+     principal that matches the username, even though an authorized principal has
+     already been matched in the output of the subprocess. Fix this by using the
+     same logic to determine if pw->pw_name should be passed, as is used to
+     determine if a authorized principal must be matched earlier on.
+    
+    ok djm@
+    
+    Upstream-ID: 43b42302ec846b0ea68aceb40677245391b9409d
+
+commit aff3e94c0d75d0d0fa84ea392b50ab04f8c57905
+Author: jsing@openbsd.org <jsing@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jun 15 18:42:19 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Make the arguments to match_principals_command() similar
+     to match_principals_file(), by changing the last argument a struct
+     sshkey_cert * and dereferencing key->cert in the caller.
+    
+    No functional change.
+    
+    ok djm@
+    
+    Upstream-ID: 533f99b844b21b47342b32b62e198dfffcf8651c
+
+commit 97e2e1596c202a4693468378b16b2353fd2d6c5e
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Jun 17 14:36:54 2015 +1000
+
+    trivial optimisation for seccomp-bpf
+    
+    When doing arg inspection and the syscall doesn't match, skip
+    past the instruction that reloads the syscall into the accumulator,
+    since the accumulator hasn't been modified at this point.
+
+commit 99f33d7304893bd9fa04d227cb6e870171cded19
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Jun 17 10:50:51 2015 +1000
+
+    aarch64 support for seccomp-bpf sandbox
+    
+    Also resort and tidy syscall list. Based on patches by Jakub Jelen
+    bz#2361; ok dtucker@
+
+commit 4ef702e1244633c1025ec7cfe044b9ab267097bf
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jun 15 01:32:50 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    return failure on RSA signature error; reported by Albert S
+    
+    Upstream-ID: e61bb93dbe0349625807b0810bc213a6822121fa
+
+commit a170f22baf18af0b1acf2788b8b715605f41a1f9
+Author: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
+Date:   Tue Jun 9 22:41:13 2015 -0700
+
+    Fix t12 rules for out of tree builds.
+
+commit ec04dc4a5515c913121bc04ed261857e68fa5c18
+Author: millert@openbsd.org <millert@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jun 5 15:13:13 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    For "ssh -L 12345:/tmp/sock" don't fail with "No forward host
+     name." (we have a path, not a host name).  Based on a diff from Jared
+     Yanovich. OK djm@
+    
+    Upstream-ID: 2846b0a8c7de037e33657f95afbd282837fc213f
+
+commit 732d61f417a6aea0aa5308b59cb0f563bcd6edd6
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jun 5 03:44:14 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    typo: accidental repetition; bz#2386
+    
+    Upstream-ID: 45e620d99f6bc301e5949d34a54027374991c88b
+
+commit adfb24c69d1b6f5e758db200866c711e25a2ba73
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Fri Jun 5 14:51:40 2015 +1000
+
+    Add Linux powerpc64le and powerpcle entries.
+    
+    Stopgap to resolve bz#2409 because we are so close to release and will
+    update config.guess and friends shortly after the release.  ok djm@
+
+commit a1195a0fdc9eddddb04d3e9e44c4775431cb77da
+Merge: 6397eed d2480bc
+Author: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
+Date:   Wed Jun 3 21:43:13 2015 -0700
+
+    Merge branch 'master' of git.mindrot.org:/var/git/openssh
+
+commit 6397eedf953b2b973d2d7cbb504ab501a07f8ddc
+Author: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
+Date:   Wed Jun 3 21:41:11 2015 -0700
+
+    Remove unneeded backslashes. Patch from Ángel González
+
+commit d2480bcac1caf31b03068de877a47d6e1027bf6d
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Thu Jun 4 14:10:55 2015 +1000
+
+    Remove redundant include of stdarg.h.  bz#2410
+
+commit 5e67859a623826ccdf2df284cbb37e2d8e2787eb
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Jun 2 09:10:40 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    mention CheckHostIP adding addresses to known_hosts;
+     bz#1993; ok dtucker@
+    
+    Upstream-ID: fd44b68440fd0dc29abf9f2d3f703d74a2396cb7
+
+commit d7a58bbac6583e33fd5eca8e2c2cc70c57617818
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Tue Jun 2 20:15:26 2015 +1000
+
+    Replace strcpy with strlcpy.
+    
+    ok djm, sanity check by Corinna Vinschen.
+
+commit 51a1c2115265c6e80ede8a5c9dccada9aeed7143
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri May 29 18:27:21 2015 +1000
+
+    skip, rather than fatal when run without SUDO set
+
+commit 599f01142a376645b15cbc9349d7e8975e1cf245
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri May 29 18:03:15 2015 +1000
+
+    fix merge botch that left ",," in KEX algs
+
+commit 0c2a81dfc21822f2423edd30751e5ec53467b347
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri May 29 17:08:28 2015 +1000
+
+    re-enable SSH protocol 1 at compile time
+
+commit db438f9285d64282d3ac9e8c0944f59f037c0151
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri May 29 03:05:13 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    make this work without SUDO set; ok dtucker@
+    
+    Upstream-Regress-ID: bca88217b70bce2fe52b23b8e06bdeb82d98c715
+
+commit 1d9a2e2849c9864fe75daabf433436341c968e14
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu May 28 07:37:31 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    wrap all moduli-related code in #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL.
+     based on patch from Reuben Hawkins; bz#2388 feedback and ok dtucker@
+    
+    Upstream-ID: d80cfc8be3e6ec65b3fac9e87c4466533b31b7cf
+
+commit 496aeb25bc2d6c434171292e4714771b594bd00e
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu May 28 05:41:29 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Increase the allowed length of the known host file name
+     in the log message to be consistent with other cases.  Part of bz#1993, ok
+     deraadt.
+    
+    Upstream-ID: a9e97567be49f25daf286721450968251ff78397
+
+commit dd2cfeb586c646ff8d70eb93567b2e559ace5b14
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu May 28 05:09:45 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Fix typo (keywork->keyword)
+    
+    Upstream-ID: 8aacd0f4089c0a244cf43417f4f9045dfaeab534
+
+commit 9cc6842493fbf23025ccc1edab064869640d3bec
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu May 28 04:50:53 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    add error message on ftruncate failure; bz#2176
+    
+    Upstream-ID: cbcc606e0b748520c74a210d8f3cc9718d3148cf
+
+commit d1958793a0072c22be26d136dbda5ae263e717a0
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu May 28 04:40:13 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    make ssh-keygen default to ed25519 keys when compiled
+     without OpenSSL; bz#2388, ok dtucker@
+    
+    Upstream-ID: 85a471fa6d3fa57a7b8e882d22cfbfc1d84cdc71
+
+commit 3ecde664c9fc5fb3667aedf9e6671462600f6496
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed May 27 23:51:10 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Reorder client proposal to prefer
+     diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 over diffie-hellman-group14-sha1.  ok djm@
+    
+    Upstream-ID: 552c08d47347c3ee1a9a57d88441ab50abe17058
+
+commit 40f64292b907afd0a674fdbf3e4c2356d17a7d68
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed May 27 23:39:18 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Add a stronger (4k bit) fallback group that sshd can use
+     when the moduli file is missing or broken, sourced from RFC3526.  bz#2302, ok
+     markus@ (earlier version), djm@
+    
+    Upstream-ID: b635215746a25a829d117673d5e5a76d4baee7f4
+
+commit 5ab7d5fa03ad55bc438fab45dfb3aeb30a3c237a
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Thu May 28 10:03:40 2015 +1000
+
+    New moduli file from OpenBSD, removing 1k groups.
+    
+    Remove 1k bit groups.  ok deraadt@, markus@
+
+commit a71ba58adf34e599f30cdda6e9b93ae6e3937eea
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed May 27 05:15:02 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    support PKCS#11 devices with external PIN entry devices
+     bz#2240, based on patch from Dirk-Willem van Gulik; feedback and ok dtucker@
+    
+    Upstream-ID: 504568992b55a8fc984375242b1bd505ced61b0d
+
+commit b282fec1aa05246ed3482270eb70fc3ec5f39a00
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue May 26 23:23:40 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Cap DH-GEX group size at 4kbits for Cisco implementations.
+     Some of them will choke when asked for preferred sizes >4k instead of
+     returning the 4k group that they do have.  bz#2209, ok djm@
+    
+    Upstream-ID: 54b863a19713446b7431f9d06ad0532b4fcfef8d
+
+commit 3e91b4e8b0dc2b4b7e7d42cf6e8994a32e4cb55e
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun May 24 23:39:16 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    add missing 'c' option to getopt(), case statement was
+     already there; from Felix Bolte
+    
+    Upstream-ID: 9b19b4e2e0b54d6fefa0dfac707c51cf4bae3081
+
+commit 64a89ec07660abba4d0da7c0095b7371c98bab62
+Author: jsg@openbsd.org <jsg@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat May 23 14:28:37 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    fix a memory leak in an error path ok markus@ dtucker@
+    
+    Upstream-ID: bc1da0f205494944918533d8780fde65dff6c598
+
+commit f948737449257d2cb83ffcfe7275eb79b677fd4a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri May 22 05:28:45 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    mention ssh-keygen -E for comparing legacy MD5
+     fingerprints; bz#2332
+    
+    Upstream-ID: 079a3669549041dbf10dbc072d9563f0dc3b2859
+
+commit 0882332616e4f0272c31cc47bf2018f9cb258a4e
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri May 22 04:45:52 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Reorder EscapeChar option parsing to avoid a single-byte
+     out- of-bounds read. bz#2396 from Jaak Ristioja; ok dtucker@
+    
+    Upstream-ID: 1dc6b5b63d1c8d9a88619da0b27ade461d79b060
+
+commit d7c31da4d42c115843edee2074d7d501f8804420
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri May 22 03:50:02 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    add knob to relax GSSAPI host credential check for
+     multihomed hosts bz#928, patch by Simon Wilkinson; ok dtucker
+     (kerberos/GSSAPI is not compiled by default on OpenBSD)
+    
+    Upstream-ID: 15ddf1c6f7fd9d98eea9962f480079ae3637285d
+
+commit aa72196a00be6e0b666215edcffbc10af234cb0e
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Fri May 22 17:49:46 2015 +1000
+
+    Include signal.h for sig_atomic_t, used by kex.h.
+    
+    bz#2402, from tomas.kuthan at oracle com.
+
+commit 8b02481143d75e91c49d1bfae0876ac1fbf9511a
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Fri May 22 12:47:24 2015 +1000
+
+    Import updated moduli file from OpenBSD.
+
+commit 4739e8d5e1c0be49624082bd9f6b077e9e758db9
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu May 21 12:01:19 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Support "ssh-keygen -lF hostname" to find search known_hosts
+     and print key hashes. Already advertised by ssh-keygen(1), but not delivered
+     by code; ok dtucker@
+    
+    Upstream-ID: 459e0e2bf39825e41b0811c336db2d56a1c23387
+
+commit e97201feca10b5196da35819ae516d0b87cf3a50
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu May 21 17:55:15 2015 +1000
+
+    conditionalise util.h inclusion
+
+commit 13640798c7dd011ece0a7d02841fe48e94cfa0e0
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu May 21 06:44:25 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    regress test for AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
+    
+    Upstream-Regress-ID: c658fbf1ab6b6011dc83b73402322e396f1e1219
+
+commit 84452c5d03c21f9bfb28c234e0dc1dc67dd817b1
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu May 21 06:40:02 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    regress test for AuthorizedKeysCommand arguments
+    
+    Upstream-Regress-ID: bbd65c13c6b3be9a442ec115800bff9625898f12
+
+commit bcc50d816187fa9a03907ac1f3a52f04a52e10d1
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu May 21 06:43:30 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    add AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand that allows getting
+     authorized_principals from a subprocess rather than a file, which is quite
+     useful in deployments with large userbases
+    
+    feedback and ok markus@
+    
+    Upstream-ID: aa1bdac7b16fc6d2fa3524ef08f04c7258d247f6
+
+commit 24232a3e5ab467678a86aa67968bbb915caffed4
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu May 21 06:38:35 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    support arguments to AuthorizedKeysCommand
+    
+    bz#2081 loosely based on patch by Sami Hartikainen
+    feedback and ok markus@
+    
+    Upstream-ID: b080387a14aa67dddd8ece67c00f268d626541f7
+
+commit d80fbe41a57c72420c87a628444da16d09d66ca7
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu May 21 04:55:51 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    refactor: split base64 encoding of pubkey into its own
+     sshkey_to_base64() function and out of sshkey_write(); ok markus@
+    
+    Upstream-ID: 54fc38f5832e9b91028900819bda46c3959a0c1a
+
+commit 7cc44ef74133a473734bbcbd3484f24d6a7328c5
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon May 18 15:06:05 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    getentropy() and sendsyslog() have been around long
+     enough. openssh-portable may want the #ifdef's but not base. discussed with
+     djm few weeks back
+    
+    Upstream-ID: 0506a4334de108e3fb6c66f8d6e0f9c112866926
+
+commit 9173d0fbe44de7ebcad8a15618e13a8b8d78902e
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri May 15 05:44:21 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Use a salted hash of the lock passphrase instead of plain
+     text and do constant-time comparisons of it. Should prevent leaking any
+     information about it via timing, pointed out by Ryan Castellucci.  Add a 0.1s
+     incrementing delay for each failed unlock attempt up to 10s.  ok markus@
+     (earlier version), djm@
+    
+    Upstream-ID: c599fcc325aa1cc65496b25220b622d22208c85f
+
+commit d028d5d3a697c71b21e4066d8672cacab3caa0a8
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue May 5 19:10:58 2015 +1000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+       - tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2015/01/12 03:20:04
+         [bcrypt_pbkdf.c]
+         rename blocks to words. bcrypt "blocks" are unrelated to blowfish blocks,
+         nor are they the same size.
+
+commit f6391d4e59b058984163ab28f4e317e7a72478f1
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue May 5 19:10:23 2015 +1000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+       - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2015/01/08 00:30:07
+         [bcrypt_pbkdf.c]
+         declare a local version of MIN(), call it MINIMUM()
+
+commit 8ac6b13cc9113eb47cd9e86c97d7b26b4b71b77f
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue May 5 19:09:46 2015 +1000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/12/30 01:41:43
+         [bcrypt_pbkdf.c]
+         typo in comment: ouput => output
+
+commit 1f792489d5cf86a4f4e3003e6e9177654033f0f2
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon May 4 06:10:48 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Remove pattern length argument from match_pattern_list(), we
+     only ever use it for strlen(pattern).
+    
+    Prompted by hanno AT hboeck.de pointing an out-of-bound read
+    error caused by an incorrect pattern length found using AFL
+    and his own tools.
+    
+    ok markus@
+
+commit 639d6bc57b1942393ed12fb48f00bc05d4e093e4
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri May 1 07:10:01 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    refactor ssh_dispatch_run_fatal() to use sshpkt_fatal()
+     to better report error conditions. Teach sshpkt_fatal() about ECONNRESET.
+    
+    Improves error messages on TCP connection resets. bz#2257
+    
+    ok dtucker@
+
+commit 9559d7de34c572d4d3fd990ca211f8ec99f62c4d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri May 1 07:08:08 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    a couple of parse targets were missing activep checks,
+     causing them to be misapplied in match context; bz#2272 diagnosis and
+     original patch from Sami Hartikainen ok dtucker@
+
+commit 7e8528cad04b2775c3b7db08abf8fb42e47e6b2a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri May 1 04:17:51 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    make handling of AuthorizedPrincipalsFile=none more
+     consistent with other =none options; bz#2288 from Jakub Jelen; ok dtucker@
+
+commit ca430d4d9cc0f62eca3b1fb1e2928395b7ce80f7
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri May 1 04:03:20 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    remove failed remote forwards established by muliplexing
+     from the list of active forwards; bz#2363, patch mostly by Yoann Ricordel; ok
+     dtucker@
+
+commit 8312cfb8ad88657517b3e23ac8c56c8e38eb9792
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri May 1 04:01:58 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    reduce stderr spam when using ssh -S /path/mux -O forward
+     -R 0:... ok dtucker@
+
+commit 179be0f5e62f1f492462571944e45a3da660d82b
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri May 1 03:23:51 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    prevent authorized_keys options picked up on public key
+     tests without a corresponding private key authentication being applied to
+     other authentication methods. Reported by halex@, ok markus@
+
+commit a42d67be65b719a430b7fcaba2a4e4118382723a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri May 1 03:20:54 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Don't make parsing of authorized_keys' environment=
+     option conditional on PermitUserEnv - always parse it, but only use the
+     result if the option is enabled. This prevents the syntax of authorized_keys
+     changing depending on which sshd_config options were enabled.
+    
+    bz#2329; based on patch from coladict AT gmail.com, ok dtucker@
+
+commit e661a86353e11592c7ed6a847e19a83609f49e77
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon May 4 06:10:48 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Remove pattern length argument from match_pattern_list(), we
+     only ever use it for strlen(pattern).
+    
+    Prompted by hanno AT hboeck.de pointing an out-of-bound read
+    error caused by an incorrect pattern length found using AFL
+    and his own tools.
+    
+    ok markus@
+
+commit 0ef1de742be2ee4b10381193fe90730925b7f027
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Apr 23 05:01:19 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Add a simple regression test for sshd's configuration
+     parser.  Right now, all it does is run the output of sshd -T back through
+     itself and ensure the output is valid and invariant.
+
+commit 368f83c793275faa2c52f60eaa9bdac155c4254b
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Apr 22 01:38:36 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    use correct key for nested certificate test
+
+commit 8d4d1bfddbbd7d21f545dc6997081d1ea1fbc99a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri May 1 07:11:47 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    mention that the user's shell from /etc/passwd is used
+     for commands too; bz#1459 ok dtucker@
+
+commit 5ab283d0016bbc9d4d71e8e5284d011bc5a930cf
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri May 8 07:29:00 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    whitespace
+    
+    Upstream-Regress-ID: 6b708a3e709d5b7fd37890f874bafdff1f597519
+
+commit 8377d5008ad260048192e1e56ad7d15a56d103dd
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri May 8 07:26:13 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    whitespace at EOL
+    
+    Upstream-Regress-ID: 9c48911643d5b05173b36a012041bed4080b8554
+
+commit c28a3436fa8737709ea88e4437f8f23a6ab50359
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri May 8 06:45:13 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    moar whitespace at eol
+    
+    Upstream-ID: 64eaf872a3ba52ed41e494287e80d40aaba4b515
+
+commit 2b64c490468fd4ca35ac8d5cc31c0520dc1508bb
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri May 8 06:41:56 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    whitespace at EOL
+    
+    Upstream-ID: 57bcf67d666c6fc1ad798aee448fdc3f70f7ec2c
+
+commit 4e636cf201ce6e7e3b9088568218f9d4e2c51712
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri May 8 03:56:51 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    whitespace at EOL
+
+commit 38b8272f823dc1dd4e29dbcee83943ed48bb12fa
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon May 4 01:47:53 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Use diff w/out -u for better portability
+
+commit 297060f42d5189a4065ea1b6f0afdf6371fb0507
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri May 8 03:25:07 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Use xcalloc for permitted_adm_opens instead of xmalloc to
+     ensure it's zeroed. Fixes post-auth crash with permitopen=none.  bz#2355, ok
+     djm@
+
+commit 63ebf019be863b2d90492a85e248cf55a6e87403
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri May 8 03:17:49 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    don't choke on new-format private keys encrypted with an
+     AEAD cipher; bz#2366, patch from Ron Frederick; ok markus@
+
+commit f8484dac678ab3098ae522a5f03bb2530f822987
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed May 6 05:45:17 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Clarify pseudo-terminal request behaviour and use
+     "pseudo-terminal" consistently.  bz#1716, ok jmc@ "I like it" deraadt@.
+
+commit ea139507bef8bad26e86ed99a42c7233ad115c38
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed May 6 04:07:18 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Blacklist DH-GEX for specific PuTTY versions known to
+     send non-RFC4419 DH-GEX messages rather than all versions of PuTTY.
+     According to Simon Tatham, 0.65 and newer versions will send RFC4419 DH-GEX
+     messages.  ok djm@
+
+commit b58234f00ee3872eb84f6e9e572a9a34e902e36e
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue May 5 10:17:49 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    WinSCP doesn't implement RFC4419 DH-GEX so flag it so we
+     don't offer that KEX method.  ok markus@
+
+commit d5b1507a207253b39e810e91e68f9598691b7a29
+Author: jsg@openbsd.org <jsg@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue May 5 02:48:17 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    use the sizeof the struct not the sizeof a pointer to the
+     struct in ssh_digest_start()
+    
+    This file is only used if ssh is built with OPENSSL=no
+    
+    ok markus@
+
+commit a647b9b8e616c231594b2710c925d31b1b8afea3
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Fri May 8 11:07:27 2015 +1000
+
+    Put brackets around mblen() compat constant.
+    
+    This might help with the reported problem cross compiling for Android
+    ("error: expected identifier or '(' before numeric constant") but
+    shouldn't hurt in any case.
+
+commit d1680d36e17244d9af3843aeb5025cb8e40d6c07
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Thu Apr 30 09:18:11 2015 +1000
+
+    xrealloc -> xreallocarray in portable code too.
+
+commit 531a57a3893f9fcd4aaaba8c312b612bbbcc021e
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Apr 29 03:48:56 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Allow ListenAddress, Port and AddressFamily in any
+     order.  bz#68, ok djm@, jmc@ (for the man page bit).
+
+commit c1d5bcf1aaf1209af02f79e48ba1cbc76a87b56f
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Apr 28 13:47:38 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    enviroment -> environment: apologies to darren for not
+     spotting that first time round...
+
+commit 43beea053db191cac47c2cd8d3dc1930158aff1a
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Apr 28 10:25:15 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Fix typo in previous
+
+commit 85b96ef41374f3ddc9139581f87da09b2cd9199e
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Apr 28 10:17:58 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Document that the TERM environment variable is not
+     subject to SendEnv and AcceptEnv.  bz#2386, based loosely on a patch from
+     jjelen at redhat, help and ok jmc@
+
+commit 88a7c598a94ff53f76df228eeaae238d2d467565
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Apr 27 21:42:48 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Make sshd default to PermitRootLogin=no; ok deraadt@
+     rpe@
+
+commit 734226b4480a6c736096c729fcf6f391400599c7
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Apr 27 01:52:30 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    fix compilation with OPENSSL=no; ok dtucker@
+
+commit a4b9d2ce1eb7703eaf0809b0c8a82ded8aa4f1c6
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Apr 27 00:37:53 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Include stdio.h for FILE (used in sshkey.h) so it
+     compiles with OPENSSL=no.
+
+commit dbcc652f4ca11fe04e5930c7ef18a219318c6cda
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Apr 27 00:21:21 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    allow "sshd -f none" to skip reading the config file,
+     much like "ssh -F none" does. ok dtucker
+
+commit b7ca276fca316c952f0b90f5adb1448c8481eedc
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Apr 24 06:26:49 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    combine -Dd onto one line and update usage();
+
+commit 2ea974630d7017e4c7666d14d9dc939707613e96
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Apr 24 05:26:44 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    add ssh-agent -D to leave ssh-agent in foreground
+     without enabling debug mode; bz#2381 ok dtucker@
+
+commit 8ac2ffd7aa06042f6b924c87139f2fea5c5682f7
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Apr 24 01:36:24 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    2*len -> use xreallocarray() ok djm
+
+commit 657a5fbc0d0aff309079ff8fb386f17e964963c2
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Apr 24 01:36:00 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    rename xrealloc() to xreallocarray() since it follows
+     that form. ok djm
+
+commit 1108ae242fdd2c304307b68ddf46aebe43ebffaa
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Apr 23 04:59:10 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Two small fixes for sshd -T: ListenAddress'es are added
+     to a list head so reverse the order when printing them to ensure the
+     behaviour remains the same, and print StreamLocalBindMask as octal with
+     leading zero.  ok deraadt@
+
+commit bd902b8473e1168f19378d5d0ae68d0c203525df
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Apr 23 04:53:53 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Check for and reject missing arguments for
+     VersionAddendum and ForceCommand. bz#2281, patch from plautrba at redhat com,
+     ok djm@
+
+commit ca42c1758575e592239de1d5755140e054b91a0d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Apr 22 01:24:01 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    unknown certificate extensions are non-fatal, so don't
+     fatal when they are encountered; bz#2387 reported by Bob Van Zant; ok
+     dtucker@
+
+commit 39bfbf7caad231cc4bda6909fb1af0705bca04d8
+Author: jsg@openbsd.org <jsg@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Apr 21 07:01:00 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Add back a backslash removed in rev 1.42 so
+     KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT will include aes again.
+    
+    ok deraadt@
+
+commit 6b0d576bb87eca3efd2b309fcfe4edfefc289f9c
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Apr 17 13:32:09 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    s/recommended/required/ that private keys be og-r this
+     wording change was made a while ago but got accidentally reverted
+
+commit 44a8e7ce6f3ab4c2eb1ae49115c210b98e53c4df
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Apr 17 13:25:52 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    don't try to cleanup NULL KEX proposals in
+     kex_prop_free(); found by Jukka Taimisto and Markus Hietava
+
+commit 3038a191872d2882052306098c1810d14835e704
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Apr 17 13:19:22 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    use error/logit/fatal instead of fprintf(stderr, ...)
+     and exit(0), fix a few errors that were being printed to stdout instead of
+     stderr and a few non-errors that were going to stderr instead of stdout
+     bz#2325; ok dtucker
+
+commit a58be33cb6cd24441fa7e634db0e5babdd56f07f
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Apr 17 13:16:48 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    debug log missing DISPLAY environment when X11
+     forwarding requested; bz#1682 ok dtucker@
+
+commit 17d4d9d9fbc8fb80e322f94d95eecc604588a474
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Apr 17 04:32:31 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    don't call record_login() in monitor when UseLogin is
+     enabled; bz#278 reported by drk AT sgi.com; ok dtucker
+
+commit 40132ff87b6cbc3dc05fb5df2e9d8e3afa06aafd
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Apr 17 04:12:35 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Add some missing options to sshd -T and fix the output
+     of VersionAddendum HostCertificate.  bz#2346, patch from jjelen at redhat
+     com, ok djm.
+
+commit 6cc7cfa936afde2d829e56ee6528c7ea47a42441
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Apr 16 23:25:50 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Document "none" for PidFile XAuthLocation
+     TrustedUserCAKeys and RevokedKeys. bz#2382, feedback from jmc@, ok djm@
+
+commit 15fdfc9b1c6808b26bc54d4d61a38b54541763ed
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Apr 15 23:23:25 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Plug leak of address passed to logging.  bz#2373, patch
+     from jjelen at redhat, ok markus@
+
+commit bb2289e2a47d465eaaaeff3dee2a6b7777b4c291
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Apr 14 04:17:03 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Output remote username in debug output since with Host
+     and Match it's not always obvious what it will be.  bz#2368, ok djm@
+
+commit 70860b6d07461906730632f9758ff1b7c98c695a
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Fri Apr 17 10:56:13 2015 +1000
+
+    Format UsePAM setting when using sshd -T.
+    
+    Part of bz#2346, patch from jjelen at redhat com.
+
+commit ee15d9c9f0720f5a8b0b34e4b10ecf21f9824814
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Fri Apr 17 10:40:23 2015 +1000
+
+    Wrap endian.h include inside ifdef (bz#2370).
+
+commit 408f4c2ad4a4c41baa7b9b2b7423d875abbfa70b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Fri Apr 17 09:39:58 2015 +1000
+
+    Look for '${host}-ar' before 'ar'.
+    
+    This changes configure.ac to look for '${host}-ar' as set by
+    AC_CANONICAL_HOST before looking for the unprefixed 'ar'.
+    Useful when cross-compiling when all your binutils are prefixed.
+    
+    Patch from moben at exherbo org via astrand at lysator liu se and
+    bz#2352.
+
+commit 673a1c16ad078d41558247ce739fe812c960acc8
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@google.com>
+Date:   Thu Apr 16 11:40:20 2015 +1000
+
+    remove dependency on arpa/telnet.h
+
+commit 202d443eeda1829d336595a3cfc07827e49f45ed
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Wed Apr 15 15:59:49 2015 +1000
+
+    Remove duplicate include of pwd.h.  bz#2337, patch from Mordy Ovits.
+
+commit 597986493412c499f2bc2209420cb195f97b3668
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@google.com>
+Date:   Thu Apr 9 10:14:48 2015 +1000
+
+    platform's with openpty don't need pty_release
+
+commit 318be28cda1fd9108f2e6f2f86b0b7589ba2aed0
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Apr 13 02:04:08 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    deprecate ancient, pre-RFC4419 and undocumented
+     SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD message; ok markus@ deraadt@ "seems
+     reasonable" dtucker@
+
+commit d8f391caef62378463a0e6b36f940170dadfe605
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Apr 10 05:16:50 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Don't send hostkey advertisments
+     (hostkeys-00@openssh.com) to current versions of Tera Term as they can't
+     handle them.  Newer versions should be OK.  Patch from Bryan Drewery and
+     IWAMOTO Kouichi, ok djm@
+
+commit 2c2cfe1a1c97eb9a08cc9817fd0678209680c636
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Apr 10 00:08:55 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    include port number if a non-default one has been
+     specified; based on patch from Michael Handler
+
+commit 4492a4f222da4cf1e8eab12689196322e27b08c4
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Apr 7 23:00:42 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    treat Protocol=1,2|2,1 as Protocol=2 when compiled
+     without SSH1 support; ok dtucker@ millert@
+
+commit c265e2e6e932efc6d86f6cc885dea33637a67564
+Author: miod@openbsd.org <miod@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Apr 5 15:43:43 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Do not use int for sig_atomic_t; spotted by
+     christos@netbsd; ok markus@
+
+commit e7bf3a5eda6a1b02bef6096fed78527ee11e54cc
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Tue Apr 7 10:48:04 2015 +1000
+
+    Use do{}while(0) for no-op functions.
+    
+    From FreeBSD.
+
+commit bb99844abae2b6447272f79e7fa84134802eb4df
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Tue Apr 7 10:47:15 2015 +1000
+
+    Wrap blf.h include in ifdef.  From FreeBSD.
+
+commit d9b9b43656091cf0ad55c122f08fadb07dad0abd
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Tue Apr 7 09:10:00 2015 +1000
+
+    Fix misspellings of regress CONFOPTS env variables.
+    
+    Patch from Bryan Drewery.
+
+commit 3f4ea3c9ab1d32d43c9222c4351f58ca11144156
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Apr 3 22:17:27 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    correct return value in pubkey parsing, spotted by Ben Hawkes
+     ok markus@
+
+commit 7da2be0cb9601ed25460c83aa4d44052b967ba0f
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Mar 31 22:59:01 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    adapt to recent hostfile.c change: when parsing
+     known_hosts without fully parsing the keys therein, hostkeys_foreach() will
+     now correctly identify KEY_RSA1 keys; ok markus@ miod@
+
+commit 9e1777a0d1c706714b055811c12ab8cc21033e4a
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Mar 24 20:19:15 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    use ${SSH} for -Q instead of installed ssh
+
+commit ce1b358ea414a2cc88e4430cd5a2ea7fecd9de57
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Mar 16 22:46:14 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    make CLEANFILES clean up more of the tests' droppings
+
+commit 398f9ef192d820b67beba01ec234d66faca65775
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Mar 31 22:57:06 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    downgrade error() for known_hosts parse errors to debug()
+     to quiet warnings from ssh1 keys present when compiled !ssh1.
+    
+    also identify ssh1 keys when scanning, even when compiled !ssh1
+    
+    ok markus@ miod@
+
+commit 9a47ab80030a31f2d122b8fd95bd48c408b9fcd9
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Mar 31 22:55:50 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    fd leak for !ssh1 case; found by unittests; ok markus@
+
+commit c9a0805a6280681901c270755a7cd630d7c5280e
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Mar 31 22:55:24 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    don't fatal when a !ssh1 sshd is reexeced from a w/ssh1
+     listener; reported by miod@; ok miod@ markus@
+
+commit 704d8c88988cae38fb755a6243b119731d223222
+Author: tobias@openbsd.org <tobias@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Mar 31 11:06:49 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Comments are only supported for RSA1 keys. If a user
+     tried to add one and entered his passphrase, explicitly clear it before exit.
+     This is done in all other error paths, too.
+    
+    ok djm
+
+commit 78de1673c05ea2c33e0d4a4b64ecb5186b6ea2e9
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Mar 30 18:28:37 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    ssh-askpass(1) is the default, overridden by SSH_ASKPASS;
+     diff originally from jiri b;
+
+commit 26e0bcf766fadb4a44fb6199386fb1dcab65ad00
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Mar 30 00:00:29 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    fix uninitialised memory read when parsing a config file
+     consisting of a single nul byte. Found by hanno AT hboeck.de using AFL; ok
+     dtucker
+
+commit fecede00a76fbb33a349f5121c0b2f9fbc04a777
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Mar 26 19:32:19 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    sigp and lenp are not optional in ssh_agent_sign(); ok
+     djm@
+
+commit 1b0ef3813244c78669e6d4d54c624f600945327d
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Mar 26 12:32:38 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    don't try to load .ssh/identity by default if SSH1 is
+     disabled; ok markus@
+
+commit f9b78852379b74a2d14e6fc94fe52af30b7e9c31
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Mar 26 07:00:04 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    ban all-zero curve25519 keys as recommended by latest
+     CFRG curves draft; ok markus
+
+commit b8afbe2c1aaf573565e4da775261dfafc8b1ba9c
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Mar 26 06:59:28 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    relax bits needed check to allow
+     diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 key exchange to complete for chacha20-poly1305 was
+     selected as symmetric cipher; ok markus
+
+commit 47842f71e31da130555353c1d57a1e5a8937f1c0
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Mar 25 19:29:58 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    ignore v1 errors on ssh-add -D; only try v2 keys on
+     -l/-L (unless WITH_SSH1) ok djm@
+
+commit 5f57e77f91bf2230c09eca96eb5ecec39e5f2da6
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Mar 25 19:21:48 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    unbreak ssh_agent_sign (lenp vs *lenp)
+
+commit 4daeb67181054f2a377677fac919ee8f9ed3490e
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Mar 24 20:10:08 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    don't leak 'setp' on error; noted by Nicholas Lemonias;
+     ok djm@
+
+commit 7d4f96f9de2a18af0d9fa75ea89a4990de0344f5
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Mar 24 20:09:11 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    consistent check for NULL as noted by Nicholas
+     Lemonias; ok djm@
+
+commit df100be51354e447d9345cf1ec22e6013c0eed50
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Mar 24 20:03:44 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    correct fmt-string for size_t as noted by Nicholas
+     Lemonias; ok djm@
+
+commit a22b9ef21285e81775732436f7c84a27bd3f71e0
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Mar 24 09:17:21 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    promote chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com to be the default
+     cipher; ok markus
+
+commit 2aa9da1a3b360cf7b13e96fe1521534b91501fb5
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Mar 24 01:29:19 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Compile-time disable SSH protocol 1. You can turn it
+     back on using the Makefile.inc knob if you need it to talk to ancient
+     devices.
+
+commit 53097b2022154edf96b4e8526af5666f979503f7
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Mar 24 01:11:12 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    fix double-negative error message "ssh1 is not
+     unsupported"
+
+commit 5c27e3b6ec2db711dfcd40e6359c0bcdd0b62ea9
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Mar 23 06:06:38 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    for ssh-keygen -A, don't try (and fail) to generate ssh
+     v.1 keys when compiled without SSH1 support RSA/DSA/ECDSA keys when compiled
+     without OpenSSL based on patch by Mike Frysinger; bz#2369
+
+commit 725fd22a8c41db7de73a638539a5157b7e4424ae
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Mar 18 01:44:21 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    KRL support doesn't need OpenSSL anymore, remove #ifdefs
+     from around call
+
+commit b07011c18e0b2e172c5fd09d21fb159a0bf5fcc7
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Mar 16 11:09:52 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    #if 0 some more arrays used only for decrypting (we don't
+     use since we only need encrypt for AES-CTR)
+
+commit 1cb3016635898d287e9d58b50c430995652d5358
+Author: jsg@openbsd.org <jsg@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Mar 11 00:48:39 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    add back the changes from rev 1.206, djm reverted this by
+     mistake in rev 1.207
+
+commit 4d24b3b6a4a6383e05e7da26d183b79fa8663697
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Mar 20 09:11:59 2015 +1100
+
+    remove error() accidentally inserted for debugging
+    
+    pointed out by Christian Hesse
+
+commit 9f82e5a9042f2d872e98f48a876fcab3e25dd9bb
+Author: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
+Date:   Mon Mar 16 22:49:20 2015 -0700
+
+    portability fix: Solaris systems may not have a grep that understands -q
+
+commit 8ef691f7d9ef500257a549d0906d78187490668f
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@google.com>
+Date:   Wed Mar 11 10:35:26 2015 +1100
+
+    fix compile with clang
+
+commit 4df590cf8dc799e8986268d62019b487a8ed63ad
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@google.com>
+Date:   Wed Mar 11 10:02:39 2015 +1100
+
+    make unit tests work for !OPENSSH_HAS_ECC
+
+commit 307bb40277ca2c32e97e61d70d1ed74b571fd6ba
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Mar 7 04:41:48 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    unbreak for w/SSH1 (default) case; ok markus@ deraadt@
+
+commit b44ee0c998fb4c5f3c3281f2398af5ce42840b6f
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Mar 5 18:39:20 2015 -0800
+
+    unbreak hostkeys test for w/ SSH1 case
+
+commit 55e5bdeb519cb60cc18b7ba0545be581fb8598b4
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Mar 6 01:40:56 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    fix sshkey_certify() return value for unsupported key types;
+     ok markus@ deraadt@
+
+commit be8f658e550a434eac04256bfbc4289457a24e99
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Mar 4 15:38:03 2015 -0800
+
+    update version numbers to match version.h
+
+commit ac5e8acefa253eb5e5ba186e34236c0e8007afdc
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Mar 4 23:22:35 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    make these work with !SSH1; ok markus@ deraadt@
+
+commit 2f04af92f036b0c87a23efb259c37da98cd81fe6
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Mar 4 21:12:59 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    make ssh-add -D work with !SSH1 agent
+
+commit a05adf95d2af6abb2b7826ddaa7a0ec0cdc1726b
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Mar 4 00:55:48 2015 -0800
+
+    netcat needs poll.h portability goop
+
+commit dad2b1892b4c1b7e58df483a8c5b983c4454e099
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Mar 3 22:35:19 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    make it possible to run tests w/o ssh1 support; ok djm@
+
+commit d48a22601bdd3eec054794c535f4ae8d8ae4c6e2
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Mar 4 18:53:53 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    crank; ok markus, deraadt
+
+commit bbffb23daa0b002dd9f296e396a9ab8a5866b339
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Mar 3 13:50:27 2015 -0800
+
+    more --without-ssh1 fixes
+
+commit 6c2039286f503e2012a58a1d109e389016e7a99b
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Mar 3 13:48:48 2015 -0800
+
+    fix merge both that broke --without-ssh1 compile
+
+commit 111dfb225478a76f89ecbcd31e96eaf1311b59d3
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Mar 3 21:21:13 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    add SSH1 Makefile knob to make it easier to build without
+     SSH1 support; ok markus@
+
+commit 3f7f5e6c5d2aa3f6710289c1a30119e534e56c5c
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Mar 3 20:42:49 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    expand __unused to full __attribute__ for better portability
+
+commit 2fab9b0f8720baf990c931e3f68babb0bf9949c6
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Mar 4 07:41:27 2015 +1100
+
+    avoid warning
+
+commit d1bc844322461f882b4fd2277ba9a8d4966573d2
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Mar 4 06:31:45 2015 +1100
+
+    Revert "define __unused to nothing if not already defined"
+    
+    This reverts commit 1598419e38afbaa8aa5df8dd6b0af98301e2c908.
+    
+    Some system headers have objects named __unused
+
+commit 00797e86b2d98334d1bb808f65fa1fd47f328ff1
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Mar 4 05:02:45 2015 +1100
+
+    check for crypt and DES_crypt in openssl block
+    
+    fixes builds on systems that use DES_crypt; based on patch
+    from Roumen Petrov
+
+commit 1598419e38afbaa8aa5df8dd6b0af98301e2c908
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Mar 4 04:59:13 2015 +1100
+
+    define __unused to nothing if not already defined
+    
+    fixes builds on BSD/OS
+
+commit d608a51daad4f14ad6ab43d7cf74ef4801cc3fe9
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Mar 3 17:53:40 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    reorder logic for better portability; patch from Roumen
+     Petrov
+
+commit 68d2dfc464fbcdf8d6387884260f9801f4352393
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Mar 3 06:48:58 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Allow "ssh -Q protocol-version" to list supported SSH
+     protocol versions. Useful for detecting builds without SSH v.1 support; idea
+     and ok markus@
+
+commit 39e2f1229562e1195169905607bc12290d21f021
+Author: millert@openbsd.org <millert@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Mar 1 15:44:40 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Make sure we only call getnameinfo() for AF_INET or AF_INET6
+     sockets. getpeername() of a Unix domain socket may return without error on
+     some systems without actually setting ss_family so getnameinfo() was getting
+     called with ss_family set to AF_UNSPEC.  OK djm@
+
+commit e47536ba9692d271b8ad89078abdecf0a1c11707
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sat Feb 28 08:20:11 2015 -0800
+
+    portability fixes for regress/netcat.c
+    
+    Mostly avoiding "err(1, NULL)"
+
+commit 02973ad5f6f49d8420e50a392331432b0396c100
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sat Feb 28 08:05:27 2015 -0800
+
+    twiddle another test for portability
+    
+    from Tom G. Christensen
+
+commit f7f3116abf2a6e2f309ab096b08c58d19613e5d0
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Feb 27 15:52:49 2015 -0800
+
+    twiddle test for portability
+
+commit 1ad3a77cc9d5568f5437ff99d377aa7a41859b83
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Feb 26 20:33:22 2015 -0800
+
+    make regress/netcat.c fd passing (more) portable
+
+commit 9e1cfca7e1fe9cf8edb634fc894e43993e4da1ea
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Feb 26 20:32:58 2015 -0800
+
+    create OBJ/valgrind-out before running unittests
+
+commit bd58853102cee739f0e115e6d4b5334332ab1442
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Feb 25 16:58:22 2015 -0800
+
+    valgrind support
+
+commit f43d17269194761eded9e89f17456332f4c83824
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Feb 26 20:45:47 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    don't printf NULL key comments; reported by Tom Christensen
+
+commit 6e6458b476ec854db33e3e68ebf4f489d0ab3df8
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Feb 25 23:05:47 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    zero cmsgbuf before use; we initialise the bits we use
+     but valgrind still spams warning on it
+
+commit a63cfa26864b93ab6afefad0b630e5358ed8edfa
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Feb 25 19:54:02 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    fix small memory leak when UpdateHostkeys=no
+
+commit e6b950341dd75baa8526f1862bca39e52f5b879b
+Author: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
+Date:   Wed Feb 25 09:56:48 2015 -0800
+
+    Revert "Work around finicky USL linker so netcat will build."
+    
+    This reverts commit d1db656021d0cd8c001a6692f772f1de29b67c8b.
+    
+    No longer needed with commit 678e473e2af2e4802f24dd913985864d9ead7fb3
+
+commit 6f621603f9cff2a5d6016a404c96cb2f8ac2dec0
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Feb 25 17:29:38 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    don't leak validity of user in "too many authentication
+     failures" disconnect message; reported by Sebastian Reitenbach
+
+commit 6288e3a935494df12519164f52ca5c8c65fc3ca5
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Feb 24 15:24:05 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    add -v (show ASCII art) to -l's synopsis; ok djm@
+
+commit 678e473e2af2e4802f24dd913985864d9ead7fb3
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Thu Feb 26 04:12:58 2015 +1100
+
+    Remove dependency on xmalloc.
+    
+    Remove ssh_get_progname's dependency on xmalloc, which should reduce
+    link order problems.  ok djm@
+
+commit 5d5ec165c5b614b03678afdad881f10e25832e46
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Wed Feb 25 15:32:49 2015 +1100
+
+    Restrict ECDSA and ECDH tests.
+    
+    ifdef out some more ECDSA and ECDH tests when built against an OpenSSL
+    that does not have eliptic curve functionality.
+
+commit 1734e276d99b17e92d4233fac7aef3a3180aaca7
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Wed Feb 25 13:40:45 2015 +1100
+
+    Move definition of _NSIG.
+    
+    _NSIG is only unsed in one file, so move it there prevent redefinition
+    warnings reported by Kevin Brott.
+
+commit a47ead7c95cfbeb72721066c4da2312e5b1b9f3d
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Wed Feb 25 13:17:40 2015 +1100
+
+    Add includes.h for compatibility stuff.
+
+commit 38806bda6d2e48ad32812b461eebe17672ada771
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Feb 24 16:50:06 2015 -0800
+
+    include netdb.h to look for MAXHOSTNAMELEN; ok tim
+
+commit d1db656021d0cd8c001a6692f772f1de29b67c8b
+Author: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
+Date:   Tue Feb 24 10:42:08 2015 -0800
+
+    Work around finicky USL linker so netcat will build.
+
+commit cb030ce25f555737e8ba97bdd7883ac43f3ff2a3
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Feb 24 09:23:04 2015 -0800
+
+    include includes.h to avoid build failure on AIX
+
+commit 13af342458f5064144abbb07e5ac9bbd4eb42567
+Author: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
+Date:   Tue Feb 24 07:56:47 2015 -0800
+
+    Original portability patch from djm@ for platforms missing err.h.
+    Fix name space clash on Solaris 10. Still more to do for Solaris 10
+    to deal with msghdr structure differences. ok djm@
+
+commit 910209203d0cd60c5083901cbcc0b7b44d9f48d2
+Author: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
+Date:   Mon Feb 23 22:06:56 2015 -0800
+
+    cleaner way fix dispatch.h portion of commit
+    a88dd1da119052870bb2654c1a32c51971eade16
+    (some systems have sig_atomic_t in signal.h, some in sys/signal.h)
+    Sounds good to me djm@
+
+commit 676c38d7cbe65b76bbfff796861bb6615cc6a596
+Author: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
+Date:   Mon Feb 23 21:51:33 2015 -0800
+
+    portability fix: if we can't dind a better define for HOST_NAME_MAX, use 255
+
+commit 1221b22023dce38cbc90ba77eae4c5d78c77a5e6
+Author: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
+Date:   Mon Feb 23 21:50:34 2015 -0800
+
+    portablity fix: s/__inline__/inline/
+
+commit 4c356308a88d309c796325bb75dce90ca16591d5
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Tue Feb 24 13:49:31 2015 +1100
+
+    Wrap stdint.h includes in HAVE_STDINT_H.
+
+commit c9c88355c6a27a908e7d1e5003a2b35ea99c1614
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Tue Feb 24 13:43:57 2015 +1100
+
+    Add AI_NUMERICSERV to fake-rfc2553.
+    
+    Our getaddrinfo implementation always returns numeric values already.
+
+commit ef342ab1ce6fb9a4b30186c89c309d0ae9d0eeb4
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Tue Feb 24 13:39:57 2015 +1100
+
+    Include OpenSSL's objects.h before bn.h.
+    
+    Prevents compile errors on some platforms (at least old GCCs and AIX's
+    XLC compilers).
+
+commit dcc8997d116f615195aa7c9ec019fb36c28c6228
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Tue Feb 24 12:30:59 2015 +1100
+
+    Convert two macros into functions.
+    
+    Convert packet_send_debug and packet_disconnect from macros to
+    functions.  Some older GCCs (2.7.x, 2.95.x) see to have problems with
+    variadic macros with only one argument so we convert these two into
+    functions.  ok djm@
+
+commit 2285c30d51b7e2052c6526445abe7e7cc7e170a1
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Feb 23 22:21:21 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    further silence spurious error message even when -v is
+     specified (e.g. to get visual host keys); reported by naddy@
+
+commit 9af21979c00652029e160295e988dea40758ece2
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Feb 24 09:04:32 2015 +1100
+
+    don't include stdint.h unless HAVE_STDINT_H set
+
+commit 62f678dd51660d6f8aee1da33d3222c5de10a89e
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Feb 24 09:02:54 2015 +1100
+
+    nother sys/queue.h -> sys-queue.h fix
+    
+    spotted by Tom Christensen
+
+commit b3c19151cba2c0ed01b27f55de0d723ad07ca98f
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Feb 23 20:32:15 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    fix a race condition by using a mux socket rather than an
+     ineffectual wait statement
+
+commit a88dd1da119052870bb2654c1a32c51971eade16
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Feb 24 06:30:29 2015 +1100
+
+    various include fixes for portable
+
+commit 5248429b5ec524d0a65507cff0cdd6e0cb99effd
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Feb 23 16:55:51 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    add an XXX to remind me to improve sshkey_load_public
+
+commit e94e4b07ef2eaead38b085a60535df9981cdbcdb
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Feb 23 16:55:31 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    silence a spurious error message when listing
+     fingerprints for known_hosts; bz#2342
+
+commit f2293a65392b54ac721f66bc0b44462e8d1d81f8
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Feb 23 16:33:25 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    fix setting/clearing of TTY raw mode around
+     UpdateHostKeys=ask confirmation question; reported by Herb Goldman
+
+commit f2004cd1adf34492eae0a44b1ef84e0e31b06088
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Mon Feb 23 05:04:21 2015 +1100
+
+    Repair for non-ECC OpenSSL.
+    
+    Ifdef out the ECC parts when building with an OpenSSL that doesn't have
+    it.
+
+commit 37f9220db8d1a52c75894c3de1e5f2ae5bd71b6f
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Mon Feb 23 03:07:24 2015 +1100
+
+    Wrap stdint.h includes in ifdefs.
+
+commit f81f1bbc5b892c8614ea740b1f92735652eb43f0
+Author: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
+Date:   Sat Feb 21 18:12:10 2015 -0800
+
+    out of tree build fix
+
+commit 2e13a1e4d22f3b503c3bfc878562cc7386a1d1ae
+Author: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
+Date:   Sat Feb 21 18:08:51 2015 -0800
+
+    mkdir kex unit test directory so testing out of tree builds works
+
+commit 1797f49b1ba31e8700231cd6b1d512d80bb50d2c
+Author: halex@openbsd.org <halex@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Feb 21 21:46:57 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    make "ssh-add -d" properly remove a corresponding
+     certificate, and also not whine and fail if there is none
+    
+    ok djm@
+
+commit 7faaa32da83a609059d95dbfcb0649fdb04caaf6
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Feb 22 07:57:27 2015 +1100
+
+    mkdir hostkey and bitmap unit test directories
+
+commit bd49da2ef197efac5e38f5399263a8b47990c538
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Feb 20 23:46:01 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    sort options useable under Match case-insensitively; prodded
+     jmc@
+
+commit 1a779a0dd6cd8b4a1a40ea33b5415ab8408128ac
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Feb 21 20:51:02 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    correct paths to configuration files being written/updated;
+     they live in $OBJ not cwd; some by Roumen Petrov
+
+commit 28ba006c1acddff992ae946d0bc0b500b531ba6b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Sat Feb 21 15:41:07 2015 +1100
+
+    More correct checking of HAVE_DECL_AI_NUMERICSERV.
+
+commit e50e8c97a9cecae1f28febccaa6ca5ab3bc10f54
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Sat Feb 21 15:10:33 2015 +1100
+
+    Add null declaration of AI_NUMERICINFO.
+    
+    Some platforms (older FreeBSD and DragonFly versions) do have
+    getaddrinfo() but do not have AI_NUMERICINFO. so define it to zero
+    in those cases.
+
+commit 18a208d6a460d707a45916db63a571e805f5db46
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Feb 20 22:40:32 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    more options that are available under Match; bz#2353 reported
+     by calestyo AT scientia.net
+
+commit 44732de06884238049f285f1455b2181baa7dc82
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Feb 20 22:17:21 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    UpdateHostKeys fixes:
+    
+    I accidentally changed the format of the hostkeys@openssh.com messages
+    last week without changing the extension name, and this has been causing
+    connection failures for people who are running -current. First reported
+    by sthen@
+    
+    s/hostkeys@openssh.com/hostkeys-00@openssh.com/
+    Change the name of the proof message too, and reorder it a little.
+    
+    Also, UpdateHostKeys=ask is incompatible with ControlPersist (no TTY
+    available to read the response) so disable UpdateHostKeys if it is in
+    ask mode and ControlPersist is active (and document this)
+
+commit 13a39414d25646f93e6d355521d832a03aaaffe2
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Feb 17 00:14:05 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Regression: I broke logging of public key fingerprints in
+     1.46. Pointed out by Pontus Lundkvist
+
+commit 773dda25e828c4c9a52f7bdce6e1e5924157beab
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Jan 30 23:10:17 2015 +1100
+
+    repair --without-openssl; broken in refactor
+
+commit e89c780886b23600de1e1c8d74aabd1ff61f43f0
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@google.com>
+Date:   Tue Feb 17 10:04:55 2015 +1100
+
+    hook up hostkeys unittest to portable Makefiles
+
+commit 0abf41f99aa16ff09b263bead242d6cb2dbbcf99
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Feb 16 22:21:03 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    enable hostkeys unit tests
+
+commit 68a5d647ccf0fb6782b2f749433a1eee5bc9044b
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Feb 16 22:20:50 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    check string/memory compare arguments aren't NULL
+
+commit ef575ef20d09f20722e26b45dab80b3620469687
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Feb 16 22:18:34 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    unit tests for hostfile.c code, just hostkeys_foreach so
+     far
+
+commit 8ea3365e6aa2759ccf5c76eaea62cbc8a280b0e7
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Feb 14 12:43:16 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    test server rekey limit
+
+commit ce63c4b063c39b2b22d4ada449c9e3fbde788cb3
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Feb 16 22:30:03 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    partial backout of:
+    
+    revision 1.441
+    date: 2015/01/31 20:30:05;  author: djm;  state: Exp;  lines: +17 -10;  commitid
+    : x8klYPZMJSrVlt3O;
+    Let sshd load public host keys even when private keys are missing.
+    Allows sshd to advertise additional keys for future key rotation.
+    Also log fingerprint of hostkeys loaded; ok markus@
+    
+    hostkey updates now require access to the private key, so we can't
+    load public keys only. The improved log messages (fingerprints of keys
+    loaded) are kept.
+
+commit 523463a3a2a9bfc6cfc5afa01bae9147f76a37cc
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Feb 16 22:13:32 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Revise hostkeys@openssh.com hostkey learning extension.
+    
+    The client will not ask the server to prove ownership of the private
+    halves of any hitherto-unseen hostkeys it offers to the client.
+    
+    Allow UpdateHostKeys option to take an 'ask' argument to let the
+    user manually review keys offered.
+    
+    ok markus@
+
+commit 6c5c949782d86a6e7d58006599c7685bfcd01685
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Feb 16 22:08:57 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Refactor hostkeys_foreach() and dependent code Deal with
+     IP addresses (i.e. CheckHostIP) Don't clobber known_hosts when nothing
+     changed ok markus@ as part of larger commit
+
+commit 51b082ccbe633dc970df1d1f4c9c0497115fe721
+Author: miod@openbsd.org <miod@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Feb 16 18:26:26 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Declare ge25519_base as extern, to prevent it from
+     becoming a common. Gets us rid of ``lignment 4 of symbol
+     `crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_ge25519_base' in mod_ge25519.o is smaller than 16 in
+     mod_ed25519.o'' warnings at link time.
+
+commit 02db468bf7e3281a8e3c058ced571b38b6407c34
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Feb 13 18:57:00 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    make rekey_limit for sshd w/privsep work; ok djm@
+     dtucker@
+
+commit 8ec67d505bd23c8bf9e17b7a364b563a07a58ec8
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Feb 12 20:34:19 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Prevent sshd spamming syslog with
+     "ssh_dispatch_run_fatal: disconnected". ok markus@
+
+commit d4c0295d1afc342057ba358237acad6be8af480b
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Feb 11 01:20:38 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Some packet error messages show the address of the peer,
+     but might be generated after the socket to the peer has suffered a TCP reset.
+     In these cases, getpeername() won't work so cache the address earlier.
+    
+    spotted in the wild via deraadt@ and tedu@
+
+commit 4af1709cf774475ce5d1bc3ddcc165f6c222897d
+Author: jsg@openbsd.org <jsg@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Feb 9 23:22:37 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    fix some leaks in error paths ok markus@
+
+commit fd36834871d06a03e1ff8d69e41992efa1bbf85f
+Author: millert@openbsd.org <millert@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Feb 6 23:21:59 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    SIZE_MAX is standard, we should be using it in preference to
+     the obsolete SIZE_T_MAX.  OK miod@ beck@
+
+commit 1910a286d7771eab84c0b047f31c0a17505236fa
+Author: millert@openbsd.org <millert@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Feb 5 12:59:57 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Include stdint.h, not limits.h to get SIZE_MAX.  OK guenther@
+
+commit ce4f59b2405845584f45e0b3214760eb0008c06c
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Feb 3 08:07:20 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    missing ; djm and mlarkin really having great
+     interactions recently
+
+commit 5d34aa94938abb12b877a25be51862757f25d54b
+Author: halex@openbsd.org <halex@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Feb 3 00:34:14 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    slightly extend the passphrase prompt if running with -c
+     in order to give the user a chance to notice if unintentionally running
+     without it
+    
+    wording tweak and ok djm@
+
+commit cb3bde373e80902c7d5d0db429f85068d19b2918
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Feb 2 22:48:53 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    handle PKCS#11 C_Login returning
+     CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN; based on patch from Yuri Samoilenko; ok markus@
+
+commit 15ad750e5ec3cc69765b7eba1ce90060e7083399
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Feb 2 07:41:40 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    turn UpdateHostkeys off by default until I figure out
+     mlarkin@'s warning message; requested by deraadt@
+
+commit 3cd5103c1e1aaa59bd66f7f52f6ebbcd5deb12f9
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Feb 2 01:57:44 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    increasing encounters with difficult DNS setups in
+     darknets has convinced me UseDNS off by default is better ok djm
+
+commit 6049a548a8a68ff0bbe581ab1748ea6a59ecdc38
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Jan 31 20:30:05 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Let sshd load public host keys even when private keys are
+     missing. Allows sshd to advertise additional keys for future key rotation.
+     Also log fingerprint of hostkeys loaded; ok markus@
+
+commit 46347ed5968f582661e8a70a45f448e0179ca0ab
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jan 30 11:43:14 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Add a ssh_config HostbasedKeyType option to control which
+     host public key types are tried during hostbased authentication.
+    
+    This may be used to prevent too many keys being sent to the server,
+    and blowing past its MaxAuthTries limit.
+    
+    bz#2211 based on patch by Iain Morgan; ok markus@
+
+commit 802660cb70453fa4d230cb0233bc1bbdf8328de1
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jan 30 10:44:49 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    set a timeout to prevent hangs when talking to busted
+     servers; ok markus@
+
+commit 86936ec245a15c7abe71a0722610998b0a28b194
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jan 30 01:11:39 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    regression test for 'wildcard CA' serial/key ID revocations
+
+commit 4509b5d4a4fa645a022635bfa7e86d09b285001f
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jan 30 01:13:33 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    avoid more fatal/exit in the packet.c paths that
+     ssh-keyscan uses; feedback and "looks good" markus@
+
+commit 669aee994348468af8b4b2ebd29b602cf2860b22
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jan 30 01:10:33 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    permit KRLs that revoke certificates by serial number or
+     key ID without scoping to a particular CA; ok markus@
+
+commit 7a2c368477e26575d0866247d3313da4256cb2b5
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jan 30 00:59:19 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    missing parentheses after if in do_convert_from() broke
+     private key conversion from other formats some time in 2010; bz#2345 reported
+     by jjelen AT redhat.com
+
+commit 25f5f78d8bf5c22d9cea8b49de24ebeee648a355
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jan 30 00:22:25 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    fix ssh protocol 1, spotted by miod@
+
+commit 9ce86c926dfa6e0635161b035e3944e611cbccf0
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jan 28 22:36:00 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    update to new API (key_fingerprint => sshkey_fingerprint)
+     check sshkey_fingerprint return values; ok markus
+
+commit 9125525c37bf73ad3ee4025520889d2ce9d10f29
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jan 28 22:05:31 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    avoid fatal() calls in packet code makes ssh-keyscan more
+     reliable against server failures ok dtucker@ markus@
+
+commit fae7bbe544cba7a9e5e4ab47ff6faa3d978646eb
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jan 28 21:15:47 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    avoid fatal() calls in packet code makes ssh-keyscan more
+     reliable against server failures ok dtucker@ markus@
+
+commit 1a3d14f6b44a494037c7deab485abe6496bf2c60
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jan 28 11:07:25 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    remove obsolete comment
+
+commit 80c25b7bc0a71d75c43a4575d9a1336f589eb639
+Author: okan@openbsd.org <okan@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Jan 27 12:54:06 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Since r1.2 removed the use of PRI* macros, inttypes.h is
+     no longer required.
+    
+    ok djm@
+
+commit 69ff64f69615c2a21c97cb5878a0996c21423257
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Jan 27 23:07:43 2015 +1100
+
+    compile on systems without TCP_MD5SIG (e.g. OSX)
+
+commit 358964f3082fb90b2ae15bcab07b6105cfad5a43
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Jan 27 23:07:25 2015 +1100
+
+    use ssh-keygen under test rather than system's
+
+commit a2c95c1bf33ea53038324d1fdd774bc953f98236
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Jan 27 23:06:59 2015 +1100
+
+    OSX lacks HOST_NAME_MAX, has _POSIX_HOST_NAME_MAX
+
+commit ade31d7b6f608a19b85bee29a7a00b1e636a2919
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Jan 27 23:06:23 2015 +1100
+
+    these need active_state defined to link on OSX
+    
+    temporary measure until active_state goes away entirely
+
+commit e56aa87502f22c5844918c10190e8b4f785f067b
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Jan 27 12:01:36 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    use printf instead of echo -n to reduce diff against
+     -portable
+
+commit 9f7637f56eddfaf62ce3c0af89c25480f2cf1068
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jan 26 13:55:29 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    sort previous;
+
+commit 3076ee7d530d5b16842fac7a6229706c7e5acd26
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jan 26 13:36:53 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    properly restore umask
+
+commit d411d395556b73ba1b9e451516a0bd6697c4b03d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jan 26 06:12:18 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    regression test for host key rotation
+
+commit fe8a3a51699afbc6407a8fae59b73349d01e49f8
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jan 26 06:11:28 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    adapt to sshkey API tweaks
+
+commit 7dd355fb1f0038a3d5cdca57ebab4356c7a5b434
+Author: miod@openbsd.org <miod@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Jan 24 10:39:21 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Move -lz late in the linker commandline for things to
+     build on static arches.
+
+commit 0dad3b806fddb93c475b30853b9be1a25d673a33
+Author: miod@openbsd.org <miod@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jan 23 21:21:23 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    -Wpointer-sign is supported by gcc 4 only.
+
+commit 2b3b1c1e4bd9577b6e780c255c278542ea66c098
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Jan 20 22:58:57 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    use SUBDIR to recuse into unit tests; makes "make obj"
+     actually work
+
+commit 1d1092bff8db27080155541212b420703f8b9c92
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jan 26 12:16:36 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    correct description of UpdateHostKeys in ssh_config.5 and
+     add it to -o lists for ssh, scp and sftp; pointed out by jmc@
+
+commit 5104db7cbd6cdd9c5971f4358e74414862fc1022
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jan 26 06:10:03 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    correctly match ECDSA subtype (== curve) for
+     offered/recevied host keys. Fixes connection-killing host key mismatches when
+     a server offers multiple ECDSA keys with different curve type (an extremely
+     unlikely configuration).
+    
+    ok markus, "looks mechanical" deraadt@
+
+commit 8d4f87258f31cb6def9b3b55b6a7321d84728ff2
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jan 26 03:04:45 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Host key rotation support.
+    
+    Add a hostkeys@openssh.com protocol extension (global request) for
+    a server to inform a client of all its available host key after
+    authentication has completed. The client may record the keys in
+    known_hosts, allowing it to upgrade to better host key algorithms
+    and a server to gracefully rotate its keys.
+    
+    The client side of this is controlled by a UpdateHostkeys config
+    option (default on).
+    
+    ok markus@
+
+commit 60b1825262b1f1e24fc72050b907189c92daf18e
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jan 26 02:59:11 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    small refactor and add some convenience functions; ok
+     markus
+
+commit a5a3e3328ddce91e76f71ff479022d53e35c60c9
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Jan 22 21:00:42 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    heirarchy -> hierarchy;
+
+commit dcff5810a11195c57e1b3343c0d6b6f2b9974c11
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Jan 22 20:24:41 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Provide a warning about chroot misuses (which sadly, seem
+     to have become quite popular because shiny).  sshd cannot detect/manage/do
+     anything about these cases, best we can do is warn in the right spot in the
+     man page. ok markus
+
+commit 087266ec33c76fc8d54ac5a19efacf2f4a4ca076
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Jan 20 23:14:00 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Reduce use of <sys/param.h> and transition to <limits.h>
+     throughout. ok djm markus
+
+commit 57e783c8ba2c0797f93977e83b2a8644a03065d8
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Jan 20 20:16:21 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    kex_setup errors are fatal()
+
+commit 1d6424a6ff94633c221297ae8f42d54e12a20912
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Jan 20 08:02:33 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    this test would accidentally delete agent.sh if run without
+     obj/
+
+commit 12b5f50777203e12575f1b08568281e447249ed3
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Jan 20 07:56:44 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    make this compile with KERBEROS5 enabled
+
+commit e2cc6bef08941256817d44d146115b3478586ad4
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Jan 20 07:55:33 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    fix hostkeys in agent; ok markus@
+
+commit 1ca3e2155aa5d3801a7ae050f85c71f41fcb95b1
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Jan 20 10:11:31 2015 +1100
+
+    fix kex test
+
+commit c78a578107c7e6dcf5d30a2f34cb6581bef14029
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jan 19 20:45:25 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    finally enable the KEX tests I wrote some years ago...
+
+commit 31821d7217e686667d04935aeec99e1fc4a46e7e
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jan 19 20:42:31 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    adapt to new error message (SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID)
+
+commit d3716ca19e510e95d956ae14d5b367e364bff7f1
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jan 19 17:31:13 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    this test was broken in at least two ways, such that it
+     wasn't checking that a KRL was not excluding valid keys
+
+commit 3f797653748e7c2b037dacb57574c01d9ef3b4d3
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jan 19 20:32:39 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    switch ssh-keyscan from setjmp to multiple ssh transport
+     layer instances ok djm@
+
+commit f582f0e917bb0017b00944783cd5f408bf4b0b5e
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jan 19 20:30:23 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    add experimental api for packet layer; ok djm@
+
+commit 48b3b2ba75181f11fca7f327058a591f4426cade
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jan 19 20:20:20 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    store compat flags in struct ssh; ok djm@
+
+commit 57d10cbe861a235dd269c74fb2fe248469ecee9d
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jan 19 20:16:15 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    adapt kex to sshbuf and struct ssh; ok djm@
+
+commit 3fdc88a0def4f86aa88a5846ac079dc964c0546a
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jan 19 20:07:45 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    move dispatch to struct ssh; ok djm@
+
+commit 091c302829210c41e7f57c3f094c7b9c054306f0
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jan 19 19:52:16 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    update packet.c & isolate, introduce struct ssh a) switch
+     packet.c to buffer api and isolate per-connection info into struct ssh b)
+     (de)serialization of the state is moved from monitor to packet.c c) the old
+     packet.c API is implemented in opacket.[ch] d) compress.c/h is removed and
+     integrated into packet.c with and ok djm@
+
+commit 4e62cc68ce4ba20245d208b252e74e91d3785b74
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jan 19 17:35:48 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    fix format strings in (disabled) debugging
+
+commit d85e06245907d49a2cd0cfa0abf59150ad616f42
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jan 19 06:01:32 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    be a bit more careful in these tests to ensure that
+     known_hosts is clean
+
+commit 7947810eab5fe0ad311f32a48f4d4eb1f71be6cf
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Jan 18 22:00:18 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    regression test for known_host file editing using
+     ssh-keygen (-H / -R / -F) after hostkeys_foreach() change; feedback and ok
+     markus@
+
+commit 3a2b09d147a565d8a47edf37491e149a02c0d3a3
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Jan 18 19:54:46 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    more and better key tests
+    
+    test signatures and verification
+    test certificate generation
+    flesh out nested cert test
+    
+    removes most of the XXX todo markers
+
+commit 589e69fd82724cfc9738f128e4771da2e6405d0d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Jan 18 19:53:58 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    make the signature fuzzing test much more rigorous:
+     ensure that the fuzzed input cases do not match the original (using new
+     fuzz_matches_original() function) and check that the verification fails in
+     each case
+
+commit 80603c0daa2538c349c1c152405580b164d5475f
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Jan 18 19:52:44 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    add a fuzz_matches_original() function to the fuzzer to
+     detect fuzz cases that are identical to the original data. Hacky
+     implementation, but very useful when you need the fuzz to be different, e.g.
+     when verifying signature
+
+commit 87d5495bd337e358ad69c524fcb9495208c0750b
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Jan 18 19:50:55 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    better dumps from the fuzzer (shown on errors) -
+     include the original data as well as the fuzzed copy.
+
+commit d59ec478c453a3fff05badbbfd96aa856364f2c2
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Jan 18 19:47:55 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    enable hostkey-agent.sh test
+
+commit 26b3425170bf840e4b095e1c10bf25a0a3e3a105
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Jan 17 18:54:30 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    unit test for hostkeys in ssh-agent
+
+commit 9e06a0fb23ec55d9223b26a45bb63c7649e2f2f2
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Jan 15 23:41:29 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    add kex unit tests
+
+commit d2099dec6da21ae627f6289aedae6bc1d41a22ce
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jan 19 00:32:54 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    djm, your /usr/include tree is old
+
+commit 2b3c3c76c30dc5076fe09d590f5b26880f148a54
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Jan 18 21:51:19 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    some feedback from markus@: comment hostkeys_foreach()
+     context and avoid a member in it.
+
+commit cecb30bc2ba6d594366e657d664d5c494b6c8a7f
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Jan 18 21:49:42 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    make ssh-keygen use hostkeys_foreach(). Removes some
+     horrendous code; ok markus@
+
+commit ec3d065df3a9557ea96b02d061fd821a18c1a0b9
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Jan 18 21:48:09 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    convert load_hostkeys() (hostkey ordering and
+     known_host matching) to use the new hostkey_foreach() iterator; ok markus
+
+commit c29811cc480a260e42fd88849fc86a80c1e91038
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Jan 18 21:40:23 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    introduce hostkeys_foreach() to allow iteration over a
+     known_hosts file or controlled subset thereof. This will allow us to pull out
+     some ugly and duplicated code, and will be used to implement hostkey rotation
+     later.
+    
+    feedback and ok markus
+
+commit f101d8291da01bbbfd6fb8c569cfd0cc61c0d346
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Jan 18 14:01:00 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    string truncation due to sizeof(size) ok djm markus
+
+commit 35d6022b55b7969fc10c261cb6aa78cc4a5fcc41
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Jan 18 13:33:34 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    avoid trailing ',' in host key algorithms
+
+commit 7efb455789a0cb76bdcdee91c6060a3dc8f5c007
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Jan 18 13:22:28 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    infer key length correctly when user specified a fully-
+     qualified key name instead of using the -b bits option; ok markus@
+
+commit 83f8ffa6a55ccd0ce9d8a205e3e7439ec18fedf5
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Jan 17 18:53:34 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    fix hostkeys on ssh agent; found by unit test I'm about
+     to commit
+
+commit 369d61f17657b814124268f99c033e4dc6e436c1
+Author: schwarze@openbsd.org <schwarze@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jan 16 16:20:23 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    garbage collect empty .No macros mandoc warns about
+
+commit bb8b442d32dbdb8521d610e10d8b248d938bd747
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jan 16 15:55:07 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    regression: incorrect error message on
+     otherwise-successful ssh-keygen -A. Reported by Dmitry Orlov, via deraadt@
+
+commit 9010902954a40b59d0bf3df3ccbc3140a653e2bc
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jan 16 07:19:48 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    when hostname canonicalisation is enabled, try to parse
+     hostnames as addresses before looking them up for canonicalisation. fixes
+     bz#2074 and avoids needless DNS lookups in some cases; ok markus
+
+commit 2ae4f337b2a5fb2841b6b0053b49496fef844d1c
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jan 16 06:40:12 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Replace <sys/param.h> with <limits.h> and other less
+     dirty headers where possible.  Annotate <sys/param.h> lines with their
+     current reasons.  Switch to PATH_MAX, NGROUPS_MAX, HOST_NAME_MAX+1,
+     LOGIN_NAME_MAX, etc.  Change MIN() and MAX() to local definitions of
+     MINIMUM() and MAXIMUM() where sensible to avoid pulling in the pollution.
+     These are the files confirmed through binary verification. ok guenther,
+     millert, doug (helped with the verification protocol)
+
+commit 3c4726f4c24118e8f1bb80bf75f1456c76df072c
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Jan 15 21:38:50 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    remove xmalloc, switch to sshbuf
+
+commit e17ac01f8b763e4b83976b9e521e90a280acc097
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Jan 15 21:37:14 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    switch to sshbuf
+
+commit ddef9995a1fa6c7a8ff3b38bfe6cf724bebf13d0
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Jan 15 18:32:54 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    handle UMAC128 initialization like UMAC; ok djm@ markus@
+
+commit f14564c1f7792446bca143580aef0e7ac25dcdae
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Jan 15 11:04:36 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    fix regression reported by brad@ for passworded keys without
+     agent present
+
+commit 45c0fd70bb2a88061319dfff20cb12ef7b1bc47e
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Jan 15 22:08:23 2015 +1100
+
+    make bitmap test compile
+
+commit d333f89abf7179021e5c3f28673f469abe032062
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Jan 15 07:36:28 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    unit tests for KRL bitmap
+
+commit 7613f828f49c55ff356007ae9645038ab6682556
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jan 14 09:58:21 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    re-add comment about full path
+
+commit 6c43b48b307c41cd656b415621a644074579a578
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jan 14 09:54:38 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    don't reset  to the installed sshd; connect before
+     reconfigure, too
+
+commit 771bb47a1df8b69061f09462e78aa0b66cd594bf
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Jan 13 14:51:51 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    implement a SIGINFO handler so we can discern a stuck
+     fuzz test from a merely glacial one; prompted by and ok markus
+
+commit cfaa57962f8536f3cf0fd7daf4d6a55d6f6de45f
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Jan 13 08:23:26 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    use $SSH instead of installed ssh to allow override;
+     spotted by markus@
+
+commit 0920553d0aee117a596b03ed5b49b280d34a32c5
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Jan 13 07:49:49 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    regress test for PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes; ok markus@
+
+commit 27ca1a5c0095eda151934bca39a77e391f875d17
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jan 12 20:13:27 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    unbreak parsing of pubkey comments; with gerhard; ok
+     djm/deraadt
+
+commit 55358f0b4e0b83bc0df81c5f854c91b11e0bb4dc
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jan 12 11:46:32 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    fatal if soft-PKCS11 library is missing rather (rather
+     than continue and fail with a more cryptic error)
+
+commit c3554cdd2a1a62434b8161017aa76fa09718a003
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jan 12 11:12:38 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    let this test all supporte key types; pointed out/ok
+     markus@
+
+commit 1129dcfc5a3e508635004bcc05a3574cb7687167
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Jan 15 09:40:00 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    sync ssh-keysign, ssh-keygen and some dependencies to the
+     new buffer/key API; mostly mechanical, ok markus@
+
+commit e4ebf5586452bf512da662ac277aaf6ecf0efe7c
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Jan 15 07:57:08 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    remove commented-out test code now that it has moved to a
+     proper unit test
+
+commit e81cba066c1e9eb70aba0f6e7c0ff220611b370f
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jan 14 20:54:29 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    whitespace
+
+commit 141efe49542f7156cdbc2e4cd0a041d8b1aab622
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jan 14 20:05:27 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    move authfd.c and its tentacles to the new buffer/key
+     API; ok markus@
+
+commit 0088c57af302cda278bd26d8c3ae81d5b6f7c289
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jan 14 19:33:41 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    fix small regression: ssh-agent would return a success
+     message but an empty signature if asked to sign using an unknown key; ok
+     markus@
+
+commit b03ebe2c22b8166e4f64c37737f4278676e3488d
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Jan 15 03:08:58 2015 +1100
+
+    more --without-openssl
+    
+    fix some regressions caused by upstream merges
+    
+    enable KRLs now that they no longer require BIGNUMs
+
+commit bc42cc6fe784f36df225c44c93b74830027cb5a2
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Jan 15 03:08:29 2015 +1100
+
+    kludge around tun API mismatch betterer
+
+commit c332110291089b624fa0951fbf2d1ee6de525b9f
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Jan 15 02:59:51 2015 +1100
+
+    some systems lack SO_REUSEPORT
+
+commit 83b9678a62cbdc74eb2031cf1e1e4ffd58e233ae
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Jan 15 02:35:50 2015 +1100
+
+    fix merge botch
+
+commit 0cdc5a3eb6fb383569a4da2a30705d9b90428d6b
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Jan 15 02:35:33 2015 +1100
+
+    unbreak across API change
+
+commit 6e2549ac2b5e7f96cbc2d83a6e0784b120444b47
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Jan 15 02:30:18 2015 +1100
+
+    need includes.h for portable OpenSSH
+
+commit 72ef7c148c42db7d5632a29f137f8b87b579f2d9
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Jan 15 02:21:31 2015 +1100
+
+    support --without-openssl at configure time
+    
+    Disables and removes dependency on OpenSSL. Many features don't
+    work and the set of crypto options is greatly restricted. This
+    will only work on system with native arc4random or /dev/urandom.
+    
+    Considered highly experimental for now.
+
+commit 4f38c61c68ae7e3f9ee4b3c38bc86cd39f65ece9
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Jan 15 02:28:00 2015 +1100
+
+    add files missed in last commit
+
+commit a165bab605f7be55940bb8fae977398e8c96a46d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jan 14 15:02:39 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    avoid BIGNUM in KRL code by using a simple bitmap;
+     feedback and ok markus
+
+commit 7d845f4a0b7ec97887be204c3760e44de8bf1f32
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jan 14 13:54:13 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    update sftp client and server to new buffer API. pretty
+     much just mechanical changes; with & ok markus
+
+commit 139ca81866ec1b219c717d17061e5e7ad1059e2a
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jan 14 13:09:09 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    switch to sshbuf/sshkey; with & ok djm@
+
+commit 81bfbd0bd35683de5d7f2238b985e5f8150a9180
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Jan 14 21:48:18 2015 +1100
+
+    support --without-openssl at configure time
+    
+    Disables and removes dependency on OpenSSL. Many features don't
+    work and the set of crypto options is greatly restricted. This
+    will only work on system with native arc4random or /dev/urandom.
+    
+    Considered highly experimental for now.
+
+commit 54924b53af15ccdcbb9f89984512b5efef641a31
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jan 14 10:46:28 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    avoid an warning for the !OPENSSL case
+
+commit ae8b463217f7c9b66655bfc3945c050ffdaeb861
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jan 14 10:30:34 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    swith auth-options to new sshbuf/sshkey; ok djm@
+
+commit 540e891191b98b89ee90aacf5b14a4a68635e763
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jan 14 10:29:45 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    make non-OpenSSL aes-ctr work on sshd w/ privsep; ok
+     markus@
+
+commit 60c2c4ea5e1ad0ddfe8b2877b78ed5143be79c53
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jan 14 10:24:42 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    remove unneeded includes, sync my copyright across files
+     & whitespace; ok djm@
+
+commit 128343bcdb0b60fc826f2733df8cf979ec1627b4
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Jan 13 19:31:40 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    adapt mac.c to ssherr.h return codes (de-fatal) and
+     simplify dependencies ok djm@
+
+commit e7fd952f4ea01f09ceb068721a5431ac2fd416ed
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Jan 13 19:04:35 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    sync changes from libopenssh; prepared by markus@ mostly
+     debug output tweaks, a couple of error return value changes and some other
+     minor stuff
+
+commit 76c0480a85675f03a1376167cb686abed01a3583
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Jan 13 19:38:18 2015 +1100
+
+    add --without-ssh1 option to configure
+    
+    Allows disabling support for SSH protocol 1.
+
+commit 1f729f0614d1376c3332fa1edb6a5e5cec7e9e03
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Jan 13 07:39:19 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    add sshd_config HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes and
+     PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes options to allow sshd to control what public key types
+     will be accepted. Currently defaults to all. Feedback & ok markus@
+
+commit 816d1538c24209a93ba0560b27c4fda57c3fff65
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jan 12 20:13:27 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    unbreak parsing of pubkey comments; with gerhard; ok
+     djm/deraadt
+
+commit 0097565f849851812df610b7b6b3c4bd414f6c62
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jan 12 19:22:46 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    missing error assigment on sshbuf_put_string()
+
+commit a7f49dcb527dd17877fcb8d5c3a9a6f550e0bba5
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jan 12 15:18:07 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    apparently memcpy(x, NULL, 0) is undefined behaviour
+     according to C99 (cf. sections 7.21.1 and 7.1.4), so check skip memcpy calls
+     when length==0; ok markus@
+
+commit 905fe30fca82f38213763616d0d26eb6790bde33
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jan 12 14:05:19 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    free->sshkey_free; ok djm@
+
+commit f067cca2bc20c86b110174c3fef04086a7f57b13
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jan 12 13:29:27 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    allow WITH_OPENSSL w/o WITH_SSH1; ok djm@
+
+commit c4bfafcc2a9300d9cfb3c15e75572d3a7d74670d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Jan 8 13:10:58 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    adjust for sshkey_load_file() API change
+
+commit e752c6d547036c602b89e9e704851463bd160e32
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Jan 8 13:44:36 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    fix ssh_config FingerprintHash evaluation order; from Petr
+     Lautrbach
+
+commit ab24ab847b0fc94c8d5e419feecff0bcb6d6d1bf
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Jan 8 10:15:45 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    reorder hostbased key attempts to better match the
+     default hostkey algorithms order in myproposal.h; ok markus@
+
+commit 1195f4cb07ef4b0405c839293c38600b3e9bdb46
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Jan 8 10:14:08 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    deprecate key_load_private_pem() and
+     sshkey_load_private_pem() interfaces. Refactor the generic key loading API to
+     not require pathnames to be specified (they weren't really used).
+    
+    Fixes a few other things en passant:
+    
+    Makes ed25519 keys work for hostbased authentication (ssh-keysign
+    previously used the PEM-only routines).
+    
+    Fixes key comment regression bz#2306: key pathnames were being lost as
+    comment fields.
+    
+    ok markus@
+
+commit febbe09e4e9aff579b0c5cc1623f756862e4757d
+Author: tedu@openbsd.org <tedu@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jan 7 18:15:07 2015 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    workaround for the Meyer, et al, Bleichenbacher Side
+     Channel Attack. fake up a bignum key before RSA decryption. discussed/ok djm
+     markus
+
+commit 5191df927db282d3123ca2f34a04d8d96153911a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Dec 23 22:42:48 2014 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    KNF and add a little more debug()
+
+commit 8abd80315d3419b20e6938f74d37e2e2b547f0b7
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Dec 22 09:26:31 2014 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    add fingerprinthash to the options list;
+
+commit 296ef0560f60980da01d83b9f0e1a5257826536f
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Dec 22 09:24:59 2014 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    tweak previous;
+
+commit 462082eacbd37778a173afb6b84c6f4d898a18b5
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@google.com>
+Date:   Tue Dec 30 08:16:11 2014 +1100
+
+    avoid uninitialised free of ldns_res
+    
+    If an invalid rdclass was passed to getrrsetbyname() then
+    this would execute a free on an uninitialised pointer.
+    OpenSSH only ever calls this with a fixed and valid rdclass.
+    
+    Reported by Joshua Rogers
+
+commit 01b63498801053f131a0740eb9d13faf35d636c8
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@google.com>
+Date:   Mon Dec 29 18:10:18 2014 +1100
+
+    pull updated OpenBSD BCrypt PBKDF implementation
+    
+    Includes fix for 1 byte output overflow for large key length
+    requests (not reachable in OpenSSH).
+    
+    Pointed out by Joshua Rogers
+
+commit c528c1b4af2f06712177b3de9b30705752f7cbcb
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@google.com>
+Date:   Tue Dec 23 15:26:13 2014 +1100
+
+    fix variable name for IPv6 case in construct_utmpx
+    
+    patch from writeonce AT midipix.org via bz#2296
+
+commit 293cac52dcda123244b2e594d15592e5e481c55e
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@google.com>
+Date:   Mon Dec 22 16:30:42 2014 +1100
+
+    include and use OpenBSD netcat in regress/
+
+commit 8f6784f0cb56dc4fd00af3e81a10050a5785228d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Dec 22 09:05:17 2014 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    mention ssh -Q feature to list supported { MAC, cipher,
+     KEX, key } algorithms in more places and include the query string used to
+     list the relevant information; bz#2288
+
+commit 449e11b4d7847079bd0a2daa6e3e7ea03d8ef700
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Dec 22 08:24:17 2014 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    tweak previous;
+
+commit 4bea0ab3290c0b9dd2aa199e932de8e7e18062d6
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Dec 22 08:06:03 2014 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    regression test for multiple required pubkey authentication;
+     ok markus@
+
+commit f1c4d8ec52158b6f57834b8cd839605b0a33e7f2
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Dec 22 08:04:23 2014 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    correct description of what will happen when a
+     AuthorizedKeysCommand is specified but AuthorizedKeysCommandUser is not (sshd
+     will refuse to start)
+
+commit 161cf419f412446635013ac49e8c660cadc36080
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Dec 22 07:55:51 2014 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    make internal handling of filename arguments of "none"
+     more consistent with ssh. "none" arguments are now replaced with NULL when
+     the configuration is finalised.
+    
+    Simplifies checking later on (just need to test not-NULL rather than
+    that + strcmp) and cleans up some inconsistencies. ok markus@
+
+commit f69b69b8625be447b8826b21d87713874dac25a6
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Dec 22 07:51:30 2014 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    remember which public keys have been used for
+     authentication and refuse to accept previously-used keys.
+    
+    This allows AuthenticationMethods=publickey,publickey to require
+    that users authenticate using two _different_ pubkeys.
+    
+    ok markus@
+
+commit 46ac2ed4677968224c4ca825bc98fc68dae183f0
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Dec 22 07:24:11 2014 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    fix passing of wildcard forward bind addresses when
+     connection multiplexing is in use; patch from Sami Hartikainen via bz#2324;
+     ok dtucker@
+
+commit 0d1b241a262e4d0a6bbfdd595489ab1b853c43a1
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Dec 22 06:14:29 2014 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    make this slightly easier to diff against portable
+
+commit 0715bcdddbf68953964058f17255bf54734b8737
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Mon Dec 22 13:47:07 2014 +1100
+
+    add missing regress output file
+
+commit 1e30483c8ad2c2f39445d4a4b6ab20c241e40593
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Dec 22 02:15:52 2014 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    adjust for new SHA256 key fingerprints and
+     slightly-different MD5 hex fingerprint format
+
+commit 6b40567ed722df98593ad8e6a2d2448fc2b4b151
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Dec 22 01:14:49 2014 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    poll changes to netcat (usr.bin/netcat.c r1.125) broke
+     this test; fix it by ensuring more stdio fds are sent to devnull
+
+commit a5375ccb970f49dddf7d0ef63c9b713ede9e7260
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Dec 21 23:35:14 2014 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    tweak previous;
+
+commit b79efde5c3badf5ce4312fe608d8307eade533c5
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Dec 21 23:12:42 2014 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    document FingerprintHash here too
+
+commit d16bdd8027dd116afa01324bb071a4016cdc1a75
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Mon Dec 22 10:18:09 2014 +1100
+
+    missing include for base64 encoding
+
+commit 56d1c83cdd1ac76f1c6bd41e01e80dad834f3994
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Dec 21 22:27:55 2014 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Add FingerprintHash option to control algorithm used for
+     key fingerprints. Default changes from MD5 to SHA256 and format from hex to
+     base64.
+    
+    Feedback and ok naddy@ markus@
+
+commit 058f839fe15c51be8b3a844a76ab9a8db550be4f
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Dec 18 23:58:04 2014 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    don't count partial authentication success as a failure
+     against MaxAuthTries; ok deraadt@
+
+commit c7219f4f54d64d6dde66dbcf7a2699daa782d2a1
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Dec 12 00:02:17 2014 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    revert chunk I didn't mean to commit yet; via jmc@
+
+commit 7de5991aa3997e2981440f39c1ea01273a0a2c7b
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Dec 18 11:44:06 2014 +1100
+
+    upstream libc change
+    
+    revision 1.2
+    date: 2014/12/08 03:45:00;  author: bcook;  state: Exp;  lines: +2 -2;  commitid: 7zWEBgJJOCZ2hvTV;
+    avoid left shift overflow in reallocarray.
+    
+    Some 64-bit platforms (e.g. Windows 64) have a 32-bit long. So, shifting
+    1UL 32-bits to the left causes an overflow. This replaces the constant 1UL with
+    (size_t)1 so that we get the correct constant size for the platform.
+    
+    discussed with tedu@ & deraadt@
+
+commit 2048f85a5e6da8bc6e0532efe02ecfd4e63c978c
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Dec 18 10:15:49 2014 +1100
+
+    include CFLAGS in gnome askpass targets
+    
+    from Fedora
+
+commit 48b68ce19ca42fa488960028048dec023f7899bb
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Dec 11 08:20:09 2014 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    explicitly include sys/param.h in files that use the
+     howmany() macro; from portable
+
+commit d663bea30a294d440fef4398e5cd816317bd4518
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Dec 11 05:25:06 2014 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    mention AuthorizedKeysCommandUser must be set for
+     AuthorizedKeysCommand to be run; bz#2287
+
+commit 17bf3d81e00f2abb414a4fd271118cf4913f049f
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Dec 11 05:13:28 2014 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    show in debug output which hostkeys are being tried when
+     attempting hostbased auth; patch from Iain Morgan
+
+commit da0277e3717eadf5b15e03379fc29db133487e94
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Dec 11 04:16:14 2014 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Make manual reflect reality: sftp-server's -d option
+     accepts a "%d" option, not a "%h" one.
+    
+    bz#2316; reported by Kirk Wolf
+
+commit 4cf87f4b81fa9380bce5fcff7b0f8382ae3ad996
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Dec 10 01:24:09 2014 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    better error value for invalid signature length
+
+commit 4bfad14ca56f8ae04f418997816b4ba84e2cfc3c
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Wed Dec 10 02:12:51 2014 +1100
+
+    Resync more with OpenBSD's rijndael.c, in particular "#if 0"-ing out some
+    unused code.  Should fix compile error reported by plautrba at redhat.
+
+commit 642652d280499691c8212ec6b79724b50008ce09
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Wed Dec 10 01:32:23 2014 +1100
+
+    Add reallocarray to compat library
+
+commit 3dfd8d93dfcc69261f5af99df56f3ff598581979
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Dec 4 22:31:50 2014 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    add tests for new client RevokedHostKeys option; refactor
+     to make it a bit more readable
+
+commit a31046cad1aed16a0b55171192faa6d02665ccec
+Author: krw@openbsd.org <krw@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Nov 19 13:35:37 2014 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Nuke yet more obvious #include duplications.
+    
+    ok deraadt@
+
+commit a7c762e5b2c1093542c0bc1df25ccec0b4cf479f
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Dec 4 20:47:36 2014 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    key_in_file() wrapper is no longer used
+
+commit 5e39a49930d885aac9c76af3129332b6e772cd75
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Dec 4 02:24:32 2014 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    add RevokedHostKeys option for the client
+    
+    Allow textfile or KRL-based revocation of hostkeys.
+
+commit 74de254bb92c684cf53461da97f52d5ba34ded80
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Dec 4 01:49:59 2014 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    convert KRL code to new buffer API
+    
+    ok markus@
+
+commit db995f2eed5fc432598626fa3e30654503bf7151
+Author: millert@openbsd.org <millert@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Nov 26 18:34:51 2014 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Prefer setvbuf() to setlinebuf() for portability; ok
+     deraadt@
+
+commit 72bba3d179ced8b425272efe6956a309202a91f3
+Author: jsg@openbsd.org <jsg@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Nov 24 03:39:22 2014 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Fix crashes in the handling of the sshd config file found
+     with the afl fuzzer.
+    
+    ok deraadt@ djm@
+
+commit 867f49c666adcfe92bf539d9c37c1accdea08bf6
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Nov 26 13:22:41 2014 +1100
+
+    Avoid Cygwin ssh-host-config reading /etc/group
+    
+    Patch from Corinna Vinschen
+
+commit 8b66f36291a721b1ba7c44f24a07fdf39235593e
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Nov 26 13:20:35 2014 +1100
+
+    allow custom service name for sshd on Cygwin
+    
+    Permits the use of multiple sshd running with different service names.
+    
+    Patch by Florian Friesdorf via Corinna Vinschen
+
+commit 08c0eebf55d70a9ae1964399e609288ae3186a0c
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Nov 22 19:21:03 2014 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    restore word zapped in previous, and remove some useless
+     "No" macros;
+
+commit a1418a0033fba43f061513e992e1cbcc3343e563
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Nov 22 18:15:41 2014 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    /dev/random has created the same effect as /dev/arandom
+     (and /dev/urandom) for quite some time.  Mop up the last few, by using
+     /dev/random where we actually want it, or not even mentioning arandom where
+     it is irrelevant.
+
+commit b6de5ac9ed421362f479d1ad4fa433d2e25dad5b
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Nov 21 01:00:38 2014 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    fix NULL pointer dereference crash on invalid timestamp
+    
+    found using Michal Zalewski's afl fuzzer
+
+commit a1f8110cd5ed818d59b3a2964fab7de76e92c18e
+Author: mikeb@openbsd.org <mikeb@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Nov 18 22:38:48 2014 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Sync AES code to the one shipped in OpenSSL/LibreSSL.
+    
+    This includes a commit made by Andy Polyakov <appro at openssl ! org>
+    to the OpenSSL source tree on Wed, 28 Jun 2006 with the following
+    message: "Mitigate cache-collision timing attack on last round."
+    
+    OK naddy, miod, djm
+
+commit 335c83d5f35d8620e16b8aa26592d4f836e09ad2
+Author: krw@openbsd.org <krw@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Nov 18 20:54:28 2014 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Nuke more obvious #include duplications.
+    
+    ok deraadt@ millert@ tedu@
+
+commit 51b64e44121194ae4bf153dee391228dada2abcb
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Nov 17 00:21:40 2014 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    fix KRL generation when multiple CAs are in use
+    
+    We would generate an invalid KRL when revoking certs by serial
+    number for multiple CA keys due to a section being written out
+    twice.
+    
+    Also extend the regress test to catch this case by having it
+    produce a multi-CA KRL.
+    
+    Reported by peter AT pean.org
+
+commit d2d51003a623e21fb2b25567c4878d915e90aa2a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Nov 18 01:02:25 2014 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    fix NULL pointer dereference crash in key loading
+    
+    found by Michal Zalewski's AFL fuzzer
+
+commit 9f9fad0191028edc43d100d0ded39419b6895fdf
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Nov 17 00:21:40 2014 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    fix KRL generation when multiple CAs are in use
+    
+    We would generate an invalid KRL when revoking certs by serial
+    number for multiple CA keys due to a section being written out
+    twice.
+    
+    Also extend the regress test to catch this case by having it
+    produce a multi-CA KRL.
+    
+    Reported by peter AT pean.org
+
+commit da8af83d3f7ec00099963e455010e0ed1d7d0140
+Author: bentley@openbsd.org <bentley@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Nov 15 14:41:03 2014 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Reduce instances of `` '' in manuals.
+    
+    troff displays these as typographic quotes, but nroff implementations
+    almost always print them literally, which rarely has the intended effect
+    with modern fonts, even in stock xterm.
+    
+    These uses of `` '' can be replaced either with more semantic alternatives
+    or with Dq, which prints typographic quotes in a UTF-8 locale (but will
+    automatically fall back to `` '' in an ASCII locale).
+    
+    improvements and ok schwarze@
+
+commit fc302561369483bb755b17f671f70fb894aec01d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Nov 10 22:25:49 2014 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    mux-related manual tweaks
+    
+    mention ControlPersist=0 is the same as ControlPersist=yes
+    
+    recommend that ControlPath sockets be placed in a og-w directory
+
+commit 0e4cff5f35ed11102fe3783779960ef07e0cd381
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@google.com>
+Date:   Wed Nov 5 11:01:31 2014 +1100
+
+    Prepare scripts for next Cygwin release
+    
+    Makes the Cygwin-specific ssh-user-config script independent of the
+    existence of /etc/passwd.  The next Cygwin release will allow to
+    generate passwd and group entries from the Windows account DBs, so the
+    scripts have to adapt.
+    
+    from Corinna Vinschen
+
+commit 7d0ba5336651731949762eb8877ce9e3b52df436
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Oct 30 10:45:41 2014 +1100
+
+    include version number in OpenSSL-too-old error
+
+commit 3bcb92e04d9207e9f78d82f7918c6d3422054ce9
+Author: lteo@openbsd.org <lteo@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Oct 24 02:01:20 2014 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Remove unnecessary include: netinet/in_systm.h is not needed
+     by these programs.
+    
+    NB. skipped for portable
+    
+    ok deraadt@ millert@
+
+commit 6fdcaeb99532e28a69f1a1599fbd540bb15b70a0
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Oct 20 03:43:01 2014 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    whitespace
+
+commit 165bc8786299e261706ed60342985f9de93a7461
+Author: daniel@openbsd.org <daniel@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Oct 14 03:09:59 2014 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    plug a memory leak; from Maxime Villard.
+    
+    ok djm@
+
+commit b1ba15f3885947c245c2dbfaad0a04ba050abea0
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Oct 9 06:21:31 2014 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    tweak previous;
+
+commit 259a02ebdf74ad90b41d116ecf70aa823fa4c6e7
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Oct 13 00:38:35 2014 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    whitespace
+
+commit 957fbceb0f3166e41b76fdb54075ab3b9cc84cba
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Oct 8 22:20:25 2014 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Tweak config reparsing with host canonicalisation
+    
+    Make the second pass through the config files always run when
+    hostname canonicalisation is enabled.
+    
+    Add a "Match canonical" criteria that allows ssh_config Match
+    blocks to trigger only in the second config pass.
+    
+    Add a -G option to ssh that causes it to parse its configuration
+    and dump the result to stdout, similar to "sshd -T"
+    
+    Allow ssh_config Port options set in the second config parse
+    phase to be applied (they were being ignored).
+    
+    bz#2267 bz#2286; ok markus
+
+commit 5c0dafd38bf66feeeb45fa0741a5baf5ad8039ba
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Oct 8 22:15:27 2014 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    another -Wpointer-sign from clang
+
+commit bb005dc815ebda9af3ae4b39ca101c4da918f835
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Oct 8 22:15:06 2014 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    fix a few -Wpointer-sign warnings from clang
+
+commit 3cc1fbb4fb0e804bfb873fd363cea91b27fc8188
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Oct 8 21:45:48 2014 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    parse cert sections using nested buffers to reduce
+     copies; ok markus
+
+commit 4a45922aebf99164e2fc83d34fe55b11ae1866ef
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Oct 6 00:47:15 2014 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    correct options in usage(); from mancha1 AT zoho.com
+
+commit 48dffd5bebae6fed0556dc5c36cece0370690618
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Sep 9 09:45:36 2014 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    mention permissions on tun(4) devices in PermitTunnel
+     documentation; bz#2273
+
+commit a5883d4eccb94b16c355987f58f86a7dee17a0c2
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Sep 3 18:55:07 2014 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    tighten permissions on pty when the "tty" group does
+     not exist; pointed out by Corinna Vinschen; ok markus
+
+commit 180bcb406b58bf30723c01a6b010e48ee626dda8
+Author: sobrado@openbsd.org <sobrado@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Aug 30 16:32:25 2014 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    typo.
+
+commit f70b22bcdd52f6bf127047b3584371e6e5d45627
+Author: sobrado@openbsd.org <sobrado@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Aug 30 15:33:50 2014 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    improve capitalization for the Ed25519 public-key
+     signature system.
+    
+    ok djm@
+
+commit 7df8818409c752cf3f0c3f8044fe9aebed8647bd
+Author: doug@openbsd.org <doug@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Aug 21 01:08:52 2014 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Free resources on error in mkstemp and fdopen
+    
+    ok djm@
+
+commit 40ba4c9733aaed08304714faeb61529f18da144b
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Aug 20 01:28:55 2014 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    djm how did you make a typo like that...
+
+commit 57d378ec9278ba417a726f615daad67d157de666
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Aug 19 23:58:28 2014 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    When dumping the server configuration (sshd -T), print
+     correct KEX, MAC and cipher defaults. Spotted by Iain Morgan
+
+commit 7ff880ede5195d0b17e7f1e3b6cfbc4cb6f85240
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Aug 19 23:57:18 2014 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    ~-expand lcd paths
+
+commit 4460a7ad0c78d4cd67c467f6e9f4254d0404ed59
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Oct 12 12:35:48 2014 +1100
+
+    remove duplicated KEX_DH1 entry
+
+commit c9b8426a616138d0d762176c94f51aff3faad5ff
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Oct 9 10:34:06 2014 +1100
+
+    remove ChangeLog file
+    
+    Commit logs will be generated from git at release time.
+
+commit 81d18ff7c93a04affbf3903e0963859763219aed
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@google.com>
+Date:   Tue Oct 7 21:24:25 2014 +1100
+
+    delete contrib/caldera directory
+
+commit 0ec9e87d3638206456968202f05bb5123670607a
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@google.com>
+Date:   Tue Oct 7 19:57:27 2014 +1100
+
+    test commit
+
+commit 8fb65a44568701b779f3d77326bceae63412d28d
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Oct 7 09:21:49 2014 +1100
+
+     - (djm) Release OpenSSH-6.7
+
+commit e8c9f2602c46f6781df5e52e6cd8413dab4602a3
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Oct 3 09:24:56 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [sshd_config.5] typo; from Iain Morgan
+
+commit 703b98a26706f5083801d11059486d77491342ae
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Oct 1 09:43:07 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [openbsd-compat/Makefile.in openbsd-compat/kludge-fd_set.c]
+       [openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h] Kludge around bad glibc
+       _FORTIFY_SOURCE check that doesn't grok heap-allocated fd_sets;
+       ok dtucker@
+
+commit 0fa0ed061bbfedb0daa705e220748154a84c3413
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Sep 10 08:15:34 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [sandbox-seccomp-filter.c] Allow mremap and exit for DietLibc;
+       patch from Felix von Leitner; ok dtucker
+
+commit ad7d23d461c3b7e1dcb15db13aee5f4b94dc1a95
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Tue Sep 9 12:23:10 2014 +1000
+
+    20140908
+     - (dtucker) [INSTALL] Update info about egd.  ok djm@
+
+commit 2a8699f37cc2515e3bc60e0c677ba060f4d48191
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Sep 4 03:46:05 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [openbsd-compat/arc4random.c] Zero seed after keying PRNG
+
+commit 44988defb1f5e3afe576d86000365e1f07a1b494
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Sep 3 05:35:32 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config] Fix old code leading to
+       permissions/ACLs; from Corinna Vinschen
+
+commit 23f269562b7537b2f6f5014e50a25e5dcc55a837
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Sep 3 05:33:25 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [defines.h sshbuf.c] Move __predict_true|false to defines.h and
+       conditionalise to avoid duplicate definition.
+
+commit 41c8de2c0031cf59e7cf0c06b5bcfbf4852c1fda
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sat Aug 30 16:23:06 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [Makefile.in] Make TEST_SHELL a variable; "good idea" tim@
+
+commit d7c81e216a7bd9eed6e239c970d9261bb1651947
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sat Aug 30 04:18:28 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h] add include guard
+
+commit 4687802dda57365b984b897fc3c8e2867ea09b22
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sat Aug 30 03:29:19 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [misc.c] Missing newline between functions
+
+commit 51c77e29220dee87c53be2dc47092934acab26fe
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sat Aug 30 02:30:30 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h] add
+       OPENSSL_[RD]SA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS defines for OpenSSL that lacks them
+
+commit 3d673d103bad35afaec6e7ef73e5277216ce33a3
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Aug 27 06:32:01 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [openbsd-compat/explicit_bzero.c] implement explicit_bzero()
+       using memset_s() where possible; improve fallback to indirect bzero
+       via a volatile pointer to give it more of a chance to avoid being
+       optimised away.
+
+commit 146218ac11a1eb0dcade6f793d7acdef163b5ddc
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Aug 27 04:11:55 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [monitor.c sshd.c] SIGXFSZ needs to be ignored in postauth
+       monitor, not preauth; bz#2263
+
+commit 1b215c098b3b37e38aa4e4c91bb908eee41183b1
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Aug 27 04:04:40 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.c]
+       [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.c]
+       [regress/unittests/sshkey/common.c]
+       [regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c]
+       [regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c]
+       [regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c] Don't include openssl/ec.h
+       on !ECC OpenSSL systems
+
+commit ad013944af0a19e3f612089d0099bb397cf6502d
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Aug 26 09:27:28 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [INSTALL] Recommend libcrypto be built -fPIC, mention LibreSSL,
+       update OpenSSL version requirement.
+
+commit ed126de8ee04c66640a0ea2697c4aaf36801f100
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Aug 26 08:37:47 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [bufec.c] Skip this file on !ECC OpenSSL
+
+commit 9c1dede005746864a4fdb36a7cdf6c51296ca909
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Aug 24 03:01:06 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [sftp-server.c] Some systems (e.g. Irix) have prctl() but not
+       PR_SET_DUMPABLE, so adjust ifdef; reported by Tom Christensen
+
+commit d244a5816fd1312a33404b436e4dd83594f1119e
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sat Aug 23 17:06:49 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [configure.ac] We now require a working vsnprintf everywhere (not
+       just for systems that lack asprintf); check for it always and extend
+       test to catch more brokenness. Fixes builds on Solaris <= 9
+
+commit 4cec036362a358e398e6a2e6d19d8e5780558634
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sat Aug 23 03:11:09 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [sshd.c] Ignore SIGXFSZ in preauth monitor child; can explode on
+       lastlog writing on platforms with high UIDs; bz#2263
+
+commit 394a60f2598d28b670d934b93942a3370b779b39
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Aug 22 18:06:20 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [configure.ac] double braces to appease autoconf
+
+commit 4d69aeabd6e60afcdc7cca177ca751708ab79a9d
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Aug 22 17:48:27 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c] Fix compilation failure (prototype/
+       definition mismatch) and warning for broken/missing snprintf case.
+
+commit 0c11f1ac369d2c0aeb0ab0458a7cd04c72fe5e9e
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Aug 22 17:36:56 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [sshbuf-getput-crypto.c] Fix compilation when OpenSSL lacks ECC
+
+commit 6d62784b8973340b251fea6b04890f471adf28db
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Aug 22 17:36:19 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [configure.ac] include leading zero characters in OpenSSL version
+       number; fixes test for unsupported versions
+
+commit 4f1ff1ed782117f5d5204d4e91156ed5da07cbb7
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Aug 21 15:54:50 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.c] Fix for systems that
+       don't set __progname. Diagnosed by Tom Christensen.
+
+commit 005a64da0f457410045ef0bfa93c863c2450447d
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Aug 21 10:48:41 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [key.h] Fix ifdefs for no-ECC OpenSSL
+
+commit aa6598ebb3343c7380e918388e10e8ca5852b613
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Aug 21 10:47:54 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [Makefile.in] fix reference to libtest_helper.a in sshkey test too.
+
+commit 54703e3cf63f0c80d4157e5ad7dbc2b363ee2c56
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Aug 20 11:10:51 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [contrib/cygwin/README] Correct build instructions; from Corinna
+
+commit f0935698f0461f24d8d1f1107b476ee5fd4db1cb
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Aug 20 11:06:50 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [sshkey.h] Fix compilation when OpenSSL lacks ECC
+
+commit c5089ecaec3b2c02f014f4e67518390702a4ba14
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Aug 20 11:06:20 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [Makefile.in] refer to libtest_helper.a by explicit path rather than
+       -L/-l; fixes linking problems on some platforms
+
+commit 2195847e503a382f83ee969b0a8bd3dfe0e55c18
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Aug 20 11:05:03 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [configure.ac] Check OpenSSL version is supported at configure time;
+       suggested by Kevin Brott
+
+commit a75aca1bbc989aa9f8b1b08489d37855f3d24d1a
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Aug 19 11:36:07 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [INSTALL contrib/caldera/openssh.spec contrib/cygwin/README]
+       [contrib/redhat/openssh.spec contrib/suse/openssh.spec] Remove mentions
+       of TCP wrappers.
+
+commit 3f022b5a9477abceeb1bbeab04b055f3cc7ca8f6
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Aug 19 11:32:34 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [ssh-dss.c] Include openssl/dsa.h for DSA_SIG
+
+commit 88137902632aceb923990e98cf5dc923bb3ef2f5
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Aug 19 11:28:11 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [sshbuf.h] Fix compilation on systems without OPENSSL_HAS_ECC.
+
+commit 2f3d1e7fb2eabd3cfbfd8d0f7bdd2f9a1888690b
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Aug 19 11:14:36 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [myproposal.h] Make curve25519 KEX dependent on
+       HAVE_EVP_SHA256 instead of OPENSSL_HAS_ECC.
+
+commit d4e7d59d01a6c7f59e8c1f94a83c086e9a33d8aa
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Aug 19 11:14:17 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [serverloop.c] Fix syntax error on Cygwin; from Corinna Vinschen
+
+commit 9eaeea2cf2b6af5f166cfa9ad3c7a90711a147a9
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Aug 10 11:35:05 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [README contrib/caldera/openssh.spec]
+       [contrib/redhat/openssh.spec contrib/suse/openssh.spec] Update versions
+
+commit f8988fbef0c9801d19fa2f8f4f041690412bec37
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Aug 1 13:31:52 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [regress/multiplex.sh] Use -d (detach stdin) flag to disassociate
+       nc from stdin, it's more portable
+
+commit 5b3879fd4b7a4e3d43bab8f40addda39bc1169d0
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Aug 1 12:28:31 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [regress/multiplex.sh] Instruct nc not to quit as soon as stdin
+       is closed; avoid regress failures when stdin is /dev/null
+
+commit a9c46746d266f8a1b092a72b2150682d1af8ebfc
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Aug 1 12:26:49 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [regress/multiplex.sh] Skip test for non-OpenBSD netcat. We need
+       a better solution, but this will have to do for now.
+
+commit 426117b2e965e43f47015942b5be8dd88fe74b88
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Jul 30 12:33:20 2014 +1000
+
+       - schwarze@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/28 15:40:08
+         [sftp-server.8 sshd_config.5]
+         some systems no longer need /dev/log;
+         issue noticed by jirib;
+         ok deraadt
+
+commit f497794b6962eaf802ab4ac2a7b22ae591cca1d5
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Jul 30 12:32:46 2014 +1000
+
+       - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/25 21:22:03
+         [ssh-agent.c]
+         Clear buffer used for handling messages.  This prevents keys being
+         left in memory after they have been expired or deleted in some cases
+         (but note that ssh-agent is setgid so you would still need root to
+         access them).  Pointed out by Kevin Burns, ok deraadt
+
+commit a8a0f65c57c8ecba94d65948e9090da54014dfef
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Jul 30 12:32:28 2014 +1000
+
+     - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+       - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/24 22:57:10
+         [ssh.1]
+         Mention UNIX-domain socket forwarding too.  OK jmc@ deraadt@
+
+commit 56b840f2b81e14a2f95c203403633a72566736f8
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Jul 25 08:11:30 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [regress/multiplex.sh] restore incorrectly deleted line;
+       pointed out by Christian Hesse
+
+commit dd417b60d5ca220565d1014e92b7f8f43dc081eb
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Wed Jul 23 10:41:21 2014 +1000
+
+       - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/22 23:35:38
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/*]
+         Regenerate test keys with certs signed with ed25519 instead of ecdsa.
+         These can be used in -portable on platforms that don't support ECDSA.
+
+commit 40e50211896369dba8f64f3b5e5fd58b76f5ac3f
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Wed Jul 23 10:35:45 2014 +1000
+
+       - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/22 23:57:40
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/mktestdata.sh]
+         Add $OpenBSD tag to make syncs easier
+
+commit 07e644251e809b1d4c062cf85bd1146a7e3f5a8a
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Wed Jul 23 10:34:26 2014 +1000
+
+       - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/22 23:23:22
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/mktestdata.sh]
+         Sign test certs with ed25519 instead of ecdsa so that they'll work in
+         -portable on platforms that don't have ECDSA in their OpenSSL.  ok djm
+
+commit cea099a7c4eaecb01b001e5453bb4e5c25006c22
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Wed Jul 23 10:04:02 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/22 01:32:12
+         [regress/multiplex.sh]
+         change the test for still-open Unix domain sockets to be robust against
+         nc implementations that produce error messages. from -portable
+         (Id sync only)
+
+commit 31eb78078d349b32ea41952ecc944b3ad6cb0d45
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Wed Jul 23 09:43:42 2014 +1000
+
+       - guenther@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/22 07:13:42
+         [umac.c]
+         Convert from <sys/endian.h> to the shiney new <endian.h>
+         ok dtucker@, who also confirmed that -portable handles this already
+         (ID sync only, includes.h pulls in endian.h if available.)
+
+commit 820763efef2d19d965602533036c2b4badc9d465
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Wed Jul 23 09:40:46 2014 +1000
+
+       - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/22 01:18:50
+         [key.c]
+         Prevent spam from key_load_private_pem during hostbased auth.  ok djm@
+
+commit c4ee219a66f3190fa96cbd45b4d11015685c6306
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Wed Jul 23 04:27:50 2014 +1000
+
+     - (dtucker) [regress/unittests/sshkey/test_{file,fuzz,sshkey}.c] Wrap ecdsa-
+       specific tests inside OPENSSL_HAS_ECC.
+
+commit 04f4824940ea3edd60835416ececbae16438968a
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Jul 22 11:31:47 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [regress/multiplex.sh] change the test for still-open Unix
+        domain sockets to be robust against nc implementations that produce
+        error messages.
+
+commit 5ea4fe00d55453aaa44007330bb4c3181bd9b796
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Jul 22 09:39:19 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [regress/multiplex.sh] ssh mux master lost -N somehow;
+       put it back
+
+commit 948a1774a79a85f9deba6d74db95f402dee32c69
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Tue Jul 22 01:07:11 2014 +1000
+
+     - (dtucker) [sshkey.c] ifdef out unused variable when compiling without
+       OPENSSL_HAS_ECC.
+
+commit c8f610f6cc57ae129758052439d9baf13699097b
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Mon Jul 21 10:23:27 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [regress/multiplex.sh] Not all netcat accept the -N option.
+
+commit 0e4e95566cd95c887f69272499b8f3880b3ec0f5
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Mon Jul 21 09:52:54 2014 +1000
+
+       - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/15 15:54:15
+         [forwarding.sh multiplex.sh]
+         Add support for Unix domain socket forwarding.  A remote TCP port
+         may be forwarded to a local Unix domain socket and vice versa or
+         both ends may be a Unix domain socket.  This is a reimplementation
+         of the streamlocal patches by William Ahern from:
+             http://www.25thandclement.com/~william/projects/streamlocal.html
+         OK djm@ markus@
+
+commit 93a87ab27ecdc709169fb24411133998f81e2761
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Mon Jul 21 06:30:25 2014 +1000
+
+     - (dtucker) [regress/unittests/sshkey/
+       {common,test_file,test_fuzz,test_sshkey}.c] Wrap stdint.h includes in
+       ifdefs.
+
+commit 5573171352ea23df2dc6d2fe0324d023b7ba697c
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Mon Jul 21 02:24:59 2014 +1000
+
+    - (dtucker) [cipher.c openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h] Restore the bits
+       needed to build AES CTR mode against OpenSSL 0.9.8f and above.  ok djm
+
+commit 74e28682711d005026c7c8f15f96aea9d3c8b5a3
+Author: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
+Date:   Fri Jul 18 20:00:11 2014 -0700
+
+     - (tim) [openbsd-compat/port-uw.c] Include misc.h for fwd_opts, used
+       in servconf.h.
+
+commit d1a0421f8e5e933fee6fb58ee6b9a22c63c8a613
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Sat Jul 19 07:23:55 2014 +1000
+
+     - (dtucker) [key.c sshkey.c] Put new ecdsa bits inside ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC.
+
+commit f0fe9ea1be62227c130b317769de3d1e736b6dc1
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Sat Jul 19 06:33:12 2014 +1000
+
+     - (dtucker) [Makefile.in] Add a t-exec target to run just the executable
+       tests.
+
+commit 450bc1180d4b061434a4b733c5c8814fa30b022b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Sat Jul 19 06:23:18 2014 +1000
+
+     - (dtucker) [auth2-gss.c gss-serv-krb5.c] Include misc.h for fwd_opts, used
+       in servconf.h.
+
+commit ab2ec586baad122ed169285c31927ccf58bc7b28
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Jul 18 15:04:47 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/18 02:46:01
+         [ssh-agent.c]
+         restore umask around listener socket creation (dropped in streamlocal patch
+         merge)
+
+commit 357610d15946381ae90c271837dcdd0cdce7145f
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Jul 18 15:04:10 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/17 07:22:19
+         [mux.c ssh.c]
+         reflect stdio-forward ("ssh -W host:port ...") failures in exit status.
+         previously we were always returning 0. bz#2255 reported by Brendan
+         Germain; ok dtucker
+
+commit dad9a4a0b7c2b5d78605f8df28718f116524134e
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Jul 18 15:03:49 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/17 00:12:03
+         [key.c]
+         silence "incorrect passphrase" error spam; reported and ok dtucker@
+
+commit f42f7684ecbeec6ce50e0310f80b3d6da2aaf533
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Jul 18 15:03:27 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/17 00:10:18
+         [mux.c]
+         preserve errno across syscall
+
+commit 1b83320628cb0733e3688b85bfe4d388a7c51909
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Jul 18 15:03:02 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/17 00:10:56
+         [sandbox-systrace.c]
+         ifdef SYS_sendsyslog so this will compile without patching on -stable
+
+commit 6d57656331bcd754d912950e4a18ad259d596e61
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Jul 18 15:02:06 2014 +1000
+
+       - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/16 14:48:57
+         [ssh.1]
+         add the streamlocal* options to ssh's -o list; millert says they're
+         irrelevant for scp/sftp;
+    
+         ok markus millert
+
+commit 7acefbbcbeab725420ea07397ae35992f505f702
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Jul 18 14:11:24 2014 +1000
+
+       - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/15 15:54:14
+         [PROTOCOL auth-options.c auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c]
+         [auth-rsa.c auth.c auth1.c auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c]
+         [auth2-passwd.c auth2-pubkey.c auth2.c canohost.c channels.c channels.h]
+         [clientloop.c misc.c misc.h monitor.c mux.c packet.c readconf.c]
+         [readconf.h servconf.c servconf.h serverloop.c session.c ssh-agent.c]
+         [ssh.c ssh_config.5 sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
+         [sshd_config.5 sshlogin.c]
+         Add support for Unix domain socket forwarding.  A remote TCP port
+         may be forwarded to a local Unix domain socket and vice versa or
+         both ends may be a Unix domain socket.  This is a reimplementation
+         of the streamlocal patches by William Ahern from:
+             http://www.25thandclement.com/~william/projects/streamlocal.html
+         OK djm@ markus@
+
+commit 6262d760e00714523633bd989d62e273a3dca99a
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Jul 17 09:52:07 2014 +1000
+
+       - tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/11 13:54:34
+         [myproposal.h]
+         by popular demand, add back hamc-sha1 to server proposal for better compat
+         with many clients still in use. ok deraadt
+
+commit 9d69d937b46ecba17f16d923e538ceda7b705c7a
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Jul 17 09:49:37 2014 +1000
+
+       - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/11 08:09:54
+         [sandbox-systrace.c]
+         Permit use of SYS_sendsyslog from inside the sandbox.  Clock is ticking,
+         update your kernels and sshd soon.. libc will start using sendsyslog()
+         in about 4 days.
+
+commit f6293a0b4129826fc2e37e4062f96825df43c326
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Jul 17 09:01:25 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [digest-openssl.c] Preserve array order when disabling digests.
+       Reported by Petr Lautrbach.
+
+commit 00f9cd230709c04399ef5ff80492d70a55230694
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Jul 15 10:41:38 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [configure.ac] Delay checks for arc4random* until after libcrypto
+       has been located; fixes builds agains libressl-portable
+
+commit 1d0df3249c87019556b83306c28d4769375c2edc
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Jul 11 09:19:04 2014 +1000
+
+     - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+       - benno@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/09 14:15:56
+         [ssh-add.c]
+         fix ssh-add crash while loading more than one key
+         ok markus@
+
+commit 7a57eb3d105aa4ced15fb47001092c58811e6d9d
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Jul 9 13:22:31 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/07 08:15:26
+         [multiplex.sh]
+         remove forced-fatal that I stuck in there to test the new cleanup
+         logic and forgot to remove...
+
+commit 612f965239a30fe536b11ece1834d9f470aeb029
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Jul 9 13:22:03 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/06 07:42:03
+         [multiplex.sh test-exec.sh]
+         add a hook to the cleanup() function to kill $SSH_PID if it is set
+    
+         use it to kill the mux master started in multiplex.sh (it was being left
+         around on fatal failures)
+
+commit d0bb950485ba121e43a77caf434115ed6417b46f
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Jul 9 13:07:28 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/09 03:02:15
+         [key.c]
+         downgrade more error() to debug() to better match what old authfile.c
+         did; suppresses spurious errors with hostbased authentication enabled
+
+commit 0070776a038655c57f57e70cd05e4c38a5de9d84
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Jul 9 13:07:06 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/09 01:45:10
+         [sftp.c]
+         more useful error message when GLOB_NOSPACE occurs;
+         bz#2254, patch from Orion Poplawski
+
+commit 079bac2a43c74ef7cf56850afbab3b1932534c50
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Jul 9 13:06:25 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/07 08:19:12
+         [ssh_config.5]
+         mention that ProxyCommand is executed using shell "exec" to avoid
+         a lingering process; bz#1977
+
+commit 3a48cc090096cf99b9de592deb5f90e444edebfb
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Jul 6 09:32:49 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/05 23:11:48
+         [channels.c]
+         fix remote-forward cancel regression; ok markus@
+
+commit 48bae3a38cb578713e676708164f6e7151cc64fa
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Jul 6 09:27:06 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 23:18:35
+         [authfile.h]
+         remove leakmalloc droppings
+
+commit 72e6b5c9ed5e72ca3a6ccc3177941b7c487a0826
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Jul 4 09:00:04 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 22:40:43
+         [servconf.c servconf.h session.c sshd.8 sshd_config.5]
+         Add a sshd_config PermitUserRC option to control whether ~/.ssh/rc is
+         executed, mirroring the no-user-rc authorized_keys option;
+         bz#2160; ok markus@
+
+commit 602943d1179a08dfa70af94f62296ea5e3d6ebb8
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Jul 4 08:59:41 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 22:33:41
+         [channels.c]
+         allow explicit ::1 and 127.0.0.1 forwarding bind addresses when
+         GatewayPorts=no; allows client to choose address family;
+         bz#2222 ok markus@
+
+commit 6b37fbb7921d156b31e2c8f39d9e1b6746c34983
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Jul 4 08:59:24 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 22:23:46
+         [sshconnect.c]
+         when rekeying, skip file/DNS lookup if it is the same as the key sent
+         during initial key exchange. bz#2154 patch from Iain Morgan; ok markus@
+
+commit d2c3cd5f2e47ee24cf7093ce8e948c2e79dfc3fd
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Jul 4 08:59:01 2014 +1000
+
+       - jsing@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 12:42:16
+         [cipher-chachapoly.c]
+         Call chacha_ivsetup() immediately before chacha_encrypt_bytes() - this
+         makes it easier to verify that chacha_encrypt_bytes() is only called once
+         per chacha_ivsetup() call.
+         ok djm@
+
+commit 686feb560ec43a06ba04da82b50f3c183c947309
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Jul 3 21:29:38 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 11:16:55
+         [auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2.c]
+         make the "Too many authentication failures" message include the
+         user, source address, port and protocol in a format similar to the
+         authentication success / failure messages; bz#2199, ok dtucker
+
+commit 0f12341402e18fd9996ec23189b9418d2722453f
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Jul 3 21:28:09 2014 +1000
+
+       - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 07:45:27
+         [ssh_config.5]
+         escape %C since groff thinks it part of an Rs/Re block;
+
+commit 9c38643c5cd47a19db2cc28279dcc28abadc22b3
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Jul 3 21:27:46 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 06:39:19
+         [ssh.c ssh_config.5]
+         Add a %C escape sequence for LocalCommand and ControlPath that expands
+         to a unique identifer based on a has of the tuple of (local host,
+         remote user, hostname, port).
+    
+         Helps avoid exceeding sockaddr_un's miserly pathname limits for mux
+         control paths.
+    
+         bz#2220, based on patch from mancha1 AT zoho.com; ok markus@
+
+commit 49d9bfe2b2f3e90cc158a215dffa7675e57e7830
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Jul 3 21:26:42 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 05:38:17
+         [ssh.1]
+         document that -g will only work in the multiplexed case if applied to
+         the mux master
+
+commit ef9f13ba4c58057b2166d1f2e790535da402fbe5
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Jul 3 21:26:21 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 05:32:36
+         [ssh_config.5]
+         mention '%%' escape sequence in HostName directives and how it may
+         be used to specify IPv6 link-local addresses
+
+commit e6a407789e5432dd2e53336fb73476cc69048c54
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Jul 3 21:25:03 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 04:36:45
+         [digest.h]
+         forward-declare struct sshbuf so consumers don't need to include sshbuf.h
+
+commit 4a1d3d50f02d0a8a4ef95ea4749293cbfb89f919
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Jul 3 21:24:40 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 03:47:27
+         [ssh-keygen.c]
+         When hashing or removing hosts using ssh-keygen, don't choke on
+         @revoked markers and don't remove @cert-authority markers;
+         bz#2241, reported by mlindgren AT runelind.net
+
+commit e5c0d52ceb575c3db8c313e0b1aa3845943d7ba8
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Jul 3 21:24:19 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 03:34:09
+         [gss-serv.c session.c ssh-keygen.c]
+         standardise on NI_MAXHOST for gethostname() string lengths; about
+         1/2 the cases were using it already. Fixes bz#2239 en passant
+
+commit c174a3b7c14e0d178c61219de2aa1110e209950c
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Jul 3 21:23:24 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 03:26:43
+         [digest-openssl.c]
+         use EVP_Digest() for one-shot hash instead of creating, updating,
+         finalising and destroying a context.
+         bz#2231, based on patch from Timo Teras
+
+commit d7ca2cd31ecc4d63a055e2dcc4bf35c13f2db4c5
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Jul 3 21:23:01 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 03:15:01
+         [ssh-add.c]
+         make stdout line-buffered; saves partial output getting lost when
+         ssh-add fatal()s part-way through (e.g. when listing keys from an
+         agent that supports key types that ssh-add doesn't);
+         bz#2234, reported by Phil Pennock
+
+commit b1e967c8d7c7578dd0c172d85b3046cf54ea42ba
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Jul 3 21:22:40 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 03:11:03
+         [ssh-agent.c]
+         Only cleanup agent socket in the main agent process and not in any
+         subprocesses it may have started (e.g. forked askpass). Fixes
+         agent sockets being zapped when askpass processes fatal();
+         bz#2236 patch from Dmitry V. Levin
+
+commit 61e28e55c3438d796b02ef878bcd28620d452670
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Jul 3 21:22:22 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 01:45:38
+         [sshkey.c]
+         make Ed25519 keys' title fit properly in the randomart border; bz#2247
+         based on patch from Christian Hesse
+
+commit 9eb4cd9a32c32d40d36450b68ed93badc6a94c68
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Jul 3 13:29:50 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [monitor_fdpass.c] Use sys/poll.h if poll.h doesn't exist;
+       bz#2237
+
+commit 8da0fa24934501909408327298097b1629b89eaa
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Jul 3 11:54:19 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [digest-openssl.c configure.ac] Disable RIPEMD160 if libcrypto
+       doesn't support it.
+
+commit 81309c857dd0dbc0a1245a16d621c490ad48cfbb
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Jul 2 17:45:55 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [regress/Makefile] fix execution of sshkey unit/fuzz test
+
+commit 82b2482ce68654815ee049b9bf021bb362a35ff2
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Jul 2 17:43:41 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [sshkey.c] Conditionalise inclusion of util.h
+
+commit dd8b1dd7933eb6f5652641b0cdced34a387f2e80
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Jul 2 17:38:31 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/24 01:14:17
+         [Makefile.in regress/Makefile regress/unittests/Makefile]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/Makefile]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/common.c]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/common.h]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/mktestdata.sh]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/tests.c]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1-cert.fp]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1-cert.pub]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.fp]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.fp.bb]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.param.g]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.param.priv]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.param.pub]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.pub]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1_pw]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2.fp]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2.fp.bb]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2.pub]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_n]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_n_pw]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1-cert.fp]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1-cert.pub]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.fp]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.fp.bb]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.param.curve]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.param.priv]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.param.pub]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.pub]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1_pw]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.fp]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.fp.bb]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.param.curve]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.param.priv]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.param.pub]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.pub]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_n]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_n_pw]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1-cert.fp]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1-cert.pub]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1.fp]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1.fp.bb]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1.pub]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1_pw]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2.fp]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2.fp.bb]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2.pub]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/pw]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.fp]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.fp.bb]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.param.n]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.pub]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1_pw]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.fp]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.fp.bb]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.param.n]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.pub]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1-cert.fp]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1-cert.pub]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.fp]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.fp.bb]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.param.n]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.param.p]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.param.q]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.pub]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1_pw]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.fp]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.fp.bb]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.param.n]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.param.p]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.param.q]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.pub]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_n]
+         [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_n_pw]
+         unit and fuzz tests for new key API
+
+commit c1dc24b71f087f385b92652b9673f52af64e0428
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Jul 2 17:02:03 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/24 01:04:43
+         [regress/krl.sh]
+         regress test for broken consecutive revoked serial number ranges
+
+commit 43d3ed2dd3feca6d0326c7dc82588d2faa115e92
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Jul 2 17:01:08 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/05/21 07:04:21
+         [regress/integrity.sh]
+         when failing because of unexpected output, show the offending output
+
+commit 5a96707ffc8d227c2e7d94fa6b0317f8a152cf4e
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Jul 2 15:38:05 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/30 05:32:00
+         [regress/Makefile]
+         unit tests for new buffer API; including basic fuzz testing
+         NB. Id sync only.
+
+commit 3ff92ba756aee48e4ae3e0aeff7293517b3dd185
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Jul 2 15:33:09 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/30 12:54:39
+         [key.c]
+         suppress spurious error message when loading key with a passphrase;
+         reported by kettenis@ ok markus@
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/02 04:59:06
+         [cipher-3des1.c]
+         fix ssh protocol 1 on the server that regressed with the sshkey change
+         (sometimes fatal() after auth completed), make file return useful status
+         codes.
+         NB. Id sync only for these two. They were bundled into the sshkey merge
+         above, since it was easier to sync the entire file and then apply
+         portable-specific changed atop it.
+
+commit ec3d0e24a1e46873d80507f5cd8ee6d0d03ac5dc
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Jul 2 15:30:00 2014 +1000
+
+       - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/27 18:50:39
+         [ssh-add.c]
+         fix loading of private keys
+
+commit 4b3ed647d5b328cf68e6a8ffbee490d8e0683e82
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Jul 2 15:29:40 2014 +1000
+
+       - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/27 16:41:56
+         [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c ssh.c]
+         fix remote fwding with same listen port but different listen address
+         with gerhard@, ok djm@
+
+commit 9e01ff28664921ce9b6500681333e42fb133b4d0
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Jul 2 15:29:21 2014 +1000
+
+       - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/25 14:16:09
+         [sshbuf.c]
+         unblock SIGSEGV before raising it
+         ok djm
+
+commit 1845fe6bda0729e52f4c645137f4fc3070b5438a
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Jul 2 15:29:01 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/24 02:21:01
+         [scp.c]
+         when copying local->remote fails during read, don't send uninitialised
+         heap to the remote end. Reported by Jann Horn
+
+commit 19439e9a2a0ac0b4b3b1210e89695418beb1c883
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Jul 2 15:28:40 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/24 02:19:48
+         [ssh.c]
+         don't fatal() when hostname canonicalisation fails with a
+         ProxyCommand in use; continue and allow the ProxyCommand to
+         connect anyway (e.g. to a host with a name outside the DNS
+         behind a bastion)
+
+commit 8668706d0f52654fe64c0ca41a96113aeab8d2b8
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Jul 2 15:28:02 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/24 01:13:21
+         [Makefile.in auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-options.c auth-rsa.c
+         [auth2-none.c auth2-pubkey.c authfile.c authfile.h cipher-3des1.c
+         [cipher-chachapoly.c cipher-chachapoly.h cipher.c cipher.h
+         [digest-libc.c digest-openssl.c digest.h dns.c entropy.c hmac.h
+         [hostfile.c key.c key.h krl.c monitor.c packet.c rsa.c rsa.h
+         [ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-ed25519.c
+         [ssh-keygen.c ssh-pkcs11-client.c ssh-pkcs11-helper.c ssh-pkcs11.c
+         [ssh-rsa.c sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf.h sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c
+         [sshconnect2.c sshd.c sshkey.c sshkey.h
+         [openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h]
+         New key API: refactor key-related functions to be more library-like,
+         existing API is offered as a set of wrappers.
+    
+         with and ok markus@
+    
+         Thanks also to Ben Hawkes, David Tomaschik, Ivan Fratric, Matthew
+         Dempsky and Ron Bowes for a detailed review a few months ago.
+    
+         NB. This commit also removes portable OpenSSH support for OpenSSL
+         <0.9.8e.
+
+commit 2cd7929250cf9e9f658d70dcd452f529ba08c942
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Jul 2 12:48:30 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/24 00:52:02
+         [krl.c]
+         fix bug in KRL generation: multiple consecutive revoked certificate
+         serial number ranges could be serialised to an invalid format.
+    
+         Readers of a broken KRL caused by this bug will fail closed, so no
+         should-have-been-revoked key will be accepted.
+
+commit 99db840ee8dbbd2b3fbc6c45d0ee2f6a65e96898
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Jul 2 12:48:04 2014 +1000
+
+       - naddy@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/18 15:42:09
+         [sshbuf-getput-crypto.c]
+         The ssh_get_bignum functions must accept the same range of bignums
+         the corresponding ssh_put_bignum functions create.  This fixes the
+         use of 16384-bit RSA keys (bug reported by Eivind Evensen).
+         ok djm@
+
+commit 84a89161a9629239b64171ef3e22ef6a3e462d51
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Jul 2 12:47:48 2014 +1000
+
+       - matthew@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/18 02:59:13
+         [sandbox-systrace.c]
+         Now that we have a dedicated getentropy(2) system call for
+         arc4random(3), we can disallow __sysctl(2) in OpenSSH's systrace
+         sandbox.
+    
+         ok djm
+
+commit 51504ceec627c0ad57b9f75585c7b3d277f326be
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Jul 2 12:47:25 2014 +1000
+
+       - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/13 08:26:29
+         [sandbox-systrace.c]
+         permit SYS_getentropy
+         from matthew
+
+commit a261b8df59117f7dc52abb3a34b35a40c2c9fa88
+Author: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
+Date:   Wed Jun 18 16:17:28 2014 -0700
+
+     - (tim) [openssh/session.c] Work around to get chroot sftp working on UnixWare
+
+commit 316fac6f18f87262a315c79bcf68b9f92c9337e4
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Tue Jun 17 23:06:07 2014 +1000
+
+     - (dtucker) [entropy.c openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.{c,h}
+       openbsd-compat/regress/{.cvsignore,Makefile.in,opensslvertest.c}]
+       Move the OpenSSL header/library version test into its own function and add
+       tests for it. Fix it to allow fix version upgrades (but not downgrades).
+       Prompted by chl@ via OpenSMTPD (issue #462) and Debian (bug #748150).
+       ok djm@ chl@
+
+commit af665bb7b092a59104db1e65577851cf35b86e32
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Mon Jun 16 22:50:55 2014 +1000
+
+     - (dtucker) [defines.h] Fix undef of _PATH_MAILDIR.  From rak at debian via
+       OpenSMTPD and chl@
+
+commit f9696566fb41320820f3b257ab564fa321bb3751
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Fri Jun 13 11:06:04 2014 +1000
+
+     - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Remove tcpwrappers support, support has already
+       been removed from sshd.c.
+
+commit 5e2b8894b0b24af4ad0a2f7aa33ebf255df7a8bc
+Author: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
+Date:   Wed Jun 11 18:31:10 2014 -0700
+
+     - (tim) [regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.h] Add includes.h for
+       u_intXX_t types.
+
+commit 985ee2cbc3e43bc65827c3c0d4df3faa99160c37
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Thu Jun 12 05:32:29 2014 +1000
+
+     - (dtucker) [regress/unittests/sshbuf/*.c regress/unittests/test_helper/*]
+       Wrap stdlib.h include an ifdef for platforms that don't have it.
+
+commit cf5392c2db2bb1dbef9818511d34056404436109
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Thu Jun 12 05:22:49 2014 +1000
+
+     - (dtucker) [defines.h] Add va_copy if we don't already have it, taken from
+       openbsd-compat/bsd-asprintf.c.
+
+commit 58538d795e0b662f2f4e5a7193f1204bbe992ddd
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Wed Jun 11 13:39:24 2014 +1000
+
+     - (dtucker) [bufaux.c bufbn.c bufec.c buffer.c] Pull in includes.h for
+       compat stuff, specifically whether or not OpenSSL has ECC.
+
+commit eb012ac581fd0abc16ee86ee3a68cf07c8ce4d08
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Wed Jun 11 13:10:00 2014 +1000
+
+     - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/arc4random.c] Use explicit_bzero instead of an
+       assigment that might get optimized out.  ok djm@
+
+commit b9609fd86c623d6d440e630f5f9a63295f7aea20
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Wed Jun 11 08:04:02 2014 +1000
+
+     - (dtucker) [sshbuf.h] Only declare ECC functions if building without
+       OpenSSL or if OpenSSL has ECC.
+
+commit a54a040f66944c6e8913df8635a01a2327219be9
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Wed Jun 11 07:58:35 2014 +1000
+
+       - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/10 21:46:11
+         [sshbuf.h]
+         Group ECC functions together to make things a little easier in -portable.
+         "doesn't bother me" deraadt@
+
+commit 9f92c53bad04a89067756be8198d4ec2d8a08875
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Wed Jun 11 07:57:58 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/05 22:17:50
+         [sshconnect2.c]
+         fix inverted test that caused PKCS#11 keys that were explicitly listed
+         not to be preferred. Reported by Dirk-Willem van Gulik
+
+commit 15c254a25394f96643da2ad0f674acdc51e89856
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Wed Jun 11 07:38:49 2014 +1000
+
+     - (dtucker) [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.c] ifdef
+       ECC variable too.
+
+commit d7af0cc5bf273eeed0897a99420bc26841d07d8f
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Wed Jun 11 07:37:25 2014 +1000
+
+     - (dtucker) [myprosal.h] Don't include curve25519-sha256@libssh.org in
+       the proposal if the version of OpenSSL we're using doesn't support ECC.
+
+commit 67508ac2563c33d582be181a3e777c65f549d22f
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Wed Jun 11 06:27:16 2014 +1000
+
+     - (dtucker) [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.c
+       regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.c] Only do NISTP256
+       curve tests if OpenSSL has them.
+
+commit 6482d90a65459a88c18c925368525855832272b3
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue May 27 14:34:42 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c]
+          [openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h] On Cygwin, determine privilege
+             separation user at runtime, since it may need to be a domain account.
+                Patch from Corinna Vinschen.
+
+commit f9eb5e0734f7a7f6e975809eb54684d2a06a7ffc
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue May 27 14:31:58 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config] Updated Cygwin ssh-host-config
+       from Corinna Vinschen, fixing a number of bugs and preparing for
+       Cygwin 1.7.30.
+
+commit eae88744662e6b149f43ef071657727f1a157d95
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue May 27 14:27:02 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [cipher.c] Fix merge botch.
+
+commit 564b5e253c1d95c26a00e8288f0089a2571661c3
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu May 22 08:23:59 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [Makefile.in] typo in path
+
+commit e84d10302aeaf7a1acb05c451f8718143656856a
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed May 21 17:13:36 2014 +1000
+
+    revert a diff I didn't mean to commit
+
+commit 795b86313f1f1aab9691666c4f2d5dae6e4acd50
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed May 21 17:12:53 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [misc.c] Use CLOCK_BOOTTIME in preference to CLOCK_MONOTONIC
+       when it is available. It takes into account time spent suspended,
+       thereby ensuring timeouts (e.g. for expiring agent keys) fire
+       correctly. bz#2228 reported by John Haxby
+
+commit 18912775cb97c0b1e75e838d3c7d4b56648137b5
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed May 21 17:06:46 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [commit configure.ac defines.h sshpty.c] don't attempt to use
+       vhangup on Linux. It doens't work for non-root users, and for them
+       it just messes up the tty settings.
+
+commit 7f1c264d3049cd95234e91970ccb5406e1d15b27
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu May 15 18:01:52 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [sshbuf.c] need __predict_false
+
+commit e7429f2be8643e1100380a8a7389d85cc286c8fe
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu May 15 18:01:01 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [regress/Makefile Makefile.in]
+       [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf.c
+       [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fixed.c]
+       [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fuzz.c]
+       [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_basic.c]
+       [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.c]
+       [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.c]
+       [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_misc.c]
+       [regress/unittests/sshbuf/tests.c]
+       [regress/unittests/test_helper/fuzz.c]
+       [regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.c]
+       Hook new unit tests into the build and "make tests"
+
+commit def1de086707b0e6b046fe7e115c60aca0227a99
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu May 15 15:17:15 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [regress/unittests/Makefile]
+       [regress/unittests/Makefile.inc]
+       [regress/unittests/sshbuf/Makefile]
+       [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf.c]
+       [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fixed.c]
+       [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fuzz.c]
+       [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_basic.c]
+       [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.c]
+       [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.c]
+       [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_misc.c]
+       [regress/unittests/sshbuf/tests.c]
+       [regress/unittests/test_helper/Makefile]
+       [regress/unittests/test_helper/fuzz.c]
+       [regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.c]
+       [regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.h]
+       Import new unit tests from OpenBSD; not yet hooked up to build.
+
+commit 167685756fde8bc213a8df2c8e1848e312db0f46
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu May 15 15:08:40 2014 +1000
+
+       - logan@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/05/04 10:40:59
+         [connect-privsep.sh]
+         Remove the Z flag from the list of malloc options as it
+         was removed from malloc.c 10 days ago.
+    
+         OK from miod@
+
+commit d0b69fe90466920d69c96069312e24b581771bd7
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu May 15 15:08:19 2014 +1000
+
+       - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/05/03 18:46:14
+         [proxy-connect.sh]
+         Add tests for with and without compression, with and without privsep.
+
+commit edb1af50441d19fb2dd9ccb4d75bf14473fca584
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu May 15 15:07:53 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/21 22:15:37
+         [dhgex.sh integrity.sh kextype.sh rekey.sh try-ciphers.sh]
+         repair regress tests broken by server-side default cipher/kex/mac changes
+         by ensuring that the option under test is included in the server's
+         algorithm list
+
+commit 54343e95c70994695f8842fb22836321350198d3
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu May 15 15:07:33 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/13 20:44:49
+         [login-timeout.sh]
+         this test is a sorry mess of race conditions; add another sleep
+         to avoid a failure on slow machines (at least until I find a
+         better way)
+
+commit e5b9f0f2ee6e133894307e44e862b66426990733
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu May 15 14:58:07 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [Makefile.in configure.ac sshbuf-getput-basic.c]
+       [sshbuf-getput-crypto.c sshbuf.c] compilation and portability fixes
+
+commit b9c566788a9ebd6a9d466f47a532124f111f0542
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu May 15 14:43:37 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [configure.ac] Unconditionally define WITH_OPENSSL until we write
+       portability glue to support building without libcrypto
+
+commit 3dc27178b42234b653a32f7a87292d7994045ee3
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu May 15 14:37:59 2014 +1000
+
+       - logan@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/05/05 07:02:30
+         [sftp.c]
+         Zap extra whitespace.
+    
+         OK from djm@ and dtucker@
+
+commit c31a0cd5b31961f01c5b731f62a6cb9d4f767472
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu May 15 14:37:39 2014 +1000
+
+       - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/05/03 17:20:34
+         [monitor.c packet.c packet.h]
+         unbreak compression, by re-init-ing the compression code in the
+         post-auth child. the new buffer code is more strict, and requires
+         buffer_init() while the old code was happy after a bzero();
+         originally from djm@
+
+commit 686c7d9ee6f44b2be4128d7860b6b37adaeba733
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu May 15 14:37:03 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/05/02 03:27:54
+         [chacha.h cipher-chachapoly.h digest.h hmac.h kex.h kexc25519.c]
+         [misc.h poly1305.h ssh-pkcs11.c defines.h]
+         revert __bounded change; it causes way more problems for portable than
+         it solves; pointed out by dtucker@
+
+commit 294c58a007cfb2f3bddc4fc3217e255857ffb9bf
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu May 15 14:35:03 2014 +1000
+
+       - naddy@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/30 19:07:48
+         [mac.c myproposal.h umac.c]
+         UMAC can use our local fallback implementation of AES when OpenSSL isn't
+         available.  Glue code straight from Ted Krovetz's original umac.c.
+         ok markus@
+
+commit 05e82c3b963c33048128baf72a6f6b3a1c10b4c1
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu May 15 14:33:43 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/30 05:29:56
+         [bufaux.c bufbn.c bufec.c buffer.c buffer.h sshbuf-getput-basic.c]
+         [sshbuf-getput-crypto.c sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf.c sshbuf.h ssherr.c]
+         [ssherr.h]
+         New buffer API; the first installment of the conversion/replacement
+         of OpenSSH's internals to make them usable as a standalone library.
+    
+         This includes a set of wrappers to make it compatible with the
+         existing buffer API so replacement can occur incrementally.
+    
+         With and ok markus@
+    
+         Thanks also to Ben Hawkes, David Tomaschik, Ivan Fratric, Matthew
+         Dempsky and Ron Bowes for a detailed review.
+
+commit 380948180f847a26f2d0c85b4dad3dca2ed2fd8b
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu May 15 14:25:18 2014 +1000
+
+       - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/29 20:36:51
+         [sftp.c]
+         Don't attempt to append a nul quote char to the filename.  Should prevent
+         fatal'ing with "el_insertstr failed" when there's a single quote char
+         somewhere in the string.  bz#2238, ok markus@
+
+commit d7fd8bedd4619a2ec7fd02aae4c4e1db4431ad9f
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu May 15 14:24:59 2014 +1000
+
+       - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/29 19:58:50
+         [sftp.c]
+         Move nulling of variable next to where it's freed.  ok markus@
+
+commit 1f0311c7c7d10c94ff7f823de9c5b2ed79368b14
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu May 15 14:24:09 2014 +1000
+
+       - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/29 18:01:49
+         [auth.c authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c cipher.c cipher.h hostfile.c]
+         [kex.c key.c mac.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c myproposal.h packet.c]
+         [roaming_client.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c]
+         [ssh-pkcs11.h ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
+         make compiling against OpenSSL optional (make OPENSSL=no);
+         reduces algorithms to curve25519, aes-ctr, chacha, ed25519;
+         allows us to explore further options; with and ok djm
+
+commit c5893785564498cea73cb60d2cf199490483e080
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu May 15 13:48:49 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/29 13:10:30
+         [clientloop.c serverloop.c]
+         bz#1818 - don't send channel success/failre replies on channels that
+         have sent a close already; analysis and patch from Simon Tatham;
+         ok markus@
+
+commit 633de33b192d808d87537834c316dc8b75fe1880
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu May 15 13:48:26 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/28 03:09:18
+         [authfile.c bufaux.c buffer.h channels.c krl.c mux.c packet.c packet.h]
+         [ssh-keygen.c]
+         buffer_get_string_ptr's return should be const to remind
+         callers that futzing with it will futz with the actual buffer
+         contents
+
+commit 15271907843e4ae50dcfc83b3594014cf5e9607b
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu May 15 13:47:56 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/23 12:42:34
+         [readconf.c]
+         don't record duplicate IdentityFiles
+
+commit 798a02568b13a2e46efebd81f08c8f4bb33a6dc7
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu May 15 13:47:37 2014 +1000
+
+       - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/22 14:16:30
+         [sftp.1]
+         zap eol whitespace;
+
+commit d875ff78d2b8436807381051de112f0ebf9b9ae1
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu May 15 13:47:15 2014 +1000
+
+       - logan@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/22 12:42:04
+         [sftp.1]
+         Document sftp upload resume.
+         OK from djm@, with feedback from okan@.
+
+commit b15cd7bb097fd80dc99520f45290ef775da1ef19
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu May 15 13:46:52 2014 +1000
+
+       - logan@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/22 10:07:12
+         [sftp.c]
+         Sort the sftp command list.
+         OK from djm@
+
+commit d8accc0aa72656ba63d50937165c5ae49db1dcd6
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu May 15 13:46:25 2014 +1000
+
+       - logan@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/21 14:36:16
+         [sftp-client.c sftp-client.h sftp.c]
+         Implement sftp upload resume support.
+         OK from djm@, with input from guenther@, mlarkin@ and
+         okan@
+
+commit 16cd3928a87d20c77b13592a74b60b08621d3ce6
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu May 15 13:45:58 2014 +1000
+
+       - logan@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/20 09:24:26
+         [dns.c dns.h ssh-keygen.c]
+         Add support for SSHFP DNS records for ED25519 key types.
+         OK from djm@
+
+commit ec0b67eb3b4e12f296ced1fafa01860c374f7eea
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu May 15 13:45:26 2014 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [rijndael.c rijndael.h] Sync with newly-ressurected versions ine
+       OpenBSD
+
+commit f028460d0b2e5a584355321015cde69bf6fd933e
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Thu May 1 02:24:35 2014 +1000
+
+     - (dtucker) [defines.h] Define __GNUC_PREREQ__ macro if we don't already
+       have it.  Only attempt to use __attribute__(__bounded__) for gcc.
+
+commit b628cc4c3e4a842bab5e4584d18c2bc5fa4d0edf
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Apr 20 13:33:58 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/20 02:49:32
+         [compat.c]
+         add a canonical 6.6 + curve25519 bignum fix fake version that I can
+         recommend people use ahead of the openssh-6.7 release
+
+commit 888566913933a802f3a329ace123ebcb7154cf78
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Apr 20 13:33:19 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/20 02:30:25
+         [misc.c misc.h umac.c]
+         use get/put_u32 to load values rather than *((UINT32 *)p) that breaks on
+         strict-alignment architectures; reported by and ok stsp@
+
+commit 16f85cbc7e5139950e6a38317e7c8b368beafa5d
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Apr 20 13:29:28 2014 +1000
+
+       - tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/19 18:42:19
+         [ssh.1]
+         delete .xr to hosts.equiv. there's still an unfortunate amount of
+         documentation referring to rhosts equivalency in here.
+
+commit 69cb24b7356ec3f0fc5ff04a68f98f2c55c766f4
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Apr 20 13:29:06 2014 +1000
+
+       - tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/19 18:15:16
+         [sshd.8]
+         remove some really old rsh references
+
+commit 84c1e7bca8c4ceaccf4d5557e39a833585a3c77e
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Apr 20 13:27:53 2014 +1000
+
+       - tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/19 14:53:48
+         [ssh-keysign.c sshd.c]
+         Delete futile calls to RAND_seed. ok djm
+         NB. Id sync only. This only applies to OpenBSD's libcrypto slashathon
+
+commit 0e6b67423b8662f9ca4c92750309e144fd637ef1
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Apr 20 13:27:01 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/19 05:54:59
+         [compat.c]
+         missing wildcard; pointed out by naddy@
+
+commit 9395b28223334826837c15e8c1bb4dfb3b0d2ca5
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Apr 20 13:25:30 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/18 23:52:25
+         [compat.c compat.h sshconnect2.c sshd.c version.h]
+         OpenSSH 6.5 and 6.6 have a bug that causes ~0.2% of connections
+         using the curve25519-sha256@libssh.org KEX exchange method to fail
+         when connecting with something that implements the spec properly.
+    
+         Disable this KEX method when speaking to one of the affected
+         versions.
+    
+         reported by Aris Adamantiadis; ok markus@
+
+commit 8c492da58f8ceb85cf5f7066f23e26fb813a963d
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Apr 20 13:25:09 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/16 23:28:12
+         [ssh-agent.1]
+         remove the identity files from this manpage - ssh-agent doesn't deal
+         with them at all and the same information is duplicated in ssh-add.1
+         (which does deal with them); prodded by deraadt@
+
+commit adbfdbbdccc70c9bd70d81ae096db115445c6e26
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Apr 20 13:24:49 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/16 23:22:45
+         [bufaux.c]
+         skip leading zero bytes in buffer_put_bignum2_from_string();
+         reported by jan AT mojzis.com; ok markus@
+
+commit 75c62728dc87af6805696eeb520b9748faa136c8
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Apr 20 13:24:31 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/12 04:55:53
+         [sshd.c]
+         avoid crash at exit: check that pmonitor!=NULL before dereferencing;
+         bz#2225, patch from kavi AT juniper.net
+
+commit 2a328437fb1b0976f2f4522d8645803d5a5d0967
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Apr 20 13:24:01 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/01 05:32:57
+         [packet.c]
+         demote a debug3 to PACKET_DEBUG; ok markus@
+
+commit 7d6a9fb660c808882d064e152d6070ffc3844c3f
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Apr 20 13:23:43 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/01 03:34:10
+         [sshconnect.c]
+         When using VerifyHostKeyDNS with a DNSSEC resolver, down-convert any
+         certificate keys to plain keys and attempt SSHFP resolution.
+    
+         Prevents a server from skipping SSHFP lookup and forcing a new-hostkey
+         dialog by offering only certificate keys.
+    
+         Reported by mcv21 AT cam.ac.uk
+
+commit fcd62c0b66b8415405ed0af29c236329eb88cc0f
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Apr 20 13:23:21 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/01 02:05:27
+         [ssh-keysign.c]
+         include fingerprint of key not found
+         use arc4random_buf() instead of loop+arc4random()
+
+commit 43b156cf72f900f88065b0a1c1ebd09ab733ca46
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Apr 20 13:23:03 2014 +1000
+
+       - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/31 13:39:34
+         [ssh-keygen.1]
+         the text for the -K option was inserted in the wrong place in -r1.108;
+         fix From: Matthew Clarke
+
+commit c1621c84f2dc1279065ab9fde2aa9327af418900
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Apr 20 13:22:46 2014 +1000
+
+       - naddy@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/28 05:17:11
+         [ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5]
+         sync available and default algorithms, improve algorithm list formatting
+         help from jmc@ and schwarze@, ok deraadt@
+
+commit f2719b7c2b8a3b14d778d8a6d8dc729b5174b054
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Apr 20 13:22:18 2014 +1000
+
+       - tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/26 19:58:37
+         [sshd.8 sshd.c]
+         remove libwrap support. ok deraadt djm mfriedl
+
+commit 4f40209aa4060b9c066a2f0d9332ace7b8dfb391
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Apr 20 13:21:22 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/26 04:55:35
+         [chacha.h cipher-chachapoly.h digest.h hmac.h kex.h kexc25519.c
+         [misc.h poly1305.h ssh-pkcs11.c]
+         use __bounded(...) attribute recently added to sys/cdefs.h instead of
+         longform __attribute__(__bounded(...));
+    
+         for brevity and a warning free compilation with llvm/clang
+
+commit 9235a030ad1b16903fb495d81544e0f7c7449523
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Apr 20 13:17:20 2014 +1000
+
+    Three commits in one (since they touch the same heavily-diverged file
+    repeatedly):
+    
+       - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/25 09:40:03
+         [myproposal.h]
+         trimm default proposals.
+    
+         This commit removes the weaker pre-SHA2 hashes, the broken ciphers
+         (arcfour), and the broken modes (CBC) from the default configuration
+         (the patch only changes the default, all the modes are still available
+         for the config files).
+    
+         ok djm@, reminded by tedu@ & naddy@ and discussed with many
+       - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/26 17:16:26
+         [myproposal.h]
+         The current sharing of myproposal[] between both client and server code
+         makes the previous diff highly unpallatable.  We want to go in that
+         direction for the server, but not for the client.  Sigh.
+         Brought up by naddy.
+       - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/27 23:01:27
+         [myproposal.h ssh-keyscan.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
+         disable weak proposals in sshd, but keep them in ssh; ok djm@
+
+commit 6e1777f592f15f4559728c78204617537b1ac076
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Apr 20 13:02:58 2014 +1000
+
+       - tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/19 14:42:44
+         [scp.1]
+         there is no need for rcp anymore
+         ok deraadt millert
+
+commit eb1b7c514d2a7b1802ccee8cd50e565a4d419887
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Apr 20 13:02:26 2014 +1000
+
+       - tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/17 19:44:10
+         [ssh.1]
+         old descriptions of des and blowfish are old. maybe ok deraadt
+
+commit f0858de6e1324ec730752387074b111b8551081e
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Apr 20 13:01:30 2014 +1000
+
+       - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/15 17:28:26
+         [ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c]
+         Improve usage() and documentation towards the standard form.
+         In particular, this line saves a lot of man page reading time.
+           usage: ssh-keygen [-q] [-b bits] [-t dsa | ecdsa | ed25519 | rsa | rsa1]
+                             [-N new_passphrase] [-C comment] [-f output_keyfile]
+         ok schwarze jmc
+
+commit 94bfe0fbd6e91a56b5b0ab94ac955d2a67d101aa
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Apr 20 13:00:51 2014 +1000
+
+       - naddy@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/12 13:06:59
+         [ssh-keyscan.1]
+         scan for Ed25519 keys by default too
+
+commit 3819519288b2b3928c6882f5883b0f55148f4fc0
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Apr 20 13:00:28 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/12 04:51:12
+         [authfile.c]
+         correct test that kdf name is not "none" or "bcrypt"
+
+commit 8f9cd709c7cf0655d414306a0ed28306b33802be
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Apr 20 13:00:11 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/12 04:50:32
+         [auth-bsdauth.c ssh-keygen.c]
+         don't count on things that accept arguments by reference to clear
+         things for us on error; most things do, but it's unsafe form.
+
+commit 1c7ef4be83f6dec84509a312518b9df00ab491d9
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Apr 20 12:59:46 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/12 04:44:58
+         [ssh-keyscan.c]
+         scan for Ed25519 keys by default too
+
+commit c10bf4d051c97939b30a1616c0499310057d07da
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Apr 20 12:58:04 2014 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/03 22:22:30
+         [session.c]
+         ignore enviornment variables with embedded '=' or '\0' characters;
+         spotted by Jann Horn; ok deraadt@
+         Id sync only - portable already has this.
+
+commit c2e49062faccbcd7135c40d1c78c5c329c58fc2e
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Apr 1 14:42:46 2014 +1100
+
+     - (djm) Use full release (e.g. 6.5p1) in debug output rather than just
+        version. From des@des.no
+
+commit 14928b7492abec82afa4c2b778fc03f78cd419b6
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Apr 1 14:38:07 2014 +1100
+
+     - (djm) On platforms that support it, use prctl() to prevent sftp-server
+        from accessing /proc/self/{mem,maps}; patch from jann AT thejh.net
+
+commit 48abc47e60048461fe9117e108a7e99ea1ac2bb8
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Mon Mar 17 14:45:56 2014 +1100
+
+     - (djm) [sandbox-seccomp-filter.c] Soft-fail stat() syscalls. Add XXX to
+       remind myself to add sandbox violation logging via the log socket.
+
+commit 9c36698ca2f554ec221dc7ef29c7a89e97c88705
+Author: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
+Date:   Fri Mar 14 12:45:01 2014 -0700
+
+    20140314
+     - (tim) [opensshd.init.in] Add support for ed25519
+
+commit 19158b2447e35838d69b2b735fb640d1e86061ea
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Mar 13 13:14:21 2014 +1100
+
+     - (djm) Release OpenSSH 6.6
+
+commit 8569eba5d7f7348ce3955eeeb399f66f25c52ece
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Mar 4 09:35:17 2014 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/03 22:22:30
+         [session.c]
+         ignore enviornment variables with embedded '=' or '\0' characters;
+         spotted by Jann Horn; ok deraadt@
+
+commit 2476c31b96e89aec7d4e73cb6fbfb9a4290de3a7
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Mar 2 04:01:00 2014 +1100
+
+     - (djm) [regress/Makefile] Disable dhgex regress test; it breaks when
+       no moduli file exists at the expected location.
+
+commit c83fdf30e9db865575b2521b1fe46315cf4c70ae
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Feb 28 10:34:03 2014 +1100
+
+     - (djm) [regress/host-expand.sh] Add RCS Id
+
+commit 834aeac3555e53f7d29a6fcf3db010dfb99681c7
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Feb 28 10:25:16 2014 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/27 21:21:25
+         [agent-ptrace.sh agent.sh]
+         keep return values that are printed in error messages;
+         from portable
+         (Id sync only)
+
+commit 4f7f1a9a0de24410c30952c7e16d433240422182
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Feb 28 10:24:11 2014 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/27 20:04:16
+         [login-timeout.sh]
+         remove any existing LoginGraceTime from sshd_config before adding
+         a specific one for the test back in
+
+commit d705d987c27f68080c8798eeb5262adbdd6b4ffd
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Feb 28 10:23:26 2014 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/26 10:49:17
+         [scp-ssh-wrapper.sh scp.sh]
+         make sure $SCP is tested on the remote end rather than whichever one
+         happens to be in $PATH; from portable
+         (Id sync only)
+
+commit 624a3ca376e3955a4b9d936c9e899e241b65d357
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Feb 28 10:22:37 2014 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/26 10:22:10
+         [regress/cert-hostkey.sh]
+         automatically generate revoked keys from listed keys rather than
+         manually specifying each type; from portable
+         (Id sync only)
+
+commit b84392328425e4b9a71f8bde5fe6a4a4c48d3ec4
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Feb 28 10:21:26 2014 +1100
+
+       - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/25 04:35:32
+         [regress/Makefile regress/dhgex.sh]
+         Add a test for DH GEX sizes
+
+commit 1e2aa3d90472293ea19008f02336d6d68aa05793
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Feb 28 10:19:51 2014 +1100
+
+       - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/20 00:00:30
+         [sftp-chroot.sh]
+         append to rather than truncating the log file
+
+commit f483cc16fe7314e24a37aa3a4422b03c013c3213
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Feb 28 10:19:11 2014 +1100
+
+       - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/19 23:43:02
+         [regress/sftp-chroot.sh]
+         Don't use -q on sftp as it suppresses logging, instead redirect the
+         output to the regress logfile.
+
+commit 6486f16f1c0ebd6f39286f6ab5e08286d90a994a
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Feb 28 10:03:52 2014 +1100
+
+     - (djm) [README contrib/caldera/openssh.spec contrib/redhat/openssh.spec]
+       [contrib/suse/openssh.spec] Crank version numbers
+
+commit 92cf5adea194140380e6af6ec32751f9ad540794
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Feb 28 10:01:53 2014 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/27 22:57:40
+         [version.h]
+         openssh-6.6
+
+commit fc5d6759aba71eb205b296b5f148010ffc828583
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Feb 28 10:01:28 2014 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/27 22:47:07
+         [sshd_config.5]
+         bz#2184 clarify behaviour of a keyword that appears in multiple
+         matching Match blocks; ok dtucker@
+
+commit 172ec7e0af1a5f1d682f6a2dca335c6c186153d5
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Feb 28 10:00:57 2014 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/27 08:25:09
+         [bufbn.c]
+         off by one in range check
+
+commit f9a9aaba437c2787e40cf7cc928281950e161678
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Feb 28 10:00:27 2014 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/27 00:41:49
+         [bufbn.c]
+         fix unsigned overflow that could lead to reading a short ssh protocol
+         1 bignum value; found by Ben Hawkes; ok deraadt@
+
+commit fb3423b612713d9cde67c8a75f6f51188d6a3de3
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Feb 27 10:20:07 2014 +1100
+
+       - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/26 21:53:37
+         [sshd.c]
+         ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids needs GSSAPI
+
+commit 1348129a34f0f7728c34d86c100a32dcc8d1f922
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Feb 27 10:18:32 2014 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/26 20:29:29
+         [channels.c]
+         don't assume that the socks4 username is \0 terminated;
+         spotted by Ben Hawkes; ok markus@
+
+commit e6a74aeeacd01d885262ff8e50eb28faee8c8039
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Feb 27 10:17:49 2014 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/26 20:28:44
+         [auth2-gss.c gss-serv.c ssh-gss.h sshd.c]
+         bz#2107 - cache OIDs of supported GSSAPI mechanisms before privsep
+         sandboxing, as running this code in the sandbox can cause violations;
+         ok markus@
+
+commit 08b57c67f3609340ff703fe2782d7058acf2529e
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Feb 27 10:17:13 2014 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/26 20:18:37
+         [ssh.c]
+         bz#2205: avoid early hostname lookups unless canonicalisation is enabled;
+         ok dtucker@ markus@
+
+commit 13f97b2286142fd0b8eab94e4ce84fe124eeb752
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Mon Feb 24 15:57:55 2014 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/23 20:11:36
+         [readconf.c readconf.h ssh.c ssh_config.5]
+         reparse ssh_config and ~/.ssh/config if hostname canonicalisation changes
+         the hostname. This allows users to write configurations that always
+         refer to canonical hostnames, e.g.
+    
+         CanonicalizeHostname yes
+         CanonicalDomains int.example.org example.org
+         CanonicalizeFallbackLocal no
+    
+         Host *.int.example.org
+             Compression off
+         Host *.example.org
+             User djm
+    
+         ok markus@
+
+commit bee3a234f3d1ad4244952bcff1b4b7c525330dc2
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Mon Feb 24 15:57:22 2014 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/23 20:03:42
+         [ssh-ed25519.c]
+         check for unsigned overflow; not reachable in OpenSSH but others might
+         copy our code...
+
+commit 0628780abe61e7e50cba48cdafb1837f49ff23b2
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Mon Feb 24 15:56:45 2014 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/22 01:32:19
+         [readconf.c]
+         when processing Match blocks, skip 'exec' clauses if previous predicates
+         failed to match; ok markus@
+
+commit 0890dc8191bb201eb01c3429feec0300a9d3a930
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Mon Feb 24 15:56:07 2014 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/15 23:05:36
+         [channels.c]
+         avoid spurious "getsockname failed: Bad file descriptor" errors in ssh -W;
+         bz#2200, debian#738692 via Colin Watson; ok dtucker@
+
+commit d3cf67e1117c25d151d0f86396e77ee3a827045a
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Mon Feb 24 15:55:36 2014 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/07 06:55:54
+         [cipher.c mac.c]
+         remove some logging that makes ssh debugging output very verbose;
+         ok markus
+
+commit 03ae081aeaa118361c81ece76eb7cc1aaa2b40c5
+Author: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
+Date:   Fri Feb 21 09:09:34 2014 -0800
+
+    20140221
+     - (tim) [configure.ac]  Fix cut-and-paste error. Patch from Bryan Drewery.
+
+commit 4a20959d2e3c90e9d66897c0b4032c785672d815
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Thu Feb 13 16:38:32 2014 +1100
+
+     - (dtucker) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.{c,h}]  Add compat
+       code for older OpenSSL versions that don't have EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex.
+
+commit d1a7a9c0fd1ac2e3314cceb2891959fd2cd9eabb
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Feb 7 09:24:33 2014 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/06 22:21:01
+         [sshconnect.c]
+         in ssh_create_socket(), only do the getaddrinfo for BindAddress when
+         BindAddress is actually specified. Fixes regression in 6.5 for
+         UsePrivilegedPort=yes; patch from Corinna Vinschen
+
+commit 6ce35b6cc4ead1bf98abec34cb2e2d6ca0abb15e
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Feb 7 09:24:14 2014 +1100
+
+       - naddy@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/05 20:13:25
+         [ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c]
+         tweak synopsis: calling ssh-keygen without any arguments is fine; ok jmc@
+         while here, fix ordering in usage(); requested by jmc@
+
+commit 6434cb2cfbbf0a46375d2d22f2ff9927feb5e478
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Feb 6 11:17:50 2014 +1100
+
+     - (djm) [sandbox-seccomp-filter.c] Not all Linux architectures define
+        __NR_shutdown; some go via the socketcall(2) multiplexer.
+
+commit 8d36f9ac71eff2e9f5770c0518b73d875f270647
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Thu Feb 6 10:44:13 2014 +1100
+
+     - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.c] Don't bother checking for non-NULL
+       before freeing since free(NULL) is a no-op.  ok djm.
+
+commit a0959da3680b4ce8cf911caf3293a6d90f88eeb7
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Feb 5 10:33:45 2014 +1100
+
+     - (djm) [sandbox-capsicum.c] Don't fatal if Capsicum is offered by
+       headers/libc but not supported by the kernel. Patch from Loganaden
+       Velvindron @ AfriNIC
+
+commit 9c449bc183b256c84d8f740727b0bc54d247b15e
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Feb 4 11:38:28 2014 +1100
+
+     - (djm) [regress/setuid-allowed.c] Missing string.h for strerror()
+
+commit bf7e0f03be661b6f5b3bfe325135ce19391f9c4d
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Feb 4 11:37:50 2014 +1100
+
+     - (djm) [openbsd-compat/Makefile.in] Add missing explicit_bzero.o
+
+commit eb6d870a0ea8661299bb2ea8f013d3ace04e2024
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Feb 4 11:26:34 2014 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/04 00:24:29
+         [ssh.c]
+         delay lowercasing of hostname until right before hostname
+         canonicalisation to unbreak case-sensitive matching of ssh_config;
+         reported by Ike Devolder; ok markus@
+
+commit d56b44d2dfa093883a5c4e91be3f72d99946b170
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Feb 4 11:26:04 2014 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/04 00:24:29
+         [ssh.c]
+         delay lowercasing of hostname until right before hostname
+         canonicalisation to unbreak case-sensitive matching of ssh_config;
+         reported by Ike Devolder; ok markus@
+
+commit db3c595ea74ea9ccd5aa644d7e1f8dc675710731
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Feb 4 11:25:45 2014 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/02 03:44:31
+         [digest-libc.c digest-openssl.c]
+         convert memset of potentially-private data to explicit_bzero()
+
+commit aae07e2e2000dd318418fd7fd4597760904cae32
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Feb 4 11:20:40 2014 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/03 23:28:00
+         [ssh-ecdsa.c]
+         fix memory leak; ECDSA_SIG_new() allocates 'r' and 's' for us, unlike
+         DSA_SIG_new. Reported by Batz Spear; ok markus@
+
+commit a5103f413bde6f31bff85d6e1fd29799c647d765
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Feb 4 11:20:14 2014 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/02 03:44:32
+         [auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2-passwd.c authfile.c bufaux.c bufbn.c]
+         [buffer.c cipher-3des1.c cipher.c clientloop.c gss-serv.c kex.c]
+         [kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexecdhc.c kexgexc.c kexecdhs.c kexgexs.c key.c]
+         [monitor.c monitor_wrap.c packet.c readpass.c rsa.c serverloop.c]
+         [ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-ed25519.c]
+         [ssh-keygen.c ssh-rsa.c sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c]
+         [sshd.c]
+         convert memset of potentially-private data to explicit_bzero()
+
+commit 1d2c4564265ee827147af246a16f3777741411ed
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Feb 4 11:18:20 2014 +1100
+
+       - tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/31 16:39:19
+         [auth2-chall.c authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c bufec.c canohost.c]
+         [channels.c cipher-chachapoly.c clientloop.c configure.ac hostfile.c]
+         [kexc25519.c krl.c monitor.c sandbox-systrace.c session.c]
+         [sftp-client.c ssh-keygen.c ssh.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c sshlogin.c]
+         [openbsd-compat/explicit_bzero.c openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h]
+         replace most bzero with explicit_bzero, except a few that cna be memset
+         ok djm dtucker
+
+commit 3928de067c286683a95fbdbdb5fdb3c78a0e5efd
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Feb 4 11:13:54 2014 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/30 22:26:14
+         [sandbox-systrace.c]
+         allow shutdown(2) syscall in sandbox - it may be called by packet_close()
+         from portable
+         (Id sync only; change is already in portable)
+
+commit e1e480aee8a9af6cfbe7188667b7b940d6b57f9f
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Feb 4 11:13:17 2014 +1100
+
+       - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/29 14:04:51
+         [sshd_config.5]
+         document kbdinteractiveauthentication;
+         requested From: Ross L Richardson
+    
+         dtucker/markus helped explain its workings;
+
+commit 7cc194f70d4a5ec9a82d19422eaf18db4a6624c6
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Feb 4 11:12:56 2014 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/29 06:18:35
+         [Makefile.in auth.h auth2-jpake.c auth2.c jpake.c jpake.h monitor.c]
+         [monitor.h monitor_wrap.c monitor_wrap.h readconf.c readconf.h]
+         [schnorr.c schnorr.h servconf.c servconf.h ssh2.h sshconnect2.c]
+         remove experimental, never-enabled JPAKE code; ok markus@
+
+commit b0f26544cf6f4feeb1a4f6db09fca834f5c9867d
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Feb 4 11:10:01 2014 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/29 00:19:26
+         [sshd.c]
+         use kill(0, ...) instead of killpg(0, ...); on most operating systems
+         they are equivalent, but SUSv2 describes the latter as having undefined
+         behaviour; from portable; ok dtucker
+         (Id sync only; change is already in portable)
+
+commit f8f35bc471500348bb262039fb1fc43175d251b0
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Feb 4 11:09:12 2014 +1100
+
+       - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/28 14:13:39
+         [ssh-keyscan.1]
+         kill some bad Pa;
+         From: Jan Stary
+
+commit 0ba85d696ae9daf66002c2e4ab0d6bb111e1a787
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Feb 4 11:08:38 2014 +1100
+
+    ignore a few more regress droppings
+
+commit ec93d15170b7a6ddf63fd654bd0f6a752acc19dd
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Feb 4 11:07:13 2014 +1100
+
+       - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/27 20:13:46
+         [digest.c digest-openssl.c digest-libc.c Makefile.in]
+         rename digest.c to digest-openssl.c and add libc variant; ok djm@
+
+commit 4a1c7aa640fb97d3472d51b215b6a0ec0fd025c7
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Feb 4 11:03:36 2014 +1100
+
+       - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/27 19:18:54
+         [auth-rsa.c cipher.c ssh-agent.c sshconnect1.c sshd.c]
+         replace openssl MD5 with our ssh_digest_*; ok djm@
+
+commit 4e8d937af79ce4e253f77ec93489d098b25becc3
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Feb 4 11:02:42 2014 +1100
+
+       - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/27 18:58:14
+         [Makefile.in digest.c digest.h hostfile.c kex.h mac.c hmac.c hmac.h]
+         replace openssl HMAC with an implementation based on our ssh_digest_*
+         ok and feedback djm@
+
+commit 69d0d09f76bab5aec86fbf78489169f63bd16475
+Author: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
+Date:   Fri Jan 31 14:25:18 2014 -0800
+
+     - (tim) [Makefile.in] build regress/setuid-allow.
+
+commit 0eeafcd76b972a3d159f3118227c149a4d7817fe
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Fri Jan 31 14:18:51 2014 +1100
+
+     - (dtucker) [readconf.c] Include <arpa/inet.h> for the hton macros.  Fixes
+       build with HP-UX's compiler.  Patch from Kevin Brott.
+
+commit 7e5cec6070673e9f9785ffc749837ada22fbe99f
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Jan 31 09:25:34 2014 +1100
+
+     - (djm) [sandbox-seccomp-filter.c sandbox-systrace.c] Allow shutdown(2)
+       syscall from sandboxes; it may be called by packet_close.
+
+commit cdb6c90811caa5df2df856be9b0b16db020fe31d
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Jan 30 12:50:17 2014 +1100
+
+     - (djm) Release openssh-6.5p1
+
+commit 996ea80b1884b676a901439f1f2681eb6ff68501
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Jan 30 12:49:55 2014 +1100
+
+    trim entries prior to openssh-6.0p1
+
+commit f5bbd3b657b6340551c8a95f74a70857ff8fac79
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Jan 30 11:26:46 2014 +1100
+
+     - (djm) [configure.ac atomicio.c] Kludge around NetBSD offering
+       different symbols for 'read' when various compiler flags are
+       in use, causing atomicio.c comparisons against it to break and
+       read/write operations to hang; ok dtucker
+
+commit c2868192ddc4e1420a50389e18c05db20b0b1f32
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Jan 30 10:21:19 2014 +1100
+
+     - (djm) [configure.ac] Only check for width-specified integer types
+       in headers that actually exist. patch from Tom G. Christensen;
+       ok dtucker@
+
+commit c161fc90fc86e2035710570238a9e1ca7a68d2a5
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Jan 29 21:01:33 2014 +1100
+
+     - (djm) [configure.ac] Fix broken shell test '==' vs '='; patch from
+       Tom G. Christensen
+
+commit 6f917ad376481995ab7d29fb53b08ec8d507eb9e
+Author: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
+Date:   Tue Jan 28 10:26:25 2014 -0800
+
+     - (tim) [regress/agent.sh regress/agent-ptrace.sh] Assign $? to a variable
+       when used as an error message inside an if statement so we display the
+       correct into. agent.sh patch from Petr Lautrbach.
+
+commit ab16ef4152914d44ce6f76e48167d26d22f66a06
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Jan 28 15:08:12 2014 +1100
+
+     - (djm) [sshd.c] Use kill(0, ...) instead of killpg(0, ...); the
+       latter being specified to have undefined behaviour in SUSv3;
+       ok dtucker
+
+commit ab0394905884dc6e58c3721211c6b38fb8fc2ca8
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Jan 28 15:07:10 2014 +1100
+
+     - (djm) [configure.ac] Search for inet_ntop in libnsl and libresovl;
+       ok dtucker
+
+commit 4ab20a82d4d4168d62318923f62382f6ef242fcd
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Mon Jan 27 17:35:04 2014 +1100
+
+     - (dtucker) [Makefile.in] Remove trailing backslash which some make
+       implementations (eg older Solaris) do not cope with.
+
+commit e7e8b3cfe9f8665faaf0e68b33df5bbb431bd129
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Mon Jan 27 17:32:50 2014 +1100
+
+    Welcome to 2014
+
+commit 5b447c0aac0dd444251e276f6bb3bbbe1c05331c
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Jan 26 09:46:53 2014 +1100
+
+     - (djm) [configure.ac] correct AC_DEFINE for previous.
+
+commit 2035b2236d3b1f76c749c642a43e03c85eae76e6
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Jan 26 09:39:53 2014 +1100
+
+      - (djm) [configure.ac sandbox-capsicum.c sandbox-rlimit.c] Disable
+        RLIMIT_NOFILE pseudo-sandbox on FreeBSD. In some configurations,
+        libc will attempt to open additional file descriptors for crypto
+        offload and crash if they cannot be opened.
+
+commit a92ac7410475fbb00383c7402aa954dc0a75ae19
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Jan 26 09:38:03 2014 +1100
+
+       - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/25 20:35:37
+         [kex.c]
+         dh_need needs to be set to max(seclen, blocksize, ivlen, mac_len)
+         ok dtucker@, noted by mancha
+
+commit 76eea4ab4e658670ca6e76dd1e6d17f262208b57
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Jan 26 09:37:25 2014 +1100
+
+       - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/25 10:12:50
+         [cipher.c cipher.h kex.c kex.h kexgexc.c]
+         Add a special case for the DH group size for 3des-cbc, which has an
+         effective strength much lower than the key size.  This causes problems
+         with some cryptlib implementations, which don't support group sizes larger
+         than 4k but also don't use the largest group size it does support as
+         specified in the RFC.  Based on a patch from Petr Lautrbach at Redhat,
+         reduced by me with input from Markus.  ok djm@ markus@
+
+commit 603b8f47f1cd9ed95a2017447db8e60ca6704594
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sat Jan 25 13:16:59 2014 +1100
+
+     - (djm) [configure.ac] autoconf sets finds to 'yes' not '1', so test
+       against the correct thing.
+
+commit c96d85376d779b6ac61525b5440010d344d2f23f
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sat Jan 25 13:12:28 2014 +1100
+
+     - (djm) [configure.ac] Do not attempt to use capsicum sandbox unless
+       sys/capability.h exists and cap_rights_limit is in libc. Fixes
+       build on FreeBSD9x which provides the header but not the libc
+       support.
+
+commit f62ecef9939cb3dbeb10602fd705d4db3976d822
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sat Jan 25 12:34:38 2014 +1100
+
+     - (djm) [configure.ac] Fix detection of capsicum sandbox on FreeBSD
+
+commit b0e0f760b861676a3fe5c40133b270713d5321a9
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Jan 24 14:27:04 2014 +1100
+
+     - (djm) [Makefile.in regress/scp-ssh-wrapper.sh regress/scp.sh] Make
+       the scp regress test actually test the built scp rather than the one
+       in $PATH. ok dtucker@
+
+commit 42a092530159637da9cb7f9e1b5f4679e34a85e6
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Thu Jan 23 23:14:39 2014 +1100
+
+     - (dtucker) [configure.ac] NetBSD's (and FreeBSD's) strnvis is gratuitously
+       incompatible with OpenBSD's despite post-dating it by more than a decade.
+       Declare it as broken, and document FreeBSD's as the same.  ok djm@
+
+commit 617da33c20cb59f9ea6c99c881d92493371ef7b8
+Author: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
+Date:   Wed Jan 22 19:16:10 2014 -0800
+
+     - (tim) [session.c] Improve error reporting on set_id().
+
+commit 5c2ff5e31f57d303ebb414d84a934c02728fa568
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Jan 22 21:30:12 2014 +1100
+
+     - (djm) [configure.ac aclocal.m4] More tests to detect fallout from
+       platform hardening options: include some long long int arithmatic
+       to detect missing support functions for -ftrapv in libgcc and
+       equivalents, actually test linking when -ftrapv is supplied and
+       set either both -pie/-fPIE or neither. feedback and ok dtucker@
+
+commit 852472a54b8a0dc3e53786b313baaa86850a4273
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Jan 22 16:31:18 2014 +1100
+
+     - (djm) [configure.ac] Unless specifically requested, only attempt
+       to build Position Independent Executables on gcc >= 4.x; ok dtucker
+
+commit ee87838786cef0194db36ae0675b3e7c4e8ec661
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Jan 22 16:30:15 2014 +1100
+
+     - (djm) [openbsd-compat/setproctitle.c] Don't fail to compile if a
+       platform that is expected to use the reuse-argv style setproctitle
+       hack surprises us by providing a setproctitle in libc; ok dtucker
+
+commit 5c96a154c7940fa67b1f11c421e390dbbc159f27
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Jan 21 13:10:26 2014 +1100
+
+     - (djm) [aclocal.m4] Flesh out the code run in the OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE
+       and OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK tests to give them a better chance of
+       detecting toolchain-related problems; ok dtucker
+
+commit 9464ba6fb34bb42eb3501ec3c5143662e75674bf
+Author: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
+Date:   Mon Jan 20 17:59:28 2014 -0800
+
+     - (tim) [platform.c session.c] Fix bug affecting SVR5 platforms introduced
+       with sftp chroot support. Move set_id call after chroot.
+
+commit a6d573caa14d490e6c42fb991bcb5c6860ec704b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Tue Jan 21 12:50:46 2014 +1100
+
+     - (dtucker) [aclocal.m4] Differentiate between compile-time and link-time
+       tests in the configure output.  ok djm.
+
+commit 096118dc73ab14810b3c12785c0b5acb01ad6123
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Tue Jan 21 12:48:51 2014 +1100
+
+     - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Make PIE a configure-time option which defaults
+       to on platforms where it's known to be reliably detected and off elsewhere.
+       Works around platforms such as FreeBSD 9.1 where it does not interop with
+       -ftrapv (it seems to work but fails when trying to link ssh).  ok djm@
+
+commit f9df7f6f477792254eab33cdef71a6d66488cb88
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Mon Jan 20 20:07:15 2014 +1100
+
+     - (djm) [regress/cert-hostkey.sh] Fix regress failure on platforms that
+        skip one or more key types (e.g. RHEL/CentOS 6.5); ok dtucker@
+
+commit c74e70eb52ccc0082bd5a70b5798bb01c114d138
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Mon Jan 20 13:18:09 2014 +1100
+
+    - (dtucker) [gss-serv-krb5.c] Fall back to krb5_cc_gen_new if the Kerberos
+       implementation does not have krb5_cc_new_unique, similar to what we do
+       in auth-krb5.c.
+
+commit 3510979e83b6a18ec8773c64c3fa04aa08b2e783
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Mon Jan 20 12:41:53 2014 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/20 00:08:48
+         [digest.c]
+         memleak; found by Loganaden Velvindron @ AfriNIC; ok markus@
+
+commit 7eee358d7a6580479bee5cd7e52810ebfd03e5b2
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Sun Jan 19 22:37:02 2014 +1100
+
+       - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/19 11:21:51
+         [addrmatch.c]
+         Cast the sizeof to socklen_t so it'll work even if the supplied len is
+         negative.  Suggested by and ok djm, ok deraadt.
+
+commit b7e01c09b56ab26e8fac56bbce0fd25e36d12bb0
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Sun Jan 19 22:36:13 2014 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/19 04:48:08
+         [ssh_config.5]
+         fix inverted meaning of 'no' and 'yes' for CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
+
+commit 7b1ded04adce42efa25ada7c3a39818d3109b724
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Sun Jan 19 15:30:02 2014 +1100
+
+       - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/19 04:17:29
+         [canohost.c addrmatch.c]
+         Cast socklen_t when comparing to size_t and use socklen_t to iterate over
+         the ip options, both to prevent signed/unsigned comparison warnings.
+         Patch from vinschen at redhat via portable openssh, begrudging ok deraadt.
+
+commit 293ee3c9f0796d99ebb033735f0e315f2e0180bf
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Sun Jan 19 15:28:01 2014 +1100
+
+       - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/18 09:36:26
+         [session.c]
+         explicitly define USE_PIPES to 1 to prevent redefinition warnings in
+         portable on platforms that use pipes for everything.  From redhat @
+         redhat.
+
+commit 2aca159d05f9e7880d1d8f1ce49a218840057f53
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Sun Jan 19 15:25:34 2014 +1100
+
+       - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/17 06:23:24
+         [sftp-server.c]
+         fix log message statvfs.  ok djm
+
+commit 841f7da89ae8b367bb502d61c5c41916c6e7ae4c
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Sat Jan 18 22:12:15 2014 +1100
+
+     - (dtucker) [sandbox-capsicum.c] Correct some error messages and make the
+       return value check for cap_enter() consistent with the other uses in
+       FreeBSD.  From by Loganaden Velvindron @ AfriNIC via bz#2140.
+
+commit fdce3731660699b2429e93e822f2ccbaccd163ae
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Sat Jan 18 21:12:42 2014 +1100
+
+     - (dtucker) [configure.ac] On Cygwin the getopt variables (like optargs,
+       optind) are defined in getopt.h already.  Unfortunately they are defined as
+       "declspec(dllimport)" for historical reasons, because the GNU linker didn't
+       allow auto-import on PE/COFF targets way back when.  The problem is the
+       dllexport attributes collide with the definitions in the various source
+       files in OpenSSH, which obviousy define the variables without
+       declspec(dllimport).  The least intrusive way to get rid of these warnings
+       is to disable warnings for GCC compiler attributes when building on Cygwin.
+       Patch from vinschen at redhat.com.
+
+commit 1411c9263f46e1ee49d0d302bf7258ebe69ce827
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Sat Jan 18 21:03:59 2014 +1100
+
+     - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h] Add missing function
+       declarations that stopped being included when we stopped including
+       <windows.h> from openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h.  Patch from vinschen at
+       redhat.com.
+
+commit 89c532d843c95a085777c66365067d64d1937eb9
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Sat Jan 18 20:43:49 2014 +1100
+
+     - (dtucker) [uidswap.c] Prevent unused variable warnings on Cygwin.  Patch
+       from vinschen at redhat.com
+
+commit 355f861022be7b23d3009fae8f3c9f6f7fc685f7
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Sat Jan 18 00:12:38 2014 +1100
+
+     - (dtucker) [defines.h] Move our definitions of uintXX_t types down to after
+       they're defined if we have to define them ourselves.  Fixes builds on old
+       AIX.
+
+commit a3357661ee1d5d553294f36e4940e8285c7f1332
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Sat Jan 18 00:03:57 2014 +1100
+
+     - (dtucker) [readconf.c] Wrap paths.h inside an ifdef.  Allows building on
+       Solaris.
+
+commit 9edcbff46ff01c8d5dee9c1aa843f09e9ad8a80e
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Fri Jan 17 21:54:32 2014 +1100
+
+     - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Have --without-toolchain-hardening not turn off
+       stack-protector since that has a separate flag that's been around a while.
+
+commit 6d725687c490d4ba957a1bbc0ba0a2956c09fa69
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Fri Jan 17 19:17:34 2014 +1100
+
+     - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Also look in inttypes.h for uintXX_t types.
+
+commit 5055699c7f7c7ef21703a443ec73117da392f6ae
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Fri Jan 17 18:48:22 2014 +1100
+
+     - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h] Only start including headers if we
+       need them to cut down on the name collisions.
+
+commit a5cf1e220def07290260e4125e74f41ac75cf88d
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Fri Jan 17 18:10:58 2014 +1100
+
+     - (dtucker) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.c
+       openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h] Implement enough of statvfs on top of statfs
+       to be useful (and for the regression tests to pass) on platforms that
+       have statfs and fstatfs.  ok djm@
+
+commit 1357d71d7b6d269969520aaa3e84d312ec971d5b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Fri Jan 17 18:00:40 2014 +1100
+
+     - (dtucker) Fix typo in #ifndef.
+
+commit d23a91ffb289d3553a58b7a60cec39fba9f0f506
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Fri Jan 17 17:32:30 2014 +1100
+
+     - (dtucker) [configure.ac digest.c openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
+       openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h]  Add compatibility layer for older
+       openssl versions.  ok djm@
+
+commit 868ea1ea1c1bfdbee5dbad78f81999c5983ecf31
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Jan 17 16:47:04 2014 +1100
+
+     - (djm) [Makefile.in configure.ac sandbox-capsicum.c sandbox-darwin.c]
+       [sandbox-null.c sandbox-rlimit.c sandbox-seccomp-filter.c]
+       [sandbox-systrace.c ssh-sandbox.h sshd.c] Support preauth sandboxing
+       using the Capsicum API introduced in FreeBSD 10. Patch by Dag-Erling
+       Smorgrav, updated by Loganaden Velvindron @ AfriNIC; ok dtucker@
+
+commit a9d186a8b50d18869a10e9203abf71c83ddb1f79
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Fri Jan 17 16:30:49 2014 +1100
+
+       - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/17 05:26:41
+         [digest.c]
+         remove unused includes.  ok djm@
+
+commit 5f1c57a7a7eb39c0e4fee3367712337dbcaef024
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Fri Jan 17 16:29:45 2014 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/17 00:21:06
+         [sftp-client.c]
+         signed/unsigned comparison warning fix; from portable (Id sync only)
+
+commit c548722361d89fb12c108528f96b306a26477b18
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Fri Jan 17 15:12:16 2014 +1100
+
+     - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Split AC_CHECK_FUNCS for OpenSSL functions into
+       separate lines and alphabetize for easier diffing of changes.
+
+commit acad351a5b1c37de9130c9c1710445cc45a7f6b9
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Fri Jan 17 14:20:05 2014 +1100
+
+     - (dtucker) [defines.h] Add typedefs for uintXX_t types for platforms that
+       don't have them.
+
+commit c3ed065ce8417aaa46490836648c173a5010f226
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Fri Jan 17 14:18:45 2014 +1100
+
+     - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/bcrypt_pbkdf.c] Wrap stdlib.h include inside
+       #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H.
+
+commit f45f78ae437062c7d9506c5f475b7215f486be44
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Fri Jan 17 12:43:43 2014 +1100
+
+     - (dtucker) [blocks.c fe25519.c ge25519.c hash.c sc25519.c verify.c] Include
+       includes.h to pull in all of the compatibility stuff.
+
+commit 99df369d0340caac145d57f700d830147ff18b87
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Fri Jan 17 12:42:17 2014 +1100
+
+     - (dtucker) [poly1305.c] Wrap stdlib.h include inside #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H.
+
+commit ac413b62ea1957e80c711acbe0c11b908273fc01
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Fri Jan 17 12:31:33 2014 +1100
+
+     - (dtucker) [crypto_api.h] Wrap stdlib.h include inside #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H.
+
+commit 1c4a011e9c939e74815346a560843e1862c300b8
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Fri Jan 17 12:23:23 2014 +1100
+
+     - (dtucker) [loginrec.c] Cast to the types specfied in the format
+        specification to prevent warnings.
+
+commit c3d483f9a8275be1113535a1e0d0e384f605f3c4
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Jan 17 11:20:26 2014 +1100
+
+     - (djm) [sftp-client.c] signed/unsigned comparison fix
+
+commit fd994379dd972417d0491767f7cd9b5bf23f4975
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Fri Jan 17 09:53:24 2014 +1100
+
+     - (dtucker) [aclocal.m4 configure.ac] Add some additional compiler/toolchain
+       hardening flags including -fstack-protector-strong.  These default to on
+       if the toolchain supports them, but there is a configure-time knob
+       (--without-hardening) to disable them if necessary.  ok djm@
+
+commit 366224d21768ee8ec28cfbcc5fbade1b32582d58
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Jan 16 18:51:44 2014 +1100
+
+     - (djm) [README] update release notes URL.
+
+commit 2ae77e64f8fa82cbf25c9755e8e847709b978b40
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Jan 16 18:51:07 2014 +1100
+
+     - (djm) [contrib/caldera/openssh.spec contrib/redhat/openssh.spec]
+       [contrib/suse/openssh.spec] Crank RPM spec version numbers.
+
+commit 0fa29e6d777c73a1b4ddd3b996b06ee20022ae8a
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Jan 16 18:42:31 2014 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/16 07:32:00
+         [version.h]
+         openssh-6.5
+
+commit 52c371cd6d2598cc73d4e633811b3012119c47e2
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Jan 16 18:42:10 2014 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/16 07:31:09
+         [sftp-client.c]
+         needless and incorrect cast to size_t can break resumption of
+         large download; patch from tobias@
+
+commit 91b580e4bec55118bf96ab3cdbe5a50839e75d0a
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Jan 12 19:21:22 2014 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/12 08:13:13
+         [bufaux.c buffer.h kex.c kex.h kexc25519.c kexc25519c.c kexc25519s.c]
+         [kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c]
+         avoid use of OpenSSL BIGNUM type and functions for KEX with
+         Curve25519 by adding a buffer_put_bignum2_from_string() that stores
+         a string using the bignum encoding rules. Will make it easier to
+         build a reduced-feature OpenSSH without OpenSSL in the future;
+         ok markus@
+
+commit af5d4481f4c7c8c3c746e68b961bb85ef907800e
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Jan 12 19:20:47 2014 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/10 05:59:19
+         [sshd_config]
+         the /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key is loaded by default too
+
+commit 58cd63bc63038acddfb4051ed14e11179d8f4941
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Jan 10 10:59:24 2014 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/09 23:26:48
+         [sshconnect.c sshd.c]
+         ban clients/servers that suffer from SSH_BUG_DERIVEKEY, they are ancient,
+         deranged and might make some attacks on KEX easier; ok markus@
+
+commit b3051d01e505c9c2dc00faab472a0d06fa6b0e65
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Jan 10 10:58:53 2014 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/09 23:20:00
+         [digest.c digest.h hostfile.c kex.c kex.h kexc25519.c kexc25519c.c]
+         [kexc25519s.c kexdh.c kexecdh.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c kexgex.c kexgexc.c]
+         [kexgexs.c key.c key.h roaming_client.c roaming_common.c schnorr.c]
+         [schnorr.h ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-rsa.c sshconnect2.c]
+         Introduce digest API and use it to perform all hashing operations
+         rather than calling OpenSSL EVP_Digest* directly. Will make it easier
+         to build a reduced-feature OpenSSH without OpenSSL in future;
+         feedback, ok markus@
+
+commit e00e413dd16eb747fb2c15a099971d91c13cf70f
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Jan 10 10:40:45 2014 +1100
+
+       - guenther@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/09 03:26:00
+         [sftp-common.c]
+         When formating the time for "ls -l"-style output, show dates in the future
+         with the year, and rearrange a comparison to avoid a potentional signed
+         arithmetic overflow that would give the wrong result.
+    
+         ok djm@
+
+commit 3e49853650448883685cfa32fa382d0ba6d51d48
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Jan 10 10:37:05 2014 +1100
+
+       - tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/04 17:50:55
+         [mac.c monitor_mm.c monitor_mm.h xmalloc.c]
+         use standard types and formats for size_t like variables. ok dtucker
+
+commit a9c1e500ef609795cbc662848edb1a1dca279c81
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Jan 8 16:13:12 2014 +1100
+
+     - (djm) [regress/.cvsignore] Ignore regress test droppings; ok dtucker@
+
+commit 324541e5264e1489ca0babfaf2b39612eb80dfb3
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Dec 31 12:25:40 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/30 23:52:28
+         [auth2-hostbased.c auth2-pubkey.c compat.c compat.h ssh-rsa.c]
+         [sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
+         refuse RSA keys from old proprietary clients/servers that use the
+         obsolete RSA+MD5 signature scheme. it will still be possible to connect
+         with these clients/servers but only DSA keys will be accepted, and we'll
+         deprecate them entirely in a future release. ok markus@
+
+commit 9f4c8e797ea002a883307ca906f1f1f815010e78
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Dec 29 17:57:46 2013 +1100
+
+     - (djm) [regress/Makefile] Add some generated files for cleaning
+
+commit 106bf1ca3c7a5fdc34f9fd7a1fe651ca53085bc5
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Dec 29 17:54:03 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/29 05:57:02
+         [sshconnect.c]
+         when showing other hostkeys, don't forget Ed25519 keys
+
+commit 0fa47cfb32c239117632cab41e4db7d3e6de5e91
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Dec 29 17:53:39 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/29 05:42:16
+         [ssh.c]
+         don't forget to load Ed25519 certs too
+
+commit b9a95490daa04cc307589897f95bfaff324ad2c9
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Dec 29 17:50:15 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/29 04:35:50
+         [authfile.c]
+         don't refuse to load Ed25519 certificates
+
+commit f72cdde6e6fabc51d2a62f4e75b8b926d9d7ee89
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Dec 29 17:49:55 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/29 04:29:25
+         [authfd.c]
+         allow deletion of ed25519 keys from the agent
+
+commit 29ace1cb68cc378a464c72c0fd67aa5f9acd6b5b
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Dec 29 17:49:31 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/29 04:20:04
+         [key.c]
+         to make sure we don't omit any key types as valid CA keys again,
+         factor the valid key type check into a key_type_is_valid_ca()
+         function
+
+commit 9de4fcdc5a9cff48d49a3e2f6194d3fb2d7ae34d
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Dec 29 17:49:13 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/29 02:49:52
+         [key.c]
+         correct comment for key_drop_cert()
+
+commit 5baeacf8a80f054af40731c6f92435f9164b8e02
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Dec 29 17:48:55 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/29 02:37:04
+         [key.c]
+         correct comment for key_to_certified()
+
+commit 83f2fe26cb19330712c952eddbd3c0b621674adc
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Dec 29 17:48:38 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/29 02:28:10
+         [key.c]
+         allow ed25519 keys to appear as certificate authorities
+
+commit 06122e9a74bb488b0fe0a8f64e1135de870f9cc0
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Dec 29 17:48:15 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/27 22:37:18
+         [ssh-rsa.c]
+         correct comment
+
+commit 3e19295c3a253c8dc8660cf45baad7f45fccb969
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Dec 29 17:47:50 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/27 22:30:17
+         [ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-rsa.c]
+         make the original RSA and DSA signing/verification code look more like
+         the ECDSA/Ed25519 ones: use key_type_plain() when checking the key type
+         rather than tediously listing all variants, use __func__ for debug/
+         error messages
+
+commit 137977180be6254639e2c90245763e6965f8d815
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Dec 29 17:47:14 2013 +1100
+
+       - tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/21 07:10:47
+         [ssh-keygen.1]
+         small typo
+
+commit 339a48fe7ffb3186d22bbaa9efbbc3a053e602fd
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Dec 29 17:46:49 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/19 22:57:13
+         [poly1305.c poly1305.h]
+         use full name for author, with his permission
+
+commit 0b36c83148976c7c8268f4f41497359e2fb26251
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Dec 29 17:45:51 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/19 01:19:41
+         [ssh-agent.c]
+         bz#2186: don't crash (NULL deref) when deleting PKCS#11 keys from an agent
+         that has a mix of normal and PKCS#11 keys; fix from jay AT slushpupie.com;
+         ok dtucker
+
+commit 4def184e9b6c36be6d965a9705632fc4c0c2a8af
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Dec 29 17:45:26 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/19 01:04:36
+         [channels.c]
+         bz#2147: fix multiple remote forwardings with dynamically assigned
+         listen ports. In the s->c message to open the channel we were sending
+         zero (the magic number to request a dynamic port) instead of the actual
+         listen port. The client therefore had no way of discriminating between
+         them.
+    
+         Diagnosis and fix by ronf AT timeheart.net
+
+commit bf25d114e23a803f8feca8926281b1aaedb6191b
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Dec 29 17:44:56 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/19 00:27:57
+         [auth-options.c]
+         simplify freeing of source-address certificate restriction
+
+commit bb3dafe7024a5b4e851252e65ee35d45b965e4a8
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Dec 29 17:44:29 2013 +1100
+
+       - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/19 00:19:12
+         [serverloop.c]
+         Cast client_alive_interval to u_int64_t before assinging to
+         max_time_milliseconds to avoid potential integer overflow in the timeout.
+         bz#2170, patch from Loganaden Velvindron, ok djm@
+
+commit ef275ead3dcadde4db1efe7a0aa02b5e618ed40c
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Dec 29 17:44:07 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/19 00:10:30
+         [ssh-add.c]
+         skip requesting smartcard PIN when removing keys from agent; bz#2187
+         patch from jay AT slushpupie.com; ok dtucker
+
+commit 7d97fd9a1cae778c3eacf16e09f5da3689d616c6
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Dec 29 17:40:18 2013 +1100
+
+     - (djm) [loginrec.c] Check for username truncation when looking up lastlog
+       entries
+
+commit 77244afe3b6d013b485e0952eaab89b9db83380f
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Sat Dec 21 17:02:39 2013 +1100
+
+    20131221
+     - (dtucker) [regress/keytype.sh] Actually test ecdsa key types.
+
+commit 53f8e784dc431a82d31c9b0e95b144507f9330e9
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Thu Dec 19 11:31:44 2013 +1100
+
+     - (dtucker) [auth-pam.c] bz#2163: check return value from pam_get_item().
+       Patch from Loganaden Velvindron.
+
+commit 1fcec9d4f265e38af248c4c845986ca8c174bd68
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Thu Dec 19 11:00:12 2013 +1100
+
+     - (dtucker) [configure.ac] bz#2178: Don't try to use BSM on Solaris versions
+       greater than 11 either rather than just 11.  Patch from Tomas Kuthan.
+
+commit 6674eb9683afd1ea4eb35670b5e66815543a759e
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Dec 18 17:50:39 2013 +1100
+
+       - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/17 10:36:38
+         [crypto_api.h]
+         I've assempled the header file by cut&pasting from generated headers
+         and the source files.
+
+commit d58a5964426ee014384d67d775d16712e93057f3
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Dec 18 17:50:13 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/15 21:42:35
+         [cipher-chachapoly.c]
+         add some comments and constify a constant
+
+commit 059321d19af24d87420de3193f79dfab23556078
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Dec 18 17:49:48 2013 +1100
+
+       - pascal@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/15 18:17:26
+         [ssh-add.c]
+         Make ssh-add also add .ssh/id_ed25519; fixes lie in manual page.
+         ok markus@
+
+commit 155b5a5bf158767f989215479ded2a57f331e1c6
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Dec 18 17:48:32 2013 +1100
+
+       - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/09 11:08:17
+         [crypto_api.h]
+         remove unused defines
+
+commit 8a56dc2b6b48b05590810e7f4c3567508410000c
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Dec 18 17:48:11 2013 +1100
+
+       - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/09 11:03:45
+         [blocks.c ed25519.c fe25519.c fe25519.h ge25519.c ge25519.h]
+         [ge25519_base.data hash.c sc25519.c sc25519.h verify.c]
+         Add Authors for the public domain ed25519/nacl code.
+         see also http://nacl.cr.yp.to/features.html
+            All of the NaCl software is in the public domain.
+         and http://ed25519.cr.yp.to/software.html
+            The Ed25519 software is in the public domain.
+
+commit 6575c3acf31fca117352f31f37b16ae46e664837
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Dec 18 17:47:02 2013 +1100
+
+       - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/08 09:53:27
+         [sshd_config.5]
+         Use a literal for the default value of KEXAlgorithms.  ok deraadt jmc
+
+commit 8ba0ead6985ea14999265136b14ffd5aeec516f9
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Dec 18 17:46:27 2013 +1100
+
+       - naddy@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/07 11:58:46
+         [ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keyscan.1 ssh-keysign.8 ssh.1]
+         [ssh_config.5 sshd.8 sshd_config.5]
+         add missing mentions of ed25519; ok djm@
+
+commit 4f752cf71cf44bf4bc777541156c2bf56daf9ce9
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Dec 18 17:45:35 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/07 08:08:26
+         [ssh-keygen.1]
+         document -a and -o wrt new key format
+
+commit 6d6fcd14e23a9053198342bb379815b15e504084
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Dec 8 15:53:28 2013 +1100
+
+     - (djm) [Makefile.in regress/Makefile regress/agent-ptrace.sh]
+       [regress/setuid-allowed.c] Check that ssh-agent is not on a no-setuid
+       filesystem before running agent-ptrace.sh; ok dtucker
+
+commit 7e6e42fb532c7dafd7078ef5e9e2d3e47fcf6752
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Dec 8 08:23:08 2013 +1100
+
+     - (djm) [openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.c] Missing header; from Corinna
+        Vinschen
+
+commit da3ca351b49d52ae85db2e3998265dc3c6617068
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sat Dec 7 21:43:46 2013 +1100
+
+     - (djm) [Makefile.in] PATHSUBS and keygen bits for Ed25519; from
+        Loganaden Velvindron @ AfriNIC in bz#2179
+
+commit eb401585bb8336cbf81fe4fc58eb9f7cac3ab874
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sat Dec 7 17:07:15 2013 +1100
+
+     - (djm) [regress/cert-hostkey.sh] Fix merge botch
+
+commit f54542af3ad07532188b10136ae302314ec69ed6
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sat Dec 7 16:32:44 2013 +1100
+
+       - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/06 13:52:46
+         [regress/Makefile regress/agent.sh regress/cert-hostkey.sh]
+         [regress/cert-userkey.sh regress/keytype.sh]
+         test ed25519 support; from djm@
+
+commit f104da263de995f66b6861b4f3368264ee483d7f
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sat Dec 7 12:37:53 2013 +1100
+
+     - (djm) [ed25519.c ssh-ed25519.c openbsd-compat/Makefile.in]
+        [openbsd-compat/bcrypt_pbkdf.c] Make ed25519/new key format compile on
+           Linux
+
+commit 1ff130dac9b7aea0628f4ad30683431fe35e0020
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sat Dec 7 11:51:51 2013 +1100
+
+     - [configure.ac openbsd-compat/Makefile.in openbsd-compat/bcrypt_pbkdf.c]
+       [openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/blowfish.c]
+       [openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h] Start at supporting bcrypt_pbkdf in
+       portable.
+
+commit 4260828a2958ebe8c96f66d8301dac53f4cde556
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sat Dec 7 11:38:03 2013 +1100
+
+     - [authfile.c] Conditionalise inclusion of util.h
+
+commit a913442bac8a26fd296a3add51293f8f6f9b3b4c
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sat Dec 7 11:35:36 2013 +1100
+
+     - [Makefile.in] Add ed25519 sources
+
+commit ca570a519cb846da61d002c7f46fa92e39c83e45
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sat Dec 7 11:29:09 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/07 00:19:15
+         [key.c]
+         set k->cert = NULL after freeing it
+
+commit 3cccc0e155229a2f2d86b6df40bd4559b4f960ff
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sat Dec 7 11:27:47 2013 +1100
+
+     - [blocks.c ed25519.c fe25519.c fe25519.h ge25519.c ge25519.h]
+       [ge25519_base.data hash.c sc25519.c sc25519.h verify.c] Fix RCS idents
+
+commit a7827c11b3f0380b7e593664bd62013ff9c131db
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sat Dec 7 11:24:30 2013 +1100
+
+       - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/06 15:29:07
+         [sshd.8]
+         missing comma;
+
+commit 5be9d9e3cbd9c66f24745d25bf2e809c1d158ee0
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sat Dec 7 11:24:01 2013 +1100
+
+       - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/06 13:39:49
+         [authfd.c authfile.c key.c key.h myproposal.h pathnames.h readconf.c]
+         [servconf.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.1 ssh-keyscan.c]
+         [ssh-keysign.c ssh.c ssh_config.5 sshd.8 sshd.c verify.c ssh-ed25519.c]
+         [sc25519.h sc25519.c hash.c ge25519_base.data ge25519.h ge25519.c]
+         [fe25519.h fe25519.c ed25519.c crypto_api.h blocks.c]
+         support ed25519 keys (hostkeys and user identities) using the public
+         domain ed25519 reference code from SUPERCOP, see
+         http://ed25519.cr.yp.to/software.html
+         feedback, help & ok djm@
+
+commit bcd00abd8451f36142ae2ee10cc657202149201e
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sat Dec 7 10:41:55 2013 +1100
+
+       - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/06 13:34:54
+         [authfile.c authfile.h cipher.c cipher.h key.c packet.c ssh-agent.c]
+         [ssh-keygen.c PROTOCOL.key] new private key format, bcrypt as KDF by
+         default; details in PROTOCOL.key; feedback and lots help from djm;
+         ok djm@
+
+commit f0e9060d236c0e38bec2fa1c6579fb0a2ea6458d
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sat Dec 7 10:40:26 2013 +1100
+
+       - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/06 13:30:08
+         [authfd.c key.c key.h ssh-agent.c]
+         move private key (de)serialization to key.c; ok djm
+
+commit 0f8536da23a6ef26e6495177c0d8a4242b710289
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sat Dec 7 10:31:37 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/06 03:40:51
+         [ssh-keygen.c]
+         remove duplicated character ('g') in getopt() string;
+         document the (few) remaining option characters so we don't have to
+         rummage next time.
+
+commit 393920745fd328d3fe07f739a3cf7e1e6db45b60
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sat Dec 7 10:31:08 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/05 22:59:45
+         [sftp-client.c]
+         fix memory leak in error path in do_readdir(); pointed out by
+         Loganaden Velvindron @ AfriNIC in bz#2163
+
+commit 534b2ccadea5e5e9a8b27226e6faac3ed5552e97
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Dec 5 14:07:27 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/05 01:16:41
+         [servconf.c servconf.h]
+         bz#2161 - fix AuthorizedKeysCommand inside a Match block and
+         rearrange things so the same error is harder to make next time;
+         with and ok dtucker@
+
+commit 8369c8e61a3408ec6bb75755fad4ffce29b5fdbe
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Thu Dec 5 11:00:16 2013 +1100
+
+     - (dtucker) [configure.ac] bz#2173: use pkg-config --libs to include correct
+       -L location for libedit.  Patch from Serge van den Boom.
+
+commit 9275df3e0a2a3bc3897f7d664ea86a425c8a092d
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Dec 5 10:26:32 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/04 04:20:01
+         [sftp-client.c]
+         bz#2171: don't leak local_fd on error; from Loganaden Velvindron @
+         AfriNIC
+
+commit 960f6a2b5254e4da082d8aa3700302ed12dc769a
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Dec 5 10:26:14 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/02 03:13:14
+         [cipher.c]
+         correct bzero of chacha20+poly1305 key context. bz#2177 from
+         Loganaden Velvindron @ AfriNIC
+    
+         Also make it a memset for consistency with the rest of cipher.c
+
+commit f7e8a8796d661c9d6692ab837e1effd4f5ada1c2
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Dec 5 10:25:51 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/02 03:09:22
+         [key.c]
+         make key_to_blob() return a NULL blob on failure; part of
+         bz#2175 from Loganaden Velvindron @ AfriNIC
+
+commit f1e44ea9d9a6d4c1a95a0024132e603bd1778c9c
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Dec 5 10:23:21 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/02 02:56:17
+         [ssh-pkcs11-helper.c]
+         use-after-free; bz#2175 patch from Loganaden Velvindron @ AfriNIC
+
+commit 114e540b15d57618f9ebf624264298f80bbd8c77
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Dec 5 10:22:57 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/02 02:50:27
+         [PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305]
+         typo; from Jon Cave
+
+commit e4870c090629e32f2cb649dc16d575eeb693f4a8
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Dec 5 10:22:39 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/01 23:19:05
+         [PROTOCOL]
+         mention curve25519-sha256@libssh.org key exchange algorithm
+
+commit 1d2f8804a6d33a4e908b876b2e1266b8260ec76b
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Dec 5 10:22:03 2013 +1100
+
+       - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/26 19:15:09
+         [pkcs11.h]
+         cleanup 1 << 31 idioms.  Resurrection of this issue pointed out by
+         Eitan Adler ok markus for ssh, implies same change in kerberosV
+
+commit bdb352a54f82df94a548e3874b22f2d6ae90328d
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Dec 5 10:20:52 2013 +1100
+
+       - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/26 12:14:54
+         [ssh.1 ssh.c]
+         - put -Q in the right place
+         - Ar was a poor choice for the arguments to -Q. i've chosen an
+           admittedly equally poor Cm, at least consistent with the rest
+           of the docs. also no need for multiple instances
+         - zap a now redundant Nm
+         - usage() sync
+
+commit d937dc084a087090f1cf5395822c3ac958d33759
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Dec 5 10:19:54 2013 +1100
+
+       - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/25 18:04:21
+         [ssh.1 ssh.c]
+         improve -Q usage and such.  One usage change is that the option is now
+         case-sensitive
+         ok dtucker markus djm
+
+commit dec0393f7ee8aabc7d9d0fc2c5fddb4bc649112e
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Dec 5 10:18:43 2013 +1100
+
+       - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/21 08:05:09
+         [ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5]
+         no need for .Pp before displays;
+
+commit 8a073cf57940aabf85e49799f89f5d5e9b072c1b
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Nov 21 14:26:18 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/21 03:18:51
+         [regress/cipher-speed.sh regress/integrity.sh regress/rekey.sh]
+         [regress/try-ciphers.sh]
+         use new "ssh -Q cipher-auth" query to obtain lists of authenticated
+         encryption ciphers instead of specifying them manually; ensures that
+         the new chacha20poly1305@openssh.com mode is tested;
+    
+         ok markus@ and naddy@ as part of the diff to add
+         chacha20poly1305@openssh.com
+
+commit ea61b2179f63d48968dd2c9617621002bb658bfe
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Nov 21 14:25:15 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/21 03:16:47
+         [regress/modpipe.c]
+         use unsigned long long instead of u_int64_t here to avoid warnings
+         on some systems portable OpenSSH is built on.
+
+commit 36aba25b0409d2db6afc84d54bc47a2532d38424
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Nov 21 14:24:42 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/21 03:15:46
+         [regress/krl.sh]
+         add some reminders for additional tests that I'd like to implement
+
+commit fa7a20bc289f09b334808d988746bc260a2f60c9
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Nov 21 14:24:08 2013 +1100
+
+       - naddy@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/18 05:09:32
+         [regress/forward-control.sh]
+         bump timeout to 10 seconds to allow slow machines (e.g. Alpha PC164)
+         to successfully run this; ok djm@
+         (ID sync only; our timeouts are already longer)
+
+commit 0fde8acdad78a4d20cadae974376cc0165f645ee
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Nov 21 14:12:23 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/21 00:45:44
+         [Makefile.in PROTOCOL PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305 authfile.c chacha.c]
+         [chacha.h cipher-chachapoly.c cipher-chachapoly.h cipher.c cipher.h]
+         [dh.c myproposal.h packet.c poly1305.c poly1305.h servconf.c ssh.1]
+         [ssh.c ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5] Add a new protocol 2 transport
+         cipher "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com" that combines Daniel
+         Bernstein's ChaCha20 stream cipher and Poly1305 MAC to build an
+         authenticated encryption mode.
+    
+         Inspired by and similar to Adam Langley's proposal for TLS:
+         http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-03
+         but differs in layout used for the MAC calculation and the use of a
+         second ChaCha20 instance to separately encrypt packet lengths.
+         Details are in the PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305 file.
+    
+         Feedback markus@, naddy@; manpage bits Loganden Velvindron @ AfriNIC
+         ok markus@ naddy@
+
+commit fdb2306acdc3eb2bc46b6dfdaaf6005c650af22a
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Nov 21 13:57:15 2013 +1100
+
+       - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/20 20:54:10
+         [canohost.c clientloop.c match.c readconf.c sftp.c]
+         unsigned casts for ctype macros where neccessary
+         ok guenther millert markus
+
+commit e00167307e4d3692695441e9bd712f25950cb894
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Nov 21 13:56:49 2013 +1100
+
+       - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/20 20:53:10
+         [scp.c]
+         unsigned casts for ctype macros where neccessary
+         ok guenther millert markus
+
+commit 23e00aa6ba9eee0e0c218f2026bf405ad4625832
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Nov 21 13:56:28 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/20 02:19:01
+         [sshd.c]
+         delay closure of in/out fds until after "Bad protocol version
+         identification..." message, as get_remote_ipaddr/get_remote_port
+         require them open.
+
+commit 867e6934be6521f87f04a5ab86702e2d1b314245
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Nov 21 13:56:06 2013 +1100
+
+       - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/13 13:48:20
+         [ssh-pkcs11.c]
+         add missing braces found by pedro
+
+commit 0600c7020f4fe68a780bd7cf21ff541a8d4b568a
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Nov 21 13:55:43 2013 +1100
+
+       - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/08 11:15:19
+         [bufaux.c bufbn.c buffer.c sftp-client.c sftp-common.c sftp-glob.c]
+         [uidswap.c] Include stdlib.h for free() as per the man page.
+
+commit b6a75b0b93b8faa6f79c3a395ab6c71f3f880b80
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Sun Nov 10 20:25:22 2013 +1100
+
+     - (dtucker) [regress/keytype.sh] Populate ECDSA key types to be tested by
+       querying the ones that are compiled in.
+
+commit 2c89430119367eb1bc96ea5ee55de83357e4c926
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Sun Nov 10 12:38:42 2013 +1100
+
+     - (dtucker) [key.c] Check for the correct defines for NID_secp521r1.
+
+commit dd5264db5f641dbd03186f9e5e83e4b14b3d0003
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Sat Nov 9 22:32:51 2013 +1100
+
+     - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Add missing "test".
+
+commit 95cb2d4eb08117be061f3ff076adef3e9a5372c3
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Sat Nov 9 22:02:31 2013 +1100
+
+     - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Fix brackets in NID_secp521r1 test.
+
+commit 37bcef51b3d9d496caecea6394814d2f49a1357f
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Sat Nov 9 18:39:25 2013 +1100
+
+     - (dtucker) [configure.ac kex.c key.c myproposal.h] Test for the presence of
+       NID_X9_62_prime256v1, NID_secp384r1 and NID_secp521r1 and test that the
+       latter actually works before using it.  Fedora (at least) has NID_secp521r1
+       that doesn't work (see https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1021897).
+
+commit 6e2fe81f926d995bae4be4a6b5b3c88c1c525187
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Sat Nov 9 16:55:03 2013 +1100
+
+       - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/09 05:41:34
+         [regress/test-exec.sh regress/rekey.sh]
+         Use smaller test data files to speed up tests.  Grow test datafiles
+         where necessary for a specific test.
+
+commit aff7ef1bb8b7c1eeb1f4812129091c5adbf51848
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Sat Nov 9 00:19:22 2013 +1100
+
+     - (dtucker) [contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config] Simplify host key generation:
+       rather than testing and generating each key, call ssh-keygen -A.
+       Patch from vinschen at redhat.com.
+
+commit 882abfd3fb3c98cfe70b4fc79224770468b570a5
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Sat Nov 9 00:17:41 2013 +1100
+
+     - (dtucker) [Makefile.in configure.ac] Set MALLOC_OPTIONS per platform
+       and pass in TEST_ENV.  Unknown options cause stderr to get polluted
+       and the stderr-data test to fail.
+
+commit 8c333ec23bdf7da917aa20ac6803a2cdd79182c5
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Fri Nov 8 21:12:58 2013 +1100
+
+     - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.c] Add headers to prevent compile
+       warnings.
+
+commit d94240b2f6b376b6e9de187e4a0cd4b89dfc48cb
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Fri Nov 8 21:10:04 2013 +1100
+
+     - (dtucker) [myproposal.h] Conditionally enable CURVE25519_SHA256.
+
+commit 1c8ce34909886288a3932dce770deec5449f7bb5
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Fri Nov 8 19:50:32 2013 +1100
+
+     - (dtucker) [kex.c] Only enable CURVE25519_SHA256 if we actually have
+       EVP_sha256.
+
+commit ccdb9bec46bcc88549b26a94aa0bae2b9f51031c
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Fri Nov 8 18:54:38 2013 +1100
+
+     - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h] Add null implementation of
+       arc4random_stir for platforms that have arc4random but don't have
+       arc4random_stir (right now this is only OpenBSD -current).
+
+commit 3420a50169b52cc8d2775d51316f9f866c73398f
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Nov 8 16:48:13 2013 +1100
+
+     - (djm) [README contrib/caldera/openssh.spec contrib/redhat/openssh.spec]
+       [contrib/suse/openssh.spec] Update version numbers following release.
+
+commit 3ac4a234df842fd8c94d9cb0ad198e1fe84b895b
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Nov 8 12:39:49 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/08 01:38:11
+         [version.h]
+         openssh-6.4
+
+commit 6c81fee693038de7d4a5559043350391db2a2761
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Nov 8 12:19:55 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/08 00:39:15
+         [auth-options.c auth2-chall.c authfd.c channels.c cipher-3des1.c]
+         [clientloop.c gss-genr.c monitor_mm.c packet.c schnorr.c umac.c]
+         [sftp-client.c sftp-glob.c]
+         use calloc for all structure allocations; from markus@
+
+commit 690d989008e18af3603a5e03f1276c9bad090370
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Nov 8 12:16:49 2013 +1100
+
+       - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/07 11:58:27
+         [cipher.c cipher.h kex.c kex.h mac.c mac.h servconf.c ssh.c]
+         Output the effective values of Ciphers, MACs and KexAlgorithms when
+         the default has not been overridden.  ok markus@
+
+commit 08998c5fb9c7c1d248caa73b76e02ca0482e6d85
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Fri Nov 8 12:11:46 2013 +1100
+
+        - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/08 01:06:14
+          [regress/rekey.sh]
+          Rekey less frequently during tests to speed them up
+
+commit 4bf7e50e533aa956366df7402c132f202e841a48
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Thu Nov 7 22:33:48 2013 +1100
+
+     - (dtucker) [Makefile.in configure.ac] Remove TEST_SSH_SHA256 environment
+       variable.  It's no longer used now that we get the supported MACs from
+       ssh -Q.
+
+commit 6e9d6f411288374d1dee4b7debbfa90bc7e73035
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Thu Nov 7 15:32:37 2013 +1100
+
+       - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/07 04:26:56
+         [regress/kextype.sh]
+         trailing space
+
+commit 74cbc22529f3e5de756e1b7677b7624efb28f62c
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Thu Nov 7 15:26:12 2013 +1100
+
+       - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/07 03:55:41
+         [regress/kextype.sh]
+         Use ssh -Q to get kex types instead of a static list.
+
+commit a955041c930e63405159ff7d25ef14272f36eab3
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Thu Nov 7 15:21:19 2013 +1100
+
+       - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/07 02:48:38
+         [regress/integrity.sh regress/cipher-speed.sh regress/try-ciphers.sh]
+         Use ssh -Q instead of hardcoding lists of ciphers or MACs.
+
+commit 06595d639577577bc15d359e037a31eb83563269
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Thu Nov 7 15:08:02 2013 +1100
+
+       - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/07 01:12:51
+         [regress/rekey.sh]
+         Factor out the data transfer rekey tests
+
+commit 651dc8b2592202dac6b16ee3b82ce5b331be7da3
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Thu Nov 7 15:04:44 2013 +1100
+
+       - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/07 00:12:05
+         [regress/rekey.sh]
+         Test rekeying for every Cipher, MAC and KEX, plus test every KEX with
+         the GCM ciphers.
+
+commit 234557762ba1096a867ca6ebdec07efebddb5153
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Thu Nov 7 15:00:51 2013 +1100
+
+       - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/04 12:27:42
+         [regress/rekey.sh]
+         Test rekeying with all KexAlgorithms.
+
+commit bbfb9b0f386aab0c3e19d11f136199ef1b9ad0ef
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Thu Nov 7 14:56:43 2013 +1100
+
+       - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/02 22:39:53
+         [regress/kextype.sh]
+         add curve25519-sha256@libssh.org
+
+commit aa19548a98c0f89283ebd7354abd746ca6bc4fdf
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Thu Nov 7 14:50:09 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/09 23:44:14
+         [regress/Makefile] (ID sync only)
+         regression test for sftp request white/blacklisting and readonly mode.
+
+commit c8908aabff252f5da772d4e679479c2b7d18cac1
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Nov 7 13:38:35 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/06 23:05:59
+         [ssh-pkcs11.c]
+         from portable: s/true/true_val/ to avoid name collisions on dump platforms
+         RCSID sync only
+
+commit 49c145c5e89b9d7d48e84328d6347d5ad640b567
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Nov 7 13:35:39 2013 +1100
+
+       - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/06 16:52:11
+         [monitor_wrap.c]
+         fix rekeying for AES-GCM modes; ok deraadt
+
+commit 67a8800f290b39fd60e379988c700656ae3f2539
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Nov 7 13:32:51 2013 +1100
+
+       - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/04 11:51:16
+         [monitor.c]
+         fix rekeying for KEX_C25519_SHA256; noted by dtucker@
+         RCSID sync only; I thought this was a merge botch and fixed it already
+
+commit df8b030b15fcec7baf38ec7944f309f9ca8cc9a7
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Nov 7 13:28:16 2013 +1100
+
+     - (djm) [configure.ac defines.h] Skip arc4random_stir() calls on platforms
+       that lack it but have arc4random_uniform()
+
+commit a6fd1d3c38a562709374a70fa76423859160aa90
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Nov 7 12:03:26 2013 +1100
+
+     - (djm) [regress/modpipe.c regress/rekey.sh] Never intended to commit these
+
+commit c98319750b0bbdd0d1794420ec97d65dd9244613
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Nov 7 12:00:23 2013 +1100
+
+     - (djm) [Makefile.in monitor.c] Missed chunks of curve25519 KEX diff
+
+commit 61c5c2319e84a58210810d39b062c8b8e3321160
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Nov 7 11:34:14 2013 +1100
+
+     - (djm) [ssh-pkcs11.c] Bring back "non-constant initialiser" fix (rev 1.5)
+       that got lost in recent merge.
+
+commit 094003f5454a9f5a607674b2739824a7e91835f4
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Mon Nov 4 22:59:27 2013 +1100
+
+     - (djm) [kexc25519.c kexc25519c.c kexc25519s.c] Import missed files from
+       KEX/curve25519 change
+
+commit ca67a7eaf8766499ba67801d0be8cdaa550b9a50
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Mon Nov 4 09:05:17 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/03 10:37:19
+         [roaming_common.c]
+         fix a couple of function definitions foo() -> foo(void)
+         (-Wold-style-definition)
+
+commit 0bd8f1519d51af8d4229be81e8f2f4903a1d440b
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Mon Nov 4 08:55:43 2013 +1100
+
+       - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/02 22:39:19
+         [ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5]
+         the default kex is now curve25519-sha256@libssh.org
+
+commit 4c3ba0767fbe4a8a2a748df4035aaf86651f6b30
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Mon Nov 4 08:40:13 2013 +1100
+
+       - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/02 22:34:01
+         [auth-options.c]
+         no need to include monitor_wrap.h and ssh-gss.h
+
+commit 660621b2106b987b874c2f120218bec249d0f6ba
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Mon Nov 4 08:37:51 2013 +1100
+
+       - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/02 22:24:24
+         [kexdhs.c kexecdhs.c]
+         no need to include ssh-gss.h
+
+commit abdca986decfbbc008c895195b85e879ed460ada
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Mon Nov 4 08:30:05 2013 +1100
+
+       - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/02 22:10:15
+         [kexdhs.c kexecdhs.c]
+         no need to include monitor_wrap.h
+
+commit 1e1242604eb0fd510fe93f81245c529237ffc513
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Mon Nov 4 08:26:52 2013 +1100
+
+       - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/02 21:59:15
+         [kex.c kex.h myproposal.h ssh-keyscan.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
+         use curve25519 for default key exchange (curve25519-sha256@libssh.org);
+         initial patch from Aris Adamantiadis; ok djm@
+
+commit d2252c79191d069372ed6effce7c7a2de93448cd
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Mon Nov 4 07:41:48 2013 +1100
+
+       - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/02 20:03:54
+         [ssh-pkcs11.c]
+         support pkcs#11 tokes that only provide x509 zerts instead of raw pubkeys;
+         fixes bz#1908; based on patch from Laurent Barbe; ok djm
+
+commit 007e3b357e880caa974d5adf9669298ba0751c78
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Sun Nov 3 18:43:55 2013 +1100
+
+     - (dtucker) [configure.ac defines.h] Add typedefs for intmax_t and uintmax_t
+       for platforms that don't have them.
+
+commit 710f3747352fb93a63e5b69b12379da37f5b3fa9
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Sun Nov 3 17:20:34 2013 +1100
+
+     - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/setproctitle.c] Handle error case form the 2nd
+       vsnprintf.  From eric at openbsd via chl@.
+
+commit d52770452308e5c2e99f4da6edaaa77ef078b610
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Sun Nov 3 16:30:46 2013 +1100
+
+     - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c] Include time.h for nanosleep.
+       From OpenSMTPD where it prevents "implicit declaration" warnings (it's
+       a no-op in OpenSSH).  From chl at openbsd.
+
+commit 63857c9340d3482746a5622ffdacc756751f6448
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Oct 30 22:31:06 2013 +1100
+
+       - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/29 18:49:32
+         [sshd_config.5]
+         pty(4), not pty(7);
+
+commit 5ff30c6b68adeee767dd29bf2369763c6a13c0b3
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Oct 30 22:21:50 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/29 09:48:02
+         [servconf.c servconf.h session.c sshd_config sshd_config.5]
+         shd_config PermitTTY to disallow TTY allocation, mirroring the
+         longstanding no-pty authorized_keys option;
+         bz#2070, patch from Teran McKinney; ok markus@
+
+commit 4a3a9d4bbf8048473f5cc202cd8db7164d5e6b8d
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Oct 30 22:19:47 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/29 09:42:11
+         [key.c key.h]
+         fix potential stack exhaustion caused by nested certificates;
+         report by Mateusz Kocielski; ok dtucker@ markus@
+
+commit 28631ceaa7acd9bc500f924614431542893c6a21
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sat Oct 26 10:07:56 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/25 23:04:51
+         [ssh.c]
+         fix crash when using ProxyCommand caused by previous commit - was calling
+         freeaddrinfo(NULL); spotted by sthen@ and Tim Ruehsen, patch by sthen@
+
+commit 26506ad29350c5681815745cc90b3952a84cf118
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sat Oct 26 10:05:46 2013 +1100
+
+     - (djm) [ssh-keygen.c ssh-keysign.c sshconnect1.c sshd.c] Remove
+       unnecessary arc4random_stir() calls. The only ones left are to ensure
+       that the PRNG gets a different state after fork() for platforms that
+       have broken the API.
+
+commit bd43e8872325e9bbb3319c89da593614709f317c
+Author: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
+Date:   Thu Oct 24 12:22:49 2013 -0700
+
+     - (tim) [regress/sftp-perm.sh] We need a shell that understands "! somecmd"
+
+commit a90c0338083ee0e4064c4bdf61f497293a699be0
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Oct 24 21:03:17 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/24 08:19:36
+         [ssh.c]
+         fix bug introduced in hostname canonicalisation commit: don't try to
+         resolve hostnames when a ProxyCommand is set unless the user has forced
+         canonicalisation; spotted by Iain Morgan
+
+commit cf31f3863425453ffcda540fbefa9df80088c8d1
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Oct 24 21:02:56 2013 +1100
+
+       - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/24 00:51:48
+         [readconf.c servconf.c ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5]
+         Disallow empty Match statements and add "Match all" which matches
+         everything.  ok djm, man page help jmc@
+
+commit 4bedd4032a09ce87322ae5ea80f193f109e5c607
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Oct 24 21:02:26 2013 +1100
+
+       - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/24 00:49:49
+         [moduli.c]
+         Periodically print progress and, if possible, expected time to completion
+         when screening moduli for DH groups.  ok deraadt djm
+
+commit 5ecb41629860687b145be63b8877fabb6bae5eda
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Oct 24 21:02:02 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/23 23:35:32
+         [sshd.c]
+         include local address and port in "Connection from ..." message (only
+         shown at loglevel>=verbose)
+
+commit 03bf2e61ad6ac59a362a1f11b105586cb755c147
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Oct 24 21:01:26 2013 +1100
+
+       - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/23 05:40:58
+         [servconf.c]
+         fix comment
+
+commit 8f1873191478847773906af961c8984d02a49dd6
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Oct 24 10:53:02 2013 +1100
+
+     - (djm) [auth-krb5.c] bz#2032 - use local username in krb5_kuserok check
+       rather than full client name which may be of form user@REALM;
+       patch from Miguel Sanders; ok dtucker@
+
+commit 5b01b0dcb417eb615df77e7ce1b59319bf04342c
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Oct 23 16:31:31 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/23 04:16:22
+         [ssh-keygen.c]
+         Make code match documentation: relative-specified certificate expiry time
+         should be relative to current time and not the validity start time.
+         Reported by Petr Lautrbach; ok deraadt@
+
+commit eff5cada589f25793dbe63a76aba9da39837a148
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Oct 23 16:31:10 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/23 03:05:19
+         [readconf.c ssh.c]
+         comment
+
+commit 084bcd24e9fe874020e4df4e073e7408e1b17fb7
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Oct 23 16:30:51 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/23 03:03:07
+         [readconf.c]
+         Hostname may have %h sequences that should be expanded prior to Match
+         evaluation; spotted by Iain Morgan
+
+commit 8e5a67f46916def40b2758bb7755350dd2eee843
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Oct 23 16:30:25 2013 +1100
+
+       - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/20 18:00:13
+         [ssh_config.5]
+         tweak the "exec" description, as worded by djm;
+
+commit c0049bd0bca02890cd792babc594771c563f91f2
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Oct 23 16:29:59 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/20 09:51:26
+         [scp.1 sftp.1]
+         add canonicalisation options to -o lists
+
+commit 8a04be795fc28514a09e55a54b2e67968f2e1b3a
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Oct 23 16:29:40 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/20 06:19:28
+         [readconf.c ssh_config.5]
+         rename "command" subclause of the recently-added "Match" keyword to
+         "exec"; it's shorter, clearer in intent and we might want to add the
+         ability to match against the command being executed at the remote end in
+         the future.
+
+commit 5c86ebdf83b636b6741db4b03569ef4a53b89a58
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Oct 23 16:29:12 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/20 04:39:28
+         [ssh_config.5]
+         document % expansions performed by "Match command ..."
+
+commit 4502f88774edc56194707167443f94026d3c7cfa
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Oct 18 10:17:36 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/17 22:08:04
+         [sshd.c]
+         include remote port in bad banner message; bz#2162
+
+commit 1edcbf65ebd2febeaf10a836468f35e519eed7ca
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Oct 18 10:17:17 2013 +1100
+
+       - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/17 07:35:48
+         [sftp.1 sftp.c]
+         tweak previous;
+
+commit a176e1823013dd8533a20235b3a5131f0626f46b
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Oct 18 09:05:41 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/09 23:44:14
+         [regress/Makefile regress/sftp-perm.sh]
+         regression test for sftp request white/blacklisting and readonly mode.
+
+commit e3ea09494dcfe7ba76536e95765c8328ecfc18fb
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Oct 17 11:57:23 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/17 00:46:49
+         [ssh.c]
+         rearrange check to reduce diff against -portable
+         (Id sync only)
+
+commit f29238e67471a7f1088a99c3c3dbafce76b790cf
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Oct 17 11:48:52 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/17 00:30:13
+         [PROTOCOL sftp-client.c sftp-client.h sftp-server.c sftp.1 sftp.c]
+         fsync@openssh.com protocol extension for sftp-server
+         client support to allow calling fsync() faster successful transfer
+         patch mostly by imorgan AT nas.nasa.gov; bz#1798
+         "fine" markus@ "grumble OK" deraadt@ "doesn't sound bad to me" millert@
+
+commit 51682faa599550a69d8120e5e2bdbdc0625ef4be
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Oct 17 11:48:31 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/16 22:58:01
+         [ssh.c ssh_config.5]
+         one I missed in previous: s/isation/ization/
+
+commit 3850559be93f1a442ae9ed370e8c389889dd5f72
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Oct 17 11:48:13 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/16 22:49:39
+         [readconf.c readconf.h ssh.1 ssh.c ssh_config.5]
+         s/canonicalise/canonicalize/ for consistency with existing spelling,
+         e.g. authorized_keys; pointed out by naddy@
+
+commit 607af3434b75acc7199a5d99d5a9c11068c01f27
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Oct 17 11:47:51 2013 +1100
+
+       - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/16 06:42:25
+         [ssh_config.5]
+         tweak previous;
+
+commit 0faf747e2f77f0f7083bcd59cbed30c4b5448444
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Oct 17 11:47:23 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/16 02:31:47
+         [readconf.c readconf.h roaming_client.c ssh.1 ssh.c ssh_config.5]
+         [sshconnect.c sshconnect.h]
+         Implement client-side hostname canonicalisation to allow an explicit
+         search path of domain suffixes to use to convert unqualified host names
+         to fully-qualified ones for host key matching.
+         This is particularly useful for host certificates, which would otherwise
+         need to list unqualified names alongside fully-qualified ones (and this
+         causes a number of problems).
+         "looks fine" markus@
+
+commit d77b81f856e078714ec6b0f86f61c20249b7ead4
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Oct 17 11:39:00 2013 +1100
+
+       - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/15 14:10:25
+         [ssh.1 ssh_config.5]
+         tweak previous;
+
+commit dcd39f29ce3308dc74a0ff27a9056205a932ce05
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Oct 17 11:31:40 2013 +1100
+
+     - [ssh.c] g/c unused variable.
+
+commit 5359a628ce3763408da25d83271a8eddec597a0c
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Oct 15 12:20:37 2013 +1100
+
+     - [ssh.c] g/c unused variable.
+
+commit 386feab0c4736b054585ee8ee372865d5cde8d69
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Oct 15 12:14:49 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/14 23:31:01
+         [ssh.c]
+         whitespace at EOL; pointed out by markus@
+
+commit e9fc72edd6c313b670558cd5219601c38a949b67
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Oct 15 12:14:12 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/14 23:28:23
+         [canohost.c misc.c misc.h readconf.c sftp-server.c ssh.c]
+         refactor client config code a little:
+         add multistate option partsing to readconf.c, similar to servconf.c's
+         existing code.
+         move checking of options that accept "none" as an argument to readconf.c
+         add a lowercase() function and use it instead of explicit tolower() in
+         loops
+         part of a larger diff that was ok markus@
+
+commit 194fd904d8597a274b93e075b2047afdf5a175d4
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Oct 15 12:13:05 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/14 22:22:05
+         [readconf.c readconf.h ssh-keysign.c ssh.c ssh_config.5]
+         add a "Match" keyword to ssh_config that allows matching on hostname,
+         user and result of arbitrary commands. "nice work" markus@
+
+commit 71df752de2a04f423b1cd18d961a79f4fbccbcee
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Oct 15 12:12:02 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/14 21:20:52
+         [session.c session.h]
+         Add logging of session starts in a useful format; ok markus@ feedback and
+         ok dtucker@
+
+commit 6efab27109b82820e8d32a5d811adb7bfc354f65
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Oct 15 12:07:05 2013 +1100
+
+       - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/14 14:18:56
+         [sftp-server.8 sftp-server.c]
+         tweak previous;
+         ok djm
+
+commit 61c7de8a94156f6d7e9718ded9be8c65bb902b66
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Oct 15 12:06:45 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/11 02:53:45
+         [sftp-client.h]
+         obsolete comment
+
+commit 2f93d0556e4892208c9b072624caa8cc5ddd839d
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Oct 15 12:06:27 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/11 02:52:23
+         [sftp-client.c]
+         missed one arg reorder
+
+commit bda5c8445713ae592d969a5105ed1a65da22bc96
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Oct 15 12:05:58 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/11 02:45:36
+         [sftp-client.c]
+         rename flag arguments to be more clear and consistent.
+         reorder some internal function arguments to make adding additional flags
+         easier.
+         no functional change
+
+commit 61ee4d68ca0fcc793a826fc7ec70f3b8ffd12ab6
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Oct 15 11:56:47 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/10 01:43:03
+         [sshd.c]
+         bz#2139: fix re-exec fallback by ensuring that startup_pipe is correctly
+         updated; ok dtucker@
+
+commit 73600e51af9ee734a19767e0c084bbbc5eb5b8da
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Oct 15 11:56:25 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/10 00:53:25
+         [sftp-server.c]
+         add -Q, -P and -p to usage() before jmc@ catches me
+
+commit 6eaeebf27d92f39a38c772aa3f20c2250af2dd29
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Oct 15 11:55:57 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/09 23:42:17
+         [sftp-server.8 sftp-server.c]
+         Add ability to whitelist and/or blacklist sftp protocol requests by name.
+         Refactor dispatch loop and consolidate read-only mode checks.
+         Make global variables static, since sftp-server is linked into sshd(8).
+         ok dtucker@
+
+commit df62d71e64d29d1054e7a53d1a801075ef70335f
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Thu Oct 10 10:32:39 2013 +1100
+
+       - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/08 11:42:13
+         [dh.c dh.h]
+         Increase the size of the Diffie-Hellman groups requested for a each
+         symmetric key size.  New values from NIST Special Publication 800-57 with
+         the upper limit specified by RFC4419.  Pointed out by Peter Backes, ok
+         djm@.
+
+commit e6e52f8c5dc89a6767702e65bb595aaf7bc8991c
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Thu Oct 10 10:28:07 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/09/19 01:26:29
+         [sshconnect.c]
+         bz#1211: make BindAddress work with UsePrivilegedPort=yes; patch from
+         swp AT swp.pp.ru; ok dtucker@
+
+commit 71152bc9911bc34a98810b2398dac20df3fe8de3
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Thu Oct 10 10:27:21 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/09/19 01:24:46
+         [channels.c]
+         bz#1297 - tell the client (via packet_send_debug) when their preferred
+         listen address has been overridden by the server's GatewayPorts;
+         ok dtucker@
+
+commit b59aaf3c4f3f449a4b86d8528668bd979be9aa5f
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Thu Oct 10 10:26:21 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/09/19 00:49:12
+         [sftp-client.c]
+         fix swapped pflag and printflag in sftp upload_dir; from Iain Morgan
+
+commit 5d80e4522d6238bdefe9d0c634f0e6d35a241e41
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Thu Oct 10 10:25:09 2013 +1100
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/09/19 00:24:52
+         [progressmeter.c]
+         store the initial file offset so the progress meter doesn't freak out
+         when resuming sftp transfers. bz#2137; patch from Iain Morgan; ok dtucker@
+
+commit ad92df7e5ed26fea85adfb3f95352d6cd8e86344
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Thu Oct 10 10:24:11 2013 +1100
+
+       - sthen@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/09/16 11:35:43
+         [ssh_config]
+         Remove gssapi config parts from ssh_config, as was already done for
+         sshd_config.  Req by/ok ajacoutot@
+         ID SYNC ONLY for portable; kerberos/gssapi is still pretty popular
+
+commit 720711960b130d36dfdd3d50eb25ef482bdd000e
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Oct 9 10:44:47 2013 +1100
+
+     - (djm) [openbsd-compat/Makefile.in openbsd-compat/arc4random.c]
+       [openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c] Replace old RC4-based arc4random
+       implementation with recent OpenBSD's ChaCha-based PRNG. ok dtucker@,
+       tested tim@
+
+commit 9159310087a218e28940a592896808b8eb76a039
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Oct 9 10:42:32 2013 +1100
+
+     - (djm) [openbsd-compat/arc4random.c openbsd-compat/chacha_private.h] Pull
+       in OpenBSD implementation of arc4random, shortly to replace the existing
+       bsd-arc4random.c
+
+commit 67f1d557a68d6fa8966a327d7b6dee3408cf0e72
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Oct 9 09:33:08 2013 +1100
+
+    correct incorrect years in datestamps; from des
+
+commit f2bf36c3eb4d969f85ec8aa342e9aecb61cc8bb1
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Sun Sep 22 19:02:40 2013 +1000
+
+     - (dtucker) [platform.c platform.h sshd.c] bz#2156: restore Linux oom_adj
+       setting when handling SIGHUP to maintain behaviour over retart.  Patch
+       from Matthew Ife.
+
+commit e90a06ae570fd259a2f5ced873c7f17390f535a5
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+Date:   Wed Sep 18 15:09:38 2013 +1000
+
+     - (dtucker) [sshd_config] Trailing whitespace; from jstjohn at purdue edu.
+
+commit 13840e0103946982cee2a05c40697be7e57dca41
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sat Sep 14 09:49:43 2013 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/09/13 06:54:34
+         [channels.c]
+         avoid unaligned access in code that reused a buffer to send a
+         struct in_addr in a reply; simpler just use use buffer_put_int();
+         from portable; spotted by and ok dtucker@
+
+commit 70182522a47d283513a010338cd028cb80dac2ab
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sat Sep 14 09:49:19 2013 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/09/12 01:41:12
+         [clientloop.c]
+         fix connection crash when sending break (~B) on ControlPersist'd session;
+         ok dtucker@
+
+commit ff9d6c2a4171ee32e8fe28fc3b86eb33bd5c845b
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sat Sep 14 09:48:55 2013 +1000
+
+       - sthen@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/09/07 13:53:11
+         [sshd_config]
+         Remove commented-out kerberos/gssapi config options from sample config,
+         kerberos support is currently not enabled in ssh in OpenBSD. Discussed with
+         various people; ok deraadt@
+         ID SYNC ONLY for portable; kerberos/gssapi is still pretty popular
+
+commit 8bab5e7b5ff6721d926b5ebf05a3a24489889c58
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sat Sep 14 09:47:00 2013 +1000
+
+       - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/09/02 22:00:34
+         [ssh-keygen.c sshconnect1.c sshd.c]
+         All the instances of arc4random_stir() are bogus, since arc4random()
+         does this itself, inside itself, and has for a very long time..  Actually,
+         this was probably reducing the entropy available.
+         ok djm
+         ID SYNC ONLY for portable; we don't trust other arc4random implementations
+         to do this right.
+
+commit 61353b3208d548fab863e0e0ac5d2400ee5bb340
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sat Sep 14 09:45:32 2013 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/08/31 00:13:54
+         [sftp.c]
+         make ^w match ksh behaviour (delete previous word instead of entire line)
+
+commit 660854859cad31d234edb9353fb7ca2780df8128
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sat Sep 14 09:45:03 2013 +1000
+
+       - mikeb@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/08/28 12:34:27
+         [ssh-keygen.c]
+         improve batch processing a bit by making use of the quite flag a bit
+         more often and exit with a non zero code if asked to find a hostname
+         in a known_hosts file and it wasn't there;
+         originally from reyk@,  ok djm
+
+commit 045bda5cb8acf0eb9d71c275ee1247e3154fc9e5
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sat Sep 14 09:44:37 2013 +1000
+
+       - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/08/22 19:02:21
+         [sshd.c]
+         Stir PRNG after post-accept fork. The child gets a different PRNG state
+         anyway via rexec and explicit privsep reseeds, but it's good to be sure.
+         ok markus@
+
+commit ed4af412da60a084891b20412433a27966613fb8
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sat Sep 14 09:40:51 2013 +1000
+
+    add marker for 6.3p1 release at the point of the last included change
+
+commit 43968a8e66a0aa1afefb11665bf96f86b113f5d9
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Aug 28 14:00:54 2013 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c] #ifdef noytet for intmax_t bits
+       until we have configure support.
+
+commit 04be8b9e53f8388c94b531ebc5d1bd6e10e930d1
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Aug 28 12:49:43 2013 +1000
+
+     - (djm) [openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c] teach our local snprintf code the
+       'j' (intmax_t/uintmax_t) and 'z' (size_t/ssize_t) conversions in case we
+       start to use them in the future.
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/INSTALL b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/INSTALL
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cbbb2df59
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/INSTALL
@@ -0,0 +1,262 @@
+1. Prerequisites
+----------------
+
+You will need working installations of Zlib and libcrypto (LibreSSL /
+OpenSSL)
+
+Zlib 1.1.4 or 1.2.1.2 or greater (ealier 1.2.x versions have problems):
+http://www.gzip.org/zlib/
+
+libcrypto (LibreSSL or OpenSSL >= 0.9.8f)
+LibreSSL http://www.libressl.org/ ; or
+OpenSSL http://www.openssl.org/
+
+LibreSSL/OpenSSL should be compiled as a position-independent library
+(i.e. with -fPIC) otherwise OpenSSH will not be able to link with it.
+If you must use a non-position-independent libcrypto, then you may need
+to configure OpenSSH --without-pie.
+
+The remaining items are optional.
+
+NB. If you operating system supports /dev/random, you should configure
+libcrypto (LibreSSL/OpenSSL) to use it. OpenSSH relies on libcrypto's
+direct support of /dev/random, or failing that, either prngd or egd
+
+PRNGD:
+
+If your system lacks kernel-based random collection, the use of Lutz
+Jaenicke's PRNGd is recommended.
+
+http://prngd.sourceforge.net/
+
+EGD:
+
+If the kernel lacks /dev/random the Entropy Gathering Daemon (EGD) is
+supported only if libcrypto supports it.
+
+http://egd.sourceforge.net/
+
+PAM:
+
+OpenSSH can utilise Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM) if your
+system supports it. PAM is standard most Linux distributions, Solaris,
+HP-UX 11, AIX >= 5.2, FreeBSD and NetBSD.
+
+Information about the various PAM implementations are available:
+
+Solaris PAM:	http://www.sun.com/software/solaris/pam/
+Linux PAM:	http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/pam/
+OpenPAM:	http://www.openpam.org/
+
+If you wish to build the GNOME passphrase requester, you will need the GNOME
+libraries and headers.
+
+GNOME:
+http://www.gnome.org/
+
+Alternatively, Jim Knoble <jmknoble@pobox.com> has written an excellent X11
+passphrase requester. This is maintained separately at:
+
+http://www.jmknoble.net/software/x11-ssh-askpass/
+
+S/Key Libraries:
+
+If you wish to use --with-skey then you will need the library below
+installed.  No other S/Key library is currently known to be supported.
+
+http://www.sparc.spb.su/solaris/skey/
+
+LibEdit:
+
+sftp supports command-line editing via NetBSD's libedit.  If your platform
+has it available natively you can use that, alternatively you might try
+these multi-platform ports:
+
+http://www.thrysoee.dk/editline/
+http://sourceforge.net/projects/libedit/
+
+LDNS:
+
+LDNS is a DNS BSD-licensed resolver library which supports DNSSEC.
+
+http://nlnetlabs.nl/projects/ldns/
+
+Autoconf:
+
+If you modify configure.ac or configure doesn't exist (eg if you checked
+the code out of CVS yourself) then you will need autoconf-2.68 to rebuild
+the automatically generated files by running "autoreconf".  Earlier
+versions may also work but this is not guaranteed.
+
+http://www.gnu.org/software/autoconf/
+
+Basic Security Module (BSM):
+
+Native BSM support is know to exist in Solaris from at least 2.5.1,
+FreeBSD 6.1 and OS X.  Alternatively, you may use the OpenBSM
+implementation (http://www.openbsm.org).
+
+
+2. Building / Installation
+--------------------------
+
+To install OpenSSH with default options:
+
+./configure
+make
+make install
+
+This will install the OpenSSH binaries in /usr/local/bin, configuration files
+in /usr/local/etc, the server in /usr/local/sbin, etc. To specify a different
+installation prefix, use the --prefix option to configure:
+
+./configure --prefix=/opt
+make
+make install
+
+Will install OpenSSH in /opt/{bin,etc,lib,sbin}. You can also override
+specific paths, for example:
+
+./configure --prefix=/opt --sysconfdir=/etc/ssh
+make
+make install
+
+This will install the binaries in /opt/{bin,lib,sbin}, but will place the
+configuration files in /etc/ssh.
+
+If you are using Privilege Separation (which is enabled by default)
+then you will also need to create the user, group and directory used by
+sshd for privilege separation.  See README.privsep for details.
+
+If you are using PAM, you may need to manually install a PAM control
+file as "/etc/pam.d/sshd" (or wherever your system prefers to keep
+them).  Note that the service name used to start PAM is __progname,
+which is the basename of the path of your sshd (e.g., the service name
+for /usr/sbin/osshd will be osshd).  If you have renamed your sshd
+executable, your PAM configuration may need to be modified.
+
+A generic PAM configuration is included as "contrib/sshd.pam.generic",
+you may need to edit it before using it on your system. If you are
+using a recent version of Red Hat Linux, the config file in
+contrib/redhat/sshd.pam should be more useful.  Failure to install a
+valid PAM file may result in an inability to use password
+authentication.  On HP-UX 11 and Solaris, the standard /etc/pam.conf
+configuration will work with sshd (sshd will match the other service
+name).
+
+There are a few other options to the configure script:
+
+--with-audit=[module] enable additional auditing via the specified module.
+Currently, drivers for "debug" (additional info via syslog) and "bsm"
+(Sun's Basic Security Module) are supported.
+
+--with-pam enables PAM support. If PAM support is compiled in, it must
+also be enabled in sshd_config (refer to the UsePAM directive).
+
+--with-prngd-socket=/some/file allows you to enable EGD or PRNGD
+support and to specify a PRNGd socket. Use this if your Unix lacks
+/dev/random and you don't want to use OpenSSH's builtin entropy
+collection support.
+
+--with-prngd-port=portnum allows you to enable EGD or PRNGD support
+and to specify a EGD localhost TCP port. Use this if your Unix lacks
+/dev/random and you don't want to use OpenSSH's builtin entropy
+collection support.
+
+--with-lastlog=FILE will specify the location of the lastlog file.
+./configure searches a few locations for lastlog, but may not find
+it if lastlog is installed in a different place.
+
+--without-lastlog will disable lastlog support entirely.
+
+--with-osfsia, --without-osfsia will enable or disable OSF1's Security
+Integration Architecture.  The default for OSF1 machines is enable.
+
+--with-skey=PATH will enable S/Key one time password support. You will
+need the S/Key libraries and header files installed for this to work.
+
+--with-md5-passwords will enable the use of MD5 passwords. Enable this
+if your operating system uses MD5 passwords and the system crypt() does
+not support them directly (see the crypt(3/3c) man page). If enabled, the
+resulting binary will support both MD5 and traditional crypt passwords.
+
+--with-utmpx enables utmpx support. utmpx support is automatic for
+some platforms.
+
+--without-shadow disables shadow password support.
+
+--with-ipaddr-display forces the use of a numeric IP address in the
+$DISPLAY environment variable. Some broken systems need this.
+
+--with-default-path=PATH allows you to specify a default $PATH for sessions
+started by sshd. This replaces the standard path entirely.
+
+--with-pid-dir=PATH specifies the directory in which the sshd.pid file is
+created.
+
+--with-xauth=PATH specifies the location of the xauth binary
+
+--with-ssl-dir=DIR allows you to specify where your Libre/OpenSSL
+libraries
+are installed.
+
+--with-ssl-engine enables Libre/OpenSSL's (hardware) ENGINE support
+
+--with-4in6 Check for IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses and convert them to
+real (AF_INET) IPv4 addresses. Works around some quirks on Linux.
+
+If you need to pass special options to the compiler or linker, you
+can specify these as environment variables before running ./configure.
+For example:
+
+CFLAGS="-O -m486" LDFLAGS="-s" LIBS="-lrubbish" LD="/usr/foo/ld" ./configure
+
+3. Configuration
+----------------
+
+The runtime configuration files are installed by in ${prefix}/etc or
+whatever you specified as your --sysconfdir (/usr/local/etc by default).
+
+The default configuration should be instantly usable, though you should
+review it to ensure that it matches your security requirements.
+
+To generate a host key, run "make host-key". Alternately you can do so
+manually using the following commands:
+
+    ssh-keygen -t rsa1 -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key -N ""
+    ssh-keygen -t rsa -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key -N ""
+    ssh-keygen -t dsa -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key -N ""
+
+Replacing /etc/ssh with the correct path to the configuration directory.
+(${prefix}/etc or whatever you specified with --sysconfdir during
+configuration)
+
+If you have configured OpenSSH with EGD support, ensure that EGD is
+running and has collected some Entropy.
+
+For more information on configuration, please refer to the manual pages
+for sshd, ssh and ssh-agent.
+
+4. (Optional) Send survey
+-------------------------
+
+$ make survey
+[check the contents of the file "survey" to ensure there's no information
+that you consider sensitive]
+$ make send-survey
+
+This will send configuration information for the currently configured
+host to a survey address.  This will help determine which configurations
+are actually in use, and what valid combinations of configure options
+exist.  The raw data is available only to the OpenSSH developers, however
+summary data may be published.
+
+5. Problems?
+------------
+
+If you experience problems compiling, installing or running OpenSSH.
+Please refer to the "reporting bugs" section of the webpage at
+http://www.openssh.com/
+
+
+$Id: INSTALL,v 1.91 2014/09/09 02:23:11 dtucker Exp $
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/README.dns b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/README.dns
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..97879183e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/README.dns
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+How to verify host keys using OpenSSH and DNS
+---------------------------------------------
+
+OpenSSH contains support for verifying host keys using DNS as described in
+draft-ietf-secsh-dns-05.txt. The document contains very brief instructions
+on how to use this feature. Configuring DNS is out of the scope of this
+document.
+
+
+(1) Server: Generate and publish the DNS RR
+
+To create a DNS resource record (RR) containing a fingerprint of the
+public host key, use the following command:
+
+	ssh-keygen -r hostname -f keyfile -g
+
+where "hostname" is your fully qualified hostname and "keyfile" is the
+file containing the public host key file. If you have multiple keys,
+you should generate one RR for each key.
+
+In the example above, ssh-keygen will print the fingerprint in a
+generic DNS RR format parsable by most modern name server
+implementations. If your nameserver has support for the SSHFP RR
+you can omit the -g flag and ssh-keygen will print a standard SSHFP RR.
+
+To publish the fingerprint using the DNS you must add the generated RR
+to your DNS zone file and sign your zone.
+
+
+(2) Client: Enable ssh to verify host keys using DNS
+
+To enable the ssh client to verify host keys using DNS, you have to
+add the following option to the ssh configuration file
+($HOME/.ssh/config or /etc/ssh/ssh_config):
+
+    VerifyHostKeyDNS yes
+
+Upon connection the client will try to look up the fingerprint RR
+using DNS. If the fingerprint received from the DNS server matches
+the remote host key, the user will be notified.
+
+
+	Jakob Schlyter
+	Wesley Griffin
+
+
+$OpenBSD: README.dns,v 1.2 2003/10/14 19:43:23 jakob Exp $
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/README.platform b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/README.platform
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d1982321e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/README.platform
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+This file contains notes about OpenSSH on specific platforms.
+
+AIX
+---
+As of OpenSSH 3.8p1, sshd will now honour an accounts password expiry
+settings, where previously it did not.  Because of this, it's possible for
+sites that have used OpenSSH's sshd exclusively to have accounts which
+have passwords expired longer than the inactive time (ie the "Weeks between
+password EXPIRATION and LOCKOUT" setting in SMIT or the maxexpired
+chuser attribute).
+
+Accounts in this state must have their passwords reset manually by the
+administrator.  As a precaution, it is recommended that the administrative
+passwords be reset before upgrading from OpenSSH <3.8.
+
+As of OpenSSH 4.0, configure will attempt to detect if your version
+and maintenance level of AIX has a working getaddrinfo, and will use it
+if found.  This will enable IPv6 support.  If for some reason configure
+gets it wrong, or if you want to build binaries to work on earlier MLs
+than the build host then you can add "-DBROKEN_GETADDRINFO" to CFLAGS
+to force the previous IPv4-only behaviour.
+
+IPv6 known to work: 5.1ML7 5.2ML2 5.2ML5
+IPv6 known broken: 4.3.3ML11 5.1ML4
+
+If you wish to use dynamic libraries that aren't in the normal system
+locations (eg IBM's OpenSSL and zlib packages) then you will need to
+define the environment variable blibpath before running configure, eg
+
+blibpath=/lib:/usr/lib:/opt/freeware/lib ./configure \
+  --with-ssl-dir=/opt/freeware --with-zlib=/opt/freeware
+
+If sshd is built with the WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE option (which is enabled
+by default) then sshd checks that users are permitted via the
+loginrestrictions() function, in particular that the user has the
+"rlogin" attribute set.  This check is not done for the root account,
+instead the PermitRootLogin setting in sshd_config is used.
+
+
+Cygwin
+------
+To build on Cygwin, OpenSSH requires the following packages:
+gcc, gcc-mingw-core, mingw-runtime, binutils, make, openssl,
+openssl-devel, zlib, minres, minires-devel.
+
+
+Darwin and MacOS X
+------------------
+Darwin does not provide a tun(4) driver required for OpenSSH-based
+virtual private networks. The BSD manpage still exists, but the driver
+has been removed in recent releases of Darwin and MacOS X.
+
+Nevertheless, tunnel support is known to work with Darwin 8 and
+MacOS X 10.4 in Point-to-Point (Layer 3) and Ethernet (Layer 2) mode
+using a third party driver. More information is available at:
+	http://www-user.rhrk.uni-kl.de/~nissler/tuntap/
+
+
+Linux
+-----
+
+Some Linux distributions (including Red Hat/Fedora/CentOS) include
+headers and library links in the -devel RPMs rather than the main
+binary RPMs. If you get an error about headers, or complaining about a
+missing prerequisite then you may need to install the equivalent
+development packages.  On Redhat based distros these may be openssl-devel,
+zlib-devel and pam-devel, on Debian based distros these may be
+libssl-dev, libz-dev and libpam-dev.
+
+
+Solaris
+-------
+If you enable BSM auditing on Solaris, you need to update audit_event(4)
+for praudit(1m) to give sensible output.  The following line needs to be
+added to /etc/security/audit_event:
+
+	32800:AUE_openssh:OpenSSH login:lo
+
+The BSM audit event range available for third party TCB applications is
+32768 - 65535.  Event number 32800 has been choosen for AUE_openssh.
+There is no official registry of 3rd party event numbers, so if this
+number is already in use on your system, you may change it at build time
+by configure'ing --with-cflags=-DAUE_openssh=32801 then rebuilding.
+
+
+Platforms using PAM
+-------------------
+As of OpenSSH 4.3p1, sshd will no longer check /etc/nologin itself when
+PAM is enabled.  To maintain existing behaviour, pam_nologin should be
+added to sshd's session stack which will prevent users from starting shell
+sessions.  Alternatively, pam_nologin can be added to either the auth or
+account stacks which will prevent authentication entirely, but will still
+return the output from pam_nologin to the client.
+
+
+$Id: README.platform,v 1.10 2009/08/28 23:14:48 dtucker Exp $
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/README.privsep b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/README.privsep
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f565e72da
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/README.privsep
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+Privilege separation, or privsep, is method in OpenSSH by which
+operations that require root privilege are performed by a separate
+privileged monitor process.  Its purpose is to prevent privilege
+escalation by containing corruption to an unprivileged process.
+More information is available at:
+	http://www.citi.umich.edu/u/provos/ssh/privsep.html
+
+Privilege separation is now enabled by default; see the
+UsePrivilegeSeparation option in sshd_config(5).
+
+On systems which lack mmap or anonymous (MAP_ANON) memory mapping,
+compression must be disabled in order for privilege separation to
+function.
+
+When privsep is enabled, during the pre-authentication phase sshd will
+chroot(2) to "/var/empty" and change its privileges to the "sshd" user
+and its primary group.  sshd is a pseudo-account that should not be
+used by other daemons, and must be locked and should contain a
+"nologin" or invalid shell.
+
+You should do something like the following to prepare the privsep
+preauth environment:
+
+	# mkdir /var/empty
+	# chown root:sys /var/empty
+	# chmod 755 /var/empty
+	# groupadd sshd
+	# useradd -g sshd -c 'sshd privsep' -d /var/empty -s /bin/false sshd
+
+/var/empty should not contain any files.
+
+configure supports the following options to change the default
+privsep user and chroot directory:
+
+  --with-privsep-path=xxx Path for privilege separation chroot
+  --with-privsep-user=user Specify non-privileged user for privilege separation
+
+Privsep requires operating system support for file descriptor passing.
+Compression will be disabled on systems without a working mmap MAP_ANON.
+
+PAM-enabled OpenSSH is known to function with privsep on AIX, FreeBSD, 
+HP-UX (including Trusted Mode), Linux, NetBSD and Solaris.
+
+On Cygwin, Tru64 Unix, OpenServer, and Unicos only the pre-authentication
+part of privsep is supported.  Post-authentication privsep is disabled
+automatically (so you won't see the additional process mentioned below).
+
+Note that for a normal interactive login with a shell, enabling privsep
+will require 1 additional process per login session.
+
+Given the following process listing (from HP-UX):
+
+     UID   PID  PPID  C    STIME TTY       TIME COMMAND
+    root  1005     1  0 10:45:17 ?         0:08 /opt/openssh/sbin/sshd -u0
+    root  6917  1005  0 15:19:16 ?         0:00 sshd: stevesk [priv]
+ stevesk  6919  6917  0 15:19:17 ?         0:03 sshd: stevesk@2
+ stevesk  6921  6919  0 15:19:17 pts/2     0:00 -bash
+
+process 1005 is the sshd process listening for new connections.
+process 6917 is the privileged monitor process, 6919 is the user owned
+sshd process and 6921 is the shell process.
+
+$Id: README.privsep,v 1.16 2005/06/04 23:21:41 djm Exp $
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/README.tun b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/README.tun
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5e1cb074c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/README.tun
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+How to use OpenSSH-based virtual private networks
+-------------------------------------------------
+
+OpenSSH contains support for VPN tunneling using the tun(4) network
+tunnel pseudo-device which is available on most platforms, either for
+layer 2 or 3 traffic.
+
+The following brief instructions on how to use this feature use
+a network configuration specific to the OpenBSD operating system.
+
+(1) Server: Enable support for SSH tunneling
+
+To enable the ssh server to accept tunnel requests from the client, you
+have to add the following option to the ssh server configuration file
+(/etc/ssh/sshd_config):
+
+	PermitTunnel yes
+
+Restart the server or send the hangup signal (SIGHUP) to let the server
+reread it's configuration.
+
+(2) Server: Restrict client access and assign the tunnel
+
+The OpenSSH server simply uses the file /root/.ssh/authorized_keys to
+restrict the client to connect to a specified tunnel and to
+automatically start the related interface configuration command. These
+settings are optional but recommended:
+
+	tunnel="1",command="sh /etc/netstart tun1" ssh-rsa ... reyk@openbsd.org
+
+(3) Client: Configure the local network tunnel interface
+
+Use the hostname.if(5) interface-specific configuration file to set up
+the network tunnel configuration with OpenBSD. For example, use the
+following configuration in /etc/hostname.tun0 to set up the layer 3
+tunnel on the client:
+
+	inet 192.168.5.1 255.255.255.252 192.168.5.2
+
+OpenBSD also supports layer 2 tunneling over the tun device by adding
+the link0 flag:
+
+	inet 192.168.1.78 255.255.255.0 192.168.1.255 link0
+
+Layer 2 tunnels can be used in combination with an Ethernet bridge(4)
+interface, like the following example for /etc/bridgename.bridge0:
+
+	add tun0
+	add sis0
+	up
+
+(4) Client: Configure the OpenSSH client
+
+To establish tunnel forwarding for connections to a specified
+remote host by default, use the following ssh client configuration for
+the privileged user (in /root/.ssh/config):
+
+	Host sshgateway
+		Tunnel yes
+		TunnelDevice 0:any
+		PermitLocalCommand yes
+	        LocalCommand sh /etc/netstart tun0
+
+A more complicated configuration is possible to establish a tunnel to
+a remote host which is not directly accessible by the client.
+The following example describes a client configuration to connect to
+the remote host over two ssh hops in between. It uses the OpenSSH
+ProxyCommand in combination with the nc(1) program to forward the final
+ssh tunnel destination over multiple ssh sessions.
+
+	Host access.somewhere.net
+	        User puffy
+	Host dmzgw
+	        User puffy
+	        ProxyCommand ssh access.somewhere.net nc dmzgw 22
+	Host sshgateway
+	        Tunnel Ethernet
+	        TunnelDevice 0:any
+	        PermitLocalCommand yes
+	        LocalCommand sh /etc/netstart tun0
+	        ProxyCommand ssh dmzgw nc sshgateway 22
+
+The following network plan illustrates the previous configuration in
+combination with layer 2 tunneling and Ethernet bridging.
+
++--------+       (          )      +----------------------+
+| Client |------(  Internet  )-----| access.somewhere.net |
++--------+       (          )      +----------------------+
+    : 192.168.1.78                             |
+    :.............................         +-------+
+     Forwarded ssh connection    :         | dmzgw |
+     Layer 2 tunnel              :         +-------+
+                                 :             |
+                                 :             |
+                                 :      +------------+
+                                 :......| sshgateway |
+                                      | +------------+
+--- real connection                 Bridge ->  |          +----------+
+... "virtual connection"                     [ X ]--------| somehost |
+[X] switch                                                +----------+
+                                                          192.168.1.25
+
+(5) Client: Connect to the server and establish the tunnel
+
+Finally connect to the OpenSSH server to establish the tunnel by using
+the following command:
+
+	ssh sshgateway
+
+It is also possible to tell the client to fork into the background after
+the connection has been successfully established:
+
+	ssh -f sshgateway true
+
+Without the ssh configuration done in step (4), it is also possible
+to use the following command lines:
+
+	ssh -fw 0:1 sshgateway true
+	ifconfig tun0 192.168.5.1 192.168.5.2 netmask 255.255.255.252
+
+Using OpenSSH tunnel forwarding is a simple way to establish secure
+and ad hoc virtual private networks. Possible fields of application
+could be wireless networks or administrative VPN tunnels.
+
+Nevertheless, ssh tunneling requires some packet header overhead and
+runs on top of TCP. It is still suggested to use the IP Security
+Protocol (IPSec) for robust and permanent VPN connections and to
+interconnect corporate networks.
+
+	Reyk Floeter
+
+$OpenBSD: README.tun,v 1.4 2006/03/28 00:12:31 deraadt Exp $
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/TODO b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/TODO
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e8aaa4b96
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/TODO
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+Documentation:
+
+- Update the docs
+  - Update README
+  - Update INSTALL
+  - Merge INSTALL & README.privsep
+
+- Install FAQ?
+
+- General FAQ on S/Key, TIS, RSA, RSA2, DSA, etc and suggestions on when it
+  would be best to use them.
+
+- Create a Documentation/ directory?
+
+Programming:
+
+- Grep for 'XXX' comments and fix
+
+- Link order is incorrect for some systems using Kerberos 4 and AFS. Result
+  is multiple inclusion of DES symbols. Holger Trapp
+  <holger.trapp@hrz.tu-chemnitz.de> reports that changing the configure
+  generated link order from:
+	-lresolv -lkrb -lz -lnsl  -lutil -lkafs -lkrb -ldes -lcrypto
+  to:
+	-lresolv -lkrb -lz -lnsl  -lutil -lcrypto -lkafs -lkrb -ldes
+  fixing the problem.
+
+- Write a test program that calls stat() to search for EGD/PRNGd socket
+  rather than use the (non-portable) "test -S".
+
+- More platforms for for setproctitle() emulation (testing needed)
+
+- Improve PAM ChallengeResponseAuthentication
+ - Informational messages
+ - Use different PAM service name for kbdint vs regular auth (suggest from
+   Solar Designer)
+ - Ability to select which ChallengeResponseAuthentications may be used
+   and order to try them in e.g. "ChallengeResponseAuthentication skey, pam"
+
+- Complete Tru64 SIA support
+ - It looks like we could merge it into the password auth code to cut down
+   on diff size. Maybe PAM password auth too?
+
+- Finish integrating kernel-level auditing code for IRIX and SOLARIS
+  (Gilbert.r.loomis@saic.com)
+
+- 64-bit builds on HP-UX 11.X (stevesk@pobox.com):
+  - utmp/wtmp get corrupted (something in loginrec?)
+  - can't build with PAM (no 64-bit libpam yet)
+
+Clean up configure/makefiles:
+- Clean up configure.ac - There are a few double #defined variables
+  left to do.  HAVE_LOGIN is one of them.  Consider NOT looking for
+  information in wtmpx or utmpx or any of that stuff if it's not detected
+  from the start
+
+- Replace the whole u_intXX_t evilness in acconfig.h with something better???
+ - Do it in configure.ac
+
+- Consider splitting the u_intXX_t test for sys/bitype.h  into seperate test
+  to allow people to (right/wrongfully) link against Bind directly.
+
+- Consider splitting configure.ac into seperate files which do logically
+  similar tests. E.g move all the type detection stuff into one file,
+  entropy related stuff into another.
+
+Packaging:
+- HP-UX: Provide DEPOT package scripts.
+  (gilbert.r.loomis@saic.com)
+
+PrivSep Issues:
+- mmap() issues.
+  + /dev/zero solution (Solaris)
+  + No/broken MAP_ANON (Irix)
+  + broken /dev/zero parse (Linux)
+- PAM
+  + See above PAM notes
+- AIX
+  + usrinfo() does not set TTY, but only required for legacy systems.  Works
+    with PrivSep.
+- OSF
+  + SIA is broken
+- Cygwin
+  + Privsep for Pre-auth only (no fd passing)
+
+$Id: TODO,v 1.58 2004/12/06 11:40:11 dtucker Exp $
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/audit-bsm.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/audit-bsm.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..613559140
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/audit-bsm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,457 @@
+/* $Id: audit-bsm.c,v 1.8 2012/02/23 23:40:43 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * TODO
+ *
+ * - deal with overlap between this and sys_auth_allowed_user
+ *   sys_auth_record_login and record_failed_login.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright 1988-2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc.  All rights reserved.
+ * Use is subject to license terms.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ */
+/* #pragma ident	"@(#)bsmaudit.c	1.1	01/09/17 SMI" */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#if defined(USE_BSM_AUDIT)
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#ifdef BROKEN_BSM_API
+#include <libscf.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+#ifndef AUE_openssh
+# define AUE_openssh     32800
+#endif
+#include <bsm/audit.h>
+#include <bsm/libbsm.h>
+#include <bsm/audit_uevents.h>
+#include <bsm/audit_record.h>
+#include <locale.h>
+
+#if defined(HAVE_GETAUDIT_ADDR)
+#define	AuditInfoStruct		auditinfo_addr
+#define AuditInfoTermID		au_tid_addr_t
+#define SetAuditFunc(a,b)	setaudit_addr((a),(b))
+#define SetAuditFuncText	"setaudit_addr"
+#define AUToSubjectFunc		au_to_subject_ex
+#define AUToReturnFunc(a,b)	au_to_return32((a), (int32_t)(b))
+#else
+#define	AuditInfoStruct		auditinfo
+#define AuditInfoTermID		au_tid_t
+#define SetAuditFunc(a,b)	setaudit(a)
+#define SetAuditFuncText	"setaudit"
+#define AUToSubjectFunc		au_to_subject
+#define AUToReturnFunc(a,b)	au_to_return((a), (u_int)(b))
+#endif
+
+#ifndef cannot_audit
+extern int	cannot_audit(int);
+#endif
+extern void	aug_init(void);
+extern void	aug_save_auid(au_id_t);
+extern void	aug_save_uid(uid_t);
+extern void	aug_save_euid(uid_t);
+extern void	aug_save_gid(gid_t);
+extern void	aug_save_egid(gid_t);
+extern void	aug_save_pid(pid_t);
+extern void	aug_save_asid(au_asid_t);
+extern void	aug_save_tid(dev_t, unsigned int);
+extern void	aug_save_tid_ex(dev_t, u_int32_t *, u_int32_t);
+extern int	aug_save_me(void);
+extern int	aug_save_namask(void);
+extern void	aug_save_event(au_event_t);
+extern void	aug_save_sorf(int);
+extern void	aug_save_text(char *);
+extern void	aug_save_text1(char *);
+extern void	aug_save_text2(char *);
+extern void	aug_save_na(int);
+extern void	aug_save_user(char *);
+extern void	aug_save_path(char *);
+extern int	aug_save_policy(void);
+extern void	aug_save_afunc(int (*)(int));
+extern int	aug_audit(void);
+extern int	aug_na_selected(void);
+extern int	aug_selected(void);
+extern int	aug_daemon_session(void);
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GETTEXT
+# define gettext(a)	(a)
+#endif
+
+extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+static AuditInfoTermID ssh_bsm_tid;
+
+#ifdef BROKEN_BSM_API
+/* For some reason this constant is no longer defined
+   in Solaris 11. */
+#define BSM_TEXTBUFSZ 256
+#endif
+
+/* Below is the low-level BSM interface code */
+
+/*
+ * aug_get_machine is only required on IPv6 capable machines, we use a
+ * different mechanism in audit_connection_from() for IPv4-only machines.
+ * getaudit_addr() is only present on IPv6 capable machines.
+ */
+#if defined(HAVE_AUG_GET_MACHINE) || !defined(HAVE_GETAUDIT_ADDR)
+extern int 	aug_get_machine(char *, u_int32_t *, u_int32_t *);
+#else
+static int
+aug_get_machine(char *host, u_int32_t *addr, u_int32_t *type)
+{
+	struct addrinfo *ai; 
+	struct sockaddr_in *in4;
+	struct sockaddr_in6 *in6;
+	int ret = 0, r;
+
+	if ((r = getaddrinfo(host, NULL, NULL, &ai)) != 0) {
+		error("BSM audit: getaddrinfo failed for %.100s: %.100s", host,
+		    r == EAI_SYSTEM ? strerror(errno) : gai_strerror(r));
+		return -1;
+	}
+	
+	switch (ai->ai_family) {
+	case AF_INET:
+		in4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)ai->ai_addr;
+		*type = AU_IPv4;
+		memcpy(addr, &in4->sin_addr, sizeof(struct in_addr));
+		break;
+#ifdef AU_IPv6
+	case AF_INET6: 
+		in6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)ai->ai_addr;
+		*type = AU_IPv6;
+		memcpy(addr, &in6->sin6_addr, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
+		break;
+#endif
+	default:
+		error("BSM audit: unknown address family for %.100s: %d",
+		    host, ai->ai_family);
+		ret = -1;
+	}
+	freeaddrinfo(ai);
+	return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef BROKEN_BSM_API
+/*
+  In Solaris 11 the audit daemon has been moved to SMF. In the process
+  they simply dropped getacna() from the API, since it read from a now
+  non-existent config file. This function re-implements getacna() to
+  read from the SMF repository instead.
+ */
+int
+getacna(char *auditstring, int len)
+{
+	scf_handle_t *handle = NULL;
+	scf_property_t *property = NULL;
+	scf_value_t *value = NULL;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	handle = scf_handle_create(SCF_VERSION);
+	if (handle == NULL) 
+	        return -2; /* The man page for getacna on Solaris 10 states
+			      we should return -2 in case of error and set
+			      errno to indicate the error. We don't bother
+			      with errno here, though, since the only use
+			      of this function below doesn't check for errors
+			      anyway. 
+			   */
+
+	ret = scf_handle_bind(handle);
+	if (ret == -1) 
+	        return -2;
+
+	property = scf_property_create(handle);
+	if (property == NULL) 
+	        return -2;
+
+	ret = scf_handle_decode_fmri(handle, 
+	     "svc:/system/auditd:default/:properties/preselection/naflags",
+				     NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, property, 0);
+	if (ret == -1) 
+	        return -2;
+
+	value = scf_value_create(handle);
+	if (value == NULL) 
+	        return -2;
+
+	ret = scf_property_get_value(property, value);
+	if (ret == -1) 
+	        return -2;
+
+	ret = scf_value_get_astring(value, auditstring, len);
+	if (ret == -1) 
+	        return -2;
+
+	scf_value_destroy(value);
+	scf_property_destroy(property);
+	scf_handle_destroy(handle);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Check if the specified event is selected (enabled) for auditing.
+ * Returns 1 if the event is selected, 0 if not and -1 on failure.
+ */
+static int
+selected(char *username, uid_t uid, au_event_t event, int sf)
+{
+	int rc, sorf;
+	char naflags[512];
+	struct au_mask mask;
+
+	mask.am_success = mask.am_failure = 0;
+	if (uid < 0) {
+		/* get flags for non-attributable (to a real user) events */
+		rc = getacna(naflags, sizeof(naflags));
+		if (rc == 0)
+			(void) getauditflagsbin(naflags, &mask);
+	} else
+		rc = au_user_mask(username, &mask);
+
+	sorf = (sf == 0) ? AU_PRS_SUCCESS : AU_PRS_FAILURE;
+	return(au_preselect(event, &mask, sorf, AU_PRS_REREAD));
+}
+
+static void
+bsm_audit_record(int typ, char *string, au_event_t event_no)
+{
+	int		ad, rc, sel;
+	uid_t		uid = -1;
+	gid_t		gid = -1;
+	pid_t		pid = getpid();
+	AuditInfoTermID	tid = ssh_bsm_tid;
+
+	if (the_authctxt != NULL && the_authctxt->valid) {
+		uid = the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid;
+		gid = the_authctxt->pw->pw_gid;
+	}
+
+	rc = (typ == 0) ? 0 : -1;
+	sel = selected(the_authctxt->user, uid, event_no, rc);
+	debug3("BSM audit: typ %d rc %d \"%s\"", typ, rc, string);
+	if (!sel)
+		return;	/* audit event does not match mask, do not write */
+
+	debug3("BSM audit: writing audit new record");
+	ad = au_open();
+
+	(void) au_write(ad, AUToSubjectFunc(uid, uid, gid, uid, gid,
+	    pid, pid, &tid));
+	(void) au_write(ad, au_to_text(string));
+	(void) au_write(ad, AUToReturnFunc(typ, rc));
+
+#ifdef BROKEN_BSM_API
+	/* The last argument is the event modifier flags. For
+	   some seemingly undocumented reason it was added in
+	   Solaris 11. */
+	rc = au_close(ad, AU_TO_WRITE, event_no, 0);
+#else
+	rc = au_close(ad, AU_TO_WRITE, event_no);
+#endif
+
+	if (rc < 0)
+		error("BSM audit: %s failed to write \"%s\" record: %s",
+		    __func__, string, strerror(errno));
+}
+
+static void
+bsm_audit_session_setup(void)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct AuditInfoStruct info;
+	au_mask_t mask;
+
+	if (the_authctxt == NULL) {
+		error("BSM audit: session setup internal error (NULL ctxt)");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (the_authctxt->valid)
+		info.ai_auid = the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid;
+	else
+		info.ai_auid = -1;
+	info.ai_asid = getpid();
+	mask.am_success = 0;
+	mask.am_failure = 0;
+
+	(void) au_user_mask(the_authctxt->user, &mask);
+
+	info.ai_mask.am_success  = mask.am_success;
+	info.ai_mask.am_failure  = mask.am_failure;
+
+	info.ai_termid = ssh_bsm_tid;
+
+	rc = SetAuditFunc(&info, sizeof(info));
+	if (rc < 0)
+		error("BSM audit: %s: %s failed: %s", __func__,
+		    SetAuditFuncText, strerror(errno));
+}
+
+static void
+bsm_audit_bad_login(const char *what)
+{
+	char textbuf[BSM_TEXTBUFSZ];
+
+	if (the_authctxt->valid) {
+		(void) snprintf(textbuf, sizeof (textbuf),
+			gettext("invalid %s for user %s"),
+			    what, the_authctxt->user);
+		bsm_audit_record(4, textbuf, AUE_openssh);
+	} else {
+		(void) snprintf(textbuf, sizeof (textbuf),
+			gettext("invalid user name \"%s\""),
+			    the_authctxt->user);
+		bsm_audit_record(3, textbuf, AUE_openssh);
+	}
+}
+
+/* Below is the sshd audit API code */
+
+void
+audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port)
+{
+	AuditInfoTermID *tid = &ssh_bsm_tid;
+	char buf[1024];
+
+	if (cannot_audit(0))
+		return;
+	debug3("BSM audit: connection from %.100s port %d", host, port);
+
+	/* populate our terminal id structure */
+#if defined(HAVE_GETAUDIT_ADDR)
+	tid->at_port = (dev_t)port;
+	aug_get_machine((char *)host, &(tid->at_addr[0]), &(tid->at_type));
+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%08x %08x %08x %08x", tid->at_addr[0],
+	    tid->at_addr[1], tid->at_addr[2], tid->at_addr[3]);
+	debug3("BSM audit: iptype %d machine ID %s", (int)tid->at_type, buf);
+#else
+	/* this is used on IPv4-only machines */
+	tid->port = (dev_t)port;
+	tid->machine = inet_addr(host);
+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%08x", tid->machine);
+	debug3("BSM audit: machine ID %s", buf);
+#endif
+}
+
+void
+audit_run_command(const char *command)
+{
+	/* not implemented */
+}
+
+void
+audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	/* not implemented */
+}
+
+void
+audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	/* not implemented */
+}
+
+void
+audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
+{
+	char    textbuf[BSM_TEXTBUFSZ];
+	static int logged_in = 0;
+	const char *user = the_authctxt ? the_authctxt->user : "(unknown user)";
+
+	if (cannot_audit(0))
+		return;
+
+	switch(event) {
+	case SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS:
+		logged_in = 1;
+		bsm_audit_session_setup();
+		snprintf(textbuf, sizeof(textbuf),
+		    gettext("successful login %s"), user);
+		bsm_audit_record(0, textbuf, AUE_openssh);
+		break;
+
+	case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE:
+		/*
+		 * We can also get a close event if the user attempted auth
+		 * but never succeeded.
+		 */
+		if (logged_in) {
+			snprintf(textbuf, sizeof(textbuf),
+			    gettext("sshd logout %s"), the_authctxt->user);
+			bsm_audit_record(0, textbuf, AUE_logout);
+		} else {
+			debug("%s: connection closed without authentication",
+			    __func__);
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case SSH_NOLOGIN:
+		bsm_audit_record(1,
+		    gettext("logins disabled by /etc/nologin"), AUE_openssh);
+		break;
+
+	case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
+		snprintf(textbuf, sizeof(textbuf),
+		    gettext("too many tries for user %s"), the_authctxt->user);
+		bsm_audit_record(1, textbuf, AUE_openssh);
+		break;
+
+	case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED:
+		bsm_audit_record(2, gettext("not_console"), AUE_openssh);
+		break;
+
+	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD:
+		bsm_audit_bad_login("password");
+		break;
+
+	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT:
+		bsm_audit_bad_login("interactive password entry");
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event);
+	}
+}
+#endif /* BSM */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/audit-linux.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/audit-linux.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b3ee2f4da
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/audit-linux.c
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+/* $Id: audit-linux.c,v 1.1 2011/01/17 10:15:30 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright 2010 Red Hat, Inc.  All rights reserved.
+ * Use is subject to license terms.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * Red Hat author: Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com>
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#if defined(USE_LINUX_AUDIT)
+#include <libaudit.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "audit.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+
+const char* audit_username(void);
+
+int
+linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const char *username,
+    const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success)
+{
+	int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;
+
+	audit_fd = audit_open();
+	if (audit_fd < 0) {
+		if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
+		    errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
+			return 1; /* No audit support in kernel */
+		else
+			return 0; /* Must prevent login */
+	}
+	rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN,
+	    NULL, "login", username ? username : "(unknown)",
+	    username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success);
+	saved_errno = errno;
+	close(audit_fd);
+	/*
+	 * Do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non
+	 * root user.
+	 */
+	if ((rc == -EPERM) && (geteuid() != 0))
+		rc = 0;
+	errno = saved_errno;
+	return (rc >= 0);
+}
+
+/* Below is the sshd audit API code */
+
+void
+audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port)
+{
+}
+	/* not implemented */
+
+void
+audit_run_command(const char *command)
+{
+	/* not implemented */
+}
+
+void
+audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	if (linux_audit_record_event(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
+	    NULL, li->line, 1) == 0)
+		fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno));
+}
+
+void
+audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	/* not implemented */
+}
+
+void
+audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
+{
+	switch(event) {
+	case SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS:
+	case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE:
+	case SSH_NOLOGIN:
+	case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
+	case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED:
+		break;
+
+	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE:
+	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD:
+	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT:
+	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY:
+	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED:
+	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI:
+	case SSH_INVALID_USER:
+		linux_audit_record_event(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
+			get_remote_ipaddr(), "sshd", 0);
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event);
+	}
+}
+
+#endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/audit.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/audit.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ced57fa64
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/audit.c
@@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
+/* $Id: audit.c,v 1.6 2011/01/17 10:15:30 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004, 2005 Darren Tucker.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+
+#include "audit.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+
+/*
+ * Care must be taken when using this since it WILL NOT be initialized when
+ * audit_connection_from() is called and MAY NOT be initialized when
+ * audit_event(CONNECTION_ABANDON) is called.  Test for NULL before using.
+ */
+extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+
+/* Maybe add the audit class to struct Authmethod? */
+ssh_audit_event_t
+audit_classify_auth(const char *method)
+{
+	if (strcmp(method, "none") == 0)
+		return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE;
+	else if (strcmp(method, "password") == 0)
+		return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD;
+	else if (strcmp(method, "publickey") == 0 ||
+	    strcmp(method, "rsa") == 0)
+		return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY;
+	else if (strncmp(method, "keyboard-interactive", 20) == 0 ||
+	    strcmp(method, "challenge-response") == 0)
+		return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT;
+	else if (strcmp(method, "hostbased") == 0 ||
+	    strcmp(method, "rhosts-rsa") == 0)
+		return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED;
+	else if (strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0)
+		return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI;
+	else
+		return SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN;
+}
+
+/* helper to return supplied username */
+const char *
+audit_username(void)
+{
+	static const char unknownuser[] = "(unknown user)";
+	static const char invaliduser[] = "(invalid user)";
+
+	if (the_authctxt == NULL || the_authctxt->user == NULL)
+		return (unknownuser);
+	if (!the_authctxt->valid)
+		return (invaliduser);
+	return (the_authctxt->user);
+}
+
+const char *
+audit_event_lookup(ssh_audit_event_t ev)
+{
+	int i;
+	static struct event_lookup_struct {
+		ssh_audit_event_t event;
+		const char *name;
+	} event_lookup[] = {
+		{SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES,	"LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES"},
+		{SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED,		"LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED"},
+		{SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS,		"AUTH_SUCCESS"},
+		{SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE,		"AUTH_FAIL_NONE"},
+		{SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD,		"AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD"},
+		{SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT,		"AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT"},
+		{SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY,		"AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY"},
+		{SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED,	"AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED"},
+		{SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI,		"AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI"},
+		{SSH_INVALID_USER,		"INVALID_USER"},
+		{SSH_NOLOGIN,			"NOLOGIN"},
+		{SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE,		"CONNECTION_CLOSE"},
+		{SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON,	"CONNECTION_ABANDON"},
+		{SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN,		"AUDIT_UNKNOWN"}
+	};
+
+	for (i = 0; event_lookup[i].event != SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN; i++)
+		if (event_lookup[i].event == ev)
+			break;
+	return(event_lookup[i].name);
+}
+
+# ifndef CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+/*
+ * Null implementations of audit functions.
+ * These get used if SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS is defined but no audit module is enabled.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Called after a connection has been accepted but before any authentication
+ * has been attempted.
+ */
+void
+audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port)
+{
+	debug("audit connection from %s port %d euid %d", host, port,
+	    (int)geteuid());
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called when various events occur (see audit.h for a list of possible
+ * events and what they mean).
+ */
+void
+audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
+{
+	debug("audit event euid %d user %s event %d (%s)", geteuid(),
+	    audit_username(), event, audit_event_lookup(event));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called when a user session is started.  Argument is the tty allocated to
+ * the session, or NULL if no tty was allocated.
+ *
+ * Note that this may be called multiple times if multiple sessions are used
+ * within a single connection.
+ */
+void
+audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	const char *t = li->line ? li->line : "(no tty)";
+
+	debug("audit session open euid %d user %s tty name %s", geteuid(),
+	    audit_username(), t);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called when a user session is closed.  Argument is the tty allocated to
+ * the session, or NULL if no tty was allocated.
+ *
+ * Note that this may be called multiple times if multiple sessions are used
+ * within a single connection.
+ */
+void
+audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	const char *t = li->line ? li->line : "(no tty)";
+
+	debug("audit session close euid %d user %s tty name %s", geteuid(),
+	    audit_username(), t);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This will be called when a user runs a non-interactive command.  Note that
+ * it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows
+ * multiple sessions within a single connection.
+ */
+void
+audit_run_command(const char *command)
+{
+	debug("audit run command euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(),
+	    audit_username(), command);
+}
+# endif  /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/audit.h b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/audit.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..92ede5bc4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/audit.h
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+/* $Id: audit.h,v 1.4 2011/01/17 10:15:30 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004, 2005 Darren Tucker.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SSH_AUDIT_H
+# define _SSH_AUDIT_H
+
+#include "loginrec.h"
+
+enum ssh_audit_event_type {
+	SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES,
+	SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED,
+	SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS,
+	SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE,
+	SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD,
+	SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT,	/* keyboard-interactive or challenge-response */
+	SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY,	/* ssh2 pubkey or ssh1 rsa */
+	SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED,	/* ssh2 hostbased or ssh1 rhostsrsa */
+	SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI,
+	SSH_INVALID_USER,
+	SSH_NOLOGIN,		/* denied by /etc/nologin, not implemented */
+	SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE,	/* closed after attempting auth or session */
+	SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON,	/* closed without completing auth */
+	SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN
+};
+typedef enum ssh_audit_event_type ssh_audit_event_t;
+
+void	audit_connection_from(const char *, int);
+void	audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
+void	audit_session_open(struct logininfo *);
+void	audit_session_close(struct logininfo *);
+void	audit_run_command(const char *);
+ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *);
+
+#endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-shadow.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-shadow.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..219091677
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-shadow.c
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004 Darren Tucker.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if defined(USE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE)
+#include <shadow.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+#ifdef DAY
+# undef DAY
+#endif
+#define DAY	(24L * 60 * 60) /* 1 day in seconds */
+
+extern Buffer loginmsg;
+
+/*
+ * For the account and password expiration functions, we assume the expiry
+ * occurs the day after the day specified.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Check if specified account is expired.  Returns 1 if account is expired,
+ * 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int
+auth_shadow_acctexpired(struct spwd *spw)
+{
+	time_t today;
+	int daysleft;
+	char buf[256];
+
+	today = time(NULL) / DAY;
+	daysleft = spw->sp_expire - today;
+	debug3("%s: today %d sp_expire %d days left %d", __func__, (int)today,
+	    (int)spw->sp_expire, daysleft);
+
+	if (spw->sp_expire == -1) {
+		debug3("account expiration disabled");
+	} else if (daysleft < 0) {
+		logit("Account %.100s has expired", spw->sp_namp);
+		return 1;
+	} else if (daysleft <= spw->sp_warn) {
+		debug3("account will expire in %d days", daysleft);
+		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
+		    "Your account will expire in %d day%s.\n", daysleft,
+		    daysleft == 1 ? "" : "s");
+		buffer_append(&loginmsg, buf, strlen(buf));
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Checks password expiry for platforms that use shadow passwd files.
+ * Returns: 1 = password expired, 0 = password not expired
+ */
+int
+auth_shadow_pwexpired(Authctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	struct spwd *spw = NULL;
+	const char *user = ctxt->pw->pw_name;
+	char buf[256];
+	time_t today;
+	int daysleft, disabled = 0;
+
+	if ((spw = getspnam((char *)user)) == NULL) {
+		error("Could not get shadow information for %.100s", user);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	today = time(NULL) / DAY;
+	debug3("%s: today %d sp_lstchg %d sp_max %d", __func__, (int)today,
+	    (int)spw->sp_lstchg, (int)spw->sp_max);
+
+#if defined(__hpux) && !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
+	if (iscomsec()) {
+		struct pr_passwd *pr;
+
+		pr = getprpwnam((char *)user);
+
+		/* Test for Trusted Mode expiry disabled */
+		if (pr != NULL && pr->ufld.fd_min == 0 &&
+		    pr->ufld.fd_lifetime == 0 && pr->ufld.fd_expire == 0 &&
+		    pr->ufld.fd_pw_expire_warning == 0 &&
+		    pr->ufld.fd_schange != 0)
+			disabled = 1;
+	}
+#endif
+
+	/* TODO: check sp_inact */
+	daysleft = spw->sp_lstchg + spw->sp_max - today;
+	if (disabled) {
+		debug3("password expiration disabled");
+	} else if (spw->sp_lstchg == 0) {
+		logit("User %.100s password has expired (root forced)", user);
+		return 1;
+	} else if (spw->sp_max == -1) {
+		debug3("password expiration disabled");
+	} else if (daysleft < 0) {
+		logit("User %.100s password has expired (password aged)", user);
+		return 1;
+	} else if (daysleft <= spw->sp_warn) {
+		debug3("password will expire in %d days", daysleft);
+		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
+		    "Your password will expire in %d day%s.\n", daysleft,
+		    daysleft == 1 ? "" : "s");
+		buffer_append(&loginmsg, buf, strlen(buf));
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif	/* USE_SHADOW && HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-sia.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-sia.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a9e1c258c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-sia.c
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 Chris Adams.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef HAVE_OSF_SIA
+#include <sia.h>
+#include <siad.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <setjmp.h>
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "auth-sia.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+
+extern ServerOptions options;
+extern int saved_argc;
+extern char **saved_argv;
+
+int
+sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *pass)
+{
+	int ret;
+	SIAENTITY *ent = NULL;
+	const char *host;
+
+	host = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns);
+
+	if (!authctxt->user || pass == NULL || pass[0] == '\0')
+		return (0);
+
+	if (sia_ses_init(&ent, saved_argc, saved_argv, host, authctxt->user,
+	    NULL, 0, NULL) != SIASUCCESS)
+		return (0);
+
+	if ((ret = sia_ses_authent(NULL, pass, ent)) != SIASUCCESS) {
+		error("Couldn't authenticate %s from %s",
+		    authctxt->user, host);
+		if (ret & SIASTOP)
+			sia_ses_release(&ent);
+
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	sia_ses_release(&ent);
+
+	return (1);
+}
+
+void
+session_setup_sia(struct passwd *pw, char *tty)
+{
+	SIAENTITY *ent = NULL;
+	const char *host;
+
+	host = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns);
+
+	if (sia_ses_init(&ent, saved_argc, saved_argv, host, pw->pw_name,
+	    tty, 0, NULL) != SIASUCCESS)
+		fatal("sia_ses_init failed");
+
+	if (sia_make_entity_pwd(pw, ent) != SIASUCCESS) {
+		sia_ses_release(&ent);
+		fatal("sia_make_entity_pwd failed");
+	}
+
+	ent->authtype = SIA_A_NONE;
+	if (sia_ses_estab(sia_collect_trm, ent) != SIASUCCESS)
+		fatal("Couldn't establish session for %s from %s",
+		    pw->pw_name, host);
+
+	if (sia_ses_launch(sia_collect_trm, ent) != SIASUCCESS)
+		fatal("Couldn't launch session for %s from %s",
+		    pw->pw_name, host);
+
+	sia_ses_release(&ent);
+
+	setuid(0);
+	permanently_set_uid(pw);
+}
+
+#endif /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-sia.h b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-sia.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..27cbb93f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-sia.h
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 Chris Adams.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef HAVE_OSF_SIA
+
+void	session_setup_sia(struct passwd *, char *);
+
+#endif /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/bindresvport.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/bindresvport.c
new file mode 120000
index 000000000..97fa52656
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/bindresvport.c
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/bsd-misc.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/bsd-misc.c
new file mode 120000
index 000000000..353b22a33
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/bsd-misc.c
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/bsd-setres_id.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/bsd-setres_id.c
new file mode 120000
index 000000000..0772787a2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/bsd-setres_id.c
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.c
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/cipher-aes.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/cipher-aes.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8b1017272
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/cipher-aes.c
@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+/* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+
+#ifdef USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "rijndael.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+#define RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE 16
+struct ssh_rijndael_ctx
+{
+	rijndael_ctx	r_ctx;
+	u_char		r_iv[RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE];
+};
+
+static int
+ssh_rijndael_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const u_char *key, const u_char *iv,
+    int enc)
+{
+	struct ssh_rijndael_ctx *c;
+
+	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL) {
+		c = xmalloc(sizeof(*c));
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, c);
+	}
+	if (key != NULL) {
+		if (enc == -1)
+			enc = ctx->encrypt;
+		rijndael_set_key(&c->r_ctx, (u_char *)key,
+		    8*EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx), enc);
+	}
+	if (iv != NULL)
+		memcpy(c->r_iv, iv, RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE);
+	return (1);
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_rijndael_cbc(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char *dest, const u_char *src,
+    LIBCRYPTO_EVP_INL_TYPE len)
+{
+	struct ssh_rijndael_ctx *c;
+	u_char buf[RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE];
+	u_char *cprev, *cnow, *plain, *ivp;
+	int i, j, blocks = len / RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE;
+
+	if (len == 0)
+		return (1);
+	if (len % RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE)
+		fatal("ssh_rijndael_cbc: bad len %d", len);
+	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL) {
+		error("ssh_rijndael_cbc: no context");
+		return (0);
+	}
+	if (ctx->encrypt) {
+		cnow  = dest;
+		plain = (u_char *)src;
+		cprev = c->r_iv;
+		for (i = 0; i < blocks; i++, plain+=RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE,
+		    cnow+=RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE) {
+			for (j = 0; j < RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE; j++)
+				buf[j] = plain[j] ^ cprev[j];
+			rijndael_encrypt(&c->r_ctx, buf, cnow);
+			cprev = cnow;
+		}
+		memcpy(c->r_iv, cprev, RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE);
+	} else {
+		cnow  = (u_char *) (src+len-RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE);
+		plain = dest+len-RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE;
+
+		memcpy(buf, cnow, RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE);
+		for (i = blocks; i > 0; i--, cnow-=RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE,
+		    plain-=RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE) {
+			rijndael_decrypt(&c->r_ctx, cnow, plain);
+			ivp = (i == 1) ? c->r_iv : cnow-RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE;
+			for (j = 0; j < RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE; j++)
+				plain[j] ^= ivp[j];
+		}
+		memcpy(c->r_iv, buf, RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE);
+	}
+	return (1);
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_rijndael_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+{
+	struct ssh_rijndael_ctx *c;
+
+	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) != NULL) {
+		memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
+		free(c);
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, NULL);
+	}
+	return (1);
+}
+
+void
+ssh_rijndael_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp, int doset, u_char * iv, u_int len)
+{
+	struct ssh_rijndael_ctx *c;
+
+	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(evp)) == NULL)
+		fatal("ssh_rijndael_iv: no context");
+	if (doset)
+		memcpy(c->r_iv, iv, len);
+	else
+		memcpy(iv, c->r_iv, len);
+}
+
+const EVP_CIPHER *
+evp_rijndael(void)
+{
+	static EVP_CIPHER rijndal_cbc;
+
+	memset(&rijndal_cbc, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
+	rijndal_cbc.nid = NID_undef;
+	rijndal_cbc.block_size = RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE;
+	rijndal_cbc.iv_len = RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE;
+	rijndal_cbc.key_len = 16;
+	rijndal_cbc.init = ssh_rijndael_init;
+	rijndal_cbc.cleanup = ssh_rijndael_cleanup;
+	rijndal_cbc.do_cipher = ssh_rijndael_cbc;
+#ifndef SSH_OLD_EVP
+	rijndal_cbc.flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH |
+	    EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV;
+#endif
+	return (&rijndal_cbc);
+}
+#endif /* USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/cipher-ctr.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/cipher-ctr.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..32771f287
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/cipher-ctr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: cipher-ctr.c,v 1.11 2010/10/01 23:05:32 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR)
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+/* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+
+#ifndef USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL
+#include <openssl/aes.h>
+#endif
+
+struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx
+{
+	AES_KEY		aes_ctx;
+	u_char		aes_counter[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+};
+
+/*
+ * increment counter 'ctr',
+ * the counter is of size 'len' bytes and stored in network-byte-order.
+ * (LSB at ctr[len-1], MSB at ctr[0])
+ */
+static void
+ssh_ctr_inc(u_char *ctr, size_t len)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = len - 1; i >= 0; i--)
+		if (++ctr[i])	/* continue on overflow */
+			return;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_aes_ctr(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char *dest, const u_char *src,
+    LIBCRYPTO_EVP_INL_TYPE len)
+{
+	struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c;
+	size_t n = 0;
+	u_char buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+
+	if (len == 0)
+		return (1);
+	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL)
+		return (0);
+
+	while ((len--) > 0) {
+		if (n == 0) {
+			AES_encrypt(c->aes_counter, buf, &c->aes_ctx);
+			ssh_ctr_inc(c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		}
+		*(dest++) = *(src++) ^ buf[n];
+		n = (n + 1) % AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+	}
+	return (1);
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_aes_ctr_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const u_char *key, const u_char *iv,
+    int enc)
+{
+	struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c;
+
+	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL) {
+		c = xmalloc(sizeof(*c));
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, c);
+	}
+	if (key != NULL)
+		AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+		    &c->aes_ctx);
+	if (iv != NULL)
+		memcpy(c->aes_counter, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	return (1);
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_aes_ctr_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+{
+	struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c;
+
+	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) != NULL) {
+		memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
+		free(c);
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, NULL);
+	}
+	return (1);
+}
+
+void
+ssh_aes_ctr_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp, int doset, u_char * iv, size_t len)
+{
+	struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c;
+
+	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(evp)) == NULL)
+		fatal("ssh_aes_ctr_iv: no context");
+	if (doset)
+		memcpy(c->aes_counter, iv, len);
+	else
+		memcpy(iv, c->aes_counter, len);
+}
+
+const EVP_CIPHER *
+evp_aes_128_ctr(void)
+{
+	static EVP_CIPHER aes_ctr;
+
+	memset(&aes_ctr, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
+	aes_ctr.nid = NID_undef;
+	aes_ctr.block_size = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+	aes_ctr.iv_len = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+	aes_ctr.key_len = 16;
+	aes_ctr.init = ssh_aes_ctr_init;
+	aes_ctr.cleanup = ssh_aes_ctr_cleanup;
+	aes_ctr.do_cipher = ssh_aes_ctr;
+#ifndef SSH_OLD_EVP
+	aes_ctr.flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH |
+	    EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV;
+#endif
+	return (&aes_ctr);
+}
+
+#endif /* defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR) */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/config.h b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/config.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8f6ba4e95
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/config.h
@@ -0,0 +1,1708 @@
+/* config.h.  Generated from config.h.in by configure.  */
+/* config.h.in.  Generated from configure.ac by autoheader.  */
+
+/* Define if you have a getaddrinfo that fails for the all-zeros IPv6 address
+   */
+/* #undef AIX_GETNAMEINFO_HACK */
+
+/* Define if your AIX loginfailed() function takes 4 arguments (AIX >= 5.2) */
+/* #undef AIX_LOGINFAILED_4ARG */
+
+/* System only supports IPv4 audit records */
+/* #undef AU_IPv4 */
+
+/* Define if your resolver libs need this for getrrsetbyname */
+/* #undef BIND_8_COMPAT */
+
+/* The system has incomplete BSM API */
+/* #undef BROKEN_BSM_API */
+
+/* Define if cmsg_type is not passed correctly */
+/* #undef BROKEN_CMSG_TYPE */
+
+/* getaddrinfo is broken (if present) */
+/* #undef BROKEN_GETADDRINFO */
+
+/* getgroups(0,NULL) will return -1 */
+/* #undef BROKEN_GETGROUPS */
+
+/* FreeBSD glob does not do what we need */
+/* #undef BROKEN_GLOB */
+
+/* Define if you system's inet_ntoa is busted (e.g. Irix gcc issue) */
+/* #undef BROKEN_INET_NTOA */
+
+/* ia_uinfo routines not supported by OS yet */
+/* #undef BROKEN_LIBIAF */
+
+/* Ultrix mmap can't map files */
+/* #undef BROKEN_MMAP */
+
+/* Define if your struct dirent expects you to allocate extra space for d_name
+   */
+/* #undef BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME */
+
+/* Can't do comparisons on readv */
+/* #undef BROKEN_READV_COMPARISON */
+
+/* NetBSD read function is sometimes redirected, breaking atomicio comparisons
+   against it */
+/* #undef BROKEN_READ_COMPARISON */
+
+/* realpath does not work with nonexistent files */
+#define BROKEN_REALPATH 1
+
+/* Needed for NeXT */
+/* #undef BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS */
+
+/* Define if your setregid() is broken */
+/* #undef BROKEN_SETREGID */
+
+/* Define if your setresgid() is broken */
+/* #undef BROKEN_SETRESGID */
+
+/* Define if your setresuid() is broken */
+/* #undef BROKEN_SETRESUID */
+
+/* Define if your setreuid() is broken */
+/* #undef BROKEN_SETREUID */
+
+/* LynxOS has broken setvbuf() implementation */
+/* #undef BROKEN_SETVBUF */
+
+/* QNX shadow support is broken */
+/* #undef BROKEN_SHADOW_EXPIRE */
+
+/* Define if your snprintf is busted */
+/* #undef BROKEN_SNPRINTF */
+
+/* FreeBSD strnvis argument order is swapped compared to OpenBSD */
+/* #undef BROKEN_STRNVIS */
+
+/* tcgetattr with ICANON may hang */
+/* #undef BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON */
+
+/* updwtmpx is broken (if present) */
+/* #undef BROKEN_UPDWTMPX */
+
+/* Define if you have BSD auth support */
+/* #undef BSD_AUTH */
+
+/* Define if you want to specify the path to your lastlog file */
+/* #undef CONF_LASTLOG_FILE */
+
+/* Define if you want to specify the path to your utmp file */
+#define CONF_UTMP_FILE "/var/run/utmp"
+
+/* Define if you want to specify the path to your wtmpx file */
+/* #undef CONF_WTMPX_FILE */
+
+/* Define if you want to specify the path to your wtmp file */
+/* #undef CONF_WTMP_FILE */
+
+/* Define if your platform needs to skip post auth file descriptor passing */
+/* #undef DISABLE_FD_PASSING */
+
+/* Define if you don't want to use lastlog */
+/* #undef DISABLE_LASTLOG */
+
+/* Define if you don't want to use your system's login() call */
+/* #undef DISABLE_LOGIN */
+
+/* Define if you don't want to use pututline() etc. to write [uw]tmp */
+/* #undef DISABLE_PUTUTLINE */
+
+/* Define if you don't want to use pututxline() etc. to write [uw]tmpx */
+/* #undef DISABLE_PUTUTXLINE */
+
+/* Define if you want to disable shadow passwords */
+/* #undef DISABLE_SHADOW */
+
+/* Define if you don't want to use utmp */
+/* #undef DISABLE_UTMP */
+
+/* Define if you don't want to use utmpx */
+/* #undef DISABLE_UTMPX */
+
+/* Define if you don't want to use wtmp */
+#define DISABLE_WTMP 1
+
+/* Define if you don't want to use wtmpx */
+#define DISABLE_WTMPX 1
+
+/* Enable for PKCS#11 support */
+#define ENABLE_PKCS11 
+
+/* File names may not contain backslash characters */
+/* #undef FILESYSTEM_NO_BACKSLASH */
+
+/* fsid_t has member val */
+/* #undef FSID_HAS_VAL */
+
+/* fsid_t has member __val */
+/* #undef FSID_HAS___VAL */
+
+/* Define to 1 if the `getpgrp' function requires zero arguments. */
+#define GETPGRP_VOID 1
+
+/* Conflicting defs for getspnam */
+/* #undef GETSPNAM_CONFLICTING_DEFS */
+
+/* Define if your system glob() function has the GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC extension */
+#define GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC 1
+
+/* Define if your system glob() function has gl_matchc options in glob_t */
+#define GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC 1
+
+/* Define if your system glob() function has gl_statv options in glob_t */
+/* #undef GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV */
+
+/* Define this if you want GSSAPI support in the version 2 protocol */
+/* #undef GSSAPI */
+
+/* Define if you want to use shadow password expire field */
+/* #undef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE */
+
+/* Define if your system uses access rights style file descriptor passing */
+/* #undef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR */
+
+/* Define if you have ut_addr in utmp.h */
+/* #undef HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMP */
+
+/* Define if you have ut_addr in utmpx.h */
+/* #undef HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMPX */
+
+/* Define if you have ut_addr_v6 in utmp.h */
+/* #undef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP */
+
+/* Define if you have ut_addr_v6 in utmpx.h */
+/* #undef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMPX */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `arc4random' function. */
+#define HAVE_ARC4RANDOM 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `arc4random_buf' function. */
+#define HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `arc4random_stir' function. */
+#define HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_STIR 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `arc4random_uniform' function. */
+#define HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `asprintf' function. */
+#define HAVE_ASPRINTF 1
+
+/* OpenBSD's gcc has bounded */
+/* #undef HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__BOUNDED__ */
+
+/* Have attribute nonnull */
+#define HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__NONNULL__ 1
+
+/* OpenBSD's gcc has sentinel */
+/* #undef HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__SENTINEL__ */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `aug_get_machine' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_AUG_GET_MACHINE */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `b64_ntop' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_B64_NTOP */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `b64_pton' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_B64_PTON */
+
+/* Define if you have the basename function. */
+#define HAVE_BASENAME 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `bcopy' function. */
+#define HAVE_BCOPY 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `bcrypt_pbkdf' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `bindresvport_sa' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_BINDRESVPORT_SA */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `blf_enc' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_BLF_ENC */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <blf.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_BLF_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `Blowfish_expand0state' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_BLOWFISH_EXPAND0STATE */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `Blowfish_expandstate' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_BLOWFISH_EXPANDSTATE */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `Blowfish_initstate' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_BLOWFISH_INITSTATE */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `Blowfish_stream2word' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_BLOWFISH_STREAM2WORD */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `BN_is_prime_ex' function. */
+#define HAVE_BN_IS_PRIME_EX 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <bsd/libutil.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_BSD_LIBUTIL_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <bsm/audit.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_BSM_AUDIT_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <bstring.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_BSTRING_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `cap_rights_limit' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_CAP_RIGHTS_LIMIT */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `clock' function. */
+#define HAVE_CLOCK 1
+
+/* Have clock_gettime */
+#define HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME 1
+
+/* define if you have clock_t data type */
+#define HAVE_CLOCK_T 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `closefrom' function. */
+#define HAVE_CLOSEFROM 1
+
+/* Define if gai_strerror() returns const char * */
+#define HAVE_CONST_GAI_STRERROR_PROTO 1
+
+/* Define if your system uses ancillary data style file descriptor passing */
+#define HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `crypt' function. */
+#define HAVE_CRYPT 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <crypto/sha2.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_CRYPTO_SHA2_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <crypt.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_CRYPT_H */
+
+/* Define if you are on Cygwin */
+/* #undef HAVE_CYGWIN */
+
+/* Define if your libraries define daemon() */
+#define HAVE_DAEMON 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `AI_NUMERICSERV', and to 0 if
+   you don't. */
+#define HAVE_DECL_AI_NUMERICSERV 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `authenticate', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+/* #undef HAVE_DECL_AUTHENTICATE */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `GLOB_NOMATCH', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+#define HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE',
+   and to 0 if you don't. */
+/* #undef HAVE_DECL_GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `howmany', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+#define HAVE_DECL_HOWMANY 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `h_errno', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+#define HAVE_DECL_H_ERRNO 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `loginfailed', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+/* #undef HAVE_DECL_LOGINFAILED */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `loginrestrictions', and to 0 if
+   you don't. */
+/* #undef HAVE_DECL_LOGINRESTRICTIONS */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `loginsuccess', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+/* #undef HAVE_DECL_LOGINSUCCESS */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `MAXSYMLINKS', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+#define HAVE_DECL_MAXSYMLINKS 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `NFDBITS', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+#define HAVE_DECL_NFDBITS 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `offsetof', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+#define HAVE_DECL_OFFSETOF 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `O_NONBLOCK', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+#define HAVE_DECL_O_NONBLOCK 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `passwdexpired', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+/* #undef HAVE_DECL_PASSWDEXPIRED */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `setauthdb', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+/* #undef HAVE_DECL_SETAUTHDB */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `SHUT_RD', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+#define HAVE_DECL_SHUT_RD 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `writev', and to 0 if you don't.
+   */
+#define HAVE_DECL_WRITEV 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `_getlong', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+#define HAVE_DECL__GETLONG 0
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `_getshort', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+#define HAVE_DECL__GETSHORT 0
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `DES_crypt' function. */
+#define HAVE_DES_CRYPT 1
+
+/* Define if you have /dev/ptmx */
+#define HAVE_DEV_PTMX 1
+
+/* Define if you have /dev/ptc */
+/* #undef HAVE_DEV_PTS_AND_PTC */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <dirent.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_DIRENT_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `dirfd' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_DIRFD */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `dirname' function. */
+#define HAVE_DIRNAME 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `DSA_generate_parameters_ex' function. */
+#define HAVE_DSA_GENERATE_PARAMETERS_EX 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <elf.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_ELF_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `endgrent' function. */
+#define HAVE_ENDGRENT 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <endian.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_ENDIAN_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `endutent' function. */
+#define HAVE_ENDUTENT 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `endutxent' function. */
+#define HAVE_ENDUTXENT 1
+
+/* Define if your system has /etc/default/login */
+/* #undef HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN */
+
+/* Define if libcrypto has EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl */
+#define HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_CTRL 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_DigestFinal_ex' function. */
+#define HAVE_EVP_DIGESTFINAL_EX 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_DigestInit_ex' function. */
+#define HAVE_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup' function. */
+#define HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_CLEANUP 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex' function. */
+#define HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_MD_CTX_init' function. */
+#define HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_INIT 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_ripemd160' function. */
+#define HAVE_EVP_RIPEMD160 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_sha256' function. */
+#define HAVE_EVP_SHA256 1
+
+/* Define if you have ut_exit in utmp.h */
+/* #undef HAVE_EXIT_IN_UTMP */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `explicit_bzero' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `fchmod' function. */
+#define HAVE_FCHMOD 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `fchown' function. */
+#define HAVE_FCHOWN 1
+
+/* Use F_CLOSEM fcntl for closefrom */
+/* #undef HAVE_FCNTL_CLOSEM */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <fcntl.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_FCNTL_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `fd_mask'. */
+#define HAVE_FD_MASK 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <features.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_FEATURES_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <floatingpoint.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_FLOATINGPOINT_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `fmt_scaled' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_FMT_SCALED */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `freeaddrinfo' function. */
+#define HAVE_FREEADDRINFO 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `fsblkcnt_t'. */
+#define HAVE_FSBLKCNT_T 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `fsfilcnt_t'. */
+#define HAVE_FSFILCNT_T 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `fstatfs' function. */
+#define HAVE_FSTATFS 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `fstatvfs' function. */
+#define HAVE_FSTATVFS 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `futimes' function. */
+#define HAVE_FUTIMES 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `gai_strerror' function. */
+#define HAVE_GAI_STRERROR 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getaddrinfo' function. */
+#define HAVE_GETADDRINFO 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getaudit' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_GETAUDIT */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getaudit_addr' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_GETAUDIT_ADDR */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getcwd' function. */
+#define HAVE_GETCWD 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getgrouplist' function. */
+#define HAVE_GETGROUPLIST 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getgrset' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_GETGRSET */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getlastlogxbyname' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getluid' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_GETLUID */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getnameinfo' function. */
+#define HAVE_GETNAMEINFO 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getopt' function. */
+#define HAVE_GETOPT 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <getopt.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_GETOPT_H 1
+
+/* Define if your getopt(3) defines and uses optreset */
+#define HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET 1
+
+/* Define if your libraries define getpagesize() */
+#define HAVE_GETPAGESIZE 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getpeereid' function. */
+#define HAVE_GETPEEREID 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getpeerucred' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_GETPEERUCRED */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getpgid' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_GETPGID */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getpgrp' function. */
+#define HAVE_GETPGRP 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getpwanam' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_GETPWANAM */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getrlimit' function. */
+#define HAVE_GETRLIMIT 1
+
+/* Define if getrrsetbyname() exists */
+/* #undef HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getrusage' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_GETRUSAGE */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getseuserbyname' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `gettimeofday' function. */
+#define HAVE_GETTIMEOFDAY 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getttyent' function. */
+#define HAVE_GETTTYENT 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutent' function. */
+#define HAVE_GETUTENT 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutid' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_GETUTID */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutline' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_GETUTLINE */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutxent' function. */
+#define HAVE_GETUTXENT 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutxid' function. */
+#define HAVE_GETUTXID 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutxline' function. */
+#define HAVE_GETUTXLINE 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutxuser' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_GETUTXUSER */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `get_default_context_with_level' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `glob' function. */
+#define HAVE_GLOB 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <glob.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_GLOB_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `group_from_gid' function. */
+#define HAVE_GROUP_FROM_GID 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <gssapi_generic.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <gssapi/gssapi_generic.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <gssapi/gssapi.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_KRB5_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <gssapi.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_GSSAPI_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <gssapi_krb5.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H */
+
+/* Define if HEADER.ad exists in arpa/nameser.h */
+#define HAVE_HEADER_AD 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `HMAC_CTX_init' function. */
+#define HAVE_HMAC_CTX_INIT 1
+
+/* Define if you have ut_host in utmp.h */
+#define HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP 1
+
+/* Define if you have ut_host in utmpx.h */
+#define HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <iaf.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_IAF_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <ia.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_IA_H */
+
+/* Define if you have ut_id in utmp.h */
+/* #undef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMP */
+
+/* Define if you have ut_id in utmpx.h */
+#define HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `inet_aton' function. */
+#define HAVE_INET_ATON 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `inet_ntoa' function. */
+#define HAVE_INET_NTOA 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `inet_ntop' function. */
+#define HAVE_INET_NTOP 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `innetgr' function. */
+#define HAVE_INNETGR 1
+
+/* define if you have int64_t data type */
+#define HAVE_INT64_T 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `intmax_t'. */
+#define HAVE_INTMAX_T 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <inttypes.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_INTTYPES_H 1
+
+/* define if you have intxx_t data type */
+#define HAVE_INTXX_T 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `in_addr_t'. */
+#define HAVE_IN_ADDR_T 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `in_port_t'. */
+#define HAVE_IN_PORT_T 1
+
+/* Define if you have isblank(3C). */
+#define HAVE_ISBLANK 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `krb5_cc_new_unique' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_KRB5_CC_NEW_UNIQUE */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `krb5_free_error_message' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_KRB5_FREE_ERROR_MESSAGE */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `krb5_get_error_message' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_KRB5_GET_ERROR_MESSAGE */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <lastlog.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_LASTLOG_H */
+
+/* Define if you want ldns support */
+/* #undef HAVE_LDNS */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <libaudit.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_LIBAUDIT_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `bsm' library (-lbsm). */
+/* #undef HAVE_LIBBSM */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `crypt' library (-lcrypt). */
+/* #undef HAVE_LIBCRYPT */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `dl' library (-ldl). */
+/* #undef HAVE_LIBDL */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <libgen.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_LIBGEN_H 1
+
+/* Define if system has libiaf that supports set_id */
+/* #undef HAVE_LIBIAF */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `network' library (-lnetwork). */
+/* #undef HAVE_LIBNETWORK */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `nsl' library (-lnsl). */
+/* #undef HAVE_LIBNSL */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `pam' library (-lpam). */
+/* #undef HAVE_LIBPAM */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `socket' library (-lsocket). */
+/* #undef HAVE_LIBSOCKET */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <libutil.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_LIBUTIL_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `xnet' library (-lxnet). */
+/* #undef HAVE_LIBXNET */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `z' library (-lz). */
+#define HAVE_LIBZ 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <limits.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_LIMITS_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <linux/audit.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <linux/filter.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_LINUX_FILTER_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <linux/if_tun.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_LINUX_IF_TUN_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <linux/seccomp.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_LINUX_SECCOMP_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <locale.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_LOCALE_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `login' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_LOGIN */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <login_cap.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `login_getcapbool' function. */
+#define HAVE_LOGIN_GETCAPBOOL 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <login.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_LOGIN_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `logout' function. */
+#define HAVE_LOGOUT 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `logwtmp' function. */
+#define HAVE_LOGWTMP 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `long double'. */
+#define HAVE_LONG_DOUBLE 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `long long'. */
+#define HAVE_LONG_LONG 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <maillock.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_MAILLOCK_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `mblen' function. */
+#define HAVE_MBLEN 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `md5_crypt' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_MD5_CRYPT */
+
+/* Define if you want to allow MD5 passwords */
+/* #undef HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `memmove' function. */
+#define HAVE_MEMMOVE 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <memory.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_MEMORY_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `memset_s' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_MEMSET_S */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `mkdtemp' function. */
+#define HAVE_MKDTEMP 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `mmap' function. */
+#define HAVE_MMAP 1
+
+/* define if you have mode_t data type */
+#define HAVE_MODE_T 1
+
+/* Some systems put nanosleep outside of libc */
+#define HAVE_NANOSLEEP 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <ndir.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_NDIR_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <netdb.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_NETDB_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <netgroup.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_NETGROUP_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <net/if_tun.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_NET_IF_TUN_H */
+
+/* Define if you are on NeXT */
+/* #undef HAVE_NEXT */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `ngetaddrinfo' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_NGETADDRINFO */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `nsleep' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_NSLEEP */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `ogetaddrinfo' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_OGETADDRINFO */
+
+/* Define if you have an old version of PAM which takes only one argument to
+   pam_strerror */
+/* #undef HAVE_OLD_PAM */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `openlog_r' function. */
+#define HAVE_OPENLOG_R 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `openpty' function. */
+#define HAVE_OPENPTY 1
+
+/* Define if your ssl headers are included with #include <openssl/header.h> */
+#define HAVE_OPENSSL 1
+
+/* Define if you have Digital Unix Security Integration Architecture */
+/* #undef HAVE_OSF_SIA */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `pam_getenvlist' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <pam/pam_appl.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `pam_putenv' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <paths.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_PATHS_H 1
+
+/* Define if you have ut_pid in utmp.h */
+/* #undef HAVE_PID_IN_UTMP */
+
+/* define if you have pid_t data type */
+#define HAVE_PID_T 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `poll' function. */
+#define HAVE_POLL 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <poll.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_POLL_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `prctl' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_PRCTL */
+
+/* Define if you have /proc/$pid/fd */
+/* #undef HAVE_PROC_PID */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `pstat' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_PSTAT */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <pty.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_PTY_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `pututline' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_PUTUTLINE */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `pututxline' function. */
+#define HAVE_PUTUTXLINE 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `readpassphrase' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_READPASSPHRASE */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <readpassphrase.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_READPASSPHRASE_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `reallocarray' function. */
+/*#define HAVE_REALLOCARRAY 1*/
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `realpath' function. */
+#define HAVE_REALPATH 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `recvmsg' function. */
+#define HAVE_RECVMSG 1
+
+/* sys/resource.h has RLIMIT_NPROC */
+#define HAVE_RLIMIT_NPROC 
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <rpc/types.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_RPC_TYPES_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `rresvport_af' function. */
+#define HAVE_RRESVPORT_AF 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_generate_key_ex' function. */
+#define HAVE_RSA_GENERATE_KEY_EX 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_get_default_method' function. */
+#define HAVE_RSA_GET_DEFAULT_METHOD 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sandbox.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_SANDBOX_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `sandbox_init' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_SANDBOX_INIT */
+
+/* define if you have sa_family_t data type */
+#define HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `scan_scaled' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_SCAN_SCALED */
+
+/* Define if you have SecureWare-based protected password database */
+/* #undef HAVE_SECUREWARE */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <security/pam_appl.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `sendmsg' function. */
+#define HAVE_SENDMSG 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setauthdb' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_SETAUTHDB */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setdtablesize' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_SETDTABLESIZE */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setegid' function. */
+#define HAVE_SETEGID 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setenv' function. */
+#define HAVE_SETENV 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `seteuid' function. */
+#define HAVE_SETEUID 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setgroupent' function. */
+#define HAVE_SETGROUPENT 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setgroups' function. */
+#define HAVE_SETGROUPS 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setlinebuf' function. */
+#define HAVE_SETLINEBUF 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setlogin' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_SETLOGIN */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setluid' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_SETLUID */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setpassent' function. */
+#define HAVE_SETPASSENT 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setpcred' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_SETPCRED */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setproctitle' function. */
+#define HAVE_SETPROCTITLE 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setregid' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_SETREGID */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setresgid' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_SETRESGID */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setresuid' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_SETRESUID */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setreuid' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_SETREUID */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setrlimit' function. */
+#define HAVE_SETRLIMIT 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setsid' function. */
+#define HAVE_SETSID 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setutent' function. */
+#define HAVE_SETUTENT 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setutxdb' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_SETUTXDB */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setutxent' function. */
+#define HAVE_SETUTXENT 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setvbuf' function. */
+#define HAVE_SETVBUF 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `set_id' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_SET_ID */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `SHA256_Update' function. */
+#define HAVE_SHA256_UPDATE 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sha2.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_SHA2_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <shadow.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_SHADOW_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `sigaction' function. */
+#define HAVE_SIGACTION 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `sigvec' function. */
+#define HAVE_SIGVEC 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `sig_atomic_t'. */
+#define HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T 1
+
+/* define if you have size_t data type */
+#define HAVE_SIZE_T 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `snprintf' function. */
+#define HAVE_SNPRINTF 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `socketpair' function. */
+#define HAVE_SOCKETPAIR 1
+
+/* Have PEERCRED socket option */
+/* #undef HAVE_SO_PEERCRED */
+
+/* define if you have ssize_t data type */
+#define HAVE_SSIZE_T 1
+
+/* Fields in struct sockaddr_storage */
+#define HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `statfs' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_STATFS */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `statvfs' function. */
+#define HAVE_STATVFS 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <stddef.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_STDDEF_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <stdint.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_STDINT_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <stdlib.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_STDLIB_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strdup' function. */
+#define HAVE_STRDUP 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strerror' function. */
+#define HAVE_STRERROR 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strftime' function. */
+#define HAVE_STRFTIME 1
+
+/* Silly mkstemp() */
+/* #undef HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <strings.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_STRINGS_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <string.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_STRING_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strlcat' function. */
+#define HAVE_STRLCAT 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strlcpy' function. */
+#define HAVE_STRLCPY 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strmode' function. */
+#define HAVE_STRMODE 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strnlen' function. */
+#define HAVE_STRNLEN 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strnvis' function. */
+#define HAVE_STRNVIS 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strptime' function. */
+#define HAVE_STRPTIME 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strsep' function. */
+#define HAVE_STRSEP 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strtoll' function. */
+#define HAVE_STRTOLL 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strtonum' function. */
+/*#define HAVE_STRTONUM 1*/
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strtoul' function. */
+#define HAVE_STRTOUL 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strtoull' function. */
+#define HAVE_STRTOULL 1
+
+/* define if you have struct addrinfo data type */
+#define HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO 1
+
+/* define if you have struct in6_addr data type */
+#define HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if `pw_change' is member of `struct passwd'. */
+#define HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CHANGE 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if `pw_class' is member of `struct passwd'. */
+#define HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if `pw_expire' is member of `struct passwd'. */
+#define HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_EXPIRE 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if `pw_gecos' is member of `struct passwd'. */
+#define HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS 1
+
+/* define if you have struct sockaddr_in6 data type */
+#define HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if `sin6_scope_id' is member of `struct sockaddr_in6'. */
+#define HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6_SIN6_SCOPE_ID 1
+
+/* define if you have struct sockaddr_storage data type */
+#define HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if `st_blksize' is member of `struct stat'. */
+#define HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `struct timespec'. */
+#define HAVE_STRUCT_TIMESPEC 1
+
+/* define if you have struct timeval */
+#define HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `swap32' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_SWAP32 */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `sysconf' function. */
+#define HAVE_SYSCONF 1
+
+/* Define if you have syslen in utmpx.h */
+/* #undef HAVE_SYSLEN_IN_UTMPX */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/audit.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_SYS_AUDIT_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/bitypes.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/bsdtty.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_SYS_BSDTTY_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/capability.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_SYS_CAPABILITY_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/cdefs.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_SYS_CDEFS_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/dir.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_SYS_DIR_H 1
+
+/* Define if your system defines sys_errlist[] */
+#define HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/mman.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_SYS_MMAN_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/mount.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/ndir.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_SYS_NDIR_H */
+
+/* Define if your system defines sys_nerr */
+#define HAVE_SYS_NERR 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/poll.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_SYS_POLL_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/prctl.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_SYS_PRCTL_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/pstat.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_SYS_PSTAT_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/ptms.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_SYS_PTMS_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/select.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/statvfs.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/stat.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_SYS_STAT_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/stream.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_SYS_STREAM_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/stropts.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_SYS_STROPTS_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/strtio.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_SYS_STRTIO_H */
+
+/* Force use of sys/syslog.h on Ultrix */
+/* #undef HAVE_SYS_SYSLOG_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/sysmacros.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/timers.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_SYS_TIMERS_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/time.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_SYS_TIME_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/types.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/un.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_SYS_UN_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `tcgetpgrp' function. */
+#define HAVE_TCGETPGRP 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `tcsendbreak' function. */
+#define HAVE_TCSENDBREAK 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `time' function. */
+#define HAVE_TIME 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <time.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_TIME_H 1
+
+/* Define if you have ut_time in utmp.h */
+#define HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP 1
+
+/* Define if you have ut_time in utmpx.h */
+/* #undef HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `timingsafe_bcmp' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_TIMINGSAFE_BCMP */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <tmpdir.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_TMPDIR_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `truncate' function. */
+#define HAVE_TRUNCATE 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <ttyent.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_TTYENT_H 1
+
+/* Define if you have ut_tv in utmp.h */
+/* #undef HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP */
+
+/* Define if you have ut_tv in utmpx.h */
+#define HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX 1
+
+/* Define if you have ut_type in utmp.h */
+/* #undef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP */
+
+/* Define if you have ut_type in utmpx.h */
+#define HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <ucred.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_UCRED_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `uintmax_t'. */
+#define HAVE_UINTMAX_T 1
+
+/* define if you have uintxx_t data type */
+#define HAVE_UINTXX_T 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <unistd.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_UNISTD_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `unsetenv' function. */
+#define HAVE_UNSETENV 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `unsigned long long'. */
+#define HAVE_UNSIGNED_LONG_LONG 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `updwtmp' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_UPDWTMP */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `updwtmpx' function. */
+#define HAVE_UPDWTMPX 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <usersec.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_USERSEC_H */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `user_from_uid' function. */
+#define HAVE_USER_FROM_UID 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `usleep' function. */
+#define HAVE_USLEEP 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <util.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_UTIL_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `utimes' function. */
+#define HAVE_UTIMES 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <utime.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_UTIME_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `utmpname' function. */
+#define HAVE_UTMPNAME 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `utmpxname' function. */
+#define HAVE_UTMPXNAME 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <utmpx.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_UTMPX_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <utmp.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_UTMP_H 1
+
+/* define if you have u_char data type */
+#define HAVE_U_CHAR 1
+
+/* define if you have u_int data type */
+#define HAVE_U_INT 1
+
+/* define if you have u_int64_t data type */
+#define HAVE_U_INT64_T 1
+
+/* define if you have u_intxx_t data type */
+#define HAVE_U_INTXX_T 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `vasprintf' function. */
+#define HAVE_VASPRINTF 1
+
+/* Define if va_copy exists */
+#define HAVE_VA_COPY 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <vis.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_VIS_H 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `vsnprintf' function. */
+#define HAVE_VSNPRINTF 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `waitpid' function. */
+#define HAVE_WAITPID 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `_getlong' function. */
+#define HAVE__GETLONG 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `_getpty' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE__GETPTY */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `_getshort' function. */
+#define HAVE__GETSHORT 1
+
+/* Define if you have struct __res_state _res as an extern */
+#define HAVE__RES_EXTERN 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `__b64_ntop' function. */
+#define HAVE___B64_NTOP 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `__b64_pton' function. */
+#define HAVE___B64_PTON 1
+
+/* Define if compiler implements __FUNCTION__ */
+#define HAVE___FUNCTION__ 1
+
+/* Define if libc defines __progname */
+#define HAVE___PROGNAME 1
+
+/* Fields in struct sockaddr_storage */
+/* #undef HAVE___SS_FAMILY_IN_SS */
+
+/* Define if __va_copy exists */
+#define HAVE___VA_COPY 1
+
+/* Define if compiler implements __func__ */
+#define HAVE___func__ 1
+
+/* Define this if you are using the Heimdal version of Kerberos V5 */
+/* #undef HEIMDAL */
+
+/* Define if you need to use IP address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY */
+/* #undef IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY */
+
+/* Detect IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses and treat as IPv4 */
+/* #undef IPV4_IN_IPV6 */
+
+/* Define if your system choked on IP TOS setting */
+/* #undef IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN */
+
+/* Define if you want Kerberos 5 support */
+/* #undef KRB5 */
+
+/* Define if pututxline updates lastlog too */
+/* #undef LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE */
+
+/* Define to whatever link() returns for "not supported" if it doesn't return
+   EOPNOTSUPP. */
+/* #undef LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO */
+
+/* Adjust Linux out-of-memory killer */
+/* #undef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST */
+
+/* max value of long long calculated by configure */
+/* #undef LLONG_MAX */
+
+/* min value of long long calculated by configure */
+/* #undef LLONG_MIN */
+
+/* Account locked with pw(1) */
+/* #undef LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX */
+
+/* String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account */
+/* #undef LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING */
+
+/* String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account */
+/* #undef LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR */
+
+/* Some versions of /bin/login need the TERM supplied on the commandline */
+/* #undef LOGIN_NEEDS_TERM */
+
+/* Some systems need a utmpx entry for /bin/login to work */
+/* #undef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX */
+
+/* Define if your login program cannot handle end of options ("--") */
+/* #undef LOGIN_NO_ENDOPT */
+
+/* If your header files don't define LOGIN_PROGRAM, then use this (detected)
+   from environment and PATH */
+#define LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK "/usr/bin/login"
+
+/* Set this to your mail directory if you do not have _PATH_MAILDIR */
+/* #undef MAIL_DIRECTORY */
+
+/* Need setpgrp to acquire controlling tty */
+/* #undef NEED_SETPGRP */
+
+/* compiler does not accept __attribute__ on return types */
+/* #undef NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_RETURN_TYPE */
+
+/* Define if the concept of ports only accessible to superusers isn't known */
+/* #undef NO_IPPORT_RESERVED_CONCEPT */
+
+/* Define if you don't want to use lastlog in session.c */
+/* #undef NO_SSH_LASTLOG */
+
+/* Define if X11 doesn't support AF_UNIX sockets on that system */
+/* #undef NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS */
+
+/* Define if EVP_DigestUpdate returns void */
+/* #undef OPENSSL_EVP_DIGESTUPDATE_VOID */
+
+/* OpenSSL has ECC */
+#define OPENSSL_HAS_ECC 1
+
+/* libcrypto has NID_X9_62_prime256v1 */
+#define OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256 1
+
+/* libcrypto has NID_secp384r1 */
+#define OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP384 1
+
+/* libcrypto has NID_secp521r1 */
+#define OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 1
+
+/* libcrypto has EVP AES CTR */
+#define OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR 1
+
+/* libcrypto has EVP AES GCM */
+#define OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM 1
+
+/* libcrypto is missing AES 192 and 256 bit functions */
+/* #undef OPENSSL_LOBOTOMISED_AES */
+
+/* Define if you want the OpenSSL internally seeded PRNG only */
+#define OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY 1
+
+/* Define to the address where bug reports for this package should be sent. */
+#define PACKAGE_BUGREPORT "openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org"
+
+/* Define to the full name of this package. */
+#define PACKAGE_NAME "OpenSSH"
+
+/* Define to the full name and version of this package. */
+#define PACKAGE_STRING "OpenSSH Portable"
+
+/* Define to the one symbol short name of this package. */
+#define PACKAGE_TARNAME "openssh"
+
+/* Define to the version of this package. */
+#define PACKAGE_VERSION "Portable"
+
+/* Define if you are using Solaris-derived PAM which passes pam_messages to
+   the conversation function with an extra level of indirection */
+/* #undef PAM_SUN_CODEBASE */
+
+/* Work around problematic Linux PAM modules handling of PAM_TTY */
+/* #undef PAM_TTY_KLUDGE */
+
+/* must supply username to passwd */
+/* #undef PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME */
+
+/* System dirs owned by bin (uid 2) */
+/* #undef PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID */
+
+/* Port number of PRNGD/EGD random number socket */
+/* #undef PRNGD_PORT */
+
+/* Location of PRNGD/EGD random number socket */
+/* #undef PRNGD_SOCKET */
+
+/* read(1) can return 0 for a non-closed fd */
+/* #undef PTY_ZEROREAD */
+
+/* Sandbox using capsicum */
+/* #undef SANDBOX_CAPSICUM */
+
+/* Sandbox using Darwin sandbox_init(3) */
+/* #undef SANDBOX_DARWIN */
+
+/* no privsep sandboxing */
+#define SANDBOX_NULL 1
+
+/* Sandbox using setrlimit(2) */
+/* #undef SANDBOX_RLIMIT */
+
+/* Sandbox using seccomp filter */
+/* #undef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER */
+
+/* setrlimit RLIMIT_FSIZE works */
+/* #undef SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_FSIZE */
+
+/* define if setrlimit RLIMIT_NOFILE breaks things */
+/* #undef SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_NOFILE */
+
+/* Sandbox using systrace(4) */
+/* #undef SANDBOX_SYSTRACE */
+
+/* Specify the system call convention in use */
+/* #undef SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH */
+
+/* Define if your platform breaks doing a seteuid before a setuid */
+/* #undef SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID */
+
+/* The size of `int', as computed by sizeof. */
+#define SIZEOF_INT 4
+
+/* The size of `long int', as computed by sizeof. */
+#define SIZEOF_LONG_INT 4
+
+/* The size of `long long int', as computed by sizeof. */
+#define SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT 8
+
+/* The size of `short int', as computed by sizeof. */
+#define SIZEOF_SHORT_INT 2
+
+/* Define if you want S/Key support */
+/* #undef SKEY */
+
+/* Define if your skeychallenge() function takes 4 arguments (NetBSD) */
+/* #undef SKEYCHALLENGE_4ARG */
+
+/* Define as const if snprintf() can declare const char *fmt */
+#define SNPRINTF_CONST /* not const */
+
+/* Define to a Set Process Title type if your system is supported by
+   bsd-setproctitle.c */
+/* #undef SPT_TYPE */
+
+/* Define if sshd somehow reacquires a controlling TTY after setsid() */
+/* #undef SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY */
+
+/* Define if pam_chauthtok wants real uid set to the unpriv'ed user */
+/* #undef SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID */
+
+/* Use audit debugging module */
+/* #undef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+
+/* Windows is sensitive to read buffer size */
+/* #undef SSH_IOBUFSZ */
+
+/* non-privileged user for privilege separation */
+#define SSH_PRIVSEP_USER "sshd"
+
+/* Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD */
+/* #undef SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF */
+
+/* Open tunnel devices the FreeBSD way */
+/* #undef SSH_TUN_FREEBSD */
+
+/* Open tunnel devices the Linux tun/tap way */
+/* #undef SSH_TUN_LINUX */
+
+/* No layer 2 tunnel support */
+/* #undef SSH_TUN_NO_L2 */
+
+/* Open tunnel devices the OpenBSD way */
+/* #undef SSH_TUN_OPENBSD */
+
+/* Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic */
+/* #undef SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the ANSI C header files. */
+#define STDC_HEADERS 1
+
+/* Define if you want a different $PATH for the superuser */
+/* #undef SUPERUSER_PATH */
+
+/* syslog_r function is safe to use in in a signal handler */
+/* #undef SYSLOG_R_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND */
+
+/* Support passwords > 8 chars */
+/* #undef UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS */
+
+/* Specify default $PATH */
+/* #undef USER_PATH */
+
+/* Define this if you want to use libkafs' AFS support */
+/* #undef USE_AFS */
+
+/* Use BSM audit module */
+/* #undef USE_BSM_AUDIT */
+
+/* Use btmp to log bad logins */
+/* #undef USE_BTMP */
+
+/* Use libedit for sftp */
+/* #undef USE_LIBEDIT */
+
+/* Use Linux audit module */
+/* #undef USE_LINUX_AUDIT */
+
+/* Enable OpenSSL engine support */
+/* #undef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE */
+
+/* Define if you want to enable PAM support */
+/* #undef USE_PAM */
+
+/* Use PIPES instead of a socketpair() */
+/* #undef USE_PIPES */
+
+/* Define if you have Solaris process contracts */
+/* #undef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS */
+
+/* Define if you have Solaris projects */
+/* #undef USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS */
+
+/* Define if you shouldn't strip 'tty' from your ttyname in [uw]tmp */
+/* #undef WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY */
+
+/* Define if you want to enable AIX4's authenticate function */
+/* #undef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */
+
+/* Define if you have/want arrays (cluster-wide session managment, not C
+   arrays) */
+/* #undef WITH_IRIX_ARRAY */
+
+/* Define if you want IRIX audit trails */
+/* #undef WITH_IRIX_AUDIT */
+
+/* Define if you want IRIX kernel jobs */
+/* #undef WITH_IRIX_JOBS */
+
+/* Define if you want IRIX project management */
+/* #undef WITH_IRIX_PROJECT */
+
+/* use libcrypto for cryptography */
+#define WITH_OPENSSL 1
+
+/* Define if you want SELinux support. */
+/* #undef WITH_SELINUX */
+
+/* include SSH protocol version 1 support */
+/* #undef WITH_SSH1 */
+
+/* Define to 1 if your processor stores words with the most significant byte
+   first (like Motorola and SPARC, unlike Intel and VAX). */
+/* #undef WORDS_BIGENDIAN */
+
+/* Define if xauth is found in your path */
+#define XAUTH_PATH "/usr/X11R7/bin/xauth"
+
+/* Number of bits in a file offset, on hosts where this is settable. */
+/* #undef _FILE_OFFSET_BITS */
+
+/* Define for large files, on AIX-style hosts. */
+/* #undef _LARGE_FILES */
+
+/* log for bad login attempts */
+/* #undef _PATH_BTMP */
+
+/* Full path of your "passwd" program */
+#define _PATH_PASSWD_PROG "/usr/bin/passwd"
+
+/* Specify location of ssh.pid */
+#define _PATH_SSH_PIDDIR "/var/run"
+
+/* Define if we don't have struct __res_state in resolv.h */
+/* #undef __res_state */
+
+/* Define to `__inline__' or `__inline' if that's what the C compiler
+   calls it, or to nothing if 'inline' is not supported under any name.  */
+#ifndef __cplusplus
+/* #undef inline */
+#endif
+
+/* type to use in place of socklen_t if not defined */
+/* #undef socklen_t */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/Makefile b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..eaf7fe2fd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+PKG_CONFIG = pkg-config
+
+all:
+	@echo "Valid targets: gnome-ssh-askpass1 gnome-ssh-askpass2"
+
+gnome-ssh-askpass1: gnome-ssh-askpass1.c
+	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) `gnome-config --cflags gnome gnomeui` \
+		gnome-ssh-askpass1.c -o gnome-ssh-askpass1 \
+		`gnome-config --libs gnome gnomeui`
+
+gnome-ssh-askpass2: gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
+	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) `$(PKG_CONFIG) --cflags gtk+-2.0` \
+		gnome-ssh-askpass2.c -o gnome-ssh-askpass2 \
+		`$(PKG_CONFIG) --libs gtk+-2.0 x11`
+
+clean:
+	rm -f *.o gnome-ssh-askpass1 gnome-ssh-askpass2 gnome-ssh-askpass
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/README b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/README
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..60e19ba9f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/README
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+Other patches and addons for OpenSSH. Please send submissions to
+djm@mindrot.org
+
+Externally maintained
+---------------------
+
+SSH Proxy Command -- connect.c
+
+Shun-ichi GOTO <gotoh@imasy.or.jp> has written a very useful ProxyCommand
+which allows the use of outbound SSH from behind a SOCKS4, SOCKS5 or
+https CONNECT style proxy server. His page for connect.c has extensive
+documentation on its use as well as compiled versions for Win32.
+
+https://bitbucket.org/gotoh/connect/wiki/Home
+
+
+X11 SSH Askpass:
+
+Jim Knoble <jmknoble@pobox.com> has written an excellent X11
+passphrase requester. This is highly recommended:
+
+http://www.jmknoble.net/software/x11-ssh-askpass/
+
+
+In this directory
+-----------------
+
+ssh-copy-id:
+
+Phil Hands' <phil@hands.com> shell script to automate the process of adding
+your public key to a remote machine's ~/.ssh/authorized_keys file.
+
+gnome-ssh-askpass[12]:
+
+A GNOME and Gtk2 passphrase requesters. Use "make gnome-ssh-askpass1" or
+"make gnome-ssh-askpass2" to build.
+
+sshd.pam.generic:
+
+A generic PAM config file which may be useful on your system. YMMV
+
+sshd.pam.freebsd:
+
+A PAM config file which works with FreeBSD's PAM port. Contributed by
+Dominik Brettnacher <domi@saargate.de>
+
+findssl.sh:
+
+Search for all instances of OpenSSL headers and libraries and print their 
+versions.  This is intended to help diagnose OpenSSH's "OpenSSL headers do not
+match your library" errors. 
+
+aix:
+    Files to build an AIX native (installp or SMIT installable) package.
+
+caldera:
+    RPM spec file and scripts for building Caldera OpenLinuix packages
+
+cygwin:
+    Support files for Cygwin
+
+hpux:
+    Support files for HP-UX
+
+redhat:
+    RPM spec file and scripts for building Redhat packages
+
+suse:
+    RPM spec file and scripts for building SuSE packages
+
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/aix/README b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/aix/README
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2a299350a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/aix/README
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+Overview:
+
+This directory contains files to build an AIX native (installp or SMIT
+installable) openssh package.
+
+
+Directions:
+
+(optional) create config.local in your build dir
+./configure [options]
+contrib/aix/buildbff.sh
+
+The file config.local or the environment is read to set the following options
+(default first):
+PERMIT_ROOT_LOGIN=[no|yes]
+X11_FORWARDING=[no|yes]
+AIX_SRC=[no|yes]
+
+Acknowledgements:
+
+The contents of this directory are based on Ben Lindstrom's Solaris
+buildpkg.sh. Ben also supplied inventory.sh.
+
+Jim Abbey's (GPL'ed) lppbuild-2.1 was used to learn how to build .bff's
+and for comparison with the output from this script, however no code
+from lppbuild is included and it is not required for operation.
+
+SRC support based on examples provided by Sandor Sklar and Maarten Kreuger.
+PrivSep account handling fixes contributed by W. Earl Allen.
+
+
+Other notes:
+
+The script treats all packages as USR packages (not ROOT+USR when
+appropriate).  It seems to work, though......
+
+If there are any patches to this that have not yet been integrated they
+may be found at http://www.zip.com.au/~dtucker/openssh/.
+
+
+Disclaimer:
+
+It is hoped that it is useful but there is no warranty. If it breaks
+you get to keep both pieces.
+
+
+	- Darren Tucker (dtucker at zip dot com dot au)
+	  2002/03/01
+
+$Id: README,v 1.4 2003/08/25 05:01:04 dtucker Exp $
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/aix/buildbff.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/aix/buildbff.sh
new file mode 100755
index 000000000..81d8cc301
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/aix/buildbff.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,381 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+#
+# buildbff.sh: Create AIX SMIT-installable OpenSSH packages
+# $Id: buildbff.sh,v 1.13 2011/05/05 03:48:41 djm Exp $
+#
+# Author: Darren Tucker (dtucker at zip dot com dot au)
+# This file is placed in the public domain and comes with absolutely
+# no warranty.
+#
+# Based originally on Ben Lindstrom's buildpkg.sh for Solaris
+#
+
+#
+# Tunable configuration settings
+# 	create a "config.local" in your build directory or set
+#	environment variables to override these.
+#
+[ -z "$PERMIT_ROOT_LOGIN" ] && PERMIT_ROOT_LOGIN=no
+[ -z "$X11_FORWARDING" ] && X11_FORWARDING=no
+[ -z "$AIX_SRC" ] && AIX_SRC=no
+
+umask 022
+
+startdir=`pwd`
+
+perl -v >/dev/null || (echo perl required; exit 1)
+
+# Path to inventory.sh: same place as buildbff.sh
+if  echo $0 | egrep '^/'
+then
+	inventory=`dirname $0`/inventory.sh		# absolute path
+else
+	inventory=`pwd`/`dirname $0`/inventory.sh	# relative path
+fi
+
+#
+# We still support running from contrib/aix, but this is deprecated
+#
+if pwd | egrep 'contrib/aix$'
+then
+	echo "Changing directory to `pwd`/../.."
+	echo "Please run buildbff.sh from your build directory in future."
+	cd ../..
+	contribaix=1
+fi
+
+if [ ! -f Makefile ]
+then
+	echo "Makefile not found (did you run configure?)"
+	exit 1
+fi
+
+#
+# Directories used during build:
+# current dir = $objdir		directory you ran ./configure in.
+# $objdir/$PKGDIR/ 		directory package files are constructed in
+# $objdir/$PKGDIR/root/		package root ($FAKE_ROOT)
+#
+objdir=`pwd`
+PKGNAME=openssh
+PKGDIR=package
+
+#
+# Collect local configuration settings to override defaults
+#
+if [ -s ./config.local ]
+then
+	echo Reading local settings from config.local
+	. ./config.local
+fi
+
+#
+# Fill in some details from Makefile, like prefix and sysconfdir
+#	the eval also expands variables like sysconfdir=${prefix}/etc
+#	provided they are eval'ed in the correct order
+#
+for confvar in prefix exec_prefix bindir sbindir libexecdir datadir mandir mansubdir sysconfdir piddir srcdir
+do
+	eval $confvar=`grep "^$confvar=" $objdir/Makefile | cut -d = -f 2`
+done
+
+#
+# Collect values of privsep user and privsep path
+#	currently only found in config.h
+#
+for confvar in SSH_PRIVSEP_USER PRIVSEP_PATH
+do
+	eval $confvar=`awk '/#define[ \t]'$confvar'/{print $3}' $objdir/config.h`
+done
+
+# Set privsep defaults if not defined
+if [ -z "$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER" ]
+then
+	SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=sshd
+fi
+if [ -z "$PRIVSEP_PATH" ]
+then
+	PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty
+fi
+
+# Clean package build directory
+rm -rf $objdir/$PKGDIR
+FAKE_ROOT=$objdir/$PKGDIR/root
+mkdir -p $FAKE_ROOT
+
+# Start by faking root install
+echo "Faking root install..."
+cd $objdir
+make install-nokeys DESTDIR=$FAKE_ROOT
+
+if [ $? -gt 0 ]
+then
+	echo "Fake root install failed, stopping."
+	exit 1
+fi
+
+#
+# Copy informational files to include in package
+#
+cp $srcdir/LICENCE $objdir/$PKGDIR/
+cp $srcdir/README* $objdir/$PKGDIR/
+
+#
+# Extract common info requires for the 'info' part of the package.
+#	AIX requires 4-part version numbers
+#
+VERSION=`./ssh -V 2>&1 | cut -f 1 -d , | cut -f 2 -d _`
+MAJOR=`echo $VERSION | cut -f 1 -d p | cut -f 1 -d .`
+MINOR=`echo $VERSION | cut -f 1 -d p | cut -f 2 -d .`
+PATCH=`echo $VERSION | cut -f 1 -d p | cut -f 3 -d .`
+PORTABLE=`echo $VERSION | awk 'BEGIN{FS="p"}{print $2}'`
+[ "$PATCH" = "" ] && PATCH=0
+[ "$PORTABLE" = "" ] && PORTABLE=0
+BFFVERSION=`printf "%d.%d.%d.%d" $MAJOR $MINOR $PATCH $PORTABLE`
+
+echo "Building BFF for $PKGNAME $VERSION (package version $BFFVERSION)"
+
+#
+# Set ssh and sshd parameters as per config.local
+#
+if [ "${PERMIT_ROOT_LOGIN}" = no ]
+then
+	perl -p -i -e "s/#PermitRootLogin yes/PermitRootLogin no/" \
+		$FAKE_ROOT/${sysconfdir}/sshd_config
+fi
+if [ "${X11_FORWARDING}" = yes ]
+then
+	perl -p -i -e "s/#X11Forwarding no/X11Forwarding yes/" \
+		$FAKE_ROOT/${sysconfdir}/sshd_config
+fi
+
+
+# Rename config files; postinstall script will copy them if necessary
+for cfgfile in ssh_config sshd_config
+do
+	mv $FAKE_ROOT/$sysconfdir/$cfgfile $FAKE_ROOT/$sysconfdir/$cfgfile.default
+done
+
+#
+# Generate lpp control files.
+#	working dir is $FAKE_ROOT but files are generated in dir above
+#	and moved into place just before creation of .bff
+#
+cd $FAKE_ROOT
+echo Generating LPP control files
+find . ! -name . -print >../openssh.al
+$inventory >../openssh.inventory
+
+cat <<EOD >../openssh.copyright
+This software is distributed under a BSD-style license.
+For the full text of the license, see /usr/lpp/openssh/LICENCE
+EOD
+
+#
+# openssh.size file allows filesystem expansion as required
+# generate list of directories containing files
+# then calculate disk usage for each directory and store in openssh.size
+#
+files=`find . -type f -print`
+dirs=`for file in $files; do dirname $file; done | sort -u`
+for dir in $dirs
+do
+	du $dir
+done > ../openssh.size
+
+#
+# Create postinstall script
+#
+cat <<EOF >>../openssh.post_i
+#!/bin/sh
+
+echo Creating configs from defaults if necessary.
+for cfgfile in ssh_config sshd_config
+do
+	if [ ! -f $sysconfdir/\$cfgfile ]
+	then
+		echo "Creating \$cfgfile from default"
+		cp $sysconfdir/\$cfgfile.default $sysconfdir/\$cfgfile
+	else
+		echo "\$cfgfile already exists."
+	fi
+done
+echo
+
+# Create PrivilegeSeparation user and group if not present
+echo Checking for PrivilegeSeparation user and group.
+if cut -f1 -d: /etc/group | egrep '^'$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER'\$' >/dev/null
+then
+	echo "PrivSep group $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER already exists."
+else
+	echo "Creating PrivSep group $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER."
+	mkgroup -A $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER
+fi
+
+# Create user if required
+if lsuser "$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER" >/dev/null
+then
+	echo "PrivSep user $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER already exists."
+else
+	echo "Creating PrivSep user $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER."
+	mkuser gecos='SSHD PrivSep User' login=false rlogin=false account_locked=true pgrp=$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER
+fi
+
+if egrep '^[ \t]*UsePrivilegeSeparation[ \t]+no' $sysconfdir/sshd_config >/dev/null
+then
+	echo UsePrivilegeSeparation not enabled, privsep directory not required.
+else
+	# create chroot directory if required
+	if [ -d $PRIVSEP_PATH ]
+	then
+		echo "PrivSep chroot directory $PRIVSEP_PATH already exists."
+	else
+		echo "Creating PrivSep chroot directory $PRIVSEP_PATH."
+		mkdir $PRIVSEP_PATH
+		chown 0 $PRIVSEP_PATH
+		chgrp 0 $PRIVSEP_PATH
+		chmod 755 $PRIVSEP_PATH
+	fi
+fi
+echo
+
+# Generate keys unless they already exist
+echo Creating host keys if required.
+if [ -f "$sysconfdir/ssh_host_key" ] ; then
+	echo "$sysconfdir/ssh_host_key already exists, skipping."
+else
+	$bindir/ssh-keygen -t rsa1 -f $sysconfdir/ssh_host_key -N ""
+fi
+if [ -f $sysconfdir/ssh_host_dsa_key ] ; then
+	echo "$sysconfdir/ssh_host_dsa_key already exists, skipping."
+else
+	$bindir/ssh-keygen -t dsa -f $sysconfdir/ssh_host_dsa_key -N ""
+fi
+if [ -f $sysconfdir/ssh_host_rsa_key ] ; then
+	echo "$sysconfdir/ssh_host_rsa_key already exists, skipping."
+else
+	$bindir/ssh-keygen -t rsa -f $sysconfdir/ssh_host_rsa_key -N ""
+fi
+echo
+
+# Set startup command depending on SRC support
+if [ "$AIX_SRC" = "yes" ]
+then
+	echo Creating SRC sshd subsystem.
+	rmssys -s sshd 2>&1 >/dev/null
+	mkssys -s sshd -p "$sbindir/sshd" -a '-D' -u 0 -S -n 15 -f 9 -R -G tcpip
+	startupcmd="start $sbindir/sshd \\\"\\\$src_running\\\""
+	oldstartcmd="$sbindir/sshd"
+else
+	startupcmd="$sbindir/sshd"
+	oldstartcmd="start $sbindir/sshd \\\"$src_running\\\""
+fi
+
+# If migrating to or from SRC, change previous startup command
+# otherwise add to rc.tcpip
+if egrep "^\$oldstartcmd" /etc/rc.tcpip >/dev/null
+then
+	if sed "s|^\$oldstartcmd|\$startupcmd|g" /etc/rc.tcpip >/etc/rc.tcpip.new
+	then
+		chmod 0755 /etc/rc.tcpip.new
+		mv /etc/rc.tcpip /etc/rc.tcpip.old && \
+		mv /etc/rc.tcpip.new /etc/rc.tcpip
+	else
+		echo "Updating /etc/rc.tcpip failed, please check."
+	fi
+else
+	# Add to system startup if required
+	if grep "^\$startupcmd" /etc/rc.tcpip >/dev/null
+	then
+		echo "sshd found in rc.tcpip, not adding."
+	else
+		echo "Adding sshd to rc.tcpip"
+		echo >>/etc/rc.tcpip
+		echo "# Start sshd" >>/etc/rc.tcpip
+		echo "\$startupcmd" >>/etc/rc.tcpip
+	fi
+fi
+EOF
+
+#
+# Create liblpp.a and move control files into it
+#
+echo Creating liblpp.a
+(
+	cd ..
+	for i in openssh.al openssh.copyright openssh.inventory openssh.post_i openssh.size LICENCE README*
+	do
+		ar -r liblpp.a $i
+		rm $i
+	done
+)
+
+#
+# Create lpp_name
+#
+# This will end up looking something like:
+# 4 R I OpenSSH {
+# OpenSSH 3.0.2.1 1 N U en_US OpenSSH 3.0.2p1 Portable for AIX
+# [
+# %
+# /usr/local/bin 8073
+# /usr/local/etc 189
+# /usr/local/libexec 185
+# /usr/local/man/man1 145
+# /usr/local/man/man8 83
+# /usr/local/sbin 2105
+# /usr/local/share 3
+# %
+# ]
+# }
+
+echo Creating lpp_name
+cat <<EOF >../lpp_name
+4 R I $PKGNAME {
+$PKGNAME $BFFVERSION 1 N U en_US OpenSSH $VERSION Portable for AIX
+[
+%
+EOF
+
+for i in $bindir $sysconfdir $libexecdir $mandir/${mansubdir}1 $mandir/${mansubdir}8 $sbindir $datadir /usr/lpp/openssh
+do
+	# get size in 512 byte blocks
+	if [ -d $FAKE_ROOT/$i ]
+	then
+		size=`du $FAKE_ROOT/$i | awk '{print $1}'`
+		echo "$i $size" >>../lpp_name
+	fi
+done
+
+echo '%' >>../lpp_name
+echo ']' >>../lpp_name
+echo '}' >>../lpp_name
+
+#
+# Move pieces into place
+#
+mkdir -p usr/lpp/openssh
+mv ../liblpp.a usr/lpp/openssh
+mv ../lpp_name .
+
+#
+# Now invoke backup to create .bff file
+#	note: lpp_name needs to be the first file so we generate the
+#	file list on the fly and feed it to backup using -i
+#
+echo Creating $PKGNAME-$VERSION.bff with backup...
+rm -f $PKGNAME-$VERSION.bff
+(
+	echo "./lpp_name"
+	find . ! -name lpp_name -a ! -name . -print
+) | backup  -i -q -f ../$PKGNAME-$VERSION.bff $filelist
+
+#
+# Move package into final location and clean up
+#
+mv ../$PKGNAME-$VERSION.bff $startdir
+cd $startdir
+rm -rf $objdir/$PKGDIR
+
+echo $0: done.
+
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/aix/inventory.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/aix/inventory.sh
new file mode 100755
index 000000000..e2641e79c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/aix/inventory.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+#
+# inventory.sh
+# $Id: inventory.sh,v 1.6 2003/11/21 12:48:56 djm Exp $
+#
+# Originally written by Ben Lindstrom, modified by Darren Tucker to use perl
+# This file is placed into the public domain.
+#
+# This will produce an AIX package inventory file, which looks like:
+#
+# /usr/local/bin:
+#          class=apply,inventory,openssh
+#          owner=root
+#          group=system
+#          mode=755
+#          type=DIRECTORY
+# /usr/local/bin/slogin:
+#          class=apply,inventory,openssh
+#          owner=root
+#          group=system
+#          mode=777
+#          type=SYMLINK
+#          target=ssh
+# /usr/local/share/Ssh.bin:
+#          class=apply,inventory,openssh
+#          owner=root
+#          group=system
+#          mode=644
+#          type=FILE
+#          size=VOLATILE
+#          checksum=VOLATILE
+
+find . ! -name . -print | perl -ne '{
+	chomp;
+	if ( -l $_ ) {
+		($dev,$ino,$mod,$nl,$uid,$gid,$rdev,$sz,$at,$mt,$ct,$bsz,$blk)=lstat;
+	} else {
+		($dev,$ino,$mod,$nl,$uid,$gid,$rdev,$sz,$at,$mt,$ct,$bsz,$blk)=stat;
+	}
+
+	# Start to display inventory information
+	$name = $_;
+	$name =~ s|^.||;	# Strip leading dot from path
+	print "$name:\n";
+	print "\tclass=apply,inventory,openssh\n";
+	print "\towner=root\n";
+	print "\tgroup=system\n";
+	printf "\tmode=%lo\n", $mod & 07777;	# Mask perm bits
+	
+	if ( -l $_ ) {
+		# Entry is SymLink
+		print "\ttype=SYMLINK\n";
+		printf "\ttarget=%s\n", readlink($_);
+	} elsif ( -f $_ ) {
+		# Entry is File
+		print "\ttype=FILE\n";
+		print "\tsize=$sz\n";
+		print "\tchecksum=VOLATILE\n";
+	} elsif ( -d $_ ) {
+		# Entry is Directory
+		print "\ttype=DIRECTORY\n";
+	}
+}'
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/aix/pam.conf b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/aix/pam.conf
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f1528b005
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/aix/pam.conf
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+#
+# PAM configuration file /etc/pam.conf
+# Example for OpenSSH on AIX 5.2
+#
+
+# Authentication Management
+sshd    auth            required        /usr/lib/security/pam_aix
+OTHER   auth            required        /usr/lib/security/pam_aix
+
+# Account Management
+sshd    account         required        /usr/lib/security/pam_aix
+OTHER   account         required        /usr/lib/security/pam_aix
+
+# Password Management
+sshd    password        required        /usr/lib/security/pam_aix
+OTHER   password        required        /usr/lib/security/pam_aix
+
+# Session Management
+sshd    session         required        /usr/lib/security/pam_aix
+OTHER   session         required        /usr/lib/security/pam_aix
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/cygwin/Makefile b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/cygwin/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a0261f48d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/cygwin/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+srcdir=../..
+copyidsrcdir=..
+prefix=/usr
+exec_prefix=$(prefix)
+bindir=$(prefix)/bin
+datadir=$(prefix)/share
+mandir=$(datadir)/man
+docdir=$(datadir)/doc
+sshdocdir=$(docdir)/openssh
+cygdocdir=$(docdir)/Cygwin
+sysconfdir=/etc
+defaultsdir=$(sysconfdir)/defaults/etc
+inetdefdir=$(defaultsdir)/inetd.d
+PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty
+INSTALL=/usr/bin/install -c
+
+DESTDIR=
+
+all:
+	@echo
+	@echo "Use \`make cygwin-postinstall DESTDIR=[package directory]'"
+	@echo "Be sure having DESTDIR set correctly!"
+	@echo
+
+move-config-files: $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config
+	$(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(defaultsdir)
+	mv $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config $(DESTDIR)$(defaultsdir)
+	mv $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config $(DESTDIR)$(defaultsdir)
+
+remove-empty-dir:
+	rm -rf $(DESTDIR)$(PRIVSEP_PATH)
+
+install-inetd-config:
+	$(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(inetdefdir)
+	$(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd-inetd  $(DESTDIR)$(inetdefdir)/sshd-inetd
+
+install-sshdoc:
+	$(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)
+	-$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/CREDITS $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/CREDITS
+	-$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/ChangeLog $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/ChangeLog
+	-$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/LICENCE $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/LICENCE
+	-$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/OVERVIEW $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/OVERVIEW
+	-$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/PROTOCOL $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/PROTOCOL
+	-$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/PROTOCOL.agent $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/PROTOCOL.agent
+	-$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/PROTOCOL.certkeys $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/PROTOCOL.certkeys
+	-$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/PROTOCOL.mux $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/PROTOCOL.mux
+	-$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/README $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/README
+	-$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/README.dns $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/README.dns
+	-$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/README.platform $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/README.platform
+	-$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/README.privsep $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/README.privsep
+	-$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/README.tun $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/README.tun
+	-$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/TODO $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/TODO
+
+install-cygwindoc: README
+	$(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(cygdocdir)
+	$(INSTALL) -m 644 README $(DESTDIR)$(cygdocdir)/openssh.README
+
+install-doc: install-sshdoc install-cygwindoc
+
+install-scripts: ssh-host-config ssh-user-config
+	$(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)
+	$(INSTALL) -m 755 ssh-host-config $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-host-config
+	$(INSTALL) -m 755 ssh-user-config $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-user-config
+
+install-copy-id: $(copyidsrcdir)/ssh-copy-id $(copyidsrcdir)/ssh-copy-id.1
+	$(INSTALL) -m 755 $(copyidsrcdir)/ssh-copy-id $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-copy-id
+	$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(copyidsrcdir)/ssh-copy-id.1 $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/man1/ssh-copy-id.1
+
+gzip-man-pages:
+	rm $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/man1/slogin.1
+	gzip $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/man1/*.1
+	gzip $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/man5/*.5
+	gzip $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/man8/*.8
+	cd $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/man1 && ln -s ssh.1.gz slogin.1.gz
+
+cygwin-postinstall: move-config-files remove-empty-dir install-inetd-config install-doc install-scripts install-copy-id gzip-man-pages
+	@echo "Cygwin specific configuration finished."
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/cygwin/README b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/cygwin/README
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1396d99cd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/cygwin/README
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+This package describes important Cygwin specific stuff concerning OpenSSH.
+
+The binary package is usually built for recent Cygwin versions and might
+not run on older versions.  Please check http://cygwin.com/ for information
+about current Cygwin releases.
+
+==================
+Host configuration
+==================
+
+If you are installing OpenSSH the first time, you can generate global config
+files and server keys, as well as installing sshd as a service, by running
+
+   /usr/bin/ssh-host-config
+
+Note that this binary archive doesn't contain default config files in /etc.
+That files are only created if ssh-host-config is started.
+
+To support testing and unattended installation ssh-host-config got
+some options:
+
+usage: ssh-host-config [OPTION]...
+Options:
+    --debug  -d            Enable shell's debug output.
+    --yes    -y            Answer all questions with "yes" automatically.
+    --no     -n            Answer all questions with "no" automatically.
+    --cygwin -c <options>  Use "options" as value for CYGWIN environment var.
+    --port   -p <n>        sshd listens on port n.
+    --user   -u <account>  privileged user for service, default 'cyg_server'.
+    --pwd    -w <passwd>   Use "pwd" as password for privileged user.
+    --privileged           On Windows XP, require privileged user
+                           instead of LocalSystem for sshd service.
+
+Installing sshd as daemon via ssh-host-config is recommended.
+
+Alternatively you can start sshd via inetd, if you have the inetutils
+package installed.  Just run ssh-host-config, but answer "no" when asked
+to install sshd as service.  The ssh-host-config script also adds the
+required lines to /etc/inetd.conf and /etc/services.
+
+==================
+User configuration
+==================
+
+Any user can simplify creating the own private and public keys by running
+
+  /usr/bin/ssh-user-config
+
+To support testing and unattended installation ssh-user-config got
+some options as well:
+
+usage: ssh-user-config [OPTION]...
+Options:
+    --debug      -d        Enable shell's debug output.
+    --yes        -y        Answer all questions with "yes" automatically.
+    --no         -n        Answer all questions with "no" automatically.
+    --passphrase -p word   Use "word" as passphrase automatically.
+
+Please note that OpenSSH does never use the value of $HOME to
+search for the users configuration files! It always uses the
+value of the pw_dir field in /etc/passwd as the home directory.
+If no home diretory is set in /etc/passwd, the root directory
+is used instead!
+
+================
+Building OpenSSH
+================
+
+Building from source is easy.  Just unpack the source archive, cd to that
+directory, and call cygport:
+
+	cygport openssh.cygport all
+
+You must have installed the following packages to be able to build OpenSSH
+with the aforementioned cygport script:
+
+  zlib
+  crypt
+  openssl-devel
+  libedit-devel
+  libkrb5-devel
+
+Please send requests, error reports etc. to cygwin@cygwin.com.
+
+
+Have fun,
+
+Corinna Vinschen
+Cygwin Developer
+Red Hat Inc.
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d934d09b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config
@@ -0,0 +1,718 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+#
+# ssh-host-config, Copyright 2000-2014 Red Hat Inc.
+#
+# This file is part of the Cygwin port of OpenSSH.
+#
+# Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+# purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+# copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+#
+# THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS  
+# OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF               
+# MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT.   
+# IN NO EVENT SHALL THE ABOVE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM,   
+# DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR    
+# OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR    
+# THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.                               
+
+# ======================================================================
+# Initialization
+# ======================================================================
+
+CSIH_SCRIPT=/usr/share/csih/cygwin-service-installation-helper.sh
+
+# List of apps used.  This is checkad for existance in csih_sanity_check
+# Don't use *any* transient commands before sourcing the csih helper script,
+# otherwise the sanity checks are short-circuited.
+declare -a csih_required_commands=(
+  /usr/bin/basename coreutils
+  /usr/bin/cat coreutils
+  /usr/bin/chmod coreutils
+  /usr/bin/dirname coreutils
+  /usr/bin/id coreutils
+  /usr/bin/mv coreutils
+  /usr/bin/rm coreutils
+  /usr/bin/cygpath cygwin
+  /usr/bin/mkpasswd cygwin
+  /usr/bin/mount cygwin
+  /usr/bin/ps cygwin
+  /usr/bin/umount cygwin
+  /usr/bin/cmp diffutils
+  /usr/bin/grep grep
+  /usr/bin/awk gawk
+  /usr/bin/ssh-keygen openssh
+  /usr/sbin/sshd openssh
+  /usr/bin/sed sed
+)
+csih_sanity_check_server=yes
+source ${CSIH_SCRIPT}
+
+PROGNAME=$(/usr/bin/basename $0)
+_tdir=$(/usr/bin/dirname $0)
+PROGDIR=$(cd $_tdir && pwd)
+
+# Subdirectory where the new package is being installed
+PREFIX=/usr
+
+# Directory where the config files are stored
+SYSCONFDIR=/etc
+LOCALSTATEDIR=/var
+
+sshd_config_configured=no
+port_number=22
+service_name=sshd
+strictmodes=yes
+privsep_used=yes
+cygwin_value=""
+user_account=
+password_value=
+opt_force=no
+
+# ======================================================================
+# Routine: update_services_file
+# ======================================================================
+update_services_file() {
+  local _my_etcdir="/ssh-host-config.$$"
+  local _win_etcdir
+  local _services
+  local _spaces
+  local _serv_tmp
+  local _wservices
+  local ret=0
+
+  _win_etcdir="${SYSTEMROOT}\\system32\\drivers\\etc"
+  _services="${_my_etcdir}/services"
+  _spaces="                           #"
+  _serv_tmp="${_my_etcdir}/srv.out.$$"
+
+  /usr/bin/mount -o text,posix=0,noacl -f "${_win_etcdir}" "${_my_etcdir}"
+
+  # Depends on the above mount
+  _wservices=`cygpath -w "${_services}"`
+
+  # Add ssh 22/tcp  and ssh 22/udp to services
+  if [ `/usr/bin/grep -q 'ssh[[:space:]][[:space:]]*22' "${_services}"; echo $?` -ne 0 ]
+  then
+    if /usr/bin/awk '{ if ( $2 ~ /^23\/tcp/ ) print "ssh                22/tcp'"${_spaces}"'SSH Remote Login Protocol\nssh                22/udp'"${_spaces}"'SSH Remote Login Protocol"; print $0; }' < "${_services}" > "${_serv_tmp}"
+    then
+      if /usr/bin/mv "${_serv_tmp}" "${_services}"
+      then
+	csih_inform "Added ssh to ${_wservices}"
+      else
+	csih_warning "Adding ssh to ${_wservices} failed!"
+	let ++ret
+      fi
+      /usr/bin/rm -f "${_serv_tmp}"
+    else
+      csih_warning "Adding ssh to ${_wservices} failed!"
+      let ++ret
+    fi
+  fi
+  /usr/bin/umount "${_my_etcdir}"
+  return $ret
+} # --- End of update_services_file --- #
+
+# ======================================================================
+# Routine: sshd_strictmodes
+#  MODIFIES: strictmodes
+# ======================================================================
+sshd_strictmodes() {
+  if [ "${sshd_config_configured}" != "yes" ]
+  then
+    echo
+    csih_inform "StrictModes is set to 'yes' by default."
+    csih_inform "This is the recommended setting, but it requires that the POSIX"
+    csih_inform "permissions of the user's home directory, the user's .ssh"
+    csih_inform "directory, and the user's ssh key files are tight so that"
+    csih_inform "only the user has write permissions."
+    csih_inform "On the other hand, StrictModes don't work well with default"
+    csih_inform "Windows permissions of a home directory mounted with the"
+    csih_inform "'noacl' option, and they don't work at all if the home"
+    csih_inform "directory is on a FAT or FAT32 partition."
+    if ! csih_request "Should StrictModes be used?"
+    then
+      strictmodes=no
+    fi
+  fi
+  return 0
+}
+
+# ======================================================================
+# Routine: sshd_privsep
+#  MODIFIES: privsep_used
+# ======================================================================
+sshd_privsep() {
+  local ret=0
+
+  if [ "${sshd_config_configured}" != "yes" ]
+  then
+    echo
+    csih_inform "Privilege separation is set to 'sandbox' by default since"
+    csih_inform "OpenSSH 6.1.  This is unsupported by Cygwin and has to be set"
+    csih_inform "to 'yes' or 'no'."
+    csih_inform "However, using privilege separation requires a non-privileged account"
+    csih_inform "called 'sshd'."
+    csih_inform "For more info on privilege separation read /usr/share/doc/openssh/README.privsep."
+    if csih_request "Should privilege separation be used?"
+    then
+      privsep_used=yes
+      if ! csih_create_unprivileged_user sshd
+      then
+	csih_error_recoverable "Couldn't create user 'sshd'!"
+	csih_error_recoverable "Privilege separation set to 'no' again!"
+	csih_error_recoverable "Check your ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config file!"
+	let ++ret
+	privsep_used=no
+      fi
+    else
+      privsep_used=no
+    fi
+  fi
+  return $ret
+} # --- End of sshd_privsep --- #
+
+# ======================================================================
+# Routine: sshd_config_tweak
+# ======================================================================
+sshd_config_tweak() {
+  local ret=0
+
+  # Modify sshd_config
+  csih_inform "Updating ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config file"
+  if [ "${port_number}" -ne 22 ]
+  then
+    /usr/bin/sed -i -e "s/^#\?[[:space:]]*Port[[:space:]].*/Port ${port_number}/" \
+      ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config
+    if [ $? -ne 0 ]
+    then
+      csih_warning "Setting listening port to ${port_number} failed!"
+      csih_warning "Check your ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config file!"
+      let ++ret
+    fi
+  fi
+  if [ "${strictmodes}" = "no" ]
+  then
+    /usr/bin/sed -i -e "s/^#\?[[:space:]]*StrictModes[[:space:]].*/StrictModes no/" \
+      ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config
+    if [ $? -ne 0 ]
+    then
+      csih_warning "Setting StrictModes to 'no' failed!"
+      csih_warning "Check your ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config file!"
+      let ++ret
+    fi
+  fi
+  if [ "${sshd_config_configured}" != "yes" ]
+  then
+    /usr/bin/sed -i -e "
+      s/^#\?UsePrivilegeSeparation .*/UsePrivilegeSeparation ${privsep_used}/" \
+      ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config
+    if [ $? -ne 0 ]
+    then
+      csih_warning "Setting privilege separation failed!"
+      csih_warning "Check your ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config file!"
+      let ++ret
+    fi
+  fi
+  return $ret
+} # --- End of sshd_config_tweak --- #
+
+# ======================================================================
+# Routine: update_inetd_conf
+# ======================================================================
+update_inetd_conf() {
+  local _inetcnf="${SYSCONFDIR}/inetd.conf"
+  local _inetcnf_tmp="${SYSCONFDIR}/inetd.conf.$$"
+  local _inetcnf_dir="${SYSCONFDIR}/inetd.d"
+  local _sshd_inetd_conf="${_inetcnf_dir}/sshd-inetd"
+  local _sshd_inetd_conf_tmp="${_inetcnf_dir}/sshd-inetd.$$"
+  local _with_comment=1
+  local ret=0
+
+  if [ -d "${_inetcnf_dir}" ]
+  then
+    # we have inetutils-1.5 inetd.d support
+    if [ -f "${_inetcnf}" ]
+    then
+      /usr/bin/grep -q '^[[:space:]]*ssh' "${_inetcnf}" && _with_comment=0
+
+      # check for sshd OR ssh in top-level inetd.conf file, and remove
+      # will be replaced by a file in inetd.d/
+      if [ $(/usr/bin/grep -q '^[# \t]*ssh' "${_inetcnf}"; echo $?) -eq 0 ]
+      then
+	/usr/bin/grep -v '^[# \t]*ssh' "${_inetcnf}" >> "${_inetcnf_tmp}"
+	if [ -f "${_inetcnf_tmp}" ]
+	then
+	  if /usr/bin/mv "${_inetcnf_tmp}" "${_inetcnf}"
+	  then
+  	    csih_inform "Removed ssh[d] from ${_inetcnf}"
+	  else
+  	    csih_warning "Removing ssh[d] from ${_inetcnf} failed!"
+	    let ++ret
+	  fi
+	  /usr/bin/rm -f "${_inetcnf_tmp}"
+	else
+	  csih_warning "Removing ssh[d] from ${_inetcnf} failed!"
+	  let ++ret
+	fi
+      fi
+    fi
+
+    csih_install_config "${_sshd_inetd_conf}"   "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults"
+    if /usr/bin/cmp "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults${_sshd_inetd_conf}" "${_sshd_inetd_conf}" >/dev/null 2>&1
+    then
+      if [ "${_with_comment}" -eq 0 ]
+      then
+	/usr/bin/sed -e 's/@COMMENT@[[:space:]]*//' < "${_sshd_inetd_conf}" > "${_sshd_inetd_conf_tmp}"
+      else
+	/usr/bin/sed -e 's/@COMMENT@[[:space:]]*/# /' < "${_sshd_inetd_conf}" > "${_sshd_inetd_conf_tmp}"
+      fi
+      if /usr/bin/mv "${_sshd_inetd_conf_tmp}" "${_sshd_inetd_conf}"
+      then
+	csih_inform "Updated ${_sshd_inetd_conf}"
+      else
+	csih_warning "Updating ${_sshd_inetd_conf} failed!"
+	let ++ret
+      fi
+    fi
+
+  elif [ -f "${_inetcnf}" ]
+  then
+    /usr/bin/grep -q '^[[:space:]]*sshd' "${_inetcnf}" && _with_comment=0
+
+    # check for sshd in top-level inetd.conf file, and remove
+    # will be replaced by a file in inetd.d/
+    if [ `/usr/bin/grep -q '^#\?[[:space:]]*sshd' "${_inetcnf}"; echo $?` -eq 0 ]
+    then
+      /usr/bin/grep -v '^#\?[[:space:]]*sshd' "${_inetcnf}" >> "${_inetcnf_tmp}"
+      if [ -f "${_inetcnf_tmp}" ]
+      then
+	if /usr/bin/mv "${_inetcnf_tmp}" "${_inetcnf}"
+	then
+	    csih_inform "Removed sshd from ${_inetcnf}"
+	else
+	    csih_warning "Removing sshd from ${_inetcnf} failed!"
+	    let ++ret
+	fi
+	/usr/bin/rm -f "${_inetcnf_tmp}"
+      else
+	csih_warning "Removing sshd from ${_inetcnf} failed!"
+	let ++ret
+      fi
+    fi
+
+    # Add ssh line to inetd.conf
+    if [ `/usr/bin/grep -q '^[# \t]*ssh' "${_inetcnf}"; echo $?` -ne 0 ]
+    then
+      if [ "${_with_comment}" -eq 0 ]
+      then
+	echo 'ssh  stream  tcp     nowait  root    /usr/sbin/sshd sshd -i' >> "${_inetcnf}"
+      else
+	echo '# ssh  stream  tcp     nowait  root    /usr/sbin/sshd sshd -i' >> "${_inetcnf}"
+      fi
+      if [ $? -eq 0 ]
+      then
+	csih_inform "Added ssh to ${_inetcnf}"
+      else
+	csih_warning "Adding ssh to ${_inetcnf} failed!"
+	let ++ret
+      fi
+    fi
+  fi
+  return $ret
+} # --- End of update_inetd_conf --- #
+
+# ======================================================================
+# Routine: check_service_files_ownership
+#   Checks that the files in /etc and /var belong to the right owner
+# ======================================================================
+check_service_files_ownership() {
+  local run_service_as=$1
+  local ret=0
+
+  if [ -z "${run_service_as}" ]
+  then
+    accnt_name=$(/usr/bin/cygrunsrv -VQ sshd |
+    		 /usr/bin/sed -ne 's/^Account *: *//gp')
+    if [ "${accnt_name}" = "LocalSystem" ]
+    then
+      # Convert "LocalSystem" to "SYSTEM" as is the correct account name
+      run_service_as="SYSTEM"
+    else
+      dom="${accnt_name%%\\*}"
+      accnt_name="${accnt_name#*\\}"
+      if [ "${dom}" = '.' ]
+      then
+	# Check local account
+	run_service_as=$(/usr/bin/mkpasswd -l -u "${accnt_name}" |
+			 /usr/bin/awk -F: '{print $1;}')
+      else
+      	# Check domain
+	run_service_as=$(/usr/bin/mkpasswd -d "${dom}" -u "${accnt_name}" |
+			 /usr/bin/awk -F: '{print $1;}')
+      fi
+    fi
+    if [ -z "${run_service_as}" ]
+    then
+      csih_warning "Couldn't determine name of user running sshd service from account database!"
+      csih_warning "As a result, this script cannot make sure that the files used"
+      csih_warning "by the sshd service belong to the user running the service."
+      return 1
+    fi
+  fi
+  for i in "${SYSCONFDIR}"/ssh_config "${SYSCONFDIR}"/sshd_config "${SYSCONFDIR}"/ssh_host_*key "${SYSCONFDIR}"/ssh_host_*key.pub
+  do
+    if [ -f "$i" ]
+    then
+      if ! chown "${run_service_as}".544 "$i" >/dev/null 2>&1
+      then
+	csih_warning "Couldn't change owner of $i!"
+	let ++ret
+      fi
+    fi
+  done
+  if ! chown "${run_service_as}".544 ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/empty >/dev/null 2>&1
+  then
+    csih_warning "Couldn't change owner of ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/empty!"
+    let ++ret
+  fi
+  if ! chown "${run_service_as}".544 ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog >/dev/null 2>&1
+  then
+    csih_warning "Couldn't change owner of ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog!"
+    let ++ret
+  fi
+  if [ -f ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/sshd.log ]
+  then
+    if ! chown "${run_service_as}".544 ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/sshd.log >/dev/null 2>&1
+    then
+      csih_warning "Couldn't change owner of ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/sshd.log!"
+      let ++ret
+    fi
+  fi
+  if [ $ret -ne 0 ]
+  then
+    csih_warning "Couldn't change owner of important files to ${run_service_as}!"
+    csih_warning "This may cause the sshd service to fail!  Please make sure that"
+    csih_warning "you have suufficient permissions to change the ownership of files"
+    csih_warning "and try to run the ssh-host-config script again."
+  fi
+  return $ret
+} # --- End of check_service_files_ownership --- #
+
+# ======================================================================
+# Routine: install_service
+#   Install sshd as a service
+# ======================================================================
+install_service() {
+  local run_service_as
+  local password
+  local ret=0
+
+  echo
+  if /usr/bin/cygrunsrv -Q ${service_name} >/dev/null 2>&1
+  then
+    csih_inform "Sshd service is already installed."
+    check_service_files_ownership "" || let ret+=$?
+  else
+    echo -e "${_csih_QUERY_STR} Do you want to install sshd as a service?"
+    if csih_request "(Say \"no\" if it is already installed as a service)"
+    then
+      csih_get_cygenv "${cygwin_value}"
+
+      if ( csih_is_nt2003 || [ "$csih_FORCE_PRIVILEGED_USER" = "yes" ] )
+      then
+	csih_inform "On Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, and above, the"
+	csih_inform "SYSTEM account cannot setuid to other users -- a capability"
+	csih_inform "sshd requires.  You need to have or to create a privileged"
+	csih_inform "account.  This script will help you do so."
+	echo
+
+	[ "${opt_force}" = "yes" ] && opt_f=-f
+	[ -n "${user_account}" ] && opt_u="-u ""${user_account}"""
+	csih_select_privileged_username ${opt_f} ${opt_u} sshd
+
+	if ! csih_create_privileged_user "${password_value}"
+	then
+	  csih_error_recoverable "There was a serious problem creating a privileged user."
+	  csih_request "Do you want to proceed anyway?" || exit 1
+	  let ++ret
+	fi
+      fi
+
+      # Never returns empty if NT or above
+      run_service_as=$(csih_service_should_run_as)
+
+      if [ "${run_service_as}" = "${csih_PRIVILEGED_USERNAME}" ]
+      then
+	password="${csih_PRIVILEGED_PASSWORD}"
+	if [ -z "${password}" ]
+	then
+	  csih_get_value "Please enter the password for user '${run_service_as}':" "-s"
+	  password="${csih_value}"
+	fi
+      fi
+
+      # At this point, we either have $run_service_as = "system" and
+      # $password is empty, or $run_service_as is some privileged user and
+      # (hopefully) $password contains the correct password.  So, from here
+      # out, we use '-z "${password}"' to discriminate the two cases.
+
+      csih_check_user "${run_service_as}"
+
+      if [ -n "${csih_cygenv}" ]
+      then
+	cygwin_env=( -e "CYGWIN=${csih_cygenv}" )
+      fi
+      if [ -z "${password}" ]
+      then
+	if /usr/bin/cygrunsrv -I ${service_name} -d "CYGWIN ${service_name}" -p /usr/sbin/sshd \
+			      -a "-D" -y tcpip "${cygwin_env[@]}"
+	then
+	  echo
+	  csih_inform "The sshd service has been installed under the LocalSystem"
+	  csih_inform "account (also known as SYSTEM). To start the service now, call"
+	  csih_inform "\`net start sshd' or \`cygrunsrv -S sshd'.  Otherwise, it"
+	  csih_inform "will start automatically after the next reboot."
+	fi
+      else
+	if /usr/bin/cygrunsrv -I ${service_name} -d "CYGWIN ${service_name}" -p /usr/sbin/sshd \
+			      -a "-D" -y tcpip "${cygwin_env[@]}" \
+			      -u "${run_service_as}" -w "${password}"
+	then
+	  /usr/bin/editrights -u "${run_service_as}" -a SeServiceLogonRight
+	  echo
+	  csih_inform "The sshd service has been installed under the '${run_service_as}'"
+	  csih_inform "account.  To start the service now, call \`net start ${service_name}' or"
+	  csih_inform "\`cygrunsrv -S ${service_name}'.  Otherwise, it will start automatically"
+	  csih_inform "after the next reboot."
+	fi
+      fi
+
+      if /usr/bin/cygrunsrv -Q ${service_name} >/dev/null 2>&1
+      then
+	check_service_files_ownership "${run_service_as}" || let ret+=$?
+      else
+	csih_error_recoverable "Installing sshd as a service failed!"
+	let ++ret
+      fi
+    fi # user allowed us to install as service
+  fi # service not yet installed
+  return $ret
+} # --- End of install_service --- #
+
+# ======================================================================
+# Main Entry Point
+# ======================================================================
+
+# Check how the script has been started.  If
+#   (1) it has been started by giving the full path and
+#       that path is /etc/postinstall, OR
+#   (2) Otherwise, if the environment variable
+#       SSH_HOST_CONFIG_AUTO_ANSWER_NO is set
+# then set auto_answer to "no".  This allows automatic
+# creation of the config files in /etc w/o overwriting
+# them if they already exist.  In both cases, color
+# escape sequences are suppressed, so as to prevent
+# cluttering setup's logfiles.
+if [ "$PROGDIR" = "/etc/postinstall" ]
+then
+  csih_auto_answer="no"
+  csih_disable_color
+  opt_force=yes
+fi
+if [ -n "${SSH_HOST_CONFIG_AUTO_ANSWER_NO}" ]
+then
+  csih_auto_answer="no"
+  csih_disable_color
+  opt_force=yes
+fi
+
+# ======================================================================
+# Parse options
+# ======================================================================
+while :
+do
+  case $# in
+  0)
+    break
+    ;;
+  esac
+
+  option=$1
+  shift
+
+  case "${option}" in
+  -d | --debug )
+    set -x
+    csih_trace_on
+    ;;
+
+  -y | --yes )
+    csih_auto_answer=yes
+    opt_force=yes
+    ;;
+
+  -n | --no )
+    csih_auto_answer=no
+    opt_force=yes
+    ;;
+
+  -c | --cygwin )
+    cygwin_value="$1"
+    shift
+    ;;
+
+  -N | --name )
+    service_name=$1
+    shift
+    ;;
+
+  -p | --port )
+    port_number=$1
+    shift
+    ;;
+
+  -u | --user )
+    user_account="$1"
+    shift
+    ;;
+    
+  -w | --pwd )
+    password_value="$1"
+    shift
+    ;;
+
+  --privileged )
+    csih_FORCE_PRIVILEGED_USER=yes
+    ;;
+
+  *)
+    echo "usage: ${progname} [OPTION]..."
+    echo
+    echo "This script creates an OpenSSH host configuration."
+    echo
+    echo "Options:"
+    echo "  --debug  -d            Enable shell's debug output."
+    echo "  --yes    -y            Answer all questions with \"yes\" automatically."
+    echo "  --no     -n            Answer all questions with \"no\" automatically."
+    echo "  --cygwin -c <options>  Use \"options\" as value for CYGWIN environment var."
+    echo "  --name   -N <name>     sshd windows service name."
+    echo "  --port   -p <n>        sshd listens on port n."
+    echo "  --user   -u <account>  privileged user for service, default 'cyg_server'."
+    echo "  --pwd    -w <passwd>   Use \"pwd\" as password for privileged user."
+    echo "  --privileged           On Windows XP, require privileged user"
+    echo "                         instead of LocalSystem for sshd service."
+    echo
+    exit 1
+    ;;
+
+  esac
+done
+
+# ======================================================================
+# Action!
+# ======================================================================
+
+# Check for running ssh/sshd processes first. Refuse to do anything while
+# some ssh processes are still running
+if /usr/bin/ps -ef | /usr/bin/grep -q '/sshd\?$'
+then
+  echo
+  csih_error "There are still ssh processes running. Please shut them down first."
+fi
+
+# Make sure the user is running in an administrative context
+admin=$(/usr/bin/id -G | /usr/bin/grep -Eq '\<544\>' && echo yes || echo no)
+if [ "${admin}" != "yes" ]
+then
+  echo
+  csih_warning "Running this script typically requires administrator privileges!"
+  csih_warning "However, it seems your account does not have these privileges."
+  csih_warning "Here's the list of groups in your user token:"
+  echo
+  /usr/bin/id -Gnz | xargs -0n1 echo "   "
+  echo
+  csih_warning "This usually means you're running this script from a non-admin"
+  csih_warning "desktop session, or in a non-elevated shell under UAC control."
+  echo
+  csih_warning "Make sure you have the appropriate privileges right now,"
+  csih_warning "otherwise parts of this script will probably fail!"
+  echo
+  echo -e "${_csih_QUERY_STR} Are you sure you want to continue?  (Say \"no\" if you're not sure"
+  if ! csih_request "you have the required privileges)"
+  then
+    echo
+    csih_inform "Ok.  Exiting.  Make sure to switch to an administrative account"
+    csih_inform "or to start this script from an elevated shell."
+    exit 1
+  fi
+fi
+
+echo
+
+warning_cnt=0
+
+# Create /var/log/lastlog if not already exists
+if [ -e ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog -a ! -f ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog ]
+then
+  echo
+  csih_error_multi "${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog exists, but is not a file." \
+		   "Cannot create ssh host configuration."
+fi
+if [ ! -e ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog ]
+then
+  /usr/bin/cat /dev/null > ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog
+  if ! /usr/bin/chmod 644 ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog >/dev/null 2>&1
+  then
+    csih_warning "Can't set permissions on ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog!"
+    let ++warning_cnt
+  fi
+fi
+
+# Create /var/empty file used as chroot jail for privilege separation
+csih_make_dir "${LOCALSTATEDIR}/empty" "Cannot create ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/empty directory."
+if ! /usr/bin/chmod 755 "${LOCALSTATEDIR}/empty" >/dev/null 2>&1
+then
+  csih_warning "Can't set permissions on ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/empty!"
+  let ++warning_cnt
+fi
+
+# generate missing host keys
+csih_inform "Generating missing SSH host keys"
+/usr/bin/ssh-keygen -A || let warning_cnt+=$?
+
+# handle ssh_config
+csih_install_config "${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config" "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults" || let ++warning_cnt
+if /usr/bin/cmp "${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config" "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults/${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config" >/dev/null 2>&1
+then
+  if [ "${port_number}" != "22" ]
+  then
+    csih_inform "Updating ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config file with requested port"
+    echo "Host localhost" >> ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config
+    echo "    Port ${port_number}" >> ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config
+  fi
+fi
+
+# handle sshd_config (and privsep)
+csih_install_config "${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults" || let ++warning_cnt
+if ! /usr/bin/cmp "${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults/${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" >/dev/null 2>&1
+then
+  sshd_config_configured=yes
+fi
+sshd_strictmodes || let warning_cnt+=$?
+sshd_privsep || let warning_cnt+=$?
+sshd_config_tweak || let warning_cnt+=$?
+update_services_file || let warning_cnt+=$?
+update_inetd_conf || let warning_cnt+=$?
+install_service || let warning_cnt+=$?
+
+echo
+if [ $warning_cnt -eq 0 ]
+then
+  csih_inform "Host configuration finished. Have fun!"
+else
+  csih_warning "Host configuration exited with ${warning_cnt} errors or warnings!"
+  csih_warning "Make sure that all problems reported are fixed,"
+  csih_warning "then re-run ssh-host-config."
+fi
+exit $warning_cnt
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/cygwin/ssh-user-config b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/cygwin/ssh-user-config
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..33dc0cbea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/cygwin/ssh-user-config
@@ -0,0 +1,257 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+#
+# ssh-user-config, Copyright 2000-2014 Red Hat Inc.
+#
+# This file is part of the Cygwin port of OpenSSH.
+#
+# Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+# purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+# copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+#
+# THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS  
+# OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF               
+# MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT.   
+# IN NO EVENT SHALL THE ABOVE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM,   
+# DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR    
+# OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR    
+# THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.                               
+
+# ======================================================================
+# Initialization
+# ======================================================================
+PROGNAME=$(basename -- $0)
+_tdir=$(dirname -- $0)
+PROGDIR=$(cd $_tdir && pwd)
+
+CSIH_SCRIPT=/usr/share/csih/cygwin-service-installation-helper.sh
+
+# Subdirectory where the new package is being installed
+PREFIX=/usr
+
+# Directory where the config files are stored
+SYSCONFDIR=/etc
+
+source ${CSIH_SCRIPT}
+
+auto_passphrase="no"
+passphrase=""
+pwdhome=
+with_passphrase=
+
+# ======================================================================
+# Routine: create_identity
+#   optionally create identity of type argument in ~/.ssh
+#   optionally add result to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+# ======================================================================
+create_identity() {
+  local file="$1"
+  local type="$2"
+  local name="$3"
+  if [ ! -f "${pwdhome}/.ssh/${file}" ]
+  then
+    if csih_request "Shall I create a ${name} identity file for you?"
+    then
+      csih_inform "Generating ${pwdhome}/.ssh/${file}"
+      if [ "${with_passphrase}" = "yes" ]
+      then
+        ssh-keygen -t "${type}" -N "${passphrase}" -f "${pwdhome}/.ssh/${file}" > /dev/null
+      else
+        ssh-keygen -t "${type}" -f "${pwdhome}/.ssh/${file}" > /dev/null
+      fi
+      if csih_request "Do you want to use this identity to login to this machine?"
+      then
+        csih_inform "Adding to ${pwdhome}/.ssh/authorized_keys"
+        cat "${pwdhome}/.ssh/${file}.pub" >> "${pwdhome}/.ssh/authorized_keys"
+      fi
+    fi
+  fi
+} # === End of create_ssh1_identity() === #
+readonly -f create_identity
+
+# ======================================================================
+# Routine: check_user_homedir
+#   Perform various checks on the user's home directory
+# SETS GLOBAL VARIABLE:
+#   pwdhome
+# ======================================================================
+check_user_homedir() {
+  pwdhome=$(getent passwd $UID | awk -F: '{ print $6; }')
+  if [ "X${pwdhome}" = "X" ]
+  then
+    csih_error_multi \
+      "There is no home directory set for you in the account database." \
+      'Setting $HOME is not sufficient!'
+  fi
+  
+  if [ ! -d "${pwdhome}" ]
+  then
+    csih_error_multi \
+      "${pwdhome} is set in the account database as your home directory" \
+      'but it is not a valid directory. Cannot create user identity files.'
+  fi
+  
+  # If home is the root dir, set home to empty string to avoid error messages
+  # in subsequent parts of that script.
+  if [ "X${pwdhome}" = "X/" ]
+  then
+    # But first raise a warning!
+    csih_warning "Your home directory in the account database is set to root (/). This is not recommended!"
+    if csih_request "Would you like to proceed anyway?"
+    then
+      pwdhome=''
+    else
+      csih_warning "Exiting. Configuration is not complete"
+      exit 1
+    fi
+  fi
+  
+  if [ -d "${pwdhome}" -a -n "`chmod -c g-w,o-w "${pwdhome}"`" ]
+  then
+    echo
+    csih_warning 'group and other have been revoked write permission to your home'
+    csih_warning "directory ${pwdhome}."
+    csih_warning 'This is required by OpenSSH to allow public key authentication using'
+    csih_warning 'the key files stored in your .ssh subdirectory.'
+    csih_warning 'Revert this change ONLY if you know what you are doing!'
+    echo
+  fi
+} # === End of check_user_homedir() === #
+readonly -f check_user_homedir
+
+# ======================================================================
+# Routine: check_user_dot_ssh_dir
+#   Perform various checks on the ~/.ssh directory
+# PREREQUISITE:
+#   pwdhome -- check_user_homedir()
+# ======================================================================
+check_user_dot_ssh_dir() {
+  if [ -e "${pwdhome}/.ssh" -a ! -d "${pwdhome}/.ssh" ]
+  then
+    csih_error "${pwdhome}/.ssh is existant but not a directory. Cannot create user identity files."
+  fi
+  
+  if [ ! -e "${pwdhome}/.ssh" ]
+  then
+    mkdir "${pwdhome}/.ssh"
+    if [ ! -e "${pwdhome}/.ssh" ]
+    then
+      csih_error "Creating users ${pwdhome}/.ssh directory failed"
+    fi
+  fi
+} # === End of check_user_dot_ssh_dir() === #
+readonly -f check_user_dot_ssh_dir
+
+# ======================================================================
+# Routine: fix_authorized_keys_perms
+#   Corrects the permissions of ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+# PREREQUISITE:
+#   pwdhome   -- check_user_homedir()
+# ======================================================================
+fix_authorized_keys_perms() {
+  if [ -e "${pwdhome}/.ssh/authorized_keys" ]
+  then
+    setfacl -b "${pwdhome}/.ssh/authorized_keys" 2>/dev/null || echo -n
+    if ! chmod u-x,g-wx,o-wx "${pwdhome}/.ssh/authorized_keys"
+    then
+      csih_warning "Setting correct permissions to ${pwdhome}/.ssh/authorized_keys"
+      csih_warning "failed.  Please care for the correct permissions.  The minimum requirement"
+      csih_warning "is, the owner needs read permissions."
+      echo
+    fi
+  fi
+} # === End of fix_authorized_keys_perms() === #
+readonly -f fix_authorized_keys_perms
+
+
+# ======================================================================
+# Main Entry Point
+# ======================================================================
+
+# Check how the script has been started.  If
+#   (1) it has been started by giving the full path and
+#       that path is /etc/postinstall, OR
+#   (2) Otherwise, if the environment variable
+#       SSH_USER_CONFIG_AUTO_ANSWER_NO is set
+# then set auto_answer to "no".  This allows automatic
+# creation of the config files in /etc w/o overwriting
+# them if they already exist.  In both cases, color
+# escape sequences are suppressed, so as to prevent
+# cluttering setup's logfiles.
+if [ "$PROGDIR" = "/etc/postinstall" ]
+then
+  csih_auto_answer="no"
+  csih_disable_color
+fi
+if [ -n "${SSH_USER_CONFIG_AUTO_ANSWER_NO}" ]
+then
+  csih_auto_answer="no"
+  csih_disable_color
+fi
+
+# ======================================================================
+# Parse options
+# ======================================================================
+while :
+do
+  case $# in
+  0)
+    break
+    ;;
+  esac
+
+  option=$1
+  shift
+
+  case "$option" in
+  -d | --debug )
+    set -x
+    csih_trace_on
+    ;;
+
+  -y | --yes )
+    csih_auto_answer=yes
+    ;;
+
+  -n | --no )
+    csih_auto_answer=no
+    ;;
+
+  -p | --passphrase )
+    with_passphrase="yes"
+    passphrase=$1
+    shift
+    ;;
+
+  *)
+    echo "usage: ${PROGNAME} [OPTION]..."
+    echo
+    echo "This script creates an OpenSSH user configuration."
+    echo
+    echo "Options:"
+    echo "    --debug      -d        Enable shell's debug output."
+    echo "    --yes        -y        Answer all questions with \"yes\" automatically."
+    echo "    --no         -n        Answer all questions with \"no\" automatically."
+    echo "    --passphrase -p word   Use \"word\" as passphrase automatically."
+    echo
+    exit 1
+    ;;
+
+  esac
+done
+
+# ======================================================================
+# Action!
+# ======================================================================
+
+check_user_homedir
+check_user_dot_ssh_dir
+create_identity id_rsa rsa "SSH2 RSA"
+create_identity id_dsa dsa "SSH2 DSA"
+create_identity id_ecdsa ecdsa "SSH2 ECDSA"
+create_identity identity rsa1 "(deprecated) SSH1 RSA"
+fix_authorized_keys_perms
+
+echo
+csih_inform "Configuration finished. Have fun!"
+
+
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/cygwin/sshd-inetd b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/cygwin/sshd-inetd
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..aa6bf073f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/cygwin/sshd-inetd
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+# This file can be used to enable sshd as a slave of the inetd service
+# To do so, the line below should be uncommented.
+@COMMENT@ ssh  stream  tcp     nowait  root    /usr/sbin/sshd sshd -i
+
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/findssl.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/findssl.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..263fd2644
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/findssl.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+#
+# $Id: findssl.sh,v 1.4 2007/02/19 11:44:25 dtucker Exp $
+#
+# findssl.sh
+#	Search for all instances of OpenSSL headers and libraries
+#	and print their versions.
+#	Intended to help diagnose OpenSSH's "OpenSSL headers do not
+#	match your library" errors.
+#
+#	Written by Darren Tucker (dtucker at zip dot com dot au)
+#	This file is placed in the public domain.
+#
+#	Release history:
+#	2002-07-27: Initial release.
+#	2002-08-04: Added public domain notice.
+#	2003-06-24: Incorporated readme, set library paths. First cvs version.
+#	2004-12-13: Add traps to cleanup temp files, from Amarendra Godbole.
+#
+# "OpenSSL headers do not match your library" are usually caused by
+# OpenSSH's configure picking up an older version of OpenSSL headers
+# or libraries.  You can use the following # procedure to help identify
+# the cause.
+#
+# The  output  of  configure  will  tell you the versions of the OpenSSL
+# headers and libraries that were picked up, for example:
+#
+# checking OpenSSL header version... 90604f (OpenSSL 0.9.6d 9 May 2002)
+# checking OpenSSL library version... 90602f (OpenSSL 0.9.6b [engine] 9 Jul 2001)
+# checking whether OpenSSL's headers match the library... no
+# configure: error: Your OpenSSL headers do not match your library
+#
+# Now run findssl.sh. This should identify the headers and libraries
+# present  and  their  versions.  You  should  be  able  to identify the
+# libraries  and headers used and adjust your CFLAGS or remove incorrect
+# versions.  The  output will show OpenSSL's internal version identifier
+# and should look something like:
+
+# $ ./findssl.sh
+# Searching for OpenSSL header files.
+# 0x0090604fL /usr/include/openssl/opensslv.h
+# 0x0090604fL /usr/local/ssl/include/openssl/opensslv.h
+#
+# Searching for OpenSSL shared library files.
+# 0x0090602fL /lib/libcrypto.so.0.9.6b
+# 0x0090602fL /lib/libcrypto.so.2
+# 0x0090581fL /usr/lib/libcrypto.so.0
+# 0x0090602fL /usr/lib/libcrypto.so
+# 0x0090581fL /usr/lib/libcrypto.so.0.9.5a
+# 0x0090600fL /usr/lib/libcrypto.so.0.9.6
+# 0x0090600fL /usr/lib/libcrypto.so.1
+#
+# Searching for OpenSSL static library files.
+# 0x0090602fL /usr/lib/libcrypto.a
+# 0x0090604fL /usr/local/ssl/lib/libcrypto.a
+#
+# In  this  example, I gave configure no extra flags, so it's picking up
+# the  OpenSSL header from /usr/include/openssl (90604f) and the library
+# from /usr/lib/ (90602f).
+
+#
+# Adjust these to suit your compiler.
+# You may also need to set the *LIB*PATH environment variables if
+# DEFAULT_LIBPATH is not correct for your system.
+#
+CC=gcc
+STATIC=-static
+
+#
+# Cleanup on interrupt
+#
+trap 'rm -f conftest.c' INT HUP TERM
+
+#
+# Set up conftest C source
+#
+rm -f findssl.log
+cat >conftest.c <<EOD
+#include <stdio.h>
+int main(){printf("0x%08xL\n", SSLeay());}
+EOD
+
+#
+# Set default library paths if not already set
+#
+DEFAULT_LIBPATH=/usr/lib:/usr/local/lib
+LIBPATH=${LIBPATH:=$DEFAULT_LIBPATH}
+LD_LIBRARY_PATH=${LD_LIBRARY_PATH:=$DEFAULT_LIBPATH}
+LIBRARY_PATH=${LIBRARY_PATH:=$DEFAULT_LIBPATH}
+export LIBPATH LD_LIBRARY_PATH LIBRARY_PATH
+
+# not all platforms have a 'which' command
+if which ls >/dev/null 2>/dev/null; then
+    : which is defined
+else
+    which () {
+	saveIFS="$IFS"
+	IFS=:
+	for p in $PATH; do
+	    if test -x "$p/$1" -a -f "$p/$1"; then
+		IFS="$saveIFS"
+		echo "$p/$1"
+		return 0
+	    fi
+	done
+	IFS="$saveIFS"
+	return 1
+    }
+fi
+
+#
+# Search for OpenSSL headers and print versions
+#
+echo Searching for OpenSSL header files.
+if [ -x "`which locate`" ]
+then
+	headers=`locate opensslv.h`
+else
+	headers=`find / -name opensslv.h -print 2>/dev/null`
+fi
+
+for header in $headers
+do
+	ver=`awk '/OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER/{printf \$3}' $header`
+	echo "$ver $header"
+done
+echo
+
+#
+# Search for shared libraries.
+# Relies on shared libraries looking like "libcrypto.s*"
+#
+echo Searching for OpenSSL shared library files.
+if [ -x "`which locate`" ]
+then
+	libraries=`locate libcrypto.s`
+else
+	libraries=`find / -name 'libcrypto.s*' -print 2>/dev/null`
+fi
+
+for lib in $libraries
+do
+	(echo "Trying libcrypto $lib" >>findssl.log
+	dir=`dirname $lib`
+	LIBPATH="$dir:$LIBPATH"
+	LD_LIBRARY_PATH="$dir:$LIBPATH"
+	LIBRARY_PATH="$dir:$LIBPATH"
+	export LIBPATH LD_LIBRARY_PATH LIBRARY_PATH
+	${CC} -o conftest conftest.c $lib 2>>findssl.log
+	if [ -x ./conftest ]
+	then
+		ver=`./conftest 2>/dev/null`
+		rm -f ./conftest
+		echo "$ver $lib"
+	fi)
+done
+echo
+
+#
+# Search for static OpenSSL libraries and print versions
+#
+echo Searching for OpenSSL static library files.
+if [ -x "`which locate`" ]
+then
+	libraries=`locate libcrypto.a`
+else
+	libraries=`find / -name libcrypto.a -print 2>/dev/null`
+fi
+
+for lib in $libraries
+do
+	libdir=`dirname $lib`
+	echo "Trying libcrypto $lib" >>findssl.log
+	${CC} ${STATIC} -o conftest conftest.c -L${libdir} -lcrypto 2>>findssl.log
+	if [ -x ./conftest ]
+	then
+		ver=`./conftest 2>/dev/null`
+		rm -f ./conftest
+		echo "$ver $lib"
+	fi
+done
+
+#
+# Clean up
+#
+rm -f conftest.c
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass1.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass1.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4d51032d1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass1.c
@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2002 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * This is a simple GNOME SSH passphrase grabber. To use it, set the
+ * environment variable SSH_ASKPASS to point to the location of
+ * gnome-ssh-askpass before calling "ssh-add < /dev/null".
+ *
+ * There is only two run-time options: if you set the environment variable
+ * "GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_SERVER=true" then gnome-ssh-askpass will grab
+ * the X server. If you set "GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_POINTER=true", then the
+ * pointer will be grabbed too. These may have some benefit to security if
+ * you don't trust your X server. We grab the keyboard always.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Compile with:
+ *
+ * cc `gnome-config --cflags gnome gnomeui` \
+ *    gnome-ssh-askpass1.c -o gnome-ssh-askpass \
+ *    `gnome-config --libs gnome gnomeui`
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <gnome.h>
+#include <X11/Xlib.h>
+#include <gdk/gdkx.h>
+
+void
+report_failed_grab (void)
+{
+	GtkWidget *err;
+
+	err = gnome_message_box_new("Could not grab keyboard or mouse.\n"
+		"A malicious client may be eavesdropping on your session.",
+				    GNOME_MESSAGE_BOX_ERROR, "EXIT", NULL);
+	gtk_window_set_position(GTK_WINDOW(err), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER);
+	gtk_object_set(GTK_OBJECT(err), "type", GTK_WINDOW_POPUP, NULL);
+
+	gnome_dialog_run_and_close(GNOME_DIALOG(err));
+}
+
+int
+passphrase_dialog(char *message)
+{
+	char *passphrase;
+	char **messages;
+	int result, i, grab_server, grab_pointer;
+	GtkWidget *dialog, *entry, *label;
+
+	grab_server = (getenv("GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_SERVER") != NULL);
+	grab_pointer = (getenv("GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_POINTER") != NULL);
+
+	dialog = gnome_dialog_new("OpenSSH", GNOME_STOCK_BUTTON_OK,
+	    GNOME_STOCK_BUTTON_CANCEL, NULL);
+
+	messages = g_strsplit(message, "\\n", 0);
+	if (messages)
+		for(i = 0; messages[i]; i++) {
+			label = gtk_label_new(messages[i]);
+			gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox),
+			    label, FALSE, FALSE, 0);
+		}
+
+	entry = gtk_entry_new();
+	gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), entry, FALSE,
+	    FALSE, 0);
+	gtk_entry_set_visibility(GTK_ENTRY(entry), FALSE);
+	gtk_widget_grab_focus(entry);
+
+	/* Center window and prepare for grab */
+	gtk_object_set(GTK_OBJECT(dialog), "type", GTK_WINDOW_POPUP, NULL);
+	gnome_dialog_set_default(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog), 0);
+	gtk_window_set_position (GTK_WINDOW(dialog), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER);
+	gtk_window_set_policy(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), FALSE, FALSE, TRUE);
+	gnome_dialog_close_hides(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog), TRUE);
+	gtk_container_set_border_width(GTK_CONTAINER(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox),
+	    GNOME_PAD);
+	gtk_widget_show_all(dialog);
+
+	/* Grab focus */
+	if (grab_server)
+		XGrabServer(GDK_DISPLAY());
+	if (grab_pointer && gdk_pointer_grab(dialog->window, TRUE, 0,
+	    NULL, NULL, GDK_CURRENT_TIME))
+		goto nograb;
+	if (gdk_keyboard_grab(dialog->window, FALSE, GDK_CURRENT_TIME))
+		goto nograbkb;
+
+	/* Make <enter> close dialog */
+	gnome_dialog_editable_enters(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog), GTK_EDITABLE(entry));
+
+	/* Run dialog */
+	result = gnome_dialog_run(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog));
+
+	/* Ungrab */
+	if (grab_server)
+		XUngrabServer(GDK_DISPLAY());
+	if (grab_pointer)
+		gdk_pointer_ungrab(GDK_CURRENT_TIME);
+	gdk_keyboard_ungrab(GDK_CURRENT_TIME);
+	gdk_flush();
+
+	/* Report passphrase if user selected OK */
+	passphrase = gtk_entry_get_text(GTK_ENTRY(entry));
+	if (result == 0)
+		puts(passphrase);
+		
+	/* Zero passphrase in memory */
+	memset(passphrase, '\0', strlen(passphrase));
+	gtk_entry_set_text(GTK_ENTRY(entry), passphrase);
+			
+	gnome_dialog_close(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog));
+	return (result == 0 ? 0 : -1);
+
+	/* At least one grab failed - ungrab what we got, and report
+	   the failure to the user.  Note that XGrabServer() cannot
+	   fail.  */
+ nograbkb:
+	gdk_pointer_ungrab(GDK_CURRENT_TIME);
+ nograb:
+	if (grab_server)
+		XUngrabServer(GDK_DISPLAY());
+	gnome_dialog_close(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog));
+	
+	report_failed_grab();
+	return (-1);
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	char *message;
+	int result;
+
+	gnome_init("GNOME ssh-askpass", "0.1", argc, argv);
+
+	if (argc == 2)
+		message = argv[1];
+	else
+		message = "Enter your OpenSSH passphrase:";
+
+	setvbuf(stdout, 0, _IONBF, 0);
+	result = passphrase_dialog(message);
+
+	return (result);
+}
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9d97c30c0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
@@ -0,0 +1,223 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2002 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* GTK2 support by Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> */
+
+/*
+ * This is a simple GNOME SSH passphrase grabber. To use it, set the
+ * environment variable SSH_ASKPASS to point to the location of
+ * gnome-ssh-askpass before calling "ssh-add < /dev/null".
+ *
+ * There is only two run-time options: if you set the environment variable
+ * "GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_SERVER=true" then gnome-ssh-askpass will grab
+ * the X server. If you set "GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_POINTER=true", then the
+ * pointer will be grabbed too. These may have some benefit to security if
+ * you don't trust your X server. We grab the keyboard always.
+ */
+
+#define GRAB_TRIES	16
+#define GRAB_WAIT	250 /* milliseconds */
+
+/*
+ * Compile with:
+ *
+ * cc -Wall `pkg-config --cflags gtk+-2.0` \
+ *    gnome-ssh-askpass2.c -o gnome-ssh-askpass \
+ *    `pkg-config --libs gtk+-2.0`
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <X11/Xlib.h>
+#include <gtk/gtk.h>
+#include <gdk/gdkx.h>
+
+static void
+report_failed_grab (const char *what)
+{
+	GtkWidget *err;
+
+	err = gtk_message_dialog_new(NULL, 0,
+				     GTK_MESSAGE_ERROR,
+				     GTK_BUTTONS_CLOSE,
+				     "Could not grab %s. "
+				     "A malicious client may be eavesdropping "
+				     "on your session.", what);
+	gtk_window_set_position(GTK_WINDOW(err), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER);
+	gtk_label_set_line_wrap(GTK_LABEL((GTK_MESSAGE_DIALOG(err))->label),
+				TRUE);
+
+	gtk_dialog_run(GTK_DIALOG(err));
+
+	gtk_widget_destroy(err);
+}
+
+static void
+ok_dialog(GtkWidget *entry, gpointer dialog)
+{
+	g_return_if_fail(GTK_IS_DIALOG(dialog));
+	gtk_dialog_response(GTK_DIALOG(dialog), GTK_RESPONSE_OK);
+}
+
+static int
+passphrase_dialog(char *message)
+{
+	const char *failed;
+	char *passphrase, *local;
+	int result, grab_tries, grab_server, grab_pointer;
+	GtkWidget *dialog, *entry;
+	GdkGrabStatus status;
+
+	grab_server = (getenv("GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_SERVER") != NULL);
+	grab_pointer = (getenv("GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_POINTER") != NULL);
+	grab_tries = 0;
+
+	dialog = gtk_message_dialog_new(NULL, 0,
+					GTK_MESSAGE_QUESTION,
+					GTK_BUTTONS_OK_CANCEL,
+					"%s",
+					message);
+
+	entry = gtk_entry_new();
+	gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), entry, FALSE,
+	    FALSE, 0);
+	gtk_entry_set_visibility(GTK_ENTRY(entry), FALSE);
+	gtk_widget_grab_focus(entry);
+	gtk_widget_show(entry);
+
+	gtk_window_set_title(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), "OpenSSH");
+	gtk_window_set_position (GTK_WINDOW(dialog), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER);
+	gtk_window_set_keep_above(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), TRUE);
+	gtk_label_set_line_wrap(GTK_LABEL((GTK_MESSAGE_DIALOG(dialog))->label),
+				TRUE);
+
+	/* Make <enter> close dialog */
+	gtk_dialog_set_default_response(GTK_DIALOG(dialog), GTK_RESPONSE_OK);
+	g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "activate",
+			 G_CALLBACK(ok_dialog), dialog);
+
+	gtk_window_set_keep_above(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), TRUE);
+
+	/* Grab focus */
+	gtk_widget_show_now(dialog);
+	if (grab_pointer) {
+		for(;;) {
+			status = gdk_pointer_grab(
+			   (GTK_WIDGET(dialog))->window, TRUE, 0, NULL,
+			   NULL, GDK_CURRENT_TIME);
+			if (status == GDK_GRAB_SUCCESS)
+				break;
+			usleep(GRAB_WAIT * 1000);
+			if (++grab_tries > GRAB_TRIES) {
+				failed = "mouse";
+				goto nograb;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	for(;;) {
+		status = gdk_keyboard_grab((GTK_WIDGET(dialog))->window,
+		   FALSE, GDK_CURRENT_TIME);
+		if (status == GDK_GRAB_SUCCESS)
+			break;
+		usleep(GRAB_WAIT * 1000);
+		if (++grab_tries > GRAB_TRIES) {
+			failed = "keyboard";
+			goto nograbkb;
+		}
+	}
+	if (grab_server) {
+		gdk_x11_grab_server();
+	}
+
+	result = gtk_dialog_run(GTK_DIALOG(dialog));
+
+	/* Ungrab */
+	if (grab_server)
+		XUngrabServer(GDK_DISPLAY());
+	if (grab_pointer)
+		gdk_pointer_ungrab(GDK_CURRENT_TIME);
+	gdk_keyboard_ungrab(GDK_CURRENT_TIME);
+	gdk_flush();
+
+	/* Report passphrase if user selected OK */
+	passphrase = g_strdup(gtk_entry_get_text(GTK_ENTRY(entry)));
+	if (result == GTK_RESPONSE_OK) {
+		local = g_locale_from_utf8(passphrase, strlen(passphrase),
+					   NULL, NULL, NULL);
+		if (local != NULL) {
+			puts(local);
+			memset(local, '\0', strlen(local));
+			g_free(local);
+		} else {
+			puts(passphrase);
+		}
+	}
+		
+	/* Zero passphrase in memory */
+	memset(passphrase, '\b', strlen(passphrase));
+	gtk_entry_set_text(GTK_ENTRY(entry), passphrase);
+	memset(passphrase, '\0', strlen(passphrase));
+	g_free(passphrase);
+			
+	gtk_widget_destroy(dialog);
+	return (result == GTK_RESPONSE_OK ? 0 : -1);
+
+	/* At least one grab failed - ungrab what we got, and report
+	   the failure to the user.  Note that XGrabServer() cannot
+	   fail.  */
+ nograbkb:
+	gdk_pointer_ungrab(GDK_CURRENT_TIME);
+ nograb:
+	if (grab_server)
+		XUngrabServer(GDK_DISPLAY());
+	gtk_widget_destroy(dialog);
+	
+	report_failed_grab(failed);
+
+	return (-1);
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	char *message;
+	int result;
+
+	gtk_init(&argc, &argv);
+
+	if (argc > 1) {
+		message = g_strjoinv(" ", argv + 1);
+	} else {
+		message = g_strdup("Enter your OpenSSH passphrase:");
+	}
+
+	setvbuf(stdout, 0, _IONBF, 0);
+	result = passphrase_dialog(message);
+	g_free(message);
+
+	return (result);
+}
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/hpux/README b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/hpux/README
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f8bfa84e4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/hpux/README
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+README for OpenSSH HP-UX contrib files
+Kevin Steves <stevesk@pobox.com>
+
+sshd:		configuration file for sshd.rc
+sshd.rc:	SSH startup script
+egd:		configuration file for egd.rc
+egd.rc:		EGD (entropy gathering daemon) startup script
+
+To install:
+
+sshd.rc:
+
+o Verify paths in sshd.rc match your local installation
+  (WHAT_PATH and WHAT_PID)
+o Customize sshd if needed (SSHD_ARGS)
+o Install:
+
+  # cp sshd /etc/rc.config.d
+  # chmod 444 /etc/rc.config.d/sshd
+  # cp sshd.rc /sbin/init.d
+  # chmod 555 /sbin/init.d/sshd.rc
+  # ln -s /sbin/init.d/sshd.rc /sbin/rc1.d/K100sshd
+  # ln -s /sbin/init.d/sshd.rc /sbin/rc2.d/S900sshd
+
+egd.rc:
+
+o Verify egd.pl path in egd.rc matches your local installation
+  (WHAT_PATH)
+o Customize egd if needed (EGD_ARGS and EGD_LOG)
+o Add pseudo account:
+
+  # groupadd egd
+  # useradd -g egd egd
+  # mkdir -p /etc/opt/egd
+  # chown egd:egd /etc/opt/egd
+  # chmod 711 /etc/opt/egd
+
+o Install:
+
+  # cp egd /etc/rc.config.d
+  # chmod 444 /etc/rc.config.d/egd
+  # cp egd.rc /sbin/init.d
+  # chmod 555 /sbin/init.d/egd.rc
+  # ln -s /sbin/init.d/egd.rc /sbin/rc1.d/K600egd
+  # ln -s /sbin/init.d/egd.rc /sbin/rc2.d/S400egd
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/hpux/egd b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/hpux/egd
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..21af0bd13
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/hpux/egd
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# EGD_START:		Set to 1 to start entropy gathering daemon
+# EGD_ARGS:		Command line arguments to pass to egd
+# EGD_LOG:		EGD stdout and stderr log file (default /etc/opt/egd/egd.log)
+#
+# To configure the egd environment:
+
+# groupadd egd
+# useradd -g egd egd
+# mkdir -p /etc/opt/egd
+# chown egd:egd /etc/opt/egd
+# chmod 711 /etc/opt/egd
+
+EGD_START=1
+EGD_ARGS='/etc/opt/egd/entropy'
+EGD_LOG=
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/hpux/egd.rc b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/hpux/egd.rc
new file mode 100755
index 000000000..919dea725
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/hpux/egd.rc
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+#!/sbin/sh
+
+#
+# egd.rc: EGD start-up and shutdown script
+#
+
+# Allowed exit values:
+#       0 = success; causes "OK" to show up in checklist.
+#       1 = failure; causes "FAIL" to show up in checklist.
+#       2 = skip; causes "N/A" to show up in the checklist.
+#           Use this value if execution of this script is overridden
+#           by the use of a control variable, or if this script is not
+#           appropriate to execute for some other reason.
+#       3 = reboot; causes the system to be rebooted after execution.
+
+# Input and output:
+#       stdin is redirected from /dev/null
+#
+#       stdout and stderr are redirected to the /etc/rc.log file
+#       during checklist mode, or to the console in raw mode.
+
+umask 022
+
+PATH=/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin
+export PATH
+
+WHAT='EGD (entropy gathering daemon)'
+WHAT_PATH=/opt/perl/bin/egd.pl
+WHAT_CONFIG=/etc/rc.config.d/egd
+WHAT_LOG=/etc/opt/egd/egd.log
+
+# NOTE: If your script executes in run state 0 or state 1, then /usr might
+#       not be available.  Do not attempt to access commands or files in
+#       /usr unless your script executes in run state 2 or greater.  Other
+#       file systems typically not mounted until run state 2 include /var
+#       and /opt.
+
+rval=0
+
+# Check the exit value of a command run by this script.  If non-zero, the
+# exit code is echoed to the log file and the return value of this script
+# is set to indicate failure.
+
+set_return() {
+	x=$?
+	if [ $x -ne 0 ]; then
+		echo "EXIT CODE: $x"
+		rval=1	# script FAILed
+	fi
+}
+
+case $1 in
+'start_msg')
+	echo "Starting $WHAT"
+	;;
+
+'stop_msg')
+	echo "Stopping $WHAT"
+	;;
+
+'start')
+	if [ -f $WHAT_CONFIG ] ; then
+		. $WHAT_CONFIG
+	else
+		echo "ERROR: $WHAT_CONFIG defaults file MISSING"
+	fi
+	
+
+	if [ "$EGD_START" -eq 1 -a -x $WHAT_PATH ]; then
+		EGD_LOG=${EGD_LOG:-$WHAT_LOG}
+		su egd -c "nohup $WHAT_PATH $EGD_ARGS >$EGD_LOG 2>&1" &&
+			echo $WHAT started
+		set_return
+	else
+		rval=2
+	fi
+	;;
+
+'stop')
+	pid=`ps -fuegd | awk '$1 == "egd" { print $2 }'`
+	if [ "X$pid" != "X" ]; then
+		if kill "$pid"; then
+			echo "$WHAT stopped"
+		else
+			rval=1
+			echo "Unable to stop $WHAT"
+		fi
+	fi
+	set_return
+	;;
+
+*)
+	echo "usage: $0 {start|stop|start_msg|stop_msg}"
+	rval=1
+	;;
+esac
+
+exit $rval
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/hpux/sshd b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/hpux/sshd
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8eb5e92a3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/hpux/sshd
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+# SSHD_START:		Set to 1 to start SSH daemon
+# SSHD_ARGS:		Command line arguments to pass to sshd
+#
+SSHD_START=1
+SSHD_ARGS=
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/hpux/sshd.rc b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/hpux/sshd.rc
new file mode 100755
index 000000000..f9a10999b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/hpux/sshd.rc
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+#!/sbin/sh
+
+#
+# sshd.rc: SSH daemon start-up and shutdown script
+#
+
+# Allowed exit values:
+#	0 = success; causes "OK" to show up in checklist.
+#	1 = failure; causes "FAIL" to show up in checklist.
+#	2 = skip; causes "N/A" to show up in the checklist.
+#           Use this value if execution of this script is overridden
+#	    by the use of a control variable, or if this script is not
+#	    appropriate to execute for some other reason.
+#       3 = reboot; causes the system to be rebooted after execution.
+
+# Input and output:
+#	stdin is redirected from /dev/null
+#
+#	stdout and stderr are redirected to the /etc/rc.log file
+#	during checklist mode, or to the console in raw mode.
+
+PATH=/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin
+export PATH
+
+WHAT='OpenSSH'
+WHAT_PATH=/opt/openssh/sbin/sshd
+WHAT_PID=/var/run/sshd.pid
+WHAT_CONFIG=/etc/rc.config.d/sshd
+
+# NOTE: If your script executes in run state 0 or state 1, then /usr might
+#	not be available.  Do not attempt to access commands or files in
+#	/usr unless your script executes in run state 2 or greater.  Other
+#	file systems typically not mounted until run state 2 include /var
+#	and /opt.
+
+rval=0
+
+# Check the exit value of a command run by this script.  If non-zero, the
+# exit code is echoed to the log file and the return value of this script
+# is set to indicate failure.
+
+set_return() {
+	x=$?
+	if [ $x -ne 0 ]; then
+		echo "EXIT CODE: $x"
+		rval=1	# script FAILed
+	fi
+}
+
+case $1 in
+'start_msg')
+	echo "Starting $WHAT"
+	;;
+
+'stop_msg')
+	echo "Stopping $WHAT"
+	;;
+
+'start')
+	if [ -f $WHAT_CONFIG ] ; then
+		. $WHAT_CONFIG
+	else
+		echo "ERROR: $WHAT_CONFIG defaults file MISSING"
+	fi
+	
+	if [ "$SSHD_START" -eq 1 -a -x "$WHAT_PATH" ]; then
+		$WHAT_PATH $SSHD_ARGS && echo "$WHAT started"
+		set_return
+	else
+		rval=2
+	fi
+	;;
+
+'stop')
+	if kill `cat $WHAT_PID`; then
+		echo "$WHAT stopped"
+	else
+		rval=1
+		echo "Unable to stop $WHAT"
+	fi
+	set_return
+	;;
+
+*)
+	echo "usage: $0 {start|stop|start_msg|stop_msg}"
+	rval=1
+	;;
+esac
+
+exit $rval
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/redhat/gnome-ssh-askpass.csh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/redhat/gnome-ssh-askpass.csh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..dd77712cd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/redhat/gnome-ssh-askpass.csh
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+setenv SSH_ASKPASS /usr/libexec/openssh/gnome-ssh-askpass
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/redhat/gnome-ssh-askpass.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/redhat/gnome-ssh-askpass.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..355189f45
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/redhat/gnome-ssh-askpass.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+SSH_ASKPASS=/usr/libexec/openssh/gnome-ssh-askpass
+export SSH_ASKPASS
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5b27106fb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec
@@ -0,0 +1,811 @@
+%define ver 7.1p1
+%define rel 1
+
+# OpenSSH privilege separation requires a user & group ID
+%define sshd_uid    74
+%define sshd_gid    74
+
+# Version of ssh-askpass
+%define aversion 1.2.4.1
+
+# Do we want to disable building of x11-askpass? (1=yes 0=no)
+%define no_x11_askpass 0
+
+# Do we want to disable building of gnome-askpass? (1=yes 0=no)
+%define no_gnome_askpass 0
+
+# Do we want to link against a static libcrypto? (1=yes 0=no)
+%define static_libcrypto 0
+
+# Do we want smartcard support (1=yes 0=no)
+%define scard 0
+
+# Use GTK2 instead of GNOME in gnome-ssh-askpass
+%define gtk2 1
+
+# Is this build for RHL 6.x?
+%define build6x 0
+
+# Do we want kerberos5 support (1=yes 0=no)
+%define kerberos5 1
+
+# Reserve options to override askpass settings with:
+# rpm -ba|--rebuild --define 'skip_xxx 1'
+%{?skip_x11_askpass:%define no_x11_askpass 1}
+%{?skip_gnome_askpass:%define no_gnome_askpass 1}
+
+# Add option to build without GTK2 for older platforms with only GTK+.
+# RedHat <= 7.2 and Red Hat Advanced Server 2.1 are examples.
+# rpm -ba|--rebuild --define 'no_gtk2 1'
+%{?no_gtk2:%define gtk2 0}
+
+# Is this a build for RHL 6.x or earlier?
+%{?build_6x:%define build6x 1}
+
+# If this is RHL 6.x, the default configuration has sysconfdir in /usr/etc.
+%if %{build6x}
+%define _sysconfdir /etc
+%endif
+
+# Options for static OpenSSL link:
+# rpm -ba|--rebuild --define "static_openssl 1"
+%{?static_openssl:%define static_libcrypto 1}
+
+# Options for Smartcard support: (needs libsectok and openssl-engine)
+# rpm -ba|--rebuild --define "smartcard 1"
+%{?smartcard:%define scard 1}
+
+# Is this a build for the rescue CD (without PAM, with MD5)? (1=yes 0=no)
+%define rescue 0
+%{?build_rescue:%define rescue 1}
+
+# Turn off some stuff for resuce builds
+%if %{rescue}
+%define kerberos5 0
+%endif
+
+Summary: The OpenSSH implementation of SSH protocol versions 1 and 2.
+Name: openssh
+Version: %{ver}
+%if %{rescue}
+Release: %{rel}rescue
+%else
+Release: %{rel}
+%endif
+URL: http://www.openssh.com/portable.html
+Source0: ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz
+%if ! %{no_x11_askpass}
+Source1: http://www.jmknoble.net/software/x11-ssh-askpass/x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}.tar.gz
+%endif
+License: BSD
+Group: Applications/Internet
+BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-buildroot
+Obsoletes: ssh
+%if %{build6x}
+PreReq: initscripts >= 5.00
+%else
+Requires: initscripts >= 5.20
+%endif
+BuildRequires: perl, openssl-devel
+BuildRequires: /bin/login
+%if ! %{build6x}
+BuildPreReq: glibc-devel, pam
+%else
+BuildRequires: /usr/include/security/pam_appl.h
+%endif
+%if ! %{no_x11_askpass}
+BuildRequires: /usr/include/X11/Xlib.h
+%endif
+%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass}
+BuildRequires: pkgconfig
+%endif
+%if %{kerberos5}
+BuildRequires: krb5-devel
+BuildRequires: krb5-libs
+%endif
+
+%package clients
+Summary: OpenSSH clients.
+Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}
+Group: Applications/Internet
+Obsoletes: ssh-clients
+
+%package server
+Summary: The OpenSSH server daemon.
+Group: System Environment/Daemons
+Obsoletes: ssh-server
+Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}, chkconfig >= 0.9
+%if ! %{build6x}
+Requires: /etc/pam.d/system-auth
+%endif
+
+%package askpass
+Summary: A passphrase dialog for OpenSSH and X.
+Group: Applications/Internet
+Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}
+Obsoletes: ssh-extras
+
+%package askpass-gnome
+Summary: A passphrase dialog for OpenSSH, X, and GNOME.
+Group: Applications/Internet
+Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}
+Obsoletes: ssh-extras
+
+%description
+SSH (Secure SHell) is a program for logging into and executing
+commands on a remote machine. SSH is intended to replace rlogin and
+rsh, and to provide secure encrypted communications between two
+untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and
+arbitrary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel.
+
+OpenSSH is OpenBSD's version of the last free version of SSH, bringing
+it up to date in terms of security and features, as well as removing
+all patented algorithms to separate libraries.
+
+This package includes the core files necessary for both the OpenSSH
+client and server. To make this package useful, you should also
+install openssh-clients, openssh-server, or both.
+
+%description clients
+OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging
+into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package includes
+the clients necessary to make encrypted connections to SSH servers.
+You'll also need to install the openssh package on OpenSSH clients.
+
+%description server
+OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging
+into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains
+the secure shell daemon (sshd). The sshd daemon allows SSH clients to
+securely connect to your SSH server. You also need to have the openssh
+package installed.
+
+%description askpass
+OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging
+into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains
+an X11 passphrase dialog for OpenSSH.
+
+%description askpass-gnome
+OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging
+into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains
+an X11 passphrase dialog for OpenSSH and the GNOME GUI desktop
+environment.
+
+%prep
+
+%if ! %{no_x11_askpass}
+%setup -q -a 1
+%else
+%setup -q
+%endif
+
+%build
+%if %{rescue}
+CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS -Os"; export CFLAGS
+%endif
+
+%if %{kerberos5}
+K5DIR=`rpm -ql krb5-devel | grep include/krb5.h | sed 's,\/include\/krb5.h,,'`
+echo K5DIR=$K5DIR
+%endif
+
+%configure \
+	--sysconfdir=%{_sysconfdir}/ssh \
+	--libexecdir=%{_libexecdir}/openssh \
+	--datadir=%{_datadir}/openssh \
+	--with-rsh=%{_bindir}/rsh \
+	--with-default-path=/usr/local/bin:/bin:/usr/bin \
+	--with-superuser-path=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin \
+	--with-privsep-path=%{_var}/empty/sshd \
+	--with-md5-passwords \
+%if %{scard}
+	--with-smartcard \
+%endif
+%if %{rescue}
+	--without-pam \
+%else
+	--with-pam \
+%endif
+%if %{kerberos5}
+	 --with-kerberos5=$K5DIR \
+%endif
+
+
+%if %{static_libcrypto}
+perl -pi -e "s|-lcrypto|%{_libdir}/libcrypto.a|g" Makefile
+%endif
+
+make
+
+%if ! %{no_x11_askpass}
+pushd x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}
+%configure --libexecdir=%{_libexecdir}/openssh
+xmkmf -a
+make
+popd
+%endif
+
+# Define a variable to toggle gnome1/gtk2 building.  This is necessary
+# because RPM doesn't handle nested %if statements.
+%if %{gtk2}
+	gtk2=yes
+%else
+	gtk2=no
+%endif
+
+%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass}
+pushd contrib
+if [ $gtk2 = yes ] ; then
+	make gnome-ssh-askpass2
+	mv gnome-ssh-askpass2 gnome-ssh-askpass
+else
+	make gnome-ssh-askpass1
+	mv gnome-ssh-askpass1 gnome-ssh-askpass
+fi
+popd
+%endif
+
+%install
+rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
+mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/ssh
+mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh
+mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_var}/empty/sshd
+
+make install DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT
+
+install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/
+install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/rc.d/init.d
+install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh
+%if %{build6x}
+install -m644 contrib/redhat/sshd.pam.old $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/sshd
+%else
+install -m644 contrib/redhat/sshd.pam     $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/sshd
+%endif
+install -m755 contrib/redhat/sshd.init $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/rc.d/init.d/sshd
+
+%if ! %{no_x11_askpass}
+install -s x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/x11-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/x11-ssh-askpass
+ln -s x11-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-askpass
+%endif
+
+%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass}
+install -s contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/gnome-ssh-askpass
+%endif
+
+%if ! %{scard}
+	 rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/share/openssh/Ssh.bin
+%endif
+
+%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass}
+install -m 755 -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/
+install -m 755 contrib/redhat/gnome-ssh-askpass.csh $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/
+install -m 755 contrib/redhat/gnome-ssh-askpass.sh $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/
+%endif
+
+perl -pi -e "s|$RPM_BUILD_ROOT||g" $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man*/*
+
+%clean
+rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
+
+%triggerun server -- ssh-server
+if [ "$1" != 0 -a -r /var/run/sshd.pid ] ; then
+	touch /var/run/sshd.restart
+fi
+
+%triggerun server -- openssh-server < 2.5.0p1
+# Count the number of HostKey and HostDsaKey statements we have.
+gawk	'BEGIN {IGNORECASE=1}
+	 /^hostkey/ || /^hostdsakey/ {sawhostkey = sawhostkey + 1}
+	 END {exit sawhostkey}' /etc/ssh/sshd_config
+# And if we only found one, we know the client was relying on the old default
+# behavior, which loaded the the SSH2 DSA host key when HostDsaKey wasn't
+# specified.  Now that HostKey is used for both SSH1 and SSH2 keys, specifying
+# one nullifies the default, which would have loaded both.
+if [ $? -eq 1 ] ; then
+	echo HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key >> /etc/ssh/sshd_config
+	echo HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key >> /etc/ssh/sshd_config
+fi
+
+%triggerpostun server -- ssh-server
+if [ "$1" != 0 ] ; then
+	/sbin/chkconfig --add sshd
+	if test -f /var/run/sshd.restart ; then
+		rm -f /var/run/sshd.restart
+		/sbin/service sshd start > /dev/null 2>&1 || :
+	fi
+fi
+
+%pre server
+%{_sbindir}/groupadd -r -g %{sshd_gid} sshd 2>/dev/null || :
+%{_sbindir}/useradd -d /var/empty/sshd -s /bin/false -u %{sshd_uid} \
+	-g sshd -M -r sshd 2>/dev/null || :
+
+%post server
+/sbin/chkconfig --add sshd
+
+%postun server
+/sbin/service sshd condrestart > /dev/null 2>&1 || :
+
+%preun server
+if [ "$1" = 0 ]
+then
+	/sbin/service sshd stop > /dev/null 2>&1 || :
+	/sbin/chkconfig --del sshd
+fi
+
+%files
+%defattr(-,root,root)
+%doc CREDITS ChangeLog INSTALL LICENCE OVERVIEW README* PROTOCOL* TODO
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/scp
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/scp.1*
+%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh
+%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/moduli
+%if ! %{rescue}
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keygen
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keygen.1*
+%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libexecdir}/openssh
+%attr(4711,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-keysign
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-pkcs11-helper
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-keysign.8*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8*
+%endif
+%if %{scard}
+%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_datadir}/openssh
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_datadir}/openssh/Ssh.bin
+%endif
+
+%files clients
+%defattr(-,root,root)
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh.1*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/ssh_config.5*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ssh_config
+%attr(-,root,root) %{_bindir}/slogin
+%attr(-,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/slogin.1*
+%if ! %{rescue}
+%attr(2755,root,nobody) %{_bindir}/ssh-agent
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-add
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keyscan
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/sftp
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-agent.1*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-add.1*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keyscan.1*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/sftp.1*
+%endif
+
+%if ! %{rescue}
+%files server
+%defattr(-,root,root)
+%dir %attr(0111,root,root) %{_var}/empty/sshd
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/sshd
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/sftp-server
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/sshd.8*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/moduli.5*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/sshd_config.5*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/sftp-server.8*
+%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh
+%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config
+%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) /etc/pam.d/sshd
+%attr(0755,root,root) %config /etc/rc.d/init.d/sshd
+%endif
+
+%if ! %{no_x11_askpass}
+%files askpass
+%defattr(-,root,root)
+%doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/README
+%doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/ChangeLog
+%doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/SshAskpass*.ad
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-askpass
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/x11-ssh-askpass
+%endif
+
+%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass}
+%files askpass-gnome
+%defattr(-,root,root)
+%attr(0755,root,root) %config %{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/gnome-ssh-askpass.*
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/gnome-ssh-askpass
+%endif
+
+%changelog
+* Wed Jul 14 2010 Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
+- test for skip_x11_askpass (line 77) should have been for no_x11_askpass
+
+* Mon Jun 2 2003 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+- Remove noip6 option. This may be controlled at run-time in client config
+  file using new AddressFamily directive
+
+* Mon May 12 2003 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+- Don't install profile.d scripts when not building with GNOME/GTK askpass
+  (patch from bet@rahul.net)
+
+* Wed Oct 01 2002 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+- Install ssh-agent setgid nobody to prevent ptrace() key theft attacks
+
+* Mon Sep 30 2002 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+- Use contrib/ Makefile for building askpass programs
+
+* Fri Jun 21 2002 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+- Merge in spec changes from seba@iq.pl (Sebastian Pachuta)
+- Add new {ssh,sshd}_config.5 manpages
+- Add new ssh-keysign program and remove setuid from ssh client
+
+* Fri May 10 2002 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+- Merge in spec changes from RedHat, reorgansie a little
+- Add Privsep user, group and directory
+
+* Thu Mar  7 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 3.1p1-2
+- bump and grind (through the build system)
+
+* Thu Mar  7 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 3.1p1-1
+- require sharutils for building (mindrot #137)
+- require db1-devel only when building for 6.x (#55105), which probably won't
+  work anyway (3.1 requires OpenSSL 0.9.6 to build), but what the heck
+- require pam-devel by file (not by package name) again
+- add Markus's patch to compile with OpenSSL 0.9.5a (from
+  http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=141) and apply it if we're
+  building for 6.x
+
+* Thu Mar  7 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 3.1p1-0
+- update to 3.1p1
+
+* Tue Mar  5 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> SNAP-20020305
+- update to SNAP-20020305
+- drop debug patch, fixed upstream
+
+* Wed Feb 20 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> SNAP-20020220
+- update to SNAP-20020220 for testing purposes (you've been warned, if there's
+  anything to be warned about, gss patches won't apply, I don't mind)
+
+* Wed Feb 13 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 3.0.2p1-3
+- add patches from Simon Wilkinson and Nicolas Williams for GSSAPI key
+  exchange, authentication, and named key support
+
+* Wed Jan 23 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 3.0.2p1-2
+- remove dependency on db1-devel, which has just been swallowed up whole
+  by gnome-libs-devel
+
+* Sun Dec 29 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- adjust build dependencies so that build6x actually works right (fix
+  from Hugo van der Kooij)
+
+* Tue Dec  4 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 3.0.2p1-1
+- update to 3.0.2p1
+
+* Fri Nov 16 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 3.0.1p1-1
+- update to 3.0.1p1
+
+* Tue Nov 13 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- update to current CVS (not for use in distribution)
+
+* Thu Nov  8 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 3.0p1-1
+- merge some of Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> changes from the upstream
+  3.0p1 spec file and init script
+
+* Wed Nov  7 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- update to 3.0p1
+- update to x11-ssh-askpass 1.2.4.1
+- change build dependency on a file from pam-devel to the pam-devel package
+- replace primes with moduli
+
+* Thu Sep 27 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 2.9p2-9
+- incorporate fix from Markus Friedl's advisory for IP-based authorization bugs
+
+* Thu Sep 13 2001 Bernhard Rosenkraenzer <bero@redhat.com> 2.9p2-8
+- Merge changes to rescue build from current sysadmin survival cd
+
+* Thu Sep  6 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 2.9p2-7
+- fix scp's server's reporting of file sizes, and build with the proper
+  preprocessor define to get large-file capable open(), stat(), etc.
+  (sftp has been doing this correctly all along) (#51827)
+- configure without --with-ipv4-default on RHL 7.x and newer (#45987,#52247)
+- pull cvs patch to fix support for /etc/nologin for non-PAM logins (#47298)
+- mark profile.d scriptlets as config files (#42337)
+- refer to Jason Stone's mail for zsh workaround for exit-hanging quasi-bug
+- change a couple of log() statements to debug() statements (#50751)
+- pull cvs patch to add -t flag to sshd (#28611)
+- clear fd_sets correctly (one bit per FD, not one byte per FD) (#43221)
+
+* Mon Aug 20 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 2.9p2-6
+- add db1-devel as a BuildPrerequisite (noted by Hans Ecke)
+
+* Thu Aug 16 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- pull cvs patch to fix remote port forwarding with protocol 2
+
+* Thu Aug  9 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- pull cvs patch to add session initialization to no-pty sessions
+- pull cvs patch to not cut off challengeresponse auth needlessly
+- refuse to do X11 forwarding if xauth isn't there, handy if you enable
+  it by default on a system that doesn't have X installed (#49263)
+
+* Wed Aug  8 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- don't apply patches to code we don't intend to build (spotted by Matt Galgoci)
+
+* Mon Aug  6 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- pass OPTIONS correctly to initlog (#50151)
+
+* Wed Jul 25 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- switch to x11-ssh-askpass 1.2.2
+
+* Wed Jul 11 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- rebuild in new environment
+
+* Mon Jun 25 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- disable the gssapi patch
+
+* Mon Jun 18 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- update to 2.9p2
+- refresh to a new version of the gssapi patch
+
+* Thu Jun  7 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- change Copyright: BSD to License: BSD
+- add Markus Friedl's unverified patch for the cookie file deletion problem
+  so that we can verify it
+- drop patch to check if xauth is present (was folded into cookie patch)
+- don't apply gssapi patches for the errata candidate
+- clear supplemental groups list at startup
+
+* Fri May 25 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- fix an error parsing the new default sshd_config
+- add a fix from Markus Friedl (via openssh-unix-dev) for ssh-keygen not
+  dealing with comments right
+
+* Thu May 24 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- add in Simon Wilkinson's GSSAPI patch to give it some testing in-house,
+  to be removed before the next beta cycle because it's a big departure
+  from the upstream version
+
+* Thu May  3 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- finish marking strings in the init script for translation
+- modify init script to source /etc/sysconfig/sshd and pass $OPTIONS to sshd
+  at startup (change merged from openssh.com init script, originally by
+  Pekka Savola)
+- refuse to do X11 forwarding if xauth isn't there, handy if you enable
+  it by default on a system that doesn't have X installed
+
+* Wed May  2 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- update to 2.9
+- drop various patches that came from or went upstream or to or from CVS
+
+* Wed Apr 18 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- only require initscripts 5.00 on 6.2 (reported by Peter Bieringer)
+
+* Sun Apr  8 2001 Preston Brown <pbrown@redhat.com>
+- remove explicit openssl requirement, fixes builddistro issue
+- make initscript stop() function wait until sshd really dead to avoid
+  races in condrestart
+
+* Mon Apr  2 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- mention that challengereponse supports PAM, so disabling password doesn't
+  limit users to pubkey and rsa auth (#34378)
+- bypass the daemon() function in the init script and call initlog directly,
+  because daemon() won't start a daemon it detects is already running (like
+  open connections)
+- require the version of openssl we had when we were built
+
+* Fri Mar 23 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- make do_pam_setcred() smart enough to know when to establish creds and
+  when to reinitialize them
+- add in a couple of other fixes from Damien for inclusion in the errata
+
+* Thu Mar 22 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- update to 2.5.2p2
+- call setcred() again after initgroups, because the "creds" could actually
+  be group memberships
+
+* Tue Mar 20 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- update to 2.5.2p1 (includes endianness fixes in the rijndael implementation)
+- don't enable challenge-response by default until we find a way to not
+  have too many userauth requests (we may make up to six pubkey and up to
+  three password attempts as it is)
+- remove build dependency on rsh to match openssh.com's packages more closely
+
+* Sat Mar  3 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- remove dependency on openssl -- would need to be too precise
+
+* Fri Mar  2 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- rebuild in new environment
+
+* Mon Feb 26 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Revert the patch to move pam_open_session.
+- Init script and spec file changes from Pekka Savola. (#28750)
+- Patch sftp to recognize '-o protocol' arguments. (#29540)
+
+* Thu Feb 22 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Chuck the closing patch.
+- Add a trigger to add host keys for protocol 2 to the config file, now that
+  configuration file syntax requires us to specify it with HostKey if we
+  specify any other HostKey values, which we do.
+
+* Tue Feb 20 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Redo patch to move pam_open_session after the server setuid()s to the user.
+- Rework the nopam patch to use be picked up by autoconf.
+
+* Mon Feb 19 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Update for 2.5.1p1.
+- Add init script mods from Pekka Savola.
+- Tweak the init script to match the CVS contrib script more closely.
+- Redo patch to ssh-add to try to adding both identity and id_dsa to also try
+  adding id_rsa.
+
+* Fri Feb 16 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Update for 2.5.0p1.
+- Use $RPM_OPT_FLAGS instead of -O when building gnome-ssh-askpass
+- Resync with parts of Damien Miller's openssh.spec from CVS, including
+  update of x11 askpass to 1.2.0.
+- Only require openssl (don't prereq) because we generate keys in the init
+  script now.
+
+* Tue Feb 13 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Don't open a PAM session until we've forked and become the user (#25690).
+- Apply Andrew Bartlett's patch for letting pam_authenticate() know which
+  host the user is attempting a login from.
+- Resync with parts of Damien Miller's openssh.spec from CVS.
+- Don't expose KbdInt responses in debug messages (from CVS).
+- Detect and handle errors in rsa_{public,private}_decrypt (from CVS).
+
+* Wed Feb  7 2001 Trond Eivind Glomsrxd <teg@redhat.com>
+- i18n-tweak to initscript.
+
+* Tue Jan 23 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- More gettextizing.
+- Close all files after going into daemon mode (needs more testing).
+- Extract patch from CVS to handle auth banners (in the client).
+- Extract patch from CVS to handle compat weirdness.
+
+* Fri Jan 19 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Finish with the gettextizing.
+
+* Thu Jan 18 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Fix a bug in auth2-pam.c (#23877)
+- Gettextize the init script.
+
+* Wed Dec 20 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Incorporate a switch for using PAM configs for 6.x, just in case.
+
+* Tue Dec  5 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Incorporate Bero's changes for a build specifically for rescue CDs.
+
+* Wed Nov 29 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Don't treat pam_setcred() failure as fatal unless pam_authenticate() has
+  succeeded, to allow public-key authentication after a failure with "none"
+  authentication.  (#21268)
+
+* Tue Nov 28 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Update to x11-askpass 1.1.1. (#21301)
+- Don't second-guess fixpaths, which causes paths to get fixed twice. (#21290)
+
+* Mon Nov 27 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Merge multiple PAM text messages into subsequent prompts when possible when
+  doing keyboard-interactive authentication.
+
+* Sun Nov 26 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Disable the built-in MD5 password support.  We're using PAM.
+- Take a crack at doing keyboard-interactive authentication with PAM, and
+  enable use of it in the default client configuration so that the client
+  will try it when the server disallows password authentication.
+- Build with debugging flags.  Build root policies strip all binaries anyway.
+
+* Tue Nov 21 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Use DESTDIR instead of %%makeinstall.
+- Remove /usr/X11R6/bin from the path-fixing patch.
+
+* Mon Nov 20 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Add the primes file from the latest snapshot to the main package (#20884).
+- Add the dev package to the prereq list (#19984).
+- Remove the default path and mimic login's behavior in the server itself.
+
+* Fri Nov 17 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Resync with conditional options in Damien Miller's .spec file for an errata.
+- Change libexecdir from %%{_libexecdir}/ssh to %%{_libexecdir}/openssh.
+
+* Tue Nov  7 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Update to OpenSSH 2.3.0p1.
+- Update to x11-askpass 1.1.0.
+- Enable keyboard-interactive authentication.
+
+* Mon Oct 30 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Update to ssh-askpass-x11 1.0.3.
+- Change authentication related messages to be private (#19966).
+
+* Tue Oct 10 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Patch ssh-keygen to be able to list signatures for DSA public key files
+  it generates.
+
+* Thu Oct  5 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Add BuildRequires on /usr/include/security/pam_appl.h to be sure we always
+  build PAM authentication in.
+- Try setting SSH_ASKPASS if gnome-ssh-askpass is installed.
+- Clean out no-longer-used patches.
+- Patch ssh-add to try to add both identity and id_dsa, and to error only
+  when neither exists.
+
+* Mon Oct  2 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Update x11-askpass to 1.0.2. (#17835)
+- Add BuildRequiress for /bin/login and /usr/bin/rsh so that configure will
+  always find them in the right place. (#17909)
+- Set the default path to be the same as the one supplied by /bin/login, but
+  add /usr/X11R6/bin. (#17909)
+- Try to handle obsoletion of ssh-server more cleanly.  Package names
+  are different, but init script name isn't. (#17865)
+
+* Wed Sep  6 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Update to 2.2.0p1. (#17835)
+- Tweak the init script to allow proper restarting. (#18023)
+
+* Wed Aug 23 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Update to 20000823 snapshot.
+- Change subpackage requirements from %%{version} to %%{version}-%%{release}
+- Back out the pipe patch.
+
+* Mon Jul 17 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Update to 2.1.1p4, which includes fixes for config file parsing problems.
+- Move the init script back.
+- Add Damien's quick fix for wackiness.
+
+* Wed Jul 12 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Update to 2.1.1p3, which includes fixes for X11 forwarding and strtok().
+
+* Thu Jul  6 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Move condrestart to server postun.
+- Move key generation to init script.
+- Actually use the right patch for moving the key generation to the init script.
+- Clean up the init script a bit.
+
+* Wed Jul  5 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Fix X11 forwarding, from mail post by Chan Shih-Ping Richard.
+
+* Sun Jul  2 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Update to 2.1.1p2.
+- Use of strtok() considered harmful.
+
+* Sat Jul  1 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Get the build root out of the man pages.
+
+* Thu Jun 29 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Add and use condrestart support in the init script.
+- Add newer initscripts as a prereq.
+
+* Tue Jun 27 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Build in new environment (release 2)
+- Move -clients subpackage to Applications/Internet group
+
+* Fri Jun  9 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Update to 2.2.1p1
+
+* Sat Jun  3 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Patch to build with neither RSA nor RSAref.
+- Miscellaneous FHS-compliance tweaks.
+- Fix for possibly-compressed man pages.
+
+* Wed Mar 15 2000 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
+- Updated for new location
+- Updated for new gnome-ssh-askpass build
+
+* Sun Dec 26 1999 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+- Added Jim Knoble's <jmknoble@pobox.com> askpass
+
+* Mon Nov 15 1999 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+- Split subpackages further based on patch from jim knoble <jmknoble@pobox.com>
+
+* Sat Nov 13 1999 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+- Added 'Obsoletes' directives
+
+* Tue Nov 09 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
+- Use make install
+- Subpackages
+
+* Mon Nov 08 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
+- Added links for slogin
+- Fixed perms on manpages
+
+* Sat Oct 30 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
+- Renamed init script
+
+* Fri Oct 29 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
+- Back to old binary names
+
+* Thu Oct 28 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
+- Use autoconf
+- New binary names
+
+* Wed Oct 27 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
+- Initial RPMification, based on Jan "Yenya" Kasprzak's <kas@fi.muni.cz> spec.
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/redhat/sshd.init b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/redhat/sshd.init
new file mode 100755
index 000000000..40c8dfd9f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/redhat/sshd.init
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+#
+# Init file for OpenSSH server daemon
+#
+# chkconfig: 2345 55 25
+# description: OpenSSH server daemon
+#
+# processname: sshd
+# config: /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
+# config: /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub
+# config: /etc/ssh/ssh_random_seed
+# config: /etc/ssh/sshd_config
+# pidfile: /var/run/sshd.pid
+
+# source function library
+. /etc/rc.d/init.d/functions
+
+# pull in sysconfig settings
+[ -f /etc/sysconfig/sshd ] && . /etc/sysconfig/sshd
+
+RETVAL=0
+prog="sshd"
+
+# Some functions to make the below more readable
+SSHD=/usr/sbin/sshd
+PID_FILE=/var/run/sshd.pid
+
+do_restart_sanity_check()
+{
+	$SSHD -t
+	RETVAL=$?
+	if [ $RETVAL -ne 0 ]; then
+		failure $"Configuration file or keys are invalid"
+		echo
+	fi
+}
+
+start()
+{
+	# Create keys if necessary
+	/usr/bin/ssh-keygen -A
+	if [ -x /sbin/restorecon ]; then
+		/sbin/restorecon /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub
+		/sbin/restorecon /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub
+		/sbin/restorecon /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key.pub
+		/sbin/restorecon /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key.pub
+	fi
+
+	echo -n $"Starting $prog:"
+	$SSHD $OPTIONS && success || failure
+	RETVAL=$?
+	[ $RETVAL -eq 0 ] && touch /var/lock/subsys/sshd
+	echo
+}
+
+stop()
+{
+	echo -n $"Stopping $prog:"
+	killproc $SSHD -TERM
+	RETVAL=$?
+	[ $RETVAL -eq 0 ] && rm -f /var/lock/subsys/sshd
+	echo
+}
+
+reload()
+{
+	echo -n $"Reloading $prog:"
+	killproc $SSHD -HUP
+	RETVAL=$?
+	echo
+}
+
+case "$1" in
+	start)
+		start
+		;;
+	stop)
+		stop
+		;;
+	restart)
+		stop
+		start
+		;;
+	reload)
+		reload
+		;;
+	condrestart)
+		if [ -f /var/lock/subsys/sshd ] ; then
+			do_restart_sanity_check
+			if [ $RETVAL -eq 0 ] ; then
+				stop
+				# avoid race
+				sleep 3
+				start
+			fi
+		fi
+		;;
+	status)
+		status $SSHD
+		RETVAL=$?
+		;;
+	*)
+		echo $"Usage: $0 {start|stop|restart|reload|condrestart|status}"
+		RETVAL=1
+esac
+exit $RETVAL
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/redhat/sshd.init.old b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/redhat/sshd.init.old
new file mode 100755
index 000000000..0deb6080e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/redhat/sshd.init.old
@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+#
+# Init file for OpenSSH server daemon
+#
+# chkconfig: 2345 55 25
+# description: OpenSSH server daemon
+#
+# processname: sshd
+# config: /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
+# config: /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub
+# config: /etc/ssh/ssh_random_seed
+# config: /etc/ssh/sshd_config
+# pidfile: /var/run/sshd.pid
+
+# source function library
+. /etc/rc.d/init.d/functions
+
+# pull in sysconfig settings
+[ -f /etc/sysconfig/sshd ] && . /etc/sysconfig/sshd
+
+RETVAL=0
+prog="sshd"
+
+# Some functions to make the below more readable
+KEYGEN=/usr/bin/ssh-keygen
+SSHD=/usr/sbin/sshd
+RSA1_KEY=/etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
+RSA_KEY=/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+DSA_KEY=/etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
+PID_FILE=/var/run/sshd.pid
+
+my_success() {
+  local msg
+  if [ $# -gt 1 ]; then
+    msg="$2"
+  else
+    msg="done"
+  fi
+  case "`type -type success`" in
+    function)
+      success "$1"
+    ;;
+    *)
+      echo -n "${msg}"
+    ;;
+  esac
+}
+my_failure() {
+  local msg
+  if [ $# -gt 1 ]; then
+    msg="$2"
+  else
+    msg="FAILED"
+  fi
+  case "`type -type failure`" in
+    function)
+      failure "$1"
+    ;;
+    *)
+      echo -n "${msg}"
+    ;;
+  esac
+}
+do_rsa1_keygen() {
+	if [ ! -s $RSA1_KEY ]; then
+		echo -n "Generating SSH1 RSA host key: "
+		if $KEYGEN -q -t rsa1 -f $RSA1_KEY -C '' -N '' >&/dev/null; then
+			chmod 600 $RSA1_KEY
+			chmod 644 $RSA1_KEY.pub
+			my_success "RSA1 key generation"
+			echo
+		else
+			my_failure "RSA1 key generation"
+			echo
+			exit 1
+		fi
+	fi
+}
+do_rsa_keygen() {
+	if [ ! -s $RSA_KEY ]; then
+		echo -n "Generating SSH2 RSA host key: "
+		if $KEYGEN -q -t rsa -f $RSA_KEY -C '' -N '' >&/dev/null; then
+			chmod 600 $RSA_KEY
+			chmod 644 $RSA_KEY.pub
+			my_success "RSA key generation"
+			echo
+		else
+			my_failure "RSA key generation"
+			echo
+			exit 1
+		fi
+	fi
+}
+do_dsa_keygen() {
+	if [ ! -s $DSA_KEY ]; then
+		echo -n "Generating SSH2 DSA host key: "
+		if $KEYGEN -q -t dsa -f $DSA_KEY -C '' -N '' >&/dev/null; then
+			chmod 600 $DSA_KEY
+			chmod 644 $DSA_KEY.pub
+			my_success "DSA key generation"
+			echo
+		else
+			my_failure "DSA key generation"
+			echo
+			exit 1
+		fi
+	fi
+}
+do_restart_sanity_check() {
+	$SSHD -t
+	RETVAL=$?
+	if [ ! "$RETVAL" = 0 ]; then
+		my_failure "Configuration file or keys"
+		echo
+	fi
+}
+
+
+case "$1" in
+	start)
+		# Create keys if necessary
+		do_rsa1_keygen;
+		do_rsa_keygen;
+		do_dsa_keygen;
+		
+		echo -n "Starting sshd: "
+		if [ ! -f $PID_FILE ] ; then
+			sshd $OPTIONS
+			RETVAL=$?
+			if [ "$RETVAL" = "0" ] ; then
+				my_success "sshd startup" "sshd"
+				touch /var/lock/subsys/sshd
+			else
+				my_failure "sshd startup" ""
+			fi
+		fi
+		echo
+		;;
+	stop)
+		echo -n "Shutting down sshd: "
+		if [ -f $PID_FILE ] ; then
+			killproc sshd
+			RETVAL=$?
+			[ $RETVAL -eq 0 ] && rm -f /var/lock/subsys/sshd
+		fi
+		echo
+		;;
+	restart)
+		do_restart_sanity_check
+		$0 stop
+		$0 start
+		RETVAL=$?
+		;;
+	condrestart)
+		if [ -f /var/lock/subsys/sshd ] ; then
+			do_restart_sanity_check
+			$0 stop
+			$0 start
+			RETVAL=$?
+		fi
+		;;
+	status)
+		status sshd
+		RETVAL=$?
+		;;
+	*)
+		echo "Usage: sshd {start|stop|restart|status|condrestart}"
+		exit 1
+		;;
+esac
+
+exit $RETVAL
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/redhat/sshd.pam b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/redhat/sshd.pam
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ffa5adbe5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/redhat/sshd.pam
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+#%PAM-1.0
+auth       required     pam_stack.so service=system-auth
+account    required     pam_nologin.so
+account    required     pam_stack.so service=system-auth
+password   required     pam_stack.so service=system-auth
+session    required     pam_stack.so service=system-auth
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/redhat/sshd.pam.old b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/redhat/sshd.pam.old
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..26dcb34d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/redhat/sshd.pam.old
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+#%PAM-1.0
+auth       required     /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so shadow nodelay
+auth       required     /lib/security/pam_nologin.so
+account    required     /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so
+password   required     /lib/security/pam_cracklib.so
+password   required     /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so shadow nullok use_authtok
+session    required     /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so
+session    required     /lib/security/pam_limits.so
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/solaris/README b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/solaris/README
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..fefdd4b53
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/solaris/README
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+The following is a new package build script for Solaris.   This is being
+introduced into OpenSSH 3.0 and above in hopes of simplifying the build
+process.  As of 3.1p2 the script should work on all platforms that have
+SVR4 style package tools.
+
+The build process is called a 'dummy install'.. Which means the software does
+a  "make install-nokeys DESTDIR=[fakeroot]".  This way all manpages should
+be handled correctly and key are defered until the first time the sshd
+is started.
+
+Directions:
+
+1. make -F Makefile.in distprep  (Only if you are getting from the CVS tree)
+2. ./configure --with-pam [..any other options you want..]
+3. look at the top of buildpkg.sh for the configurable options and put
+   any changes you want in openssh-config.local. Additional customizations
+   can be done to the build process by creating one or more of the following
+   scripts that will be sourced by buildpkg.sh.
+	pkg_post_make_install_fixes.sh pkg-post-prototype-edit.sh
+	pkg-preinstall.local pkg-postinstall.local pkg-preremove.local
+	pkg-postremove.local pkg-request.local
+4. Run "make package"
+
+If all goes well you should have a solaris package ready to be installed.
+
+If you have any problems with this script please post them to
+openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org and I will try to assist you as best as I can.
+
+- Ben Lindstrom
+
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/ssh-copy-id b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/ssh-copy-id
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ae88e9958
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/ssh-copy-id
@@ -0,0 +1,300 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+# Copyright (c) 1999-2013 Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>
+#               2013 Martin Kletzander <mkletzan@redhat.com>
+#               2010 Adeodato =?iso-8859-1?Q?Sim=F3?= <asp16@alu.ua.es>
+#               2010 Eric Moret <eric.moret@gmail.com>
+#               2009 Xr <xr@i-jeuxvideo.com>
+#               2007 Justin Pryzby <justinpryzby@users.sourceforge.net>
+#               2004 Reini Urban <rurban@x-ray.at>
+#               2003 Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
+# All rights reserved.
+#
+# Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+# modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+# are met:
+# 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+#    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+# 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+#    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+#    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+#
+# THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+# IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+# OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+# IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+# INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+# NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+# DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+# THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+# (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+# THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+
+# Shell script to install your public key(s) on a remote machine
+# See the ssh-copy-id(1) man page for details
+
+# check that we have something mildly sane as our shell, or try to find something better
+if false ^ printf "%s: WARNING: ancient shell, hunting for a more modern one... " "$0"
+then
+  SANE_SH=${SANE_SH:-/usr/bin/ksh}
+  if printf 'true ^ false\n' | "$SANE_SH"
+  then
+    printf "'%s' seems viable.\n" "$SANE_SH"
+    exec "$SANE_SH" "$0" "$@"
+  else
+    cat <<-EOF
+	oh dear.
+
+	  If you have a more recent shell available, that supports \$(...) etc.
+	  please try setting the environment variable SANE_SH to the path of that
+	  shell, and then retry running this script. If that works, please report
+	  a bug describing your setup, and the shell you used to make it work.
+
+	EOF
+    printf "%s: ERROR: Less dimwitted shell required.\n" "$0"
+    exit 1
+  fi
+fi
+
+DEFAULT_PUB_ID_FILE=$(ls -t ${HOME}/.ssh/id*.pub 2>/dev/null | grep -v -- '-cert.pub$' | head -n 1)
+
+usage () {
+  printf 'Usage: %s [-h|-?|-n] [-i [identity_file]] [-p port] [[-o <ssh -o options>] ...] [user@]hostname\n' "$0" >&2
+  exit 1
+}
+
+# escape any single quotes in an argument
+quote() {
+  printf "%s\n" "$1" | sed -e "s/'/'\\\\''/g"
+}
+
+use_id_file() {
+  local L_ID_FILE="$1"
+
+  if expr "$L_ID_FILE" : ".*\.pub$" >/dev/null ; then
+    PUB_ID_FILE="$L_ID_FILE"
+  else
+    PUB_ID_FILE="$L_ID_FILE.pub"
+  fi
+
+  PRIV_ID_FILE=$(dirname "$PUB_ID_FILE")/$(basename "$PUB_ID_FILE" .pub)
+
+  # check that the files are readable
+  for f in $PUB_ID_FILE $PRIV_ID_FILE ; do
+    ErrMSG=$( { : < $f ; } 2>&1 ) || {
+      printf "\n%s: ERROR: failed to open ID file '%s': %s\n\n" "$0" "$f" "$(printf "%s\n" "$ErrMSG" | sed -e 's/.*: *//')"
+      exit 1
+    }
+  done
+  GET_ID="cat \"$PUB_ID_FILE\""
+}
+
+if [ -n "$SSH_AUTH_SOCK" ] && ssh-add -L >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
+  GET_ID="ssh-add -L"
+fi
+
+while test "$#" -gt 0
+do
+  [ "${SEEN_OPT_I}" ] && expr "$1" : "[-]i" >/dev/null && {
+        printf "\n%s: ERROR: -i option must not be specified more than once\n\n" "$0"
+        usage
+  }
+
+  OPT= OPTARG=
+  # implement something like getopt to avoid Solaris pain
+  case "$1" in
+    -i?*|-o?*|-p?*)
+      OPT="$(printf -- "$1"|cut -c1-2)"
+      OPTARG="$(printf -- "$1"|cut -c3-)"
+      shift
+      ;;
+    -o|-p)
+      OPT="$1"
+      OPTARG="$2"
+      shift 2
+      ;;
+    -i)
+      OPT="$1"
+      test "$#" -le 2 || expr "$2" : "[-]" >/dev/null || {
+        OPTARG="$2"
+        shift
+      }
+      shift
+      ;;
+    -n|-h|-\?)
+      OPT="$1"
+      OPTARG=
+      shift
+      ;;
+    --)
+      shift
+      while test "$#" -gt 0
+      do
+        SAVEARGS="${SAVEARGS:+$SAVEARGS }'$(quote "$1")'"
+        shift
+      done
+      break
+      ;;
+    -*)
+      printf "\n%s: ERROR: invalid option (%s)\n\n" "$0" "$1"
+      usage
+      ;;
+    *)
+      SAVEARGS="${SAVEARGS:+$SAVEARGS }'$(quote "$1")'"
+      shift
+      continue
+      ;;
+  esac
+
+  case "$OPT" in
+    -i)
+      SEEN_OPT_I="yes"
+      use_id_file "${OPTARG:-$DEFAULT_PUB_ID_FILE}"
+      ;;
+    -o|-p)
+      SSH_OPTS="${SSH_OPTS:+$SSH_OPTS }$OPT '$(quote "$OPTARG")'"
+      ;;
+    -n)
+      DRY_RUN=1
+      ;;
+    -h|-\?)
+      usage
+      ;;
+  esac
+done 
+
+eval set -- "$SAVEARGS"
+
+if [ $# = 0 ] ; then
+  usage
+fi
+if [ $# != 1 ] ; then
+  printf '%s: ERROR: Too many arguments.  Expecting a target hostname, got: %s\n\n' "$0" "$SAVEARGS" >&2
+  usage
+fi
+
+# drop trailing colon
+USER_HOST=$(printf "%s\n" "$1" | sed 's/:$//')
+# tack the hostname onto SSH_OPTS
+SSH_OPTS="${SSH_OPTS:+$SSH_OPTS }'$(quote "$USER_HOST")'"
+# and populate "$@" for later use (only way to get proper quoting of options)
+eval set -- "$SSH_OPTS"
+
+if [ -z "$(eval $GET_ID)" ] && [ -r "${PUB_ID_FILE:=$DEFAULT_PUB_ID_FILE}" ] ; then
+  use_id_file "$PUB_ID_FILE"
+fi
+
+if [ -z "$(eval $GET_ID)" ] ; then
+  printf '%s: ERROR: No identities found\n' "$0" >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+# populate_new_ids() uses several global variables ($USER_HOST, $SSH_OPTS ...)
+# and has the side effect of setting $NEW_IDS
+populate_new_ids() {
+  local L_SUCCESS="$1"
+
+  # repopulate "$@" inside this function 
+  eval set -- "$SSH_OPTS"
+
+  umask 0177
+  local L_TMP_ID_FILE=$(mktemp ~/.ssh/ssh-copy-id_id.XXXXXXXXXX)
+  if test $? -ne 0 || test "x$L_TMP_ID_FILE" = "x" ; then
+    echo "mktemp failed" 1>&2
+    exit 1
+  fi
+  trap "rm -f $L_TMP_ID_FILE ${L_TMP_ID_FILE}.pub" EXIT TERM INT QUIT
+  printf '%s: INFO: attempting to log in with the new key(s), to filter out any that are already installed\n' "$0" >&2
+  NEW_IDS=$(
+    eval $GET_ID | {
+      while read ID ; do
+        printf '%s\n' "$ID" > $L_TMP_ID_FILE
+
+        # the next line assumes $PRIV_ID_FILE only set if using a single id file - this
+        # assumption will break if we implement the possibility of multiple -i options.
+        # The point being that if file based, ssh needs the private key, which it cannot
+        # find if only given the contents of the .pub file in an unrelated tmpfile
+        ssh -i "${PRIV_ID_FILE:-$L_TMP_ID_FILE}" \
+            -o PreferredAuthentications=publickey \
+            -o IdentitiesOnly=yes "$@" exit 2>$L_TMP_ID_FILE.stderr </dev/null
+        if [ "$?" = "$L_SUCCESS" ] ; then
+          : > $L_TMP_ID_FILE
+        else
+          grep 'Permission denied' $L_TMP_ID_FILE.stderr >/dev/null || {
+            sed -e 's/^/ERROR: /' <$L_TMP_ID_FILE.stderr >$L_TMP_ID_FILE
+            cat >/dev/null #consume the other keys, causing loop to end
+          }
+        fi
+
+        cat $L_TMP_ID_FILE
+      done
+    }
+  )
+  rm -f $L_TMP_ID_FILE* && trap - EXIT TERM INT QUIT
+
+  if expr "$NEW_IDS" : "^ERROR: " >/dev/null ; then
+    printf '\n%s: %s\n\n' "$0" "$NEW_IDS" >&2
+    exit 1
+  fi
+  if [ -z "$NEW_IDS" ] ; then
+    printf '\n%s: WARNING: All keys were skipped because they already exist on the remote system.\n\n' "$0" >&2
+    exit 0
+  fi
+  printf '%s: INFO: %d key(s) remain to be installed -- if you are prompted now it is to install the new keys\n' "$0" "$(printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | wc -l)" >&2
+}
+
+REMOTE_VERSION=$(ssh -v -o PreferredAuthentications=',' "$@" 2>&1 |
+                 sed -ne 's/.*remote software version //p')
+
+case "$REMOTE_VERSION" in
+  NetScreen*)
+    populate_new_ids 1
+    for KEY in $(printf "%s" "$NEW_IDS" | cut -d' ' -f2) ; do
+      KEY_NO=$(($KEY_NO + 1))
+      printf "%s\n" "$KEY" | grep ssh-dss >/dev/null || {
+         printf '%s: WARNING: Non-dsa key (#%d) skipped (NetScreen only supports DSA keys)\n' "$0" "$KEY_NO" >&2
+         continue
+      }
+      [ "$DRY_RUN" ] || printf 'set ssh pka-dsa key %s\nsave\nexit\n' "$KEY" | ssh -T "$@" >/dev/null 2>&1
+      if [ $? = 255 ] ; then
+        printf '%s: ERROR: installation of key #%d failed (please report a bug describing what caused this, so that we can make this message useful)\n' "$0" "$KEY_NO" >&2
+      else
+        ADDED=$(($ADDED + 1))
+      fi
+    done
+    if [ -z "$ADDED" ] ; then
+      exit 1
+    fi
+    ;;
+  *)
+    # Assuming that the remote host treats ~/.ssh/authorized_keys as one might expect
+    populate_new_ids 0
+    [ "$DRY_RUN" ] || printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | ssh "$@" "
+		umask 077 ;
+		mkdir -p .ssh && cat >> .ssh/authorized_keys || exit 1 ;
+		if type restorecon >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then restorecon -F .ssh .ssh/authorized_keys ; fi" \
+      || exit 1
+    ADDED=$(printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | wc -l)
+    ;;
+esac
+
+if [ "$DRY_RUN" ] ; then
+  cat <<-EOF
+	=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
+	Would have added the following key(s):
+
+	$NEW_IDS
+	=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
+	EOF
+else
+  cat <<-EOF
+
+	Number of key(s) added: $ADDED
+
+	Now try logging into the machine, with:   "ssh $SSH_OPTS"
+	and check to make sure that only the key(s) you wanted were added.
+
+	EOF
+fi
+
+# =-=-=-=
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1 b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..67a59e492
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1
@@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
+.ig \"  -*- nroff -*-
+Copyright (c) 1999-2013 hands.com Ltd. <http://hands.com/>
+
+Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+are met:
+1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+   notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+   notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+   documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+
+THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+(INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+..
+.Dd $Mdocdate: June 17 2010 $
+.Dt SSH-COPY-ID 1
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm ssh-copy-id
+.Nd use locally available keys to authorise logins on a remote machine
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Nm
+.Op Fl n
+.Op Fl i Op Ar identity_file
+.Op Fl p Ar port
+.Op Fl o Ar ssh_option
+.Op Ar user Ns @ Ns
+.Ar hostname
+.Nm
+.Fl h | Fl ?
+.br
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+.Nm
+is a script that uses
+.Xr ssh 1
+to log into a remote machine (presumably using a login password,
+so password authentication should be enabled, unless you've done some
+clever use of multiple identities).  It assembles a list of one or more
+fingerprints (as described below) and tries to log in with each key, to
+see if any of them are already installed (of course, if you are not using
+.Xr ssh-agent 1
+this may result in you being repeatedly prompted for pass-phrases).
+It then assembles a list of those that failed to log in, and using ssh,
+enables logins with those keys on the remote server.  By default it adds
+the keys by appending them to the remote user's
+.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+(creating the file, and directory, if necessary).  It is also capable
+of detecting if the remote system is a NetScreen, and using its
+.Ql set ssh pka-dsa key ...
+command instead.
+.Pp
+The options are as follows:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Fl i Ar identity_file
+Use only the key(s) contained in
+.Ar identity_file
+(rather than looking for identities via
+.Xr ssh-add 1
+or in the
+.Ic default_ID_file ) .
+If the filename does not end in
+.Pa .pub
+this is added.  If the filename is omitted, the 
+.Ic default_ID_file
+is used.
+.Pp
+Note that this can be used to ensure that the keys copied have the
+comment one prefers and/or extra options applied, by ensuring that the
+key file has these set as preferred before the copy is attempted.
+.It Fl n
+do a dry-run.  Instead of installing keys on the remote system simply
+prints the key(s) that would have been installed.
+.It Fl h , Fl ?
+Print Usage summary
+.It Fl p Ar port , Fl o Ar ssh_option
+These two options are simply passed through untouched, along with their
+argument, to allow one to set the port or other
+.Xr ssh 1
+options, respectively.
+.Pp
+Rather than specifying these as command line options, it is often better to use (per-host) settings in
+.Xr ssh 1 Ns 's
+configuration file:
+.Xr ssh_config 5 .
+.El
+.Pp
+Default behaviour without
+.Fl i ,
+is to check if
+.Ql ssh-add -L
+provides any output, and if so those keys are used.  Note that this results in
+the comment on the key being the filename that was given to
+.Xr ssh-add 1
+when the key was loaded into your
+.Xr ssh-agent 1
+rather than the comment contained in that file, which is a bit of a shame.
+Otherwise, if
+.Xr ssh-add 1
+provides no keys contents of the 
+.Ic default_ID_file
+will be used.
+.Pp
+The
+.Ic default_ID_file
+is the most recent file that matches:
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id*.pub ,
+(excluding those that match
+.Pa ~/.ssh/*-cert.pub )
+so if you create a key that is not the one you want
+.Nm
+to use, just use
+.Xr touch 1
+on your preferred key's 
+.Pa .pub
+file to reinstate it as the most recent.
+.Pp
+.Sh EXAMPLES
+If you have already installed keys from one system on a lot of remote
+hosts, and you then create a new key, on a new client machine, say,
+it can be difficult to keep track of which systems on which you've
+installed the new key.  One way of dealing with this is to load both
+the new key and old key(s) into your
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
+Load the new key first, without the
+.Fl c
+option, then load one or more old keys into the agent, possibly by
+ssh-ing to the client machine that has that old key, using the
+.Fl A
+option to allow agent forwarding:
+.Pp
+.D1 user@newclient$ ssh-add
+.D1 user@newclient$ ssh -A old.client
+.D1 user@oldl$ ssh-add -c
+.D1 No   ... prompt for pass-phrase ...
+.D1 user@old$ logoff
+.D1 user@newclient$ ssh someserver
+.Pp
+now, if the new key is installed on the server, you'll be allowed in
+unprompted, whereas if you only have the old key(s) enabled, you'll be
+asked for confirmation, which is your cue to log back out and run
+.Pp
+.D1 user@newclient$ ssh-copy-id -i someserver
+.Pp
+The reason you might want to specify the -i option in this case is to
+ensure that the comment on the installed key is the one from the
+.Pa .pub
+file, rather than just the filename that was loaded into you agent.
+It also ensures that only the id you intended is installed, rather than
+all the keys that you have in your
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
+Of course, you can specify another id, or use the contents of the
+.Xr ssh-agent 1
+as you prefer.
+.Pp
+Having mentioned
+.Xr ssh-add 1 Ns 's
+.Fl c
+option, you might consider using this whenever using agent forwarding
+to avoid your key being hijacked, but it is much better to instead use
+.Xr ssh 1 Ns 's
+.Ar ProxyCommand
+and 
+.Fl W
+option,
+to bounce through remote servers while always doing direct end-to-end
+authentication. This way the middle hop(s) don't get access to your
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
+A web search for
+.Ql ssh proxycommand nc
+should prove enlightening (N.B. the modern approach is to use the
+.Fl W
+option, rather than
+.Xr nc 1 ) .
+.Sh "SEE ALSO"
+.Xr ssh 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+.Xr sshd 8
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/sshd.pam.freebsd b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/sshd.pam.freebsd
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c0bc36410
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/sshd.pam.freebsd
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+sshd    auth      required  pam_unix.so    try_first_pass
+sshd    account   required  pam_unix.so
+sshd    password  required  pam_permit.so
+sshd    session   required  pam_permit.so
+
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/sshd.pam.generic b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/sshd.pam.generic
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..215f0fe30
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/sshd.pam.generic
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+#%PAM-1.0
+auth       required     /lib/security/pam_unix.so shadow nodelay
+account    required     /lib/security/pam_nologin.so
+account    required     /lib/security/pam_unix.so
+password   required     /lib/security/pam_cracklib.so
+password   required     /lib/security/pam_unix.so shadow nullok use_authtok
+session    required     /lib/security/pam_unix.so
+session    required     /lib/security/pam_limits.so
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/suse/openssh.spec b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/suse/openssh.spec
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..596895882
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/suse/openssh.spec
@@ -0,0 +1,243 @@
+# Default values for additional components
+%define build_x11_askpass	1
+
+# Define the UID/GID to use for privilege separation
+%define sshd_gid	65
+%define sshd_uid	71
+
+# The version of x11-ssh-askpass to use
+%define xversion	1.2.4.1
+
+# Allow the ability to override defaults with -D skip_xxx=1
+%{?skip_x11_askpass:%define build_x11_askpass 0}
+
+Summary:	OpenSSH, a free Secure Shell (SSH) protocol implementation
+Name:		openssh
+Version:	7.1p1
+URL:		http://www.openssh.com/
+Release:	1
+Source0:	openssh-%{version}.tar.gz
+Source1:	x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}.tar.gz
+License:	BSD
+Group:		Productivity/Networking/SSH
+BuildRoot:	%{_tmppath}/openssh-%{version}-buildroot
+PreReq:		openssl
+Obsoletes:	ssh
+Provides:	ssh
+#
+# (Build[ing] Prereq[uisites] only work for RPM 2.95 and newer.)
+# building prerequisites -- stuff for
+#   OpenSSL (openssl-devel),
+#   and Gnome (glibdev, gtkdev, and gnlibsd)
+#
+BuildPrereq:	openssl
+BuildPrereq:	zlib-devel
+#BuildPrereq:	glibdev
+#BuildPrereq:	gtkdev
+#BuildPrereq:	gnlibsd
+
+%package	askpass
+Summary:	A passphrase dialog for OpenSSH and the X window System.
+Group:		Productivity/Networking/SSH
+Requires:	openssh = %{version}
+Obsoletes:	ssh-extras
+Provides:	openssh:${_libdir}/ssh/ssh-askpass
+
+%if %{build_x11_askpass}
+BuildPrereq:	XFree86-devel
+%endif
+
+%description
+Ssh (Secure Shell) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for
+executing commands in a remote machine.  It is intended to replace
+rlogin and rsh, and provide secure encrypted communications between
+two untrusted hosts over an insecure network.  X11 connections and
+arbitrary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel.
+
+OpenSSH is OpenBSD's rework of the last free version of SSH, bringing it
+up to date in terms of security and features, as well as removing all
+patented algorithms to seperate libraries (OpenSSL).
+
+This package includes all files necessary for both the OpenSSH
+client and server.
+
+%description askpass
+Ssh (Secure Shell) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for
+executing commands in a remote machine.  It is intended to replace
+rlogin and rsh, and provide secure encrypted communications between
+two untrusted hosts over an insecure network.  X11 connections and
+arbitrary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel.
+
+OpenSSH is OpenBSD's rework of the last free version of SSH, bringing it
+up to date in terms of security and features, as well as removing all
+patented algorithms to seperate libraries (OpenSSL).
+
+This package contains an X Window System passphrase dialog for OpenSSH.
+
+%changelog
+* Wed Oct 26 2005 Iain Morgan <imorgan@nas.nasa.gov>
+- Removed accidental inclusion of --without-zlib-version-check
+* Tue Oct 25 2005 Iain Morgan <imorgan@nas.nasa.gov>
+- Overhaul to deal with newer versions of SuSE and OpenSSH
+* Mon Jun 12 2000 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+- Glob manpages to catch compressed files
+* Wed Mar 15 2000 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
+- Updated for new location
+- Updated for new gnome-ssh-askpass build
+* Sun Dec 26 1999 Chris Saia <csaia@wtower.com>
+- Made symlink to gnome-ssh-askpass called ssh-askpass
+* Wed Nov 24 1999 Chris Saia <csaia@wtower.com>
+- Removed patches that included /etc/pam.d/sshd, /sbin/init.d/rc.sshd, and
+  /var/adm/fillup-templates/rc.config.sshd, since Damien merged these into
+  his released tarfile
+- Changed permissions on ssh_config in the install procedure to 644 from 600
+  even though it was correct in the %files section and thus right in the RPMs
+- Postinstall script for the server now only prints "Generating SSH host
+  key..." if we need to actually do this, in order to eliminate a confusing
+  message if an SSH host key is already in place
+- Marked all manual pages as %doc(umentation)
+* Mon Nov 22 1999 Chris Saia <csaia@wtower.com>
+- Added flag to configure daemon with TCP Wrappers support
+- Added building prerequisites (works in RPM 3.0 and newer)
+* Thu Nov 18 1999 Chris Saia <csaia@wtower.com>
+- Made this package correct for SuSE.
+- Changed instances of pam_pwdb.so to pam_unix.so, since it works more properly
+  with SuSE, and lib_pwdb.so isn't installed by default.
+* Mon Nov 15 1999 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+- Split subpackages further based on patch from jim knoble <jmknoble@pobox.com>
+* Sat Nov 13 1999 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+- Added 'Obsoletes' directives
+* Tue Nov 09 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
+- Use make install
+- Subpackages
+* Mon Nov 08 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
+- Added links for slogin
+- Fixed perms on manpages
+* Sat Oct 30 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
+- Renamed init script
+* Fri Oct 29 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
+- Back to old binary names
+* Thu Oct 28 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
+- Use autoconf
+- New binary names
+* Wed Oct 27 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
+- Initial RPMification, based on Jan "Yenya" Kasprzak's <kas@fi.muni.cz> spec.
+
+%prep
+
+%if %{build_x11_askpass}
+%setup -q -a 1
+%else
+%setup -q
+%endif
+
+%build
+CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS" \
+%configure	--prefix=/usr \
+		--sysconfdir=%{_sysconfdir}/ssh \
+		--mandir=%{_mandir} \
+		--with-privsep-path=/var/lib/empty \
+		--with-pam \
+		--libexecdir=%{_libdir}/ssh
+make
+
+%if %{build_x11_askpass}
+cd x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}
+%configure	--mandir=/usr/X11R6/man \
+		--libexecdir=%{_libdir}/ssh
+xmkmf -a
+make
+cd ..
+%endif
+
+%install
+rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
+make install DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT/
+install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/
+install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/init.d/
+install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/var/adm/fillup-templates
+install -m644 contrib/sshd.pam.generic $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/sshd
+install -m744 contrib/suse/rc.sshd $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/init.d/sshd
+install -m744 contrib/suse/sysconfig.ssh \
+   $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/var/adm/fillup-templates
+
+%if %{build_x11_askpass}
+cd x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}
+make install install.man BINDIR=%{_libdir}/ssh DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT/
+rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/share/Ssh.bin
+%endif
+
+%clean
+rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
+
+%pre
+/usr/sbin/groupadd -g %{sshd_gid} -o -r sshd 2> /dev/null || :
+/usr/sbin/useradd -r -o -g sshd -u %{sshd_uid} -s /bin/false -c "SSH Privilege Separation User" -d /var/lib/sshd sshd 2> /dev/null || :
+
+%post
+/usr/bin/ssh-keygen -A
+%{fillup_and_insserv -n -y ssh sshd}
+%run_permissions
+
+%verifyscript
+%verify_permissions -e /etc/ssh/sshd_config -e /etc/ssh/ssh_config -e /usr/bin/ssh
+
+%preun
+%stop_on_removal sshd
+
+%postun
+%restart_on_update sshd
+%{insserv_cleanup}
+
+%files
+%defattr(-,root,root)
+%doc ChangeLog OVERVIEW README* PROTOCOL*
+%doc TODO CREDITS LICENCE
+%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh
+%attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ssh_config
+%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config
+%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/moduli
+%attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) /etc/pam.d/sshd
+%attr(0755,root,root) %config /etc/init.d/sshd
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keygen
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/scp
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh
+%attr(-,root,root) %{_bindir}/slogin
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-agent
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-add
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keyscan
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/sftp
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/sshd
+%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libdir}/ssh
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/sftp-server
+%attr(4711,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/ssh-keysign
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/ssh-pkcs11-helper
+%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/scp.1*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/sftp.1*
+%attr(-,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/slogin.1*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh.1*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-add.1*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-agent.1*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keygen.1*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keyscan.1*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man5/moduli.5*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man5/ssh_config.5*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man5/sshd_config.5*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/sftp-server.8*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-keysign.8*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/sshd.8*
+%attr(0644,root,root) /var/adm/fillup-templates/sysconfig.ssh
+
+%if %{build_x11_askpass}
+%files askpass
+%defattr(-,root,root)
+%doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}/README
+%doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}/ChangeLog
+%doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}/SshAskpass*.ad
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/ssh-askpass
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/x11-ssh-askpass
+%attr(0644,root,root) %doc /usr/X11R6/man/man1/ssh-askpass.1x*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %doc /usr/X11R6/man/man1/x11-ssh-askpass.1x*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %config /usr/X11R6/lib/X11/app-defaults/SshAskpass
+%endif
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/suse/rc.config.sshd b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/suse/rc.config.sshd
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..baaa7a5a1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/suse/rc.config.sshd
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+#
+# Start the Secure Shell (SSH) Daemon?
+#
+START_SSHD="yes"
+
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/suse/rc.sshd b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/suse/rc.sshd
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..28f28e41d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/suse/rc.sshd
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+#! /bin/sh
+# Copyright (c) 1995-2000 SuSE GmbH Nuernberg, Germany.
+#
+# Author: Jiri Smid <feedback@suse.de>
+#
+# /etc/init.d/sshd
+#
+#   and symbolic its link
+#
+# /usr/sbin/rcsshd
+#
+### BEGIN INIT INFO
+# Provides: sshd
+# Required-Start: $network $remote_fs
+# Required-Stop: $network $remote_fs
+# Default-Start: 3 5
+# Default-Stop: 0 1 2 6
+# Description: Start the sshd daemon
+### END INIT INFO
+
+SSHD_BIN=/usr/sbin/sshd
+test -x $SSHD_BIN || exit 5
+
+SSHD_SYSCONFIG=/etc/sysconfig/ssh
+test -r $SSHD_SYSCONFIG || exit 6
+. $SSHD_SYSCONFIG
+
+SSHD_PIDFILE=/var/run/sshd.init.pid
+
+. /etc/rc.status
+
+# Shell functions sourced from /etc/rc.status:
+#      rc_check         check and set local and overall rc status
+#      rc_status        check and set local and overall rc status
+#      rc_status -v     ditto but be verbose in local rc status
+#      rc_status -v -r  ditto and clear the local rc status
+#      rc_failed        set local and overall rc status to failed
+#      rc_reset         clear local rc status (overall remains)
+#      rc_exit          exit appropriate to overall rc status
+
+# First reset status of this service
+rc_reset
+
+case "$1" in
+    start)
+	# Generate any missing host keys
+	ssh-keygen -A
+	echo -n "Starting SSH daemon"
+	## Start daemon with startproc(8). If this fails
+	## the echo return value is set appropriate.
+
+	startproc -f -p $SSHD_PIDFILE $SSHD_BIN $SSHD_OPTS -o "PidFile=$SSHD_PIDFILE" 
+
+	# Remember status and be verbose
+	rc_status -v
+	;;
+    stop)
+	echo -n "Shutting down SSH daemon"
+	## Stop daemon with killproc(8) and if this fails
+	## set echo the echo return value.
+
+	killproc -p $SSHD_PIDFILE -TERM $SSHD_BIN
+
+	# Remember status and be verbose
+	rc_status -v
+	;;
+    try-restart)
+        ## Stop the service and if this succeeds (i.e. the 
+        ## service was running before), start it again.
+        $0 status >/dev/null &&  $0 restart
+
+        # Remember status and be quiet
+        rc_status
+        ;;
+    restart)
+        ## Stop the service and regardless of whether it was
+        ## running or not, start it again.
+        $0 stop
+        $0 start
+
+        # Remember status and be quiet
+        rc_status
+        ;;
+    force-reload|reload)
+	## Signal the daemon to reload its config. Most daemons
+	## do this on signal 1 (SIGHUP).
+
+	echo -n "Reload service sshd"
+
+	killproc -p $SSHD_PIDFILE -HUP $SSHD_BIN
+
+        rc_status -v
+
+        ;;
+    status)
+	echo -n "Checking for service sshd "
+        ## Check status with checkproc(8), if process is running
+        ## checkproc will return with exit status 0.
+
+        # Status has a slightly different for the status command:
+        # 0 - service running
+        # 1 - service dead, but /var/run/  pid  file exists
+        # 2 - service dead, but /var/lock/ lock file exists
+        # 3 - service not running
+
+	checkproc -p $SSHD_PIDFILE $SSHD_BIN
+
+	rc_status -v
+	;;
+    probe)
+	## Optional: Probe for the necessity of a reload,
+	## give out the argument which is required for a reload.
+
+        test /etc/ssh/sshd_config -nt $SSHD_PIDFILE && echo reload
+	;;
+    *)
+	echo "Usage: $0 {start|stop|status|try-restart|restart|force-reload|reload|probe}"
+	exit 1
+	;;
+esac
+rc_exit
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/suse/sysconfig.ssh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/suse/sysconfig.ssh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c6a37e5cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/contrib/suse/sysconfig.ssh
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+## Path:	Network/Remote access/SSH
+## Description:	SSH server settings
+## Type:	string
+## Default:	""
+## ServiceRestart: sshd
+#
+# Options for sshd
+#
+SSHD_OPTS=""
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/defines.h b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/defines.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..fa0ccba7c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/defines.h
@@ -0,0 +1,853 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2003 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _DEFINES_H
+#define _DEFINES_H
+
+/* $Id: defines.h,v 1.183 2014/09/02 19:33:26 djm Exp $ */
+
+
+/* Constants */
+
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_SHUT_RD) && HAVE_DECL_SHUT_RD == 0
+enum
+{
+  SHUT_RD = 0,		/* No more receptions.  */
+  SHUT_WR,			/* No more transmissions.  */
+  SHUT_RDWR			/* No more receptions or transmissions.  */
+};
+# define SHUT_RD   SHUT_RD
+# define SHUT_WR   SHUT_WR
+# define SHUT_RDWR SHUT_RDWR
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Definitions for IP type of service (ip_tos)
+ */
+#include <netinet/in_systm.h>
+#include <netinet/ip.h>
+#ifndef IPTOS_LOWDELAY
+# define IPTOS_LOWDELAY          0x10
+# define IPTOS_THROUGHPUT        0x08
+# define IPTOS_RELIABILITY       0x04
+# define IPTOS_LOWCOST           0x02
+# define IPTOS_MINCOST           IPTOS_LOWCOST
+#endif /* IPTOS_LOWDELAY */
+
+/*
+ * Definitions for DiffServ Codepoints as per RFC2474
+ */
+#ifndef IPTOS_DSCP_AF11
+# define	IPTOS_DSCP_AF11		0x28
+# define	IPTOS_DSCP_AF12		0x30
+# define	IPTOS_DSCP_AF13		0x38
+# define	IPTOS_DSCP_AF21		0x48
+# define	IPTOS_DSCP_AF22		0x50
+# define	IPTOS_DSCP_AF23		0x58
+# define	IPTOS_DSCP_AF31		0x68
+# define	IPTOS_DSCP_AF32		0x70
+# define	IPTOS_DSCP_AF33		0x78
+# define	IPTOS_DSCP_AF41		0x88
+# define	IPTOS_DSCP_AF42		0x90
+# define	IPTOS_DSCP_AF43		0x98
+# define	IPTOS_DSCP_EF		0xb8
+#endif /* IPTOS_DSCP_AF11 */
+#ifndef IPTOS_DSCP_CS0
+# define	IPTOS_DSCP_CS0		0x00
+# define	IPTOS_DSCP_CS1		0x20
+# define	IPTOS_DSCP_CS2		0x40
+# define	IPTOS_DSCP_CS3		0x60
+# define	IPTOS_DSCP_CS4		0x80
+# define	IPTOS_DSCP_CS5		0xa0
+# define	IPTOS_DSCP_CS6		0xc0
+# define	IPTOS_DSCP_CS7		0xe0
+#endif /* IPTOS_DSCP_CS0 */
+#ifndef IPTOS_DSCP_EF
+# define	IPTOS_DSCP_EF		0xb8
+#endif /* IPTOS_DSCP_EF */
+
+#ifndef PATH_MAX
+# ifdef _POSIX_PATH_MAX
+# define PATH_MAX _POSIX_PATH_MAX
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#ifndef MAXPATHLEN
+# ifdef PATH_MAX
+#  define MAXPATHLEN PATH_MAX
+# else /* PATH_MAX */
+#  define MAXPATHLEN 64
+/* realpath uses a fixed buffer of size MAXPATHLEN, so force use of ours */
+#  ifndef BROKEN_REALPATH
+#   define BROKEN_REALPATH 1
+#  endif /* BROKEN_REALPATH */
+# endif /* PATH_MAX */
+#endif /* MAXPATHLEN */
+
+#ifndef HOST_NAME_MAX
+# include "netdb.h" /* for MAXHOSTNAMELEN */
+# if defined(_POSIX_HOST_NAME_MAX)
+#  define HOST_NAME_MAX _POSIX_HOST_NAME_MAX
+# elif defined(MAXHOSTNAMELEN)
+#  define HOST_NAME_MAX MAXHOSTNAMELEN
+# else
+#  define HOST_NAME_MAX	255
+# endif
+#endif /* HOST_NAME_MAX */
+
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_MAXSYMLINKS) && HAVE_DECL_MAXSYMLINKS == 0
+# define MAXSYMLINKS 5
+#endif
+
+#ifndef STDIN_FILENO
+# define STDIN_FILENO    0
+#endif
+#ifndef STDOUT_FILENO
+# define STDOUT_FILENO   1
+#endif
+#ifndef STDERR_FILENO
+# define STDERR_FILENO   2
+#endif
+
+#ifndef NGROUPS_MAX	/* Disable groupaccess if NGROUP_MAX is not set */
+#ifdef NGROUPS
+#define NGROUPS_MAX NGROUPS
+#else
+#define NGROUPS_MAX 0
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_O_NONBLOCK) && HAVE_DECL_O_NONBLOCK == 0
+# define O_NONBLOCK      00004	/* Non Blocking Open */
+#endif
+
+#ifndef S_IFSOCK
+# define S_IFSOCK 0
+#endif /* S_IFSOCK */
+
+#ifndef S_ISDIR
+# define S_ISDIR(mode)	(((mode) & (_S_IFMT)) == (_S_IFDIR))
+#endif /* S_ISDIR */
+
+#ifndef S_ISREG
+# define S_ISREG(mode)	(((mode) & (_S_IFMT)) == (_S_IFREG))
+#endif /* S_ISREG */
+
+#ifndef S_ISLNK
+# define S_ISLNK(mode)	(((mode) & S_IFMT) == S_IFLNK)
+#endif /* S_ISLNK */
+
+#ifndef S_IXUSR
+# define S_IXUSR			0000100	/* execute/search permission, */
+# define S_IXGRP			0000010	/* execute/search permission, */
+# define S_IXOTH			0000001	/* execute/search permission, */
+# define _S_IWUSR			0000200	/* write permission, */
+# define S_IWUSR			_S_IWUSR	/* write permission, owner */
+# define S_IWGRP			0000020	/* write permission, group */
+# define S_IWOTH			0000002	/* write permission, other */
+# define S_IRUSR			0000400	/* read permission, owner */
+# define S_IRGRP			0000040	/* read permission, group */
+# define S_IROTH			0000004	/* read permission, other */
+# define S_IRWXU			0000700	/* read, write, execute */
+# define S_IRWXG			0000070	/* read, write, execute */
+# define S_IRWXO			0000007	/* read, write, execute */
+#endif /* S_IXUSR */
+
+#if !defined(MAP_ANON) && defined(MAP_ANONYMOUS)
+#define MAP_ANON MAP_ANONYMOUS
+#endif
+
+#ifndef MAP_FAILED
+# define MAP_FAILED ((void *)-1)
+#endif
+
+/*
+SCO Open Server 3 has INADDR_LOOPBACK defined in rpc/rpc.h but
+including rpc/rpc.h breaks Solaris 6
+*/
+#ifndef INADDR_LOOPBACK
+#define INADDR_LOOPBACK ((u_long)0x7f000001)
+#endif
+
+/* Types */
+
+/* If sys/types.h does not supply intXX_t, supply them ourselves */
+/* (or die trying) */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_U_INT
+typedef unsigned int u_int;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_INTXX_T
+typedef signed char int8_t;
+# if (SIZEOF_SHORT_INT == 2)
+typedef short int int16_t;
+# else
+#  ifdef _UNICOS
+#   if (SIZEOF_SHORT_INT == 4)
+typedef short int16_t;
+#   else
+typedef long  int16_t;
+#   endif
+#  else
+#   error "16 bit int type not found."
+#  endif /* _UNICOS */
+# endif
+# if (SIZEOF_INT == 4)
+typedef int int32_t;
+# else
+#  ifdef _UNICOS
+typedef long  int32_t;
+#  else
+#   error "32 bit int type not found."
+#  endif /* _UNICOS */
+# endif
+#endif
+
+/* If sys/types.h does not supply u_intXX_t, supply them ourselves */
+#ifndef HAVE_U_INTXX_T
+# ifdef HAVE_UINTXX_T
+typedef uint8_t u_int8_t;
+typedef uint16_t u_int16_t;
+typedef uint32_t u_int32_t;
+# define HAVE_U_INTXX_T 1
+# else
+typedef unsigned char u_int8_t;
+#  if (SIZEOF_SHORT_INT == 2)
+typedef unsigned short int u_int16_t;
+#  else
+#   ifdef _UNICOS
+#    if (SIZEOF_SHORT_INT == 4)
+typedef unsigned short u_int16_t;
+#    else
+typedef unsigned long  u_int16_t;
+#    endif
+#   else
+#    error "16 bit int type not found."
+#   endif
+#  endif
+#  if (SIZEOF_INT == 4)
+typedef unsigned int u_int32_t;
+#  else
+#   ifdef _UNICOS
+typedef unsigned long  u_int32_t;
+#   else
+#    error "32 bit int type not found."
+#   endif
+#  endif
+# endif
+#define __BIT_TYPES_DEFINED__
+#endif
+
+/* 64-bit types */
+#ifndef HAVE_INT64_T
+# if (SIZEOF_LONG_INT == 8)
+typedef long int int64_t;
+# else
+#  if (SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT == 8)
+typedef long long int int64_t;
+#  endif
+# endif
+#endif
+#ifndef HAVE_U_INT64_T
+# if (SIZEOF_LONG_INT == 8)
+typedef unsigned long int u_int64_t;
+# else
+#  if (SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT == 8)
+typedef unsigned long long int u_int64_t;
+#  endif
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_UINTXX_T
+typedef u_int8_t uint8_t;
+typedef u_int16_t uint16_t;
+typedef u_int32_t uint32_t;
+typedef u_int64_t uint64_t;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_INTMAX_T
+typedef long long intmax_t;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_UINTMAX_T
+typedef unsigned long long uintmax_t;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_U_CHAR
+typedef unsigned char u_char;
+# define HAVE_U_CHAR
+#endif /* HAVE_U_CHAR */
+
+#ifndef ULLONG_MAX
+# define ULLONG_MAX ((unsigned long long)-1)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef SIZE_T_MAX
+#define SIZE_T_MAX ULONG_MAX
+#endif /* SIZE_T_MAX */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SIZE_T
+typedef unsigned int size_t;
+# define HAVE_SIZE_T
+# define SIZE_T_MAX UINT_MAX
+#endif /* HAVE_SIZE_T */
+
+#ifndef SIZE_MAX
+#define SIZE_MAX SIZE_T_MAX
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SSIZE_T
+typedef int ssize_t;
+# define HAVE_SSIZE_T
+#endif /* HAVE_SSIZE_T */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_CLOCK_T
+typedef long clock_t;
+# define HAVE_CLOCK_T
+#endif /* HAVE_CLOCK_T */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T
+typedef int sa_family_t;
+# define HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T
+#endif /* HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_PID_T
+typedef int pid_t;
+# define HAVE_PID_T
+#endif /* HAVE_PID_T */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T
+typedef int sig_atomic_t;
+# define HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T
+#endif /* HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_MODE_T
+typedef int mode_t;
+# define HAVE_MODE_T
+#endif /* HAVE_MODE_T */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS) && defined(HAVE___SS_FAMILY_IN_SS)
+# define ss_family __ss_family
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS) && defined(HAVE_SA_FAMILY_IN_SS) */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SYS_UN_H
+struct	sockaddr_un {
+	short	sun_family;		/* AF_UNIX */
+	char	sun_path[108];		/* path name (gag) */
+};
+#endif /* HAVE_SYS_UN_H */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_IN_ADDR_T
+typedef u_int32_t	in_addr_t;
+#endif
+#ifndef HAVE_IN_PORT_T
+typedef u_int16_t	in_port_t;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(BROKEN_SYS_TERMIO_H) && !defined(_STRUCT_WINSIZE)
+#define _STRUCT_WINSIZE
+struct winsize {
+      unsigned short ws_row;          /* rows, in characters */
+      unsigned short ws_col;          /* columns, in character */
+      unsigned short ws_xpixel;       /* horizontal size, pixels */
+      unsigned short ws_ypixel;       /* vertical size, pixels */
+};
+#endif
+
+/* bits needed for select that may not be in the system headers */
+#ifndef HAVE_FD_MASK
+ typedef unsigned long int	fd_mask;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_NFDBITS) && HAVE_DECL_NFDBITS == 0
+# define	NFDBITS (8 * sizeof(unsigned long))
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_HOWMANY) && HAVE_DECL_HOWMANY == 0
+# define howmany(x,y)	(((x)+((y)-1))/(y))
+#endif
+
+/* Paths */
+
+#ifndef _PATH_BSHELL
+# define _PATH_BSHELL "/bin/sh"
+#endif
+
+#ifdef USER_PATH
+# ifdef _PATH_STDPATH
+#  undef _PATH_STDPATH
+# endif
+# define _PATH_STDPATH USER_PATH
+#endif
+
+#ifndef _PATH_STDPATH
+# define _PATH_STDPATH "/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin"
+#endif
+
+#ifndef SUPERUSER_PATH
+# define SUPERUSER_PATH	_PATH_STDPATH
+#endif
+
+#ifndef _PATH_DEVNULL
+# define _PATH_DEVNULL "/dev/null"
+#endif
+
+/* user may have set a different path */
+#if defined(_PATH_MAILDIR) && defined(MAIL_DIRECTORY)
+# undef _PATH_MAILDIR
+#endif /* defined(_PATH_MAILDIR) && defined(MAIL_DIRECTORY) */
+
+#ifdef MAIL_DIRECTORY
+# define _PATH_MAILDIR MAIL_DIRECTORY
+#endif
+
+#ifndef _PATH_NOLOGIN
+# define _PATH_NOLOGIN "/etc/nologin"
+#endif
+
+/* Define this to be the path of the xauth program. */
+#ifdef XAUTH_PATH
+#define _PATH_XAUTH XAUTH_PATH
+#endif /* XAUTH_PATH */
+
+/* derived from XF4/xc/lib/dps/Xlibnet.h */
+#ifndef X_UNIX_PATH
+#  ifdef __hpux
+#    define X_UNIX_PATH "/var/spool/sockets/X11/%u"
+#  else
+#    define X_UNIX_PATH "/tmp/.X11-unix/X%u"
+#  endif
+#endif /* X_UNIX_PATH */
+#define _PATH_UNIX_X X_UNIX_PATH
+
+#ifndef _PATH_TTY
+# define _PATH_TTY "/dev/tty"
+#endif
+
+/* Macros */
+
+#if defined(HAVE_LOGIN_GETCAPBOOL) && defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H)
+# define HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+#endif
+
+#ifndef MAX
+# define MAX(a,b) (((a)>(b))?(a):(b))
+# define MIN(a,b) (((a)<(b))?(a):(b))
+#endif
+
+#ifndef roundup
+# define roundup(x, y)   ((((x)+((y)-1))/(y))*(y))
+#endif
+
+#ifndef timersub
+#define timersub(a, b, result)					\
+   do {								\
+      (result)->tv_sec = (a)->tv_sec - (b)->tv_sec;		\
+      (result)->tv_usec = (a)->tv_usec - (b)->tv_usec;		\
+      if ((result)->tv_usec < 0) {				\
+	 --(result)->tv_sec;					\
+	 (result)->tv_usec += 1000000;				\
+      }								\
+   } while (0)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC
+#define	TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC(tv, ts) {					\
+	(ts)->tv_sec = (tv)->tv_sec;					\
+	(ts)->tv_nsec = (tv)->tv_usec * 1000;				\
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef TIMESPEC_TO_TIMEVAL
+#define	TIMESPEC_TO_TIMEVAL(tv, ts) {					\
+	(tv)->tv_sec = (ts)->tv_sec;					\
+	(tv)->tv_usec = (ts)->tv_nsec / 1000;				\
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef __P
+# define __P(x) x
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED)
+# define IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(a) \
+	((((u_int32_t *) (a))[0] == 0) && (((u_int32_t *) (a))[1] == 0) && \
+	 (((u_int32_t *) (a))[2] == htonl (0xffff)))
+#endif /* !defined(IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED) */
+
+#if !defined(__GNUC__) || (__GNUC__ < 2)
+# define __attribute__(x)
+#endif /* !defined(__GNUC__) || (__GNUC__ < 2) */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__SENTINEL__) && !defined(__sentinel__)
+# define __sentinel__
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__BOUNDED__) && !defined(__bounded__)
+# define __bounded__(x, y, z)
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__NONNULL__) && !defined(__nonnull__)
+# define __nonnull__(x)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OSSH_ALIGNBYTES
+#define OSSH_ALIGNBYTES	(sizeof(int) - 1)
+#endif
+#ifndef __CMSG_ALIGN
+#define	__CMSG_ALIGN(p) (((u_int)(p) + OSSH_ALIGNBYTES) &~ OSSH_ALIGNBYTES)
+#endif
+
+/* Length of the contents of a control message of length len */
+#ifndef CMSG_LEN
+#define	CMSG_LEN(len)	(__CMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) + (len))
+#endif
+
+/* Length of the space taken up by a padded control message of length len */
+#ifndef CMSG_SPACE
+#define	CMSG_SPACE(len)	(__CMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) + __CMSG_ALIGN(len))
+#endif
+
+/* given pointer to struct cmsghdr, return pointer to data */
+#ifndef CMSG_DATA
+#define CMSG_DATA(cmsg) ((u_char *)(cmsg) + __CMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct cmsghdr)))
+#endif /* CMSG_DATA */
+
+/*
+ * RFC 2292 requires to check msg_controllen, in case that the kernel returns
+ * an empty list for some reasons.
+ */
+#ifndef CMSG_FIRSTHDR
+#define CMSG_FIRSTHDR(mhdr) \
+	((mhdr)->msg_controllen >= sizeof(struct cmsghdr) ? \
+	 (struct cmsghdr *)(mhdr)->msg_control : \
+	 (struct cmsghdr *)NULL)
+#endif /* CMSG_FIRSTHDR */
+
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_OFFSETOF) && HAVE_DECL_OFFSETOF == 0
+# define offsetof(type, member) ((size_t) &((type *)0)->member)
+#endif
+
+/* Set up BSD-style BYTE_ORDER definition if it isn't there already */
+/* XXX: doesn't try to cope with strange byte orders (PDP_ENDIAN) */
+#ifndef BYTE_ORDER
+# ifndef LITTLE_ENDIAN
+#  define LITTLE_ENDIAN  1234
+# endif /* LITTLE_ENDIAN */
+# ifndef BIG_ENDIAN
+#  define BIG_ENDIAN     4321
+# endif /* BIG_ENDIAN */
+# ifdef WORDS_BIGENDIAN
+#  define BYTE_ORDER BIG_ENDIAN
+# else /* WORDS_BIGENDIAN */
+#  define BYTE_ORDER LITTLE_ENDIAN
+# endif /* WORDS_BIGENDIAN */
+#endif /* BYTE_ORDER */
+
+/* Function replacement / compatibility hacks */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_GETADDRINFO) && (defined(HAVE_OGETADDRINFO) || defined(HAVE_NGETADDRINFO))
+# define HAVE_GETADDRINFO
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET
+# undef getopt
+# undef opterr
+# undef optind
+# undef optopt
+# undef optreset
+# undef optarg
+# define getopt(ac, av, o)  BSDgetopt(ac, av, o)
+# define opterr             BSDopterr
+# define optind             BSDoptind
+# define optopt             BSDoptopt
+# define optreset           BSDoptreset
+# define optarg             BSDoptarg
+#endif
+
+#if defined(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO) && defined(HAVE_GETADDRINFO)
+# undef HAVE_GETADDRINFO
+#endif
+#if defined(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO) && defined(HAVE_FREEADDRINFO)
+# undef HAVE_FREEADDRINFO
+#endif
+#if defined(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO) && defined(HAVE_GAI_STRERROR)
+# undef HAVE_GAI_STRERROR
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_GETADDRINFO)
+# if defined(HAVE_DECL_AI_NUMERICSERV) && HAVE_DECL_AI_NUMERICSERV == 0
+#   define AI_NUMERICSERV	0
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined(BROKEN_UPDWTMPX) && defined(HAVE_UPDWTMPX)
+# undef HAVE_UPDWTMPX
+#endif
+
+#if defined(BROKEN_SHADOW_EXPIRE) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE)
+# undef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT) && \
+    defined(SYSLOG_R_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND)
+# define DO_LOG_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_MEMMOVE) && defined(HAVE_BCOPY)
+# define memmove(s1, s2, n) bcopy((s2), (s1), (n))
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_MEMMOVE) && defined(HAVE_BCOPY) */
+
+#ifndef GETPGRP_VOID
+# include <unistd.h>
+# define getpgrp() getpgrp(0)
+#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_BSM_AUDIT
+# define SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+# define CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_LINUX_AUDIT
+# define SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+# define CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(HAVE___func__) && defined(HAVE___FUNCTION__)
+#  define __func__ __FUNCTION__
+#elif !defined(HAVE___func__)
+#  define __func__ ""
+#endif
+
+#if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
+#  define krb5_get_err_text(context,code) error_message(code)
+#endif
+
+#if defined(SKEYCHALLENGE_4ARG)
+# define _compat_skeychallenge(a,b,c,d) skeychallenge(a,b,c,d)
+#else
+# define _compat_skeychallenge(a,b,c,d) skeychallenge(a,b,c)
+#endif
+
+/* Maximum number of file descriptors available */
+#ifdef HAVE_SYSCONF
+# define SSH_SYSFDMAX sysconf(_SC_OPEN_MAX)
+#else
+# define SSH_SYSFDMAX 10000
+#endif
+
+#ifdef FSID_HAS_VAL
+/* encode f_fsid into a 64 bit value  */
+#define FSID_TO_ULONG(f) \
+	((((u_int64_t)(f).val[0] & 0xffffffffUL) << 32) | \
+	    ((f).val[1] & 0xffffffffUL))
+#elif defined(FSID_HAS___VAL)
+#define FSID_TO_ULONG(f) \
+	((((u_int64_t)(f).__val[0] & 0xffffffffUL) << 32) | \
+	    ((f).__val[1] & 0xffffffffUL))
+#else
+# define FSID_TO_ULONG(f) ((f))
+#endif
+
+#if defined(__Lynx__)
+ /*
+  * LynxOS defines these in param.h which we do not want to include since
+  * it will also pull in a bunch of kernel definitions.
+  */
+# define ALIGNBYTES (sizeof(int) - 1)
+# define ALIGN(p) (((unsigned)p + ALIGNBYTES) & ~ALIGNBYTES)
+  /* Missing prototypes on LynxOS */
+  int snprintf (char *, size_t, const char *, ...);
+  int mkstemp (char *);
+  char *crypt (const char *, const char *);
+  int seteuid (uid_t);
+  int setegid (gid_t);
+  char *mkdtemp (char *);
+  int rresvport_af (int *, sa_family_t);
+  int innetgr (const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Define this to use pipes instead of socketpairs for communicating with the
+ * client program.  Socketpairs do not seem to work on all systems.
+ *
+ * configure.ac sets this for a few OS's which are known to have problems
+ * but you may need to set it yourself
+ */
+/* #define USE_PIPES 1 */
+
+/**
+ ** login recorder definitions
+ **/
+
+/* FIXME: put default paths back in */
+#ifndef UTMP_FILE
+#  ifdef _PATH_UTMP
+#    define UTMP_FILE _PATH_UTMP
+#  else
+#    ifdef CONF_UTMP_FILE
+#      define UTMP_FILE CONF_UTMP_FILE
+#    endif
+#  endif
+#endif
+#ifndef WTMP_FILE
+#  ifdef _PATH_WTMP
+#    define WTMP_FILE _PATH_WTMP
+#  else
+#    ifdef CONF_WTMP_FILE
+#      define WTMP_FILE CONF_WTMP_FILE
+#    endif
+#  endif
+#endif
+/* pick up the user's location for lastlog if given */
+#ifndef LASTLOG_FILE
+#  ifdef _PATH_LASTLOG
+#    define LASTLOG_FILE _PATH_LASTLOG
+#  else
+#    ifdef CONF_LASTLOG_FILE
+#      define LASTLOG_FILE CONF_LASTLOG_FILE
+#    endif
+#  endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW)
+# define USE_SHADOW
+#endif
+
+/* The login() library function in libutil is first choice */
+#if defined(HAVE_LOGIN) && !defined(DISABLE_LOGIN)
+#  define USE_LOGIN
+
+#else
+/* Simply select your favourite login types. */
+/* Can't do if-else because some systems use several... <sigh> */
+#  if !defined(DISABLE_UTMPX)
+#    define USE_UTMPX
+#  endif
+#  if defined(UTMP_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_UTMP)
+#    define USE_UTMP
+#  endif
+#  if defined(WTMPX_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_WTMPX)
+#    define USE_WTMPX
+#  endif
+#  if defined(WTMP_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_WTMP)
+#    define USE_WTMP
+#  endif
+
+#endif
+
+#ifndef UT_LINESIZE
+# define UT_LINESIZE 8
+#endif
+
+/* I hope that the presence of LASTLOG_FILE is enough to detect this */
+#if defined(LASTLOG_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_LASTLOG)
+#  define USE_LASTLOG
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_OSF_SIA
+# ifdef USE_SHADOW
+#  undef USE_SHADOW
+# endif
+# define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_PASSWD 1
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF) && defined(HAVE_SET_ID) && !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
+# define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_PASSWD 1
+#endif
+#if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF) && defined(HAVE_SET_ID) && !defined(BROKEN_LIBIAF)
+# define USE_LIBIAF
+#endif
+
+/* HP-UX 11.11 */
+#ifdef BTMP_FILE
+# define _PATH_BTMP BTMP_FILE
+#endif
+
+#if defined(USE_BTMP) && defined(_PATH_BTMP)
+# define CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
+#endif
+
+/** end of login recorder definitions */
+
+#ifdef BROKEN_GETGROUPS
+# define getgroups(a,b) ((a)==0 && (b)==NULL ? NGROUPS_MAX : getgroups((a),(b)))
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_MMAP) && defined(BROKEN_MMAP)
+# undef HAVE_MMAP
+#endif
+
+#ifndef IOV_MAX
+# if defined(_XOPEN_IOV_MAX)
+#  define	IOV_MAX		_XOPEN_IOV_MAX
+# elif defined(DEF_IOV_MAX)
+#  define	IOV_MAX		DEF_IOV_MAX
+# else
+#  define	IOV_MAX		16
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#ifndef EWOULDBLOCK
+# define EWOULDBLOCK EAGAIN
+#endif
+
+#ifndef INET6_ADDRSTRLEN	/* for non IPv6 machines */
+#define INET6_ADDRSTRLEN 46
+#endif
+
+#ifndef SSH_IOBUFSZ
+# define SSH_IOBUFSZ 8192
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Platforms that have arc4random_uniform() and not arc4random_stir()
+ * shouldn't need the latter.
+ */
+#if defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM) && defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM) && \
+    !defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_STIR)
+# define arc4random_stir()
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_VA_COPY
+# ifdef HAVE___VA_COPY
+#  define va_copy(dest, src) __va_copy(dest, src)
+# else
+#  define va_copy(dest, src) (dest) = (src)
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#ifndef __predict_true
+# if defined(__GNUC__) && \
+     ((__GNUC__ > (2)) || (__GNUC__ == (2) && __GNUC_MINOR__ >= (96)))
+#  define __predict_true(exp)     __builtin_expect(((exp) != 0), 1)
+#  define __predict_false(exp)    __builtin_expect(((exp) != 0), 0)
+# else
+#  define __predict_true(exp)     ((exp) != 0)
+#  define __predict_false(exp)    ((exp) != 0)
+# endif /* gcc version */
+#endif /* __predict_true */
+
+#endif /* _DEFINES_H */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/entropy.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/entropy.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9305f89ae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/entropy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,244 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H
+# include <sys/un.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stddef.h> /* for offsetof */
+
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+
+/*
+ * Portable OpenSSH PRNG seeding:
+ * If OpenSSL has not "internally seeded" itself (e.g. pulled data from
+ * /dev/random), then collect RANDOM_SEED_SIZE bytes of randomness from
+ * PRNGd.
+ */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
+
+#define RANDOM_SEED_SIZE 48
+
+/*
+ * Collect 'len' bytes of entropy into 'buf' from PRNGD/EGD daemon
+ * listening either on 'tcp_port', or via Unix domain socket at *
+ * 'socket_path'.
+ * Either a non-zero tcp_port or a non-null socket_path must be
+ * supplied.
+ * Returns 0 on success, -1 on error
+ */
+int
+get_random_bytes_prngd(unsigned char *buf, int len,
+    unsigned short tcp_port, char *socket_path)
+{
+	int fd, addr_len, rval, errors;
+	u_char msg[2];
+	struct sockaddr_storage addr;
+	struct sockaddr_in *addr_in = (struct sockaddr_in *)&addr;
+	struct sockaddr_un *addr_un = (struct sockaddr_un *)&addr;
+	mysig_t old_sigpipe;
+
+	/* Sanity checks */
+	if (socket_path == NULL && tcp_port == 0)
+		fatal("You must specify a port or a socket");
+	if (socket_path != NULL &&
+	    strlen(socket_path) >= sizeof(addr_un->sun_path))
+		fatal("Random pool path is too long");
+	if (len <= 0 || len > 255)
+		fatal("Too many bytes (%d) to read from PRNGD", len);
+
+	memset(&addr, '\0', sizeof(addr));
+
+	if (tcp_port != 0) {
+		addr_in->sin_family = AF_INET;
+		addr_in->sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_LOOPBACK);
+		addr_in->sin_port = htons(tcp_port);
+		addr_len = sizeof(*addr_in);
+	} else {
+		addr_un->sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+		strlcpy(addr_un->sun_path, socket_path,
+		    sizeof(addr_un->sun_path));
+		addr_len = offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) +
+		    strlen(socket_path) + 1;
+	}
+
+	old_sigpipe = mysignal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+
+	errors = 0;
+	rval = -1;
+reopen:
+	fd = socket(addr.ss_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+	if (fd == -1) {
+		error("Couldn't create socket: %s", strerror(errno));
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	if (connect(fd, (struct sockaddr*)&addr, addr_len) == -1) {
+		if (tcp_port != 0) {
+			error("Couldn't connect to PRNGD port %d: %s",
+			    tcp_port, strerror(errno));
+		} else {
+			error("Couldn't connect to PRNGD socket \"%s\": %s",
+			    addr_un->sun_path, strerror(errno));
+		}
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	/* Send blocking read request to PRNGD */
+	msg[0] = 0x02;
+	msg[1] = len;
+
+	if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, msg, sizeof(msg)) != sizeof(msg)) {
+		if (errno == EPIPE && errors < 10) {
+			close(fd);
+			errors++;
+			goto reopen;
+		}
+		error("Couldn't write to PRNGD socket: %s",
+		    strerror(errno));
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	if (atomicio(read, fd, buf, len) != (size_t)len) {
+		if (errno == EPIPE && errors < 10) {
+			close(fd);
+			errors++;
+			goto reopen;
+		}
+		error("Couldn't read from PRNGD socket: %s",
+		    strerror(errno));
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	rval = 0;
+done:
+	mysignal(SIGPIPE, old_sigpipe);
+	if (fd != -1)
+		close(fd);
+	return rval;
+}
+
+static int
+seed_from_prngd(unsigned char *buf, size_t bytes)
+{
+#ifdef PRNGD_PORT
+	debug("trying egd/prngd port %d", PRNGD_PORT);
+	if (get_random_bytes_prngd(buf, bytes, PRNGD_PORT, NULL) == 0)
+		return 0;
+#endif
+#ifdef PRNGD_SOCKET
+	debug("trying egd/prngd socket %s", PRNGD_SOCKET);
+	if (get_random_bytes_prngd(buf, bytes, 0, PRNGD_SOCKET) == 0)
+		return 0;
+#endif
+	return -1;
+}
+
+void
+rexec_send_rng_seed(Buffer *m)
+{
+	u_char buf[RANDOM_SEED_SIZE];
+
+	if (RAND_bytes(buf, sizeof(buf)) <= 0) {
+		error("Couldn't obtain random bytes (error %ld)",
+		    ERR_get_error());
+		buffer_put_string(m, "", 0);
+	} else 
+		buffer_put_string(m, buf, sizeof(buf));
+}
+
+void
+rexec_recv_rng_seed(Buffer *m)
+{
+	u_char *buf;
+	u_int len;
+
+	buf = buffer_get_string_ret(m, &len);
+	if (buf != NULL) {
+		debug3("rexec_recv_rng_seed: seeding rng with %u bytes", len);
+		RAND_add(buf, len, len);
+	}
+}
+#endif /* OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY */
+
+void
+seed_rng(void)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
+	unsigned char buf[RANDOM_SEED_SIZE];
+#endif
+	if (!ssh_compatible_openssl(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, SSLeay()))
+		fatal("OpenSSL version mismatch. Built against %lx, you "
+		    "have %lx", (u_long)OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, SSLeay());
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
+	if (RAND_status() == 1) {
+		debug3("RNG is ready, skipping seeding");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (seed_from_prngd(buf, sizeof(buf)) == -1)
+		fatal("Could not obtain seed from PRNGd");
+	RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), sizeof(buf));
+	memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf));
+
+#endif /* OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY */
+	if (RAND_status() != 1)
+		fatal("PRNG is not seeded");
+}
+
+#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+/* Handled in arc4random() */
+void
+seed_rng(void)
+{
+}
+
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/entropy.h b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/entropy.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c3d78dbad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/entropy.h
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2000 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* $Id: entropy.h,v 1.6 2011/09/09 01:29:41 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+#ifndef _RANDOMS_H
+#define _RANDOMS_H
+
+#include "buffer.h"
+
+void seed_rng(void);
+
+void rexec_send_rng_seed(Buffer *);
+void rexec_recv_rng_seed(Buffer *);
+
+#endif /* _RANDOMS_H */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/explicit_bzero.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/explicit_bzero.c
new file mode 120000
index 000000000..5efce3f43
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/explicit_bzero.c
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+openbsd-compat/explicit_bzero.c
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/loginrec.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/loginrec.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..94ae81dc6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/loginrec.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1726 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Andre Lucas.  All rights reserved.
+ * Portions copyright (c) 1998 Todd C. Miller
+ * Portions copyright (c) 1996 Jason Downs
+ * Portions copyright (c) 1996 Theo de Raadt
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * The btmp logging code is derived from login.c from util-linux and is under
+ * the the following license:
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 1980, 1987, 1988 The Regents of the University of California.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms are permitted
+ * provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
+ * duplicated in all such forms and that any documentation,
+ * advertising materials, and other materials related to such
+ * distribution and use acknowledge that the software was developed
+ * by the University of California, Berkeley.  The name of the
+ * University may not be used to endorse or promote products derived
+ * from this software without specific prior written permission.
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, THE IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
+ */
+
+
+/**
+ ** loginrec.c:  platform-independent login recording and lastlog retrieval
+ **/
+
+/*
+ *  The new login code explained
+ *  ============================
+ *
+ *  This code attempts to provide a common interface to login recording
+ *  (utmp and friends) and last login time retrieval.
+ *
+ *  Its primary means of achieving this is to use 'struct logininfo', a
+ *  union of all the useful fields in the various different types of
+ *  system login record structures one finds on UNIX variants.
+ *
+ *  We depend on autoconf to define which recording methods are to be
+ *  used, and which fields are contained in the relevant data structures
+ *  on the local system. Many C preprocessor symbols affect which code
+ *  gets compiled here.
+ *
+ *  The code is designed to make it easy to modify a particular
+ *  recording method, without affecting other methods nor requiring so
+ *  many nested conditional compilation blocks as were commonplace in
+ *  the old code.
+ *
+ *  For login recording, we try to use the local system's libraries as
+ *  these are clearly most likely to work correctly. For utmp systems
+ *  this usually means login() and logout() or setutent() etc., probably
+ *  in libutil, along with logwtmp() etc. On these systems, we fall back
+ *  to writing the files directly if we have to, though this method
+ *  requires very thorough testing so we do not corrupt local auditing
+ *  information. These files and their access methods are very system
+ *  specific indeed.
+ *
+ *  For utmpx systems, the corresponding library functions are
+ *  setutxent() etc. To the author's knowledge, all utmpx systems have
+ *  these library functions and so no direct write is attempted. If such
+ *  a system exists and needs support, direct analogues of the [uw]tmp
+ *  code should suffice.
+ *
+ *  Retrieving the time of last login ('lastlog') is in some ways even
+ *  more problemmatic than login recording. Some systems provide a
+ *  simple table of all users which we seek based on uid and retrieve a
+ *  relatively standard structure. Others record the same information in
+ *  a directory with a separate file, and others don't record the
+ *  information separately at all. For systems in the latter category,
+ *  we look backwards in the wtmp or wtmpx file for the last login entry
+ *  for our user. Naturally this is slower and on busy systems could
+ *  incur a significant performance penalty.
+ *
+ *  Calling the new code
+ *  --------------------
+ *
+ *  In OpenSSH all login recording and retrieval is performed in
+ *  login.c. Here you'll find working examples. Also, in the logintest.c
+ *  program there are more examples.
+ *
+ *  Internal handler calling method
+ *  -------------------------------
+ *
+ *  When a call is made to login_login() or login_logout(), both
+ *  routines set a struct logininfo flag defining which action (log in,
+ *  or log out) is to be taken. They both then call login_write(), which
+ *  calls whichever of the many structure-specific handlers autoconf
+ *  selects for the local system.
+ *
+ *  The handlers themselves handle system data structure specifics. Both
+ *  struct utmp and struct utmpx have utility functions (see
+ *  construct_utmp*()) to try to make it simpler to add extra systems
+ *  that introduce new features to either structure.
+ *
+ *  While it may seem terribly wasteful to replicate so much similar
+ *  code for each method, experience has shown that maintaining code to
+ *  write both struct utmp and utmpx in one function, whilst maintaining
+ *  support for all systems whether they have library support or not, is
+ *  a difficult and time-consuming task.
+ *
+ *  Lastlog support proceeds similarly. Functions login_get_lastlog()
+ *  (and its OpenSSH-tuned friend login_get_lastlog_time()) call
+ *  getlast_entry(), which tries one of three methods to find the last
+ *  login time. It uses local system lastlog support if it can,
+ *  otherwise it tries wtmp or wtmpx before giving up and returning 0,
+ *  meaning "tilt".
+ *
+ *  Maintenance
+ *  -----------
+ *
+ *  In many cases it's possible to tweak autoconf to select the correct
+ *  methods for a particular platform, either by improving the detection
+ *  code (best), or by presetting DISABLE_<method> or CONF_<method>_FILE
+ *  symbols for the platform.
+ *
+ *  Use logintest to check which symbols are defined before modifying
+ *  configure.ac and loginrec.c. (You have to build logintest yourself
+ *  with 'make logintest' as it's not built by default.)
+ *
+ *  Otherwise, patches to the specific method(s) are very helpful!
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "loginrec.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+
+#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
+# include <util.h>
+#endif
+
+/**
+ ** prototypes for helper functions in this file
+ **/
+
+#if HAVE_UTMP_H
+void set_utmp_time(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut);
+void construct_utmp(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H
+void set_utmpx_time(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *ut);
+void construct_utmpx(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *ut);
+#endif
+
+int utmp_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+int utmpx_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+int wtmp_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+int wtmpx_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+int lastlog_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+int syslogin_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+
+int getlast_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+int lastlog_get_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+int utmpx_get_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+int wtmp_get_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+int wtmpx_get_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+
+extern Buffer loginmsg;
+
+/* pick the shortest string */
+#define MIN_SIZEOF(s1,s2) (sizeof(s1) < sizeof(s2) ? sizeof(s1) : sizeof(s2))
+
+/**
+ ** platform-independent login functions
+ **/
+
+/*
+ * login_login(struct logininfo *) - Record a login
+ *
+ * Call with a pointer to a struct logininfo initialised with
+ * login_init_entry() or login_alloc_entry()
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *  >0 if successful
+ *  0  on failure (will use OpenSSH's logging facilities for diagnostics)
+ */
+int
+login_login(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	li->type = LTYPE_LOGIN;
+	return (login_write(li));
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * login_logout(struct logininfo *) - Record a logout
+ *
+ * Call as with login_login()
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *  >0 if successful
+ *  0  on failure (will use OpenSSH's logging facilities for diagnostics)
+ */
+int
+login_logout(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	li->type = LTYPE_LOGOUT;
+	return (login_write(li));
+}
+
+/*
+ * login_get_lastlog_time(int) - Retrieve the last login time
+ *
+ * Retrieve the last login time for the given uid. Will try to use the
+ * system lastlog facilities if they are available, but will fall back
+ * to looking in wtmp/wtmpx if necessary
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *   0 on failure, or if user has never logged in
+ *   Time in seconds from the epoch if successful
+ *
+ * Useful preprocessor symbols:
+ *   DISABLE_LASTLOG: If set, *never* even try to retrieve lastlog
+ *                    info
+ *   USE_LASTLOG: If set, indicates the presence of system lastlog
+ *                facilities. If this and DISABLE_LASTLOG are not set,
+ *                try to retrieve lastlog information from wtmp/wtmpx.
+ */
+unsigned int
+login_get_lastlog_time(const uid_t uid)
+{
+	struct logininfo li;
+
+	if (login_get_lastlog(&li, uid))
+		return (li.tv_sec);
+	else
+		return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * login_get_lastlog(struct logininfo *, int)   - Retrieve a lastlog entry
+ *
+ * Retrieve a logininfo structure populated (only partially) with
+ * information from the system lastlog data, or from wtmp/wtmpx if no
+ * system lastlog information exists.
+ *
+ * Note this routine must be given a pre-allocated logininfo.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *  >0: A pointer to your struct logininfo if successful
+ *  0  on failure (will use OpenSSH's logging facilities for diagnostics)
+ */
+struct logininfo *
+login_get_lastlog(struct logininfo *li, const uid_t uid)
+{
+	struct passwd *pw;
+
+	memset(li, '\0', sizeof(*li));
+	li->uid = uid;
+
+	/*
+	 * If we don't have a 'real' lastlog, we need the username to
+	 * reliably search wtmp(x) for the last login (see
+	 * wtmp_get_entry().)
+	 */
+	pw = getpwuid(uid);
+	if (pw == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: Cannot find account for uid %ld", __func__,
+		    (long)uid);
+
+	if (strlcpy(li->username, pw->pw_name, sizeof(li->username)) >=
+	    sizeof(li->username)) {
+		error("%s: username too long (%lu > max %lu)", __func__,
+		    (unsigned long)strlen(pw->pw_name),
+		    (unsigned long)sizeof(li->username) - 1);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (getlast_entry(li))
+		return (li);
+	else
+		return (NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * login_alloc_entry(int, char*, char*, char*)    - Allocate and initialise
+ *                                                  a logininfo structure
+ *
+ * This function creates a new struct logininfo, a data structure
+ * meant to carry the information required to portably record login info.
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to a newly created struct logininfo. If memory
+ * allocation fails, the program halts.
+ */
+struct
+logininfo *login_alloc_entry(pid_t pid, const char *username,
+    const char *hostname, const char *line)
+{
+	struct logininfo *newli;
+
+	newli = xmalloc(sizeof(*newli));
+	login_init_entry(newli, pid, username, hostname, line);
+	return (newli);
+}
+
+
+/* login_free_entry(struct logininfo *)    - free struct memory */
+void
+login_free_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	free(li);
+}
+
+
+/* login_init_entry(struct logininfo *, int, char*, char*, char*)
+ *                                        - initialise a struct logininfo
+ *
+ * Populates a new struct logininfo, a data structure meant to carry
+ * the information required to portably record login info.
+ *
+ * Returns: 1
+ */
+int
+login_init_entry(struct logininfo *li, pid_t pid, const char *username,
+    const char *hostname, const char *line)
+{
+	struct passwd *pw;
+
+	memset(li, 0, sizeof(*li));
+
+	li->pid = pid;
+
+	/* set the line information */
+	if (line)
+		line_fullname(li->line, line, sizeof(li->line));
+
+	if (username) {
+		strlcpy(li->username, username, sizeof(li->username));
+		pw = getpwnam(li->username);
+		if (pw == NULL) {
+			fatal("%s: Cannot find user \"%s\"", __func__,
+			    li->username);
+		}
+		li->uid = pw->pw_uid;
+	}
+
+	if (hostname)
+		strlcpy(li->hostname, hostname, sizeof(li->hostname));
+
+	return (1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * login_set_current_time(struct logininfo *)    - set the current time
+ *
+ * Set the current time in a logininfo structure. This function is
+ * meant to eliminate the need to deal with system dependencies for
+ * time handling.
+ */
+void
+login_set_current_time(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	struct timeval tv;
+
+	gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
+
+	li->tv_sec = tv.tv_sec;
+	li->tv_usec = tv.tv_usec;
+}
+
+/* copy a sockaddr_* into our logininfo */
+void
+login_set_addr(struct logininfo *li, const struct sockaddr *sa,
+    const unsigned int sa_size)
+{
+	unsigned int bufsize = sa_size;
+
+	/* make sure we don't overrun our union */
+	if (sizeof(li->hostaddr) < sa_size)
+		bufsize = sizeof(li->hostaddr);
+
+	memcpy(&li->hostaddr.sa, sa, bufsize);
+}
+
+
+/**
+ ** login_write: Call low-level recording functions based on autoconf
+ ** results
+ **/
+int
+login_write(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
+	if (geteuid() != 0) {
+		logit("Attempt to write login records by non-root user (aborting)");
+		return (1);
+	}
+#endif
+
+	/* set the timestamp */
+	login_set_current_time(li);
+#ifdef USE_LOGIN
+	syslogin_write_entry(li);
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_LASTLOG
+	if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGIN)
+		lastlog_write_entry(li);
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_UTMP
+	utmp_write_entry(li);
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_WTMP
+	wtmp_write_entry(li);
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_UTMPX
+	utmpx_write_entry(li);
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_WTMPX
+	wtmpx_write_entry(li);
+#endif
+#ifdef CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_RECORD_LOGIN
+	if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGIN &&
+	    !sys_auth_record_login(li->username,li->hostname,li->line,
+	    &loginmsg))
+		logit("Writing login record failed for %s", li->username);
+#endif
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+	if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGIN)
+		audit_session_open(li);
+	else if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGOUT)
+		audit_session_close(li);
+#endif
+	return (0);
+}
+
+#ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
+int
+login_utmp_only(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	li->type = LTYPE_LOGIN;
+	login_set_current_time(li);
+# ifdef USE_UTMP
+	utmp_write_entry(li);
+# endif
+# ifdef USE_WTMP
+	wtmp_write_entry(li);
+# endif
+# ifdef USE_UTMPX
+	utmpx_write_entry(li);
+# endif
+# ifdef USE_WTMPX
+	wtmpx_write_entry(li);
+# endif
+	return (0);
+}
+#endif
+
+/**
+ ** getlast_entry: Call low-level functions to retrieve the last login
+ **                time.
+ **/
+
+/* take the uid in li and return the last login time */
+int
+getlast_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+#ifdef USE_LASTLOG
+	return(lastlog_get_entry(li));
+#else /* !USE_LASTLOG */
+#if defined(USE_UTMPX) && defined(HAVE_SETUTXDB) && \
+    defined(UTXDB_LASTLOGIN) && defined(HAVE_GETUTXUSER)
+	return (utmpx_get_entry(li));
+#endif
+
+#if defined(DISABLE_LASTLOG)
+	/* On some systems we shouldn't even try to obtain last login
+	 * time, e.g. AIX */
+	return (0);
+# elif defined(USE_WTMP) && \
+    (defined(HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP) || defined(HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP))
+	/* retrieve last login time from utmp */
+	return (wtmp_get_entry(li));
+# elif defined(USE_WTMPX) && \
+    (defined(HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX) || defined(HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX))
+	/* If wtmp isn't available, try wtmpx */
+	return (wtmpx_get_entry(li));
+# else
+	/* Give up: No means of retrieving last login time */
+	return (0);
+# endif /* DISABLE_LASTLOG */
+#endif /* USE_LASTLOG */
+}
+
+
+
+/*
+ * 'line' string utility functions
+ *
+ * These functions process the 'line' string into one of three forms:
+ *
+ * 1. The full filename (including '/dev')
+ * 2. The stripped name (excluding '/dev')
+ * 3. The abbreviated name (e.g. /dev/ttyp00 -> yp00
+ *                               /dev/pts/1  -> ts/1 )
+ *
+ * Form 3 is used on some systems to identify a .tmp.? entry when
+ * attempting to remove it. Typically both addition and removal is
+ * performed by one application - say, sshd - so as long as the choice
+ * uniquely identifies a terminal it's ok.
+ */
+
+
+/*
+ * line_fullname(): add the leading '/dev/' if it doesn't exist make
+ * sure dst has enough space, if not just copy src (ugh)
+ */
+char *
+line_fullname(char *dst, const char *src, u_int dstsize)
+{
+	memset(dst, '\0', dstsize);
+	if ((strncmp(src, "/dev/", 5) == 0) || (dstsize < (strlen(src) + 5)))
+		strlcpy(dst, src, dstsize);
+	else {
+		strlcpy(dst, "/dev/", dstsize);
+		strlcat(dst, src, dstsize);
+	}
+	return (dst);
+}
+
+/* line_stripname(): strip the leading '/dev' if it exists, return dst */
+char *
+line_stripname(char *dst, const char *src, int dstsize)
+{
+	memset(dst, '\0', dstsize);
+	if (strncmp(src, "/dev/", 5) == 0)
+		strlcpy(dst, src + 5, dstsize);
+	else
+		strlcpy(dst, src, dstsize);
+	return (dst);
+}
+
+/*
+ * line_abbrevname(): Return the abbreviated (usually four-character)
+ * form of the line (Just use the last <dstsize> characters of the
+ * full name.)
+ *
+ * NOTE: use strncpy because we do NOT necessarily want zero
+ * termination
+ */
+char *
+line_abbrevname(char *dst, const char *src, int dstsize)
+{
+	size_t len;
+
+	memset(dst, '\0', dstsize);
+
+	/* Always skip prefix if present */
+	if (strncmp(src, "/dev/", 5) == 0)
+		src += 5;
+
+#ifdef WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY
+	if (strncmp(src, "tty", 3) == 0)
+		src += 3;
+#endif
+
+	len = strlen(src);
+
+	if (len > 0) {
+		if (((int)len - dstsize) > 0)
+			src +=  ((int)len - dstsize);
+
+		/* note: _don't_ change this to strlcpy */
+		strncpy(dst, src, (size_t)dstsize);
+	}
+
+	return (dst);
+}
+
+/**
+ ** utmp utility functions
+ **
+ ** These functions manipulate struct utmp, taking system differences
+ ** into account.
+ **/
+
+#if defined(USE_UTMP) || defined (USE_WTMP) || defined (USE_LOGIN)
+
+/* build the utmp structure */
+void
+set_utmp_time(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut)
+{
+# if defined(HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP)
+	ut->ut_tv.tv_sec = li->tv_sec;
+	ut->ut_tv.tv_usec = li->tv_usec;
+# elif defined(HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP)
+	ut->ut_time = li->tv_sec;
+# endif
+}
+
+void
+construct_utmp(struct logininfo *li,
+		    struct utmp *ut)
+{
+# ifdef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP
+	struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6;
+# endif
+
+	memset(ut, '\0', sizeof(*ut));
+
+	/* First fill out fields used for both logins and logouts */
+
+# ifdef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMP
+	line_abbrevname(ut->ut_id, li->line, sizeof(ut->ut_id));
+# endif
+
+# ifdef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP
+	/* This is done here to keep utmp constants out of struct logininfo */
+	switch (li->type) {
+	case LTYPE_LOGIN:
+		ut->ut_type = USER_PROCESS;
+#ifdef _UNICOS
+		cray_set_tmpdir(ut);
+#endif
+		break;
+	case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
+		ut->ut_type = DEAD_PROCESS;
+#ifdef _UNICOS
+		cray_retain_utmp(ut, li->pid);
+#endif
+		break;
+	}
+# endif
+	set_utmp_time(li, ut);
+
+	line_stripname(ut->ut_line, li->line, sizeof(ut->ut_line));
+
+# ifdef HAVE_PID_IN_UTMP
+	ut->ut_pid = li->pid;
+# endif
+
+	/* If we're logging out, leave all other fields blank */
+	if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGOUT)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * These fields are only used when logging in, and are blank
+	 * for logouts.
+	 */
+
+	/* Use strncpy because we don't necessarily want null termination */
+	strncpy(ut->ut_name, li->username,
+	    MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_name, li->username));
+# ifdef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP
+	strncpy(ut->ut_host, li->hostname,
+	    MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_host, li->hostname));
+# endif
+# ifdef HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMP
+	/* this is just a 32-bit IP address */
+	if (li->hostaddr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET)
+		ut->ut_addr = li->hostaddr.sa_in.sin_addr.s_addr;
+# endif
+# ifdef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP
+	/* this is just a 128-bit IPv6 address */
+	if (li->hostaddr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6) {
+		sa6 = ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&li->hostaddr.sa);
+		memcpy(ut->ut_addr_v6, sa6->sin6_addr.s6_addr, 16);
+		if (IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&sa6->sin6_addr)) {
+			ut->ut_addr_v6[0] = ut->ut_addr_v6[3];
+			ut->ut_addr_v6[1] = 0;
+			ut->ut_addr_v6[2] = 0;
+			ut->ut_addr_v6[3] = 0;
+		}
+	}
+# endif
+}
+#endif /* USE_UTMP || USE_WTMP || USE_LOGIN */
+
+/**
+ ** utmpx utility functions
+ **
+ ** These functions manipulate struct utmpx, accounting for system
+ ** variations.
+ **/
+
+#if defined(USE_UTMPX) || defined (USE_WTMPX)
+/* build the utmpx structure */
+void
+set_utmpx_time(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx)
+{
+# if defined(HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX)
+	utx->ut_tv.tv_sec = li->tv_sec;
+	utx->ut_tv.tv_usec = li->tv_usec;
+# elif defined(HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX)
+	utx->ut_time = li->tv_sec;
+# endif
+}
+
+void
+construct_utmpx(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx)
+{
+# ifdef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP
+	struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6;
+#  endif
+	memset(utx, '\0', sizeof(*utx));
+
+# ifdef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX
+	line_abbrevname(utx->ut_id, li->line, sizeof(utx->ut_id));
+# endif
+
+	/* this is done here to keep utmp constants out of loginrec.h */
+	switch (li->type) {
+	case LTYPE_LOGIN:
+		utx->ut_type = USER_PROCESS;
+		break;
+	case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
+		utx->ut_type = DEAD_PROCESS;
+		break;
+	}
+	line_stripname(utx->ut_line, li->line, sizeof(utx->ut_line));
+	set_utmpx_time(li, utx);
+	utx->ut_pid = li->pid;
+
+	/* strncpy(): Don't necessarily want null termination */
+	strncpy(utx->ut_user, li->username,
+	    MIN_SIZEOF(utx->ut_user, li->username));
+
+	if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGOUT)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * These fields are only used when logging in, and are blank
+	 * for logouts.
+	 */
+
+# ifdef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX
+	strncpy(utx->ut_host, li->hostname,
+	    MIN_SIZEOF(utx->ut_host, li->hostname));
+# endif
+# ifdef HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMPX
+	/* this is just a 32-bit IP address */
+	if (li->hostaddr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET)
+		utx->ut_addr = li->hostaddr.sa_in.sin_addr.s_addr;
+# endif
+# ifdef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP
+	/* this is just a 128-bit IPv6 address */
+	if (li->hostaddr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6) {
+		sa6 = ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&li->hostaddr.sa);
+		memcpy(utx->ut_addr_v6, sa6->sin6_addr.s6_addr, 16);
+		if (IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&sa6->sin6_addr)) {
+			utx->ut_addr_v6[0] = utx->ut_addr_v6[3];
+			utx->ut_addr_v6[1] = 0;
+			utx->ut_addr_v6[2] = 0;
+			utx->ut_addr_v6[3] = 0;
+		}
+	}
+# endif
+# ifdef HAVE_SYSLEN_IN_UTMPX
+	/* ut_syslen is the length of the utx_host string */
+	utx->ut_syslen = MIN(strlen(li->hostname), sizeof(utx->ut_host));
+# endif
+}
+#endif /* USE_UTMPX || USE_WTMPX */
+
+/**
+ ** Low-level utmp functions
+ **/
+
+/* FIXME: (ATL) utmp_write_direct needs testing */
+#ifdef USE_UTMP
+
+/* if we can, use pututline() etc. */
+# if !defined(DISABLE_PUTUTLINE) && defined(HAVE_SETUTENT) && \
+	defined(HAVE_PUTUTLINE)
+#  define UTMP_USE_LIBRARY
+# endif
+
+
+/* write a utmp entry with the system's help (pututline() and pals) */
+# ifdef UTMP_USE_LIBRARY
+static int
+utmp_write_library(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut)
+{
+	setutent();
+	pututline(ut);
+#  ifdef HAVE_ENDUTENT
+	endutent();
+#  endif
+	return (1);
+}
+# else /* UTMP_USE_LIBRARY */
+
+/*
+ * Write a utmp entry direct to the file
+ * This is a slightly modification of code in OpenBSD's login.c
+ */
+static int
+utmp_write_direct(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut)
+{
+	struct utmp old_ut;
+	register int fd;
+	int tty;
+
+	/* FIXME: (ATL) ttyslot() needs local implementation */
+
+#if defined(HAVE_GETTTYENT)
+	struct ttyent *ty;
+
+	tty=0;
+	setttyent();
+	while (NULL != (ty = getttyent())) {
+		tty++;
+		if (!strncmp(ty->ty_name, ut->ut_line, sizeof(ut->ut_line)))
+			break;
+	}
+	endttyent();
+
+	if (NULL == ty) {
+		logit("%s: tty not found", __func__);
+		return (0);
+	}
+#else /* FIXME */
+
+	tty = ttyslot(); /* seems only to work for /dev/ttyp? style names */
+
+#endif /* HAVE_GETTTYENT */
+
+	if (tty > 0 && (fd = open(UTMP_FILE, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0644)) >= 0) {
+		off_t pos, ret;
+
+		pos = (off_t)tty * sizeof(struct utmp);
+		if ((ret = lseek(fd, pos, SEEK_SET)) == -1) {
+			logit("%s: lseek: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+			close(fd);
+			return (0);
+		}
+		if (ret != pos) {
+			logit("%s: Couldn't seek to tty %d slot in %s",
+			    __func__, tty, UTMP_FILE);
+			close(fd);
+			return (0);
+		}
+		/*
+		 * Prevent luser from zero'ing out ut_host.
+		 * If the new ut_line is empty but the old one is not
+		 * and ut_line and ut_name match, preserve the old ut_line.
+		 */
+		if (atomicio(read, fd, &old_ut, sizeof(old_ut)) == sizeof(old_ut) &&
+		    (ut->ut_host[0] == '\0') && (old_ut.ut_host[0] != '\0') &&
+		    (strncmp(old_ut.ut_line, ut->ut_line, sizeof(ut->ut_line)) == 0) &&
+		    (strncmp(old_ut.ut_name, ut->ut_name, sizeof(ut->ut_name)) == 0))
+			memcpy(ut->ut_host, old_ut.ut_host, sizeof(ut->ut_host));
+
+		if ((ret = lseek(fd, pos, SEEK_SET)) == -1) {
+			logit("%s: lseek: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+			close(fd);
+			return (0);
+		}
+		if (ret != pos) {
+			logit("%s: Couldn't seek to tty %d slot in %s",
+			    __func__, tty, UTMP_FILE);
+			close(fd);
+			return (0);
+		}
+		if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, ut, sizeof(*ut)) != sizeof(*ut)) {
+			logit("%s: error writing %s: %s", __func__,
+			    UTMP_FILE, strerror(errno));
+			close(fd);
+			return (0);
+		}
+
+		close(fd);
+		return (1);
+	} else {
+		return (0);
+	}
+}
+# endif /* UTMP_USE_LIBRARY */
+
+static int
+utmp_perform_login(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	struct utmp ut;
+
+	construct_utmp(li, &ut);
+# ifdef UTMP_USE_LIBRARY
+	if (!utmp_write_library(li, &ut)) {
+		logit("%s: utmp_write_library() failed", __func__);
+		return (0);
+	}
+# else
+	if (!utmp_write_direct(li, &ut)) {
+		logit("%s: utmp_write_direct() failed", __func__);
+		return (0);
+	}
+# endif
+	return (1);
+}
+
+
+static int
+utmp_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	struct utmp ut;
+
+	construct_utmp(li, &ut);
+# ifdef UTMP_USE_LIBRARY
+	if (!utmp_write_library(li, &ut)) {
+		logit("%s: utmp_write_library() failed", __func__);
+		return (0);
+	}
+# else
+	if (!utmp_write_direct(li, &ut)) {
+		logit("%s: utmp_write_direct() failed", __func__);
+		return (0);
+	}
+# endif
+	return (1);
+}
+
+
+int
+utmp_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	switch(li->type) {
+	case LTYPE_LOGIN:
+		return (utmp_perform_login(li));
+
+	case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
+		return (utmp_perform_logout(li));
+
+	default:
+		logit("%s: invalid type field", __func__);
+		return (0);
+	}
+}
+#endif /* USE_UTMP */
+
+
+/**
+ ** Low-level utmpx functions
+ **/
+
+/* not much point if we don't want utmpx entries */
+#ifdef USE_UTMPX
+
+/* if we have the wherewithall, use pututxline etc. */
+# if !defined(DISABLE_PUTUTXLINE) && defined(HAVE_SETUTXENT) && \
+	defined(HAVE_PUTUTXLINE)
+#  define UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY
+# endif
+
+
+/* write a utmpx entry with the system's help (pututxline() and pals) */
+# ifdef UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY
+static int
+utmpx_write_library(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx)
+{
+	setutxent();
+	pututxline(utx);
+
+#  ifdef HAVE_ENDUTXENT
+	endutxent();
+#  endif
+	return (1);
+}
+
+# else /* UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY */
+
+/* write a utmp entry direct to the file */
+static int
+utmpx_write_direct(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx)
+{
+	logit("%s: not implemented!", __func__);
+	return (0);
+}
+# endif /* UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY */
+
+static int
+utmpx_perform_login(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	struct utmpx utx;
+
+	construct_utmpx(li, &utx);
+# ifdef UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY
+	if (!utmpx_write_library(li, &utx)) {
+		logit("%s: utmp_write_library() failed", __func__);
+		return (0);
+	}
+# else
+	if (!utmpx_write_direct(li, &ut)) {
+		logit("%s: utmp_write_direct() failed", __func__);
+		return (0);
+	}
+# endif
+	return (1);
+}
+
+
+static int
+utmpx_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	struct utmpx utx;
+
+	construct_utmpx(li, &utx);
+# ifdef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX
+	line_abbrevname(utx.ut_id, li->line, sizeof(utx.ut_id));
+# endif
+# ifdef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX
+	utx.ut_type = DEAD_PROCESS;
+# endif
+
+# ifdef UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY
+	utmpx_write_library(li, &utx);
+# else
+	utmpx_write_direct(li, &utx);
+# endif
+	return (1);
+}
+
+int
+utmpx_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	switch(li->type) {
+	case LTYPE_LOGIN:
+		return (utmpx_perform_login(li));
+	case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
+		return (utmpx_perform_logout(li));
+	default:
+		logit("%s: invalid type field", __func__);
+		return (0);
+	}
+}
+#endif /* USE_UTMPX */
+
+
+/**
+ ** Low-level wtmp functions
+ **/
+
+#ifdef USE_WTMP
+
+/*
+ * Write a wtmp entry direct to the end of the file
+ * This is a slight modification of code in OpenBSD's logwtmp.c
+ */
+static int
+wtmp_write(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut)
+{
+	struct stat buf;
+	int fd, ret = 1;
+
+	if ((fd = open(WTMP_FILE, O_WRONLY|O_APPEND, 0)) < 0) {
+		logit("%s: problem writing %s: %s", __func__,
+		    WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno));
+		return (0);
+	}
+	if (fstat(fd, &buf) == 0)
+		if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, ut, sizeof(*ut)) != sizeof(*ut)) {
+			ftruncate(fd, buf.st_size);
+			logit("%s: problem writing %s: %s", __func__,
+			    WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno));
+			ret = 0;
+		}
+	close(fd);
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+static int
+wtmp_perform_login(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	struct utmp ut;
+
+	construct_utmp(li, &ut);
+	return (wtmp_write(li, &ut));
+}
+
+
+static int
+wtmp_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	struct utmp ut;
+
+	construct_utmp(li, &ut);
+	return (wtmp_write(li, &ut));
+}
+
+
+int
+wtmp_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	switch(li->type) {
+	case LTYPE_LOGIN:
+		return (wtmp_perform_login(li));
+	case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
+		return (wtmp_perform_logout(li));
+	default:
+		logit("%s: invalid type field", __func__);
+		return (0);
+	}
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Notes on fetching login data from wtmp/wtmpx
+ *
+ * Logouts are usually recorded with (amongst other things) a blank
+ * username on a given tty line.  However, some systems (HP-UX is one)
+ * leave all fields set, but change the ut_type field to DEAD_PROCESS.
+ *
+ * Since we're only looking for logins here, we know that the username
+ * must be set correctly. On systems that leave it in, we check for
+ * ut_type==USER_PROCESS (indicating a login.)
+ *
+ * Portability: Some systems may set something other than USER_PROCESS
+ * to indicate a login process. I don't know of any as I write. Also,
+ * it's possible that some systems may both leave the username in
+ * place and not have ut_type.
+ */
+
+/* return true if this wtmp entry indicates a login */
+static int
+wtmp_islogin(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut)
+{
+	if (strncmp(li->username, ut->ut_name,
+	    MIN_SIZEOF(li->username, ut->ut_name)) == 0) {
+# ifdef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP
+		if (ut->ut_type & USER_PROCESS)
+			return (1);
+# else
+		return (1);
+# endif
+	}
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+wtmp_get_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	struct stat st;
+	struct utmp ut;
+	int fd, found = 0;
+
+	/* Clear the time entries in our logininfo */
+	li->tv_sec = li->tv_usec = 0;
+
+	if ((fd = open(WTMP_FILE, O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
+		logit("%s: problem opening %s: %s", __func__,
+		    WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno));
+		return (0);
+	}
+	if (fstat(fd, &st) != 0) {
+		logit("%s: couldn't stat %s: %s", __func__,
+		    WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno));
+		close(fd);
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	/* Seek to the start of the last struct utmp */
+	if (lseek(fd, -(off_t)sizeof(struct utmp), SEEK_END) == -1) {
+		/* Looks like we've got a fresh wtmp file */
+		close(fd);
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	while (!found) {
+		if (atomicio(read, fd, &ut, sizeof(ut)) != sizeof(ut)) {
+			logit("%s: read of %s failed: %s", __func__,
+			    WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno));
+			close (fd);
+			return (0);
+		}
+		if (wtmp_islogin(li, &ut) ) {
+			found = 1;
+			/*
+			 * We've already checked for a time in struct
+			 * utmp, in login_getlast()
+			 */
+# ifdef HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP
+			li->tv_sec = ut.ut_time;
+# else
+#  if HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP
+			li->tv_sec = ut.ut_tv.tv_sec;
+#  endif
+# endif
+			line_fullname(li->line, ut.ut_line,
+			    MIN_SIZEOF(li->line, ut.ut_line));
+# ifdef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP
+			strlcpy(li->hostname, ut.ut_host,
+			    MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, ut.ut_host));
+# endif
+			continue;
+		}
+		/* Seek back 2 x struct utmp */
+		if (lseek(fd, -(off_t)(2 * sizeof(struct utmp)), SEEK_CUR) == -1) {
+			/* We've found the start of the file, so quit */
+			close(fd);
+			return (0);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* We found an entry. Tidy up and return */
+	close(fd);
+	return (1);
+}
+# endif /* USE_WTMP */
+
+
+/**
+ ** Low-level wtmpx functions
+ **/
+
+#ifdef USE_WTMPX
+/*
+ * Write a wtmpx entry direct to the end of the file
+ * This is a slight modification of code in OpenBSD's logwtmp.c
+ */
+static int
+wtmpx_write(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx)
+{
+#ifndef HAVE_UPDWTMPX
+	struct stat buf;
+	int fd, ret = 1;
+
+	if ((fd = open(WTMPX_FILE, O_WRONLY|O_APPEND, 0)) < 0) {
+		logit("%s: problem opening %s: %s", __func__,
+		    WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno));
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	if (fstat(fd, &buf) == 0)
+		if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, utx, sizeof(*utx)) != sizeof(*utx)) {
+			ftruncate(fd, buf.st_size);
+			logit("%s: problem writing %s: %s", __func__,
+			    WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno));
+			ret = 0;
+		}
+	close(fd);
+
+	return (ret);
+#else
+	updwtmpx(WTMPX_FILE, utx);
+	return (1);
+#endif
+}
+
+
+static int
+wtmpx_perform_login(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	struct utmpx utx;
+
+	construct_utmpx(li, &utx);
+	return (wtmpx_write(li, &utx));
+}
+
+
+static int
+wtmpx_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	struct utmpx utx;
+
+	construct_utmpx(li, &utx);
+	return (wtmpx_write(li, &utx));
+}
+
+
+int
+wtmpx_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	switch(li->type) {
+	case LTYPE_LOGIN:
+		return (wtmpx_perform_login(li));
+	case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
+		return (wtmpx_perform_logout(li));
+	default:
+		logit("%s: invalid type field", __func__);
+		return (0);
+	}
+}
+
+/* Please see the notes above wtmp_islogin() for information about the
+   next two functions */
+
+/* Return true if this wtmpx entry indicates a login */
+static int
+wtmpx_islogin(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx)
+{
+	if (strncmp(li->username, utx->ut_user,
+	    MIN_SIZEOF(li->username, utx->ut_user)) == 0 ) {
+# ifdef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX
+		if (utx->ut_type == USER_PROCESS)
+			return (1);
+# else
+		return (1);
+# endif
+	}
+	return (0);
+}
+
+
+int
+wtmpx_get_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	struct stat st;
+	struct utmpx utx;
+	int fd, found=0;
+
+	/* Clear the time entries */
+	li->tv_sec = li->tv_usec = 0;
+
+	if ((fd = open(WTMPX_FILE, O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
+		logit("%s: problem opening %s: %s", __func__,
+		    WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno));
+		return (0);
+	}
+	if (fstat(fd, &st) != 0) {
+		logit("%s: couldn't stat %s: %s", __func__,
+		    WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno));
+		close(fd);
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	/* Seek to the start of the last struct utmpx */
+	if (lseek(fd, -(off_t)sizeof(struct utmpx), SEEK_END) == -1 ) {
+		/* probably a newly rotated wtmpx file */
+		close(fd);
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	while (!found) {
+		if (atomicio(read, fd, &utx, sizeof(utx)) != sizeof(utx)) {
+			logit("%s: read of %s failed: %s", __func__,
+			    WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno));
+			close (fd);
+			return (0);
+		}
+		/*
+		 * Logouts are recorded as a blank username on a particular
+		 * line. So, we just need to find the username in struct utmpx
+		 */
+		if (wtmpx_islogin(li, &utx)) {
+			found = 1;
+# if defined(HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX)
+			li->tv_sec = utx.ut_tv.tv_sec;
+# elif defined(HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX)
+			li->tv_sec = utx.ut_time;
+# endif
+			line_fullname(li->line, utx.ut_line, sizeof(li->line));
+# if defined(HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX)
+			strlcpy(li->hostname, utx.ut_host,
+			    MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, utx.ut_host));
+# endif
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (lseek(fd, -(off_t)(2 * sizeof(struct utmpx)), SEEK_CUR) == -1) {
+			close(fd);
+			return (0);
+		}
+	}
+
+	close(fd);
+	return (1);
+}
+#endif /* USE_WTMPX */
+
+/**
+ ** Low-level libutil login() functions
+ **/
+
+#ifdef USE_LOGIN
+static int
+syslogin_perform_login(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	struct utmp *ut;
+
+	ut = xmalloc(sizeof(*ut));
+	construct_utmp(li, ut);
+	login(ut);
+	free(ut);
+
+	return (1);
+}
+
+static int
+syslogin_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+# ifdef HAVE_LOGOUT
+	char line[UT_LINESIZE];
+
+	(void)line_stripname(line, li->line, sizeof(line));
+
+	if (!logout(line))
+		logit("%s: logout() returned an error", __func__);
+#  ifdef HAVE_LOGWTMP
+	else
+		logwtmp(line, "", "");
+#  endif
+	/* FIXME: (ATL - if the need arises) What to do if we have
+	 * login, but no logout?  what if logout but no logwtmp? All
+	 * routines are in libutil so they should all be there,
+	 * but... */
+# endif
+	return (1);
+}
+
+int
+syslogin_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	switch (li->type) {
+	case LTYPE_LOGIN:
+		return (syslogin_perform_login(li));
+	case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
+		return (syslogin_perform_logout(li));
+	default:
+		logit("%s: Invalid type field", __func__);
+		return (0);
+	}
+}
+#endif /* USE_LOGIN */
+
+/* end of file log-syslogin.c */
+
+/**
+ ** Low-level lastlog functions
+ **/
+
+#ifdef USE_LASTLOG
+
+#if !defined(LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE) || !defined(HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME)
+/* open the file (using filemode) and seek to the login entry */
+static int
+lastlog_openseek(struct logininfo *li, int *fd, int filemode)
+{
+	off_t offset;
+	char lastlog_file[1024];
+	struct stat st;
+
+	if (stat(LASTLOG_FILE, &st) != 0) {
+		logit("%s: Couldn't stat %s: %s", __func__,
+		    LASTLOG_FILE, strerror(errno));
+		return (0);
+	}
+	if (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) {
+		snprintf(lastlog_file, sizeof(lastlog_file), "%s/%s",
+		    LASTLOG_FILE, li->username);
+	} else if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
+		strlcpy(lastlog_file, LASTLOG_FILE, sizeof(lastlog_file));
+	} else {
+		logit("%s: %.100s is not a file or directory!", __func__,
+		    LASTLOG_FILE);
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	*fd = open(lastlog_file, filemode, 0600);
+	if (*fd < 0) {
+		debug("%s: Couldn't open %s: %s", __func__,
+		    lastlog_file, strerror(errno));
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
+		/* find this uid's offset in the lastlog file */
+		offset = (off_t) ((u_long)li->uid * sizeof(struct lastlog));
+
+		if (lseek(*fd, offset, SEEK_SET) != offset) {
+			logit("%s: %s->lseek(): %s", __func__,
+			    lastlog_file, strerror(errno));
+			close(*fd);
+			return (0);
+		}
+	}
+
+	return (1);
+}
+#endif /* !LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE || !HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME */
+
+#ifdef LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE
+int
+lastlog_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	switch(li->type) {
+	case LTYPE_LOGIN:
+		return 1; /* lastlog written by pututxline */
+	default:
+		logit("lastlog_write_entry: Invalid type field");
+		return 0;
+	}
+}
+#else /* LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE */
+int
+lastlog_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	struct lastlog last;
+	int fd;
+
+	switch(li->type) {
+	case LTYPE_LOGIN:
+		/* create our struct lastlog */
+		memset(&last, '\0', sizeof(last));
+		line_stripname(last.ll_line, li->line, sizeof(last.ll_line));
+		strlcpy(last.ll_host, li->hostname,
+		    MIN_SIZEOF(last.ll_host, li->hostname));
+		last.ll_time = li->tv_sec;
+	
+		if (!lastlog_openseek(li, &fd, O_RDWR|O_CREAT))
+			return (0);
+	
+		/* write the entry */
+		if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, &last, sizeof(last)) != sizeof(last)) {
+			close(fd);
+			logit("%s: Error writing to %s: %s", __func__,
+			    LASTLOG_FILE, strerror(errno));
+			return (0);
+		}
+	
+		close(fd);
+		return (1);
+	default:
+		logit("%s: Invalid type field", __func__);
+		return (0);
+	}
+}
+#endif /* LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME
+int
+lastlog_get_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	struct lastlogx l, *ll;
+
+	if ((ll = getlastlogxbyname(li->username, &l)) == NULL) {
+		memset(&l, '\0', sizeof(l));
+		ll = &l;
+	}
+	line_fullname(li->line, ll->ll_line, sizeof(li->line));
+	strlcpy(li->hostname, ll->ll_host,
+		MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, ll->ll_host));
+	li->tv_sec = ll->ll_tv.tv_sec;
+	li->tv_usec = ll->ll_tv.tv_usec;
+	return (1);
+}
+#else /* HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME */
+int
+lastlog_get_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	struct lastlog last;
+	int fd, ret;
+
+	if (!lastlog_openseek(li, &fd, O_RDONLY))
+		return (0);
+
+	ret = atomicio(read, fd, &last, sizeof(last));
+	close(fd);
+
+	switch (ret) {
+	case 0:
+		memset(&last, '\0', sizeof(last));
+		/* FALLTHRU */
+	case sizeof(last):
+		line_fullname(li->line, last.ll_line, sizeof(li->line));
+		strlcpy(li->hostname, last.ll_host,
+		    MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, last.ll_host));
+		li->tv_sec = last.ll_time;
+		return (1);
+	case -1:
+		error("%s: Error reading from %s: %s", __func__,
+		    LASTLOG_FILE, strerror(errno));
+		return (0);
+	default:
+		error("%s: Error reading from %s: Expecting %d, got %d",
+		    __func__, LASTLOG_FILE, (int)sizeof(last), ret);
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	/* NOTREACHED */
+	return (0);
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME */
+#endif /* USE_LASTLOG */
+
+#if defined(USE_UTMPX) && defined(HAVE_SETUTXDB) && \
+    defined(UTXDB_LASTLOGIN) && defined(HAVE_GETUTXUSER)
+int
+utmpx_get_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	struct utmpx *utx;
+
+	if (setutxdb(UTXDB_LASTLOGIN, NULL) != 0)
+		return (0);
+	utx = getutxuser(li->username);
+	if (utx == NULL) {
+		endutxent();
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	line_fullname(li->line, utx->ut_line,
+	    MIN_SIZEOF(li->line, utx->ut_line));
+	strlcpy(li->hostname, utx->ut_host,
+	    MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, utx->ut_host));
+	li->tv_sec = utx->ut_tv.tv_sec;
+	li->tv_usec = utx->ut_tv.tv_usec;
+	endutxent();
+	return (1);
+}
+#endif /* USE_UTMPX && HAVE_SETUTXDB && UTXDB_LASTLOGIN && HAVE_GETUTXUSER */
+
+#ifdef USE_BTMP
+  /*
+   * Logs failed login attempts in _PATH_BTMP if that exists.
+   * The most common login failure is to give password instead of username.
+   * So the _PATH_BTMP file checked for the correct permission, so that
+   * only root can read it.
+   */
+
+void
+record_failed_login(const char *username, const char *hostname,
+    const char *ttyn)
+{
+	int fd;
+	struct utmp ut;
+	struct sockaddr_storage from;
+	socklen_t fromlen = sizeof(from);
+	struct sockaddr_in *a4;
+	struct sockaddr_in6 *a6;
+	time_t t;
+	struct stat fst;
+
+	if (geteuid() != 0)
+		return;
+	if ((fd = open(_PATH_BTMP, O_WRONLY | O_APPEND)) < 0) {
+		debug("Unable to open the btmp file %s: %s", _PATH_BTMP,
+		    strerror(errno));
+		return;
+	}
+	if (fstat(fd, &fst) < 0) {
+		logit("%s: fstat of %s failed: %s", __func__, _PATH_BTMP,
+		    strerror(errno));
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if((fst.st_mode & (S_IXGRP | S_IRWXO)) || (fst.st_uid != 0)){
+		logit("Excess permission or bad ownership on file %s",
+		    _PATH_BTMP);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	memset(&ut, 0, sizeof(ut));
+	/* strncpy because we don't necessarily want nul termination */
+	strncpy(ut.ut_user, username, sizeof(ut.ut_user));
+	strlcpy(ut.ut_line, "ssh:notty", sizeof(ut.ut_line));
+
+	time(&t);
+	ut.ut_time = t;     /* ut_time is not always a time_t */
+	ut.ut_type = LOGIN_PROCESS;
+	ut.ut_pid = getpid();
+
+	/* strncpy because we don't necessarily want nul termination */
+	strncpy(ut.ut_host, hostname, sizeof(ut.ut_host));
+
+	if (packet_connection_is_on_socket() &&
+	    getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
+	    (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == 0) {
+		ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
+		if (from.ss_family == AF_INET) {
+			a4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)&from;
+			memcpy(&ut.ut_addr, &(a4->sin_addr),
+			    MIN_SIZEOF(ut.ut_addr, a4->sin_addr));
+		}
+#ifdef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP
+		if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6) {
+			a6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&from;
+			memcpy(&ut.ut_addr_v6, &(a6->sin6_addr),
+			    MIN_SIZEOF(ut.ut_addr_v6, a6->sin6_addr));
+		}
+#endif
+	}
+
+	if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, &ut, sizeof(ut)) != sizeof(ut))
+		error("Failed to write to %s: %s", _PATH_BTMP,
+		    strerror(errno));
+
+out:
+	close(fd);
+}
+#endif	/* USE_BTMP */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/loginrec.h b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/loginrec.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..28923e781
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/loginrec.h
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+#ifndef _HAVE_LOGINREC_H_
+#define _HAVE_LOGINREC_H_
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Andre Lucas.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/**
+ ** loginrec.h:  platform-independent login recording and lastlog retrieval
+ **/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+/**
+ ** you should use the login_* calls to work around platform dependencies
+ **/
+
+/*
+ * login_netinfo structure
+ */
+
+union login_netinfo {
+	struct sockaddr sa;
+	struct sockaddr_in sa_in;
+	struct sockaddr_storage sa_storage;
+};
+
+/*
+ *   * logininfo structure  *
+ */
+/* types - different to utmp.h 'type' macros */
+/* (though set to the same value as linux, openbsd and others...) */
+#define LTYPE_LOGIN    7
+#define LTYPE_LOGOUT   8
+
+/* string lengths - set very long */
+#define LINFO_PROGSIZE 64
+#define LINFO_LINESIZE 64
+#define LINFO_NAMESIZE 512
+#define LINFO_HOSTSIZE 256
+
+struct logininfo {
+	char       progname[LINFO_PROGSIZE];     /* name of program (for PAM) */
+	int        progname_null;
+	short int  type;                         /* type of login (LTYPE_*) */
+	pid_t      pid;                          /* PID of login process */
+	uid_t      uid;                          /* UID of this user */
+	char       line[LINFO_LINESIZE];         /* tty/pty name */
+	char       username[LINFO_NAMESIZE];     /* login username */
+	char       hostname[LINFO_HOSTSIZE];     /* remote hostname */
+	/* 'exit_status' structure components */
+	int        exit;                        /* process exit status */
+	int        termination;                 /* process termination status */
+	/* struct timeval (sys/time.h) isn't always available, if it isn't we'll
+	 * use time_t's value as tv_sec and set tv_usec to 0
+	 */
+	unsigned int tv_sec;
+	unsigned int tv_usec;
+	union login_netinfo hostaddr;       /* caller's host address(es) */
+}; /* struct logininfo */
+
+/*
+ * login recording functions
+ */
+
+/** 'public' functions */
+
+/* construct a new login entry */
+struct logininfo *login_alloc_entry(pid_t pid, const char *username,
+				    const char *hostname, const char *line);
+/* free a structure */
+void login_free_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+/* fill out a pre-allocated structure with useful information */
+int login_init_entry(struct logininfo *li, pid_t pid, const char *username,
+		     const char *hostname, const char *line);
+/* place the current time in a logininfo struct */
+void login_set_current_time(struct logininfo *li);
+
+/* record the entry */
+int login_login (struct logininfo *li);
+int login_logout(struct logininfo *li);
+#ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
+int login_utmp_only(struct logininfo *li);
+#endif
+
+/** End of public functions */
+
+/* record the entry */
+int login_write (struct logininfo *li);
+int login_log_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+
+/* set the network address based on network address type */
+void login_set_addr(struct logininfo *li, const struct sockaddr *sa,
+		    const unsigned int sa_size);
+
+/*
+ * lastlog retrieval functions
+ */
+/* lastlog *entry* functions fill out a logininfo */
+struct logininfo *login_get_lastlog(struct logininfo *li, const uid_t uid);
+/* lastlog *time* functions return time_t equivalent (uint) */
+unsigned int login_get_lastlog_time(const uid_t uid);
+
+/* produce various forms of the line filename */
+char *line_fullname(char *dst, const char *src, u_int dstsize);
+char *line_stripname(char *dst, const char *src, int dstsize);
+char *line_abbrevname(char *dst, const char *src, int dstsize);
+
+void record_failed_login(const char *, const char *, const char *);
+
+#endif /* _HAVE_LOGINREC_H_ */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/logintest.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/logintest.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4897ae0f9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/logintest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,308 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Andre Lucas.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/**
+ ** logintest.c:  simple test driver for platform-independent login recording
+ **               and lastlog retrieval
+ **/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H
+#include <time.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "loginrec.h"
+
+extern char *__progname;
+
+#define PAUSE_BEFORE_LOGOUT 3
+
+int nologtest = 0;
+int compile_opts_only = 0;
+int be_verbose = 0;
+
+
+/* Dump a logininfo to stdout. Assumes a tab size of 8 chars. */
+void
+dump_logininfo(struct logininfo *li, char *descname)
+{
+	/* yes I know how nasty this is */
+	printf("struct logininfo %s = {\n\t"
+	       "progname\t'%s'\n\ttype\t\t%d\n\t"
+	       "pid\t\t%d\n\tuid\t\t%d\n\t"
+	       "line\t\t'%s'\n\tusername\t'%s'\n\t"
+	       "hostname\t'%s'\n\texit\t\t%d\n\ttermination\t%d\n\t"
+	       "tv_sec\t%d\n\ttv_usec\t%d\n\t"
+	       "struct login_netinfo hostaddr {\n\t\t"
+	       "struct sockaddr sa {\n"
+	       "\t\t\tfamily\t%d\n\t\t}\n"
+	       "\t}\n"
+	       "}\n",
+	       descname, li->progname, li->type,
+	       li->pid, li->uid, li->line,
+	       li->username, li->hostname, li->exit,
+	       li->termination, li->tv_sec, li->tv_usec,
+	       li->hostaddr.sa.sa_family);
+}
+
+
+int
+testAPI()
+{
+	struct logininfo *li1;
+	struct passwd *pw;
+	struct hostent *he;
+	struct sockaddr_in sa_in4;
+	char cmdstring[256], stripline[8];
+	char username[32];
+#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H
+	time_t t0, t1, t2, logintime, logouttime;
+	char s_t0[64],s_t1[64],s_t2[64];
+	char s_logintime[64], s_logouttime[64]; /* ctime() strings */
+#endif
+
+	printf("**\n** Testing the API...\n**\n");
+
+	pw = getpwuid(getuid());
+	strlcpy(username, pw->pw_name, sizeof(username));
+
+	/* gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)); */
+
+	printf("login_alloc_entry test (no host info):\n");
+
+	/* FIXME fake tty more effectively - this could upset some platforms */
+	li1 = login_alloc_entry((int)getpid(), username, NULL, ttyname(0));
+	strlcpy(li1->progname, "OpenSSH-logintest", sizeof(li1->progname));
+
+	if (be_verbose)
+		dump_logininfo(li1, "li1");
+
+	printf("Setting host address info for 'localhost' (may call out):\n");
+	if (! (he = gethostbyname("localhost"))) {
+		printf("Couldn't set hostname(lookup failed)\n");
+	} else {
+		/* NOTE: this is messy, but typically a program wouldn't have to set
+		 *  any of this, a sockaddr_in* would be already prepared */
+		memcpy((void *)&(sa_in4.sin_addr), (void *)&(he->h_addr_list[0][0]),
+		       sizeof(struct in_addr));
+		login_set_addr(li1, (struct sockaddr *) &sa_in4, sizeof(sa_in4));
+		strlcpy(li1->hostname, "localhost", sizeof(li1->hostname));
+	}
+	if (be_verbose)
+		dump_logininfo(li1, "li1");
+
+	if ((int)geteuid() != 0) {
+		printf("NOT RUNNING LOGIN TESTS - you are not root!\n");
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	if (nologtest)
+		return 1;
+
+	line_stripname(stripline, li1->line, sizeof(stripline));
+
+	printf("Performing an invalid login attempt (no type field)\n--\n");
+	login_write(li1);
+	printf("--\n(Should have written errors to stderr)\n");
+
+#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H
+	(void)time(&t0);
+	strlcpy(s_t0, ctime(&t0), sizeof(s_t0));
+	t1 = login_get_lastlog_time(getuid());
+	strlcpy(s_t1, ctime(&t1), sizeof(s_t1));
+	printf("Before logging in:\n\tcurrent time is %d - %s\t"
+	       "lastlog time is %d - %s\n",
+	       (int)t0, s_t0, (int)t1, s_t1);
+#endif
+
+	printf("Performing a login on line %s ", stripline);
+#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H
+	(void)time(&logintime);
+	strlcpy(s_logintime, ctime(&logintime), sizeof(s_logintime));
+	printf("at %d - %s", (int)logintime, s_logintime);
+#endif
+	printf("--\n");
+	login_login(li1);
+
+	snprintf(cmdstring, sizeof(cmdstring), "who | grep '%s '",
+		 stripline);
+	system(cmdstring);
+
+	printf("--\nPausing for %d second(s)...\n", PAUSE_BEFORE_LOGOUT);
+	sleep(PAUSE_BEFORE_LOGOUT);
+
+	printf("Performing a logout ");
+#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H
+	(void)time(&logouttime);
+	strlcpy(s_logouttime, ctime(&logouttime), sizeof(s_logouttime));
+	printf("at %d - %s", (int)logouttime, s_logouttime);
+#endif
+	printf("\nThe root login shown above should be gone.\n"
+	       "If the root login hasn't gone, but another user on the same\n"
+	       "pty has, this is OK - we're hacking it here, and there\n"
+	       "shouldn't be two users on one pty in reality...\n"
+	       "-- ('who' output follows)\n");
+	login_logout(li1);
+
+	system(cmdstring);
+	printf("-- ('who' output ends)\n");
+
+#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H
+	t2 = login_get_lastlog_time(getuid());
+	strlcpy(s_t2, ctime(&t2), sizeof(s_t2));
+	printf("After logging in, lastlog time is %d - %s\n", (int)t2, s_t2);
+	if (t1 == t2)
+		printf("The lastlog times before and after logging in are the "
+		       "same.\nThis indicates that lastlog is ** NOT WORKING "
+		       "CORRECTLY **\n");
+	else if (t0 != t2)
+		/* We can be off by a second or so, even when recording works fine.
+		 * I'm not 100% sure why, but it's true. */
+		printf("** The login time and the lastlog time differ.\n"
+		       "** This indicates that lastlog is either recording the "
+		       "wrong time,\n** or retrieving the wrong entry.\n"
+		       "If it's off by less than %d second(s) "
+		       "run the test again.\n", PAUSE_BEFORE_LOGOUT);
+	else
+		printf("lastlog agrees with the login time. This is a good thing.\n");
+
+#endif
+
+	printf("--\nThe output of 'last' shown next should have "
+	       "an entry for root \n  on %s for the time shown above:\n--\n",
+	       stripline);
+	snprintf(cmdstring, sizeof(cmdstring), "last | grep '%s ' | head -3",
+		 stripline);
+	system(cmdstring);
+
+	printf("--\nEnd of login test.\n");
+
+	login_free_entry(li1);
+
+	return 1;
+} /* testAPI() */
+
+
+void
+testLineName(char *line)
+{
+	/* have to null-terminate - these functions are designed for
+	 * structures with fixed-length char arrays, and don't null-term.*/
+	char full[17], strip[9], abbrev[5];
+
+	memset(full, '\0', sizeof(full));
+	memset(strip, '\0', sizeof(strip));
+	memset(abbrev, '\0', sizeof(abbrev));
+
+	line_fullname(full, line, sizeof(full)-1);
+	line_stripname(strip, full, sizeof(strip)-1);
+	line_abbrevname(abbrev, full, sizeof(abbrev)-1);
+	printf("%s: %s, %s, %s\n", line, full, strip, abbrev);
+
+} /* testLineName() */
+
+
+int
+testOutput()
+{
+	printf("**\n** Testing linename functions\n**\n");
+	testLineName("/dev/pts/1");
+	testLineName("pts/1");
+	testLineName("pts/999");
+	testLineName("/dev/ttyp00");
+	testLineName("ttyp00");
+
+	return 1;
+} /* testOutput() */
+
+
+/* show which options got compiled in */
+void
+showOptions(void)
+{
+	printf("**\n** Compile-time options\n**\n");
+
+	printf("login recording methods selected:\n");
+#ifdef USE_LOGIN
+	printf("\tUSE_LOGIN\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_UTMP
+	printf("\tUSE_UTMP (UTMP_FILE=%s)\n", UTMP_FILE);
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_UTMPX
+	printf("\tUSE_UTMPX\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_WTMP
+	printf("\tUSE_WTMP (WTMP_FILE=%s)\n", WTMP_FILE);
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_WTMPX
+	printf("\tUSE_WTMPX (WTMPX_FILE=%s)\n", WTMPX_FILE);
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_LASTLOG
+	printf("\tUSE_LASTLOG (LASTLOG_FILE=%s)\n", LASTLOG_FILE);
+#endif
+	printf("\n");
+
+} /* showOptions() */
+
+
+int
+main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+	printf("Platform-independent login recording test driver\n");
+
+	__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
+	if (argc == 2) {
+		if (strncmp(argv[1], "-i", 3) == 0)
+			compile_opts_only = 1;
+		else if (strncmp(argv[1], "-v", 3) == 0)
+			be_verbose=1;
+	}
+
+	if (!compile_opts_only) {
+		if (be_verbose && !testOutput())
+			return 1;
+
+		if (!testAPI())
+			return 1;
+	}
+
+	showOptions();
+
+	return 0;
+} /* main() */
+
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/md5crypt.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/md5crypt.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..22ef98933
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/md5crypt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+/*
+ * ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * "THE BEER-WARE LICENSE" (Revision 42):
+ * <phk@login.dknet.dk> wrote this file.  As long as you retain this
+ * notice you can do whatever you want with this stuff. If we meet some
+ * day, and you think this stuff is worth it, you can buy me a beer in
+ * return.   Poul-Henning Kamp
+ * ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if defined(HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS) && !defined(HAVE_MD5_CRYPT)
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+
+/* 0 ... 63 => ascii - 64 */
+static unsigned char itoa64[] =
+    "./0123456789ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz";
+
+static char *magic = "$1$";
+
+static char *
+to64(unsigned long v, int n)
+{
+	static char buf[5];
+	char *s = buf;
+
+	if (n > 4)
+		return (NULL);
+
+	memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf));
+	while (--n >= 0) {
+		*s++ = itoa64[v&0x3f];
+		v >>= 6;
+	}
+
+	return (buf);
+}
+
+int
+is_md5_salt(const char *salt)
+{
+	return (strncmp(salt, magic, strlen(magic)) == 0);
+}
+
+char *
+md5_crypt(const char *pw, const char *salt)
+{
+	static char passwd[120], salt_copy[9], *p;
+	static const char *sp, *ep;
+	unsigned char final[16];
+	int sl, pl, i, j;
+	MD5_CTX	ctx, ctx1;
+	unsigned long l;
+
+	/* Refine the Salt first */
+	sp = salt;
+
+	/* If it starts with the magic string, then skip that */
+	if(strncmp(sp, magic, strlen(magic)) == 0)
+		sp += strlen(magic);
+
+	/* It stops at the first '$', max 8 chars */
+	for (ep = sp; *ep != '$'; ep++) {
+		if (*ep == '\0' || ep >= (sp + 8))
+			return (NULL);
+	}
+
+	/* get the length of the true salt */
+	sl = ep - sp;
+
+	/* Stash the salt */
+	memcpy(salt_copy, sp, sl);
+	salt_copy[sl] = '\0';
+
+	MD5_Init(&ctx);
+
+	/* The password first, since that is what is most unknown */
+	MD5_Update(&ctx, pw, strlen(pw));
+
+	/* Then our magic string */
+	MD5_Update(&ctx, magic, strlen(magic));
+
+	/* Then the raw salt */
+	MD5_Update(&ctx, sp, sl);
+
+	/* Then just as many characters of the MD5(pw, salt, pw) */
+	MD5_Init(&ctx1);
+	MD5_Update(&ctx1, pw, strlen(pw));
+	MD5_Update(&ctx1, sp, sl);
+	MD5_Update(&ctx1, pw, strlen(pw));
+	MD5_Final(final, &ctx1);
+
+	for(pl = strlen(pw); pl > 0; pl -= 16)
+		MD5_Update(&ctx, final, pl > 16 ? 16 : pl);
+
+	/* Don't leave anything around in vm they could use. */
+	memset(final, '\0', sizeof final);
+
+	/* Then something really weird... */
+	for (j = 0, i = strlen(pw); i != 0; i >>= 1)
+		if (i & 1)
+			MD5_Update(&ctx, final + j, 1);
+		else
+			MD5_Update(&ctx, pw + j, 1);
+
+	/* Now make the output string */
+	snprintf(passwd, sizeof(passwd), "%s%s$", magic, salt_copy);
+
+	MD5_Final(final, &ctx);
+
+	/*
+	 * and now, just to make sure things don't run too fast
+	 * On a 60 Mhz Pentium this takes 34 msec, so you would
+	 * need 30 seconds to build a 1000 entry dictionary...
+	 */
+	for(i = 0; i < 1000; i++) {
+		MD5_Init(&ctx1);
+		if (i & 1)
+			MD5_Update(&ctx1, pw, strlen(pw));
+		else
+			MD5_Update(&ctx1, final, 16);
+
+		if (i % 3)
+			MD5_Update(&ctx1, sp, sl);
+
+		if (i % 7)
+			MD5_Update(&ctx1, pw, strlen(pw));
+
+		if (i & 1)
+			MD5_Update(&ctx1, final, 16);
+		else
+			MD5_Update(&ctx1, pw, strlen(pw));
+
+		MD5_Final(final, &ctx1);
+	}
+
+	p = passwd + strlen(passwd);
+
+	l = (final[ 0]<<16) | (final[ 6]<<8) | final[12];
+	strlcat(passwd, to64(l, 4), sizeof(passwd));
+	l = (final[ 1]<<16) | (final[ 7]<<8) | final[13];
+	strlcat(passwd, to64(l, 4), sizeof(passwd));
+	l = (final[ 2]<<16) | (final[ 8]<<8) | final[14];
+	strlcat(passwd, to64(l, 4), sizeof(passwd));
+	l = (final[ 3]<<16) | (final[ 9]<<8) | final[15];
+	strlcat(passwd, to64(l, 4), sizeof(passwd));
+	l = (final[ 4]<<16) | (final[10]<<8) | final[ 5];
+	strlcat(passwd, to64(l, 4), sizeof(passwd));
+	l =                    final[11]                ;
+	strlcat(passwd, to64(l, 2), sizeof(passwd));
+
+	/* Don't leave anything around in vm they could use. */
+	memset(final, 0, sizeof(final));
+	memset(salt_copy, 0, sizeof(salt_copy));
+	memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+	memset(&ctx1, 0, sizeof(ctx1));
+	(void)to64(0, 4);
+
+	return (passwd);
+}
+
+#endif /* defined(HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS) && !defined(HAVE_MD5_CRYPT) */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/md5crypt.h b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/md5crypt.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2341e2c12
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/md5crypt.h
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+/*
+ * ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * "THE BEER-WARE LICENSE" (Revision 42):
+ * <phk@login.dknet.dk> wrote this file.  As long as you retain this notice you
+ * can do whatever you want with this stuff. If we meet some day, and you think
+ * this stuff is worth it, you can buy me a beer in return.   Poul-Henning Kamp
+ * ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+/* $Id: md5crypt.h,v 1.4 2003/05/18 14:46:46 djm Exp $ */
+
+#ifndef _MD5CRYPT_H
+#define _MD5CRYPT_H
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#if defined(HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS) && !defined(HAVE_MD5_CRYPT)
+
+int is_md5_salt(const char *);
+char *md5_crypt(const char *, const char *);
+
+#endif /* defined(HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS) && !defined(HAVE_MD5_CRYPT) */
+
+#endif /* MD5CRYPT_H */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/moduli.0 b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/moduli.0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..087e5963e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/moduli.0
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+MODULI(5)                     File Formats Manual                    MODULI(5)
+
+NAME
+     moduli M-bM-^@M-^S Diffie-Hellman moduli
+
+DESCRIPTION
+     The /etc/moduli file contains prime numbers and generators for use by
+     sshd(8) in the Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange key exchange method.
+
+     New moduli may be generated with ssh-keygen(1) using a two-step process.
+     An initial candidate generation pass, using ssh-keygen -G, calculates
+     numbers that are likely to be useful.  A second primality testing pass,
+     using ssh-keygen -T, provides a high degree of assurance that the numbers
+     are prime and are safe for use in Diffie-Hellman operations by sshd(8).
+     This moduli format is used as the output from each pass.
+
+     The file consists of newline-separated records, one per modulus,
+     containing seven space-separated fields.  These fields are as follows:
+
+           timestamp    The time that the modulus was last processed as
+                        YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.
+
+           type         Decimal number specifying the internal structure of
+                        the prime modulus.  Supported types are:
+
+                        0     Unknown, not tested.
+                        2     "Safe" prime; (p-1)/2 is also prime.
+                        4     Sophie Germain; 2p+1 is also prime.
+
+                        Moduli candidates initially produced by ssh-keygen(1)
+                        are Sophie Germain primes (type 4).  Further primality
+                        testing with ssh-keygen(1) produces safe prime moduli
+                        (type 2) that are ready for use in sshd(8).  Other
+                        types are not used by OpenSSH.
+
+           tests        Decimal number indicating the type of primality tests
+                        that the number has been subjected to represented as a
+                        bitmask of the following values:
+
+                        0x00  Not tested.
+                        0x01  Composite number M-bM-^@M-^S not prime.
+                        0x02  Sieve of Eratosthenes.
+                        0x04  Probabilistic Miller-Rabin primality tests.
+
+                        The ssh-keygen(1) moduli candidate generation uses the
+                        Sieve of Eratosthenes (flag 0x02).  Subsequent
+                        ssh-keygen(1) primality tests are Miller-Rabin tests
+                        (flag 0x04).
+
+           trials       Decimal number indicating the number of primality
+                        trials that have been performed on the modulus.
+
+           size         Decimal number indicating the size of the prime in
+                        bits.
+
+           generator    The recommended generator for use with this modulus
+                        (hexadecimal).
+
+           modulus      The modulus itself in hexadecimal.
+
+     When performing Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange, sshd(8) first estimates
+     the size of the modulus required to produce enough Diffie-Hellman output
+     to sufficiently key the selected symmetric cipher.  sshd(8) then randomly
+     selects a modulus from /etc/moduli that best meets the size requirement.
+
+SEE ALSO
+     ssh-keygen(1), sshd(8)
+
+STANDARDS
+     M. Friedl, N. Provos, and W. Simpson, Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for
+     the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol, RFC 4419, March 2006,
+     2006.
+
+OpenBSD 5.8                   September 26, 2012                   OpenBSD 5.8
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/.cvsignore b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/.cvsignore
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f3c7a7c5d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/.cvsignore
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Makefile
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/Makefile b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..32c4cf8d5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.56 2014/09/30 23:43:08 djm Exp $
+
+sysconfdir=${prefix}/etc
+piddir=/var/run
+srcdir=.
+top_srcdir=..
+
+
+CC=cc
+LD=cc
+CFLAGS=-g -O2 -Qunused-arguments -Wunknown-warning-option -Wall -Wpointer-arith -Wuninitialized -Wsign-compare -Wformat-security -Wsizeof-pointer-memaccess -Wno-pointer-sign -Wno-unused-result -fno-strict-aliasing -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 -ftrapv -fno-builtin-memset -fstack-protector-strong 
+CPPFLAGS=-I. -I.. -I$(srcdir) -I$(srcdir)/..  -DHAVE_CONFIG_H
+LIBS=-lcrypto -lutil -lz 
+AR=ar
+RANLIB=ranlib
+INSTALL=/usr/bin/install -c
+LDFLAGS=-L.  -Wl,-z,relro -Wl,-z,now -Wl,-z,noexecstack -fstack-protector-strong
+
+OPENBSD=base64.o basename.o bcrypt_pbkdf.o bindresvport.o blowfish.o daemon.o dirname.o fmt_scaled.o getcwd.o getgrouplist.o getopt_long.o getrrsetbyname.o glob.o inet_aton.o inet_ntoa.o inet_ntop.o mktemp.o pwcache.o readpassphrase.o reallocarray.o realpath.o rresvport.o setenv.o setproctitle.o sha1.o sha2.o rmd160.o md5.o sigact.o strlcat.o strlcpy.o strmode.o strnlen.o strptime.o strsep.o strtonum.o strtoll.o strtoul.o strtoull.o timingsafe_bcmp.o vis.o blowfish.o bcrypt_pbkdf.o explicit_bzero.o
+
+COMPAT=arc4random.o bsd-asprintf.o bsd-closefrom.o bsd-cray.o bsd-cygwin_util.o bsd-getpeereid.o getrrsetbyname-ldns.o bsd-misc.o bsd-nextstep.o bsd-openpty.o bsd-poll.o bsd-setres_id.o bsd-snprintf.o bsd-statvfs.o bsd-waitpid.o fake-rfc2553.o openssl-compat.o xmmap.o xcrypt.o kludge-fd_set.o
+
+PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o
+
+.c.o:
+	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $<
+
+all: libopenbsd-compat.a
+
+$(COMPAT): ../config.h
+$(OPENBSD): ../config.h
+$(PORTS): ../config.h
+
+libopenbsd-compat.a:  $(COMPAT) $(OPENBSD) $(PORTS)
+	$(AR) rv $@ $(COMPAT) $(OPENBSD) $(PORTS)
+	$(RANLIB) $@
+
+clean:
+	rm -f *.o *.a core 
+
+distclean: clean
+	rm -f Makefile *~
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3c5e3b7f7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.56 2014/09/30 23:43:08 djm Exp $
+
+sysconfdir=@sysconfdir@
+piddir=@piddir@
+srcdir=@srcdir@
+top_srcdir=@top_srcdir@
+
+VPATH=@srcdir@
+CC=@CC@
+LD=@LD@
+CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@
+CPPFLAGS=-I. -I.. -I$(srcdir) -I$(srcdir)/.. @CPPFLAGS@ @DEFS@
+LIBS=@LIBS@
+AR=@AR@
+RANLIB=@RANLIB@
+INSTALL=@INSTALL@
+LDFLAGS=-L. @LDFLAGS@
+
+OPENBSD=base64.o basename.o bcrypt_pbkdf.o bindresvport.o blowfish.o daemon.o dirname.o fmt_scaled.o getcwd.o getgrouplist.o getopt_long.o getrrsetbyname.o glob.o inet_aton.o inet_ntoa.o inet_ntop.o mktemp.o pwcache.o readpassphrase.o reallocarray.o realpath.o rresvport.o setenv.o setproctitle.o sha1.o sha2.o rmd160.o md5.o sigact.o strlcat.o strlcpy.o strmode.o strnlen.o strptime.o strsep.o strtonum.o strtoll.o strtoul.o strtoull.o timingsafe_bcmp.o vis.o blowfish.o bcrypt_pbkdf.o explicit_bzero.o
+
+COMPAT=arc4random.o bsd-asprintf.o bsd-closefrom.o bsd-cray.o bsd-cygwin_util.o bsd-getpeereid.o getrrsetbyname-ldns.o bsd-misc.o bsd-nextstep.o bsd-openpty.o bsd-poll.o bsd-setres_id.o bsd-snprintf.o bsd-statvfs.o bsd-waitpid.o fake-rfc2553.o openssl-compat.o xmmap.o xcrypt.o kludge-fd_set.o
+
+PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o
+
+.c.o:
+	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $<
+
+all: libopenbsd-compat.a
+
+$(COMPAT): ../config.h
+$(OPENBSD): ../config.h
+$(PORTS): ../config.h
+
+libopenbsd-compat.a:  $(COMPAT) $(OPENBSD) $(PORTS)
+	$(AR) rv $@ $(COMPAT) $(OPENBSD) $(PORTS)
+	$(RANLIB) $@
+
+clean:
+	rm -f *.o *.a core 
+
+distclean: clean
+	rm -f Makefile *~
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/arc4random.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/arc4random.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..046f57e61
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/arc4random.c
@@ -0,0 +1,328 @@
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/crypto/arc4random.c */
+
+/*	$OpenBSD: arc4random.c,v 1.25 2013/10/01 18:34:57 markus Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1996, David Mazieres <dm@uun.org>
+ * Copyright (c) 2008, Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
+ * Copyright (c) 2013, Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * ChaCha based random number generator for OpenBSD.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "log.h"
+
+#define KEYSTREAM_ONLY
+#include "chacha_private.h"
+
+#ifdef __GNUC__
+#define inline __inline
+#else				/* !__GNUC__ */
+#define inline
+#endif				/* !__GNUC__ */
+
+/* OpenSSH isn't multithreaded */
+#define _ARC4_LOCK()
+#define _ARC4_UNLOCK()
+
+#define KEYSZ	32
+#define IVSZ	8
+#define BLOCKSZ	64
+#define RSBUFSZ	(16*BLOCKSZ)
+static int rs_initialized;
+static pid_t rs_stir_pid;
+static chacha_ctx rs;		/* chacha context for random keystream */
+static u_char rs_buf[RSBUFSZ];	/* keystream blocks */
+static size_t rs_have;		/* valid bytes at end of rs_buf */
+static size_t rs_count;		/* bytes till reseed */
+
+static inline void _rs_rekey(u_char *dat, size_t datlen);
+
+static inline void
+_rs_init(u_char *buf, size_t n)
+{
+	if (n < KEYSZ + IVSZ)
+		return;
+	chacha_keysetup(&rs, buf, KEYSZ * 8, 0);
+	chacha_ivsetup(&rs, buf + KEYSZ);
+}
+
+#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL
+#define SSH_RANDOM_DEV "/dev/urandom"
+/* XXX use getrandom() if supported on Linux */
+static void
+getrnd(u_char *s, size_t len)
+{
+	int fd;
+	ssize_t r;
+	size_t o = 0;
+
+	if ((fd = open(SSH_RANDOM_DEV, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
+		fatal("Couldn't open %s: %s", SSH_RANDOM_DEV, strerror(errno));
+	while (o < len) {
+		r = read(fd, s + o, len - o);
+		if (r < 0) {
+			if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR ||
+			    errno == EWOULDBLOCK)
+				continue;
+			fatal("read %s: %s", SSH_RANDOM_DEV, strerror(errno));
+		}
+		o += r;
+	}
+	close(fd);
+}
+#endif
+
+static void
+_rs_stir(void)
+{
+	u_char rnd[KEYSZ + IVSZ];
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	if (RAND_bytes(rnd, sizeof(rnd)) <= 0)
+		fatal("Couldn't obtain random bytes (error %ld)",
+		    ERR_get_error());
+#else
+	getrnd(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+#endif
+
+	if (!rs_initialized) {
+		rs_initialized = 1;
+		_rs_init(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+	} else
+		_rs_rekey(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+	explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+
+	/* invalidate rs_buf */
+	rs_have = 0;
+	memset(rs_buf, 0, RSBUFSZ);
+
+	rs_count = 1600000;
+}
+
+static inline void
+_rs_stir_if_needed(size_t len)
+{
+	pid_t pid = getpid();
+
+	if (rs_count <= len || !rs_initialized || rs_stir_pid != pid) {
+		rs_stir_pid = pid;
+		_rs_stir();
+	} else
+		rs_count -= len;
+}
+
+static inline void
+_rs_rekey(u_char *dat, size_t datlen)
+{
+#ifndef KEYSTREAM_ONLY
+	memset(rs_buf, 0,RSBUFSZ);
+#endif
+	/* fill rs_buf with the keystream */
+	chacha_encrypt_bytes(&rs, rs_buf, rs_buf, RSBUFSZ);
+	/* mix in optional user provided data */
+	if (dat) {
+		size_t i, m;
+
+		m = MIN(datlen, KEYSZ + IVSZ);
+		for (i = 0; i < m; i++)
+			rs_buf[i] ^= dat[i];
+	}
+	/* immediately reinit for backtracking resistance */
+	_rs_init(rs_buf, KEYSZ + IVSZ);
+	memset(rs_buf, 0, KEYSZ + IVSZ);
+	rs_have = RSBUFSZ - KEYSZ - IVSZ;
+}
+
+static inline void
+_rs_random_buf(void *_buf, size_t n)
+{
+	u_char *buf = (u_char *)_buf;
+	size_t m;
+
+	_rs_stir_if_needed(n);
+	while (n > 0) {
+		if (rs_have > 0) {
+			m = MIN(n, rs_have);
+			memcpy(buf, rs_buf + RSBUFSZ - rs_have, m);
+			memset(rs_buf + RSBUFSZ - rs_have, 0, m);
+			buf += m;
+			n -= m;
+			rs_have -= m;
+		}
+		if (rs_have == 0)
+			_rs_rekey(NULL, 0);
+	}
+}
+
+static inline void
+_rs_random_u32(u_int32_t *val)
+{
+	_rs_stir_if_needed(sizeof(*val));
+	if (rs_have < sizeof(*val))
+		_rs_rekey(NULL, 0);
+	memcpy(val, rs_buf + RSBUFSZ - rs_have, sizeof(*val));
+	memset(rs_buf + RSBUFSZ - rs_have, 0, sizeof(*val));
+	rs_have -= sizeof(*val);
+	return;
+}
+
+void
+arc4random_stir(void)
+{
+	_ARC4_LOCK();
+	_rs_stir();
+	_ARC4_UNLOCK();
+}
+
+void
+arc4random_addrandom(u_char *dat, int datlen)
+{
+	int m;
+
+	_ARC4_LOCK();
+	if (!rs_initialized)
+		_rs_stir();
+	while (datlen > 0) {
+		m = MIN(datlen, KEYSZ + IVSZ);
+		_rs_rekey(dat, m);
+		dat += m;
+		datlen -= m;
+	}
+	_ARC4_UNLOCK();
+}
+
+u_int32_t
+arc4random(void)
+{
+	u_int32_t val;
+
+	_ARC4_LOCK();
+	_rs_random_u32(&val);
+	_ARC4_UNLOCK();
+	return val;
+}
+
+/*
+ * If we are providing arc4random, then we can provide a more efficient 
+ * arc4random_buf().
+ */
+# ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF
+void
+arc4random_buf(void *buf, size_t n)
+{
+	_ARC4_LOCK();
+	_rs_random_buf(buf, n);
+	_ARC4_UNLOCK();
+}
+# endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF */
+#endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM */
+
+/* arc4random_buf() that uses platform arc4random() */
+#if !defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF) && defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM)
+void
+arc4random_buf(void *_buf, size_t n)
+{
+	size_t i;
+	u_int32_t r = 0;
+	char *buf = (char *)_buf;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+		if (i % 4 == 0)
+			r = arc4random();
+		buf[i] = r & 0xff;
+		r >>= 8;
+	}
+	explicit_bzero(&r, sizeof(r));
+}
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF) && defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM) */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM
+/*
+ * Calculate a uniformly distributed random number less than upper_bound
+ * avoiding "modulo bias".
+ *
+ * Uniformity is achieved by generating new random numbers until the one
+ * returned is outside the range [0, 2**32 % upper_bound).  This
+ * guarantees the selected random number will be inside
+ * [2**32 % upper_bound, 2**32) which maps back to [0, upper_bound)
+ * after reduction modulo upper_bound.
+ */
+u_int32_t
+arc4random_uniform(u_int32_t upper_bound)
+{
+	u_int32_t r, min;
+
+	if (upper_bound < 2)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* 2**32 % x == (2**32 - x) % x */
+	min = -upper_bound % upper_bound;
+
+	/*
+	 * This could theoretically loop forever but each retry has
+	 * p > 0.5 (worst case, usually far better) of selecting a
+	 * number inside the range we need, so it should rarely need
+	 * to re-roll.
+	 */
+	for (;;) {
+		r = arc4random();
+		if (r >= min)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	return r % upper_bound;
+}
+#endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM */
+
+#if 0
+/*-------- Test code for i386 --------*/
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <machine/pctr.h>
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	const int iter = 1000000;
+	int     i;
+	pctrval v;
+
+	v = rdtsc();
+	for (i = 0; i < iter; i++)
+		arc4random();
+	v = rdtsc() - v;
+	v /= iter;
+
+	printf("%qd cycles\n", v);
+	exit(0);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/base64.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/base64.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9e7466716
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/base64.c
@@ -0,0 +1,315 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: base64.c,v 1.5 2006/10/21 09:55:03 otto Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1996 by Internet Software Consortium.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND INTERNET SOFTWARE CONSORTIUM DISCLAIMS
+ * ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL INTERNET SOFTWARE
+ * CONSORTIUM BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR
+ * PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS
+ * ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1995 by International Business Machines, Inc.
+ *
+ * International Business Machines, Inc. (hereinafter called IBM) grants
+ * permission under its copyrights to use, copy, modify, and distribute this
+ * Software with or without fee, provided that the above copyright notice and
+ * all paragraphs of this notice appear in all copies, and that the name of IBM
+ * not be used in connection with the marketing of any product incorporating
+ * the Software or modifications thereof, without specific, written prior
+ * permission.
+ *
+ * To the extent it has a right to do so, IBM grants an immunity from suit
+ * under its patents, if any, for the use, sale or manufacture of products to
+ * the extent that such products are used for performing Domain Name System
+ * dynamic updates in TCP/IP networks by means of the Software.  No immunity is
+ * granted for any product per se or for any other function of any product.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", AND IBM DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES,
+ * INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A
+ * PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  IN NO EVENT SHALL IBM BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL,
+ * DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER ARISING
+ * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN
+ * IF IBM IS APPRISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/net/base64.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if (!defined(HAVE_B64_NTOP) && !defined(HAVE___B64_NTOP)) || (!defined(HAVE_B64_PTON) && !defined(HAVE___B64_PTON))
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "base64.h"
+
+static const char Base64[] =
+	"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/";
+static const char Pad64 = '=';
+
+/* (From RFC1521 and draft-ietf-dnssec-secext-03.txt)
+   The following encoding technique is taken from RFC 1521 by Borenstein
+   and Freed.  It is reproduced here in a slightly edited form for
+   convenience.
+
+   A 65-character subset of US-ASCII is used, enabling 6 bits to be
+   represented per printable character. (The extra 65th character, "=",
+   is used to signify a special processing function.)
+
+   The encoding process represents 24-bit groups of input bits as output
+   strings of 4 encoded characters. Proceeding from left to right, a
+   24-bit input group is formed by concatenating 3 8-bit input groups.
+   These 24 bits are then treated as 4 concatenated 6-bit groups, each
+   of which is translated into a single digit in the base64 alphabet.
+
+   Each 6-bit group is used as an index into an array of 64 printable
+   characters. The character referenced by the index is placed in the
+   output string.
+
+                         Table 1: The Base64 Alphabet
+
+      Value Encoding  Value Encoding  Value Encoding  Value Encoding
+          0 A            17 R            34 i            51 z
+          1 B            18 S            35 j            52 0
+          2 C            19 T            36 k            53 1
+          3 D            20 U            37 l            54 2
+          4 E            21 V            38 m            55 3
+          5 F            22 W            39 n            56 4
+          6 G            23 X            40 o            57 5
+          7 H            24 Y            41 p            58 6
+          8 I            25 Z            42 q            59 7
+          9 J            26 a            43 r            60 8
+         10 K            27 b            44 s            61 9
+         11 L            28 c            45 t            62 +
+         12 M            29 d            46 u            63 /
+         13 N            30 e            47 v
+         14 O            31 f            48 w         (pad) =
+         15 P            32 g            49 x
+         16 Q            33 h            50 y
+
+   Special processing is performed if fewer than 24 bits are available
+   at the end of the data being encoded.  A full encoding quantum is
+   always completed at the end of a quantity.  When fewer than 24 input
+   bits are available in an input group, zero bits are added (on the
+   right) to form an integral number of 6-bit groups.  Padding at the
+   end of the data is performed using the '=' character.
+
+   Since all base64 input is an integral number of octets, only the
+         -------------------------------------------------                       
+   following cases can arise:
+   
+       (1) the final quantum of encoding input is an integral
+           multiple of 24 bits; here, the final unit of encoded
+	   output will be an integral multiple of 4 characters
+	   with no "=" padding,
+       (2) the final quantum of encoding input is exactly 8 bits;
+           here, the final unit of encoded output will be two
+	   characters followed by two "=" padding characters, or
+       (3) the final quantum of encoding input is exactly 16 bits;
+           here, the final unit of encoded output will be three
+	   characters followed by one "=" padding character.
+   */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_B64_NTOP) && !defined(HAVE___B64_NTOP) 
+int
+b64_ntop(u_char const *src, size_t srclength, char *target, size_t targsize)
+{
+	size_t datalength = 0;
+	u_char input[3];
+	u_char output[4];
+	u_int i;
+
+	while (2 < srclength) {
+		input[0] = *src++;
+		input[1] = *src++;
+		input[2] = *src++;
+		srclength -= 3;
+
+		output[0] = input[0] >> 2;
+		output[1] = ((input[0] & 0x03) << 4) + (input[1] >> 4);
+		output[2] = ((input[1] & 0x0f) << 2) + (input[2] >> 6);
+		output[3] = input[2] & 0x3f;
+
+		if (datalength + 4 > targsize)
+			return (-1);
+		target[datalength++] = Base64[output[0]];
+		target[datalength++] = Base64[output[1]];
+		target[datalength++] = Base64[output[2]];
+		target[datalength++] = Base64[output[3]];
+	}
+    
+	/* Now we worry about padding. */
+	if (0 != srclength) {
+		/* Get what's left. */
+		input[0] = input[1] = input[2] = '\0';
+		for (i = 0; i < srclength; i++)
+			input[i] = *src++;
+	
+		output[0] = input[0] >> 2;
+		output[1] = ((input[0] & 0x03) << 4) + (input[1] >> 4);
+		output[2] = ((input[1] & 0x0f) << 2) + (input[2] >> 6);
+
+		if (datalength + 4 > targsize)
+			return (-1);
+		target[datalength++] = Base64[output[0]];
+		target[datalength++] = Base64[output[1]];
+		if (srclength == 1)
+			target[datalength++] = Pad64;
+		else
+			target[datalength++] = Base64[output[2]];
+		target[datalength++] = Pad64;
+	}
+	if (datalength >= targsize)
+		return (-1);
+	target[datalength] = '\0';	/* Returned value doesn't count \0. */
+	return (datalength);
+}
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_B64_NTOP) && !defined(HAVE___B64_NTOP) */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_B64_PTON) && !defined(HAVE___B64_PTON)
+
+/* skips all whitespace anywhere.
+   converts characters, four at a time, starting at (or after)
+   src from base - 64 numbers into three 8 bit bytes in the target area.
+   it returns the number of data bytes stored at the target, or -1 on error.
+ */
+
+int
+b64_pton(char const *src, u_char *target, size_t targsize)
+{
+	u_int tarindex, state;
+	int ch;
+	char *pos;
+
+	state = 0;
+	tarindex = 0;
+
+	while ((ch = *src++) != '\0') {
+		if (isspace(ch))	/* Skip whitespace anywhere. */
+			continue;
+
+		if (ch == Pad64)
+			break;
+
+		pos = strchr(Base64, ch);
+		if (pos == 0) 		/* A non-base64 character. */
+			return (-1);
+
+		switch (state) {
+		case 0:
+			if (target) {
+				if (tarindex >= targsize)
+					return (-1);
+				target[tarindex] = (pos - Base64) << 2;
+			}
+			state = 1;
+			break;
+		case 1:
+			if (target) {
+				if (tarindex + 1 >= targsize)
+					return (-1);
+				target[tarindex]   |=  (pos - Base64) >> 4;
+				target[tarindex+1]  = ((pos - Base64) & 0x0f)
+							<< 4 ;
+			}
+			tarindex++;
+			state = 2;
+			break;
+		case 2:
+			if (target) {
+				if (tarindex + 1 >= targsize)
+					return (-1);
+				target[tarindex]   |=  (pos - Base64) >> 2;
+				target[tarindex+1]  = ((pos - Base64) & 0x03)
+							<< 6;
+			}
+			tarindex++;
+			state = 3;
+			break;
+		case 3:
+			if (target) {
+				if (tarindex >= targsize)
+					return (-1);
+				target[tarindex] |= (pos - Base64);
+			}
+			tarindex++;
+			state = 0;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * We are done decoding Base-64 chars.  Let's see if we ended
+	 * on a byte boundary, and/or with erroneous trailing characters.
+	 */
+
+	if (ch == Pad64) {		/* We got a pad char. */
+		ch = *src++;		/* Skip it, get next. */
+		switch (state) {
+		case 0:		/* Invalid = in first position */
+		case 1:		/* Invalid = in second position */
+			return (-1);
+
+		case 2:		/* Valid, means one byte of info */
+			/* Skip any number of spaces. */
+			for (; ch != '\0'; ch = *src++)
+				if (!isspace(ch))
+					break;
+			/* Make sure there is another trailing = sign. */
+			if (ch != Pad64)
+				return (-1);
+			ch = *src++;		/* Skip the = */
+			/* Fall through to "single trailing =" case. */
+			/* FALLTHROUGH */
+
+		case 3:		/* Valid, means two bytes of info */
+			/*
+			 * We know this char is an =.  Is there anything but
+			 * whitespace after it?
+			 */
+			for (; ch != '\0'; ch = *src++)
+				if (!isspace(ch))
+					return (-1);
+
+			/*
+			 * Now make sure for cases 2 and 3 that the "extra"
+			 * bits that slopped past the last full byte were
+			 * zeros.  If we don't check them, they become a
+			 * subliminal channel.
+			 */
+			if (target && target[tarindex] != 0)
+				return (-1);
+		}
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * We ended by seeing the end of the string.  Make sure we
+		 * have no partial bytes lying around.
+		 */
+		if (state != 0)
+			return (-1);
+	}
+
+	return (tarindex);
+}
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_B64_PTON) && !defined(HAVE___B64_PTON) */
+#endif 
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/base64.h b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/base64.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..732c6b3f8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/base64.h
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+/* $Id: base64.h,v 1.6 2003/08/29 16:59:52 mouring Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1996 by Internet Software Consortium.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND INTERNET SOFTWARE CONSORTIUM DISCLAIMS
+ * ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL INTERNET SOFTWARE
+ * CONSORTIUM BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR
+ * PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS
+ * ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1995 by International Business Machines, Inc.
+ *
+ * International Business Machines, Inc. (hereinafter called IBM) grants
+ * permission under its copyrights to use, copy, modify, and distribute this
+ * Software with or without fee, provided that the above copyright notice and
+ * all paragraphs of this notice appear in all copies, and that the name of IBM
+ * not be used in connection with the marketing of any product incorporating
+ * the Software or modifications thereof, without specific, written prior
+ * permission.
+ *
+ * To the extent it has a right to do so, IBM grants an immunity from suit
+ * under its patents, if any, for the use, sale or manufacture of products to
+ * the extent that such products are used for performing Domain Name System
+ * dynamic updates in TCP/IP networks by means of the Software.  No immunity is
+ * granted for any product per se or for any other function of any product.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", AND IBM DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES,
+ * INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A
+ * PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  IN NO EVENT SHALL IBM BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL,
+ * DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER ARISING
+ * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN
+ * IF IBM IS APPRISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _BSD_BASE64_H
+#define _BSD_BASE64_H
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE___B64_NTOP
+# ifndef HAVE_B64_NTOP
+int b64_ntop(u_char const *src, size_t srclength, char *target, 
+    size_t targsize);
+# endif /* !HAVE_B64_NTOP */
+# define __b64_ntop(a,b,c,d) b64_ntop(a,b,c,d)
+#endif /* HAVE___B64_NTOP */
+
+#ifndef HAVE___B64_PTON
+# ifndef HAVE_B64_PTON
+int b64_pton(char const *src, u_char *target, size_t targsize);
+# endif /* !HAVE_B64_PTON */
+# define __b64_pton(a,b,c) b64_pton(a,b,c)
+#endif /* HAVE___B64_PTON */
+
+#endif /* _BSD_BASE64_H */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/basename.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/basename.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ffa5c8984
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/basename.c
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: basename.c,v 1.14 2005/08/08 08:05:33 espie Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1997, 2004 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/basename.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#ifndef HAVE_BASENAME
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+char *
+basename(const char *path)
+{
+	static char bname[MAXPATHLEN];
+	size_t len;
+	const char *endp, *startp;
+
+	/* Empty or NULL string gets treated as "." */
+	if (path == NULL || *path == '\0') {
+		bname[0] = '.';
+		bname[1] = '\0';
+		return (bname);
+	}
+
+	/* Strip any trailing slashes */
+	endp = path + strlen(path) - 1;
+	while (endp > path && *endp == '/')
+		endp--;
+
+	/* All slashes becomes "/" */
+	if (endp == path && *endp == '/') {
+		bname[0] = '/';
+		bname[1] = '\0';
+		return (bname);
+	}
+
+	/* Find the start of the base */
+	startp = endp;
+	while (startp > path && *(startp - 1) != '/')
+		startp--;
+
+	len = endp - startp + 1;
+	if (len >= sizeof(bname)) {
+		errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+	memcpy(bname, startp, len);
+	bname[len] = '\0';
+	return (bname);
+}
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_BASENAME) */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bcrypt_pbkdf.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bcrypt_pbkdf.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0a07f9a0f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bcrypt_pbkdf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: bcrypt_pbkdf.c,v 1.13 2015/01/12 03:20:04 tedu Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2013 Ted Unangst <tedu@openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_STDLIB_H
+# include <stdlib.h>
+#endif
+#include <string.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_BLF_H
+# include <blf.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "crypto_api.h"
+#ifdef SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH
+# undef SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH
+#endif
+#define SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH crypto_hash_sha512_BYTES
+
+#define	MINIMUM(a,b) (((a) < (b)) ? (a) : (b))
+
+/*
+ * pkcs #5 pbkdf2 implementation using the "bcrypt" hash
+ *
+ * The bcrypt hash function is derived from the bcrypt password hashing
+ * function with the following modifications:
+ * 1. The input password and salt are preprocessed with SHA512.
+ * 2. The output length is expanded to 256 bits.
+ * 3. Subsequently the magic string to be encrypted is lengthened and modifed
+ *    to "OxychromaticBlowfishSwatDynamite"
+ * 4. The hash function is defined to perform 64 rounds of initial state
+ *    expansion. (More rounds are performed by iterating the hash.)
+ *
+ * Note that this implementation pulls the SHA512 operations into the caller
+ * as a performance optimization.
+ *
+ * One modification from official pbkdf2. Instead of outputting key material
+ * linearly, we mix it. pbkdf2 has a known weakness where if one uses it to
+ * generate (e.g.) 512 bits of key material for use as two 256 bit keys, an
+ * attacker can merely run once through the outer loop, but the user
+ * always runs it twice. Shuffling output bytes requires computing the
+ * entirety of the key material to assemble any subkey. This is something a
+ * wise caller could do; we just do it for you.
+ */
+
+#define BCRYPT_WORDS 8
+#define BCRYPT_HASHSIZE (BCRYPT_WORDS * 4)
+
+static void
+bcrypt_hash(u_int8_t *sha2pass, u_int8_t *sha2salt, u_int8_t *out)
+{
+	blf_ctx state;
+	u_int8_t ciphertext[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE] =
+	    "OxychromaticBlowfishSwatDynamite";
+	uint32_t cdata[BCRYPT_WORDS];
+	int i;
+	uint16_t j;
+	size_t shalen = SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+
+	/* key expansion */
+	Blowfish_initstate(&state);
+	Blowfish_expandstate(&state, sha2salt, shalen, sha2pass, shalen);
+	for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
+		Blowfish_expand0state(&state, sha2salt, shalen);
+		Blowfish_expand0state(&state, sha2pass, shalen);
+	}
+
+	/* encryption */
+	j = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < BCRYPT_WORDS; i++)
+		cdata[i] = Blowfish_stream2word(ciphertext, sizeof(ciphertext),
+		    &j);
+	for (i = 0; i < 64; i++)
+		blf_enc(&state, cdata, sizeof(cdata) / sizeof(uint64_t));
+
+	/* copy out */
+	for (i = 0; i < BCRYPT_WORDS; i++) {
+		out[4 * i + 3] = (cdata[i] >> 24) & 0xff;
+		out[4 * i + 2] = (cdata[i] >> 16) & 0xff;
+		out[4 * i + 1] = (cdata[i] >> 8) & 0xff;
+		out[4 * i + 0] = cdata[i] & 0xff;
+	}
+
+	/* zap */
+	explicit_bzero(ciphertext, sizeof(ciphertext));
+	explicit_bzero(cdata, sizeof(cdata));
+	explicit_bzero(&state, sizeof(state));
+}
+
+int
+bcrypt_pbkdf(const char *pass, size_t passlen, const u_int8_t *salt, size_t saltlen,
+    u_int8_t *key, size_t keylen, unsigned int rounds)
+{
+	u_int8_t sha2pass[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+	u_int8_t sha2salt[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+	u_int8_t out[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE];
+	u_int8_t tmpout[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE];
+	u_int8_t *countsalt;
+	size_t i, j, amt, stride;
+	uint32_t count;
+	size_t origkeylen = keylen;
+
+	/* nothing crazy */
+	if (rounds < 1)
+		return -1;
+	if (passlen == 0 || saltlen == 0 || keylen == 0 ||
+	    keylen > sizeof(out) * sizeof(out) || saltlen > 1<<20)
+		return -1;
+	if ((countsalt = calloc(1, saltlen + 4)) == NULL)
+		return -1;
+	stride = (keylen + sizeof(out) - 1) / sizeof(out);
+	amt = (keylen + stride - 1) / stride;
+
+	memcpy(countsalt, salt, saltlen);
+
+	/* collapse password */
+	crypto_hash_sha512(sha2pass, pass, passlen);
+
+	/* generate key, sizeof(out) at a time */
+	for (count = 1; keylen > 0; count++) {
+		countsalt[saltlen + 0] = (count >> 24) & 0xff;
+		countsalt[saltlen + 1] = (count >> 16) & 0xff;
+		countsalt[saltlen + 2] = (count >> 8) & 0xff;
+		countsalt[saltlen + 3] = count & 0xff;
+
+		/* first round, salt is salt */
+		crypto_hash_sha512(sha2salt, countsalt, saltlen + 4);
+
+		bcrypt_hash(sha2pass, sha2salt, tmpout);
+		memcpy(out, tmpout, sizeof(out));
+
+		for (i = 1; i < rounds; i++) {
+			/* subsequent rounds, salt is previous output */
+			crypto_hash_sha512(sha2salt, tmpout, sizeof(tmpout));
+			bcrypt_hash(sha2pass, sha2salt, tmpout);
+			for (j = 0; j < sizeof(out); j++)
+				out[j] ^= tmpout[j];
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * pbkdf2 deviation: output the key material non-linearly.
+		 */
+		amt = MINIMUM(amt, keylen);
+		for (i = 0; i < amt; i++) {
+			size_t dest = i * stride + (count - 1);
+			if (dest >= origkeylen)
+				break;
+			key[dest] = out[i];
+		}
+		keylen -= i;
+	}
+
+	/* zap */
+	explicit_bzero(out, sizeof(out));
+	free(countsalt);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c89f21403
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+/* This file has be substantially modified from the original OpenBSD source */
+
+/*	$OpenBSD: bindresvport.c,v 1.17 2005/12/21 01:40:22 millert Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * Copyright 1996, Jason Downs.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright 1998, Theo de Raadt.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright 2000, Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/rpc/bindresvport.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_BINDRESVPORT_SA
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#define STARTPORT 600
+#define ENDPORT (IPPORT_RESERVED - 1)
+#define NPORTS	(ENDPORT - STARTPORT + 1)
+
+/*
+ * Bind a socket to a privileged IP port
+ */
+int
+bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr *sa)
+{
+	int error, af;
+	struct sockaddr_storage myaddr;
+	struct sockaddr_in *in;
+	struct sockaddr_in6 *in6;
+	u_int16_t *portp;
+	u_int16_t port;
+	socklen_t salen;
+	int i;
+
+	if (sa == NULL) {
+		memset(&myaddr, 0, sizeof(myaddr));
+		sa = (struct sockaddr *)&myaddr;
+
+		if (getsockname(sd, sa, &salen) == -1)
+			return -1;	/* errno is correctly set */
+
+		af = sa->sa_family;
+		memset(&myaddr, 0, salen);
+	} else
+		af = sa->sa_family;
+
+	if (af == AF_INET) {
+		in = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa;
+		salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
+		portp = &in->sin_port;
+	} else if (af == AF_INET6) {
+		in6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa;
+		salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
+		portp = &in6->sin6_port;
+	} else {
+		errno = EPFNOSUPPORT;
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	sa->sa_family = af;
+
+	port = ntohs(*portp);
+	if (port == 0)
+		port = arc4random_uniform(NPORTS) + STARTPORT;
+
+	/* Avoid warning */
+	error = -1;
+
+	for(i = 0; i < NPORTS; i++) {
+		*portp = htons(port);
+		
+		error = bind(sd, sa, salen);
+
+		/* Terminate on success */
+		if (error == 0)
+			break;
+			
+		/* Terminate on errors, except "address already in use" */
+		if ((error < 0) && !((errno == EADDRINUSE) || (errno == EINVAL)))
+			break;
+			
+		port++;
+		if (port > ENDPORT)
+			port = STARTPORT;
+	}
+
+	return (error);
+}
+
+#endif /* HAVE_BINDRESVPORT_SA */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/blf.h b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/blf.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f1ac5a5c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/blf.h
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: blf.h,v 1.7 2007/03/14 17:59:41 grunk Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Blowfish - a fast block cipher designed by Bruce Schneier
+ *
+ * Copyright 1997 Niels Provos <provos@physnet.uni-hamburg.de>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *      This product includes software developed by Niels Provos.
+ * 4. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products
+ *    derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _BLF_H_
+#define _BLF_H_
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF) && !defined(HAVE_BLH_H)
+
+/* Schneier specifies a maximum key length of 56 bytes.
+ * This ensures that every key bit affects every cipher
+ * bit.  However, the subkeys can hold up to 72 bytes.
+ * Warning: For normal blowfish encryption only 56 bytes
+ * of the key affect all cipherbits.
+ */
+
+#define BLF_N	16			/* Number of Subkeys */
+#define BLF_MAXKEYLEN ((BLF_N-2)*4)	/* 448 bits */
+#define BLF_MAXUTILIZED ((BLF_N+2)*4)	/* 576 bits */
+
+/* Blowfish context */
+typedef struct BlowfishContext {
+	u_int32_t S[4][256];	/* S-Boxes */
+	u_int32_t P[BLF_N + 2];	/* Subkeys */
+} blf_ctx;
+
+/* Raw access to customized Blowfish
+ *	blf_key is just:
+ *	Blowfish_initstate( state )
+ *	Blowfish_expand0state( state, key, keylen )
+ */
+
+void Blowfish_encipher(blf_ctx *, u_int32_t *, u_int32_t *);
+void Blowfish_decipher(blf_ctx *, u_int32_t *, u_int32_t *);
+void Blowfish_initstate(blf_ctx *);
+void Blowfish_expand0state(blf_ctx *, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t);
+void Blowfish_expandstate
+(blf_ctx *, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t);
+
+/* Standard Blowfish */
+
+void blf_key(blf_ctx *, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t);
+void blf_enc(blf_ctx *, u_int32_t *, u_int16_t);
+void blf_dec(blf_ctx *, u_int32_t *, u_int16_t);
+
+void blf_ecb_encrypt(blf_ctx *, u_int8_t *, u_int32_t);
+void blf_ecb_decrypt(blf_ctx *, u_int8_t *, u_int32_t);
+
+void blf_cbc_encrypt(blf_ctx *, u_int8_t *, u_int8_t *, u_int32_t);
+void blf_cbc_decrypt(blf_ctx *, u_int8_t *, u_int8_t *, u_int32_t);
+
+/* Converts u_int8_t to u_int32_t */
+u_int32_t Blowfish_stream2word(const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t , u_int16_t *);
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF) && !defined(HAVE_BLH_H) */
+#endif /* _BLF_H */
+
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/blowfish.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/blowfish.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e10f7e7d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/blowfish.c
@@ -0,0 +1,696 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: blowfish.c,v 1.18 2004/11/02 17:23:26 hshoexer Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Blowfish block cipher for OpenBSD
+ * Copyright 1997 Niels Provos <provos@physnet.uni-hamburg.de>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Implementation advice by David Mazieres <dm@lcs.mit.edu>.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *      This product includes software developed by Niels Provos.
+ * 4. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products
+ *    derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * This code is derived from section 14.3 and the given source
+ * in section V of Applied Cryptography, second edition.
+ * Blowfish is an unpatented fast block cipher designed by
+ * Bruce Schneier.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF) && (!defined(HAVE_BLOWFISH_INITSTATE) || \
+    !defined(HAVE_BLOWFISH_EXPAND0STATE) || !defined(HAVE_BLF_ENC))
+
+#if 0
+#include <stdio.h>		/* used for debugging */
+#include <string.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_BLF_H
+#include <blf.h>
+#endif
+
+#undef inline
+#ifdef __GNUC__
+#define inline __inline
+#else				/* !__GNUC__ */
+#define inline
+#endif				/* !__GNUC__ */
+
+/* Function for Feistel Networks */
+
+#define F(s, x) ((((s)[        (((x)>>24)&0xFF)]  \
+		 + (s)[0x100 + (((x)>>16)&0xFF)]) \
+		 ^ (s)[0x200 + (((x)>> 8)&0xFF)]) \
+		 + (s)[0x300 + ( (x)     &0xFF)])
+
+#define BLFRND(s,p,i,j,n) (i ^= F(s,j) ^ (p)[n])
+
+void
+Blowfish_encipher(blf_ctx *c, u_int32_t *xl, u_int32_t *xr)
+{
+	u_int32_t Xl;
+	u_int32_t Xr;
+	u_int32_t *s = c->S[0];
+	u_int32_t *p = c->P;
+
+	Xl = *xl;
+	Xr = *xr;
+
+	Xl ^= p[0];
+	BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 1); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 2);
+	BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 3); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 4);
+	BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 5); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 6);
+	BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 7); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 8);
+	BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 9); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 10);
+	BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 11); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 12);
+	BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 13); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 14);
+	BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 15); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 16);
+
+	*xl = Xr ^ p[17];
+	*xr = Xl;
+}
+
+void
+Blowfish_decipher(blf_ctx *c, u_int32_t *xl, u_int32_t *xr)
+{
+	u_int32_t Xl;
+	u_int32_t Xr;
+	u_int32_t *s = c->S[0];
+	u_int32_t *p = c->P;
+
+	Xl = *xl;
+	Xr = *xr;
+
+	Xl ^= p[17];
+	BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 16); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 15);
+	BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 14); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 13);
+	BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 12); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 11);
+	BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 10); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 9);
+	BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 8); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 7);
+	BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 6); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 5);
+	BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 4); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 3);
+	BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 2); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 1);
+
+	*xl = Xr ^ p[0];
+	*xr = Xl;
+}
+
+void
+Blowfish_initstate(blf_ctx *c)
+{
+	/* P-box and S-box tables initialized with digits of Pi */
+
+	static const blf_ctx initstate =
+	{ {
+		{
+			0xd1310ba6, 0x98dfb5ac, 0x2ffd72db, 0xd01adfb7,
+			0xb8e1afed, 0x6a267e96, 0xba7c9045, 0xf12c7f99,
+			0x24a19947, 0xb3916cf7, 0x0801f2e2, 0x858efc16,
+			0x636920d8, 0x71574e69, 0xa458fea3, 0xf4933d7e,
+			0x0d95748f, 0x728eb658, 0x718bcd58, 0x82154aee,
+			0x7b54a41d, 0xc25a59b5, 0x9c30d539, 0x2af26013,
+			0xc5d1b023, 0x286085f0, 0xca417918, 0xb8db38ef,
+			0x8e79dcb0, 0x603a180e, 0x6c9e0e8b, 0xb01e8a3e,
+			0xd71577c1, 0xbd314b27, 0x78af2fda, 0x55605c60,
+			0xe65525f3, 0xaa55ab94, 0x57489862, 0x63e81440,
+			0x55ca396a, 0x2aab10b6, 0xb4cc5c34, 0x1141e8ce,
+			0xa15486af, 0x7c72e993, 0xb3ee1411, 0x636fbc2a,
+			0x2ba9c55d, 0x741831f6, 0xce5c3e16, 0x9b87931e,
+			0xafd6ba33, 0x6c24cf5c, 0x7a325381, 0x28958677,
+			0x3b8f4898, 0x6b4bb9af, 0xc4bfe81b, 0x66282193,
+			0x61d809cc, 0xfb21a991, 0x487cac60, 0x5dec8032,
+			0xef845d5d, 0xe98575b1, 0xdc262302, 0xeb651b88,
+			0x23893e81, 0xd396acc5, 0x0f6d6ff3, 0x83f44239,
+			0x2e0b4482, 0xa4842004, 0x69c8f04a, 0x9e1f9b5e,
+			0x21c66842, 0xf6e96c9a, 0x670c9c61, 0xabd388f0,
+			0x6a51a0d2, 0xd8542f68, 0x960fa728, 0xab5133a3,
+			0x6eef0b6c, 0x137a3be4, 0xba3bf050, 0x7efb2a98,
+			0xa1f1651d, 0x39af0176, 0x66ca593e, 0x82430e88,
+			0x8cee8619, 0x456f9fb4, 0x7d84a5c3, 0x3b8b5ebe,
+			0xe06f75d8, 0x85c12073, 0x401a449f, 0x56c16aa6,
+			0x4ed3aa62, 0x363f7706, 0x1bfedf72, 0x429b023d,
+			0x37d0d724, 0xd00a1248, 0xdb0fead3, 0x49f1c09b,
+			0x075372c9, 0x80991b7b, 0x25d479d8, 0xf6e8def7,
+			0xe3fe501a, 0xb6794c3b, 0x976ce0bd, 0x04c006ba,
+			0xc1a94fb6, 0x409f60c4, 0x5e5c9ec2, 0x196a2463,
+			0x68fb6faf, 0x3e6c53b5, 0x1339b2eb, 0x3b52ec6f,
+			0x6dfc511f, 0x9b30952c, 0xcc814544, 0xaf5ebd09,
+			0xbee3d004, 0xde334afd, 0x660f2807, 0x192e4bb3,
+			0xc0cba857, 0x45c8740f, 0xd20b5f39, 0xb9d3fbdb,
+			0x5579c0bd, 0x1a60320a, 0xd6a100c6, 0x402c7279,
+			0x679f25fe, 0xfb1fa3cc, 0x8ea5e9f8, 0xdb3222f8,
+			0x3c7516df, 0xfd616b15, 0x2f501ec8, 0xad0552ab,
+			0x323db5fa, 0xfd238760, 0x53317b48, 0x3e00df82,
+			0x9e5c57bb, 0xca6f8ca0, 0x1a87562e, 0xdf1769db,
+			0xd542a8f6, 0x287effc3, 0xac6732c6, 0x8c4f5573,
+			0x695b27b0, 0xbbca58c8, 0xe1ffa35d, 0xb8f011a0,
+			0x10fa3d98, 0xfd2183b8, 0x4afcb56c, 0x2dd1d35b,
+			0x9a53e479, 0xb6f84565, 0xd28e49bc, 0x4bfb9790,
+			0xe1ddf2da, 0xa4cb7e33, 0x62fb1341, 0xcee4c6e8,
+			0xef20cada, 0x36774c01, 0xd07e9efe, 0x2bf11fb4,
+			0x95dbda4d, 0xae909198, 0xeaad8e71, 0x6b93d5a0,
+			0xd08ed1d0, 0xafc725e0, 0x8e3c5b2f, 0x8e7594b7,
+			0x8ff6e2fb, 0xf2122b64, 0x8888b812, 0x900df01c,
+			0x4fad5ea0, 0x688fc31c, 0xd1cff191, 0xb3a8c1ad,
+			0x2f2f2218, 0xbe0e1777, 0xea752dfe, 0x8b021fa1,
+			0xe5a0cc0f, 0xb56f74e8, 0x18acf3d6, 0xce89e299,
+			0xb4a84fe0, 0xfd13e0b7, 0x7cc43b81, 0xd2ada8d9,
+			0x165fa266, 0x80957705, 0x93cc7314, 0x211a1477,
+			0xe6ad2065, 0x77b5fa86, 0xc75442f5, 0xfb9d35cf,
+			0xebcdaf0c, 0x7b3e89a0, 0xd6411bd3, 0xae1e7e49,
+			0x00250e2d, 0x2071b35e, 0x226800bb, 0x57b8e0af,
+			0x2464369b, 0xf009b91e, 0x5563911d, 0x59dfa6aa,
+			0x78c14389, 0xd95a537f, 0x207d5ba2, 0x02e5b9c5,
+			0x83260376, 0x6295cfa9, 0x11c81968, 0x4e734a41,
+			0xb3472dca, 0x7b14a94a, 0x1b510052, 0x9a532915,
+			0xd60f573f, 0xbc9bc6e4, 0x2b60a476, 0x81e67400,
+			0x08ba6fb5, 0x571be91f, 0xf296ec6b, 0x2a0dd915,
+			0xb6636521, 0xe7b9f9b6, 0xff34052e, 0xc5855664,
+		0x53b02d5d, 0xa99f8fa1, 0x08ba4799, 0x6e85076a},
+		{
+			0x4b7a70e9, 0xb5b32944, 0xdb75092e, 0xc4192623,
+			0xad6ea6b0, 0x49a7df7d, 0x9cee60b8, 0x8fedb266,
+			0xecaa8c71, 0x699a17ff, 0x5664526c, 0xc2b19ee1,
+			0x193602a5, 0x75094c29, 0xa0591340, 0xe4183a3e,
+			0x3f54989a, 0x5b429d65, 0x6b8fe4d6, 0x99f73fd6,
+			0xa1d29c07, 0xefe830f5, 0x4d2d38e6, 0xf0255dc1,
+			0x4cdd2086, 0x8470eb26, 0x6382e9c6, 0x021ecc5e,
+			0x09686b3f, 0x3ebaefc9, 0x3c971814, 0x6b6a70a1,
+			0x687f3584, 0x52a0e286, 0xb79c5305, 0xaa500737,
+			0x3e07841c, 0x7fdeae5c, 0x8e7d44ec, 0x5716f2b8,
+			0xb03ada37, 0xf0500c0d, 0xf01c1f04, 0x0200b3ff,
+			0xae0cf51a, 0x3cb574b2, 0x25837a58, 0xdc0921bd,
+			0xd19113f9, 0x7ca92ff6, 0x94324773, 0x22f54701,
+			0x3ae5e581, 0x37c2dadc, 0xc8b57634, 0x9af3dda7,
+			0xa9446146, 0x0fd0030e, 0xecc8c73e, 0xa4751e41,
+			0xe238cd99, 0x3bea0e2f, 0x3280bba1, 0x183eb331,
+			0x4e548b38, 0x4f6db908, 0x6f420d03, 0xf60a04bf,
+			0x2cb81290, 0x24977c79, 0x5679b072, 0xbcaf89af,
+			0xde9a771f, 0xd9930810, 0xb38bae12, 0xdccf3f2e,
+			0x5512721f, 0x2e6b7124, 0x501adde6, 0x9f84cd87,
+			0x7a584718, 0x7408da17, 0xbc9f9abc, 0xe94b7d8c,
+			0xec7aec3a, 0xdb851dfa, 0x63094366, 0xc464c3d2,
+			0xef1c1847, 0x3215d908, 0xdd433b37, 0x24c2ba16,
+			0x12a14d43, 0x2a65c451, 0x50940002, 0x133ae4dd,
+			0x71dff89e, 0x10314e55, 0x81ac77d6, 0x5f11199b,
+			0x043556f1, 0xd7a3c76b, 0x3c11183b, 0x5924a509,
+			0xf28fe6ed, 0x97f1fbfa, 0x9ebabf2c, 0x1e153c6e,
+			0x86e34570, 0xeae96fb1, 0x860e5e0a, 0x5a3e2ab3,
+			0x771fe71c, 0x4e3d06fa, 0x2965dcb9, 0x99e71d0f,
+			0x803e89d6, 0x5266c825, 0x2e4cc978, 0x9c10b36a,
+			0xc6150eba, 0x94e2ea78, 0xa5fc3c53, 0x1e0a2df4,
+			0xf2f74ea7, 0x361d2b3d, 0x1939260f, 0x19c27960,
+			0x5223a708, 0xf71312b6, 0xebadfe6e, 0xeac31f66,
+			0xe3bc4595, 0xa67bc883, 0xb17f37d1, 0x018cff28,
+			0xc332ddef, 0xbe6c5aa5, 0x65582185, 0x68ab9802,
+			0xeecea50f, 0xdb2f953b, 0x2aef7dad, 0x5b6e2f84,
+			0x1521b628, 0x29076170, 0xecdd4775, 0x619f1510,
+			0x13cca830, 0xeb61bd96, 0x0334fe1e, 0xaa0363cf,
+			0xb5735c90, 0x4c70a239, 0xd59e9e0b, 0xcbaade14,
+			0xeecc86bc, 0x60622ca7, 0x9cab5cab, 0xb2f3846e,
+			0x648b1eaf, 0x19bdf0ca, 0xa02369b9, 0x655abb50,
+			0x40685a32, 0x3c2ab4b3, 0x319ee9d5, 0xc021b8f7,
+			0x9b540b19, 0x875fa099, 0x95f7997e, 0x623d7da8,
+			0xf837889a, 0x97e32d77, 0x11ed935f, 0x16681281,
+			0x0e358829, 0xc7e61fd6, 0x96dedfa1, 0x7858ba99,
+			0x57f584a5, 0x1b227263, 0x9b83c3ff, 0x1ac24696,
+			0xcdb30aeb, 0x532e3054, 0x8fd948e4, 0x6dbc3128,
+			0x58ebf2ef, 0x34c6ffea, 0xfe28ed61, 0xee7c3c73,
+			0x5d4a14d9, 0xe864b7e3, 0x42105d14, 0x203e13e0,
+			0x45eee2b6, 0xa3aaabea, 0xdb6c4f15, 0xfacb4fd0,
+			0xc742f442, 0xef6abbb5, 0x654f3b1d, 0x41cd2105,
+			0xd81e799e, 0x86854dc7, 0xe44b476a, 0x3d816250,
+			0xcf62a1f2, 0x5b8d2646, 0xfc8883a0, 0xc1c7b6a3,
+			0x7f1524c3, 0x69cb7492, 0x47848a0b, 0x5692b285,
+			0x095bbf00, 0xad19489d, 0x1462b174, 0x23820e00,
+			0x58428d2a, 0x0c55f5ea, 0x1dadf43e, 0x233f7061,
+			0x3372f092, 0x8d937e41, 0xd65fecf1, 0x6c223bdb,
+			0x7cde3759, 0xcbee7460, 0x4085f2a7, 0xce77326e,
+			0xa6078084, 0x19f8509e, 0xe8efd855, 0x61d99735,
+			0xa969a7aa, 0xc50c06c2, 0x5a04abfc, 0x800bcadc,
+			0x9e447a2e, 0xc3453484, 0xfdd56705, 0x0e1e9ec9,
+			0xdb73dbd3, 0x105588cd, 0x675fda79, 0xe3674340,
+			0xc5c43465, 0x713e38d8, 0x3d28f89e, 0xf16dff20,
+		0x153e21e7, 0x8fb03d4a, 0xe6e39f2b, 0xdb83adf7},
+		{
+			0xe93d5a68, 0x948140f7, 0xf64c261c, 0x94692934,
+			0x411520f7, 0x7602d4f7, 0xbcf46b2e, 0xd4a20068,
+			0xd4082471, 0x3320f46a, 0x43b7d4b7, 0x500061af,
+			0x1e39f62e, 0x97244546, 0x14214f74, 0xbf8b8840,
+			0x4d95fc1d, 0x96b591af, 0x70f4ddd3, 0x66a02f45,
+			0xbfbc09ec, 0x03bd9785, 0x7fac6dd0, 0x31cb8504,
+			0x96eb27b3, 0x55fd3941, 0xda2547e6, 0xabca0a9a,
+			0x28507825, 0x530429f4, 0x0a2c86da, 0xe9b66dfb,
+			0x68dc1462, 0xd7486900, 0x680ec0a4, 0x27a18dee,
+			0x4f3ffea2, 0xe887ad8c, 0xb58ce006, 0x7af4d6b6,
+			0xaace1e7c, 0xd3375fec, 0xce78a399, 0x406b2a42,
+			0x20fe9e35, 0xd9f385b9, 0xee39d7ab, 0x3b124e8b,
+			0x1dc9faf7, 0x4b6d1856, 0x26a36631, 0xeae397b2,
+			0x3a6efa74, 0xdd5b4332, 0x6841e7f7, 0xca7820fb,
+			0xfb0af54e, 0xd8feb397, 0x454056ac, 0xba489527,
+			0x55533a3a, 0x20838d87, 0xfe6ba9b7, 0xd096954b,
+			0x55a867bc, 0xa1159a58, 0xcca92963, 0x99e1db33,
+			0xa62a4a56, 0x3f3125f9, 0x5ef47e1c, 0x9029317c,
+			0xfdf8e802, 0x04272f70, 0x80bb155c, 0x05282ce3,
+			0x95c11548, 0xe4c66d22, 0x48c1133f, 0xc70f86dc,
+			0x07f9c9ee, 0x41041f0f, 0x404779a4, 0x5d886e17,
+			0x325f51eb, 0xd59bc0d1, 0xf2bcc18f, 0x41113564,
+			0x257b7834, 0x602a9c60, 0xdff8e8a3, 0x1f636c1b,
+			0x0e12b4c2, 0x02e1329e, 0xaf664fd1, 0xcad18115,
+			0x6b2395e0, 0x333e92e1, 0x3b240b62, 0xeebeb922,
+			0x85b2a20e, 0xe6ba0d99, 0xde720c8c, 0x2da2f728,
+			0xd0127845, 0x95b794fd, 0x647d0862, 0xe7ccf5f0,
+			0x5449a36f, 0x877d48fa, 0xc39dfd27, 0xf33e8d1e,
+			0x0a476341, 0x992eff74, 0x3a6f6eab, 0xf4f8fd37,
+			0xa812dc60, 0xa1ebddf8, 0x991be14c, 0xdb6e6b0d,
+			0xc67b5510, 0x6d672c37, 0x2765d43b, 0xdcd0e804,
+			0xf1290dc7, 0xcc00ffa3, 0xb5390f92, 0x690fed0b,
+			0x667b9ffb, 0xcedb7d9c, 0xa091cf0b, 0xd9155ea3,
+			0xbb132f88, 0x515bad24, 0x7b9479bf, 0x763bd6eb,
+			0x37392eb3, 0xcc115979, 0x8026e297, 0xf42e312d,
+			0x6842ada7, 0xc66a2b3b, 0x12754ccc, 0x782ef11c,
+			0x6a124237, 0xb79251e7, 0x06a1bbe6, 0x4bfb6350,
+			0x1a6b1018, 0x11caedfa, 0x3d25bdd8, 0xe2e1c3c9,
+			0x44421659, 0x0a121386, 0xd90cec6e, 0xd5abea2a,
+			0x64af674e, 0xda86a85f, 0xbebfe988, 0x64e4c3fe,
+			0x9dbc8057, 0xf0f7c086, 0x60787bf8, 0x6003604d,
+			0xd1fd8346, 0xf6381fb0, 0x7745ae04, 0xd736fccc,
+			0x83426b33, 0xf01eab71, 0xb0804187, 0x3c005e5f,
+			0x77a057be, 0xbde8ae24, 0x55464299, 0xbf582e61,
+			0x4e58f48f, 0xf2ddfda2, 0xf474ef38, 0x8789bdc2,
+			0x5366f9c3, 0xc8b38e74, 0xb475f255, 0x46fcd9b9,
+			0x7aeb2661, 0x8b1ddf84, 0x846a0e79, 0x915f95e2,
+			0x466e598e, 0x20b45770, 0x8cd55591, 0xc902de4c,
+			0xb90bace1, 0xbb8205d0, 0x11a86248, 0x7574a99e,
+			0xb77f19b6, 0xe0a9dc09, 0x662d09a1, 0xc4324633,
+			0xe85a1f02, 0x09f0be8c, 0x4a99a025, 0x1d6efe10,
+			0x1ab93d1d, 0x0ba5a4df, 0xa186f20f, 0x2868f169,
+			0xdcb7da83, 0x573906fe, 0xa1e2ce9b, 0x4fcd7f52,
+			0x50115e01, 0xa70683fa, 0xa002b5c4, 0x0de6d027,
+			0x9af88c27, 0x773f8641, 0xc3604c06, 0x61a806b5,
+			0xf0177a28, 0xc0f586e0, 0x006058aa, 0x30dc7d62,
+			0x11e69ed7, 0x2338ea63, 0x53c2dd94, 0xc2c21634,
+			0xbbcbee56, 0x90bcb6de, 0xebfc7da1, 0xce591d76,
+			0x6f05e409, 0x4b7c0188, 0x39720a3d, 0x7c927c24,
+			0x86e3725f, 0x724d9db9, 0x1ac15bb4, 0xd39eb8fc,
+			0xed545578, 0x08fca5b5, 0xd83d7cd3, 0x4dad0fc4,
+			0x1e50ef5e, 0xb161e6f8, 0xa28514d9, 0x6c51133c,
+			0x6fd5c7e7, 0x56e14ec4, 0x362abfce, 0xddc6c837,
+		0xd79a3234, 0x92638212, 0x670efa8e, 0x406000e0},
+		{
+			0x3a39ce37, 0xd3faf5cf, 0xabc27737, 0x5ac52d1b,
+			0x5cb0679e, 0x4fa33742, 0xd3822740, 0x99bc9bbe,
+			0xd5118e9d, 0xbf0f7315, 0xd62d1c7e, 0xc700c47b,
+			0xb78c1b6b, 0x21a19045, 0xb26eb1be, 0x6a366eb4,
+			0x5748ab2f, 0xbc946e79, 0xc6a376d2, 0x6549c2c8,
+			0x530ff8ee, 0x468dde7d, 0xd5730a1d, 0x4cd04dc6,
+			0x2939bbdb, 0xa9ba4650, 0xac9526e8, 0xbe5ee304,
+			0xa1fad5f0, 0x6a2d519a, 0x63ef8ce2, 0x9a86ee22,
+			0xc089c2b8, 0x43242ef6, 0xa51e03aa, 0x9cf2d0a4,
+			0x83c061ba, 0x9be96a4d, 0x8fe51550, 0xba645bd6,
+			0x2826a2f9, 0xa73a3ae1, 0x4ba99586, 0xef5562e9,
+			0xc72fefd3, 0xf752f7da, 0x3f046f69, 0x77fa0a59,
+			0x80e4a915, 0x87b08601, 0x9b09e6ad, 0x3b3ee593,
+			0xe990fd5a, 0x9e34d797, 0x2cf0b7d9, 0x022b8b51,
+			0x96d5ac3a, 0x017da67d, 0xd1cf3ed6, 0x7c7d2d28,
+			0x1f9f25cf, 0xadf2b89b, 0x5ad6b472, 0x5a88f54c,
+			0xe029ac71, 0xe019a5e6, 0x47b0acfd, 0xed93fa9b,
+			0xe8d3c48d, 0x283b57cc, 0xf8d56629, 0x79132e28,
+			0x785f0191, 0xed756055, 0xf7960e44, 0xe3d35e8c,
+			0x15056dd4, 0x88f46dba, 0x03a16125, 0x0564f0bd,
+			0xc3eb9e15, 0x3c9057a2, 0x97271aec, 0xa93a072a,
+			0x1b3f6d9b, 0x1e6321f5, 0xf59c66fb, 0x26dcf319,
+			0x7533d928, 0xb155fdf5, 0x03563482, 0x8aba3cbb,
+			0x28517711, 0xc20ad9f8, 0xabcc5167, 0xccad925f,
+			0x4de81751, 0x3830dc8e, 0x379d5862, 0x9320f991,
+			0xea7a90c2, 0xfb3e7bce, 0x5121ce64, 0x774fbe32,
+			0xa8b6e37e, 0xc3293d46, 0x48de5369, 0x6413e680,
+			0xa2ae0810, 0xdd6db224, 0x69852dfd, 0x09072166,
+			0xb39a460a, 0x6445c0dd, 0x586cdecf, 0x1c20c8ae,
+			0x5bbef7dd, 0x1b588d40, 0xccd2017f, 0x6bb4e3bb,
+			0xdda26a7e, 0x3a59ff45, 0x3e350a44, 0xbcb4cdd5,
+			0x72eacea8, 0xfa6484bb, 0x8d6612ae, 0xbf3c6f47,
+			0xd29be463, 0x542f5d9e, 0xaec2771b, 0xf64e6370,
+			0x740e0d8d, 0xe75b1357, 0xf8721671, 0xaf537d5d,
+			0x4040cb08, 0x4eb4e2cc, 0x34d2466a, 0x0115af84,
+			0xe1b00428, 0x95983a1d, 0x06b89fb4, 0xce6ea048,
+			0x6f3f3b82, 0x3520ab82, 0x011a1d4b, 0x277227f8,
+			0x611560b1, 0xe7933fdc, 0xbb3a792b, 0x344525bd,
+			0xa08839e1, 0x51ce794b, 0x2f32c9b7, 0xa01fbac9,
+			0xe01cc87e, 0xbcc7d1f6, 0xcf0111c3, 0xa1e8aac7,
+			0x1a908749, 0xd44fbd9a, 0xd0dadecb, 0xd50ada38,
+			0x0339c32a, 0xc6913667, 0x8df9317c, 0xe0b12b4f,
+			0xf79e59b7, 0x43f5bb3a, 0xf2d519ff, 0x27d9459c,
+			0xbf97222c, 0x15e6fc2a, 0x0f91fc71, 0x9b941525,
+			0xfae59361, 0xceb69ceb, 0xc2a86459, 0x12baa8d1,
+			0xb6c1075e, 0xe3056a0c, 0x10d25065, 0xcb03a442,
+			0xe0ec6e0e, 0x1698db3b, 0x4c98a0be, 0x3278e964,
+			0x9f1f9532, 0xe0d392df, 0xd3a0342b, 0x8971f21e,
+			0x1b0a7441, 0x4ba3348c, 0xc5be7120, 0xc37632d8,
+			0xdf359f8d, 0x9b992f2e, 0xe60b6f47, 0x0fe3f11d,
+			0xe54cda54, 0x1edad891, 0xce6279cf, 0xcd3e7e6f,
+			0x1618b166, 0xfd2c1d05, 0x848fd2c5, 0xf6fb2299,
+			0xf523f357, 0xa6327623, 0x93a83531, 0x56cccd02,
+			0xacf08162, 0x5a75ebb5, 0x6e163697, 0x88d273cc,
+			0xde966292, 0x81b949d0, 0x4c50901b, 0x71c65614,
+			0xe6c6c7bd, 0x327a140a, 0x45e1d006, 0xc3f27b9a,
+			0xc9aa53fd, 0x62a80f00, 0xbb25bfe2, 0x35bdd2f6,
+			0x71126905, 0xb2040222, 0xb6cbcf7c, 0xcd769c2b,
+			0x53113ec0, 0x1640e3d3, 0x38abbd60, 0x2547adf0,
+			0xba38209c, 0xf746ce76, 0x77afa1c5, 0x20756060,
+			0x85cbfe4e, 0x8ae88dd8, 0x7aaaf9b0, 0x4cf9aa7e,
+			0x1948c25c, 0x02fb8a8c, 0x01c36ae4, 0xd6ebe1f9,
+			0x90d4f869, 0xa65cdea0, 0x3f09252d, 0xc208e69f,
+		0xb74e6132, 0xce77e25b, 0x578fdfe3, 0x3ac372e6}
+	},
+	{
+		0x243f6a88, 0x85a308d3, 0x13198a2e, 0x03707344,
+		0xa4093822, 0x299f31d0, 0x082efa98, 0xec4e6c89,
+		0x452821e6, 0x38d01377, 0xbe5466cf, 0x34e90c6c,
+		0xc0ac29b7, 0xc97c50dd, 0x3f84d5b5, 0xb5470917,
+		0x9216d5d9, 0x8979fb1b
+	} };
+
+	*c = initstate;
+}
+
+u_int32_t
+Blowfish_stream2word(const u_int8_t *data, u_int16_t databytes,
+    u_int16_t *current)
+{
+	u_int8_t i;
+	u_int16_t j;
+	u_int32_t temp;
+
+	temp = 0x00000000;
+	j = *current;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 4; i++, j++) {
+		if (j >= databytes)
+			j = 0;
+		temp = (temp << 8) | data[j];
+	}
+
+	*current = j;
+	return temp;
+}
+
+void
+Blowfish_expand0state(blf_ctx *c, const u_int8_t *key, u_int16_t keybytes)
+{
+	u_int16_t i;
+	u_int16_t j;
+	u_int16_t k;
+	u_int32_t temp;
+	u_int32_t datal;
+	u_int32_t datar;
+
+	j = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < BLF_N + 2; i++) {
+		/* Extract 4 int8 to 1 int32 from keystream */
+		temp = Blowfish_stream2word(key, keybytes, &j);
+		c->P[i] = c->P[i] ^ temp;
+	}
+
+	j = 0;
+	datal = 0x00000000;
+	datar = 0x00000000;
+	for (i = 0; i < BLF_N + 2; i += 2) {
+		Blowfish_encipher(c, &datal, &datar);
+
+		c->P[i] = datal;
+		c->P[i + 1] = datar;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
+		for (k = 0; k < 256; k += 2) {
+			Blowfish_encipher(c, &datal, &datar);
+
+			c->S[i][k] = datal;
+			c->S[i][k + 1] = datar;
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+
+void
+Blowfish_expandstate(blf_ctx *c, const u_int8_t *data, u_int16_t databytes,
+    const u_int8_t *key, u_int16_t keybytes)
+{
+	u_int16_t i;
+	u_int16_t j;
+	u_int16_t k;
+	u_int32_t temp;
+	u_int32_t datal;
+	u_int32_t datar;
+
+	j = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < BLF_N + 2; i++) {
+		/* Extract 4 int8 to 1 int32 from keystream */
+		temp = Blowfish_stream2word(key, keybytes, &j);
+		c->P[i] = c->P[i] ^ temp;
+	}
+
+	j = 0;
+	datal = 0x00000000;
+	datar = 0x00000000;
+	for (i = 0; i < BLF_N + 2; i += 2) {
+		datal ^= Blowfish_stream2word(data, databytes, &j);
+		datar ^= Blowfish_stream2word(data, databytes, &j);
+		Blowfish_encipher(c, &datal, &datar);
+
+		c->P[i] = datal;
+		c->P[i + 1] = datar;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
+		for (k = 0; k < 256; k += 2) {
+			datal ^= Blowfish_stream2word(data, databytes, &j);
+			datar ^= Blowfish_stream2word(data, databytes, &j);
+			Blowfish_encipher(c, &datal, &datar);
+
+			c->S[i][k] = datal;
+			c->S[i][k + 1] = datar;
+		}
+	}
+
+}
+
+void
+blf_key(blf_ctx *c, const u_int8_t *k, u_int16_t len)
+{
+	/* Initialize S-boxes and subkeys with Pi */
+	Blowfish_initstate(c);
+
+	/* Transform S-boxes and subkeys with key */
+	Blowfish_expand0state(c, k, len);
+}
+
+void
+blf_enc(blf_ctx *c, u_int32_t *data, u_int16_t blocks)
+{
+	u_int32_t *d;
+	u_int16_t i;
+
+	d = data;
+	for (i = 0; i < blocks; i++) {
+		Blowfish_encipher(c, d, d + 1);
+		d += 2;
+	}
+}
+
+void
+blf_dec(blf_ctx *c, u_int32_t *data, u_int16_t blocks)
+{
+	u_int32_t *d;
+	u_int16_t i;
+
+	d = data;
+	for (i = 0; i < blocks; i++) {
+		Blowfish_decipher(c, d, d + 1);
+		d += 2;
+	}
+}
+
+void
+blf_ecb_encrypt(blf_ctx *c, u_int8_t *data, u_int32_t len)
+{
+	u_int32_t l, r;
+	u_int32_t i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i += 8) {
+		l = data[0] << 24 | data[1] << 16 | data[2] << 8 | data[3];
+		r = data[4] << 24 | data[5] << 16 | data[6] << 8 | data[7];
+		Blowfish_encipher(c, &l, &r);
+		data[0] = l >> 24 & 0xff;
+		data[1] = l >> 16 & 0xff;
+		data[2] = l >> 8 & 0xff;
+		data[3] = l & 0xff;
+		data[4] = r >> 24 & 0xff;
+		data[5] = r >> 16 & 0xff;
+		data[6] = r >> 8 & 0xff;
+		data[7] = r & 0xff;
+		data += 8;
+	}
+}
+
+void
+blf_ecb_decrypt(blf_ctx *c, u_int8_t *data, u_int32_t len)
+{
+	u_int32_t l, r;
+	u_int32_t i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i += 8) {
+		l = data[0] << 24 | data[1] << 16 | data[2] << 8 | data[3];
+		r = data[4] << 24 | data[5] << 16 | data[6] << 8 | data[7];
+		Blowfish_decipher(c, &l, &r);
+		data[0] = l >> 24 & 0xff;
+		data[1] = l >> 16 & 0xff;
+		data[2] = l >> 8 & 0xff;
+		data[3] = l & 0xff;
+		data[4] = r >> 24 & 0xff;
+		data[5] = r >> 16 & 0xff;
+		data[6] = r >> 8 & 0xff;
+		data[7] = r & 0xff;
+		data += 8;
+	}
+}
+
+void
+blf_cbc_encrypt(blf_ctx *c, u_int8_t *iv, u_int8_t *data, u_int32_t len)
+{
+	u_int32_t l, r;
+	u_int32_t i, j;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i += 8) {
+		for (j = 0; j < 8; j++)
+			data[j] ^= iv[j];
+		l = data[0] << 24 | data[1] << 16 | data[2] << 8 | data[3];
+		r = data[4] << 24 | data[5] << 16 | data[6] << 8 | data[7];
+		Blowfish_encipher(c, &l, &r);
+		data[0] = l >> 24 & 0xff;
+		data[1] = l >> 16 & 0xff;
+		data[2] = l >> 8 & 0xff;
+		data[3] = l & 0xff;
+		data[4] = r >> 24 & 0xff;
+		data[5] = r >> 16 & 0xff;
+		data[6] = r >> 8 & 0xff;
+		data[7] = r & 0xff;
+		iv = data;
+		data += 8;
+	}
+}
+
+void
+blf_cbc_decrypt(blf_ctx *c, u_int8_t *iva, u_int8_t *data, u_int32_t len)
+{
+	u_int32_t l, r;
+	u_int8_t *iv;
+	u_int32_t i, j;
+
+	iv = data + len - 16;
+	data = data + len - 8;
+	for (i = len - 8; i >= 8; i -= 8) {
+		l = data[0] << 24 | data[1] << 16 | data[2] << 8 | data[3];
+		r = data[4] << 24 | data[5] << 16 | data[6] << 8 | data[7];
+		Blowfish_decipher(c, &l, &r);
+		data[0] = l >> 24 & 0xff;
+		data[1] = l >> 16 & 0xff;
+		data[2] = l >> 8 & 0xff;
+		data[3] = l & 0xff;
+		data[4] = r >> 24 & 0xff;
+		data[5] = r >> 16 & 0xff;
+		data[6] = r >> 8 & 0xff;
+		data[7] = r & 0xff;
+		for (j = 0; j < 8; j++)
+			data[j] ^= iv[j];
+		iv -= 8;
+		data -= 8;
+	}
+	l = data[0] << 24 | data[1] << 16 | data[2] << 8 | data[3];
+	r = data[4] << 24 | data[5] << 16 | data[6] << 8 | data[7];
+	Blowfish_decipher(c, &l, &r);
+	data[0] = l >> 24 & 0xff;
+	data[1] = l >> 16 & 0xff;
+	data[2] = l >> 8 & 0xff;
+	data[3] = l & 0xff;
+	data[4] = r >> 24 & 0xff;
+	data[5] = r >> 16 & 0xff;
+	data[6] = r >> 8 & 0xff;
+	data[7] = r & 0xff;
+	for (j = 0; j < 8; j++)
+		data[j] ^= iva[j];
+}
+
+#if 0
+void
+report(u_int32_t data[], u_int16_t len)
+{
+	u_int16_t i;
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i += 2)
+		printf("Block %0hd: %08lx %08lx.\n",
+		    i / 2, data[i], data[i + 1]);
+}
+void
+main(void)
+{
+
+	blf_ctx c;
+	char    key[] = "AAAAA";
+	char    key2[] = "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz";
+
+	u_int32_t data[10];
+	u_int32_t data2[] =
+	{0x424c4f57l, 0x46495348l};
+
+	u_int16_t i;
+
+	/* First test */
+	for (i = 0; i < 10; i++)
+		data[i] = i;
+
+	blf_key(&c, (u_int8_t *) key, 5);
+	blf_enc(&c, data, 5);
+	blf_dec(&c, data, 1);
+	blf_dec(&c, data + 2, 4);
+	printf("Should read as 0 - 9.\n");
+	report(data, 10);
+
+	/* Second test */
+	blf_key(&c, (u_int8_t *) key2, strlen(key2));
+	blf_enc(&c, data2, 1);
+	printf("\nShould read as: 0x324ed0fe 0xf413a203.\n");
+	report(data2, 2);
+	blf_dec(&c, data2, 1);
+	report(data2, 2);
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF) && (!defined(HAVE_BLOWFISH_INITSTATE) || \
+    !defined(HAVE_BLOWFISH_EXPAND0STATE) || !defined(HAVE_BLF_ENC)) */
+
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-asprintf.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-asprintf.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3368195d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-asprintf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004 Darren Tucker.
+ *
+ * Based originally on asprintf.c from OpenBSD:
+ * Copyright (c) 1997 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_VASPRINTF
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#ifndef VA_COPY
+# ifdef HAVE_VA_COPY
+#  define VA_COPY(dest, src) va_copy(dest, src)
+# else
+#  ifdef HAVE___VA_COPY
+#   define VA_COPY(dest, src) __va_copy(dest, src)
+#  else
+#   define VA_COPY(dest, src) (dest) = (src)
+#  endif
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#define INIT_SZ	128
+
+int
+vasprintf(char **str, const char *fmt, va_list ap)
+{
+	int ret = -1;
+	va_list ap2;
+	char *string, *newstr;
+	size_t len;
+
+	VA_COPY(ap2, ap);
+	if ((string = malloc(INIT_SZ)) == NULL)
+		goto fail;
+
+	ret = vsnprintf(string, INIT_SZ, fmt, ap2);
+	if (ret >= 0 && ret < INIT_SZ) { /* succeeded with initial alloc */
+		*str = string;
+	} else if (ret == INT_MAX || ret < 0) { /* Bad length */
+		free(string);
+		goto fail;
+	} else {	/* bigger than initial, realloc allowing for nul */
+		len = (size_t)ret + 1;
+		if ((newstr = realloc(string, len)) == NULL) {
+			free(string);
+			goto fail;
+		} else {
+			va_end(ap2);
+			VA_COPY(ap2, ap);
+			ret = vsnprintf(newstr, len, fmt, ap2);
+			if (ret >= 0 && (size_t)ret < len) {
+				*str = newstr;
+			} else { /* failed with realloc'ed string, give up */
+				free(newstr);
+				goto fail;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	va_end(ap2);
+	return (ret);
+
+fail:
+	*str = NULL;
+	errno = ENOMEM;
+	va_end(ap2);
+	return (-1);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_ASPRINTF
+int asprintf(char **str, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	va_list ap;
+	int ret;
+	
+	*str = NULL;
+	va_start(ap, fmt);
+	ret = vasprintf(str, fmt, ap);
+	va_end(ap);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9380b33a7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2005 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_CLOSEFROM
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
+# include <fcntl.h>
+#endif
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_DIRENT_H
+# include <dirent.h>
+# define NAMLEN(dirent) strlen((dirent)->d_name)
+#else
+# define dirent direct
+# define NAMLEN(dirent) (dirent)->d_namlen
+# ifdef HAVE_SYS_NDIR_H
+#  include <sys/ndir.h>
+# endif
+# ifdef HAVE_SYS_DIR_H
+#  include <sys/dir.h>
+# endif
+# ifdef HAVE_NDIR_H
+#  include <ndir.h>
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPEN_MAX
+# define OPEN_MAX	256
+#endif
+
+#if 0
+__unused static const char rcsid[] = "$Sudo: closefrom.c,v 1.11 2006/08/17 15:26:54 millert Exp $";
+#endif /* lint */
+
+/*
+ * Close all file descriptors greater than or equal to lowfd.
+ */
+#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_CLOSEM
+void
+closefrom(int lowfd)
+{
+    (void) fcntl(lowfd, F_CLOSEM, 0);
+}
+#else
+void
+closefrom(int lowfd)
+{
+    long fd, maxfd;
+#if defined(HAVE_DIRFD) && defined(HAVE_PROC_PID)
+    char fdpath[PATH_MAX], *endp;
+    struct dirent *dent;
+    DIR *dirp;
+    int len;
+
+    /* Check for a /proc/$$/fd directory. */
+    len = snprintf(fdpath, sizeof(fdpath), "/proc/%ld/fd", (long)getpid());
+    if (len > 0 && (size_t)len <= sizeof(fdpath) && (dirp = opendir(fdpath))) {
+	while ((dent = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) {
+	    fd = strtol(dent->d_name, &endp, 10);
+	    if (dent->d_name != endp && *endp == '\0' &&
+		fd >= 0 && fd < INT_MAX && fd >= lowfd && fd != dirfd(dirp))
+		(void) close((int) fd);
+	}
+	(void) closedir(dirp);
+    } else
+#endif
+    {
+	/*
+	 * Fall back on sysconf() or getdtablesize().  We avoid checking
+	 * resource limits since it is possible to open a file descriptor
+	 * and then drop the rlimit such that it is below the open fd.
+	 */
+#ifdef HAVE_SYSCONF
+	maxfd = sysconf(_SC_OPEN_MAX);
+#else
+	maxfd = getdtablesize();
+#endif /* HAVE_SYSCONF */
+	if (maxfd < 0)
+	    maxfd = OPEN_MAX;
+
+	for (fd = lowfd; fd < maxfd; fd++)
+	    (void) close((int) fd);
+    }
+}
+#endif /* !HAVE_FCNTL_CLOSEM */
+#endif /* HAVE_CLOSEFROM */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f1bbd7dec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.c
@@ -0,0 +1,817 @@
+/* 
+ * $Id: bsd-cray.c,v 1.17 2007/08/15 09:17:43 dtucker Exp $
+ *
+ * bsd-cray.c
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2002, Cray Inc.  (Wendy Palm <wendyp@cray.com>)
+ * Significant portions provided by 
+ *          Wayne Schroeder, SDSC <schroeder@sdsc.edu>
+ *          William Jones, UTexas <jones@tacc.utexas.edu>
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * Created: Apr 22 16.34:00 2002 wp
+ *
+ * This file contains functions required for proper execution
+ * on UNICOS systems.
+ *
+ */
+#ifdef _UNICOS
+
+#include <udb.h>
+#include <tmpdir.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/category.h>
+#include <utmp.h>
+#include <sys/jtab.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <sys/priv.h>
+#include <sys/secparm.h>
+#include <sys/tfm.h>
+#include <sys/usrv.h>
+#include <sys/sysv.h>
+#include <sys/sectab.h>
+#include <sys/secstat.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/session.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <ia.h>
+#include <urm.h>
+#include "ssh.h"
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "sys/types.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE
+# define      _SS_MAXSIZE     128     /* Implementation specific max size */
+# define       _SS_PADSIZE     (_SS_MAXSIZE - sizeof (struct sockaddr))
+
+# define ss_family ss_sa.sa_family
+#endif /* !HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE */
+
+#ifndef IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK
+# define IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK(a) \
+	(((u_int32_t *) (a))[0] == 0 && ((u_int32_t *) (a))[1] == 0 && \
+	 ((u_int32_t *) (a))[2] == 0 && ((u_int32_t *) (a))[3] == htonl (1))
+#endif /* !IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK */
+
+#ifndef AF_INET6
+/* Define it to something that should never appear */
+#define AF_INET6 AF_MAX
+#endif
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "bsd-cray.h"
+
+#define MAXACID 80
+
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+char cray_tmpdir[TPATHSIZ + 1];		    /* job TMPDIR path */
+
+struct sysv sysv;	/* system security structure */
+struct usrv usrv;	/* user security structure */
+
+/*
+ * Functions.
+ */
+void cray_retain_utmp(struct utmp *, int);
+void cray_delete_tmpdir(char *, int, uid_t);
+void cray_init_job(struct passwd *);
+void cray_set_tmpdir(struct utmp *);
+void cray_login_failure(char *, int);
+int cray_setup(uid_t, char *, const char *);
+int cray_access_denied(char *);
+
+void
+cray_login_failure(char *username, int errcode)
+{
+	struct udb *ueptr;		/* UDB pointer for username */
+	ia_failure_t fsent;		/* ia_failure structure */
+	ia_failure_ret_t fret;		/* ia_failure return stuff */
+	struct jtab jtab;		/* job table structure */
+	int jid = 0;			/* job id */
+
+	if ((jid = getjtab(&jtab)) < 0)
+		debug("cray_login_failure(): getjtab error");
+
+	getsysudb();
+	if ((ueptr = getudbnam(username)) == UDB_NULL)
+		debug("cray_login_failure(): getudbname() returned NULL");
+	endudb();
+
+	memset(&fsent, '\0', sizeof(fsent));
+	fsent.revision = 0;
+	fsent.uname = username;
+	fsent.host = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns);
+	fsent.ttyn = "sshd";
+	fsent.caller = IA_SSHD;
+	fsent.flags = IA_INTERACTIVE;
+	fsent.ueptr = ueptr;
+	fsent.jid = jid;
+	fsent.errcode = errcode;
+	fsent.pwdp = NULL;
+	fsent.exitcode = 0;	/* dont exit in ia_failure() */
+
+	fret.revision = 0;
+	fret.normal = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Call ia_failure because of an login failure.
+	 */
+	ia_failure(&fsent, &fret);
+}
+
+/*
+ *  Cray access denied
+ */
+int
+cray_access_denied(char *username)
+{
+	struct udb *ueptr;		/* UDB pointer for username */
+	int errcode;			/* IA errorcode */
+
+	errcode = 0;
+	getsysudb();
+	if ((ueptr = getudbnam(username)) == UDB_NULL)
+		debug("cray_login_failure(): getudbname() returned NULL");
+	endudb();
+
+	if (ueptr != NULL && ueptr->ue_disabled)
+		errcode = IA_DISABLED;
+	if (errcode)
+		cray_login_failure(username, errcode);
+
+	return (errcode);
+}
+
+/*
+ * record_failed_login: generic "login failed" interface function
+ */
+void
+record_failed_login(const char *user, const char *hostname, const char *ttyname)
+{
+	cray_login_failure((char *)user, IA_UDBERR);
+}
+
+int
+cray_setup (uid_t uid, char *username, const char *command)
+{
+	extern struct udb *getudb();
+	extern char *setlimits();
+
+	int err;			/* error return */
+	time_t system_time;		/* current system clock */
+	time_t expiration_time;		/* password expiration time */
+	int maxattempts;		/* maximum no. of failed login attempts */
+	int SecureSys;			/* unicos security flag */
+	int minslevel = 0;		/* system minimum security level */
+	int i, j;
+	int valid_acct = -1;		/* flag for reading valid acct */
+	char acct_name[MAXACID] = { "" }; /* used to read acct name */
+	struct jtab jtab;		/* Job table struct */
+	struct udb ue;			/* udb entry for logging-in user */
+	struct udb *up;			/* pointer to UDB entry */
+	struct secstat secinfo;		/* file  security attributes */
+	struct servprov init_info;	/* used for sesscntl() call */
+	int jid;			/* job ID */
+	int pid;			/* process ID */
+	char *sr;			/* status return from setlimits() */
+	char *ttyn = NULL;		/* ttyname or command name*/
+	char hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
+	/* passwd stuff for ia_user */
+	passwd_t pwdacm, pwddialup, pwdudb, pwdwal, pwddce;
+	ia_user_ret_t uret;		/* stuff returned from ia_user */
+	ia_user_t usent;		/* ia_user main structure */
+	int ia_rcode;			/* ia_user return code */
+	ia_failure_t fsent;		/* ia_failure structure */
+	ia_failure_ret_t fret;		/* ia_failure return stuff */
+	ia_success_t ssent;		/* ia_success structure */
+	ia_success_ret_t sret;		/* ia_success return stuff */
+	int ia_mlsrcode;		/* ia_mlsuser return code */
+	int secstatrc;			/* [f]secstat return code */
+
+	if (SecureSys = (int)sysconf(_SC_CRAY_SECURE_SYS)) {
+		getsysv(&sysv, sizeof(struct sysv));
+		minslevel = sysv.sy_minlvl;
+		if (getusrv(&usrv) < 0)
+			fatal("getusrv() failed, errno = %d", errno);
+	}
+	hostname[0] = '\0';
+	strlcpy(hostname,
+	   (char *)get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns),
+	   MAXHOSTNAMELEN);
+	/*
+	 *  Fetch user's UDB entry.
+	 */
+	getsysudb();
+	if ((up = getudbnam(username)) == UDB_NULL)
+		fatal("cannot fetch user's UDB entry");
+
+	/*
+	 *  Prevent any possible fudging so perform a data
+	 *  safety check and compare the supplied uid against
+	 *  the udb's uid.
+	 */
+	if (up->ue_uid != uid)
+		fatal("IA uid missmatch");
+	endudb();
+
+	if ((jid = getjtab(&jtab)) < 0) {
+		debug("getjtab");
+		return(-1);
+	}
+	pid = getpid();
+	ttyn = ttyname(0);
+	if (SecureSys) {
+		if (ttyn != NULL)
+			secstatrc = secstat(ttyn, &secinfo);
+		else
+			secstatrc = fsecstat(1, &secinfo);
+
+		if (secstatrc == 0)
+			debug("[f]secstat() successful");
+		else
+			fatal("[f]secstat() error, rc = %d", secstatrc);
+	}
+	if ((ttyn == NULL) && ((char *)command != NULL))
+		ttyn = (char *)command;
+	/*
+	 *  Initialize all structures to call ia_user
+	 */
+	usent.revision = 0;
+	usent.uname = username;
+	usent.host = hostname;
+	usent.ttyn = ttyn;
+	usent.caller = IA_SSHD; 
+	usent.pswdlist = &pwdacm;
+	usent.ueptr = &ue;
+	usent.flags = IA_INTERACTIVE | IA_FFLAG;
+	pwdacm.atype = IA_SECURID;
+	pwdacm.pwdp = NULL;
+	pwdacm.next = &pwdudb;
+
+	pwdudb.atype = IA_UDB;
+	pwdudb.pwdp = NULL;
+	pwdudb.next = &pwddce;
+
+	pwddce.atype = IA_DCE;
+	pwddce.pwdp = NULL;
+	pwddce.next = &pwddialup;
+
+	pwddialup.atype = IA_DIALUP;
+	pwddialup.pwdp = NULL;
+	/* pwddialup.next = &pwdwal; */
+	pwddialup.next = NULL;
+
+	pwdwal.atype = IA_WAL;
+	pwdwal.pwdp = NULL;
+	pwdwal.next = NULL;
+
+	uret.revision = 0;
+	uret.pswd = NULL;
+	uret.normal = 0;
+
+	ia_rcode = ia_user(&usent, &uret);
+	switch (ia_rcode) {
+	/*
+	 *  These are acceptable return codes from ia_user()
+	 */
+	case IA_UDBWEEK:        /* Password Expires in 1 week */
+		expiration_time = ue.ue_pwage.time + ue.ue_pwage.maxage;
+		printf ("WARNING - your current password will expire %s\n",
+		ctime((const time_t *)&expiration_time));
+		break;
+	case IA_UDBEXPIRED:
+		if (ttyname(0) != NULL) {
+			/* Force a password change */
+			printf("Your password has expired; Choose a new one.\n");
+			execl("/bin/passwd", "passwd", username, 0);
+			exit(9);
+			}
+		break;
+	case IA_NORMAL:         /* Normal Return Code */
+		break;
+	case IA_BACKDOOR:
+		/* XXX: can we memset it to zero here so save some of this */
+		strlcpy(ue.ue_name, "root", sizeof(ue.ue_name));
+		strlcpy(ue.ue_dir, "/", sizeof(ue.ue_dir));
+		strlcpy(ue.ue_shell, "/bin/sh", sizeof(ue.ue_shell));
+
+		ue.ue_passwd[0] = '\0';
+		ue.ue_age[0] = '\0';
+		ue.ue_comment[0] = '\0';
+		ue.ue_loghost[0] = '\0';
+		ue.ue_logline[0] = '\0';
+
+		ue.ue_uid = -1;
+		ue.ue_nice[UDBRC_INTER] = 0;
+
+		for (i = 0; i < MAXVIDS; i++)
+			ue.ue_gids[i] = 0;
+
+		ue.ue_logfails = 0;
+		ue.ue_minlvl = ue.ue_maxlvl = ue.ue_deflvl = minslevel;
+		ue.ue_defcomps = 0;
+		ue.ue_comparts = 0;
+		ue.ue_permits = 0;
+		ue.ue_trap = 0;
+		ue.ue_disabled = 0;
+		ue.ue_logtime = 0;
+		break;
+	case IA_CONSOLE:        /* Superuser not from Console */
+	case IA_TRUSTED:	/* Trusted user */
+		if (options.permit_root_login > PERMIT_NO)
+			break;	/* Accept root login */
+	default:
+	/*
+	 *  These are failed return codes from ia_user()
+	 */
+		switch (ia_rcode) 
+		{
+		case IA_BADAUTH:
+			printf("Bad authorization, access denied.\n");
+			break;
+		case IA_DISABLED:
+			printf("Your login has been disabled. Contact the system ");
+			printf("administrator for assistance.\n");
+			break;
+		case IA_GETSYSV:
+			printf("getsysv() failed - errno = %d\n", errno);
+			break;
+		case IA_MAXLOGS:
+			printf("Maximum number of failed login attempts exceeded.\n");
+			printf("Access denied.\n");
+			break;
+		case IA_UDBPWDNULL:
+			if (SecureSys)
+				printf("NULL Password not allowed on MLS systems.\n");
+			break;
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 *  Authentication failed.
+		 */
+		printf("sshd: Login incorrect, (0%o)\n",
+		    ia_rcode-IA_ERRORCODE);
+
+		/*
+		 *  Initialize structure for ia_failure
+		 *  which will exit.
+		 */
+		fsent.revision = 0;
+		fsent.uname = username;
+		fsent.host = hostname;
+		fsent.ttyn = ttyn;
+		fsent.caller = IA_SSHD;
+		fsent.flags = IA_INTERACTIVE;
+		fsent.ueptr = &ue;
+		fsent.jid = jid;
+		fsent.errcode = ia_rcode;
+		fsent.pwdp = uret.pswd;
+		fsent.exitcode = 1;
+
+		fret.revision = 0;
+		fret.normal = 0;
+
+		/*
+		*  Call ia_failure because of an IA failure.
+		*  There is no return because ia_failure exits.
+		*/
+		ia_failure(&fsent, &fret);
+
+		exit(1); 
+	}
+
+	ia_mlsrcode = IA_NORMAL;
+	if (SecureSys) {
+		debug("calling ia_mlsuser()");
+		ia_mlsrcode = ia_mlsuser(&ue, &secinfo, &usrv, NULL, 0);
+	}
+	if (ia_mlsrcode != IA_NORMAL) {
+		printf("sshd: Login incorrect, (0%o)\n",
+		    ia_mlsrcode-IA_ERRORCODE);
+		/*
+		 *  Initialize structure for ia_failure
+		 *  which will exit.
+		 */
+		fsent.revision = 0;
+		fsent.uname = username;
+		fsent.host = hostname;
+		fsent.ttyn = ttyn;
+		fsent.caller = IA_SSHD;
+		fsent.flags = IA_INTERACTIVE;
+		fsent.ueptr = &ue;
+		fsent.jid  = jid;
+		fsent.errcode = ia_mlsrcode;
+		fsent.pwdp = uret.pswd;
+		fsent.exitcode = 1;
+		fret.revision = 0;
+		fret.normal = 0;
+
+		/*
+		 *  Call ia_failure because of an IA failure.
+		 *  There is no return because ia_failure exits.
+		 */
+		ia_failure(&fsent,&fret);
+		exit(1); 
+	}
+
+	/* Provide login status information */
+	if (options.print_lastlog && ue.ue_logtime != 0) {
+		printf("Last successful login was : %.*s ", 19,
+		    (char *)ctime(&ue.ue_logtime));
+
+		if (*ue.ue_loghost != '\0') {
+			printf("from %.*s\n", sizeof(ue.ue_loghost),
+			    ue.ue_loghost);
+		} else {
+			printf("on %.*s\n", sizeof(ue.ue_logline),
+			    ue.ue_logline);
+		}
+
+		if (SecureSys && (ue.ue_logfails != 0)) {
+			printf("  followed by %d failed attempts\n",
+			    ue.ue_logfails);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Call ia_success to process successful I/A.
+	 */
+	ssent.revision = 0;
+	ssent.uname = username;
+	ssent.host = hostname;
+	ssent.ttyn = ttyn;
+	ssent.caller = IA_SSHD;
+	ssent.flags = IA_INTERACTIVE;
+	ssent.ueptr = &ue;
+	ssent.jid = jid;
+	ssent.errcode = ia_rcode;
+	ssent.us = NULL;
+	ssent.time = 1;	/* Set ue_logtime */
+
+	sret.revision = 0;
+	sret.normal = 0;
+
+	ia_success(&ssent, &sret);
+
+	/*
+	 * Query for account, iff > 1 valid acid & askacid permbit
+	 */
+	if (((ue.ue_permbits & PERMBITS_ACCTID) ||
+	    (ue.ue_acids[0] >= 0) && (ue.ue_acids[1] >= 0)) &&
+	    ue.ue_permbits & PERMBITS_ASKACID) {
+		if (ttyname(0) != NULL) {
+			debug("cray_setup: ttyname true case, %.100s", ttyname);
+			while (valid_acct == -1) {
+				printf("Account (? for available accounts)"
+				    " [%s]: ", acid2nam(ue.ue_acids[0]));
+				fgets(acct_name, MAXACID, stdin);
+				switch (acct_name[0]) {
+				case EOF:
+					exit(0);
+					break;
+				case '\0':
+					valid_acct = ue.ue_acids[0];
+					strlcpy(acct_name, acid2nam(valid_acct), MAXACID);
+					break;
+				case '?':
+					/* Print the list 3 wide */
+					for (i = 0, j = 0; i < MAXVIDS; i++) {
+						if (ue.ue_acids[i] == -1) {
+							printf("\n");
+							break;
+						}
+						if (++j == 4) {
+							j = 1;
+							printf("\n");
+						}
+						printf(" %s",
+						    acid2nam(ue.ue_acids[i]));
+					}
+					if (ue.ue_permbits & PERMBITS_ACCTID) {
+						printf("\"acctid\" permbit also allows"
+						    " you to select any valid "
+						    "account name.\n");
+					}
+					printf("\n");
+					break;
+				default:
+					valid_acct = nam2acid(acct_name);
+					if (valid_acct == -1) 
+						printf(
+						    "Account id not found for"
+						    " account name \"%s\"\n\n",
+						    acct_name);
+					break;
+				}
+				/*
+				 * If an account was given, search the user's
+				 * acids array to verify they can use this account.
+				 */
+				if ((valid_acct != -1) &&
+				    !(ue.ue_permbits & PERMBITS_ACCTID)) {
+					for (i = 0; i < MAXVIDS; i++) {
+						if (ue.ue_acids[i] == -1)
+							break;
+						if (valid_acct == ue.ue_acids[i])
+							break;
+					}
+					if (i == MAXVIDS ||
+					    ue.ue_acids[i] == -1) {
+						fprintf(stderr, "Cannot set"
+						    " account name to "
+						    "\"%s\", permission "
+						    "denied\n\n", acct_name);
+						valid_acct = -1;
+					}
+				}
+			}
+		} else {
+			/*
+			 * The client isn't connected to a terminal and can't
+			 * respond to an acid prompt.  Use default acid.
+			 */
+			debug("cray_setup: ttyname false case, %.100s",
+			    ttyname);
+			valid_acct = ue.ue_acids[0];
+		}
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * The user doesn't have the askacid permbit set or
+		 * only has one valid account to use.
+		 */
+		valid_acct = ue.ue_acids[0];
+	}
+	if (acctid(0, valid_acct) < 0) {
+		printf ("Bad account id: %d\n", valid_acct);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+
+	/* 
+	 * Now set shares, quotas, limits, including CPU time for the 
+	 * (interactive) job and process, and set up permissions 
+	 * (for chown etc), etc.
+	 */
+	if (setshares(ue.ue_uid, valid_acct, printf, 0, 0)) {
+		printf("Unable to give %d shares to <%s>(%d/%d)\n",
+		    ue.ue_shares, ue.ue_name, ue.ue_uid, valid_acct);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+
+	sr = setlimits(username, C_PROC, pid, UDBRC_INTER);
+	if (sr != NULL) {
+		debug("%.200s", sr);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	sr = setlimits(username, C_JOB, jid, UDBRC_INTER);
+	if (sr != NULL) {
+		debug("%.200s", sr);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Place the service provider information into
+	 * the session table (Unicos) or job table (Unicos/mk).
+	 * There exist double defines for the job/session table in
+	 * unicos/mk (jtab.h) so no need for a compile time switch.
+	 */
+	memset(&init_info, '\0', sizeof(init_info));
+	init_info.s_sessinit.si_id = URM_SPT_LOGIN;
+	init_info.s_sessinit.si_pid = getpid();
+	init_info.s_sessinit.si_sid = jid;
+	sesscntl(0, S_SETSERVPO, (int)&init_info);
+
+	/*
+	 * Set user and controlling tty security attributes.
+	 */
+	if (SecureSys) {
+		if (setusrv(&usrv) == -1) {
+			debug("setusrv() failed, errno = %d",errno);
+			exit(1);
+		}
+	}
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The rc.* and /etc/sdaemon methods of starting a program on unicos/unicosmk
+ * can have pal privileges that sshd can inherit which
+ * could allow a user to su to root with out a password.
+ * This subroutine clears all privileges.
+ */
+void
+drop_cray_privs()
+{
+#if defined(_SC_CRAY_PRIV_SU)
+	priv_proc_t *privstate;
+	int result;
+	extern int priv_set_proc();
+	extern priv_proc_t *priv_init_proc();
+
+	/*
+	 * If ether of theses two flags are not set
+	 * then don't allow this version of ssh to run.
+	 */
+	if (!sysconf(_SC_CRAY_PRIV_SU))
+		fatal("Not PRIV_SU system.");
+	if (!sysconf(_SC_CRAY_POSIX_PRIV))
+		fatal("Not POSIX_PRIV.");
+
+	debug("Setting MLS labels.");;
+
+	if (sysconf(_SC_CRAY_SECURE_MAC)) {
+		usrv.sv_minlvl = SYSLOW;
+		usrv.sv_actlvl = SYSHIGH;
+		usrv.sv_maxlvl = SYSHIGH;
+	} else {
+		usrv.sv_minlvl = sysv.sy_minlvl;
+		usrv.sv_actlvl = sysv.sy_minlvl;
+		usrv.sv_maxlvl = sysv.sy_maxlvl;
+	}       
+	usrv.sv_actcmp = 0;
+	usrv.sv_valcmp = sysv.sy_valcmp;
+
+	usrv.sv_intcat = TFM_SYSTEM;
+	usrv.sv_valcat |= (TFM_SYSTEM | TFM_SYSFILE);
+
+	if (setusrv(&usrv) < 0) {
+		fatal("%s(%d): setusrv(): %s", __FILE__, __LINE__,
+		    strerror(errno));
+	}
+
+	if ((privstate = priv_init_proc()) != NULL) {
+		result = priv_set_proc(privstate);
+		if (result != 0 ) {
+			fatal("%s(%d): priv_set_proc(): %s",
+			    __FILE__, __LINE__, strerror(errno));
+		}
+		priv_free_proc(privstate);
+	}
+	debug ("Privileges should be cleared...");
+#else
+	/* XXX: do this differently */
+#	error Cray systems must be run with _SC_CRAY_PRIV_SU on!
+#endif
+}
+
+
+/*
+ *  Retain utmp/wtmp information - used by cray accounting.
+ */
+void
+cray_retain_utmp(struct utmp *ut, int pid)
+{
+	int fd;
+	struct utmp utmp;
+
+	if ((fd = open(UTMP_FILE, O_RDONLY)) != -1) {
+		/* XXX use atomicio */
+		while (read(fd, (char *)&utmp, sizeof(utmp)) == sizeof(utmp)) {
+			if (pid == utmp.ut_pid) {
+				ut->ut_jid = utmp.ut_jid;
+				strncpy(ut->ut_tpath, utmp.ut_tpath, sizeof(utmp.ut_tpath));
+				strncpy(ut->ut_host, utmp.ut_host, sizeof(utmp.ut_host));
+				strncpy(ut->ut_name, utmp.ut_name, sizeof(utmp.ut_name));
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		close(fd);
+	} else
+		fatal("Unable to open utmp file");
+}
+
+/*
+ * tmpdir support.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * find and delete jobs tmpdir.
+ */
+void
+cray_delete_tmpdir(char *login, int jid, uid_t uid)
+{
+	static char jtmp[TPATHSIZ];
+	struct stat statbuf;
+	int child, c, wstat;
+
+	for (c = 'a'; c <= 'z'; c++) {
+		snprintf(jtmp, TPATHSIZ, "%s/jtmp.%06d%c", JTMPDIR, jid, c);
+		if (stat(jtmp, &statbuf) == 0 && statbuf.st_uid == uid)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	if (c > 'z')
+		return;
+
+	if ((child = fork()) == 0) {
+		execl(CLEANTMPCMD, CLEANTMPCMD, login, jtmp, (char *)NULL);
+		fatal("cray_delete_tmpdir: execl of CLEANTMPCMD failed");
+	}
+
+	while (waitpid(child, &wstat, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR)
+		;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Remove tmpdir on job termination.
+ */
+void
+cray_job_termination_handler(int sig)
+{
+	int jid;
+	char *login = NULL;
+	struct jtab jtab;
+
+	if ((jid = waitjob(&jtab)) == -1 ||
+	    (login = uid2nam(jtab.j_uid)) == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	cray_delete_tmpdir(login, jid, jtab.j_uid);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set job id and create tmpdir directory.
+ */
+void
+cray_init_job(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+	int jid;
+	int c;
+
+	jid = setjob(pw->pw_uid, WJSIGNAL);
+	if (jid < 0)
+		fatal("System call setjob failure");
+
+	for (c = 'a'; c <= 'z'; c++) {
+		snprintf(cray_tmpdir, TPATHSIZ, "%s/jtmp.%06d%c", JTMPDIR, jid, c);
+		if (mkdir(cray_tmpdir, JTMPMODE) != 0)
+			continue;
+		if (chown(cray_tmpdir,	pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid) != 0) {
+			rmdir(cray_tmpdir);
+			continue;
+		}
+		break;
+	}
+
+	if (c > 'z')
+		cray_tmpdir[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+void
+cray_set_tmpdir(struct utmp *ut)
+{
+	int jid;
+	struct jtab jbuf;
+
+	if ((jid = getjtab(&jbuf)) < 0)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Set jid and tmpdir in utmp record.
+	 */
+	ut->ut_jid = jid;
+	strncpy(ut->ut_tpath, cray_tmpdir, TPATHSIZ);
+}
+#endif /* UNICOS */
+
+#ifdef _UNICOSMP
+#include <pwd.h>
+/*
+ * Set job id and create tmpdir directory.
+ */
+void
+cray_init_job(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+	initrm_silent(pw->pw_uid);
+	return;
+}
+#endif /* _UNICOSMP */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.h b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..774eceb5a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.h
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+/* $Id: bsd-cray.h,v 1.12 2005/02/02 06:10:11 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2002, Cray Inc.  (Wendy Palm <wendyp@cray.com>)
+ * Significant portions provided by 
+ *          Wayne Schroeder, SDSC <schroeder@sdsc.edu>
+ *          William Jones, UTexas <jones@tacc.utexas.edu>
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * Created: Apr 22 16.34:00 2002 wp
+ *
+ * This file contains functions required for proper execution
+ * on UNICOS systems.
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef _BSD_CRAY_H
+#define _BSD_CRAY_H
+
+#ifdef _UNICOS
+
+void cray_init_job(struct passwd *);
+void cray_job_termination_handler(int);
+void cray_login_failure(char *, int );
+int cray_access_denied(char *);
+extern char cray_tmpdir[];
+
+#define CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN 1
+
+#ifndef IA_SSHD
+# define IA_SSHD IA_LOGIN
+#endif
+#ifndef MAXHOSTNAMELEN
+# define MAXHOSTNAMELEN  64
+#endif
+#ifndef _CRAYT3E
+# define TIOCGPGRP (tIOC|20)
+#endif
+
+#endif /* UNICOS */
+
+#endif /* _BSD_CRAY_H */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8672ccf7f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2011, 2013 Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * Created: Sat Sep 02 12:17:00 2000 cv
+ *
+ * This file contains functions for forcing opened file descriptors to
+ * binary mode on Windows systems.
+ */
+
+#define NO_BINARY_OPEN	/* Avoid redefining open to binary_open for this file */
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+int 
+binary_open(const char *filename, int flags, ...)
+{
+	va_list ap;
+	mode_t mode;
+	
+	va_start(ap, flags);
+	mode = va_arg(ap, mode_t);
+	va_end(ap);
+	return (open(filename, flags | O_BINARY, mode));
+}
+
+int
+check_ntsec(const char *filename)
+{
+	return (pathconf(filename, _PC_POSIX_PERMISSIONS));
+}
+
+const char *
+cygwin_ssh_privsep_user()
+{
+  static char cyg_privsep_user[DNLEN + UNLEN + 2];
+
+  if (!cyg_privsep_user[0])
+    {
+#ifdef CW_CYGNAME_FROM_WINNAME
+      if (cygwin_internal (CW_CYGNAME_FROM_WINNAME, "sshd", cyg_privsep_user,
+			   sizeof cyg_privsep_user) != 0)
+#endif
+	strlcpy(cyg_privsep_user, "sshd", sizeof(cyg_privsep_user));
+    }
+  return cyg_privsep_user;
+}
+
+#define NL(x) x, (sizeof (x) - 1)
+#define WENV_SIZ (sizeof (wenv_arr) / sizeof (wenv_arr[0]))
+
+static struct wenv {
+	const char *name;
+	size_t namelen;
+} wenv_arr[] = {
+	{ NL("ALLUSERSPROFILE=") },
+	{ NL("COMPUTERNAME=") },
+	{ NL("COMSPEC=") },
+	{ NL("CYGWIN=") },
+	{ NL("OS=") },
+	{ NL("PATH=") },
+	{ NL("PATHEXT=") },
+	{ NL("PROGRAMFILES=") },
+	{ NL("SYSTEMDRIVE=") },
+	{ NL("SYSTEMROOT=") },
+	{ NL("WINDIR=") }
+};
+
+char **
+fetch_windows_environment(void)
+{
+	char **e, **p;
+	unsigned int i, idx = 0;
+
+	p = xcalloc(WENV_SIZ + 1, sizeof(char *));
+	for (e = environ; *e != NULL; ++e) {
+		for (i = 0; i < WENV_SIZ; ++i) {
+			if (!strncmp(*e, wenv_arr[i].name, wenv_arr[i].namelen))
+				p[idx++] = *e;
+		}
+	}
+	p[idx] = NULL;
+	return p;
+}
+
+void
+free_windows_environment(char **p)
+{
+	free(p);
+}
+
+#endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..79cb2a197
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+/* $Id: bsd-cygwin_util.h,v 1.18 2014/05/27 04:34:43 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2011, 2013 Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * Created: Sat Sep 02 12:17:00 2000 cv
+ *
+ * This file contains functions for forcing opened file descriptors to
+ * binary mode on Windows systems.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _BSD_CYGWIN_UTIL_H
+#define _BSD_CYGWIN_UTIL_H
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+
+#undef ERROR
+
+/* Avoid including windows headers. */
+typedef void *HANDLE;
+#define INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE ((HANDLE) -1)
+#define DNLEN 16
+#define UNLEN 256
+
+/* Cygwin functions for which declarations are only available when including
+   windows headers, so we have to define them here explicitely. */
+extern HANDLE cygwin_logon_user (const struct passwd *, const char *);
+extern void cygwin_set_impersonation_token (const HANDLE);
+
+#include <sys/cygwin.h>
+#include <io.h>
+
+#define CYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER (cygwin_ssh_privsep_user())
+const char *cygwin_ssh_privsep_user();
+
+int binary_open(const char *, int , ...);
+int check_ntsec(const char *);
+char **fetch_windows_environment(void);
+void free_windows_environment(char **);
+
+#ifndef NO_BINARY_OPEN
+#define open binary_open
+#endif
+
+#endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */
+
+#endif /* _BSD_CYGWIN_UTIL_H */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-getpeereid.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-getpeereid.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5f7e677e5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-getpeereid.c
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2002,2004 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_GETPEEREID)
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#if defined(SO_PEERCRED)
+int
+getpeereid(int s, uid_t *euid, gid_t *gid)
+{
+	struct ucred cred;
+	socklen_t len = sizeof(cred);
+
+	if (getsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEERCRED, &cred, &len) < 0)
+		return (-1);
+	*euid = cred.uid;
+	*gid = cred.gid;
+
+	return (0);
+}
+#elif defined(HAVE_GETPEERUCRED)
+
+#ifdef HAVE_UCRED_H
+# include <ucred.h>
+#endif
+
+int
+getpeereid(int s, uid_t *euid, gid_t *gid)
+{
+	ucred_t *ucred = NULL;
+
+	if (getpeerucred(s, &ucred) == -1)
+		return (-1);
+	if ((*euid = ucred_geteuid(ucred)) == -1)
+		return (-1);
+	if ((*gid = ucred_getrgid(ucred)) == -1)
+		return (-1);
+
+	ucred_free(ucred);
+
+	return (0);
+}
+#else
+int
+getpeereid(int s, uid_t *euid, gid_t *gid)
+{
+	*euid = geteuid();
+	*gid = getgid();
+
+	return (0);
+}
+#endif /* defined(SO_PEERCRED) */
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_GETPEEREID) */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f7be415ec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,278 @@
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
+# include <sys/select.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#ifndef HAVE___PROGNAME
+char *__progname;
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * NB. duplicate __progname in case it is an alias for argv[0]
+ * Otherwise it may get clobbered by setproctitle()
+ */
+char *ssh_get_progname(char *argv0)
+{
+	char *p, *q;
+#ifdef HAVE___PROGNAME
+	extern char *__progname;
+
+	p = __progname;
+#else
+	if (argv0 == NULL)
+		return ("unknown");	/* XXX */
+	p = strrchr(argv0, '/');
+	if (p == NULL)
+		p = argv0;
+	else
+		p++;
+#endif
+	if ((q = strdup(p)) == NULL) {
+		perror("strdup");
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	return q;
+}
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SETLOGIN
+int setlogin(const char *name)
+{
+	return (0);
+}
+#endif /* !HAVE_SETLOGIN */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_INNETGR
+int innetgr(const char *netgroup, const char *host, 
+            const char *user, const char *domain)
+{
+	return (0);
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_INNETGR */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_SETEUID) && defined(HAVE_SETREUID)
+int seteuid(uid_t euid)
+{
+	return (setreuid(-1, euid));
+}
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SETEUID) && defined(HAVE_SETREUID) */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_SETEGID) && defined(HAVE_SETRESGID)
+int setegid(uid_t egid)
+{
+	return(setresgid(-1, egid, -1));
+}
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SETEGID) && defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_STRERROR) && defined(HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST) && defined(HAVE_SYS_NERR)
+const char *strerror(int e)
+{
+	extern int sys_nerr;
+	extern char *sys_errlist[];
+	
+	if ((e >= 0) && (e < sys_nerr))
+		return (sys_errlist[e]);
+
+	return ("unlisted error");
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_UTIMES
+int utimes(char *filename, struct timeval *tvp)
+{
+	struct utimbuf ub;
+
+	ub.actime = tvp[0].tv_sec;
+	ub.modtime = tvp[1].tv_sec;
+	
+	return (utime(filename, &ub));
+}
+#endif 
+
+#ifndef HAVE_TRUNCATE
+int truncate(const char *path, off_t length)
+{
+	int fd, ret, saverrno;
+
+	fd = open(path, O_WRONLY);
+	if (fd < 0)
+		return (-1);
+
+	ret = ftruncate(fd, length);
+	saverrno = errno;
+	close(fd);
+	if (ret == -1)
+		errno = saverrno;
+
+	return(ret);
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_TRUNCATE */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_NANOSLEEP) && !defined(HAVE_NSLEEP)
+int nanosleep(const struct timespec *req, struct timespec *rem)
+{
+	int rc, saverrno;
+	extern int errno;
+	struct timeval tstart, tstop, tremain, time2wait;
+
+	TIMESPEC_TO_TIMEVAL(&time2wait, req)
+	(void) gettimeofday(&tstart, NULL);
+	rc = select(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, &time2wait);
+	if (rc == -1) {
+		saverrno = errno;
+		(void) gettimeofday (&tstop, NULL);
+		errno = saverrno;
+		tremain.tv_sec = time2wait.tv_sec - 
+			(tstop.tv_sec - tstart.tv_sec);
+		tremain.tv_usec = time2wait.tv_usec - 
+			(tstop.tv_usec - tstart.tv_usec);
+		tremain.tv_sec += tremain.tv_usec / 1000000L;
+		tremain.tv_usec %= 1000000L;
+	} else {
+		tremain.tv_sec = 0;
+		tremain.tv_usec = 0;
+	}
+	if (rem != NULL)
+		TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC(&tremain, rem)
+
+	return(rc);
+}
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_USLEEP)
+int usleep(unsigned int useconds)
+{
+	struct timespec ts;
+
+	ts.tv_sec = useconds / 1000000;
+	ts.tv_nsec = (useconds % 1000000) * 1000;
+	return nanosleep(&ts, NULL);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_TCGETPGRP
+pid_t
+tcgetpgrp(int fd)
+{
+	int ctty_pgrp;
+
+	if (ioctl(fd, TIOCGPGRP, &ctty_pgrp) == -1)
+		return(-1);
+	else
+		return(ctty_pgrp);
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_TCGETPGRP */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_TCSENDBREAK
+int
+tcsendbreak(int fd, int duration)
+{
+# if defined(TIOCSBRK) && defined(TIOCCBRK)
+	struct timeval sleepytime;
+
+	sleepytime.tv_sec = 0;
+	sleepytime.tv_usec = 400000;
+	if (ioctl(fd, TIOCSBRK, 0) == -1)
+		return (-1);
+	(void)select(0, 0, 0, 0, &sleepytime);
+	if (ioctl(fd, TIOCCBRK, 0) == -1)
+		return (-1);
+	return (0);
+# else
+	return -1;
+# endif
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_TCSENDBREAK */
+
+mysig_t
+mysignal(int sig, mysig_t act)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_SIGACTION
+	struct sigaction sa, osa;
+
+	if (sigaction(sig, NULL, &osa) == -1)
+		return (mysig_t) -1;
+	if (osa.sa_handler != act) {
+		memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
+		sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask);
+		sa.sa_flags = 0;
+#ifdef SA_INTERRUPT
+		if (sig == SIGALRM)
+			sa.sa_flags |= SA_INTERRUPT;
+#endif
+		sa.sa_handler = act;
+		if (sigaction(sig, &sa, NULL) == -1)
+			return (mysig_t) -1;
+	}
+	return (osa.sa_handler);
+#else
+	#undef signal
+	return (signal(sig, act));
+#endif
+}
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRDUP
+char *
+strdup(const char *str)
+{
+	size_t len;
+	char *cp;
+
+	len = strlen(str) + 1;
+	cp = malloc(len);
+	if (cp != NULL)
+		return(memcpy(cp, str, len));
+	return NULL;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_ISBLANK
+int
+isblank(int c)
+{
+	return (c == ' ' || c == '\t');
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GETPGID
+pid_t
+getpgid(pid_t pid)
+{
+#if defined(HAVE_GETPGRP) && !defined(GETPGRP_VOID)
+	return getpgrp(pid);
+#elif defined(HAVE_GETPGRP)
+	if (pid == 0)
+		return getpgrp();
+#endif
+
+	errno = ESRCH;
+	return -1;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ff347a24b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+/* $Id: bsd-misc.h,v 1.25 2013/08/04 11:48:41 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _BSD_MISC_H
+#define _BSD_MISC_H
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+char *ssh_get_progname(char *);
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SETSID
+#define setsid() setpgrp(0, getpid())
+#endif /* !HAVE_SETSID */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SETENV
+int setenv(const char *, const char *, int);
+#endif /* !HAVE_SETENV */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SETLOGIN
+int setlogin(const char *);
+#endif /* !HAVE_SETLOGIN */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_INNETGR
+int innetgr(const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
+#endif /* HAVE_INNETGR */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_SETEUID) && defined(HAVE_SETREUID)
+int seteuid(uid_t);
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SETEUID) && defined(HAVE_SETREUID) */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_SETEGID) && defined(HAVE_SETRESGID)
+int setegid(uid_t);
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SETEGID) && defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_STRERROR) && defined(HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST) && defined(HAVE_SYS_NERR)
+const char *strerror(int);
+#endif 
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_SETLINEBUF)
+#define setlinebuf(a)	(setvbuf((a), NULL, _IOLBF, 0))
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_UTIMES
+#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL
+struct timeval {
+	long tv_sec;
+	long tv_usec;
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL */
+
+int utimes(char *, struct timeval *);
+#endif /* HAVE_UTIMES */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_TRUNCATE
+int truncate (const char *, off_t);
+#endif /* HAVE_TRUNCATE */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_NANOSLEEP) && !defined(HAVE_NSLEEP)
+#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_TIMESPEC
+struct timespec {
+	time_t	tv_sec;
+	long	tv_nsec;
+};
+#endif
+int nanosleep(const struct timespec *, struct timespec *);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_USLEEP
+int usleep(unsigned int useconds);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_TCGETPGRP
+pid_t tcgetpgrp(int);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_TCSENDBREAK
+int tcsendbreak(int, int);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_UNSETENV
+int unsetenv(const char *);
+#endif
+
+/* wrapper for signal interface */
+typedef void (*mysig_t)(int);
+mysig_t mysignal(int sig, mysig_t act);
+
+#define signal(a,b) mysignal(a,b)
+
+#ifndef HAVE_ISBLANK
+int	isblank(int);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GETPGID
+pid_t getpgid(pid_t);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_ENDGRENT
+# define endgrent() do { } while(0)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_KRB5_GET_ERROR_MESSAGE
+# define krb5_get_error_message krb5_get_err_text
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_KRB5_FREE_ERROR_MESSAGE
+# define krb5_free_error_message(a,b) do { } while(0)
+#endif
+
+#endif /* _BSD_MISC_H */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8195af88a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.c
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000,2001 Ben Lindstrom.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef HAVE_NEXT
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include "bsd-nextstep.h"
+
+pid_t 
+posix_wait(int *status)
+{
+	union wait statusp;
+	pid_t wait_pid;
+
+	#undef wait			/* Use NeXT's wait() function */
+	wait_pid = wait(&statusp);
+	if (status)
+		*status = (int) statusp.w_status;
+
+	return (wait_pid);
+}
+
+int
+tcgetattr(int fd, struct termios *t)
+{
+	return (ioctl(fd, TIOCGETA, t));
+}
+
+int
+tcsetattr(int fd, int opt, const struct termios *t)
+{
+	struct termios localterm;
+
+	if (opt & TCSASOFT) {
+		localterm = *t;
+		localterm.c_cflag |= CIGNORE;
+		t = &localterm;
+	}
+	switch (opt & ~TCSASOFT) {
+	case TCSANOW:
+		return (ioctl(fd, TIOCSETA, t));
+	case TCSADRAIN:
+		return (ioctl(fd, TIOCSETAW, t));
+	case TCSAFLUSH:
+		return (ioctl(fd, TIOCSETAF, t));
+	default:
+		errno = EINVAL;
+		return (-1);
+	}
+}
+
+int tcsetpgrp(int fd, pid_t pgrp)
+{
+	return (ioctl(fd, TIOCSPGRP, &pgrp));
+}
+
+speed_t cfgetospeed(const struct termios *t)
+{
+	return (t->c_ospeed);
+}
+
+speed_t cfgetispeed(const struct termios *t)
+{
+	return (t->c_ispeed);
+}
+
+int
+cfsetospeed(struct termios *t,int speed)
+{
+	t->c_ospeed = speed;
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+cfsetispeed(struct termios *t, int speed)
+{
+	t->c_ispeed = speed;
+	return (0);
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_NEXT */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ca5b4b54a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+/* $Id: bsd-nextstep.h,v 1.9 2003/08/29 16:59:52 mouring Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000,2001 Ben Lindstrom.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef _NEXT_POSIX_H
+#define _NEXT_POSIX_H
+
+#ifdef HAVE_NEXT
+#include <sys/dir.h>
+
+/* NGROUPS_MAX is behind -lposix.  Use the BSD version which is NGROUPS */
+#undef NGROUPS_MAX
+#define NGROUPS_MAX NGROUPS
+
+/* NeXT's readdir() is BSD (struct direct) not POSIX (struct dirent) */
+#define dirent direct
+
+/* Swap out NeXT's BSD wait() for a more POSIX complient one */
+pid_t posix_wait(int *);
+#define wait(a) posix_wait(a)
+
+/* #ifdef wrapped functions that need defining for clean compiling */
+pid_t getppid(void);
+void vhangup(void);
+int innetgr(const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
+
+/* TERMCAP */
+int tcgetattr(int, struct termios *);
+int tcsetattr(int, int, const struct termios *);
+int tcsetpgrp(int, pid_t);
+speed_t cfgetospeed(const struct termios *);
+speed_t cfgetispeed(const struct termios *);
+int cfsetospeed(struct termios *, int);
+int cfsetispeed(struct termios *, int);
+#endif /* HAVE_NEXT */
+#endif /* _NEXT_POSIX_H */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-openpty.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-openpty.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9777eb556
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-openpty.c
@@ -0,0 +1,220 @@
+/*
+ * Please note: this implementation of openpty() is far from complete.
+ * it is just enough for portable OpenSSH's needs.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * Allocating a pseudo-terminal, and making it the controlling tty.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#if !defined(HAVE_OPENPTY)
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_IOCTL_H
+# include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
+# include <fcntl.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
+# include <util.h>
+#endif /* HAVE_UTIL_H */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_PTY_H
+# include <pty.h>
+#endif
+#if defined(HAVE_DEV_PTMX) && defined(HAVE_SYS_STROPTS_H)
+# include <sys/stropts.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#ifndef O_NOCTTY
+#define O_NOCTTY 0
+#endif
+
+int
+openpty(int *amaster, int *aslave, char *name, struct termios *termp,
+   struct winsize *winp)
+{
+#if defined(HAVE__GETPTY)
+	/*
+	 * _getpty(3) exists in SGI Irix 4.x, 5.x & 6.x -- it generates more
+	 * pty's automagically when needed
+	 */
+	char *slave;
+
+	if ((slave = _getpty(amaster, O_RDWR, 0622, 0)) == NULL)
+		return (-1);
+
+	/* Open the slave side. */
+	if ((*aslave = open(slave, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) == -1) {
+		close(*amaster);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	return (0);
+
+#elif defined(HAVE_DEV_PTMX)
+	/*
+	 * This code is used e.g. on Solaris 2.x.  (Note that Solaris 2.3
+	 * also has bsd-style ptys, but they simply do not work.)
+	 */
+	int ptm;
+	char *pts;
+	mysig_t old_signal;
+
+	if ((ptm = open("/dev/ptmx", O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) == -1)
+		return (-1);
+
+	/* XXX: need to close ptm on error? */
+	old_signal = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+	if (grantpt(ptm) < 0)
+		return (-1);
+	signal(SIGCHLD, old_signal);
+
+	if (unlockpt(ptm) < 0)
+		return (-1);
+
+	if ((pts = ptsname(ptm)) == NULL)
+		return (-1);
+	*amaster = ptm;
+
+	/* Open the slave side. */
+	if ((*aslave = open(pts, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) == -1) {
+		close(*amaster);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Try to push the appropriate streams modules, as described 
+	 * in Solaris pts(7).
+	 */
+	ioctl(*aslave, I_PUSH, "ptem");
+	ioctl(*aslave, I_PUSH, "ldterm");
+# ifndef __hpux
+	ioctl(*aslave, I_PUSH, "ttcompat");
+# endif /* __hpux */
+
+	return (0);
+
+#elif defined(HAVE_DEV_PTS_AND_PTC)
+	/* AIX-style pty code. */
+	const char *ttname;
+
+	if ((*amaster = open("/dev/ptc", O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) == -1)
+		return (-1);
+	if ((ttname = ttyname(*amaster)) == NULL)
+		return (-1);
+	if ((*aslave = open(ttname, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) == -1) {
+		close(*amaster);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	return (0);
+
+#elif defined(_UNICOS)
+	char ptbuf[64], ttbuf[64];
+	int i;
+	int highpty;
+
+	highpty = 128;
+#ifdef _SC_CRAY_NPTY
+	if ((highpty = sysconf(_SC_CRAY_NPTY)) == -1)
+		highpty = 128;
+#endif /* _SC_CRAY_NPTY */
+
+	for (i = 0; i < highpty; i++) {
+		snprintf(ptbuf, sizeof(ptbuf), "/dev/pty/%03d", i);
+		snprintf(ttbuf, sizeof(ttbuf), "/dev/ttyp%03d", i);
+		if ((*amaster = open(ptbuf, O_RDWR|O_NOCTTY)) == -1)
+			continue;
+		/* Open the slave side. */
+		if ((*aslave = open(ttbuf, O_RDWR|O_NOCTTY)) == -1) {
+			close(*amaster);
+			return (-1);
+		}
+		return (0);
+	}
+	return (-1);
+
+#else
+	/* BSD-style pty code. */
+	char ptbuf[64], ttbuf[64];
+	int i;
+	const char *ptymajors = "pqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmno"
+	    "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ";
+	const char *ptyminors = "0123456789abcdef";
+	int num_minors = strlen(ptyminors);
+	int num_ptys = strlen(ptymajors) * num_minors;
+	struct termios tio;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < num_ptys; i++) {
+		snprintf(ptbuf, sizeof(ptbuf), "/dev/pty%c%c", 
+		    ptymajors[i / num_minors], ptyminors[i % num_minors]);
+		snprintf(ttbuf, sizeof(ttbuf), "/dev/tty%c%c",
+		    ptymajors[i / num_minors], ptyminors[i % num_minors]);
+
+		if ((*amaster = open(ptbuf, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) == -1) {
+			/* Try SCO style naming */
+			snprintf(ptbuf, sizeof(ptbuf), "/dev/ptyp%d", i);
+			snprintf(ttbuf, sizeof(ttbuf), "/dev/ttyp%d", i);
+			if ((*amaster = open(ptbuf, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) == -1)
+				continue;
+		}
+
+		/* Open the slave side. */
+		if ((*aslave = open(ttbuf, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) == -1) {
+			close(*amaster);
+			return (-1);
+		}
+		/* set tty modes to a sane state for broken clients */
+		if (tcgetattr(*amaster, &tio) != -1) {
+			tio.c_lflag |= (ECHO | ISIG | ICANON);
+			tio.c_oflag |= (OPOST | ONLCR);
+			tio.c_iflag |= ICRNL;
+			tcsetattr(*amaster, TCSANOW, &tio);
+		}
+
+		return (0);
+	}
+	return (-1);
+#endif
+}
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_OPENPTY) */
+
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..73a852480
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.c
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+/* $Id: bsd-poll.c,v 1.6 2014/02/05 23:44:13 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004, 2005, 2007 Darren Tucker (dtucker at zip com au).
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#if !defined(HAVE_POLL)
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
+# include <sys/select.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include "bsd-poll.h"
+
+/*
+ * A minimal implementation of poll(2), built on top of select(2).
+ *
+ * Only supports POLLIN and POLLOUT flags in pfd.events, and POLLIN, POLLOUT
+ * and POLLERR flags in revents.
+ *
+ * Supports pfd.fd = -1 meaning "unused" although it's not standard.
+ */
+
+int
+poll(struct pollfd *fds, nfds_t nfds, int timeout)
+{
+	nfds_t i;
+	int saved_errno, ret, fd, maxfd = 0;
+	fd_set *readfds = NULL, *writefds = NULL, *exceptfds = NULL;
+	size_t nmemb;
+	struct timeval tv, *tvp = NULL;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < nfds; i++) {
+		fd = fds[i].fd;
+		if (fd >= FD_SETSIZE) {
+			errno = EINVAL;
+			return -1;
+		}
+		maxfd = MAX(maxfd, fd);
+	}
+
+	nmemb = howmany(maxfd + 1 , NFDBITS);
+	if ((readfds = calloc(nmemb, sizeof(fd_mask))) == NULL ||
+	    (writefds = calloc(nmemb, sizeof(fd_mask))) == NULL ||
+	    (exceptfds = calloc(nmemb, sizeof(fd_mask))) == NULL) {
+		saved_errno = ENOMEM;
+		ret = -1;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* populate event bit vectors for the events we're interested in */
+	for (i = 0; i < nfds; i++) {
+		fd = fds[i].fd;
+		if (fd == -1)
+			continue;
+		if (fds[i].events & POLLIN) {
+			FD_SET(fd, readfds);
+			FD_SET(fd, exceptfds);
+		}
+		if (fds[i].events & POLLOUT) {
+			FD_SET(fd, writefds);
+			FD_SET(fd, exceptfds);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* poll timeout is msec, select is timeval (sec + usec) */
+	if (timeout >= 0) {
+		tv.tv_sec = timeout / 1000;
+		tv.tv_usec = (timeout % 1000) * 1000;
+		tvp = &tv;
+	}
+
+	ret = select(maxfd + 1, readfds, writefds, exceptfds, tvp);
+	saved_errno = errno;
+
+	/* scan through select results and set poll() flags */
+	for (i = 0; i < nfds; i++) {
+		fd = fds[i].fd;
+		fds[i].revents = 0;
+		if (fd == -1)
+			continue;
+		if (FD_ISSET(fd, readfds)) {
+			fds[i].revents |= POLLIN;
+		}
+		if (FD_ISSET(fd, writefds)) {
+			fds[i].revents |= POLLOUT;
+		}
+		if (FD_ISSET(fd, exceptfds)) {
+			fds[i].revents |= POLLERR;
+		}
+	}
+
+out:
+	free(readfds);
+	free(writefds);
+	free(exceptfds);
+	if (ret == -1)
+		errno = saved_errno;
+	return ret;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..dcbb9ca40
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: poll.h,v 1.11 2003/12/10 23:10:08 millert Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1996 Theo de Raadt
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: sys/sys/poll.h */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_POLL) && !defined(HAVE_POLL_H)
+#ifndef	_COMPAT_POLL_H_
+#define	_COMPAT_POLL_H_
+
+typedef struct pollfd {
+	int 	fd;
+	short	events;
+	short	revents;
+} pollfd_t;
+
+typedef unsigned int	nfds_t;
+
+#define	POLLIN		0x0001
+#define	POLLOUT		0x0004
+#define	POLLERR		0x0008
+#if 0
+/* the following are currently not implemented */
+#define	POLLPRI		0x0002
+#define	POLLHUP		0x0010
+#define	POLLNVAL	0x0020
+#define	POLLRDNORM	0x0040
+#define POLLNORM	POLLRDNORM
+#define POLLWRNORM      POLLOUT
+#define	POLLRDBAND	0x0080
+#define	POLLWRBAND	0x0100
+#endif
+
+#define INFTIM		(-1)	/* not standard */
+
+int   poll(struct pollfd *, nfds_t, int);
+#endif /* !_COMPAT_POLL_H_ */
+#endif /* !HAVE_POLL_H */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..018bde8c7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.c
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+/* $Id: bsd-setres_id.c,v 1.2 2013/12/07 21:23:09 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2012 Darren Tucker (dtucker at zip com au).
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) || defined(BROKEN_SETRESGID)
+int
+setresgid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid, gid_t sgid)
+{
+	int ret = 0, saved_errno;
+
+	if (rgid != sgid) {
+		errno = ENOSYS;
+		return -1;
+	}
+#if defined(HAVE_SETREGID) && !defined(BROKEN_SETREGID)
+	if (setregid(rgid, egid) < 0) {
+		saved_errno = errno;
+		error("setregid %u: %.100s", rgid, strerror(errno));
+		errno = saved_errno;
+		ret = -1;
+	}
+#else
+	if (setegid(egid) < 0) {
+		saved_errno = errno;
+		error("setegid %u: %.100s", (u_int)egid, strerror(errno));
+		errno = saved_errno;
+		ret = -1;
+	}
+	if (setgid(rgid) < 0) {
+		saved_errno = errno;
+		error("setgid %u: %.100s", rgid, strerror(errno));
+		errno = saved_errno;
+		ret = -1;
+	}
+#endif
+	return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_SETRESUID) || defined(BROKEN_SETRESUID)
+int
+setresuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid, uid_t suid)
+{
+	int ret = 0, saved_errno;
+
+	if (ruid != suid) {
+		errno = ENOSYS;
+		return -1;
+	}
+#if defined(HAVE_SETREUID) && !defined(BROKEN_SETREUID)
+	if (setreuid(ruid, euid) < 0) {
+		saved_errno = errno;
+		error("setreuid %u: %.100s", ruid, strerror(errno));
+		errno = saved_errno;
+		ret = -1;
+	}
+#else
+
+# ifndef SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID
+	if (seteuid(euid) < 0) {
+		saved_errno = errno;
+		error("seteuid %u: %.100s", euid, strerror(errno));
+		errno = saved_errno;
+		ret = -1;
+	}
+# endif
+	if (setuid(ruid) < 0) {
+		saved_errno = errno;
+		error("setuid %u: %.100s", ruid, strerror(errno));
+		errno = saved_errno;
+		ret = -1;
+	}
+#endif
+	return ret;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6c269e0b9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+/* $Id: bsd-setres_id.h,v 1.1 2012/11/05 06:04:37 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2012 Darren Tucker (dtucker at zip com au).
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SETRESGID
+int	setresgid(gid_t, gid_t, gid_t);
+#endif
+#ifndef HAVE_SETRESUID
+int	setresuid(uid_t, uid_t, uid_t);
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..23a635989
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,892 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright Patrick Powell 1995
+ * This code is based on code written by Patrick Powell (papowell@astart.com)
+ * It may be used for any purpose as long as this notice remains intact
+ * on all source code distributions
+ */
+
+/**************************************************************
+ * Original:
+ * Patrick Powell Tue Apr 11 09:48:21 PDT 1995
+ * A bombproof version of doprnt (dopr) included.
+ * Sigh.  This sort of thing is always nasty do deal with.  Note that
+ * the version here does not include floating point...
+ *
+ * snprintf() is used instead of sprintf() as it does limit checks
+ * for string length.  This covers a nasty loophole.
+ *
+ * The other functions are there to prevent NULL pointers from
+ * causing nast effects.
+ *
+ * More Recently:
+ *  Brandon Long <blong@fiction.net> 9/15/96 for mutt 0.43
+ *  This was ugly.  It is still ugly.  I opted out of floating point
+ *  numbers, but the formatter understands just about everything
+ *  from the normal C string format, at least as far as I can tell from
+ *  the Solaris 2.5 printf(3S) man page.
+ *
+ *  Brandon Long <blong@fiction.net> 10/22/97 for mutt 0.87.1
+ *    Ok, added some minimal floating point support, which means this
+ *    probably requires libm on most operating systems.  Don't yet
+ *    support the exponent (e,E) and sigfig (g,G).  Also, fmtint()
+ *    was pretty badly broken, it just wasn't being exercised in ways
+ *    which showed it, so that's been fixed.  Also, formated the code
+ *    to mutt conventions, and removed dead code left over from the
+ *    original.  Also, there is now a builtin-test, just compile with:
+ *           gcc -DTEST_SNPRINTF -o snprintf snprintf.c -lm
+ *    and run snprintf for results.
+ * 
+ *  Thomas Roessler <roessler@guug.de> 01/27/98 for mutt 0.89i
+ *    The PGP code was using unsigned hexadecimal formats. 
+ *    Unfortunately, unsigned formats simply didn't work.
+ *
+ *  Michael Elkins <me@cs.hmc.edu> 03/05/98 for mutt 0.90.8
+ *    The original code assumed that both snprintf() and vsnprintf() were
+ *    missing.  Some systems only have snprintf() but not vsnprintf(), so
+ *    the code is now broken down under HAVE_SNPRINTF and HAVE_VSNPRINTF.
+ *
+ *  Andrew Tridgell (tridge@samba.org) Oct 1998
+ *    fixed handling of %.0f
+ *    added test for HAVE_LONG_DOUBLE
+ *
+ * tridge@samba.org, idra@samba.org, April 2001
+ *    got rid of fcvt code (twas buggy and made testing harder)
+ *    added C99 semantics
+ *
+ * date: 2002/12/19 19:56:31;  author: herb;  state: Exp;  lines: +2 -0
+ * actually print args for %g and %e
+ * 
+ * date: 2002/06/03 13:37:52;  author: jmcd;  state: Exp;  lines: +8 -0
+ * Since includes.h isn't included here, VA_COPY has to be defined here.  I don't
+ * see any include file that is guaranteed to be here, so I'm defining it
+ * locally.  Fixes AIX and Solaris builds.
+ * 
+ * date: 2002/06/03 03:07:24;  author: tridge;  state: Exp;  lines: +5 -13
+ * put the ifdef for HAVE_VA_COPY in one place rather than in lots of
+ * functions
+ * 
+ * date: 2002/05/17 14:51:22;  author: jmcd;  state: Exp;  lines: +21 -4
+ * Fix usage of va_list passed as an arg.  Use __va_copy before using it
+ * when it exists.
+ * 
+ * date: 2002/04/16 22:38:04;  author: idra;  state: Exp;  lines: +20 -14
+ * Fix incorrect zpadlen handling in fmtfp.
+ * Thanks to Ollie Oldham <ollie.oldham@metro-optix.com> for spotting it.
+ * few mods to make it easier to compile the tests.
+ * addedd the "Ollie" test to the floating point ones.
+ *
+ * Martin Pool (mbp@samba.org) April 2003
+ *    Remove NO_CONFIG_H so that the test case can be built within a source
+ *    tree with less trouble.
+ *    Remove unnecessary SAFE_FREE() definition.
+ *
+ * Martin Pool (mbp@samba.org) May 2003
+ *    Put in a prototype for dummy_snprintf() to quiet compiler warnings.
+ *
+ *    Move #endif to make sure VA_COPY, LDOUBLE, etc are defined even
+ *    if the C library has some snprintf functions already.
+ *
+ * Damien Miller (djm@mindrot.org) Jan 2007
+ *    Fix integer overflows in return value.
+ *    Make formatting quite a bit faster by inlining dopr_outch()
+ *
+ **************************************************************/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if defined(BROKEN_SNPRINTF)		/* For those with broken snprintf() */
+# undef HAVE_SNPRINTF
+# undef HAVE_VSNPRINTF
+#endif
+
+#ifndef VA_COPY
+# ifdef HAVE_VA_COPY
+#  define VA_COPY(dest, src) va_copy(dest, src)
+# else
+#  ifdef HAVE___VA_COPY
+#   define VA_COPY(dest, src) __va_copy(dest, src)
+#  else
+#   define VA_COPY(dest, src) (dest) = (src)
+#  endif
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_SNPRINTF) || !defined(HAVE_VSNPRINTF)
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LONG_DOUBLE
+# define LDOUBLE long double
+#else
+# define LDOUBLE double
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LONG_LONG
+# define LLONG long long
+#else
+# define LLONG long
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * dopr(): poor man's version of doprintf
+ */
+
+/* format read states */
+#define DP_S_DEFAULT 0
+#define DP_S_FLAGS   1
+#define DP_S_MIN     2
+#define DP_S_DOT     3
+#define DP_S_MAX     4
+#define DP_S_MOD     5
+#define DP_S_CONV    6
+#define DP_S_DONE    7
+
+/* format flags - Bits */
+#define DP_F_MINUS 	(1 << 0)
+#define DP_F_PLUS  	(1 << 1)
+#define DP_F_SPACE 	(1 << 2)
+#define DP_F_NUM   	(1 << 3)
+#define DP_F_ZERO  	(1 << 4)
+#define DP_F_UP    	(1 << 5)
+#define DP_F_UNSIGNED 	(1 << 6)
+
+/* Conversion Flags */
+#define DP_C_SHORT   1
+#define DP_C_LONG    2
+#define DP_C_LDOUBLE 3
+#define DP_C_LLONG   4
+#define DP_C_SIZE    5
+#define DP_C_INTMAX  6
+
+#define char_to_int(p) ((p)- '0')
+#ifndef MAX
+# define MAX(p,q) (((p) >= (q)) ? (p) : (q))
+#endif
+
+#define DOPR_OUTCH(buf, pos, buflen, thechar) \
+	do { \
+		if (pos + 1 >= INT_MAX) { \
+			errno = ERANGE; \
+			return -1; \
+		} \
+		if (pos < buflen) \
+			buf[pos] = thechar; \
+		(pos)++; \
+	} while (0)
+
+static int dopr(char *buffer, size_t maxlen, const char *format, 
+    va_list args_in);
+static int fmtstr(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen,
+    char *value, int flags, int min, int max);
+static int fmtint(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen,
+    intmax_t value, int base, int min, int max, int flags);
+static int fmtfp(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen,
+    LDOUBLE fvalue, int min, int max, int flags);
+
+static int
+dopr(char *buffer, size_t maxlen, const char *format, va_list args_in)
+{
+	char ch;
+	intmax_t value;
+	LDOUBLE fvalue;
+	char *strvalue;
+	int min;
+	int max;
+	int state;
+	int flags;
+	int cflags;
+	size_t currlen;
+	va_list args;
+
+	VA_COPY(args, args_in);
+	
+	state = DP_S_DEFAULT;
+	currlen = flags = cflags = min = 0;
+	max = -1;
+	ch = *format++;
+	
+	while (state != DP_S_DONE) {
+		if (ch == '\0') 
+			state = DP_S_DONE;
+
+		switch(state) {
+		case DP_S_DEFAULT:
+			if (ch == '%') 
+				state = DP_S_FLAGS;
+			else
+				DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, currlen, maxlen, ch);
+			ch = *format++;
+			break;
+		case DP_S_FLAGS:
+			switch (ch) {
+			case '-':
+				flags |= DP_F_MINUS;
+				ch = *format++;
+				break;
+			case '+':
+				flags |= DP_F_PLUS;
+				ch = *format++;
+				break;
+			case ' ':
+				flags |= DP_F_SPACE;
+				ch = *format++;
+				break;
+			case '#':
+				flags |= DP_F_NUM;
+				ch = *format++;
+				break;
+			case '0':
+				flags |= DP_F_ZERO;
+				ch = *format++;
+				break;
+			default:
+				state = DP_S_MIN;
+				break;
+			}
+			break;
+		case DP_S_MIN:
+			if (isdigit((unsigned char)ch)) {
+				min = 10*min + char_to_int (ch);
+				ch = *format++;
+			} else if (ch == '*') {
+				min = va_arg (args, int);
+				ch = *format++;
+				state = DP_S_DOT;
+			} else {
+				state = DP_S_DOT;
+			}
+			break;
+		case DP_S_DOT:
+			if (ch == '.') {
+				state = DP_S_MAX;
+				ch = *format++;
+			} else { 
+				state = DP_S_MOD;
+			}
+			break;
+		case DP_S_MAX:
+			if (isdigit((unsigned char)ch)) {
+				if (max < 0)
+					max = 0;
+				max = 10*max + char_to_int (ch);
+				ch = *format++;
+			} else if (ch == '*') {
+				max = va_arg (args, int);
+				ch = *format++;
+				state = DP_S_MOD;
+			} else {
+				state = DP_S_MOD;
+			}
+			break;
+		case DP_S_MOD:
+			switch (ch) {
+			case 'h':
+				cflags = DP_C_SHORT;
+				ch = *format++;
+				break;
+			case 'j':
+				cflags = DP_C_INTMAX;
+				ch = *format++;
+				break;
+			case 'l':
+				cflags = DP_C_LONG;
+				ch = *format++;
+				if (ch == 'l') {	/* It's a long long */
+					cflags = DP_C_LLONG;
+					ch = *format++;
+				}
+				break;
+			case 'L':
+				cflags = DP_C_LDOUBLE;
+				ch = *format++;
+				break;
+			case 'z':
+				cflags = DP_C_SIZE;
+				ch = *format++;
+				break;
+			default:
+				break;
+			}
+			state = DP_S_CONV;
+			break;
+		case DP_S_CONV:
+			switch (ch) {
+			case 'd':
+			case 'i':
+				if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT) 
+					value = va_arg (args, int);
+				else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG)
+					value = va_arg (args, long int);
+				else if (cflags == DP_C_LLONG)
+					value = va_arg (args, LLONG);
+				else if (cflags == DP_C_SIZE)
+					value = va_arg (args, ssize_t);
+				else if (cflags == DP_C_INTMAX)
+					value = va_arg (args, intmax_t);
+				else
+					value = va_arg (args, int);
+				if (fmtint(buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
+				    value, 10, min, max, flags) == -1)
+					return -1;
+				break;
+			case 'o':
+				flags |= DP_F_UNSIGNED;
+				if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT)
+					value = va_arg (args, unsigned int);
+				else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG)
+					value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned long int);
+				else if (cflags == DP_C_LLONG)
+					value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned LLONG);
+				else if (cflags == DP_C_SIZE)
+					value = va_arg (args, size_t);
+#ifdef notyet
+				else if (cflags == DP_C_INTMAX)
+					value = va_arg (args, uintmax_t);
+#endif
+				else
+					value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned int);
+				if (fmtint(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value,
+				    8, min, max, flags) == -1)
+					return -1;
+				break;
+			case 'u':
+				flags |= DP_F_UNSIGNED;
+				if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT)
+					value = va_arg (args, unsigned int);
+				else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG)
+					value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned long int);
+				else if (cflags == DP_C_LLONG)
+					value = (LLONG)va_arg (args, unsigned LLONG);
+				else if (cflags == DP_C_SIZE)
+					value = va_arg (args, size_t);
+#ifdef notyet
+				else if (cflags == DP_C_INTMAX)
+					value = va_arg (args, uintmax_t);
+#endif
+				else
+					value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned int);
+				if (fmtint(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value,
+				    10, min, max, flags) == -1)
+					return -1;
+				break;
+			case 'X':
+				flags |= DP_F_UP;
+			case 'x':
+				flags |= DP_F_UNSIGNED;
+				if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT)
+					value = va_arg (args, unsigned int);
+				else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG)
+					value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned long int);
+				else if (cflags == DP_C_LLONG)
+					value = (LLONG)va_arg (args, unsigned LLONG);
+				else if (cflags == DP_C_SIZE)
+					value = va_arg (args, size_t);
+#ifdef notyet
+				else if (cflags == DP_C_INTMAX)
+					value = va_arg (args, uintmax_t);
+#endif
+				else
+					value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned int);
+				if (fmtint(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value,
+				    16, min, max, flags) == -1)
+					return -1;
+				break;
+			case 'f':
+				if (cflags == DP_C_LDOUBLE)
+					fvalue = va_arg (args, LDOUBLE);
+				else
+					fvalue = va_arg (args, double);
+				if (fmtfp(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, fvalue,
+				    min, max, flags) == -1)
+					return -1;
+				break;
+			case 'E':
+				flags |= DP_F_UP;
+			case 'e':
+				if (cflags == DP_C_LDOUBLE)
+					fvalue = va_arg (args, LDOUBLE);
+				else
+					fvalue = va_arg (args, double);
+				if (fmtfp(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, fvalue,
+				    min, max, flags) == -1)
+					return -1;
+				break;
+			case 'G':
+				flags |= DP_F_UP;
+			case 'g':
+				if (cflags == DP_C_LDOUBLE)
+					fvalue = va_arg (args, LDOUBLE);
+				else
+					fvalue = va_arg (args, double);
+				if (fmtfp(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, fvalue,
+				    min, max, flags) == -1)
+					return -1;
+				break;
+			case 'c':
+				DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, currlen, maxlen,
+				    va_arg (args, int));
+				break;
+			case 's':
+				strvalue = va_arg (args, char *);
+				if (!strvalue) strvalue = "(NULL)";
+				if (max == -1) {
+					max = strlen(strvalue);
+				}
+				if (min > 0 && max >= 0 && min > max) max = min;
+				if (fmtstr(buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
+				    strvalue, flags, min, max) == -1)
+					return -1;
+				break;
+			case 'p':
+				strvalue = va_arg (args, void *);
+				if (fmtint(buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
+				    (long) strvalue, 16, min, max, flags) == -1)
+					return -1;
+				break;
+#if we_dont_want_this_in_openssh
+			case 'n':
+				if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT) {
+					short int *num;
+					num = va_arg (args, short int *);
+					*num = currlen;
+				} else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG) {
+					long int *num;
+					num = va_arg (args, long int *);
+					*num = (long int)currlen;
+				} else if (cflags == DP_C_LLONG) {
+					LLONG *num;
+					num = va_arg (args, LLONG *);
+					*num = (LLONG)currlen;
+				} else if (cflags == DP_C_SIZE) {
+					ssize_t *num;
+					num = va_arg (args, ssize_t *);
+					*num = (ssize_t)currlen;
+				} else if (cflags == DP_C_INTMAX) {
+					intmax_t *num;
+					num = va_arg (args, intmax_t *);
+					*num = (intmax_t)currlen;
+				} else {
+					int *num;
+					num = va_arg (args, int *);
+					*num = currlen;
+				}
+				break;
+#endif
+			case '%':
+				DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, currlen, maxlen, ch);
+				break;
+			case 'w':
+				/* not supported yet, treat as next char */
+				ch = *format++;
+				break;
+			default:
+				/* Unknown, skip */
+				break;
+			}
+			ch = *format++;
+			state = DP_S_DEFAULT;
+			flags = cflags = min = 0;
+			max = -1;
+			break;
+		case DP_S_DONE:
+			break;
+		default:
+			/* hmm? */
+			break; /* some picky compilers need this */
+		}
+	}
+	if (maxlen != 0) {
+		if (currlen < maxlen - 1) 
+			buffer[currlen] = '\0';
+		else if (maxlen > 0) 
+			buffer[maxlen - 1] = '\0';
+	}
+	
+	return currlen < INT_MAX ? (int)currlen : -1;
+}
+
+static int
+fmtstr(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen,
+    char *value, int flags, int min, int max)
+{
+	int padlen, strln;     /* amount to pad */
+	int cnt = 0;
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_SNPRINTF
+	printf("fmtstr min=%d max=%d s=[%s]\n", min, max, value);
+#endif
+	if (value == 0) {
+		value = "<NULL>";
+	}
+
+	for (strln = 0; strln < max && value[strln]; ++strln); /* strlen */
+	padlen = min - strln;
+	if (padlen < 0) 
+		padlen = 0;
+	if (flags & DP_F_MINUS) 
+		padlen = -padlen; /* Left Justify */
+	
+	while ((padlen > 0) && (cnt < max)) {
+		DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' ');
+		--padlen;
+		++cnt;
+	}
+	while (*value && (cnt < max)) {
+		DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, *value);
+		value++;
+		++cnt;
+	}
+	while ((padlen < 0) && (cnt < max)) {
+		DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' ');
+		++padlen;
+		++cnt;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Have to handle DP_F_NUM (ie 0x and 0 alternates) */
+
+static int
+fmtint(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen,
+    intmax_t value, int base, int min, int max, int flags)
+{
+	int signvalue = 0;
+	unsigned LLONG uvalue;
+	char convert[20];
+	int place = 0;
+	int spadlen = 0; /* amount to space pad */
+	int zpadlen = 0; /* amount to zero pad */
+	int caps = 0;
+	
+	if (max < 0)
+		max = 0;
+	
+	uvalue = value;
+	
+	if(!(flags & DP_F_UNSIGNED)) {
+		if( value < 0 ) {
+			signvalue = '-';
+			uvalue = -value;
+		} else {
+			if (flags & DP_F_PLUS)  /* Do a sign (+/i) */
+				signvalue = '+';
+			else if (flags & DP_F_SPACE)
+				signvalue = ' ';
+		}
+	}
+  
+	if (flags & DP_F_UP) caps = 1; /* Should characters be upper case? */
+
+	do {
+		convert[place++] =
+			(caps? "0123456789ABCDEF":"0123456789abcdef")
+			[uvalue % (unsigned)base  ];
+		uvalue = (uvalue / (unsigned)base );
+	} while(uvalue && (place < 20));
+	if (place == 20) place--;
+	convert[place] = 0;
+
+	zpadlen = max - place;
+	spadlen = min - MAX (max, place) - (signvalue ? 1 : 0);
+	if (zpadlen < 0) zpadlen = 0;
+	if (spadlen < 0) spadlen = 0;
+	if (flags & DP_F_ZERO) {
+		zpadlen = MAX(zpadlen, spadlen);
+		spadlen = 0;
+	}
+	if (flags & DP_F_MINUS) 
+		spadlen = -spadlen; /* Left Justifty */
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_SNPRINTF
+	printf("zpad: %d, spad: %d, min: %d, max: %d, place: %d\n",
+	       zpadlen, spadlen, min, max, place);
+#endif
+
+	/* Spaces */
+	while (spadlen > 0) {
+		DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' ');
+		--spadlen;
+	}
+
+	/* Sign */
+	if (signvalue) 
+		DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, signvalue);
+
+	/* Zeros */
+	if (zpadlen > 0) {
+		while (zpadlen > 0) {
+			DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, '0');
+			--zpadlen;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Digits */
+	while (place > 0) {
+		--place;
+		DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, convert[place]);
+	}
+  
+	/* Left Justified spaces */
+	while (spadlen < 0) {
+		DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' ');
+		++spadlen;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static LDOUBLE abs_val(LDOUBLE value)
+{
+	LDOUBLE result = value;
+
+	if (value < 0)
+		result = -value;
+	
+	return result;
+}
+
+static LDOUBLE POW10(int val)
+{
+	LDOUBLE result = 1;
+	
+	while (val) {
+		result *= 10;
+		val--;
+	}
+  
+	return result;
+}
+
+static LLONG ROUND(LDOUBLE value)
+{
+	LLONG intpart;
+
+	intpart = (LLONG)value;
+	value = value - intpart;
+	if (value >= 0.5) intpart++;
+	
+	return intpart;
+}
+
+/* a replacement for modf that doesn't need the math library. Should
+   be portable, but slow */
+static double my_modf(double x0, double *iptr)
+{
+	int i;
+	long l;
+	double x = x0;
+	double f = 1.0;
+
+	for (i=0;i<100;i++) {
+		l = (long)x;
+		if (l <= (x+1) && l >= (x-1)) break;
+		x *= 0.1;
+		f *= 10.0;
+	}
+
+	if (i == 100) {
+		/*
+		 * yikes! the number is beyond what we can handle.
+		 * What do we do?
+		 */
+		(*iptr) = 0;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (i != 0) {
+		double i2;
+		double ret;
+
+		ret = my_modf(x0-l*f, &i2);
+		(*iptr) = l*f + i2;
+		return ret;
+	} 
+
+	(*iptr) = l;
+	return x - (*iptr);
+}
+
+
+static int
+fmtfp (char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen,
+    LDOUBLE fvalue, int min, int max, int flags)
+{
+	int signvalue = 0;
+	double ufvalue;
+	char iconvert[311];
+	char fconvert[311];
+	int iplace = 0;
+	int fplace = 0;
+	int padlen = 0; /* amount to pad */
+	int zpadlen = 0; 
+	int caps = 0;
+	int idx;
+	double intpart;
+	double fracpart;
+	double temp;
+  
+	/* 
+	 * AIX manpage says the default is 0, but Solaris says the default
+	 * is 6, and sprintf on AIX defaults to 6
+	 */
+	if (max < 0)
+		max = 6;
+
+	ufvalue = abs_val (fvalue);
+
+	if (fvalue < 0) {
+		signvalue = '-';
+	} else {
+		if (flags & DP_F_PLUS) { /* Do a sign (+/i) */
+			signvalue = '+';
+		} else {
+			if (flags & DP_F_SPACE)
+				signvalue = ' ';
+		}
+	}
+
+#if 0
+	if (flags & DP_F_UP) caps = 1; /* Should characters be upper case? */
+#endif
+
+#if 0
+	 if (max == 0) ufvalue += 0.5; /* if max = 0 we must round */
+#endif
+
+	/* 
+	 * Sorry, we only support 16 digits past the decimal because of our 
+	 * conversion method
+	 */
+	if (max > 16)
+		max = 16;
+
+	/* We "cheat" by converting the fractional part to integer by
+	 * multiplying by a factor of 10
+	 */
+
+	temp = ufvalue;
+	my_modf(temp, &intpart);
+
+	fracpart = ROUND((POW10(max)) * (ufvalue - intpart));
+	
+	if (fracpart >= POW10(max)) {
+		intpart++;
+		fracpart -= POW10(max);
+	}
+
+	/* Convert integer part */
+	do {
+		temp = intpart*0.1;
+		my_modf(temp, &intpart);
+		idx = (int) ((temp -intpart +0.05)* 10.0);
+		/* idx = (int) (((double)(temp*0.1) -intpart +0.05) *10.0); */
+		/* printf ("%llf, %f, %x\n", temp, intpart, idx); */
+		iconvert[iplace++] =
+			(caps? "0123456789ABCDEF":"0123456789abcdef")[idx];
+	} while (intpart && (iplace < 311));
+	if (iplace == 311) iplace--;
+	iconvert[iplace] = 0;
+
+	/* Convert fractional part */
+	if (fracpart)
+	{
+		do {
+			temp = fracpart*0.1;
+			my_modf(temp, &fracpart);
+			idx = (int) ((temp -fracpart +0.05)* 10.0);
+			/* idx = (int) ((((temp/10) -fracpart) +0.05) *10); */
+			/* printf ("%lf, %lf, %ld\n", temp, fracpart, idx ); */
+			fconvert[fplace++] =
+			(caps? "0123456789ABCDEF":"0123456789abcdef")[idx];
+		} while(fracpart && (fplace < 311));
+		if (fplace == 311) fplace--;
+	}
+	fconvert[fplace] = 0;
+  
+	/* -1 for decimal point, another -1 if we are printing a sign */
+	padlen = min - iplace - max - 1 - ((signvalue) ? 1 : 0); 
+	zpadlen = max - fplace;
+	if (zpadlen < 0) zpadlen = 0;
+	if (padlen < 0) 
+		padlen = 0;
+	if (flags & DP_F_MINUS) 
+		padlen = -padlen; /* Left Justifty */
+	
+	if ((flags & DP_F_ZERO) && (padlen > 0)) {
+		if (signvalue) {
+			DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, signvalue);
+			--padlen;
+			signvalue = 0;
+		}
+		while (padlen > 0) {
+			DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, '0');
+			--padlen;
+		}
+	}
+	while (padlen > 0) {
+		DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' ');
+		--padlen;
+	}
+	if (signvalue) 
+		DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, signvalue);
+	
+	while (iplace > 0) {
+		--iplace;
+		DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, iconvert[iplace]);
+	}
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_SNPRINTF
+	printf("fmtfp: fplace=%d zpadlen=%d\n", fplace, zpadlen);
+#endif
+
+	/*
+	 * Decimal point.  This should probably use locale to find the correct
+	 * char to print out.
+	 */
+	if (max > 0) {
+		DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, '.');
+		
+		while (zpadlen > 0) {
+			DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, '0');
+			--zpadlen;
+		}
+
+		while (fplace > 0) {
+			--fplace;
+			DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, fconvert[fplace]);
+		}
+	}
+
+	while (padlen < 0) {
+		DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' ');
+		++padlen;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SNPRINTF) || !defined(HAVE_VSNPRINTF) */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_VSNPRINTF)
+int
+vsnprintf (char *str, size_t count, const char *fmt, va_list args)
+{
+	return dopr(str, count, fmt, args);
+}
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_SNPRINTF)
+int
+snprintf(char *str, size_t count, SNPRINTF_CONST char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	size_t ret;
+	va_list ap;
+
+	va_start(ap, fmt);
+	ret = vsnprintf(str, count, fmt, ap);
+	va_end(ap);
+	return ret;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2b1da80ec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.c
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+/* $Id: bsd-statvfs.c,v 1.2 2014/01/17 07:10:59 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2008,2014 Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF MIND, USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER
+ * IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING
+ * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_STATVFS) || !defined(HAVE_FSTATVFS)
+
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H
+# include <sys/mount.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <errno.h>
+
+static void
+copy_statfs_to_statvfs(struct statvfs *to, struct statfs *from)
+{
+	to->f_bsize = from->f_bsize;
+	to->f_frsize = from->f_bsize;	/* no exact equivalent */
+	to->f_blocks = from->f_blocks;
+	to->f_bfree = from->f_bfree;
+	to->f_bavail = from->f_bavail;
+	to->f_files = from->f_files;
+	to->f_ffree = from->f_ffree;
+	to->f_favail = from->f_ffree;	/* no exact equivalent */
+	to->f_fsid = 0;			/* XXX fix me */
+	to->f_flag = from->f_flags;
+	to->f_namemax = MNAMELEN;
+}
+
+# ifndef HAVE_STATVFS
+int statvfs(const char *path, struct statvfs *buf)
+{
+#  ifdef HAVE_STATFS
+	struct statfs fs;
+
+	memset(&fs, 0, sizeof(fs));
+	if (statfs(path, &fs) == -1)
+		return -1;
+	copy_statfs_to_statvfs(buf, &fs);
+	return 0;
+#  else
+	errno = ENOSYS;
+	return -1;
+#  endif
+}
+# endif
+
+# ifndef HAVE_FSTATVFS
+int fstatvfs(int fd, struct statvfs *buf)
+{
+#  ifdef HAVE_FSTATFS
+	struct statfs fs;
+
+	memset(&fs, 0, sizeof(fs));
+	if (fstatfs(fd, &fs) == -1)
+		return -1;
+	copy_statfs_to_statvfs(buf, &fs);
+	return 0;
+#  else
+	errno = ENOSYS;
+	return -1;
+#  endif
+}
+# endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..dfd609974
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+/* $Id: bsd-statvfs.h,v 1.3 2014/01/17 07:48:22 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2008,2014 Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF MIND, USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER
+ * IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING
+ * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_STATVFS) || !defined(HAVE_FSTATVFS)
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H
+#include <sys/mount.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATFS_H
+#include <sys/statfs.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_FSBLKCNT_T
+typedef unsigned long fsblkcnt_t;
+#endif
+#ifndef HAVE_FSFILCNT_T
+typedef unsigned long fsfilcnt_t;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef ST_RDONLY
+#define ST_RDONLY	1
+#endif
+#ifndef ST_NOSUID
+#define ST_NOSUID	2
+#endif
+
+	/* as defined in IEEE Std 1003.1, 2004 Edition */
+struct statvfs {
+	unsigned long f_bsize;	/* File system block size. */
+	unsigned long f_frsize;	/* Fundamental file system block size. */
+	fsblkcnt_t f_blocks;	/* Total number of blocks on file system in */
+				/* units of f_frsize. */
+	fsblkcnt_t    f_bfree;	/* Total number of free blocks. */
+	fsblkcnt_t    f_bavail;	/* Number of free blocks available to  */
+				/* non-privileged process.  */
+	fsfilcnt_t    f_files;	/* Total number of file serial numbers. */
+	fsfilcnt_t    f_ffree;	/* Total number of free file serial numbers. */
+	fsfilcnt_t    f_favail;	/* Number of file serial numbers available to */
+				/* non-privileged process. */
+	unsigned long f_fsid;	/* File system ID. */
+	unsigned long f_flag;	/* BBit mask of f_flag values. */
+	unsigned long f_namemax;/*  Maximum filename length. */
+};
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STATVFS
+int statvfs(const char *, struct statvfs *);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_FSTATVFS
+int fstatvfs(int, struct statvfs *);
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..40e6ffaa8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.c
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Ben Lindstrom.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_WAITPID 
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include "bsd-waitpid.h"
+
+pid_t
+waitpid(int pid, int *stat_loc, int options)
+{
+	union wait statusp;
+	pid_t wait_pid;
+
+	if (pid <= 0) {
+		if (pid != -1) {
+			errno = EINVAL;
+			return (-1);
+		}
+		/* wait4() wants pid=0 for indiscriminate wait. */
+		pid = 0;
+	}
+        wait_pid = wait4(pid, &statusp, options, NULL);
+	if (stat_loc)
+        	*stat_loc = (int) statusp.w_status;            
+
+        return (wait_pid);                               
+}
+
+#endif /* !HAVE_WAITPID */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2d853db61
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+/* $Id: bsd-waitpid.h,v 1.5 2003/08/29 16:59:52 mouring Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Ben Lindstrom.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef _BSD_WAITPID_H
+#define _BSD_WAITPID_H
+
+#ifndef HAVE_WAITPID
+/* Clean out any potental issues */
+#undef WIFEXITED
+#undef WIFSTOPPED
+#undef WIFSIGNALED
+
+/* Define required functions to mimic a POSIX look and feel */
+#define _W_INT(w)	(*(int*)&(w))	/* convert union wait to int */
+#define WIFEXITED(w)	(!((_W_INT(w)) & 0377))
+#define WIFSTOPPED(w)	((_W_INT(w)) & 0100)
+#define WIFSIGNALED(w)	(!WIFEXITED(w) && !WIFSTOPPED(w))
+#define WEXITSTATUS(w)	(int)(WIFEXITED(w) ? ((_W_INT(w) >> 8) & 0377) : -1)
+#define WTERMSIG(w)	(int)(WIFSIGNALED(w) ? (_W_INT(w) & 0177) : -1)
+#define WCOREFLAG	0x80
+#define WCOREDUMP(w) 	((_W_INT(w)) & WCOREFLAG)
+
+/* Prototype */
+pid_t waitpid(int, int *, int);
+
+#endif /* !HAVE_WAITPID */
+#endif /* _BSD_WAITPID_H */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/chacha_private.h b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/chacha_private.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7c3680fa6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/chacha_private.h
@@ -0,0 +1,222 @@
+/*
+chacha-merged.c version 20080118
+D. J. Bernstein
+Public domain.
+*/
+
+/* $OpenBSD: chacha_private.h,v 1.2 2013/10/04 07:02:27 djm Exp $ */
+
+typedef unsigned char u8;
+typedef unsigned int u32;
+
+typedef struct
+{
+  u32 input[16]; /* could be compressed */
+} chacha_ctx;
+
+#define U8C(v) (v##U)
+#define U32C(v) (v##U)
+
+#define U8V(v) ((u8)(v) & U8C(0xFF))
+#define U32V(v) ((u32)(v) & U32C(0xFFFFFFFF))
+
+#define ROTL32(v, n) \
+  (U32V((v) << (n)) | ((v) >> (32 - (n))))
+
+#define U8TO32_LITTLE(p) \
+  (((u32)((p)[0])      ) | \
+   ((u32)((p)[1]) <<  8) | \
+   ((u32)((p)[2]) << 16) | \
+   ((u32)((p)[3]) << 24))
+
+#define U32TO8_LITTLE(p, v) \
+  do { \
+    (p)[0] = U8V((v)      ); \
+    (p)[1] = U8V((v) >>  8); \
+    (p)[2] = U8V((v) >> 16); \
+    (p)[3] = U8V((v) >> 24); \
+  } while (0)
+
+#define ROTATE(v,c) (ROTL32(v,c))
+#define XOR(v,w) ((v) ^ (w))
+#define PLUS(v,w) (U32V((v) + (w)))
+#define PLUSONE(v) (PLUS((v),1))
+
+#define QUARTERROUND(a,b,c,d) \
+  a = PLUS(a,b); d = ROTATE(XOR(d,a),16); \
+  c = PLUS(c,d); b = ROTATE(XOR(b,c),12); \
+  a = PLUS(a,b); d = ROTATE(XOR(d,a), 8); \
+  c = PLUS(c,d); b = ROTATE(XOR(b,c), 7);
+
+static const char sigma[16] = "expand 32-byte k";
+static const char tau[16] = "expand 16-byte k";
+
+static void
+chacha_keysetup(chacha_ctx *x,const u8 *k,u32 kbits,u32 ivbits)
+{
+  const char *constants;
+
+  x->input[4] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 0);
+  x->input[5] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 4);
+  x->input[6] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 8);
+  x->input[7] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 12);
+  if (kbits == 256) { /* recommended */
+    k += 16;
+    constants = sigma;
+  } else { /* kbits == 128 */
+    constants = tau;
+  }
+  x->input[8] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 0);
+  x->input[9] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 4);
+  x->input[10] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 8);
+  x->input[11] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 12);
+  x->input[0] = U8TO32_LITTLE(constants + 0);
+  x->input[1] = U8TO32_LITTLE(constants + 4);
+  x->input[2] = U8TO32_LITTLE(constants + 8);
+  x->input[3] = U8TO32_LITTLE(constants + 12);
+}
+
+static void
+chacha_ivsetup(chacha_ctx *x,const u8 *iv)
+{
+  x->input[12] = 0;
+  x->input[13] = 0;
+  x->input[14] = U8TO32_LITTLE(iv + 0);
+  x->input[15] = U8TO32_LITTLE(iv + 4);
+}
+
+static void
+chacha_encrypt_bytes(chacha_ctx *x,const u8 *m,u8 *c,u32 bytes)
+{
+  u32 x0, x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12, x13, x14, x15;
+  u32 j0, j1, j2, j3, j4, j5, j6, j7, j8, j9, j10, j11, j12, j13, j14, j15;
+  u8 *ctarget = NULL;
+  u8 tmp[64];
+  u_int i;
+
+  if (!bytes) return;
+
+  j0 = x->input[0];
+  j1 = x->input[1];
+  j2 = x->input[2];
+  j3 = x->input[3];
+  j4 = x->input[4];
+  j5 = x->input[5];
+  j6 = x->input[6];
+  j7 = x->input[7];
+  j8 = x->input[8];
+  j9 = x->input[9];
+  j10 = x->input[10];
+  j11 = x->input[11];
+  j12 = x->input[12];
+  j13 = x->input[13];
+  j14 = x->input[14];
+  j15 = x->input[15];
+
+  for (;;) {
+    if (bytes < 64) {
+      for (i = 0;i < bytes;++i) tmp[i] = m[i];
+      m = tmp;
+      ctarget = c;
+      c = tmp;
+    }
+    x0 = j0;
+    x1 = j1;
+    x2 = j2;
+    x3 = j3;
+    x4 = j4;
+    x5 = j5;
+    x6 = j6;
+    x7 = j7;
+    x8 = j8;
+    x9 = j9;
+    x10 = j10;
+    x11 = j11;
+    x12 = j12;
+    x13 = j13;
+    x14 = j14;
+    x15 = j15;
+    for (i = 20;i > 0;i -= 2) {
+      QUARTERROUND( x0, x4, x8,x12)
+      QUARTERROUND( x1, x5, x9,x13)
+      QUARTERROUND( x2, x6,x10,x14)
+      QUARTERROUND( x3, x7,x11,x15)
+      QUARTERROUND( x0, x5,x10,x15)
+      QUARTERROUND( x1, x6,x11,x12)
+      QUARTERROUND( x2, x7, x8,x13)
+      QUARTERROUND( x3, x4, x9,x14)
+    }
+    x0 = PLUS(x0,j0);
+    x1 = PLUS(x1,j1);
+    x2 = PLUS(x2,j2);
+    x3 = PLUS(x3,j3);
+    x4 = PLUS(x4,j4);
+    x5 = PLUS(x5,j5);
+    x6 = PLUS(x6,j6);
+    x7 = PLUS(x7,j7);
+    x8 = PLUS(x8,j8);
+    x9 = PLUS(x9,j9);
+    x10 = PLUS(x10,j10);
+    x11 = PLUS(x11,j11);
+    x12 = PLUS(x12,j12);
+    x13 = PLUS(x13,j13);
+    x14 = PLUS(x14,j14);
+    x15 = PLUS(x15,j15);
+
+#ifndef KEYSTREAM_ONLY
+    x0 = XOR(x0,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 0));
+    x1 = XOR(x1,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 4));
+    x2 = XOR(x2,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 8));
+    x3 = XOR(x3,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 12));
+    x4 = XOR(x4,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 16));
+    x5 = XOR(x5,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 20));
+    x6 = XOR(x6,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 24));
+    x7 = XOR(x7,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 28));
+    x8 = XOR(x8,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 32));
+    x9 = XOR(x9,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 36));
+    x10 = XOR(x10,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 40));
+    x11 = XOR(x11,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 44));
+    x12 = XOR(x12,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 48));
+    x13 = XOR(x13,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 52));
+    x14 = XOR(x14,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 56));
+    x15 = XOR(x15,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 60));
+#endif
+
+    j12 = PLUSONE(j12);
+    if (!j12) {
+      j13 = PLUSONE(j13);
+      /* stopping at 2^70 bytes per nonce is user's responsibility */
+    }
+
+    U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 0,x0);
+    U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 4,x1);
+    U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 8,x2);
+    U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 12,x3);
+    U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 16,x4);
+    U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 20,x5);
+    U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 24,x6);
+    U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 28,x7);
+    U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 32,x8);
+    U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 36,x9);
+    U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 40,x10);
+    U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 44,x11);
+    U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 48,x12);
+    U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 52,x13);
+    U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 56,x14);
+    U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 60,x15);
+
+    if (bytes <= 64) {
+      if (bytes < 64) {
+        for (i = 0;i < bytes;++i) ctarget[i] = c[i];
+      }
+      x->input[12] = j12;
+      x->input[13] = j13;
+      return;
+    }
+    bytes -= 64;
+    c += 64;
+#ifndef KEYSTREAM_ONLY
+    m += 64;
+#endif
+  }
+}
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/charclass.h b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/charclass.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..91f517447
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/charclass.h
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+/*
+ * Public domain, 2008, Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
+ *
+ * $OpenBSD: charclass.h,v 1.1 2008/10/01 23:04:13 millert Exp $
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/charclass.h */
+
+/*
+ * POSIX character class support for fnmatch() and glob().
+ */
+static struct cclass {
+	const char *name;
+	int (*isctype)(int);
+} cclasses[] = {
+	{ "alnum",	isalnum },
+	{ "alpha",	isalpha },
+	{ "blank",	isblank },
+	{ "cntrl",	iscntrl },
+	{ "digit",	isdigit },
+	{ "graph",	isgraph },
+	{ "lower",	islower },
+	{ "print",	isprint },
+	{ "punct",	ispunct },
+	{ "space",	isspace },
+	{ "upper",	isupper },
+	{ "xdigit",	isxdigit },
+	{ NULL,		NULL }
+};
+
+#define NCCLASSES	(sizeof(cclasses) / sizeof(cclasses[0]) - 1)
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/daemon.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/daemon.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3efe14c68
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/daemon.c
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: daemon.c,v 1.6 2005/08/08 08:05:33 espie Exp $ */
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 1990, 1993
+ *	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/daemon.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_DAEMON
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
+# include <fcntl.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
+# include <unistd.h>
+#endif
+
+int
+daemon(int nochdir, int noclose)
+{
+	int fd;
+
+	switch (fork()) {
+	case -1:
+		return (-1);
+	case 0:
+		break;
+	default:
+		_exit(0);
+	}
+
+	if (setsid() == -1)
+		return (-1);
+
+	if (!nochdir)
+		(void)chdir("/");
+
+	if (!noclose && (fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) {
+		(void)dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO);
+		(void)dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO);
+		(void)dup2(fd, STDERR_FILENO);
+		if (fd > 2)
+			(void)close (fd);
+	}
+	return (0);
+}
+
+#endif /* !HAVE_DAEMON */
+
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/dirname.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/dirname.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..30fcb4968
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/dirname.c
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: dirname.c,v 1.13 2005/08/08 08:05:33 espie Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1997, 2004 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/dirname.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#ifndef HAVE_DIRNAME
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+
+char *
+dirname(const char *path)
+{
+	static char dname[MAXPATHLEN];
+	size_t len;
+	const char *endp;
+
+	/* Empty or NULL string gets treated as "." */
+	if (path == NULL || *path == '\0') {
+		dname[0] = '.';
+		dname[1] = '\0';
+		return (dname);
+	}
+
+	/* Strip any trailing slashes */
+	endp = path + strlen(path) - 1;
+	while (endp > path && *endp == '/')
+		endp--;
+
+	/* Find the start of the dir */
+	while (endp > path && *endp != '/')
+		endp--;
+
+	/* Either the dir is "/" or there are no slashes */
+	if (endp == path) {
+		dname[0] = *endp == '/' ? '/' : '.';
+		dname[1] = '\0';
+		return (dname);
+	} else {
+		/* Move forward past the separating slashes */
+		do {
+			endp--;
+		} while (endp > path && *endp == '/');
+	}
+
+	len = endp - path + 1;
+	if (len >= sizeof(dname)) {
+		errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+	memcpy(dname, path, len);
+	dname[len] = '\0';
+	return (dname);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/explicit_bzero.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/explicit_bzero.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3c85a4843
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/explicit_bzero.c
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/string/explicit_bzero.c */
+/*	$OpenBSD: explicit_bzero.c,v 1.1 2014/01/22 21:06:45 tedu Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Public domain.
+ * Written by Ted Unangst
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+/*
+ * explicit_bzero - don't let the compiler optimize away bzero
+ */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO
+
+#ifdef HAVE_MEMSET_S
+
+void
+explicit_bzero(void *p, size_t n)
+{
+	(void)memset_s(p, n, 0, n);
+}
+
+#else /* HAVE_MEMSET_S */
+
+/*
+ * Indirect bzero through a volatile pointer to hopefully avoid
+ * dead-store optimisation eliminating the call.
+ */
+static void (* volatile ssh_bzero)(void *, size_t) = bzero;
+
+void
+explicit_bzero(void *p, size_t n)
+{
+	ssh_bzero(p, n);
+}
+
+#endif /* HAVE_MEMSET_S */
+
+#endif /* HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..096d9e092
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.c
@@ -0,0 +1,235 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2000-2003 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 1999 WIDE Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * 
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ * 
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Pseudo-implementation of RFC2553 name / address resolution functions
+ *
+ * But these functions are not implemented correctly. The minimum subset
+ * is implemented for ssh use only. For example, this routine assumes
+ * that ai_family is AF_INET. Don't use it for another purpose.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GETNAMEINFO
+int getnameinfo(const struct sockaddr *sa, size_t salen, char *host, 
+                size_t hostlen, char *serv, size_t servlen, int flags)
+{
+	struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa;
+	struct hostent *hp;
+	char tmpserv[16];
+
+	if (sa->sa_family != AF_UNSPEC && sa->sa_family != AF_INET)
+		return (EAI_FAMILY);
+	if (serv != NULL) {
+		snprintf(tmpserv, sizeof(tmpserv), "%d", ntohs(sin->sin_port));
+		if (strlcpy(serv, tmpserv, servlen) >= servlen)
+			return (EAI_MEMORY);
+	}
+
+	if (host != NULL) {
+		if (flags & NI_NUMERICHOST) {
+			if (strlcpy(host, inet_ntoa(sin->sin_addr),
+			    hostlen) >= hostlen)
+				return (EAI_MEMORY);
+			else
+				return (0);
+		} else {
+			hp = gethostbyaddr((char *)&sin->sin_addr, 
+			    sizeof(struct in_addr), AF_INET);
+			if (hp == NULL)
+				return (EAI_NODATA);
+			
+			if (strlcpy(host, hp->h_name, hostlen) >= hostlen)
+				return (EAI_MEMORY);
+			else
+				return (0);
+		}
+	}
+	return (0);
+}
+#endif /* !HAVE_GETNAMEINFO */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GAI_STRERROR
+#ifdef HAVE_CONST_GAI_STRERROR_PROTO
+const char *
+#else
+char *
+#endif
+gai_strerror(int err)
+{
+	switch (err) {
+	case EAI_NODATA:
+		return ("no address associated with name");
+	case EAI_MEMORY:
+		return ("memory allocation failure.");
+	case EAI_NONAME:
+		return ("nodename nor servname provided, or not known");
+	case EAI_FAMILY:
+		return ("ai_family not supported");
+	default:
+		return ("unknown/invalid error.");
+	}
+}    
+#endif /* !HAVE_GAI_STRERROR */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_FREEADDRINFO
+void
+freeaddrinfo(struct addrinfo *ai)
+{
+	struct addrinfo *next;
+
+	for(; ai != NULL;) {
+		next = ai->ai_next;
+		free(ai);
+		ai = next;
+	}
+}
+#endif /* !HAVE_FREEADDRINFO */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GETADDRINFO
+static struct
+addrinfo *malloc_ai(int port, u_long addr, const struct addrinfo *hints)
+{
+	struct addrinfo *ai;
+
+	ai = malloc(sizeof(*ai) + sizeof(struct sockaddr_in));
+	if (ai == NULL)
+		return (NULL);
+	
+	memset(ai, '\0', sizeof(*ai) + sizeof(struct sockaddr_in));
+	
+	ai->ai_addr = (struct sockaddr *)(ai + 1);
+	/* XXX -- ssh doesn't use sa_len */
+	ai->ai_addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
+	ai->ai_addr->sa_family = ai->ai_family = AF_INET;
+
+	((struct sockaddr_in *)(ai)->ai_addr)->sin_port = port;
+	((struct sockaddr_in *)(ai)->ai_addr)->sin_addr.s_addr = addr;
+	
+	/* XXX: the following is not generally correct, but does what we want */
+	if (hints->ai_socktype)
+		ai->ai_socktype = hints->ai_socktype;
+	else
+		ai->ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+
+	if (hints->ai_protocol)
+		ai->ai_protocol = hints->ai_protocol;
+
+	return (ai);
+}
+
+int
+getaddrinfo(const char *hostname, const char *servname, 
+    const struct addrinfo *hints, struct addrinfo **res)
+{
+	struct hostent *hp;
+	struct servent *sp;
+	struct in_addr in;
+	int i;
+	long int port;
+	u_long addr;
+
+	port = 0;
+	if (hints && hints->ai_family != AF_UNSPEC &&
+	    hints->ai_family != AF_INET)
+		return (EAI_FAMILY);
+	if (servname != NULL) {
+		char *cp;
+
+		port = strtol(servname, &cp, 10);
+		if (port > 0 && port <= 65535 && *cp == '\0')
+			port = htons(port);
+		else if ((sp = getservbyname(servname, NULL)) != NULL)
+			port = sp->s_port;
+		else
+			port = 0;
+	}
+
+	if (hints && hints->ai_flags & AI_PASSIVE) {
+		addr = htonl(0x00000000);
+		if (hostname && inet_aton(hostname, &in) != 0)
+			addr = in.s_addr;
+		*res = malloc_ai(port, addr, hints);
+		if (*res == NULL) 
+			return (EAI_MEMORY);
+		return (0);
+	}
+		
+	if (!hostname) {
+		*res = malloc_ai(port, htonl(0x7f000001), hints);
+		if (*res == NULL) 
+			return (EAI_MEMORY);
+		return (0);
+	}
+	
+	if (inet_aton(hostname, &in)) {
+		*res = malloc_ai(port, in.s_addr, hints);
+		if (*res == NULL) 
+			return (EAI_MEMORY);
+		return (0);
+	}
+	
+	/* Don't try DNS if AI_NUMERICHOST is set */
+	if (hints && hints->ai_flags & AI_NUMERICHOST)
+		return (EAI_NONAME);
+	
+	hp = gethostbyname(hostname);
+	if (hp && hp->h_name && hp->h_name[0] && hp->h_addr_list[0]) {
+		struct addrinfo *cur, *prev;
+
+		cur = prev = *res = NULL;
+		for (i = 0; hp->h_addr_list[i]; i++) {
+			struct in_addr *in = (struct in_addr *)hp->h_addr_list[i];
+
+			cur = malloc_ai(port, in->s_addr, hints);
+			if (cur == NULL) {
+				if (*res != NULL)
+					freeaddrinfo(*res);
+				return (EAI_MEMORY);
+			}
+			if (prev)
+				prev->ai_next = cur;
+			else
+				*res = cur;
+
+			prev = cur;
+		}
+		return (0);
+	}
+	
+	return (EAI_NODATA);
+}
+#endif /* !HAVE_GETADDRINFO */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6426f7bf6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h
@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
+/* $Id: fake-rfc2553.h,v 1.16 2008/07/14 11:37:37 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2000-2003 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 1999 WIDE Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * 
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ * 
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Pseudo-implementation of RFC2553 name / address resolution functions
+ *
+ * But these functions are not implemented correctly. The minimum subset
+ * is implemented for ssh use only. For example, this routine assumes
+ * that ai_family is AF_INET. Don't use it for another purpose.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _FAKE_RFC2553_H
+#define _FAKE_RFC2553_H
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#if defined(HAVE_NETDB_H)
+# include <netdb.h>
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * First, socket and INET6 related definitions 
+ */
+#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE
+# define	_SS_MAXSIZE	128	/* Implementation specific max size */
+# define       _SS_PADSIZE     (_SS_MAXSIZE - sizeof (struct sockaddr))
+struct sockaddr_storage {
+	struct sockaddr	ss_sa;
+	char		__ss_pad2[_SS_PADSIZE];
+};
+# define ss_family ss_sa.sa_family
+#endif /* !HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE */
+
+#ifndef IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK
+# define IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK(a) \
+	(((u_int32_t *)(a))[0] == 0 && ((u_int32_t *)(a))[1] == 0 && \
+	 ((u_int32_t *)(a))[2] == 0 && ((u_int32_t *)(a))[3] == htonl(1))
+#endif /* !IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR
+struct in6_addr {
+	u_int8_t	s6_addr[16];
+};
+#endif /* !HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6
+struct sockaddr_in6 {
+	unsigned short	sin6_family;
+	u_int16_t	sin6_port;
+	u_int32_t	sin6_flowinfo;
+	struct in6_addr	sin6_addr;
+	u_int32_t	sin6_scope_id;
+};
+#endif /* !HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6 */
+
+#ifndef AF_INET6
+/* Define it to something that should never appear */
+#define AF_INET6 AF_MAX
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Next, RFC2553 name / address resolution API
+ */
+
+#ifndef NI_NUMERICHOST
+# define NI_NUMERICHOST    (1)
+#endif
+#ifndef NI_NAMEREQD
+# define NI_NAMEREQD       (1<<1)
+#endif
+#ifndef NI_NUMERICSERV
+# define NI_NUMERICSERV    (1<<2)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef AI_PASSIVE
+# define AI_PASSIVE		(1)
+#endif
+#ifndef AI_CANONNAME
+# define AI_CANONNAME		(1<<1)
+#endif
+#ifndef AI_NUMERICHOST
+# define AI_NUMERICHOST		(1<<2)
+#endif
+#ifndef AI_NUMERICSERV
+# define AI_NUMERICSERV		(1<<3)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef NI_MAXSERV
+# define NI_MAXSERV 32
+#endif /* !NI_MAXSERV */
+#ifndef NI_MAXHOST
+# define NI_MAXHOST 1025
+#endif /* !NI_MAXHOST */
+
+#ifndef EAI_NODATA
+# define EAI_NODATA	(INT_MAX - 1)
+#endif
+#ifndef EAI_MEMORY
+# define EAI_MEMORY	(INT_MAX - 2)
+#endif
+#ifndef EAI_NONAME
+# define EAI_NONAME	(INT_MAX - 3)
+#endif
+#ifndef EAI_SYSTEM
+# define EAI_SYSTEM	(INT_MAX - 4)
+#endif
+#ifndef EAI_FAMILY
+# define EAI_FAMILY	(INT_MAX - 5)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO
+struct addrinfo {
+	int	ai_flags;	/* AI_PASSIVE, AI_CANONNAME */
+	int	ai_family;	/* PF_xxx */
+	int	ai_socktype;	/* SOCK_xxx */
+	int	ai_protocol;	/* 0 or IPPROTO_xxx for IPv4 and IPv6 */
+	size_t	ai_addrlen;	/* length of ai_addr */
+	char	*ai_canonname;	/* canonical name for hostname */
+	struct sockaddr *ai_addr;	/* binary address */
+	struct addrinfo *ai_next;	/* next structure in linked list */
+};
+#endif /* !HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GETADDRINFO
+#ifdef getaddrinfo
+# undef getaddrinfo
+#endif
+#define getaddrinfo(a,b,c,d)	(ssh_getaddrinfo(a,b,c,d))
+int getaddrinfo(const char *, const char *, 
+    const struct addrinfo *, struct addrinfo **);
+#endif /* !HAVE_GETADDRINFO */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_GAI_STRERROR) && !defined(HAVE_CONST_GAI_STRERROR_PROTO)
+#define gai_strerror(a)		(_ssh_compat_gai_strerror(a))
+char *gai_strerror(int);
+#endif /* !HAVE_GAI_STRERROR */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_FREEADDRINFO
+#define freeaddrinfo(a)		(ssh_freeaddrinfo(a))
+void freeaddrinfo(struct addrinfo *);
+#endif /* !HAVE_FREEADDRINFO */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GETNAMEINFO
+#define getnameinfo(a,b,c,d,e,f,g) (ssh_getnameinfo(a,b,c,d,e,f,g))
+int getnameinfo(const struct sockaddr *, size_t, char *, size_t, 
+    char *, size_t, int);
+#endif /* !HAVE_GETNAMEINFO */
+
+#endif /* !_FAKE_RFC2553_H */
+
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/fmt_scaled.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/fmt_scaled.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..edd682a49
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/fmt_scaled.c
@@ -0,0 +1,274 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: fmt_scaled.c,v 1.9 2007/03/20 03:42:52 tedu Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001, 2002, 2003 Ian F. Darwin.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products
+ *    derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libutil/fmt_scaled.c */
+
+/*
+ * fmt_scaled: Format numbers scaled for human comprehension
+ * scan_scaled: Scan numbers in this format.
+ *
+ * "Human-readable" output uses 4 digits max, and puts a unit suffix at
+ * the end.  Makes output compact and easy-to-read esp. on huge disks.
+ * Formatting code was originally in OpenBSD "df", converted to library routine.
+ * Scanning code written for OpenBSD libutil.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_FMT_SCALED
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+typedef enum {
+	NONE = 0, KILO = 1, MEGA = 2, GIGA = 3, TERA = 4, PETA = 5, EXA = 6
+} unit_type;
+
+/* These three arrays MUST be in sync!  XXX make a struct */
+static unit_type units[] = { NONE, KILO, MEGA, GIGA, TERA, PETA, EXA };
+static char scale_chars[] = "BKMGTPE";
+static long long scale_factors[] = {
+	1LL,
+	1024LL,
+	1024LL*1024,
+	1024LL*1024*1024,
+	1024LL*1024*1024*1024,
+	1024LL*1024*1024*1024*1024,
+	1024LL*1024*1024*1024*1024*1024,
+};
+#define	SCALE_LENGTH (sizeof(units)/sizeof(units[0]))
+
+#define MAX_DIGITS (SCALE_LENGTH * 3)	/* XXX strlen(sprintf("%lld", -1)? */
+
+/** Convert the given input string "scaled" into numeric in "result".
+ * Return 0 on success, -1 and errno set on error.
+ */
+int
+scan_scaled(char *scaled, long long *result)
+{
+	char *p = scaled;
+	int sign = 0;
+	unsigned int i, ndigits = 0, fract_digits = 0;
+	long long scale_fact = 1, whole = 0, fpart = 0;
+
+	/* Skip leading whitespace */
+	while (isascii(*p) && isspace(*p))
+		++p;
+
+	/* Then at most one leading + or - */
+	while (*p == '-' || *p == '+') {
+		if (*p == '-') {
+			if (sign) {
+				errno = EINVAL;
+				return -1;
+			}
+			sign = -1;
+			++p;
+		} else if (*p == '+') {
+			if (sign) {
+				errno = EINVAL;
+				return -1;
+			}
+			sign = +1;
+			++p;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Main loop: Scan digits, find decimal point, if present.
+	 * We don't allow exponentials, so no scientific notation
+	 * (but note that E for Exa might look like e to some!).
+	 * Advance 'p' to end, to get scale factor.
+	 */
+	for (; isascii(*p) && (isdigit(*p) || *p=='.'); ++p) {
+		if (*p == '.') {
+			if (fract_digits > 0) {	/* oops, more than one '.' */
+				errno = EINVAL;
+				return -1;
+			}
+			fract_digits = 1;
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		i = (*p) - '0';			/* whew! finally a digit we can use */
+		if (fract_digits > 0) {
+			if (fract_digits >= MAX_DIGITS-1)
+				/* ignore extra fractional digits */
+				continue;
+			fract_digits++;		/* for later scaling */
+			fpart *= 10;
+			fpart += i;
+		} else {				/* normal digit */
+			if (++ndigits >= MAX_DIGITS) {
+				errno = ERANGE;
+				return -1;
+			}
+			whole *= 10;
+			whole += i;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (sign) {
+		whole *= sign;
+		fpart *= sign;
+	}
+
+	/* If no scale factor given, we're done. fraction is discarded. */
+	if (!*p) {
+		*result = whole;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* Validate scale factor, and scale whole and fraction by it. */
+	for (i = 0; i < SCALE_LENGTH; i++) {
+
+		/** Are we there yet? */
+		if (*p == scale_chars[i] ||
+			*p == tolower(scale_chars[i])) {
+
+			/* If it ends with alphanumerics after the scale char, bad. */
+			if (isalnum(*(p+1))) {
+				errno = EINVAL;
+				return -1;
+			}
+			scale_fact = scale_factors[i];
+
+			/* scale whole part */
+			whole *= scale_fact;
+
+			/* truncate fpart so it does't overflow.
+			 * then scale fractional part.
+			 */
+			while (fpart >= LLONG_MAX / scale_fact) {
+				fpart /= 10;
+				fract_digits--;
+			}
+			fpart *= scale_fact;
+			if (fract_digits > 0) {
+				for (i = 0; i < fract_digits -1; i++)
+					fpart /= 10;
+			}
+			whole += fpart;
+			*result = whole;
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+	errno = ERANGE;
+	return -1;
+}
+
+/* Format the given "number" into human-readable form in "result".
+ * Result must point to an allocated buffer of length FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE.
+ * Return 0 on success, -1 and errno set if error.
+ */
+int
+fmt_scaled(long long number, char *result)
+{
+	long long abval, fract = 0;
+	unsigned int i;
+	unit_type unit = NONE;
+
+	abval = (number < 0LL) ? -number : number;	/* no long long_abs yet */
+
+	/* Not every negative long long has a positive representation.
+	 * Also check for numbers that are just too darned big to format
+	 */
+	if (abval < 0 || abval / 1024 >= scale_factors[SCALE_LENGTH-1]) {
+		errno = ERANGE;
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* scale whole part; get unscaled fraction */
+	for (i = 0; i < SCALE_LENGTH; i++) {
+		if (abval/1024 < scale_factors[i]) {
+			unit = units[i];
+			fract = (i == 0) ? 0 : abval % scale_factors[i];
+			number /= scale_factors[i];
+			if (i > 0)
+				fract /= scale_factors[i - 1];
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	fract = (10 * fract + 512) / 1024;
+	/* if the result would be >= 10, round main number */
+	if (fract == 10) {
+		if (number >= 0)
+			number++;
+		else
+			number--;
+		fract = 0;
+	}
+
+	if (number == 0)
+		strlcpy(result, "0B", FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE);
+	else if (unit == NONE || number >= 100 || number <= -100) {
+		if (fract >= 5) {
+			if (number >= 0)
+				number++;
+			else
+				number--;
+		}
+		(void)snprintf(result, FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE, "%lld%c",
+			number, scale_chars[unit]);
+	} else
+		(void)snprintf(result, FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE, "%lld.%1lld%c",
+			number, fract, scale_chars[unit]);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef	MAIN
+/*
+ * This is the original version of the program in the man page.
+ * Copy-and-paste whatever you need from it.
+ */
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	char *cinput = "1.5K", buf[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
+	long long ninput = 10483892, result;
+
+	if (scan_scaled(cinput, &result) == 0)
+		printf("\"%s\" -> %lld\n", cinput, result);
+	else
+		perror(cinput);
+
+	if (fmt_scaled(ninput, buf) == 0)
+		printf("%lld -> \"%s\"\n", ninput, buf);
+	else
+		fprintf(stderr, "%lld invalid (%s)\n", ninput, strerror(errno));
+
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* HAVE_FMT_SCALED */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/getcwd.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/getcwd.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3edbb9cba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/getcwd.c
@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
+/*	from OpenBSD: getcwd.c,v 1.14 2005/08/08 08:05:34 espie Exp */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1989, 1991, 1993
+ *	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/getcwd.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_GETCWD)
+
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <dirent.h>
+#include <sys/dir.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#define	ISDOT(dp) \
+	(dp->d_name[0] == '.' && (dp->d_name[1] == '\0' || \
+	    (dp->d_name[1] == '.' && dp->d_name[2] == '\0')))
+
+char *
+getcwd(char *pt, size_t size)
+{
+	struct dirent *dp;
+	DIR *dir = NULL;
+	dev_t dev;
+	ino_t ino;
+	int first;
+	char *bpt, *bup;
+	struct stat s;
+	dev_t root_dev;
+	ino_t root_ino;
+	size_t ptsize, upsize;
+	int save_errno;
+	char *ept, *eup, *up;
+
+	/*
+	 * If no buffer specified by the user, allocate one as necessary.
+	 * If a buffer is specified, the size has to be non-zero.  The path
+	 * is built from the end of the buffer backwards.
+	 */
+	if (pt) {
+		ptsize = 0;
+		if (!size) {
+			errno = EINVAL;
+			return (NULL);
+		}
+		ept = pt + size;
+	} else {
+		if ((pt = malloc(ptsize = MAXPATHLEN)) == NULL)
+			return (NULL);
+		ept = pt + ptsize;
+	}
+	bpt = ept - 1;
+	*bpt = '\0';
+
+	/*
+	 * Allocate bytes for the string of "../"'s.
+	 * Should always be enough (it's 340 levels).  If it's not, allocate
+	 * as necessary.  Special * case the first stat, it's ".", not "..".
+	 */
+	if ((up = malloc(upsize = MAXPATHLEN)) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+	eup = up + upsize;
+	bup = up;
+	up[0] = '.';
+	up[1] = '\0';
+
+	/* Save root values, so know when to stop. */
+	if (stat("/", &s))
+		goto err;
+	root_dev = s.st_dev;
+	root_ino = s.st_ino;
+
+	errno = 0;			/* XXX readdir has no error return. */
+
+	for (first = 1;; first = 0) {
+		/* Stat the current level. */
+		if (lstat(up, &s))
+			goto err;
+
+		/* Save current node values. */
+		ino = s.st_ino;
+		dev = s.st_dev;
+
+		/* Check for reaching root. */
+		if (root_dev == dev && root_ino == ino) {
+			*--bpt = '/';
+			/*
+			 * It's unclear that it's a requirement to copy the
+			 * path to the beginning of the buffer, but it's always
+			 * been that way and stuff would probably break.
+			 */
+			memmove(pt, bpt, ept - bpt);
+			free(up);
+			return (pt);
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Build pointer to the parent directory, allocating memory
+		 * as necessary.  Max length is 3 for "../", the largest
+		 * possible component name, plus a trailing NUL.
+		 */
+		if (bup + 3  + MAXNAMLEN + 1 >= eup) {
+			char *nup;
+
+			if ((nup = realloc(up, upsize *= 2)) == NULL)
+				goto err;
+			bup = nup + (bup - up);
+			up = nup;
+			eup = up + upsize;
+		}
+		*bup++ = '.';
+		*bup++ = '.';
+		*bup = '\0';
+
+		/* Open and stat parent directory. */
+		if (!(dir = opendir(up)) || fstat(dirfd(dir), &s))
+			goto err;
+
+		/* Add trailing slash for next directory. */
+		*bup++ = '/';
+
+		/*
+		 * If it's a mount point, have to stat each element because
+		 * the inode number in the directory is for the entry in the
+		 * parent directory, not the inode number of the mounted file.
+		 */
+		save_errno = 0;
+		if (s.st_dev == dev) {
+			for (;;) {
+				if (!(dp = readdir(dir)))
+					goto notfound;
+				if (dp->d_fileno == ino)
+					break;
+			}
+		} else
+			for (;;) {
+				if (!(dp = readdir(dir)))
+					goto notfound;
+				if (ISDOT(dp))
+					continue;
+				memcpy(bup, dp->d_name, dp->d_namlen + 1);
+
+				/* Save the first error for later. */
+				if (lstat(up, &s)) {
+					if (!save_errno)
+						save_errno = errno;
+					errno = 0;
+					continue;
+				}
+				if (s.st_dev == dev && s.st_ino == ino)
+					break;
+			}
+
+		/*
+		 * Check for length of the current name, preceding slash,
+		 * leading slash.
+		 */
+		if (bpt - pt < dp->d_namlen + (first ? 1 : 2)) {
+			size_t len;
+			char *npt;
+
+			if (!ptsize) {
+				errno = ERANGE;
+				goto err;
+			}
+			len = ept - bpt;
+			if ((npt = realloc(pt, ptsize *= 2)) == NULL)
+				goto err;
+			bpt = npt + (bpt - pt);
+			pt = npt;
+			ept = pt + ptsize;
+			memmove(ept - len, bpt, len);
+			bpt = ept - len;
+		}
+		if (!first)
+			*--bpt = '/';
+		bpt -= dp->d_namlen;
+		memcpy(bpt, dp->d_name, dp->d_namlen);
+		(void)closedir(dir);
+
+		/* Truncate any file name. */
+		*bup = '\0';
+	}
+
+notfound:
+	/*
+	 * If readdir set errno, use it, not any saved error; otherwise,
+	 * didn't find the current directory in its parent directory, set
+	 * errno to ENOENT.
+	 */
+	if (!errno)
+		errno = save_errno ? save_errno : ENOENT;
+	/* FALLTHROUGH */
+err:
+	save_errno = errno;
+
+	if (ptsize)
+		free(pt);
+	free(up);
+	if (dir)
+		(void)closedir(dir);
+
+	errno = save_errno;
+
+	return (NULL);
+}
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_GETCWD) */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/getgrouplist.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/getgrouplist.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3afcb9281
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/getgrouplist.c
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+/*	from OpenBSD: getgrouplist.c,v 1.12 2005/08/08 08:05:34 espie Exp */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1991, 1993
+ *	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/getgrouplist.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GETGROUPLIST
+
+/*
+ * get credential
+ */
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <grp.h>
+
+int
+getgrouplist(const char *uname, gid_t agroup, gid_t *groups, int *grpcnt)
+{
+	struct group *grp;
+	int i, ngroups;
+	int ret, maxgroups;
+	int bail;
+
+	ret = 0;
+	ngroups = 0;
+	maxgroups = *grpcnt;
+
+	/*
+	 * install primary group
+	 */
+	if (ngroups >= maxgroups) {
+		*grpcnt = ngroups;
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	groups[ngroups++] = agroup;
+
+	/*
+	 * Scan the group file to find additional groups.
+	 */
+	setgrent();
+	while ((grp = getgrent())) {
+		if (grp->gr_gid == agroup)
+			continue;
+		for (bail = 0, i = 0; bail == 0 && i < ngroups; i++)
+			if (groups[i] == grp->gr_gid)
+				bail = 1;
+		if (bail)
+			continue;
+		for (i = 0; grp->gr_mem[i]; i++) {
+			if (!strcmp(grp->gr_mem[i], uname)) {
+				if (ngroups >= maxgroups) {
+					ret = -1;
+					goto out;
+				}
+				groups[ngroups++] = grp->gr_gid;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+out:
+	endgrent();
+	*grpcnt = ngroups;
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+#endif /* HAVE_GETGROUPLIST */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/getopt.h b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/getopt.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8eb12447e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/getopt.h
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: getopt.h,v 1.2 2008/06/26 05:42:04 ray Exp $	*/
+/*	$NetBSD: getopt.h,v 1.4 2000/07/07 10:43:54 ad Exp $	*/
+
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 The NetBSD Foundation, Inc.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This code is derived from software contributed to The NetBSD Foundation
+ * by Dieter Baron and Thomas Klausner.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE NETBSD FOUNDATION, INC. AND CONTRIBUTORS
+ * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
+ * TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE FOUNDATION OR CONTRIBUTORS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
+ * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
+ * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
+ * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
+ * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _GETOPT_H_
+#define _GETOPT_H_
+
+/*
+ * GNU-like getopt_long() and 4.4BSD getsubopt()/optreset extensions
+ */
+#define no_argument        0
+#define required_argument  1
+#define optional_argument  2
+
+struct option {
+	/* name of long option */
+	const char *name;
+	/*
+	 * one of no_argument, required_argument, and optional_argument:
+	 * whether option takes an argument
+	 */
+	int has_arg;
+	/* if not NULL, set *flag to val when option found */
+	int *flag;
+	/* if flag not NULL, value to set *flag to; else return value */
+	int val;
+};
+
+int	 getopt_long(int, char * const *, const char *,
+	    const struct option *, int *);
+int	 getopt_long_only(int, char * const *, const char *,
+	    const struct option *, int *);
+#ifndef _GETOPT_DEFINED_
+#define _GETOPT_DEFINED_
+int	 getopt(int, char * const *, const char *);
+int	 getsubopt(char **, char * const *, char **);
+
+extern   char *optarg;                  /* getopt(3) external variables */
+extern   int opterr;
+extern   int optind;
+extern   int optopt;
+extern   int optreset;
+extern   char *suboptarg;               /* getsubopt(3) external variable */
+#endif
+ 
+#endif /* !_GETOPT_H_ */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/getopt_long.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/getopt_long.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e28947430
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/getopt_long.c
@@ -0,0 +1,532 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: getopt_long.c,v 1.25 2011/03/05 22:10:11 guenther Exp $	*/
+/*	$NetBSD: getopt_long.c,v 1.15 2002/01/31 22:43:40 tv Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ *
+ * Sponsored in part by the Defense Advanced Research Projects
+ * Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force
+ * Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F39502-99-1-0512.
+ */
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 The NetBSD Foundation, Inc.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This code is derived from software contributed to The NetBSD Foundation
+ * by Dieter Baron and Thomas Klausner.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE NETBSD FOUNDATION, INC. AND CONTRIBUTORS
+ * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
+ * TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE FOUNDATION OR CONTRIBUTORS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
+ * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
+ * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
+ * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
+ * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/stdlib/getopt_long.c */
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_GETOPT) || !defined(HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET)
+
+/*
+ * Some defines to make it easier to keep the code in sync with upstream.
+ * getopt opterr optind optopt optreset optarg are all in defines.h which is
+ * pulled in by includes.h.
+ */
+#define warnx		logit
+
+#if 0
+#include <err.h>
+#include <getopt.h>
+#endif
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+
+int	opterr = 1;		/* if error message should be printed */
+int	optind = 1;		/* index into parent argv vector */
+int	optopt = '?';		/* character checked for validity */
+int	optreset;		/* reset getopt */
+char    *optarg;		/* argument associated with option */
+
+#define PRINT_ERROR	((opterr) && (*options != ':'))
+
+#define FLAG_PERMUTE	0x01	/* permute non-options to the end of argv */
+#define FLAG_ALLARGS	0x02	/* treat non-options as args to option "-1" */
+#define FLAG_LONGONLY	0x04	/* operate as getopt_long_only */
+
+/* return values */
+#define	BADCH		(int)'?'
+#define	BADARG		((*options == ':') ? (int)':' : (int)'?')
+#define	INORDER 	(int)1
+
+#define	EMSG		""
+
+static int getopt_internal(int, char * const *, const char *,
+			   const struct option *, int *, int);
+static int parse_long_options(char * const *, const char *,
+			      const struct option *, int *, int);
+static int gcd(int, int);
+static void permute_args(int, int, int, char * const *);
+
+static char *place = EMSG; /* option letter processing */
+
+/* XXX: set optreset to 1 rather than these two */
+static int nonopt_start = -1; /* first non option argument (for permute) */
+static int nonopt_end = -1;   /* first option after non options (for permute) */
+
+/* Error messages */
+static const char recargchar[] = "option requires an argument -- %c";
+static const char recargstring[] = "option requires an argument -- %s";
+static const char ambig[] = "ambiguous option -- %.*s";
+static const char noarg[] = "option doesn't take an argument -- %.*s";
+static const char illoptchar[] = "unknown option -- %c";
+static const char illoptstring[] = "unknown option -- %s";
+
+/*
+ * Compute the greatest common divisor of a and b.
+ */
+static int
+gcd(int a, int b)
+{
+	int c;
+
+	c = a % b;
+	while (c != 0) {
+		a = b;
+		b = c;
+		c = a % b;
+	}
+
+	return (b);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Exchange the block from nonopt_start to nonopt_end with the block
+ * from nonopt_end to opt_end (keeping the same order of arguments
+ * in each block).
+ */
+static void
+permute_args(int panonopt_start, int panonopt_end, int opt_end,
+	char * const *nargv)
+{
+	int cstart, cyclelen, i, j, ncycle, nnonopts, nopts, pos;
+	char *swap;
+
+	/*
+	 * compute lengths of blocks and number and size of cycles
+	 */
+	nnonopts = panonopt_end - panonopt_start;
+	nopts = opt_end - panonopt_end;
+	ncycle = gcd(nnonopts, nopts);
+	cyclelen = (opt_end - panonopt_start) / ncycle;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ncycle; i++) {
+		cstart = panonopt_end+i;
+		pos = cstart;
+		for (j = 0; j < cyclelen; j++) {
+			if (pos >= panonopt_end)
+				pos -= nnonopts;
+			else
+				pos += nopts;
+			swap = nargv[pos];
+			/* LINTED const cast */
+			((char **) nargv)[pos] = nargv[cstart];
+			/* LINTED const cast */
+			((char **)nargv)[cstart] = swap;
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * parse_long_options --
+ *	Parse long options in argc/argv argument vector.
+ * Returns -1 if short_too is set and the option does not match long_options.
+ */
+static int
+parse_long_options(char * const *nargv, const char *options,
+	const struct option *long_options, int *idx, int short_too)
+{
+	char *current_argv, *has_equal;
+	size_t current_argv_len;
+	int i, match;
+
+	current_argv = place;
+	match = -1;
+
+	optind++;
+
+	if ((has_equal = strchr(current_argv, '=')) != NULL) {
+		/* argument found (--option=arg) */
+		current_argv_len = has_equal - current_argv;
+		has_equal++;
+	} else
+		current_argv_len = strlen(current_argv);
+
+	for (i = 0; long_options[i].name; i++) {
+		/* find matching long option */
+		if (strncmp(current_argv, long_options[i].name,
+		    current_argv_len))
+			continue;
+
+		if (strlen(long_options[i].name) == current_argv_len) {
+			/* exact match */
+			match = i;
+			break;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * If this is a known short option, don't allow
+		 * a partial match of a single character.
+		 */
+		if (short_too && current_argv_len == 1)
+			continue;
+
+		if (match == -1)	/* partial match */
+			match = i;
+		else {
+			/* ambiguous abbreviation */
+			if (PRINT_ERROR)
+				warnx(ambig, (int)current_argv_len,
+				     current_argv);
+			optopt = 0;
+			return (BADCH);
+		}
+	}
+	if (match != -1) {		/* option found */
+		if (long_options[match].has_arg == no_argument
+		    && has_equal) {
+			if (PRINT_ERROR)
+				warnx(noarg, (int)current_argv_len,
+				     current_argv);
+			/*
+			 * XXX: GNU sets optopt to val regardless of flag
+			 */
+			if (long_options[match].flag == NULL)
+				optopt = long_options[match].val;
+			else
+				optopt = 0;
+			return (BADARG);
+		}
+		if (long_options[match].has_arg == required_argument ||
+		    long_options[match].has_arg == optional_argument) {
+			if (has_equal)
+				optarg = has_equal;
+			else if (long_options[match].has_arg ==
+			    required_argument) {
+				/*
+				 * optional argument doesn't use next nargv
+				 */
+				optarg = nargv[optind++];
+			}
+		}
+		if ((long_options[match].has_arg == required_argument)
+		    && (optarg == NULL)) {
+			/*
+			 * Missing argument; leading ':' indicates no error
+			 * should be generated.
+			 */
+			if (PRINT_ERROR)
+				warnx(recargstring,
+				    current_argv);
+			/*
+			 * XXX: GNU sets optopt to val regardless of flag
+			 */
+			if (long_options[match].flag == NULL)
+				optopt = long_options[match].val;
+			else
+				optopt = 0;
+			--optind;
+			return (BADARG);
+		}
+	} else {			/* unknown option */
+		if (short_too) {
+			--optind;
+			return (-1);
+		}
+		if (PRINT_ERROR)
+			warnx(illoptstring, current_argv);
+		optopt = 0;
+		return (BADCH);
+	}
+	if (idx)
+		*idx = match;
+	if (long_options[match].flag) {
+		*long_options[match].flag = long_options[match].val;
+		return (0);
+	} else
+		return (long_options[match].val);
+}
+
+/*
+ * getopt_internal --
+ *	Parse argc/argv argument vector.  Called by user level routines.
+ */
+static int
+getopt_internal(int nargc, char * const *nargv, const char *options,
+	const struct option *long_options, int *idx, int flags)
+{
+	char *oli;				/* option letter list index */
+	int optchar, short_too;
+	static int posixly_correct = -1;
+
+	if (options == NULL)
+		return (-1);
+
+	/*
+	 * XXX Some GNU programs (like cvs) set optind to 0 instead of
+	 * XXX using optreset.  Work around this braindamage.
+	 */
+	if (optind == 0)
+		optind = optreset = 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * Disable GNU extensions if POSIXLY_CORRECT is set or options
+	 * string begins with a '+'.
+	 */
+	if (posixly_correct == -1 || optreset)
+		posixly_correct = (getenv("POSIXLY_CORRECT") != NULL);
+	if (*options == '-')
+		flags |= FLAG_ALLARGS;
+	else if (posixly_correct || *options == '+')
+		flags &= ~FLAG_PERMUTE;
+	if (*options == '+' || *options == '-')
+		options++;
+
+	optarg = NULL;
+	if (optreset)
+		nonopt_start = nonopt_end = -1;
+start:
+	if (optreset || !*place) {		/* update scanning pointer */
+		optreset = 0;
+		if (optind >= nargc) {          /* end of argument vector */
+			place = EMSG;
+			if (nonopt_end != -1) {
+				/* do permutation, if we have to */
+				permute_args(nonopt_start, nonopt_end,
+				    optind, nargv);
+				optind -= nonopt_end - nonopt_start;
+			}
+			else if (nonopt_start != -1) {
+				/*
+				 * If we skipped non-options, set optind
+				 * to the first of them.
+				 */
+				optind = nonopt_start;
+			}
+			nonopt_start = nonopt_end = -1;
+			return (-1);
+		}
+		if (*(place = nargv[optind]) != '-' ||
+		    (place[1] == '\0' && strchr(options, '-') == NULL)) {
+			place = EMSG;		/* found non-option */
+			if (flags & FLAG_ALLARGS) {
+				/*
+				 * GNU extension:
+				 * return non-option as argument to option 1
+				 */
+				optarg = nargv[optind++];
+				return (INORDER);
+			}
+			if (!(flags & FLAG_PERMUTE)) {
+				/*
+				 * If no permutation wanted, stop parsing
+				 * at first non-option.
+				 */
+				return (-1);
+			}
+			/* do permutation */
+			if (nonopt_start == -1)
+				nonopt_start = optind;
+			else if (nonopt_end != -1) {
+				permute_args(nonopt_start, nonopt_end,
+				    optind, nargv);
+				nonopt_start = optind -
+				    (nonopt_end - nonopt_start);
+				nonopt_end = -1;
+			}
+			optind++;
+			/* process next argument */
+			goto start;
+		}
+		if (nonopt_start != -1 && nonopt_end == -1)
+			nonopt_end = optind;
+
+		/*
+		 * If we have "-" do nothing, if "--" we are done.
+		 */
+		if (place[1] != '\0' && *++place == '-' && place[1] == '\0') {
+			optind++;
+			place = EMSG;
+			/*
+			 * We found an option (--), so if we skipped
+			 * non-options, we have to permute.
+			 */
+			if (nonopt_end != -1) {
+				permute_args(nonopt_start, nonopt_end,
+				    optind, nargv);
+				optind -= nonopt_end - nonopt_start;
+			}
+			nonopt_start = nonopt_end = -1;
+			return (-1);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Check long options if:
+	 *  1) we were passed some
+	 *  2) the arg is not just "-"
+	 *  3) either the arg starts with -- we are getopt_long_only()
+	 */
+	if (long_options != NULL && place != nargv[optind] &&
+	    (*place == '-' || (flags & FLAG_LONGONLY))) {
+		short_too = 0;
+		if (*place == '-')
+			place++;		/* --foo long option */
+		else if (*place != ':' && strchr(options, *place) != NULL)
+			short_too = 1;		/* could be short option too */
+
+		optchar = parse_long_options(nargv, options, long_options,
+		    idx, short_too);
+		if (optchar != -1) {
+			place = EMSG;
+			return (optchar);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if ((optchar = (int)*place++) == (int)':' ||
+	    (optchar == (int)'-' && *place != '\0') ||
+	    (oli = strchr(options, optchar)) == NULL) {
+		/*
+		 * If the user specified "-" and  '-' isn't listed in
+		 * options, return -1 (non-option) as per POSIX.
+		 * Otherwise, it is an unknown option character (or ':').
+		 */
+		if (optchar == (int)'-' && *place == '\0')
+			return (-1);
+		if (!*place)
+			++optind;
+		if (PRINT_ERROR)
+			warnx(illoptchar, optchar);
+		optopt = optchar;
+		return (BADCH);
+	}
+	if (long_options != NULL && optchar == 'W' && oli[1] == ';') {
+		/* -W long-option */
+		if (*place)			/* no space */
+			/* NOTHING */;
+		else if (++optind >= nargc) {	/* no arg */
+			place = EMSG;
+			if (PRINT_ERROR)
+				warnx(recargchar, optchar);
+			optopt = optchar;
+			return (BADARG);
+		} else				/* white space */
+			place = nargv[optind];
+		optchar = parse_long_options(nargv, options, long_options,
+		    idx, 0);
+		place = EMSG;
+		return (optchar);
+	}
+	if (*++oli != ':') {			/* doesn't take argument */
+		if (!*place)
+			++optind;
+	} else {				/* takes (optional) argument */
+		optarg = NULL;
+		if (*place)			/* no white space */
+			optarg = place;
+		else if (oli[1] != ':') {	/* arg not optional */
+			if (++optind >= nargc) {	/* no arg */
+				place = EMSG;
+				if (PRINT_ERROR)
+					warnx(recargchar, optchar);
+				optopt = optchar;
+				return (BADARG);
+			} else
+				optarg = nargv[optind];
+		}
+		place = EMSG;
+		++optind;
+	}
+	/* dump back option letter */
+	return (optchar);
+}
+
+/*
+ * getopt --
+ *	Parse argc/argv argument vector.
+ *
+ * [eventually this will replace the BSD getopt]
+ */
+int
+getopt(int nargc, char * const *nargv, const char *options)
+{
+
+	/*
+	 * We don't pass FLAG_PERMUTE to getopt_internal() since
+	 * the BSD getopt(3) (unlike GNU) has never done this.
+	 *
+	 * Furthermore, since many privileged programs call getopt()
+	 * before dropping privileges it makes sense to keep things
+	 * as simple (and bug-free) as possible.
+	 */
+	return (getopt_internal(nargc, nargv, options, NULL, NULL, 0));
+}
+
+#if 0
+/*
+ * getopt_long --
+ *	Parse argc/argv argument vector.
+ */
+int
+getopt_long(int nargc, char * const *nargv, const char *options,
+    const struct option *long_options, int *idx)
+{
+
+	return (getopt_internal(nargc, nargv, options, long_options, idx,
+	    FLAG_PERMUTE));
+}
+
+/*
+ * getopt_long_only --
+ *	Parse argc/argv argument vector.
+ */
+int
+getopt_long_only(int nargc, char * const *nargv, const char *options,
+    const struct option *long_options, int *idx)
+{
+
+	return (getopt_internal(nargc, nargv, options, long_options, idx,
+	    FLAG_PERMUTE|FLAG_LONGONLY));
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_GETOPT) || !defined(HAVE_OPTRESET) */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname-ldns.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname-ldns.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4647b623b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname-ldns.c
@@ -0,0 +1,284 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: getrrsetbyname.c,v 1.10 2005/03/30 02:58:28 tedu Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2007 Simon Vallet / Genoscope <svallet@genoscope.cns.fr>
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1999-2001 Internet Software Consortium.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND INTERNET SOFTWARE CONSORTIUM
+ * DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL
+ * INTERNET SOFTWARE CONSORTIUM BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT,
+ * INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING
+ * FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT,
+ * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION
+ * WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if !defined (HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME) && defined (HAVE_LDNS)
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <ldns/ldns.h>
+
+#include "getrrsetbyname.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+#define malloc(x)	(xmalloc(x))
+#define calloc(x, y)	(xcalloc((x),(y)))
+
+int
+getrrsetbyname(const char *hostname, unsigned int rdclass,
+	       unsigned int rdtype, unsigned int flags,
+	       struct rrsetinfo **res)
+{
+	int result;
+	unsigned int i, j, index_ans, index_sig;
+	struct rrsetinfo *rrset = NULL;
+	struct rdatainfo *rdata;
+	size_t len;
+	ldns_resolver *ldns_res = NULL;
+	ldns_rdf *domain = NULL;
+	ldns_pkt *pkt = NULL;
+	ldns_rr_list *rrsigs = NULL, *rrdata = NULL;
+	ldns_status err;
+	ldns_rr *rr;
+
+	/* check for invalid class and type */
+	if (rdclass > 0xffff || rdtype > 0xffff) {
+		result = ERRSET_INVAL;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	/* don't allow queries of class or type ANY */
+	if (rdclass == 0xff || rdtype == 0xff) {
+		result = ERRSET_INVAL;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	/* don't allow flags yet, unimplemented */
+	if (flags) {
+		result = ERRSET_INVAL;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	/* Initialize resolver from resolv.conf */
+	domain = ldns_dname_new_frm_str(hostname);
+	if ((err = ldns_resolver_new_frm_file(&ldns_res, NULL)) != \
+	    LDNS_STATUS_OK) {
+		result = ERRSET_FAIL;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+#ifdef LDNS_DEBUG
+	ldns_resolver_set_debug(ldns_res, true);
+#endif /* LDNS_DEBUG */
+
+	ldns_resolver_set_dnssec(ldns_res, true); /* Use DNSSEC */
+
+	/* make query */
+	pkt = ldns_resolver_query(ldns_res, domain, rdtype, rdclass, LDNS_RD);
+
+	/*** TODO: finer errcodes -- see original **/
+	if (!pkt || ldns_pkt_ancount(pkt) < 1) {
+		result = ERRSET_FAIL;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	/* initialize rrset */
+	rrset = calloc(1, sizeof(struct rrsetinfo));
+	if (rrset == NULL) {
+		result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	rrdata = ldns_pkt_rr_list_by_type(pkt, rdtype, LDNS_SECTION_ANSWER);
+	rrset->rri_nrdatas = ldns_rr_list_rr_count(rrdata);
+	if (!rrset->rri_nrdatas) {
+		result = ERRSET_NODATA;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	/* copy name from answer section */
+	len = ldns_rdf_size(ldns_rr_owner(ldns_rr_list_rr(rrdata, 0)));
+	if ((rrset->rri_name = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
+		result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	memcpy(rrset->rri_name,
+	    ldns_rdf_data(ldns_rr_owner(ldns_rr_list_rr(rrdata, 0))), len);
+
+	rrset->rri_rdclass = ldns_rr_get_class(ldns_rr_list_rr(rrdata, 0));
+	rrset->rri_rdtype = ldns_rr_get_type(ldns_rr_list_rr(rrdata, 0));
+	rrset->rri_ttl = ldns_rr_ttl(ldns_rr_list_rr(rrdata, 0));
+
+	debug2("ldns: got %u answers from DNS", rrset->rri_nrdatas);
+
+	/* Check for authenticated data */
+	if (ldns_pkt_ad(pkt)) {
+		rrset->rri_flags |= RRSET_VALIDATED;
+	} else { /* AD is not set, try autonomous validation */
+		ldns_rr_list * trusted_keys = ldns_rr_list_new();
+
+		debug2("ldns: trying to validate RRset");
+		/* Get eventual sigs */
+		rrsigs = ldns_pkt_rr_list_by_type(pkt, LDNS_RR_TYPE_RRSIG,
+		    LDNS_SECTION_ANSWER);
+
+		rrset->rri_nsigs = ldns_rr_list_rr_count(rrsigs);
+		debug2("ldns: got %u signature(s) (RRTYPE %u) from DNS",
+		       rrset->rri_nsigs, LDNS_RR_TYPE_RRSIG);
+
+		if ((err = ldns_verify_trusted(ldns_res, rrdata, rrsigs,
+		     trusted_keys)) == LDNS_STATUS_OK) {
+			rrset->rri_flags |= RRSET_VALIDATED;
+			debug2("ldns: RRset is signed with a valid key");
+		} else {
+			debug2("ldns: RRset validation failed: %s",
+			    ldns_get_errorstr_by_id(err));
+		}
+
+		ldns_rr_list_deep_free(trusted_keys);
+	}
+
+	/* allocate memory for answers */
+	rrset->rri_rdatas = calloc(rrset->rri_nrdatas,
+	   sizeof(struct rdatainfo));
+
+	if (rrset->rri_rdatas == NULL) {
+		result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	/* allocate memory for signatures */
+	if (rrset->rri_nsigs > 0) {
+		rrset->rri_sigs = calloc(rrset->rri_nsigs,
+		    sizeof(struct rdatainfo));
+
+		if (rrset->rri_sigs == NULL) {
+			result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY;
+			goto fail;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* copy answers & signatures */
+	for (i=0, index_ans=0, index_sig=0; i< pkt->_header->_ancount; i++) {
+		rdata = NULL;
+		rr = ldns_rr_list_rr(ldns_pkt_answer(pkt), i);
+
+		if (ldns_rr_get_class(rr) == rrset->rri_rdclass &&
+		    ldns_rr_get_type(rr) == rrset->rri_rdtype) {
+			rdata = &rrset->rri_rdatas[index_ans++];
+		}
+
+		if (rr->_rr_class == rrset->rri_rdclass &&
+		    rr->_rr_type == LDNS_RR_TYPE_RRSIG &&
+		    rrset->rri_sigs) {
+			rdata = &rrset->rri_sigs[index_sig++];
+		}
+
+		if (rdata) {
+			size_t rdata_offset = 0;
+
+			rdata->rdi_length = 0;
+			for (j=0; j< rr->_rd_count; j++) {
+				rdata->rdi_length +=
+				    ldns_rdf_size(ldns_rr_rdf(rr, j));
+			}
+
+			rdata->rdi_data = malloc(rdata->rdi_length);
+			if (rdata->rdi_data == NULL) {
+				result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY;
+				goto fail;
+			}
+
+			/* Re-create the raw DNS RDATA */
+			for (j=0; j< rr->_rd_count; j++) {
+				len = ldns_rdf_size(ldns_rr_rdf(rr, j));
+				memcpy(rdata->rdi_data + rdata_offset,
+				       ldns_rdf_data(ldns_rr_rdf(rr, j)), len);
+				rdata_offset += len;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	*res = rrset;
+	result = ERRSET_SUCCESS;
+
+fail:
+	/* freerrset(rrset); */
+	ldns_rdf_deep_free(domain);
+	ldns_pkt_free(pkt);
+	ldns_rr_list_deep_free(rrsigs);
+	ldns_rr_list_deep_free(rrdata);
+	ldns_resolver_deep_free(ldns_res);
+
+	return result;
+}
+
+
+void
+freerrset(struct rrsetinfo *rrset)
+{
+	u_int16_t i;
+
+	if (rrset == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	if (rrset->rri_rdatas) {
+		for (i = 0; i < rrset->rri_nrdatas; i++) {
+			if (rrset->rri_rdatas[i].rdi_data == NULL)
+				break;
+			free(rrset->rri_rdatas[i].rdi_data);
+		}
+		free(rrset->rri_rdatas);
+	}
+
+	if (rrset->rri_sigs) {
+		for (i = 0; i < rrset->rri_nsigs; i++) {
+			if (rrset->rri_sigs[i].rdi_data == NULL)
+				break;
+			free(rrset->rri_sigs[i].rdi_data);
+		}
+		free(rrset->rri_sigs);
+	}
+
+	if (rrset->rri_name)
+		free(rrset->rri_name);
+	free(rrset);
+}
+
+
+#endif /* !defined (HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME) && defined (HAVE_LDNS) */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..dc6fe0533
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c
@@ -0,0 +1,610 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: getrrsetbyname.c,v 1.11 2007/10/11 18:36:41 jakob Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Jakob Schlyter. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1999-2001 Internet Software Consortium.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND INTERNET SOFTWARE CONSORTIUM
+ * DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL
+ * INTERNET SOFTWARE CONSORTIUM BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT,
+ * INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING
+ * FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT,
+ * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION
+ * WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/net/getrrsetbyname.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if !defined (HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME) && !defined (HAVE_LDNS)
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include "getrrsetbyname.h"
+
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_H_ERRNO) && !HAVE_DECL_H_ERRNO
+extern int h_errno;
+#endif
+
+/* We don't need multithread support here */
+#ifdef _THREAD_PRIVATE
+# undef _THREAD_PRIVATE
+#endif
+#define _THREAD_PRIVATE(a,b,c) (c)
+
+#ifndef HAVE__RES_EXTERN
+struct __res_state _res;
+#endif
+
+/* Necessary functions and macros */
+
+/*
+ * Inline versions of get/put short/long.  Pointer is advanced.
+ *
+ * These macros demonstrate the property of C whereby it can be
+ * portable or it can be elegant but rarely both.
+ */
+
+#ifndef INT32SZ
+# define INT32SZ	4
+#endif
+#ifndef INT16SZ
+# define INT16SZ	2
+#endif
+
+#ifndef GETSHORT
+#define GETSHORT(s, cp) { \
+	register u_char *t_cp = (u_char *)(cp); \
+	(s) = ((u_int16_t)t_cp[0] << 8) \
+	    | ((u_int16_t)t_cp[1]) \
+	    ; \
+	(cp) += INT16SZ; \
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef GETLONG
+#define GETLONG(l, cp) { \
+	register u_char *t_cp = (u_char *)(cp); \
+	(l) = ((u_int32_t)t_cp[0] << 24) \
+	    | ((u_int32_t)t_cp[1] << 16) \
+	    | ((u_int32_t)t_cp[2] << 8) \
+	    | ((u_int32_t)t_cp[3]) \
+	    ; \
+	(cp) += INT32SZ; \
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Routines to insert/extract short/long's.
+ */
+
+#ifndef HAVE__GETSHORT
+static u_int16_t
+_getshort(msgp)
+	register const u_char *msgp;
+{
+	register u_int16_t u;
+
+	GETSHORT(u, msgp);
+	return (u);
+}
+#elif defined(HAVE_DECL__GETSHORT) && (HAVE_DECL__GETSHORT == 0)
+u_int16_t _getshort(register const u_char *);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE__GETLONG
+static u_int32_t
+_getlong(msgp)
+	register const u_char *msgp;
+{
+	register u_int32_t u;
+
+	GETLONG(u, msgp);
+	return (u);
+}
+#elif defined(HAVE_DECL__GETLONG) && (HAVE_DECL__GETLONG == 0)
+u_int32_t _getlong(register const u_char *);
+#endif
+
+/* ************** */
+
+#define ANSWER_BUFFER_SIZE 0xffff
+
+struct dns_query {
+	char			*name;
+	u_int16_t		type;
+	u_int16_t		class;
+	struct dns_query	*next;
+};
+
+struct dns_rr {
+	char			*name;
+	u_int16_t		type;
+	u_int16_t		class;
+	u_int16_t		ttl;
+	u_int16_t		size;
+	void			*rdata;
+	struct dns_rr		*next;
+};
+
+struct dns_response {
+	HEADER			header;
+	struct dns_query	*query;
+	struct dns_rr		*answer;
+	struct dns_rr		*authority;
+	struct dns_rr		*additional;
+};
+
+static struct dns_response *parse_dns_response(const u_char *, int);
+static struct dns_query *parse_dns_qsection(const u_char *, int,
+    const u_char **, int);
+static struct dns_rr *parse_dns_rrsection(const u_char *, int, const u_char **,
+    int);
+
+static void free_dns_query(struct dns_query *);
+static void free_dns_rr(struct dns_rr *);
+static void free_dns_response(struct dns_response *);
+
+static int count_dns_rr(struct dns_rr *, u_int16_t, u_int16_t);
+
+int
+getrrsetbyname(const char *hostname, unsigned int rdclass,
+    unsigned int rdtype, unsigned int flags,
+    struct rrsetinfo **res)
+{
+	struct __res_state *_resp = _THREAD_PRIVATE(_res, _res, &_res);
+	int result;
+	struct rrsetinfo *rrset = NULL;
+	struct dns_response *response = NULL;
+	struct dns_rr *rr;
+	struct rdatainfo *rdata;
+	int length;
+	unsigned int index_ans, index_sig;
+	u_char answer[ANSWER_BUFFER_SIZE];
+
+	/* check for invalid class and type */
+	if (rdclass > 0xffff || rdtype > 0xffff) {
+		result = ERRSET_INVAL;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	/* don't allow queries of class or type ANY */
+	if (rdclass == 0xff || rdtype == 0xff) {
+		result = ERRSET_INVAL;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	/* don't allow flags yet, unimplemented */
+	if (flags) {
+		result = ERRSET_INVAL;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	/* initialize resolver */
+	if ((_resp->options & RES_INIT) == 0 && res_init() == -1) {
+		result = ERRSET_FAIL;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+	_resp->options |= RES_DEBUG;
+#endif /* DEBUG */
+
+#ifdef RES_USE_DNSSEC
+	/* turn on DNSSEC if EDNS0 is configured */
+	if (_resp->options & RES_USE_EDNS0)
+		_resp->options |= RES_USE_DNSSEC;
+#endif /* RES_USE_DNSEC */
+
+	/* make query */
+	length = res_query(hostname, (signed int) rdclass, (signed int) rdtype,
+	    answer, sizeof(answer));
+	if (length < 0) {
+		switch(h_errno) {
+		case HOST_NOT_FOUND:
+			result = ERRSET_NONAME;
+			goto fail;
+		case NO_DATA:
+			result = ERRSET_NODATA;
+			goto fail;
+		default:
+			result = ERRSET_FAIL;
+			goto fail;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* parse result */
+	response = parse_dns_response(answer, length);
+	if (response == NULL) {
+		result = ERRSET_FAIL;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	if (response->header.qdcount != 1) {
+		result = ERRSET_FAIL;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	/* initialize rrset */
+	rrset = calloc(1, sizeof(struct rrsetinfo));
+	if (rrset == NULL) {
+		result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	rrset->rri_rdclass = response->query->class;
+	rrset->rri_rdtype = response->query->type;
+	rrset->rri_ttl = response->answer->ttl;
+	rrset->rri_nrdatas = response->header.ancount;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_HEADER_AD
+	/* check for authenticated data */
+	if (response->header.ad == 1)
+		rrset->rri_flags |= RRSET_VALIDATED;
+#endif
+
+	/* copy name from answer section */
+	rrset->rri_name = strdup(response->answer->name);
+	if (rrset->rri_name == NULL) {
+		result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	/* count answers */
+	rrset->rri_nrdatas = count_dns_rr(response->answer, rrset->rri_rdclass,
+	    rrset->rri_rdtype);
+	rrset->rri_nsigs = count_dns_rr(response->answer, rrset->rri_rdclass,
+	    T_RRSIG);
+
+	/* allocate memory for answers */
+	rrset->rri_rdatas = calloc(rrset->rri_nrdatas,
+	    sizeof(struct rdatainfo));
+	if (rrset->rri_rdatas == NULL) {
+		result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	/* allocate memory for signatures */
+	if (rrset->rri_nsigs > 0) {
+		rrset->rri_sigs = calloc(rrset->rri_nsigs, sizeof(struct rdatainfo));
+		if (rrset->rri_sigs == NULL) {
+			result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY;
+			goto fail;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* copy answers & signatures */
+	for (rr = response->answer, index_ans = 0, index_sig = 0;
+	    rr; rr = rr->next) {
+
+		rdata = NULL;
+
+		if (rr->class == rrset->rri_rdclass &&
+		    rr->type  == rrset->rri_rdtype)
+			rdata = &rrset->rri_rdatas[index_ans++];
+
+		if (rr->class == rrset->rri_rdclass &&
+		    rr->type  == T_RRSIG)
+			rdata = &rrset->rri_sigs[index_sig++];
+
+		if (rdata) {
+			rdata->rdi_length = rr->size;
+			rdata->rdi_data   = malloc(rr->size);
+
+			if (rdata->rdi_data == NULL) {
+				result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY;
+				goto fail;
+			}
+			memcpy(rdata->rdi_data, rr->rdata, rr->size);
+		}
+	}
+	free_dns_response(response);
+
+	*res = rrset;
+	return (ERRSET_SUCCESS);
+
+fail:
+	if (rrset != NULL)
+		freerrset(rrset);
+	if (response != NULL)
+		free_dns_response(response);
+	return (result);
+}
+
+void
+freerrset(struct rrsetinfo *rrset)
+{
+	u_int16_t i;
+
+	if (rrset == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	if (rrset->rri_rdatas) {
+		for (i = 0; i < rrset->rri_nrdatas; i++) {
+			if (rrset->rri_rdatas[i].rdi_data == NULL)
+				break;
+			free(rrset->rri_rdatas[i].rdi_data);
+		}
+		free(rrset->rri_rdatas);
+	}
+
+	if (rrset->rri_sigs) {
+		for (i = 0; i < rrset->rri_nsigs; i++) {
+			if (rrset->rri_sigs[i].rdi_data == NULL)
+				break;
+			free(rrset->rri_sigs[i].rdi_data);
+		}
+		free(rrset->rri_sigs);
+	}
+
+	if (rrset->rri_name)
+		free(rrset->rri_name);
+	free(rrset);
+}
+
+/*
+ * DNS response parsing routines
+ */
+static struct dns_response *
+parse_dns_response(const u_char *answer, int size)
+{
+	struct dns_response *resp;
+	const u_char *cp;
+
+	/* allocate memory for the response */
+	resp = calloc(1, sizeof(*resp));
+	if (resp == NULL)
+		return (NULL);
+
+	/* initialize current pointer */
+	cp = answer;
+
+	/* copy header */
+	memcpy(&resp->header, cp, HFIXEDSZ);
+	cp += HFIXEDSZ;
+
+	/* fix header byte order */
+	resp->header.qdcount = ntohs(resp->header.qdcount);
+	resp->header.ancount = ntohs(resp->header.ancount);
+	resp->header.nscount = ntohs(resp->header.nscount);
+	resp->header.arcount = ntohs(resp->header.arcount);
+
+	/* there must be at least one query */
+	if (resp->header.qdcount < 1) {
+		free_dns_response(resp);
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+
+	/* parse query section */
+	resp->query = parse_dns_qsection(answer, size, &cp,
+	    resp->header.qdcount);
+	if (resp->header.qdcount && resp->query == NULL) {
+		free_dns_response(resp);
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+
+	/* parse answer section */
+	resp->answer = parse_dns_rrsection(answer, size, &cp,
+	    resp->header.ancount);
+	if (resp->header.ancount && resp->answer == NULL) {
+		free_dns_response(resp);
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+
+	/* parse authority section */
+	resp->authority = parse_dns_rrsection(answer, size, &cp,
+	    resp->header.nscount);
+	if (resp->header.nscount && resp->authority == NULL) {
+		free_dns_response(resp);
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+
+	/* parse additional section */
+	resp->additional = parse_dns_rrsection(answer, size, &cp,
+	    resp->header.arcount);
+	if (resp->header.arcount && resp->additional == NULL) {
+		free_dns_response(resp);
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+
+	return (resp);
+}
+
+static struct dns_query *
+parse_dns_qsection(const u_char *answer, int size, const u_char **cp, int count)
+{
+	struct dns_query *head, *curr, *prev;
+	int i, length;
+	char name[MAXDNAME];
+
+	for (i = 1, head = NULL, prev = NULL; i <= count; i++, prev = curr) {
+
+		/* allocate and initialize struct */
+		curr = calloc(1, sizeof(struct dns_query));
+		if (curr == NULL) {
+			free_dns_query(head);
+			return (NULL);
+		}
+		if (head == NULL)
+			head = curr;
+		if (prev != NULL)
+			prev->next = curr;
+
+		/* name */
+		length = dn_expand(answer, answer + size, *cp, name,
+		    sizeof(name));
+		if (length < 0) {
+			free_dns_query(head);
+			return (NULL);
+		}
+		curr->name = strdup(name);
+		if (curr->name == NULL) {
+			free_dns_query(head);
+			return (NULL);
+		}
+		*cp += length;
+
+		/* type */
+		curr->type = _getshort(*cp);
+		*cp += INT16SZ;
+
+		/* class */
+		curr->class = _getshort(*cp);
+		*cp += INT16SZ;
+	}
+
+	return (head);
+}
+
+static struct dns_rr *
+parse_dns_rrsection(const u_char *answer, int size, const u_char **cp,
+    int count)
+{
+	struct dns_rr *head, *curr, *prev;
+	int i, length;
+	char name[MAXDNAME];
+
+	for (i = 1, head = NULL, prev = NULL; i <= count; i++, prev = curr) {
+
+		/* allocate and initialize struct */
+		curr = calloc(1, sizeof(struct dns_rr));
+		if (curr == NULL) {
+			free_dns_rr(head);
+			return (NULL);
+		}
+		if (head == NULL)
+			head = curr;
+		if (prev != NULL)
+			prev->next = curr;
+
+		/* name */
+		length = dn_expand(answer, answer + size, *cp, name,
+		    sizeof(name));
+		if (length < 0) {
+			free_dns_rr(head);
+			return (NULL);
+		}
+		curr->name = strdup(name);
+		if (curr->name == NULL) {
+			free_dns_rr(head);
+			return (NULL);
+		}
+		*cp += length;
+
+		/* type */
+		curr->type = _getshort(*cp);
+		*cp += INT16SZ;
+
+		/* class */
+		curr->class = _getshort(*cp);
+		*cp += INT16SZ;
+
+		/* ttl */
+		curr->ttl = _getlong(*cp);
+		*cp += INT32SZ;
+
+		/* rdata size */
+		curr->size = _getshort(*cp);
+		*cp += INT16SZ;
+
+		/* rdata itself */
+		curr->rdata = malloc(curr->size);
+		if (curr->rdata == NULL) {
+			free_dns_rr(head);
+			return (NULL);
+		}
+		memcpy(curr->rdata, *cp, curr->size);
+		*cp += curr->size;
+	}
+
+	return (head);
+}
+
+static void
+free_dns_query(struct dns_query *p)
+{
+	if (p == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	if (p->name)
+		free(p->name);
+	free_dns_query(p->next);
+	free(p);
+}
+
+static void
+free_dns_rr(struct dns_rr *p)
+{
+	if (p == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	if (p->name)
+		free(p->name);
+	if (p->rdata)
+		free(p->rdata);
+	free_dns_rr(p->next);
+	free(p);
+}
+
+static void
+free_dns_response(struct dns_response *p)
+{
+	if (p == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	free_dns_query(p->query);
+	free_dns_rr(p->answer);
+	free_dns_rr(p->authority);
+	free_dns_rr(p->additional);
+	free(p);
+}
+
+static int
+count_dns_rr(struct dns_rr *p, u_int16_t class, u_int16_t type)
+{
+	int n = 0;
+
+	while(p) {
+		if (p->class == class && p->type == type)
+			n++;
+		p = p->next;
+	}
+
+	return (n);
+}
+
+#endif /*  !defined (HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME) && !defined (HAVE_LDNS) */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1283f5506
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+/* OPENBSD BASED ON : include/netdb.h */
+
+/* $OpenBSD: getrrsetbyname.c,v 1.4 2001/08/16 18:16:43 ho Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Jakob Schlyter. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1999-2001 Internet Software Consortium.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND INTERNET SOFTWARE CONSORTIUM
+ * DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL
+ * INTERNET SOFTWARE CONSORTIUM BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT,
+ * INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING
+ * FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT,
+ * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION
+ * WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _GETRRSETBYNAME_H
+#define _GETRRSETBYNAME_H
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/nameser.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <resolv.h>
+
+#ifndef HFIXEDSZ
+#define HFIXEDSZ 12
+#endif
+
+#ifndef T_RRSIG
+#define T_RRSIG 46
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Flags for getrrsetbyname()
+ */
+#ifndef RRSET_VALIDATED
+# define RRSET_VALIDATED	1
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Return codes for getrrsetbyname()
+ */
+#ifndef ERRSET_SUCCESS
+# define ERRSET_SUCCESS		0
+# define ERRSET_NOMEMORY	1
+# define ERRSET_FAIL		2
+# define ERRSET_INVAL		3
+# define ERRSET_NONAME		4
+# define ERRSET_NODATA		5
+#endif
+
+struct rdatainfo {
+	unsigned int		rdi_length;	/* length of data */
+	unsigned char		*rdi_data;	/* record data */
+};
+
+struct rrsetinfo {
+	unsigned int		rri_flags;	/* RRSET_VALIDATED ... */
+	unsigned int		rri_rdclass;	/* class number */
+	unsigned int		rri_rdtype;	/* RR type number */
+	unsigned int		rri_ttl;	/* time to live */
+	unsigned int		rri_nrdatas;	/* size of rdatas array */
+	unsigned int		rri_nsigs;	/* size of sigs array */
+	char			*rri_name;	/* canonical name */
+	struct rdatainfo	*rri_rdatas;	/* individual records */
+	struct rdatainfo	*rri_sigs;	/* individual signatures */
+};
+
+int		getrrsetbyname(const char *, unsigned int, unsigned int, unsigned int, struct rrsetinfo **);
+void		freerrset(struct rrsetinfo *);
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME) */
+
+#endif /* _GETRRSETBYNAME_H */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/glob.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/glob.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..742b4b954
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/glob.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1065 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: glob.c,v 1.38 2011/09/22 06:27:29 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1989, 1993
+ *	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This code is derived from software contributed to Berkeley by
+ * Guido van Rossum.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/glob.c */
+
+/*
+ * glob(3) -- a superset of the one defined in POSIX 1003.2.
+ *
+ * The [!...] convention to negate a range is supported (SysV, Posix, ksh).
+ *
+ * Optional extra services, controlled by flags not defined by POSIX:
+ *
+ * GLOB_QUOTE:
+ *	Escaping convention: \ inhibits any special meaning the following
+ *	character might have (except \ at end of string is retained).
+ * GLOB_MAGCHAR:
+ *	Set in gl_flags if pattern contained a globbing character.
+ * GLOB_NOMAGIC:
+ *	Same as GLOB_NOCHECK, but it will only append pattern if it did
+ *	not contain any magic characters.  [Used in csh style globbing]
+ * GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC:
+ *	Use alternately specified directory access functions.
+ * GLOB_TILDE:
+ *	expand ~user/foo to the /home/dir/of/user/foo
+ * GLOB_BRACE:
+ *	expand {1,2}{a,b} to 1a 1b 2a 2b
+ * gl_matchc:
+ *	Number of matches in the current invocation of glob.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#include <dirent.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_GLOB) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) || \
+    !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV) || \
+    !defined(HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH) || HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH == 0 || \
+    defined(BROKEN_GLOB)
+
+#include "charclass.h"
+
+#define	DOLLAR		'$'
+#define	DOT		'.'
+#define	EOS		'\0'
+#define	LBRACKET	'['
+#define	NOT		'!'
+#define	QUESTION	'?'
+#define	QUOTE		'\\'
+#define	RANGE		'-'
+#define	RBRACKET	']'
+#define	SEP		'/'
+#define	STAR		'*'
+#define	TILDE		'~'
+#define	UNDERSCORE	'_'
+#define	LBRACE		'{'
+#define	RBRACE		'}'
+#define	SLASH		'/'
+#define	COMMA		','
+
+#ifndef DEBUG
+
+#define	M_QUOTE		0x8000
+#define	M_PROTECT	0x4000
+#define	M_MASK		0xffff
+#define	M_ASCII		0x00ff
+
+typedef u_short Char;
+
+#else
+
+#define	M_QUOTE		0x80
+#define	M_PROTECT	0x40
+#define	M_MASK		0xff
+#define	M_ASCII		0x7f
+
+typedef char Char;
+
+#endif
+
+
+#define	CHAR(c)		((Char)((c)&M_ASCII))
+#define	META(c)		((Char)((c)|M_QUOTE))
+#define	M_ALL		META('*')
+#define	M_END		META(']')
+#define	M_NOT		META('!')
+#define	M_ONE		META('?')
+#define	M_RNG		META('-')
+#define	M_SET		META('[')
+#define	M_CLASS		META(':')
+#define	ismeta(c)	(((c)&M_QUOTE) != 0)
+
+#define	GLOB_LIMIT_MALLOC	65536
+#define	GLOB_LIMIT_STAT		128
+#define	GLOB_LIMIT_READDIR	16384
+
+/* Limit of recursion during matching attempts. */
+#define GLOB_LIMIT_RECUR	64
+
+struct glob_lim {
+	size_t	glim_malloc;
+	size_t	glim_stat;
+	size_t	glim_readdir;
+};
+
+struct glob_path_stat {
+	char		*gps_path;
+	struct stat	*gps_stat;
+};
+
+static int	 compare(const void *, const void *);
+static int	 compare_gps(const void *, const void *);
+static int	 g_Ctoc(const Char *, char *, u_int);
+static int	 g_lstat(Char *, struct stat *, glob_t *);
+static DIR	*g_opendir(Char *, glob_t *);
+static Char	*g_strchr(const Char *, int);
+static int	 g_strncmp(const Char *, const char *, size_t);
+static int	 g_stat(Char *, struct stat *, glob_t *);
+static int	 glob0(const Char *, glob_t *, struct glob_lim *);
+static int	 glob1(Char *, Char *, glob_t *, struct glob_lim *);
+static int	 glob2(Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *,
+		    glob_t *, struct glob_lim *);
+static int	 glob3(Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *,
+		    Char *, Char *, glob_t *, struct glob_lim *);
+static int	 globextend(const Char *, glob_t *, struct glob_lim *,
+		    struct stat *);
+static const Char *
+		 globtilde(const Char *, Char *, size_t, glob_t *);
+static int	 globexp1(const Char *, glob_t *, struct glob_lim *);
+static int	 globexp2(const Char *, const Char *, glob_t *,
+		    struct glob_lim *);
+static int	 match(Char *, Char *, Char *, int);
+#ifdef DEBUG
+static void	 qprintf(const char *, Char *);
+#endif
+
+int
+glob(const char *pattern, int flags, int (*errfunc)(const char *, int),
+    glob_t *pglob)
+{
+	const u_char *patnext;
+	int c;
+	Char *bufnext, *bufend, patbuf[MAXPATHLEN];
+	struct glob_lim limit = { 0, 0, 0 };
+
+	if (strnlen(pattern, PATH_MAX) == PATH_MAX)
+		return(GLOB_NOMATCH);
+
+	patnext = (u_char *) pattern;
+	if (!(flags & GLOB_APPEND)) {
+		pglob->gl_pathc = 0;
+		pglob->gl_pathv = NULL;
+		pglob->gl_statv = NULL;
+		if (!(flags & GLOB_DOOFFS))
+			pglob->gl_offs = 0;
+	}
+	pglob->gl_flags = flags & ~GLOB_MAGCHAR;
+	pglob->gl_errfunc = errfunc;
+	pglob->gl_matchc = 0;
+
+	if (pglob->gl_offs < 0 || pglob->gl_pathc < 0 ||
+	    pglob->gl_offs >= INT_MAX || pglob->gl_pathc >= INT_MAX ||
+	    pglob->gl_pathc >= INT_MAX - pglob->gl_offs - 1)
+		return GLOB_NOSPACE;
+
+	bufnext = patbuf;
+	bufend = bufnext + MAXPATHLEN - 1;
+	if (flags & GLOB_NOESCAPE)
+		while (bufnext < bufend && (c = *patnext++) != EOS)
+			*bufnext++ = c;
+	else {
+		/* Protect the quoted characters. */
+		while (bufnext < bufend && (c = *patnext++) != EOS)
+			if (c == QUOTE) {
+				if ((c = *patnext++) == EOS) {
+					c = QUOTE;
+					--patnext;
+				}
+				*bufnext++ = c | M_PROTECT;
+			} else
+				*bufnext++ = c;
+	}
+	*bufnext = EOS;
+
+	if (flags & GLOB_BRACE)
+		return globexp1(patbuf, pglob, &limit);
+	else
+		return glob0(patbuf, pglob, &limit);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Expand recursively a glob {} pattern. When there is no more expansion
+ * invoke the standard globbing routine to glob the rest of the magic
+ * characters
+ */
+static int
+globexp1(const Char *pattern, glob_t *pglob, struct glob_lim *limitp)
+{
+	const Char* ptr = pattern;
+
+	/* Protect a single {}, for find(1), like csh */
+	if (pattern[0] == LBRACE && pattern[1] == RBRACE && pattern[2] == EOS)
+		return glob0(pattern, pglob, limitp);
+
+	if ((ptr = (const Char *) g_strchr(ptr, LBRACE)) != NULL)
+		return globexp2(ptr, pattern, pglob, limitp);
+
+	return glob0(pattern, pglob, limitp);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Recursive brace globbing helper. Tries to expand a single brace.
+ * If it succeeds then it invokes globexp1 with the new pattern.
+ * If it fails then it tries to glob the rest of the pattern and returns.
+ */
+static int
+globexp2(const Char *ptr, const Char *pattern, glob_t *pglob,
+    struct glob_lim *limitp)
+{
+	int     i, rv;
+	Char   *lm, *ls;
+	const Char *pe, *pm, *pl;
+	Char    patbuf[MAXPATHLEN];
+
+	/* copy part up to the brace */
+	for (lm = patbuf, pm = pattern; pm != ptr; *lm++ = *pm++)
+		;
+	*lm = EOS;
+	ls = lm;
+
+	/* Find the balanced brace */
+	for (i = 0, pe = ++ptr; *pe; pe++)
+		if (*pe == LBRACKET) {
+			/* Ignore everything between [] */
+			for (pm = pe++; *pe != RBRACKET && *pe != EOS; pe++)
+				;
+			if (*pe == EOS) {
+				/*
+				 * We could not find a matching RBRACKET.
+				 * Ignore and just look for RBRACE
+				 */
+				pe = pm;
+			}
+		} else if (*pe == LBRACE)
+			i++;
+		else if (*pe == RBRACE) {
+			if (i == 0)
+				break;
+			i--;
+		}
+
+	/* Non matching braces; just glob the pattern */
+	if (i != 0 || *pe == EOS)
+		return glob0(patbuf, pglob, limitp);
+
+	for (i = 0, pl = pm = ptr; pm <= pe; pm++) {
+		switch (*pm) {
+		case LBRACKET:
+			/* Ignore everything between [] */
+			for (pl = pm++; *pm != RBRACKET && *pm != EOS; pm++)
+				;
+			if (*pm == EOS) {
+				/*
+				 * We could not find a matching RBRACKET.
+				 * Ignore and just look for RBRACE
+				 */
+				pm = pl;
+			}
+			break;
+
+		case LBRACE:
+			i++;
+			break;
+
+		case RBRACE:
+			if (i) {
+				i--;
+				break;
+			}
+			/* FALLTHROUGH */
+		case COMMA:
+			if (i && *pm == COMMA)
+				break;
+			else {
+				/* Append the current string */
+				for (lm = ls; (pl < pm); *lm++ = *pl++)
+					;
+
+				/*
+				 * Append the rest of the pattern after the
+				 * closing brace
+				 */
+				for (pl = pe + 1; (*lm++ = *pl++) != EOS; )
+					;
+
+				/* Expand the current pattern */
+#ifdef DEBUG
+				qprintf("globexp2:", patbuf);
+#endif
+				rv = globexp1(patbuf, pglob, limitp);
+				if (rv && rv != GLOB_NOMATCH)
+					return rv;
+
+				/* move after the comma, to the next string */
+				pl = pm + 1;
+			}
+			break;
+
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+
+/*
+ * expand tilde from the passwd file.
+ */
+static const Char *
+globtilde(const Char *pattern, Char *patbuf, size_t patbuf_len, glob_t *pglob)
+{
+	struct passwd *pwd;
+	char *h;
+	const Char *p;
+	Char *b, *eb;
+
+	if (*pattern != TILDE || !(pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_TILDE))
+		return pattern;
+
+	/* Copy up to the end of the string or / */
+	eb = &patbuf[patbuf_len - 1];
+	for (p = pattern + 1, h = (char *) patbuf;
+	    h < (char *)eb && *p && *p != SLASH; *h++ = *p++)
+		;
+
+	*h = EOS;
+
+#if 0
+	if (h == (char *)eb)
+		return what;
+#endif
+
+	if (((char *) patbuf)[0] == EOS) {
+		/*
+		 * handle a plain ~ or ~/ by expanding $HOME
+		 * first and then trying the password file
+		 */
+#if 0
+		if (issetugid() != 0 || (h = getenv("HOME")) == NULL) {
+#endif
+		if ((getuid() != geteuid()) || (h = getenv("HOME")) == NULL) {
+			if ((pwd = getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL)
+				return pattern;
+			else
+				h = pwd->pw_dir;
+		}
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * Expand a ~user
+		 */
+		if ((pwd = getpwnam((char*) patbuf)) == NULL)
+			return pattern;
+		else
+			h = pwd->pw_dir;
+	}
+
+	/* Copy the home directory */
+	for (b = patbuf; b < eb && *h; *b++ = *h++)
+		;
+
+	/* Append the rest of the pattern */
+	while (b < eb && (*b++ = *p++) != EOS)
+		;
+	*b = EOS;
+
+	return patbuf;
+}
+
+static int
+g_strncmp(const Char *s1, const char *s2, size_t n)
+{
+	int rv = 0;
+
+	while (n--) {
+		rv = *(Char *)s1 - *(const unsigned char *)s2++;
+		if (rv)
+			break;
+		if (*s1++ == '\0')
+			break;
+	}
+	return rv;
+}
+
+static int
+g_charclass(const Char **patternp, Char **bufnextp)
+{
+	const Char *pattern = *patternp + 1;
+	Char *bufnext = *bufnextp;
+	const Char *colon;
+	struct cclass *cc;
+	size_t len;
+
+	if ((colon = g_strchr(pattern, ':')) == NULL || colon[1] != ']')
+		return 1;	/* not a character class */
+
+	len = (size_t)(colon - pattern);
+	for (cc = cclasses; cc->name != NULL; cc++) {
+		if (!g_strncmp(pattern, cc->name, len) && cc->name[len] == '\0')
+			break;
+	}
+	if (cc->name == NULL)
+		return -1;	/* invalid character class */
+	*bufnext++ = M_CLASS;
+	*bufnext++ = (Char)(cc - &cclasses[0]);
+	*bufnextp = bufnext;
+	*patternp += len + 3;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The main glob() routine: compiles the pattern (optionally processing
+ * quotes), calls glob1() to do the real pattern matching, and finally
+ * sorts the list (unless unsorted operation is requested).  Returns 0
+ * if things went well, nonzero if errors occurred.  It is not an error
+ * to find no matches.
+ */
+static int
+glob0(const Char *pattern, glob_t *pglob, struct glob_lim *limitp)
+{
+	const Char *qpatnext;
+	int c, err, oldpathc;
+	Char *bufnext, patbuf[MAXPATHLEN];
+
+	qpatnext = globtilde(pattern, patbuf, MAXPATHLEN, pglob);
+	oldpathc = pglob->gl_pathc;
+	bufnext = patbuf;
+
+	/* We don't need to check for buffer overflow any more. */
+	while ((c = *qpatnext++) != EOS) {
+		switch (c) {
+		case LBRACKET:
+			c = *qpatnext;
+			if (c == NOT)
+				++qpatnext;
+			if (*qpatnext == EOS ||
+			    g_strchr(qpatnext+1, RBRACKET) == NULL) {
+				*bufnext++ = LBRACKET;
+				if (c == NOT)
+					--qpatnext;
+				break;
+			}
+			*bufnext++ = M_SET;
+			if (c == NOT)
+				*bufnext++ = M_NOT;
+			c = *qpatnext++;
+			do {
+				if (c == LBRACKET && *qpatnext == ':') {
+					do {
+						err = g_charclass(&qpatnext,
+						    &bufnext);
+						if (err)
+							break;
+						c = *qpatnext++;
+					} while (c == LBRACKET && *qpatnext == ':');
+					if (err == -1 &&
+					    !(pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_NOCHECK))
+						return GLOB_NOMATCH;
+					if (c == RBRACKET)
+						break;
+				}
+				*bufnext++ = CHAR(c);
+				if (*qpatnext == RANGE &&
+				    (c = qpatnext[1]) != RBRACKET) {
+					*bufnext++ = M_RNG;
+					*bufnext++ = CHAR(c);
+					qpatnext += 2;
+				}
+			} while ((c = *qpatnext++) != RBRACKET);
+			pglob->gl_flags |= GLOB_MAGCHAR;
+			*bufnext++ = M_END;
+			break;
+		case QUESTION:
+			pglob->gl_flags |= GLOB_MAGCHAR;
+			*bufnext++ = M_ONE;
+			break;
+		case STAR:
+			pglob->gl_flags |= GLOB_MAGCHAR;
+			/* collapse adjacent stars to one,
+			 * to avoid exponential behavior
+			 */
+			if (bufnext == patbuf || bufnext[-1] != M_ALL)
+				*bufnext++ = M_ALL;
+			break;
+		default:
+			*bufnext++ = CHAR(c);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	*bufnext = EOS;
+#ifdef DEBUG
+	qprintf("glob0:", patbuf);
+#endif
+
+	if ((err = glob1(patbuf, patbuf+MAXPATHLEN-1, pglob, limitp)) != 0)
+		return(err);
+
+	/*
+	 * If there was no match we are going to append the pattern
+	 * if GLOB_NOCHECK was specified or if GLOB_NOMAGIC was specified
+	 * and the pattern did not contain any magic characters
+	 * GLOB_NOMAGIC is there just for compatibility with csh.
+	 */
+	if (pglob->gl_pathc == oldpathc) {
+		if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_NOCHECK) ||
+		    ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_NOMAGIC) &&
+		    !(pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_MAGCHAR)))
+			return(globextend(pattern, pglob, limitp, NULL));
+		else
+			return(GLOB_NOMATCH);
+	}
+	if (!(pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_NOSORT)) {
+		if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_KEEPSTAT)) {
+			/* Keep the paths and stat info synced during sort */
+			struct glob_path_stat *path_stat;
+			int i;
+			int n = pglob->gl_pathc - oldpathc;
+			int o = pglob->gl_offs + oldpathc;
+
+			if ((path_stat = calloc(n, sizeof(*path_stat))) == NULL)
+				return GLOB_NOSPACE;
+			for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+				path_stat[i].gps_path = pglob->gl_pathv[o + i];
+				path_stat[i].gps_stat = pglob->gl_statv[o + i];
+			}
+			qsort(path_stat, n, sizeof(*path_stat), compare_gps);
+			for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+				pglob->gl_pathv[o + i] = path_stat[i].gps_path;
+				pglob->gl_statv[o + i] = path_stat[i].gps_stat;
+			}
+			free(path_stat);
+		} else {
+			qsort(pglob->gl_pathv + pglob->gl_offs + oldpathc,
+			    pglob->gl_pathc - oldpathc, sizeof(char *),
+			    compare);
+		}
+	}
+	return(0);
+}
+
+static int
+compare(const void *p, const void *q)
+{
+	return(strcmp(*(char **)p, *(char **)q));
+}
+
+static int
+compare_gps(const void *_p, const void *_q)
+{
+	const struct glob_path_stat *p = (const struct glob_path_stat *)_p;
+	const struct glob_path_stat *q = (const struct glob_path_stat *)_q;
+
+	return(strcmp(p->gps_path, q->gps_path));
+}
+
+static int
+glob1(Char *pattern, Char *pattern_last, glob_t *pglob, struct glob_lim *limitp)
+{
+	Char pathbuf[MAXPATHLEN];
+
+	/* A null pathname is invalid -- POSIX 1003.1 sect. 2.4. */
+	if (*pattern == EOS)
+		return(0);
+	return(glob2(pathbuf, pathbuf+MAXPATHLEN-1,
+	    pathbuf, pathbuf+MAXPATHLEN-1,
+	    pattern, pattern_last, pglob, limitp));
+}
+
+/*
+ * The functions glob2 and glob3 are mutually recursive; there is one level
+ * of recursion for each segment in the pattern that contains one or more
+ * meta characters.
+ */
+static int
+glob2(Char *pathbuf, Char *pathbuf_last, Char *pathend, Char *pathend_last,
+    Char *pattern, Char *pattern_last, glob_t *pglob, struct glob_lim *limitp)
+{
+	struct stat sb;
+	Char *p, *q;
+	int anymeta;
+
+	/*
+	 * Loop over pattern segments until end of pattern or until
+	 * segment with meta character found.
+	 */
+	for (anymeta = 0;;) {
+		if (*pattern == EOS) {		/* End of pattern? */
+			*pathend = EOS;
+			if (g_lstat(pathbuf, &sb, pglob))
+				return(0);
+
+			if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_LIMIT) &&
+			    limitp->glim_stat++ >= GLOB_LIMIT_STAT) {
+				errno = 0;
+				*pathend++ = SEP;
+				*pathend = EOS;
+				return(GLOB_NOSPACE);
+			}
+
+			if (((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_MARK) &&
+			    pathend[-1] != SEP) && (S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode) ||
+			    (S_ISLNK(sb.st_mode) &&
+			    (g_stat(pathbuf, &sb, pglob) == 0) &&
+			    S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)))) {
+				if (pathend+1 > pathend_last)
+					return (1);
+				*pathend++ = SEP;
+				*pathend = EOS;
+			}
+			++pglob->gl_matchc;
+			return(globextend(pathbuf, pglob, limitp, &sb));
+		}
+
+		/* Find end of next segment, copy tentatively to pathend. */
+		q = pathend;
+		p = pattern;
+		while (*p != EOS && *p != SEP) {
+			if (ismeta(*p))
+				anymeta = 1;
+			if (q+1 > pathend_last)
+				return (1);
+			*q++ = *p++;
+		}
+
+		if (!anymeta) {		/* No expansion, do next segment. */
+			pathend = q;
+			pattern = p;
+			while (*pattern == SEP) {
+				if (pathend+1 > pathend_last)
+					return (1);
+				*pathend++ = *pattern++;
+			}
+		} else
+			/* Need expansion, recurse. */
+			return(glob3(pathbuf, pathbuf_last, pathend,
+			    pathend_last, pattern, p, pattern_last,
+			    pglob, limitp));
+	}
+	/* NOTREACHED */
+}
+
+static int
+glob3(Char *pathbuf, Char *pathbuf_last, Char *pathend, Char *pathend_last,
+    Char *pattern, Char *restpattern, Char *restpattern_last, glob_t *pglob,
+    struct glob_lim *limitp)
+{
+	struct dirent *dp;
+	DIR *dirp;
+	int err;
+	char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
+
+	/*
+	 * The readdirfunc declaration can't be prototyped, because it is
+	 * assigned, below, to two functions which are prototyped in glob.h
+	 * and dirent.h as taking pointers to differently typed opaque
+	 * structures.
+	 */
+	struct dirent *(*readdirfunc)(void *);
+
+	if (pathend > pathend_last)
+		return (1);
+	*pathend = EOS;
+	errno = 0;
+
+	if ((dirp = g_opendir(pathbuf, pglob)) == NULL) {
+		/* TODO: don't call for ENOENT or ENOTDIR? */
+		if (pglob->gl_errfunc) {
+			if (g_Ctoc(pathbuf, buf, sizeof(buf)))
+				return(GLOB_ABORTED);
+			if (pglob->gl_errfunc(buf, errno) ||
+			    pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ERR)
+				return(GLOB_ABORTED);
+		}
+		return(0);
+	}
+
+	err = 0;
+
+	/* Search directory for matching names. */
+	if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC)
+		readdirfunc = pglob->gl_readdir;
+	else
+		readdirfunc = (struct dirent *(*)(void *))readdir;
+	while ((dp = (*readdirfunc)(dirp))) {
+		u_char *sc;
+		Char *dc;
+
+		if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_LIMIT) &&
+		    limitp->glim_readdir++ >= GLOB_LIMIT_READDIR) {
+			errno = 0;
+			*pathend++ = SEP;
+			*pathend = EOS;
+			err = GLOB_NOSPACE;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		/* Initial DOT must be matched literally. */
+		if (dp->d_name[0] == DOT && *pattern != DOT)
+			continue;
+		dc = pathend;
+		sc = (u_char *) dp->d_name;
+		while (dc < pathend_last && (*dc++ = *sc++) != EOS)
+			;
+		if (dc >= pathend_last) {
+			*dc = EOS;
+			err = 1;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		if (!match(pathend, pattern, restpattern, GLOB_LIMIT_RECUR)) {
+			*pathend = EOS;
+			continue;
+		}
+		err = glob2(pathbuf, pathbuf_last, --dc, pathend_last,
+		    restpattern, restpattern_last, pglob, limitp);
+		if (err)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC)
+		(*pglob->gl_closedir)(dirp);
+	else
+		closedir(dirp);
+	return(err);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Extend the gl_pathv member of a glob_t structure to accommodate a new item,
+ * add the new item, and update gl_pathc.
+ *
+ * This assumes the BSD realloc, which only copies the block when its size
+ * crosses a power-of-two boundary; for v7 realloc, this would cause quadratic
+ * behavior.
+ *
+ * Return 0 if new item added, error code if memory couldn't be allocated.
+ *
+ * Invariant of the glob_t structure:
+ *	Either gl_pathc is zero and gl_pathv is NULL; or gl_pathc > 0 and
+ *	gl_pathv points to (gl_offs + gl_pathc + 1) items.
+ */
+static int
+globextend(const Char *path, glob_t *pglob, struct glob_lim *limitp,
+    struct stat *sb)
+{
+	char **pathv;
+	ssize_t i;
+	size_t newn, len;
+	char *copy = NULL;
+	const Char *p;
+	struct stat **statv;
+
+	newn = 2 + pglob->gl_pathc + pglob->gl_offs;
+	if (pglob->gl_offs >= INT_MAX ||
+	    pglob->gl_pathc >= INT_MAX ||
+	    newn >= INT_MAX ||
+	    SIZE_MAX / sizeof(*pathv) <= newn ||
+	    SIZE_MAX / sizeof(*statv) <= newn) {
+ nospace:
+		for (i = pglob->gl_offs; i < (ssize_t)(newn - 2); i++) {
+			if (pglob->gl_pathv && pglob->gl_pathv[i])
+				free(pglob->gl_pathv[i]);
+			if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_KEEPSTAT) != 0 &&
+			    pglob->gl_pathv && pglob->gl_pathv[i])
+				free(pglob->gl_statv[i]);
+		}
+		if (pglob->gl_pathv) {
+			free(pglob->gl_pathv);
+			pglob->gl_pathv = NULL;
+		}
+		if (pglob->gl_statv) {
+			free(pglob->gl_statv);
+			pglob->gl_statv = NULL;
+		}
+		return(GLOB_NOSPACE);
+	}
+
+	pathv = realloc(pglob->gl_pathv, newn * sizeof(*pathv));
+	if (pathv == NULL)
+		goto nospace;
+	if (pglob->gl_pathv == NULL && pglob->gl_offs > 0) {
+		/* first time around -- clear initial gl_offs items */
+		pathv += pglob->gl_offs;
+		for (i = pglob->gl_offs; --i >= 0; )
+			*--pathv = NULL;
+	}
+	pglob->gl_pathv = pathv;
+
+	if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_KEEPSTAT) != 0) {
+		statv = realloc(pglob->gl_statv, newn * sizeof(*statv));
+		if (statv == NULL)
+			goto nospace;
+		if (pglob->gl_statv == NULL && pglob->gl_offs > 0) {
+			/* first time around -- clear initial gl_offs items */
+			statv += pglob->gl_offs;
+			for (i = pglob->gl_offs; --i >= 0; )
+				*--statv = NULL;
+		}
+		pglob->gl_statv = statv;
+		if (sb == NULL)
+			statv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc] = NULL;
+		else {
+			limitp->glim_malloc += sizeof(**statv);
+			if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_LIMIT) &&
+			    limitp->glim_malloc >= GLOB_LIMIT_MALLOC) {
+				errno = 0;
+				return(GLOB_NOSPACE);
+			}
+			if ((statv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc] =
+			    malloc(sizeof(**statv))) == NULL)
+				goto copy_error;
+			memcpy(statv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc], sb,
+			    sizeof(*sb));
+		}
+		statv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc + 1] = NULL;
+	}
+
+	for (p = path; *p++;)
+		;
+	len = (size_t)(p - path);
+	limitp->glim_malloc += len;
+	if ((copy = malloc(len)) != NULL) {
+		if (g_Ctoc(path, copy, len)) {
+			free(copy);
+			return(GLOB_NOSPACE);
+		}
+		pathv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc++] = copy;
+	}
+	pathv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc] = NULL;
+
+	if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_LIMIT) &&
+	    (newn * sizeof(*pathv)) + limitp->glim_malloc >
+	    GLOB_LIMIT_MALLOC) {
+		errno = 0;
+		return(GLOB_NOSPACE);
+	}
+ copy_error:
+	return(copy == NULL ? GLOB_NOSPACE : 0);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * pattern matching function for filenames.  Each occurrence of the *
+ * pattern causes a recursion level.
+ */
+static int
+match(Char *name, Char *pat, Char *patend, int recur)
+{
+	int ok, negate_range;
+	Char c, k;
+
+	if (recur-- == 0)
+		return(GLOB_NOSPACE);
+
+	while (pat < patend) {
+		c = *pat++;
+		switch (c & M_MASK) {
+		case M_ALL:
+			while (pat < patend && (*pat & M_MASK) == M_ALL)
+				pat++;	/* eat consecutive '*' */
+			if (pat == patend)
+				return(1);
+			do {
+			    if (match(name, pat, patend, recur))
+				    return(1);
+			} while (*name++ != EOS);
+			return(0);
+		case M_ONE:
+			if (*name++ == EOS)
+				return(0);
+			break;
+		case M_SET:
+			ok = 0;
+			if ((k = *name++) == EOS)
+				return(0);
+			if ((negate_range = ((*pat & M_MASK) == M_NOT)) != EOS)
+				++pat;
+			while (((c = *pat++) & M_MASK) != M_END) {
+				if ((c & M_MASK) == M_CLASS) {
+					Char idx = *pat & M_MASK;
+					if (idx < NCCLASSES &&
+					    cclasses[idx].isctype(k))
+						ok = 1;
+					++pat;
+				}
+				if ((*pat & M_MASK) == M_RNG) {
+					if (c <= k && k <= pat[1])
+						ok = 1;
+					pat += 2;
+				} else if (c == k)
+					ok = 1;
+			}
+			if (ok == negate_range)
+				return(0);
+			break;
+		default:
+			if (*name++ != c)
+				return(0);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	return(*name == EOS);
+}
+
+/* Free allocated data belonging to a glob_t structure. */
+void
+globfree(glob_t *pglob)
+{
+	int i;
+	char **pp;
+
+	if (pglob->gl_pathv != NULL) {
+		pp = pglob->gl_pathv + pglob->gl_offs;
+		for (i = pglob->gl_pathc; i--; ++pp)
+			if (*pp)
+				free(*pp);
+		free(pglob->gl_pathv);
+		pglob->gl_pathv = NULL;
+	}
+	if (pglob->gl_statv != NULL) {
+		for (i = 0; i < pglob->gl_pathc; i++) {
+			if (pglob->gl_statv[i] != NULL)
+				free(pglob->gl_statv[i]);
+		}
+		free(pglob->gl_statv);
+		pglob->gl_statv = NULL;
+	}
+}
+
+static DIR *
+g_opendir(Char *str, glob_t *pglob)
+{
+	char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
+
+	if (!*str)
+		strlcpy(buf, ".", sizeof buf);
+	else {
+		if (g_Ctoc(str, buf, sizeof(buf)))
+			return(NULL);
+	}
+
+	if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC)
+		return((*pglob->gl_opendir)(buf));
+
+	return(opendir(buf));
+}
+
+static int
+g_lstat(Char *fn, struct stat *sb, glob_t *pglob)
+{
+	char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
+
+	if (g_Ctoc(fn, buf, sizeof(buf)))
+		return(-1);
+	if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC)
+		return((*pglob->gl_lstat)(buf, sb));
+	return(lstat(buf, sb));
+}
+
+static int
+g_stat(Char *fn, struct stat *sb, glob_t *pglob)
+{
+	char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
+
+	if (g_Ctoc(fn, buf, sizeof(buf)))
+		return(-1);
+	if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC)
+		return((*pglob->gl_stat)(buf, sb));
+	return(stat(buf, sb));
+}
+
+static Char *
+g_strchr(const Char *str, int ch)
+{
+	do {
+		if (*str == ch)
+			return ((Char *)str);
+	} while (*str++);
+	return (NULL);
+}
+
+static int
+g_Ctoc(const Char *str, char *buf, u_int len)
+{
+
+	while (len--) {
+		if ((*buf++ = *str++) == EOS)
+			return (0);
+	}
+	return (1);
+}
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+static void
+qprintf(const char *str, Char *s)
+{
+	Char *p;
+
+	(void)printf("%s:\n", str);
+	for (p = s; *p; p++)
+		(void)printf("%c", CHAR(*p));
+	(void)printf("\n");
+	for (p = s; *p; p++)
+		(void)printf("%c", *p & M_PROTECT ? '"' : ' ');
+	(void)printf("\n");
+	for (p = s; *p; p++)
+		(void)printf("%c", ismeta(*p) ? '_' : ' ');
+	(void)printf("\n");
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_GLOB) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) ||
+          !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV) */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/glob.h b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/glob.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f8a7fa5ff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/glob.h
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: glob.h,v 1.11 2010/09/24 13:32:55 djm Exp $	*/
+/*	$NetBSD: glob.h,v 1.5 1994/10/26 00:55:56 cgd Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1989, 1993
+ *	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This code is derived from software contributed to Berkeley by
+ * Guido van Rossum.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ *	@(#)glob.h	8.1 (Berkeley) 6/2/93
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: include/glob.h */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_GLOB_H) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) || \
+    !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV) || \
+    !defined(HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH) || HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH == 0 || \
+    defined(BROKEN_GLOB)
+
+#ifndef _GLOB_H_
+#define	_GLOB_H_
+
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+struct stat;
+typedef struct {
+	int gl_pathc;		/* Count of total paths so far. */
+	int gl_matchc;		/* Count of paths matching pattern. */
+	int gl_offs;		/* Reserved at beginning of gl_pathv. */
+	int gl_flags;		/* Copy of flags parameter to glob. */
+	char **gl_pathv;	/* List of paths matching pattern. */
+	struct stat **gl_statv;	/* Stat entries corresponding to gl_pathv */
+				/* Copy of errfunc parameter to glob. */
+	int (*gl_errfunc)(const char *, int);
+
+	/*
+	 * Alternate filesystem access methods for glob; replacement
+	 * versions of closedir(3), readdir(3), opendir(3), stat(2)
+	 * and lstat(2).
+	 */
+	void (*gl_closedir)(void *);
+	struct dirent *(*gl_readdir)(void *);	
+	void *(*gl_opendir)(const char *);
+	int (*gl_lstat)(const char *, struct stat *);
+	int (*gl_stat)(const char *, struct stat *);
+} glob_t;
+
+#define	GLOB_APPEND	0x0001	/* Append to output from previous call. */
+#define	GLOB_DOOFFS	0x0002	/* Use gl_offs. */
+#define	GLOB_ERR	0x0004	/* Return on error. */
+#define	GLOB_MARK	0x0008	/* Append / to matching directories. */
+#define	GLOB_NOCHECK	0x0010	/* Return pattern itself if nothing matches. */
+#define	GLOB_NOSORT	0x0020	/* Don't sort. */
+#define	GLOB_NOESCAPE	0x1000	/* Disable backslash escaping. */
+
+#define	GLOB_NOSPACE	(-1)	/* Malloc call failed. */
+#define	GLOB_ABORTED	(-2)	/* Unignored error. */
+#define	GLOB_NOMATCH	(-3)	/* No match and GLOB_NOCHECK not set. */
+#define	GLOB_NOSYS	(-4)	/* Function not supported. */
+
+#define	GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC	0x0040	/* Use alternately specified directory funcs. */
+#define	GLOB_BRACE	0x0080	/* Expand braces ala csh. */
+#define	GLOB_MAGCHAR	0x0100	/* Pattern had globbing characters. */
+#define	GLOB_NOMAGIC	0x0200	/* GLOB_NOCHECK without magic chars (csh). */
+#define	GLOB_QUOTE	0x0400	/* Quote special chars with \. */
+#define	GLOB_TILDE	0x0800	/* Expand tilde names from the passwd file. */
+#define GLOB_LIMIT	0x2000	/* Limit pattern match output to ARG_MAX */
+#define	GLOB_KEEPSTAT	0x4000	/* Retain stat data for paths in gl_statv. */
+#define GLOB_ABEND	GLOB_ABORTED /* backward compatibility */
+
+int	glob(const char *, int, int (*)(const char *, int), glob_t *);
+void	globfree(glob_t *);
+
+#endif /* !_GLOB_H_ */
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_GLOB_H) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC)  ||
+	  !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) || !defined(GLOH_HAS_GL_STATV) */
+
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/inet_aton.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/inet_aton.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..130597e14
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/inet_aton.c
@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: inet_addr.c,v 1.9 2005/08/06 20:30:03 espie Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1983, 1990, 1993
+ *    The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
+ * 
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ * 
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * -
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1993 by Digital Equipment Corporation.
+ * 
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies, and that
+ * the name of Digital Equipment Corporation not be used in advertising or
+ * publicity pertaining to distribution of the document or software without
+ * specific, written prior permission.
+ * 
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND DIGITAL EQUIPMENT CORP. DISCLAIMS ALL
+ * WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS.   IN NO EVENT SHALL DIGITAL EQUIPMENT
+ * CORPORATION BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR
+ * PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS
+ * ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ * -
+ * --Copyright--
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/net/inet_addr.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_INET_ATON)
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+
+#if 0
+/*
+ * Ascii internet address interpretation routine.
+ * The value returned is in network order.
+ */
+in_addr_t
+inet_addr(const char *cp)
+{
+	struct in_addr val;
+
+	if (inet_aton(cp, &val))
+		return (val.s_addr);
+	return (INADDR_NONE);
+}
+#endif
+
+/* 
+ * Check whether "cp" is a valid ascii representation
+ * of an Internet address and convert to a binary address.
+ * Returns 1 if the address is valid, 0 if not.
+ * This replaces inet_addr, the return value from which
+ * cannot distinguish between failure and a local broadcast address.
+ */
+int
+inet_aton(const char *cp, struct in_addr *addr)
+{
+	u_int32_t val;
+	int base, n;
+	char c;
+	u_int parts[4];
+	u_int *pp = parts;
+
+	c = *cp;
+	for (;;) {
+		/*
+		 * Collect number up to ``.''.
+		 * Values are specified as for C:
+		 * 0x=hex, 0=octal, isdigit=decimal.
+		 */
+		if (!isdigit(c))
+			return (0);
+		val = 0; base = 10;
+		if (c == '0') {
+			c = *++cp;
+			if (c == 'x' || c == 'X')
+				base = 16, c = *++cp;
+			else
+				base = 8;
+		}
+		for (;;) {
+			if (isascii(c) && isdigit(c)) {
+				val = (val * base) + (c - '0');
+				c = *++cp;
+			} else if (base == 16 && isascii(c) && isxdigit(c)) {
+				val = (val << 4) |
+					(c + 10 - (islower(c) ? 'a' : 'A'));
+				c = *++cp;
+			} else
+				break;
+		}
+		if (c == '.') {
+			/*
+			 * Internet format:
+			 *	a.b.c.d
+			 *	a.b.c	(with c treated as 16 bits)
+			 *	a.b	(with b treated as 24 bits)
+			 */
+			if (pp >= parts + 3)
+				return (0);
+			*pp++ = val;
+			c = *++cp;
+		} else
+			break;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Check for trailing characters.
+	 */
+	if (c != '\0' && (!isascii(c) || !isspace(c)))
+		return (0);
+	/*
+	 * Concoct the address according to
+	 * the number of parts specified.
+	 */
+	n = pp - parts + 1;
+	switch (n) {
+
+	case 0:
+		return (0);		/* initial nondigit */
+
+	case 1:				/* a -- 32 bits */
+		break;
+
+	case 2:				/* a.b -- 8.24 bits */
+		if ((val > 0xffffff) || (parts[0] > 0xff))
+			return (0);
+		val |= parts[0] << 24;
+		break;
+
+	case 3:				/* a.b.c -- 8.8.16 bits */
+		if ((val > 0xffff) || (parts[0] > 0xff) || (parts[1] > 0xff))
+			return (0);
+		val |= (parts[0] << 24) | (parts[1] << 16);
+		break;
+
+	case 4:				/* a.b.c.d -- 8.8.8.8 bits */
+		if ((val > 0xff) || (parts[0] > 0xff) || (parts[1] > 0xff) || (parts[2] > 0xff))
+			return (0);
+		val |= (parts[0] << 24) | (parts[1] << 16) | (parts[2] << 8);
+		break;
+	}
+	if (addr)
+		addr->s_addr = htonl(val);
+	return (1);
+}
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_INET_ATON) */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/inet_ntoa.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/inet_ntoa.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0eb7b3bd7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/inet_ntoa.c
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: inet_ntoa.c,v 1.6 2005/08/06 20:30:03 espie Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1983, 1993
+ *	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/net/inet_ntoa.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if defined(BROKEN_INET_NTOA) || !defined(HAVE_INET_NTOA)
+
+/*
+ * Convert network-format internet address
+ * to base 256 d.d.d.d representation.
+ */
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+char *
+inet_ntoa(struct in_addr in)
+{
+	static char b[18];
+	char *p;
+
+	p = (char *)&in;
+#define	UC(b)	(((int)b)&0xff)
+	(void)snprintf(b, sizeof(b),
+	    "%u.%u.%u.%u", UC(p[0]), UC(p[1]), UC(p[2]), UC(p[3]));
+	return (b);
+}
+
+#endif /* defined(BROKEN_INET_NTOA) || !defined(HAVE_INET_NTOA) */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/inet_ntop.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/inet_ntop.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3259037ba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/inet_ntop.c
@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: inet_ntop.c,v 1.8 2008/12/09 19:38:38 otto Exp $	*/
+
+/* Copyright (c) 1996 by Internet Software Consortium.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND INTERNET SOFTWARE CONSORTIUM DISCLAIMS
+ * ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL INTERNET SOFTWARE
+ * CONSORTIUM BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR
+ * PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS
+ * ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/net/inet_ntop.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_INET_NTOP
+
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <arpa/nameser.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#ifndef IN6ADDRSZ
+#define IN6ADDRSZ   16   /* IPv6 T_AAAA */                 
+#endif
+
+#ifndef INT16SZ
+#define INT16SZ     2    /* for systems without 16-bit ints */
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * WARNING: Don't even consider trying to compile this on a system where
+ * sizeof(int) < 4.  sizeof(int) > 4 is fine; all the world's not a VAX.
+ */
+
+static const char *inet_ntop4(const u_char *src, char *dst, size_t size);
+static const char *inet_ntop6(const u_char *src, char *dst, size_t size);
+
+/* char *
+ * inet_ntop(af, src, dst, size)
+ *	convert a network format address to presentation format.
+ * return:
+ *	pointer to presentation format address (`dst'), or NULL (see errno).
+ * author:
+ *	Paul Vixie, 1996.
+ */
+const char *
+inet_ntop(int af, const void *src, char *dst, socklen_t size)
+{
+	switch (af) {
+	case AF_INET:
+		return (inet_ntop4(src, dst, (size_t)size));
+	case AF_INET6:
+		return (inet_ntop6(src, dst, (size_t)size));
+	default:
+		errno = EAFNOSUPPORT;
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+	/* NOTREACHED */
+}
+
+/* const char *
+ * inet_ntop4(src, dst, size)
+ *	format an IPv4 address, more or less like inet_ntoa()
+ * return:
+ *	`dst' (as a const)
+ * notes:
+ *	(1) uses no statics
+ *	(2) takes a u_char* not an in_addr as input
+ * author:
+ *	Paul Vixie, 1996.
+ */
+static const char *
+inet_ntop4(const u_char *src, char *dst, size_t size)
+{
+	static const char fmt[] = "%u.%u.%u.%u";
+	char tmp[sizeof "255.255.255.255"];
+	int l;
+
+	l = snprintf(tmp, size, fmt, src[0], src[1], src[2], src[3]);
+	if (l <= 0 || l >= size) {
+		errno = ENOSPC;
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+	strlcpy(dst, tmp, size);
+	return (dst);
+}
+
+/* const char *
+ * inet_ntop6(src, dst, size)
+ *	convert IPv6 binary address into presentation (printable) format
+ * author:
+ *	Paul Vixie, 1996.
+ */
+static const char *
+inet_ntop6(const u_char *src, char *dst, size_t size)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Note that int32_t and int16_t need only be "at least" large enough
+	 * to contain a value of the specified size.  On some systems, like
+	 * Crays, there is no such thing as an integer variable with 16 bits.
+	 * Keep this in mind if you think this function should have been coded
+	 * to use pointer overlays.  All the world's not a VAX.
+	 */
+	char tmp[sizeof "ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:255.255.255.255"];
+	char *tp, *ep;
+	struct { int base, len; } best, cur;
+	u_int words[IN6ADDRSZ / INT16SZ];
+	int i;
+	int advance;
+
+	/*
+	 * Preprocess:
+	 *	Copy the input (bytewise) array into a wordwise array.
+	 *	Find the longest run of 0x00's in src[] for :: shorthanding.
+	 */
+	memset(words, '\0', sizeof words);
+	for (i = 0; i < IN6ADDRSZ; i++)
+		words[i / 2] |= (src[i] << ((1 - (i % 2)) << 3));
+	best.base = -1;
+	cur.base = -1;
+	for (i = 0; i < (IN6ADDRSZ / INT16SZ); i++) {
+		if (words[i] == 0) {
+			if (cur.base == -1)
+				cur.base = i, cur.len = 1;
+			else
+				cur.len++;
+		} else {
+			if (cur.base != -1) {
+				if (best.base == -1 || cur.len > best.len)
+					best = cur;
+				cur.base = -1;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if (cur.base != -1) {
+		if (best.base == -1 || cur.len > best.len)
+			best = cur;
+	}
+	if (best.base != -1 && best.len < 2)
+		best.base = -1;
+
+	/*
+	 * Format the result.
+	 */
+	tp = tmp;
+	ep = tmp + sizeof(tmp);
+	for (i = 0; i < (IN6ADDRSZ / INT16SZ) && tp < ep; i++) {
+		/* Are we inside the best run of 0x00's? */
+		if (best.base != -1 && i >= best.base &&
+		    i < (best.base + best.len)) {
+			if (i == best.base) {
+				if (tp + 1 >= ep)
+					return (NULL);
+				*tp++ = ':';
+			}
+			continue;
+		}
+		/* Are we following an initial run of 0x00s or any real hex? */
+		if (i != 0) {
+			if (tp + 1 >= ep)
+				return (NULL);
+			*tp++ = ':';
+		}
+		/* Is this address an encapsulated IPv4? */
+		if (i == 6 && best.base == 0 &&
+		    (best.len == 6 || (best.len == 5 && words[5] == 0xffff))) {
+			if (!inet_ntop4(src+12, tp, (size_t)(ep - tp)))
+				return (NULL);
+			tp += strlen(tp);
+			break;
+		}
+		advance = snprintf(tp, ep - tp, "%x", words[i]);
+		if (advance <= 0 || advance >= ep - tp)
+			return (NULL);
+		tp += advance;
+	}
+	/* Was it a trailing run of 0x00's? */
+	if (best.base != -1 && (best.base + best.len) == (IN6ADDRSZ / INT16SZ)) {
+		if (tp + 1 >= ep)
+			return (NULL);
+		*tp++ = ':';
+	}
+	if (tp + 1 >= ep)
+		return (NULL);
+	*tp++ = '\0';
+
+	/*
+	 * Check for overflow, copy, and we're done.
+	 */
+	if ((size_t)(tp - tmp) > size) {
+		errno = ENOSPC;
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+	strlcpy(dst, tmp, size);
+	return (dst);
+}
+
+#endif /* !HAVE_INET_NTOP */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/kludge-fd_set.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/kludge-fd_set.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6c2ffb64b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/kludge-fd_set.c
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+/* Placed in the public domain.  */
+
+/*
+ * _FORTIFY_SOURCE includes a misguided check for FD_SET(n)/FD_ISSET(b)
+ * where n > FD_SETSIZE. This breaks OpenSSH and other programs that
+ * explicitly allocate fd_sets. To avoid this, we wrap FD_SET in a
+ * function compiled without _FORTIFY_SOURCE.
+ */
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#if defined(HAVE_FEATURES_H) && defined(_FORTIFY_SOURCE)
+# include <features.h>
+# if defined(__GNU_LIBRARY__) && defined(__GLIBC_PREREQ)
+#  if __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 15) && (_FORTIFY_SOURCE > 0)
+#   undef _FORTIFY_SOURCE
+#   undef __USE_FORTIFY_LEVEL
+#   include <sys/socket.h>
+void kludge_FD_SET(int n, fd_set *set) {
+	FD_SET(n, set);
+}
+int kludge_FD_ISSET(int n, fd_set *set) {
+	return FD_ISSET(n, set);
+}
+#  endif /* __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 15) && (_FORTIFY_SOURCE > 0) */
+# endif /* __GNU_LIBRARY__ && __GLIBC_PREREQ */
+#endif /* HAVE_FEATURES_H && _FORTIFY_SOURCE */
+
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/md5.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/md5.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..195ab515d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/md5.c
@@ -0,0 +1,251 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: md5.c,v 1.9 2014/01/08 06:14:57 tedu Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * This code implements the MD5 message-digest algorithm.
+ * The algorithm is due to Ron Rivest.	This code was
+ * written by Colin Plumb in 1993, no copyright is claimed.
+ * This code is in the public domain; do with it what you wish.
+ *
+ * Equivalent code is available from RSA Data Security, Inc.
+ * This code has been tested against that, and is equivalent,
+ * except that you don't need to include two pages of legalese
+ * with every copy.
+ *
+ * To compute the message digest of a chunk of bytes, declare an
+ * MD5Context structure, pass it to MD5Init, call MD5Update as
+ * needed on buffers full of bytes, and then call MD5Final, which
+ * will fill a supplied 16-byte array with the digest.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include "md5.h"
+
+#define PUT_64BIT_LE(cp, value) do {					\
+	(cp)[7] = (value) >> 56;					\
+	(cp)[6] = (value) >> 48;					\
+	(cp)[5] = (value) >> 40;					\
+	(cp)[4] = (value) >> 32;					\
+	(cp)[3] = (value) >> 24;					\
+	(cp)[2] = (value) >> 16;					\
+	(cp)[1] = (value) >> 8;						\
+	(cp)[0] = (value); } while (0)
+
+#define PUT_32BIT_LE(cp, value) do {					\
+	(cp)[3] = (value) >> 24;					\
+	(cp)[2] = (value) >> 16;					\
+	(cp)[1] = (value) >> 8;						\
+	(cp)[0] = (value); } while (0)
+
+static u_int8_t PADDING[MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH] = {
+	0x80, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+	0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+	0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
+};
+
+/*
+ * Start MD5 accumulation.  Set bit count to 0 and buffer to mysterious
+ * initialization constants.
+ */
+void
+MD5Init(MD5_CTX *ctx)
+{
+	ctx->count = 0;
+	ctx->state[0] = 0x67452301;
+	ctx->state[1] = 0xefcdab89;
+	ctx->state[2] = 0x98badcfe;
+	ctx->state[3] = 0x10325476;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Update context to reflect the concatenation of another buffer full
+ * of bytes.
+ */
+void
+MD5Update(MD5_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t len)
+{
+	size_t have, need;
+
+	/* Check how many bytes we already have and how many more we need. */
+	have = (size_t)((ctx->count >> 3) & (MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH - 1));
+	need = MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH - have;
+
+	/* Update bitcount */
+	ctx->count += (u_int64_t)len << 3;
+
+	if (len >= need) {
+		if (have != 0) {
+			memcpy(ctx->buffer + have, input, need);
+			MD5Transform(ctx->state, ctx->buffer);
+			input += need;
+			len -= need;
+			have = 0;
+		}
+
+		/* Process data in MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH-byte chunks. */
+		while (len >= MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH) {
+			MD5Transform(ctx->state, input);
+			input += MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+			len -= MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Handle any remaining bytes of data. */
+	if (len != 0)
+		memcpy(ctx->buffer + have, input, len);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Pad pad to 64-byte boundary with the bit pattern
+ * 1 0* (64-bit count of bits processed, MSB-first)
+ */
+void
+MD5Pad(MD5_CTX *ctx)
+{
+	u_int8_t count[8];
+	size_t padlen;
+
+	/* Convert count to 8 bytes in little endian order. */
+	PUT_64BIT_LE(count, ctx->count);
+
+	/* Pad out to 56 mod 64. */
+	padlen = MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH -
+	    ((ctx->count >> 3) & (MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH - 1));
+	if (padlen < 1 + 8)
+		padlen += MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+	MD5Update(ctx, PADDING, padlen - 8);		/* padlen - 8 <= 64 */
+	MD5Update(ctx, count, 8);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Final wrapup--call MD5Pad, fill in digest and zero out ctx.
+ */
+void
+MD5Final(unsigned char digest[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH], MD5_CTX *ctx)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	MD5Pad(ctx);
+	for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+		PUT_32BIT_LE(digest + i * 4, ctx->state[i]);
+	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+}
+
+
+/* The four core functions - F1 is optimized somewhat */
+
+/* #define F1(x, y, z) (x & y | ~x & z) */
+#define F1(x, y, z) (z ^ (x & (y ^ z)))
+#define F2(x, y, z) F1(z, x, y)
+#define F3(x, y, z) (x ^ y ^ z)
+#define F4(x, y, z) (y ^ (x | ~z))
+
+/* This is the central step in the MD5 algorithm. */
+#define MD5STEP(f, w, x, y, z, data, s) \
+	( w += f(x, y, z) + data,  w = w<<s | w>>(32-s),  w += x )
+
+/*
+ * The core of the MD5 algorithm, this alters an existing MD5 hash to
+ * reflect the addition of 16 longwords of new data.  MD5Update blocks
+ * the data and converts bytes into longwords for this routine.
+ */
+void
+MD5Transform(u_int32_t state[4], const u_int8_t block[MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH])
+{
+	u_int32_t a, b, c, d, in[MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH / 4];
+
+#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
+	memcpy(in, block, sizeof(in));
+#else
+	for (a = 0; a < MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH / 4; a++) {
+		in[a] = (u_int32_t)(
+		    (u_int32_t)(block[a * 4 + 0]) |
+		    (u_int32_t)(block[a * 4 + 1]) <<  8 |
+		    (u_int32_t)(block[a * 4 + 2]) << 16 |
+		    (u_int32_t)(block[a * 4 + 3]) << 24);
+	}
+#endif
+
+	a = state[0];
+	b = state[1];
+	c = state[2];
+	d = state[3];
+
+	MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[ 0] + 0xd76aa478,  7);
+	MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[ 1] + 0xe8c7b756, 12);
+	MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[ 2] + 0x242070db, 17);
+	MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[ 3] + 0xc1bdceee, 22);
+	MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[ 4] + 0xf57c0faf,  7);
+	MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[ 5] + 0x4787c62a, 12);
+	MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[ 6] + 0xa8304613, 17);
+	MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[ 7] + 0xfd469501, 22);
+	MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[ 8] + 0x698098d8,  7);
+	MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[ 9] + 0x8b44f7af, 12);
+	MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[10] + 0xffff5bb1, 17);
+	MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[11] + 0x895cd7be, 22);
+	MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[12] + 0x6b901122,  7);
+	MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[13] + 0xfd987193, 12);
+	MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[14] + 0xa679438e, 17);
+	MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[15] + 0x49b40821, 22);
+
+	MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[ 1] + 0xf61e2562,  5);
+	MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[ 6] + 0xc040b340,  9);
+	MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[11] + 0x265e5a51, 14);
+	MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[ 0] + 0xe9b6c7aa, 20);
+	MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[ 5] + 0xd62f105d,  5);
+	MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[10] + 0x02441453,  9);
+	MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[15] + 0xd8a1e681, 14);
+	MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[ 4] + 0xe7d3fbc8, 20);
+	MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[ 9] + 0x21e1cde6,  5);
+	MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[14] + 0xc33707d6,  9);
+	MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[ 3] + 0xf4d50d87, 14);
+	MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[ 8] + 0x455a14ed, 20);
+	MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[13] + 0xa9e3e905,  5);
+	MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[ 2] + 0xfcefa3f8,  9);
+	MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[ 7] + 0x676f02d9, 14);
+	MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[12] + 0x8d2a4c8a, 20);
+
+	MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[ 5] + 0xfffa3942,  4);
+	MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[ 8] + 0x8771f681, 11);
+	MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[11] + 0x6d9d6122, 16);
+	MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[14] + 0xfde5380c, 23);
+	MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[ 1] + 0xa4beea44,  4);
+	MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[ 4] + 0x4bdecfa9, 11);
+	MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[ 7] + 0xf6bb4b60, 16);
+	MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[10] + 0xbebfbc70, 23);
+	MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[13] + 0x289b7ec6,  4);
+	MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[ 0] + 0xeaa127fa, 11);
+	MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[ 3] + 0xd4ef3085, 16);
+	MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[ 6] + 0x04881d05, 23);
+	MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[ 9] + 0xd9d4d039,  4);
+	MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[12] + 0xe6db99e5, 11);
+	MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[15] + 0x1fa27cf8, 16);
+	MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[2 ] + 0xc4ac5665, 23);
+
+	MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[ 0] + 0xf4292244,  6);
+	MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[7 ] + 0x432aff97, 10);
+	MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[14] + 0xab9423a7, 15);
+	MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[5 ] + 0xfc93a039, 21);
+	MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[12] + 0x655b59c3,  6);
+	MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[3 ] + 0x8f0ccc92, 10);
+	MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[10] + 0xffeff47d, 15);
+	MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[1 ] + 0x85845dd1, 21);
+	MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[8 ] + 0x6fa87e4f,  6);
+	MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[15] + 0xfe2ce6e0, 10);
+	MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[6 ] + 0xa3014314, 15);
+	MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[13] + 0x4e0811a1, 21);
+	MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[4 ] + 0xf7537e82,  6);
+	MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[11] + 0xbd3af235, 10);
+	MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[2 ] + 0x2ad7d2bb, 15);
+	MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[9 ] + 0xeb86d391, 21);
+
+	state[0] += a;
+	state[1] += b;
+	state[2] += c;
+	state[3] += d;
+}
+#endif /* !WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/md5.h b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/md5.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c83c19dca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/md5.h
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: md5.h,v 1.17 2012/12/05 23:19:57 deraadt Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * This code implements the MD5 message-digest algorithm.
+ * The algorithm is due to Ron Rivest.  This code was
+ * written by Colin Plumb in 1993, no copyright is claimed.
+ * This code is in the public domain; do with it what you wish.
+ *
+ * Equivalent code is available from RSA Data Security, Inc.
+ * This code has been tested against that, and is equivalent,
+ * except that you don't need to include two pages of legalese
+ * with every copy.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _MD5_H_
+#define _MD5_H_
+
+#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL
+
+#define	MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH		64
+#define	MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH		16
+#define	MD5_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH	(MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1)
+
+typedef struct MD5Context {
+	u_int32_t state[4];			/* state */
+	u_int64_t count;			/* number of bits, mod 2^64 */
+	u_int8_t buffer[MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH];	/* input buffer */
+} MD5_CTX;
+
+void	 MD5Init(MD5_CTX *);
+void	 MD5Update(MD5_CTX *, const u_int8_t *, size_t)
+		__attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,2,3)));
+void	 MD5Pad(MD5_CTX *);
+void	 MD5Final(u_int8_t [MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH], MD5_CTX *)
+		__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH)));
+void	 MD5Transform(u_int32_t [4], const u_int8_t [MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH])
+		__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,4)))
+		__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH)));
+char	*MD5End(MD5_CTX *, char *)
+		__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,MD5_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char	*MD5File(const char *, char *)
+		__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,MD5_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char	*MD5FileChunk(const char *, char *, off_t, off_t)
+		__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,MD5_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char	*MD5Data(const u_int8_t *, size_t, char *)
+		__attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,1,2)))
+		__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,3,MD5_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+
+#endif /* !WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+#endif /* _MD5_H_ */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/mktemp.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/mktemp.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4eb52f421
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/mktemp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+/* THIS FILE HAS BEEN MODIFIED FROM THE ORIGINAL OPENBSD SOURCE */
+/* Changes: Removed mktemp */
+
+/*	$OpenBSD: mktemp.c,v 1.30 2010/03/21 23:09:30 schwarze Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1996-1998, 2008 Theo de Raadt
+ * Copyright (c) 1997, 2008-2009 Todd C. Miller
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/stdio/mktemp.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_MKDTEMP) || defined(HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP)
+
+#define MKTEMP_NAME	0
+#define MKTEMP_FILE	1
+#define MKTEMP_DIR	2
+
+#define TEMPCHARS	"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789"
+#define NUM_CHARS	(sizeof(TEMPCHARS) - 1)
+
+static int
+mktemp_internal(char *path, int slen, int mode)
+{
+	char *start, *cp, *ep;
+	const char *tempchars = TEMPCHARS;
+	unsigned int r, tries;
+	struct stat sb;
+	size_t len;
+	int fd;
+
+	len = strlen(path);
+	if (len == 0 || slen < 0 || (size_t)slen >= len) {
+		errno = EINVAL;
+		return(-1);
+	}
+	ep = path + len - slen;
+
+	tries = 1;
+	for (start = ep; start > path && start[-1] == 'X'; start--) {
+		if (tries < INT_MAX / NUM_CHARS)
+			tries *= NUM_CHARS;
+	}
+	tries *= 2;
+
+	do {
+		for (cp = start; cp != ep; cp++) {
+			r = arc4random_uniform(NUM_CHARS);
+			*cp = tempchars[r];
+		}
+
+		switch (mode) {
+		case MKTEMP_NAME:
+			if (lstat(path, &sb) != 0)
+				return(errno == ENOENT ? 0 : -1);
+			break;
+		case MKTEMP_FILE:
+			fd = open(path, O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_RDWR, S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR);
+			if (fd != -1 || errno != EEXIST)
+				return(fd);
+			break;
+		case MKTEMP_DIR:
+			if (mkdir(path, S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR|S_IXUSR) == 0)
+				return(0);
+			if (errno != EEXIST)
+				return(-1);
+			break;
+		}
+	} while (--tries);
+
+	errno = EEXIST;
+	return(-1);
+}
+
+#if 0
+char *_mktemp(char *);
+
+char *
+_mktemp(char *path)
+{
+	if (mktemp_internal(path, 0, MKTEMP_NAME) == -1)
+		return(NULL);
+	return(path);
+}
+
+__warn_references(mktemp,
+    "warning: mktemp() possibly used unsafely; consider using mkstemp()");
+
+char *
+mktemp(char *path)
+{
+	return(_mktemp(path));
+}
+#endif
+
+int
+mkstemp(char *path)
+{
+	return(mktemp_internal(path, 0, MKTEMP_FILE));
+}
+
+int
+mkstemps(char *path, int slen)
+{
+	return(mktemp_internal(path, slen, MKTEMP_FILE));
+}
+
+char *
+mkdtemp(char *path)
+{
+	int error;
+
+	error = mktemp_internal(path, 0, MKTEMP_DIR);
+	return(error ? NULL : path);
+}
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_MKDTEMP) || defined(HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP) */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1ff7114ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h
@@ -0,0 +1,302 @@
+/* $Id: openbsd-compat.h,v 1.62 2014/09/30 23:43:08 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2003 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2003 Ben Lindstrom. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 Tim Rice.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _OPENBSD_COMPAT_H
+#define _OPENBSD_COMPAT_H
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+/* OpenBSD function replacements */
+#include "base64.h"
+#include "sigact.h"
+#include "glob.h"
+#include "readpassphrase.h"
+#include "vis.h"
+#include "getrrsetbyname.h"
+#include "sha1.h"
+#include "sha2.h"
+#include "rmd160.h"
+#include "md5.h"
+#include "blf.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_BASENAME
+char *basename(const char *path);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_BINDRESVPORT_SA
+int bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr *sa);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_CLOSEFROM
+void closefrom(int);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GETCWD
+char *getcwd(char *pt, size_t size);
+#endif 
+
+#ifndef HAVE_REALLOCARRAY
+void *reallocarray(void *, size_t, size_t);
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_REALPATH) || defined(BROKEN_REALPATH)
+/*
+ * glibc's FORTIFY_SOURCE can redefine this and prevent us picking up the
+ * compat version.
+ */
+# ifdef BROKEN_REALPATH
+#  define realpath(x, y) _ssh_compat_realpath(x, y)
+# endif
+
+char *realpath(const char *path, char *resolved);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_RRESVPORT_AF
+int rresvport_af(int *alport, sa_family_t af);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRLCPY
+/* #include <sys/types.h> XXX Still needed? */
+size_t strlcpy(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRLCAT
+/* #include <sys/types.h> XXX Still needed? */
+size_t strlcat(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz);
+#endif 
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SETENV
+int setenv(register const char *name, register const char *value, int rewrite);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRMODE
+void strmode(int mode, char *p);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRPTIME
+#include  <time.h>
+char *strptime(const char *buf, const char *fmt, struct tm *tm);
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_MKDTEMP) || defined(HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP)
+int mkstemps(char *path, int slen);
+int mkstemp(char *path);
+char *mkdtemp(char *path);
+#endif 
+
+#ifndef HAVE_DAEMON
+int daemon(int nochdir, int noclose);
+#endif 
+
+#ifndef HAVE_DIRNAME
+char *dirname(const char *path);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_FMT_SCALED
+#define	FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE	7
+int	fmt_scaled(long long number, char *result);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SCAN_SCALED
+int	scan_scaled(char *, long long *);
+#endif
+
+#if defined(BROKEN_INET_NTOA) || !defined(HAVE_INET_NTOA)
+char *inet_ntoa(struct in_addr in);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_INET_NTOP
+const char *inet_ntop(int af, const void *src, char *dst, socklen_t size);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_INET_ATON
+int inet_aton(const char *cp, struct in_addr *addr);
+#endif 
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRSEP
+char *strsep(char **stringp, const char *delim);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
+void setproctitle(const char *fmt, ...);
+void compat_init_setproctitle(int argc, char *argv[]);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GETGROUPLIST
+/* #include <grp.h> XXXX Still needed ? */
+int getgrouplist(const char *, gid_t, gid_t *, int *);
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_GETOPT) || !defined(HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET)
+int BSDgetopt(int argc, char * const *argv, const char *opts);
+#include "openbsd-compat/getopt.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_WRITEV) && HAVE_DECL_WRITEV == 0
+# include <sys/types.h>
+# include <sys/uio.h>
+int writev(int, struct iovec *, int);
+#endif
+
+/* Home grown routines */
+#include "bsd-misc.h"
+#include "bsd-setres_id.h"
+#include "bsd-statvfs.h"
+#include "bsd-waitpid.h"
+#include "bsd-poll.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GETPEEREID
+int getpeereid(int , uid_t *, gid_t *);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM
+# ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_STIR
+#  define arc4random_stir()
+# endif
+#else
+unsigned int arc4random(void);
+void arc4random_stir(void);
+#endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF
+void arc4random_buf(void *, size_t);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM
+u_int32_t arc4random_uniform(u_int32_t);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_ASPRINTF
+int asprintf(char **, const char *, ...);
+#endif 
+
+#ifndef HAVE_OPENPTY
+# include <sys/ioctl.h>	/* for struct winsize */
+int openpty(int *, int *, char *, struct termios *, struct winsize *);
+#endif /* HAVE_OPENPTY */
+
+/* #include <sys/types.h> XXX needed? For size_t */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SNPRINTF
+int snprintf(char *, size_t, SNPRINTF_CONST char *, ...);
+#endif 
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRTOLL
+long long strtoll(const char *, char **, int);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRTOUL
+unsigned long strtoul(const char *, char **, int);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRTOULL
+unsigned long long strtoull(const char *, char **, int);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRTONUM
+long long strtonum(const char *, long long, long long, const char **);
+#endif
+
+/* multibyte character support */
+#ifndef HAVE_MBLEN
+# define mblen(x, y)	(1)
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_VASPRINTF) || !defined(HAVE_VSNPRINTF)
+# include <stdarg.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_VASPRINTF
+int vasprintf(char **, const char *, va_list);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_VSNPRINTF
+int vsnprintf(char *, size_t, const char *, va_list);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_USER_FROM_UID
+char *user_from_uid(uid_t, int);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GROUP_FROM_GID
+char *group_from_gid(gid_t, int);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_TIMINGSAFE_BCMP
+int timingsafe_bcmp(const void *, const void *, size_t);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF
+int	bcrypt_pbkdf(const char *, size_t, const u_int8_t *, size_t,
+    u_int8_t *, size_t, unsigned int);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO
+void explicit_bzero(void *p, size_t n);
+#endif
+
+void *xmmap(size_t size);
+char *xcrypt(const char *password, const char *salt);
+char *shadow_pw(struct passwd *pw);
+
+/* rfc2553 socket API replacements */
+#include "fake-rfc2553.h"
+
+/* Routines for a single OS platform */
+#include "bsd-cray.h"
+#include "bsd-cygwin_util.h"
+
+#include "port-aix.h"
+#include "port-irix.h"
+#include "port-linux.h"
+#include "port-solaris.h"
+#include "port-tun.h"
+#include "port-uw.h"
+
+/* _FORTIFY_SOURCE breaks FD_ISSET(n)/FD_SET(n) for n > FD_SETSIZE. Avoid. */
+#if defined(HAVE_FEATURES_H) && defined(_FORTIFY_SOURCE)
+# include <features.h>
+# if defined(__GNU_LIBRARY__) && defined(__GLIBC_PREREQ)
+#  if __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 15) && (_FORTIFY_SOURCE > 0)
+#   include <sys/socket.h>  /* Ensure include guard is defined */
+#   undef FD_SET
+#   undef FD_ISSET
+#   define FD_SET(n, set)	kludge_FD_SET(n, set)
+#   define FD_ISSET(n, set)	kludge_FD_ISSET(n, set)
+void kludge_FD_SET(int, fd_set *);
+int kludge_FD_ISSET(int, fd_set *);
+#  endif /* __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 15) && (_FORTIFY_SOURCE > 0) */
+# endif /* __GNU_LIBRARY__ && __GLIBC_PREREQ */
+#endif /* HAVE_FEATURES_H && _FORTIFY_SOURCE */
+
+#endif /* _OPENBSD_COMPAT_H */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..63a660c7a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+/* $Id: openssl-compat.c,v 1.19 2014/07/02 05:28:07 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF MIND, USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER
+ * IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING
+ * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#define SSH_DONT_OVERLOAD_OPENSSL_FUNCS
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
+# include <openssl/engine.h>
+# include <openssl/conf.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "log.h"
+
+#include "openssl-compat.h"
+
+/*
+ * OpenSSL version numbers: MNNFFPPS: major minor fix patch status
+ * We match major, minor, fix and status (not patch) for <1.0.0.
+ * After that, we acceptable compatible fix versions (so we
+ * allow 1.0.1 to work with 1.0.0). Going backwards is only allowed
+ * within a patch series.
+ */
+
+int
+ssh_compatible_openssl(long headerver, long libver)
+{
+	long mask, hfix, lfix;
+
+	/* exact match is always OK */
+	if (headerver == libver)
+		return 1;
+
+	/* for versions < 1.0.0, major,minor,fix,status must match */
+	if (headerver < 0x1000000f) {
+		mask = 0xfffff00fL; /* major,minor,fix,status */
+		return (headerver & mask) == (libver & mask);
+	}
+	
+	/*
+	 * For versions >= 1.0.0, major,minor,status must match and library
+	 * fix version must be equal to or newer than the header.
+	 */
+	mask = 0xfff0000fL; /* major,minor,status */
+	hfix = (headerver & 0x000ff000) >> 12;
+	lfix = (libver & 0x000ff000) >> 12;
+	if ( (headerver & mask) == (libver & mask) && lfix >= hfix)
+		return 1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef	USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
+void
+ssh_OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(void)
+{
+	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+
+	/* Enable use of crypto hardware */
+	ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
+	ENGINE_register_all_complete();
+	OPENSSL_config(NULL);
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8917551d3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+/* $Id: openssl-compat.h,v 1.31 2014/08/29 18:18:29 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF MIND, USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER
+ * IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING
+ * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _OPENSSL_COMPAT_H
+#define _OPENSSL_COMPAT_H
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+
+#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+
+int ssh_compatible_openssl(long, long);
+
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER <= 0x0090805fL)
+# error OpenSSL 0.9.8f or greater is required
+#endif
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000001L
+# define LIBCRYPTO_EVP_INL_TYPE unsigned int
+#else
+# define LIBCRYPTO_EVP_INL_TYPE size_t
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
+# define OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS	16384
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
+# define OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS	10000
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR
+# define EVP_aes_128_ctr evp_aes_128_ctr
+# define EVP_aes_192_ctr evp_aes_128_ctr
+# define EVP_aes_256_ctr evp_aes_128_ctr
+const EVP_CIPHER *evp_aes_128_ctr(void);
+void ssh_aes_ctr_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, size_t);
+#endif
+
+/* Avoid some #ifdef. Code that uses these is unreachable without GCM */
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM) && !defined(EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED)
+# define EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED -1
+# define EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN -1
+# define EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG -1
+# define EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG -1
+#endif
+
+/* Replace missing EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl() with something that returns failure */
+#ifndef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_CTRL
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM
+#  error AES-GCM enabled without EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl /* shouldn't happen */
+# else
+# define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(a,b,c,d) (0)
+# endif
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * We overload some of the OpenSSL crypto functions with ssh_* equivalents
+ * to automatically handle OpenSSL engine initialisation.
+ *
+ * In order for the compat library to call the real functions, it must
+ * define SSH_DONT_OVERLOAD_OPENSSL_FUNCS before including this file and
+ * implement the ssh_* equivalents.
+ */
+#ifndef SSH_DONT_OVERLOAD_OPENSSL_FUNCS
+
+# ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
+#  ifdef OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms
+#   undef OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms
+#  endif
+#  define OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms()  ssh_OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms()
+# endif
+
+void ssh_OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(void);
+
+#endif	/* SSH_DONT_OVERLOAD_OPENSSL_FUNCS */
+
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+#endif /* _OPENSSL_COMPAT_H */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/port-aix.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/port-aix.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8da367d48
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/port-aix.c
@@ -0,0 +1,472 @@
+/*
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Gert Doering.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2003,2004,2005,2006 Darren Tucker.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ */
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+#ifdef _AIX
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#if defined(HAVE_NETDB_H)
+# include <netdb.h>
+#endif
+#include <uinfo.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
+# include <login.h>
+# include <userpw.h>
+# if defined(HAVE_SYS_AUDIT_H) && defined(AIX_LOGINFAILED_4ARG)
+#  include <sys/audit.h>
+# endif
+# include <usersec.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "port-aix.h"
+
+static char *lastlogin_msg = NULL;
+
+# ifdef HAVE_SETAUTHDB
+static char old_registry[REGISTRY_SIZE] = "";
+# endif
+
+/*
+ * AIX has a "usrinfo" area where logname and other stuff is stored -
+ * a few applications actually use this and die if it's not set
+ *
+ * NOTE: TTY= should be set, but since no one uses it and it's hard to
+ * acquire due to privsep code.  We will just drop support.
+ */
+void
+aix_usrinfo(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+	u_int i;
+	size_t len;
+	char *cp;
+
+	len = sizeof("LOGNAME= NAME= ") + (2 * strlen(pw->pw_name));
+	cp = xmalloc(len);
+
+	i = snprintf(cp, len, "LOGNAME=%s%cNAME=%s%c", pw->pw_name, '\0',
+	    pw->pw_name, '\0');
+	if (usrinfo(SETUINFO, cp, i) == -1)
+		fatal("Couldn't set usrinfo: %s", strerror(errno));
+	debug3("AIX/UsrInfo: set len %d", i);
+
+	free(cp);
+}
+
+# ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
+/*
+ * Remove embedded newlines in string (if any).
+ * Used before logging messages returned by AIX authentication functions
+ * so the message is logged on one line.
+ */
+void
+aix_remove_embedded_newlines(char *p)
+{
+	if (p == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	for (; *p; p++) {
+		if (*p == '\n')
+			*p = ' ';
+	}
+	/* Remove trailing whitespace */
+	if (*--p == ' ')
+		*p = '\0';
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test specifically for the case where SYSTEM == NONE and AUTH1 contains
+ * anything other than NONE or SYSTEM, which indicates that the admin has
+ * configured the account for purely AUTH1-type authentication.
+ *
+ * Since authenticate() doesn't check AUTH1, and sshd can't sanely support
+ * AUTH1 itself, in such a case authenticate() will allow access without
+ * authentation, which is almost certainly not what the admin intends.
+ *
+ * (The native tools, eg login, will process the AUTH1 list in addition to
+ * the SYSTEM list by using ckuserID(), however ckuserID() and AUTH1 methods
+ * have been deprecated since AIX 4.2.x and would be very difficult for sshd
+ * to support.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if an unsupportable combination is found, 1 otherwise.
+ */
+static int
+aix_valid_authentications(const char *user)
+{
+	char *auth1, *sys, *p;
+	int valid = 1;
+
+	if (getuserattr((char *)user, S_AUTHSYSTEM, &sys, SEC_CHAR) != 0) {
+		logit("Can't retrieve attribute SYSTEM for %s: %.100s",
+		    user, strerror(errno));
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	debug3("AIX SYSTEM attribute %s", sys);
+	if (strcmp(sys, "NONE") != 0)
+		return 1;	/* not "NONE", so is OK */
+
+	if (getuserattr((char *)user, S_AUTH1, &auth1, SEC_LIST) != 0) {
+		logit("Can't retrieve attribute auth1 for %s: %.100s",
+		    user, strerror(errno));
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	p = auth1;
+	/* A SEC_LIST is concatenated strings, ending with two NULs. */
+	while (p[0] != '\0' && p[1] != '\0') {
+		debug3("AIX auth1 attribute list member %s", p);
+		if (strcmp(p, "NONE") != 0 && strcmp(p, "SYSTEM")) {
+			logit("Account %s has unsupported auth1 value '%s'",
+			    user, p);
+			valid = 0;
+		}
+		p += strlen(p) + 1;
+	}
+
+	return (valid);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Do authentication via AIX's authenticate routine.  We loop until the
+ * reenter parameter is 0, but normally authenticate is called only once.
+ *
+ * Note: this function returns 1 on success, whereas AIX's authenticate()
+ * returns 0.
+ */
+int
+sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *ctxt, const char *password)
+{
+	char *authmsg = NULL, *msg = NULL, *name = ctxt->pw->pw_name;
+	int authsuccess = 0, expired, reenter, result;
+
+	do {
+		result = authenticate((char *)name, (char *)password, &reenter,
+		    &authmsg);
+		aix_remove_embedded_newlines(authmsg);	
+		debug3("AIX/authenticate result %d, authmsg %.100s", result,
+		    authmsg);
+	} while (reenter);
+
+	if (!aix_valid_authentications(name))
+		result = -1;
+
+	if (result == 0) {
+		authsuccess = 1;
+
+		/*
+		 * Record successful login.  We don't have a pty yet, so just
+		 * label the line as "ssh"
+		 */
+		aix_setauthdb(name);
+
+		/*
+		 * Check if the user's password is expired.
+		 */
+		expired = passwdexpired(name, &msg);
+		if (msg && *msg) {
+			buffer_append(ctxt->loginmsg, msg, strlen(msg));
+			aix_remove_embedded_newlines(msg);
+		}
+		debug3("AIX/passwdexpired returned %d msg %.100s", expired, msg);
+
+		switch (expired) {
+		case 0: /* password not expired */
+			break;
+		case 1: /* expired, password change required */
+			ctxt->force_pwchange = 1;
+			break;
+		default: /* user can't change(2) or other error (-1) */
+			logit("Password can't be changed for user %s: %.100s",
+			    name, msg);
+			free(msg);
+			authsuccess = 0;
+		}
+
+		aix_restoreauthdb();
+	}
+
+	free(authmsg);
+
+	return authsuccess;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check if specified account is permitted to log in.
+ * Returns 1 if login is allowed, 0 if not allowed.
+ */
+int
+sys_auth_allowed_user(struct passwd *pw, Buffer *loginmsg)
+{
+	char *msg = NULL;
+	int result, permitted = 0;
+	struct stat st;
+
+	/*
+	 * Don't perform checks for root account (PermitRootLogin controls
+	 * logins via ssh) or if running as non-root user (since
+	 * loginrestrictions will always fail due to insufficient privilege).
+	 */
+	if (pw->pw_uid == 0 || geteuid() != 0) {
+		debug3("%s: not checking", __func__);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	result = loginrestrictions(pw->pw_name, S_RLOGIN, NULL, &msg);
+	if (result == 0)
+		permitted = 1;
+	/*
+	 * If restricted because /etc/nologin exists, the login will be denied
+	 * in session.c after the nologin message is sent, so allow for now
+	 * and do not append the returned message.
+	 */
+	if (result == -1 && errno == EPERM && stat(_PATH_NOLOGIN, &st) == 0)
+		permitted = 1;
+	else if (msg != NULL)
+		buffer_append(loginmsg, msg, strlen(msg));
+	if (msg == NULL)
+		msg = xstrdup("(none)");
+	aix_remove_embedded_newlines(msg);
+	debug3("AIX/loginrestrictions returned %d msg %.100s", result, msg);
+
+	if (!permitted)
+		logit("Login restricted for %s: %.100s", pw->pw_name, msg);
+	free(msg);
+	return permitted;
+}
+
+int
+sys_auth_record_login(const char *user, const char *host, const char *ttynm,
+    Buffer *loginmsg)
+{
+	char *msg = NULL;
+	int success = 0;
+
+	aix_setauthdb(user);
+	if (loginsuccess((char *)user, (char *)host, (char *)ttynm, &msg) == 0) {
+		success = 1;
+		if (msg != NULL) {
+			debug("AIX/loginsuccess: msg %s", msg);
+			if (lastlogin_msg == NULL)
+				lastlogin_msg = msg;
+		}
+	}
+	aix_restoreauthdb();
+	return (success);
+}
+
+char *
+sys_auth_get_lastlogin_msg(const char *user, uid_t uid)
+{
+	char *msg = lastlogin_msg;
+
+	lastlogin_msg = NULL;
+	return msg;
+}
+
+#  ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
+/*
+ * record_failed_login: generic "login failed" interface function
+ */
+void
+record_failed_login(const char *user, const char *hostname, const char *ttyname)
+{
+	if (geteuid() != 0)
+		return;
+
+	aix_setauthdb(user);
+#   ifdef AIX_LOGINFAILED_4ARG
+	loginfailed((char *)user, (char *)hostname, (char *)ttyname,
+	    AUDIT_FAIL_AUTH);
+#   else
+	loginfailed((char *)user, (char *)hostname, (char *)ttyname);
+#   endif
+	aix_restoreauthdb();
+}
+#  endif /* CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN */
+
+/*
+ * If we have setauthdb, retrieve the password registry for the user's
+ * account then feed it to setauthdb.  This will mean that subsequent AIX auth
+ * functions will only use the specified loadable module.  If we don't have
+ * setauthdb this is a no-op.
+ */
+void
+aix_setauthdb(const char *user)
+{
+#  ifdef HAVE_SETAUTHDB
+	char *registry;
+
+	if (setuserdb(S_READ) == -1) {
+		debug3("%s: Could not open userdb to read", __func__);
+		return;
+	}
+	
+	if (getuserattr((char *)user, S_REGISTRY, &registry, SEC_CHAR) == 0) {
+		if (setauthdb(registry, old_registry) == 0)
+			debug3("AIX/setauthdb set registry '%s'", registry);
+		else 
+			debug3("AIX/setauthdb set registry '%s' failed: %s",
+			    registry, strerror(errno));
+	} else
+		debug3("%s: Could not read S_REGISTRY for user: %s", __func__,
+		    strerror(errno));
+	enduserdb();
+#  endif /* HAVE_SETAUTHDB */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Restore the user's registry settings from old_registry.
+ * Note that if the first aix_setauthdb fails, setauthdb("") is still safe
+ * (it restores the system default behaviour).  If we don't have setauthdb,
+ * this is a no-op.
+ */
+void
+aix_restoreauthdb(void)
+{
+#  ifdef HAVE_SETAUTHDB
+	if (setauthdb(old_registry, NULL) == 0)
+		debug3("%s: restoring old registry '%s'", __func__,
+		    old_registry);
+	else
+		debug3("%s: failed to restore old registry %s", __func__,
+		    old_registry);
+#  endif /* HAVE_SETAUTHDB */
+}
+
+# endif /* WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */
+
+# ifdef USE_AIX_KRB_NAME
+/*
+ * aix_krb5_get_principal_name: returns the user's kerberos client principal name if
+ * configured, otherwise NULL.  Caller must free returned string.
+ */
+char *
+aix_krb5_get_principal_name(char *pw_name)
+{
+	char *authname = NULL, *authdomain = NULL, *principal = NULL;
+
+	setuserdb(S_READ);
+	if (getuserattr(pw_name, S_AUTHDOMAIN, &authdomain, SEC_CHAR) != 0)
+		debug("AIX getuserattr S_AUTHDOMAIN: %s", strerror(errno));
+	if (getuserattr(pw_name, S_AUTHNAME, &authname, SEC_CHAR) != 0)
+		debug("AIX getuserattr S_AUTHNAME: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+	if (authdomain != NULL)
+		xasprintf(&principal, "%s@%s", authname ? authname : pw_name, authdomain);
+	else if (authname != NULL)
+		principal = xstrdup(authname);
+	enduserdb();
+	return principal;
+}
+# endif /* USE_AIX_KRB_NAME */
+
+# if defined(AIX_GETNAMEINFO_HACK) && !defined(BROKEN_ADDRINFO)
+# undef getnameinfo
+/*
+ * For some reason, AIX's getnameinfo will refuse to resolve the all-zeros
+ * IPv6 address into its textual representation ("::"), so we wrap it
+ * with a function that will.
+ */
+int
+sshaix_getnameinfo(const struct sockaddr *sa, size_t salen, char *host,
+    size_t hostlen, char *serv, size_t servlen, int flags)
+{
+	struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6;
+	u_int32_t *a6;
+
+	if (flags & (NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) &&
+	    sa->sa_family == AF_INET6) {
+		sa6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa;
+		a6 = sa6->sin6_addr.u6_addr.u6_addr32;
+
+		if (a6[0] == 0 && a6[1] == 0 && a6[2] == 0 && a6[3] == 0) {
+			strlcpy(host, "::", hostlen);
+			snprintf(serv, servlen, "%d", sa6->sin6_port);
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+	return getnameinfo(sa, salen, host, hostlen, serv, servlen, flags);
+}
+# endif /* AIX_GETNAMEINFO_HACK */
+
+# if defined(USE_GETGRSET)
+#  include <stdlib.h>
+int
+getgrouplist(const char *user, gid_t pgid, gid_t *groups, int *grpcnt)
+{
+	char *cp, *grplist, *grp;
+	gid_t gid;
+	int ret = 0, ngroups = 0, maxgroups;
+	long l;
+
+	maxgroups = *grpcnt;
+
+	if ((cp = grplist = getgrset(user)) == NULL)
+		return -1;
+
+	/* handle zero-length case */
+	if (maxgroups <= 0) {
+		*grpcnt = 0;
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* copy primary group */
+	groups[ngroups++] = pgid;
+
+	/* copy each entry from getgrset into group list */
+	while ((grp = strsep(&grplist, ",")) != NULL) {
+		l = strtol(grp, NULL, 10);
+		if (ngroups >= maxgroups || l == LONG_MIN || l == LONG_MAX) {
+			ret = -1;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		gid = (gid_t)l;
+		if (gid == pgid)
+			continue;	/* we have already added primary gid */
+		groups[ngroups++] = gid;
+	}
+out:
+	free(cp);
+	*grpcnt = ngroups;
+	return ret;
+}
+# endif	/* USE_GETGRSET */
+
+#endif /* _AIX */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/port-aix.h b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/port-aix.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..53e4e88a0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/port-aix.h
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+/* $Id: port-aix.h,v 1.32 2009/12/20 23:49:22 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Gert Doering.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004,2005,2006 Darren Tucker.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifdef _AIX
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H
+# include <sys/socket.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "buffer.h"
+
+/* These should be in the system headers but are not. */
+int usrinfo(int, char *, int);
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_SETAUTHDB) && (HAVE_DECL_SETAUTHDB == 0)
+int setauthdb(const char *, char *);
+#endif
+/* these may or may not be in the headers depending on the version */
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_AUTHENTICATE) && (HAVE_DECL_AUTHENTICATE == 0)
+int authenticate(char *, char *, int *, char **);
+#endif
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_LOGINFAILED) && (HAVE_DECL_LOGINFAILED == 0)
+int loginfailed(char *, char *, char *);
+#endif
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_LOGINRESTRICTIONS) && (HAVE_DECL_LOGINRESTRICTIONS == 0)
+int loginrestrictions(char *, int, char *, char **);
+#endif
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_LOGINSUCCESS) && (HAVE_DECL_LOGINSUCCESS == 0)
+int loginsuccess(char *, char *, char *, char **);
+#endif
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_PASSWDEXPIRED) && (HAVE_DECL_PASSWDEXPIRED == 0)
+int passwdexpired(char *, char **);
+#endif
+
+/* Some versions define r_type in the above headers, which causes a conflict */
+#ifdef r_type
+# undef r_type
+#endif
+
+/* AIX 4.2.x doesn't have nanosleep but does have nsleep which is equivalent */
+#if !defined(HAVE_NANOSLEEP) && defined(HAVE_NSLEEP)
+# define nanosleep(a,b) nsleep(a,b)
+#endif
+
+/* For struct timespec on AIX 4.2.x */
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIMERS_H
+# include <sys/timers.h>
+#endif
+
+/* for setpcred and friends */
+#ifdef HAVE_USERSEC_H
+# include <usersec.h>
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * According to the setauthdb man page, AIX password registries must be 15
+ * chars or less plus terminating NUL.
+ */
+#ifdef HAVE_SETAUTHDB
+# define REGISTRY_SIZE	16
+#endif
+
+void aix_usrinfo(struct passwd *);
+
+#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
+# define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_PASSWD 1
+# define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_ALLOWED_USER 1
+int sys_auth_allowed_user(struct passwd *, Buffer *);
+# define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_RECORD_LOGIN 1
+int sys_auth_record_login(const char *, const char *, const char *, Buffer *);
+# define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_GET_LASTLOGIN_MSG
+char *sys_auth_get_lastlogin_msg(const char *, uid_t);
+# define CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN 1
+# if defined(S_AUTHDOMAIN)  && defined (S_AUTHNAME)
+# define USE_AIX_KRB_NAME
+char *aix_krb5_get_principal_name(char *);
+# endif
+#endif
+
+void aix_setauthdb(const char *);
+void aix_restoreauthdb(void);
+void aix_remove_embedded_newlines(char *);
+
+#if defined(AIX_GETNAMEINFO_HACK) && !defined(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO)
+# ifdef getnameinfo
+#  undef getnameinfo
+# endif
+int sshaix_getnameinfo(const struct sockaddr *, size_t, char *, size_t,
+    char *, size_t, int);
+# define getnameinfo(a,b,c,d,e,f,g) (sshaix_getnameinfo(a,b,c,d,e,f,g))
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * We use getgrset in preference to multiple getgrent calls for efficiency
+ * plus it supports NIS and LDAP groups.
+ */
+#if !defined(HAVE_GETGROUPLIST) && defined(HAVE_GETGRSET)
+# define HAVE_GETGROUPLIST
+# define USE_GETGRSET
+int getgrouplist(const char *, gid_t, gid_t *, int *);
+#endif
+
+#endif /* _AIX */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/port-irix.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/port-irix.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ba751a538
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/port-irix.c
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Denis Parker.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Michael Stone.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if defined(WITH_IRIX_PROJECT) || \
+    defined(WITH_IRIX_JOBS) || \
+    defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY)
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#ifdef WITH_IRIX_PROJECT
+# include <proj.h>
+#endif /* WITH_IRIX_PROJECT */
+#ifdef WITH_IRIX_JOBS
+# include <sys/resource.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef WITH_IRIX_AUDIT
+# include <sat.h>
+#endif /* WITH_IRIX_AUDIT */
+
+void
+irix_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+#ifdef WITH_IRIX_PROJECT
+        prid_t projid;
+#endif
+#ifdef WITH_IRIX_JOBS
+        jid_t jid = 0;
+#elif defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY)
+        int jid = 0;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef WITH_IRIX_JOBS
+        jid = jlimit_startjob(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid, "interactive");
+        if (jid == -1)
+                fatal("Failed to create job container: %.100s",
+                    strerror(errno));
+#endif /* WITH_IRIX_JOBS */
+#ifdef WITH_IRIX_ARRAY
+        /* initialize array session */
+        if (jid == 0  && newarraysess() != 0)
+                fatal("Failed to set up new array session: %.100s",
+                    strerror(errno));
+#endif /* WITH_IRIX_ARRAY */
+#ifdef WITH_IRIX_PROJECT
+        /* initialize irix project info */
+        if ((projid = getdfltprojuser(pw->pw_name)) == -1) {
+                debug("Failed to get project id, using projid 0");
+                projid = 0;
+        }
+        if (setprid(projid))
+                fatal("Failed to initialize project %d for %s: %.100s",
+                    (int)projid, pw->pw_name, strerror(errno));
+#endif /* WITH_IRIX_PROJECT */
+#ifdef WITH_IRIX_AUDIT
+        if (sysconf(_SC_AUDIT)) {
+                debug("Setting sat id to %d", (int) pw->pw_uid);
+                if (satsetid(pw->pw_uid))
+                        debug("error setting satid: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+        }
+#endif /* WITH_IRIX_AUDIT */
+}
+
+
+#endif /* defined(WITH_IRIX_PROJECT) || defined(WITH_IRIX_JOBS) || defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY) */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/port-irix.h b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/port-irix.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..67c486307
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/port-irix.h
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+/* $Id: port-irix.h,v 1.4 2003/08/29 16:59:52 mouring Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Denis Parker.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Michael Stone.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _PORT_IRIX_H
+#define _PORT_IRIX_H
+
+#if defined(WITH_IRIX_PROJECT) || \
+    defined(WITH_IRIX_JOBS) || \
+    defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY)
+
+void irix_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw);
+
+#endif /* defined(WITH_IRIX_PROJECT) || defined(WITH_IRIX_JOBS) || defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY) */
+
+#endif /* ! _PORT_IRIX_H */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f36999d7a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
@@ -0,0 +1,311 @@
+/* $Id: port-linux.c,v 1.18 2013/06/01 22:07:32 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Daniel Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Linux-specific portability code - just SELinux support at present
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if defined(WITH_SELINUX) || defined(LINUX_OOM_ADJUST)
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "port-linux.h"
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+#include <selinux/selinux.h>
+#include <selinux/flask.h>
+#include <selinux/get_context_list.h>
+
+#ifndef SSH_SELINUX_UNCONFINED_TYPE
+# define SSH_SELINUX_UNCONFINED_TYPE ":unconfined_t:"
+#endif
+
+/* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
+int
+ssh_selinux_enabled(void)
+{
+	static int enabled = -1;
+
+	if (enabled == -1) {
+		enabled = (is_selinux_enabled() == 1);
+		debug("SELinux support %s", enabled ? "enabled" : "disabled");
+	}
+
+	return (enabled);
+}
+
+/* Return the default security context for the given username */
+static security_context_t
+ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
+{
+	security_context_t sc = NULL;
+	char *sename = NULL, *lvl = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
+	if (getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl) != 0)
+		return NULL;
+#else
+	sename = pwname;
+	lvl = NULL;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
+	r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, &sc);
+#else
+	r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, &sc);
+#endif
+
+	if (r != 0) {
+		switch (security_getenforce()) {
+		case -1:
+			fatal("%s: ssh_selinux_getctxbyname: "
+			    "security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
+		case 0:
+			error("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security "
+			    "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
+			sc = NULL;
+			break;
+		default:
+			fatal("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security "
+			    "context for %s (in enforcing mode)",
+			    __func__, pwname);
+		}
+	}
+
+#ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
+	free(sename);
+	free(lvl);
+#endif
+
+	return sc;
+}
+
+/* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
+void
+ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
+{
+	security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
+
+	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
+		return;
+
+	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
+
+	user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
+	if (setexeccon(user_ctx) != 0) {
+		switch (security_getenforce()) {
+		case -1:
+			fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
+		case 0:
+			error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution "
+			    "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
+			break;
+		default:
+			fatal("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context "
+			    "for %s (in enforcing mode)", __func__, pwname);
+		}
+	}
+	if (user_ctx != NULL)
+		freecon(user_ctx);
+
+	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
+}
+
+/* Set the TTY context for the specified user */
+void
+ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty)
+{
+	security_context_t new_tty_ctx = NULL;
+	security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
+	security_context_t old_tty_ctx = NULL;
+
+	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
+		return;
+
+	debug3("%s: setting TTY context on %s", __func__, tty);
+
+	user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
+
+	/* XXX: should these calls fatal() upon failure in enforcing mode? */
+
+	if (getfilecon(tty, &old_tty_ctx) == -1) {
+		error("%s: getfilecon: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (security_compute_relabel(user_ctx, old_tty_ctx,
+	    SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, &new_tty_ctx) != 0) {
+		error("%s: security_compute_relabel: %s",
+		    __func__, strerror(errno));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (setfilecon(tty, new_tty_ctx) != 0)
+		error("%s: setfilecon: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ out:
+	if (new_tty_ctx != NULL)
+		freecon(new_tty_ctx);
+	if (old_tty_ctx != NULL)
+		freecon(old_tty_ctx);
+	if (user_ctx != NULL)
+		freecon(user_ctx);
+	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
+}
+
+void
+ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *newname)
+{
+	int len, newlen;
+	char *oldctx, *newctx, *cx;
+	void (*switchlog) (const char *fmt,...) = logit;
+
+	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
+		return;
+
+	if (getcon((security_context_t *)&oldctx) < 0) {
+		logit("%s: getcon failed with %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		return;
+	}
+	if ((cx = index(oldctx, ':')) == NULL || (cx = index(cx + 1, ':')) ==
+	    NULL) {
+		logit ("%s: unparseable context %s", __func__, oldctx);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Check whether we are attempting to switch away from an unconfined
+	 * security context.
+	 */
+	if (strncmp(cx, SSH_SELINUX_UNCONFINED_TYPE,
+	    sizeof(SSH_SELINUX_UNCONFINED_TYPE) - 1) == 0)
+		switchlog = debug3;
+
+	newlen = strlen(oldctx) + strlen(newname) + 1;
+	newctx = xmalloc(newlen);
+	len = cx - oldctx + 1;
+	memcpy(newctx, oldctx, len);
+	strlcpy(newctx + len, newname, newlen - len);
+	if ((cx = index(cx + 1, ':')))
+		strlcat(newctx, cx, newlen);
+	debug3("%s: setting context from '%s' to '%s'", __func__,
+	    oldctx, newctx);
+	if (setcon(newctx) < 0)
+		switchlog("%s: setcon %s from %s failed with %s", __func__,
+		    newctx, oldctx, strerror(errno));
+	free(oldctx);
+	free(newctx);
+}
+
+void
+ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *path)
+{
+	security_context_t context;
+
+	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
+		return;
+	if (path == NULL) {
+		setfscreatecon(NULL);
+		return;
+	}
+	if (matchpathcon(path, 0700, &context) == 0)
+		setfscreatecon(context);
+}
+
+#endif /* WITH_SELINUX */
+
+#ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
+/*
+ * The magic "don't kill me" values, old and new, as documented in eg:
+ * http://lxr.linux.no/#linux+v2.6.32/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt
+ * http://lxr.linux.no/#linux+v2.6.36/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt
+ */
+
+static int oom_adj_save = INT_MIN;
+static char *oom_adj_path = NULL;
+struct {
+	char *path;
+	int value;
+} oom_adjust[] = {
+	{"/proc/self/oom_score_adj", -1000},	/* kernels >= 2.6.36 */
+	{"/proc/self/oom_adj", -17},		/* kernels <= 2.6.35 */
+	{NULL, 0},
+};
+
+/*
+ * Tell the kernel's out-of-memory killer to avoid sshd.
+ * Returns the previous oom_adj value or zero.
+ */
+void
+oom_adjust_setup(void)
+{
+	int i, value;
+	FILE *fp;
+
+	debug3("%s", __func__);
+	 for (i = 0; oom_adjust[i].path != NULL; i++) {
+		oom_adj_path = oom_adjust[i].path;
+		value = oom_adjust[i].value;
+		if ((fp = fopen(oom_adj_path, "r+")) != NULL) {
+			if (fscanf(fp, "%d", &oom_adj_save) != 1)
+				verbose("error reading %s: %s", oom_adj_path,
+				    strerror(errno));
+			else {
+				rewind(fp);
+				if (fprintf(fp, "%d\n", value) <= 0)
+					verbose("error writing %s: %s",
+					   oom_adj_path, strerror(errno));
+				else
+					debug("Set %s from %d to %d",
+					   oom_adj_path, oom_adj_save, value);
+			}
+			fclose(fp);
+			return;
+		}
+	}
+	oom_adj_path = NULL;
+}
+
+/* Restore the saved OOM adjustment */
+void
+oom_adjust_restore(void)
+{
+	FILE *fp;
+
+	debug3("%s", __func__);
+	if (oom_adj_save == INT_MIN || oom_adj_path == NULL ||
+	    (fp = fopen(oom_adj_path, "w")) == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	if (fprintf(fp, "%d\n", oom_adj_save) <= 0)
+		verbose("error writing %s: %s", oom_adj_path, strerror(errno));
+	else
+		debug("Set %s to %d", oom_adj_path, oom_adj_save);
+
+	fclose(fp);
+	return;
+}
+#endif /* LINUX_OOM_ADJUST */
+#endif /* WITH_SELINUX || LINUX_OOM_ADJUST */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e3d1004aa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+/* $Id: port-linux.h,v 1.5 2011/01/25 01:16:18 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _PORT_LINUX_H
+#define _PORT_LINUX_H
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+int ssh_selinux_enabled(void);
+void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
+void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
+void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
+void oom_adjust_restore(void);
+void oom_adjust_setup(void);
+#endif
+
+#endif /* ! _PORT_LINUX_H */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..25382f1c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.c
@@ -0,0 +1,229 @@
+/* $Id: port-solaris.c,v 1.4 2010/11/05 01:03:05 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 Chad Mynhier.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "config.h"
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
+# include <fcntl.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include <libcontract.h>
+#include <sys/contract/process.h>
+#include <sys/ctfs.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+
+#define CT_TEMPLATE	CTFS_ROOT "/process/template"
+#define CT_LATEST	CTFS_ROOT "/process/latest"
+
+static int tmpl_fd = -1;
+
+/* Lookup the latest process contract */
+static ctid_t
+get_active_process_contract_id(void)
+{
+	int stat_fd;
+	ctid_t ctid = -1;
+	ct_stathdl_t stathdl;
+
+	if ((stat_fd = open64(CT_LATEST, O_RDONLY)) == -1) {
+		error("%s: Error opening 'latest' process "
+		    "contract: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (ct_status_read(stat_fd, CTD_COMMON, &stathdl) != 0) {
+		error("%s: Error reading process contract "
+		    "status: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((ctid = ct_status_get_id(stathdl)) < 0) {
+		error("%s: Error getting process contract id: %s",
+		    __func__, strerror(errno));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ct_status_free(stathdl);
+ out:
+	close(stat_fd);
+	return ctid;
+}
+
+void
+solaris_contract_pre_fork(void)
+{
+	if ((tmpl_fd = open64(CT_TEMPLATE, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
+		error("%s: open %s: %s", __func__,
+		    CT_TEMPLATE, strerror(errno));
+		return;
+	}
+
+	debug2("%s: setting up process contract template on fd %d",
+	    __func__, tmpl_fd);
+
+	/* First we set the template parameters and event sets. */
+	if (ct_pr_tmpl_set_param(tmpl_fd, CT_PR_PGRPONLY) != 0) {
+		error("%s: Error setting process contract parameter set "
+		    "(pgrponly): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	if (ct_pr_tmpl_set_fatal(tmpl_fd, CT_PR_EV_HWERR) != 0) {
+		error("%s: Error setting process contract template "
+		    "fatal events: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	if (ct_tmpl_set_critical(tmpl_fd, 0) != 0) {
+		error("%s: Error setting process contract template "
+		    "critical events: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	if (ct_tmpl_set_informative(tmpl_fd, CT_PR_EV_HWERR) != 0) {
+		error("%s: Error setting process contract template "
+		    "informative events: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	/* Now make this the active template for this process. */
+	if (ct_tmpl_activate(tmpl_fd) != 0) {
+		error("%s: Error activating process contract "
+		    "template: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	return;
+
+ fail:
+	if (tmpl_fd != -1) {
+		close(tmpl_fd);
+		tmpl_fd = -1;
+	}
+}
+
+void
+solaris_contract_post_fork_child()
+{
+	debug2("%s: clearing process contract template on fd %d",
+	    __func__, tmpl_fd);
+
+	/* Clear the active template. */
+	if (ct_tmpl_clear(tmpl_fd) != 0)
+		error("%s: Error clearing active process contract "
+		    "template: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+
+	close(tmpl_fd);
+	tmpl_fd = -1;
+}
+
+void
+solaris_contract_post_fork_parent(pid_t pid)
+{
+	ctid_t ctid;
+	char ctl_path[256];
+	int r, ctl_fd = -1, stat_fd = -1;
+
+	debug2("%s: clearing template (fd %d)", __func__, tmpl_fd);
+
+	if (tmpl_fd == -1)
+		return;
+
+	/* First clear the active template. */
+	if ((r = ct_tmpl_clear(tmpl_fd)) != 0)
+		error("%s: Error clearing active process contract "
+		    "template: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+
+	close(tmpl_fd);
+	tmpl_fd = -1;
+
+	/*
+	 * If either the fork didn't succeed (pid < 0), or clearing
+	 * th active contract failed (r != 0), then we have nothing
+	 * more do.
+	 */
+	if (r != 0 || pid <= 0)
+		return;
+
+	/* Now lookup and abandon the contract we've created. */
+	ctid = get_active_process_contract_id();
+
+	debug2("%s: abandoning contract id %ld", __func__, ctid);
+
+	snprintf(ctl_path, sizeof(ctl_path),
+	    CTFS_ROOT "/process/%ld/ctl", ctid);
+	if ((ctl_fd = open64(ctl_path, O_WRONLY)) < 0) {
+		error("%s: Error opening process contract "
+		    "ctl file: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	if (ct_ctl_abandon(ctl_fd) < 0) {
+		error("%s: Error abandoning process contract: %s",
+		    __func__, strerror(errno));
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	close(ctl_fd);
+	return;
+
+ fail:
+	if (tmpl_fd != -1) {
+		close(tmpl_fd);
+		tmpl_fd = -1;
+	}
+	if (stat_fd != -1)
+		close(stat_fd);
+	if (ctl_fd != -1)
+		close(ctl_fd);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS
+#include <sys/task.h>
+#include <project.h>
+
+/*
+ * Get/set solaris default project.
+ * If we fail, just run along gracefully.
+ */
+void
+solaris_set_default_project(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+	struct project  *defaultproject;
+	struct project   tempproject;
+	char buf[1024];
+
+	/* get default project, if we fail just return gracefully  */
+	if ((defaultproject = getdefaultproj(pw->pw_name, &tempproject, &buf,
+	    sizeof(buf))) > 0) {
+		/* set default project */
+		if (setproject(defaultproject->pj_name, pw->pw_name,
+		    TASK_NORMAL) != 0)
+			debug("setproject(%s): %s", defaultproject->pj_name,
+			    strerror(errno));
+	} else {
+		/* debug on getdefaultproj() error */
+		debug("getdefaultproj(%s): %s", pw->pw_name, strerror(errno));
+	}
+}
+#endif /* USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cd442e78b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+/* $Id: port-solaris.h,v 1.2 2010/11/05 01:03:05 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 Chad Mynhier.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _PORT_SOLARIS_H
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <pwd.h>
+
+void solaris_contract_pre_fork(void);
+void solaris_contract_post_fork_child(void);
+void solaris_contract_post_fork_parent(pid_t pid);
+void solaris_set_default_project(struct passwd *);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/port-tun.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/port-tun.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..49e7b4d99
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/port-tun.c
@@ -0,0 +1,282 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Reyk Floeter <reyk@openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <netinet/ip.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+
+/*
+ * This is the portable version of the SSH tunnel forwarding, it
+ * uses some preprocessor definitions for various platform-specific
+ * settings.
+ *
+ * SSH_TUN_LINUX	Use the (newer) Linux tun/tap device
+ * SSH_TUN_FREEBSD	Use the FreeBSD tun/tap device
+ * SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF	Translate the OpenBSD address family
+ * SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF	Prepend/remove the address family
+ */
+
+/*
+ * System-specific tunnel open function
+ */
+
+#if defined(SSH_TUN_LINUX)
+#include <linux/if.h>
+#include <linux/if_tun.h>
+
+int
+sys_tun_open(int tun, int mode)
+{
+	struct ifreq ifr;
+	int fd = -1;
+	const char *name = NULL;
+
+	if ((fd = open("/dev/net/tun", O_RDWR)) == -1) {
+		debug("%s: failed to open tunnel control interface: %s",
+		    __func__, strerror(errno));
+		return (-1);
+	}
+
+	bzero(&ifr, sizeof(ifr));	
+
+	if (mode == SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET) {
+		ifr.ifr_flags = IFF_TAP;
+		name = "tap%d";
+	} else {
+		ifr.ifr_flags = IFF_TUN;
+		name = "tun%d";
+	}
+	ifr.ifr_flags |= IFF_NO_PI;
+
+	if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY) {
+		if (tun > SSH_TUNID_MAX) {
+			debug("%s: invalid tunnel id %x: %s", __func__,
+			    tun, strerror(errno));
+			goto failed;
+		}
+		snprintf(ifr.ifr_name, sizeof(ifr.ifr_name), name, tun);
+	}
+
+	if (ioctl(fd, TUNSETIFF, &ifr) == -1) {
+		debug("%s: failed to configure tunnel (mode %d): %s", __func__,
+		    mode, strerror(errno));
+		goto failed;
+	}
+
+	if (tun == SSH_TUNID_ANY)
+		debug("%s: tunnel mode %d fd %d", __func__, mode, fd);
+	else
+		debug("%s: %s mode %d fd %d", __func__, ifr.ifr_name, mode, fd);
+
+	return (fd);
+
+ failed:
+	close(fd);
+	return (-1);
+}
+#endif /* SSH_TUN_LINUX */
+
+#ifdef SSH_TUN_FREEBSD
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <net/if.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_NET_IF_TUN_H
+#include <net/if_tun.h>
+#endif
+
+int
+sys_tun_open(int tun, int mode)
+{
+	struct ifreq ifr;
+	char name[100];
+	int fd = -1, sock, flag;
+	const char *tunbase = "tun";
+
+	if (mode == SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET) {
+#ifdef SSH_TUN_NO_L2
+		debug("%s: no layer 2 tunnelling support", __func__);
+		return (-1);
+#else
+		tunbase = "tap";
+#endif
+	}
+
+	/* Open the tunnel device */
+	if (tun <= SSH_TUNID_MAX) {
+		snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "/dev/%s%d", tunbase, tun);
+		fd = open(name, O_RDWR);
+	} else if (tun == SSH_TUNID_ANY) {
+		for (tun = 100; tun >= 0; tun--) {
+			snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "/dev/%s%d",
+			    tunbase, tun);
+			if ((fd = open(name, O_RDWR)) >= 0)
+				break;
+		}
+	} else {
+		debug("%s: invalid tunnel %u\n", __func__, tun);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+
+	if (fd < 0) {
+		debug("%s: %s open failed: %s", __func__, name,
+		    strerror(errno));
+		return (-1);
+	}
+
+	/* Turn on tunnel headers */
+	flag = 1;
+#if defined(TUNSIFHEAD) && !defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF)
+	if (mode != SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET &&
+	    ioctl(fd, TUNSIFHEAD, &flag) == -1) {
+		debug("%s: ioctl(%d, TUNSIFHEAD, 1): %s", __func__, fd,
+		    strerror(errno));
+		close(fd);
+	}
+#endif
+
+	debug("%s: %s mode %d fd %d", __func__, name, mode, fd);
+
+	/* Set the tunnel device operation mode */
+	snprintf(ifr.ifr_name, sizeof(ifr.ifr_name), "%s%d", tunbase, tun);
+	if ((sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1)
+		goto failed;
+
+	if (ioctl(sock, SIOCGIFFLAGS, &ifr) == -1)
+		goto failed;
+	if ((ifr.ifr_flags & IFF_UP) == 0) {
+		ifr.ifr_flags |= IFF_UP;
+		if (ioctl(sock, SIOCSIFFLAGS, &ifr) == -1)
+			goto failed;
+	}
+
+	close(sock);
+	return (fd);
+
+ failed:
+	if (fd >= 0)
+		close(fd);
+	if (sock >= 0)
+		close(sock);
+	debug("%s: failed to set %s mode %d: %s", __func__, name,
+	    mode, strerror(errno));
+	return (-1);
+}
+#endif /* SSH_TUN_FREEBSD */
+
+/*
+ * System-specific channel filters
+ */
+
+#if defined(SSH_TUN_FILTER)
+#define OPENBSD_AF_INET		2
+#define OPENBSD_AF_INET6	24
+
+int
+sys_tun_infilter(struct Channel *c, char *buf, int len)
+{
+#if defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF)
+	char rbuf[CHAN_RBUF];
+	struct ip *iph;
+#endif
+	u_int32_t *af;
+	char *ptr = buf;
+	int r;
+
+#if defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF)
+	if (len <= 0 || len > (int)(sizeof(rbuf) - sizeof(*af)))
+		return (-1);
+	ptr = (char *)&rbuf[0];
+	bcopy(buf, ptr + sizeof(u_int32_t), len);
+	len += sizeof(u_int32_t);
+	af = (u_int32_t *)ptr;
+
+	iph = (struct ip *)(ptr + sizeof(u_int32_t));
+	switch (iph->ip_v) {
+	case 6:
+		*af = AF_INET6;
+		break;
+	case 4:
+	default:
+		*af = AF_INET;
+		break;
+	}
+#endif
+
+#if defined(SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF)
+	if (len < (int)sizeof(u_int32_t))
+		return (-1);
+
+	af = (u_int32_t *)ptr;
+	if (*af == htonl(AF_INET6))
+		*af = htonl(OPENBSD_AF_INET6);
+	else
+		*af = htonl(OPENBSD_AF_INET);
+#endif
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(&c->input, ptr, len)) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+	return (0);
+}
+
+u_char *
+sys_tun_outfilter(struct Channel *c, u_char **data, u_int *dlen)
+{
+	u_char *buf;
+	u_int32_t *af;
+	int r;
+	size_t xxx_dlen;
+
+	/* XXX new API is incompatible with this signature. */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(&c->output, data, &xxx_dlen)) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+	if (dlen != NULL)
+		*dlen = xxx_dlen;
+	if (*dlen < sizeof(*af))
+		return (NULL);
+	buf = *data;
+
+#if defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF)
+	*dlen -= sizeof(u_int32_t);
+	buf = *data + sizeof(u_int32_t);
+#elif defined(SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF)
+	af = ntohl(*(u_int32_t *)buf);
+	if (*af == OPENBSD_AF_INET6)
+		*af = htonl(AF_INET6);
+	else
+		*af = htonl(AF_INET);
+#endif
+
+	return (buf);
+}
+#endif /* SSH_TUN_FILTER */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/port-tun.h b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/port-tun.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c53df01fc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/port-tun.h
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Reyk Floeter <reyk@openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _PORT_TUN_H
+#define _PORT_TUN_H
+
+struct Channel;
+
+#if defined(SSH_TUN_LINUX) || defined(SSH_TUN_FREEBSD)
+# define CUSTOM_SYS_TUN_OPEN
+int	  sys_tun_open(int, int);
+#endif
+
+#if defined(SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF) || defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF)
+# define SSH_TUN_FILTER
+int	 sys_tun_infilter(struct Channel *, char *, int);
+u_char	*sys_tun_outfilter(struct Channel *, u_char **, u_int *);
+#endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/port-uw.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/port-uw.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..db24dbb94
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/port-uw.c
@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 The SCO Group. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Tim Rice. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF)  &&  !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_H
+# include <crypt.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"	/* servconf.h needs misc.h for struct ForwardOptions */
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+
+int nischeck(char *);
+
+int
+sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+{
+	struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
+	char *salt;
+	int result;
+
+	/* Just use the supplied fake password if authctxt is invalid */
+	char *pw_password = authctxt->valid ? shadow_pw(pw) : pw->pw_passwd;
+
+	/* Check for users with no password. */
+	if (strcmp(pw_password, "") == 0 && strcmp(password, "") == 0)
+		return (1);
+
+	/* Encrypt the candidate password using the proper salt. */
+	salt = (pw_password[0] && pw_password[1]) ? pw_password : "xx";
+
+	/*
+	 * Authentication is accepted if the encrypted passwords
+	 * are identical.
+	 */
+#ifdef UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS
+	if (!nischeck(pw->pw_name)) {
+		result = ((strcmp(bigcrypt(password, salt), pw_password) == 0)
+		||  (strcmp(osr5bigcrypt(password, salt), pw_password) == 0));
+	}
+	else
+#endif /* UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS */
+		result = (strcmp(xcrypt(password, salt), pw_password) == 0);
+
+#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
+	if (authctxt->valid)
+		free(pw_password);
+#endif
+	return(result);
+}
+
+#ifdef UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS
+int
+nischeck(char *namep)
+{
+	char password_file[] = "/etc/passwd";
+	FILE *fd;
+	struct passwd *ent = NULL;
+
+	if ((fd = fopen (password_file, "r")) == NULL) {
+		/*
+		 * If the passwd file has dissapeared we are in a bad state.
+		 * However, returning 0 will send us back through the
+		 * authentication scheme that has checked the ia database for
+		 * passwords earlier.
+		 */
+		return(0);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * fgetpwent() only reads from password file, so we know for certain
+	 * that the user is local.
+	 */
+	while (ent = fgetpwent(fd)) {
+		if (strcmp (ent->pw_name, namep) == 0) {
+			/* Local user */
+			fclose (fd);
+			return(0);
+		}
+	}
+
+	fclose (fd);
+	return (1);
+}
+
+#endif /* UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS */
+
+/*
+	NOTE: ia_get_logpwd() allocates memory for arg 2
+	functions that call shadow_pw() will need to free
+ */
+
+#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
+char *
+get_iaf_password(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+	char *pw_password = NULL;
+
+	uinfo_t uinfo;
+	if (!ia_openinfo(pw->pw_name,&uinfo)) {
+		ia_get_logpwd(uinfo, &pw_password);
+		if (pw_password == NULL)
+			fatal("ia_get_logpwd: Unable to get the shadow passwd");
+		ia_closeinfo(uinfo);
+	 	return pw_password;
+	}
+	else
+		fatal("ia_openinfo: Unable to open the shadow passwd file");
+}
+#endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
+#endif /* HAVE_LIBIAF and not HAVE_SECUREWARE */
+
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/port-uw.h b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/port-uw.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..263d8b5a7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/port-uw.h
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Tim Rice.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
+char * get_iaf_password(struct passwd *pw);
+#endif
+
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/pwcache.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/pwcache.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5a8b78801
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/pwcache.c
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: pwcache.c,v 1.9 2005/08/08 08:05:34 espie Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1989, 1993
+ *	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/pwcache.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <grp.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#define	NCACHE	64			/* power of 2 */
+#define	MASK	(NCACHE - 1)		/* bits to store with */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_USER_FROM_UID
+char *
+user_from_uid(uid_t uid, int nouser)
+{
+	static struct ncache {
+		uid_t	uid;
+		char	*name;
+	} c_uid[NCACHE];
+	static int pwopen;
+	static char nbuf[15];		/* 32 bits == 10 digits */
+	struct passwd *pw;
+	struct ncache *cp;
+
+	cp = c_uid + (uid & MASK);
+	if (cp->uid != uid || cp->name == NULL) {
+		if (pwopen == 0) {
+#ifdef HAVE_SETPASSENT
+			setpassent(1);
+#endif
+			pwopen = 1;
+		}
+		if ((pw = getpwuid(uid)) == NULL) {
+			if (nouser)
+				return (NULL);
+			(void)snprintf(nbuf, sizeof(nbuf), "%u", uid);
+		}
+		cp->uid = uid;
+		if (cp->name != NULL)
+			free(cp->name);
+		cp->name = strdup(pw ? pw->pw_name : nbuf);
+	}
+	return (cp->name);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GROUP_FROM_GID
+char *
+group_from_gid(gid_t gid, int nogroup)
+{
+	static struct ncache {
+		gid_t	gid;
+		char	*name;
+	} c_gid[NCACHE];
+	static int gropen;
+	static char nbuf[15];		/* 32 bits == 10 digits */
+	struct group *gr;
+	struct ncache *cp;
+
+	cp = c_gid + (gid & MASK);
+	if (cp->gid != gid || cp->name == NULL) {
+		if (gropen == 0) {
+#ifdef HAVE_SETGROUPENT
+			setgroupent(1);
+#endif
+			gropen = 1;
+		}
+		if ((gr = getgrgid(gid)) == NULL) {
+			if (nogroup)
+				return (NULL);
+			(void)snprintf(nbuf, sizeof(nbuf), "%u", gid);
+		}
+		cp->gid = gid;
+		if (cp->name != NULL)
+			free(cp->name);
+		cp->name = strdup(gr ? gr->gr_name : nbuf);
+	}
+	return (cp->name);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d63cdf2f0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.c
@@ -0,0 +1,213 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: readpassphrase.c,v 1.22 2010/01/13 10:20:54 dtucker Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2002, 2007 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ *
+ * Sponsored in part by the Defense Advanced Research Projects
+ * Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force
+ * Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F39502-99-1-0512.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/readpassphrase.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_READPASSPHRASE
+
+#include <termios.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <readpassphrase.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#ifdef TCSASOFT
+# define _T_FLUSH	(TCSAFLUSH|TCSASOFT)
+#else
+# define _T_FLUSH	(TCSAFLUSH)
+#endif
+
+/* SunOS 4.x which lacks _POSIX_VDISABLE, but has VDISABLE */
+#if !defined(_POSIX_VDISABLE) && defined(VDISABLE)
+#  define _POSIX_VDISABLE       VDISABLE
+#endif
+
+#ifndef _NSIG
+# ifdef NSIG
+#  define _NSIG NSIG
+# else
+#  define _NSIG 128
+# endif
+#endif
+
+static volatile sig_atomic_t signo[_NSIG];
+
+static void handler(int);
+
+char *
+readpassphrase(const char *prompt, char *buf, size_t bufsiz, int flags)
+{
+	ssize_t nr;
+	int input, output, save_errno, i, need_restart;
+	char ch, *p, *end;
+	struct termios term, oterm;
+	struct sigaction sa, savealrm, saveint, savehup, savequit, saveterm;
+	struct sigaction savetstp, savettin, savettou, savepipe;
+
+	/* I suppose we could alloc on demand in this case (XXX). */
+	if (bufsiz == 0) {
+		errno = EINVAL;
+		return(NULL);
+	}
+
+restart:
+	for (i = 0; i < _NSIG; i++)
+		signo[i] = 0;
+	nr = -1;
+	save_errno = 0;
+	need_restart = 0;
+	/*
+	 * Read and write to /dev/tty if available.  If not, read from
+	 * stdin and write to stderr unless a tty is required.
+	 */
+	if ((flags & RPP_STDIN) ||
+	    (input = output = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
+		if (flags & RPP_REQUIRE_TTY) {
+			errno = ENOTTY;
+			return(NULL);
+		}
+		input = STDIN_FILENO;
+		output = STDERR_FILENO;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Catch signals that would otherwise cause the user to end
+	 * up with echo turned off in the shell.  Don't worry about
+	 * things like SIGXCPU and SIGVTALRM for now.
+	 */
+	sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask);
+	sa.sa_flags = 0;		/* don't restart system calls */
+	sa.sa_handler = handler;
+	(void)sigaction(SIGALRM, &sa, &savealrm);
+	(void)sigaction(SIGHUP, &sa, &savehup);
+	(void)sigaction(SIGINT, &sa, &saveint);
+	(void)sigaction(SIGPIPE, &sa, &savepipe);
+	(void)sigaction(SIGQUIT, &sa, &savequit);
+	(void)sigaction(SIGTERM, &sa, &saveterm);
+	(void)sigaction(SIGTSTP, &sa, &savetstp);
+	(void)sigaction(SIGTTIN, &sa, &savettin);
+	(void)sigaction(SIGTTOU, &sa, &savettou);
+
+	/* Turn off echo if possible. */
+	if (input != STDIN_FILENO && tcgetattr(input, &oterm) == 0) {
+		memcpy(&term, &oterm, sizeof(term));
+		if (!(flags & RPP_ECHO_ON))
+			term.c_lflag &= ~(ECHO | ECHONL);
+#ifdef VSTATUS
+		if (term.c_cc[VSTATUS] != _POSIX_VDISABLE)
+			term.c_cc[VSTATUS] = _POSIX_VDISABLE;
+#endif
+		(void)tcsetattr(input, _T_FLUSH, &term);
+	} else {
+		memset(&term, 0, sizeof(term));
+		term.c_lflag |= ECHO;
+		memset(&oterm, 0, sizeof(oterm));
+		oterm.c_lflag |= ECHO;
+	}
+
+	/* No I/O if we are already backgrounded. */
+	if (signo[SIGTTOU] != 1 && signo[SIGTTIN] != 1) {
+		if (!(flags & RPP_STDIN))
+			(void)write(output, prompt, strlen(prompt));
+		end = buf + bufsiz - 1;
+		p = buf;
+		while ((nr = read(input, &ch, 1)) == 1 && ch != '\n' && ch != '\r') {
+			if (p < end) {
+				if ((flags & RPP_SEVENBIT))
+					ch &= 0x7f;
+				if (isalpha(ch)) {
+					if ((flags & RPP_FORCELOWER))
+						ch = (char)tolower(ch);
+					if ((flags & RPP_FORCEUPPER))
+						ch = (char)toupper(ch);
+				}
+				*p++ = ch;
+			}
+		}
+		*p = '\0';
+		save_errno = errno;
+		if (!(term.c_lflag & ECHO))
+			(void)write(output, "\n", 1);
+	}
+
+	/* Restore old terminal settings and signals. */
+	if (memcmp(&term, &oterm, sizeof(term)) != 0) {
+		while (tcsetattr(input, _T_FLUSH, &oterm) == -1 &&
+		    errno == EINTR)
+			continue;
+	}
+	(void)sigaction(SIGALRM, &savealrm, NULL);
+	(void)sigaction(SIGHUP, &savehup, NULL);
+	(void)sigaction(SIGINT, &saveint, NULL);
+	(void)sigaction(SIGQUIT, &savequit, NULL);
+	(void)sigaction(SIGPIPE, &savepipe, NULL);
+	(void)sigaction(SIGTERM, &saveterm, NULL);
+	(void)sigaction(SIGTSTP, &savetstp, NULL);
+	(void)sigaction(SIGTTIN, &savettin, NULL);
+	(void)sigaction(SIGTTOU, &savettou, NULL);
+	if (input != STDIN_FILENO)
+		(void)close(input);
+
+	/*
+	 * If we were interrupted by a signal, resend it to ourselves
+	 * now that we have restored the signal handlers.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < _NSIG; i++) {
+		if (signo[i]) {
+			kill(getpid(), i);
+			switch (i) {
+			case SIGTSTP:
+			case SIGTTIN:
+			case SIGTTOU:
+				need_restart = 1;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if (need_restart)
+		goto restart;
+
+	if (save_errno)
+		errno = save_errno;
+	return(nr == -1 ? NULL : buf);
+}
+
+#if 0
+char *
+getpass(const char *prompt)
+{
+	static char buf[_PASSWORD_LEN + 1];
+
+	return(readpassphrase(prompt, buf, sizeof(buf), RPP_ECHO_OFF));
+}
+#endif
+
+static void handler(int s)
+{
+
+	signo[s] = 1;
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_READPASSPHRASE */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5fd7c5d77
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: readpassphrase.h,v 1.5 2003/06/17 21:56:23 millert Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2002 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ *
+ * Sponsored in part by the Defense Advanced Research Projects
+ * Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force
+ * Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F39502-99-1-0512.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: include/readpassphrase.h */
+
+#ifndef _READPASSPHRASE_H_
+#define _READPASSPHRASE_H_
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_READPASSPHRASE
+
+#define RPP_ECHO_OFF    0x00		/* Turn off echo (default). */
+#define RPP_ECHO_ON     0x01		/* Leave echo on. */
+#define RPP_REQUIRE_TTY 0x02		/* Fail if there is no tty. */
+#define RPP_FORCELOWER  0x04		/* Force input to lower case. */
+#define RPP_FORCEUPPER  0x08		/* Force input to upper case. */
+#define RPP_SEVENBIT    0x10		/* Strip the high bit from input. */
+#define RPP_STDIN       0x20		/* Read from stdin, not /dev/tty */
+
+char * readpassphrase(const char *, char *, size_t, int);
+
+#endif /* HAVE_READPASSPHRASE */
+
+#endif /* !_READPASSPHRASE_H_ */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/reallocarray.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/reallocarray.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1a52acc62
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/reallocarray.c
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: reallocarray.c,v 1.2 2014/12/08 03:45:00 bcook Exp $	*/
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2008 Otto Moerbeek <otto@drijf.net>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/stdlib/reallocarray.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#ifndef HAVE_REALLOCARRAY
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+/*
+ * This is sqrt(SIZE_MAX+1), as s1*s2 <= SIZE_MAX
+ * if both s1 < MUL_NO_OVERFLOW and s2 < MUL_NO_OVERFLOW
+ */
+#define MUL_NO_OVERFLOW	((size_t)1 << (sizeof(size_t) * 4))
+
+void *
+reallocarray(void *optr, size_t nmemb, size_t size)
+{
+	if ((nmemb >= MUL_NO_OVERFLOW || size >= MUL_NO_OVERFLOW) &&
+	    nmemb > 0 && SIZE_MAX / nmemb < size) {
+		errno = ENOMEM;
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	return realloc(optr, size * nmemb);
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_REALLOCARRAY */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/realpath.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/realpath.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ba4cea938
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/realpath.c
@@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: realpath.c,v 1.13 2005/08/08 08:05:37 espie Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2003 Constantin S. Svintsoff <kostik@iclub.nsu.ru>
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The names of the authors may not be used to endorse or promote
+ *    products derived from this software without specific prior written
+ *    permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/stdlib/realpath.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_REALPATH) || defined(BROKEN_REALPATH)
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+/*
+ * char *realpath(const char *path, char resolved[PATH_MAX]);
+ *
+ * Find the real name of path, by removing all ".", ".." and symlink
+ * components.  Returns (resolved) on success, or (NULL) on failure,
+ * in which case the path which caused trouble is left in (resolved).
+ */
+char *
+realpath(const char *path, char resolved[PATH_MAX])
+{
+	struct stat sb;
+	char *p, *q, *s;
+	size_t left_len, resolved_len;
+	unsigned symlinks;
+	int serrno, slen;
+	char left[PATH_MAX], next_token[PATH_MAX], symlink[PATH_MAX];
+
+	serrno = errno;
+	symlinks = 0;
+	if (path[0] == '/') {
+		resolved[0] = '/';
+		resolved[1] = '\0';
+		if (path[1] == '\0')
+			return (resolved);
+		resolved_len = 1;
+		left_len = strlcpy(left, path + 1, sizeof(left));
+	} else {
+		if (getcwd(resolved, PATH_MAX) == NULL) {
+			strlcpy(resolved, ".", PATH_MAX);
+			return (NULL);
+		}
+		resolved_len = strlen(resolved);
+		left_len = strlcpy(left, path, sizeof(left));
+	}
+	if (left_len >= sizeof(left) || resolved_len >= PATH_MAX) {
+		errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Iterate over path components in `left'.
+	 */
+	while (left_len != 0) {
+		/*
+		 * Extract the next path component and adjust `left'
+		 * and its length.
+		 */
+		p = strchr(left, '/');
+		s = p ? p : left + left_len;
+		if (s - left >= (ptrdiff_t)sizeof(next_token)) {
+			errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+			return (NULL);
+		}
+		memcpy(next_token, left, s - left);
+		next_token[s - left] = '\0';
+		left_len -= s - left;
+		if (p != NULL)
+			memmove(left, s + 1, left_len + 1);
+		if (resolved[resolved_len - 1] != '/') {
+			if (resolved_len + 1 >= PATH_MAX) {
+				errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+				return (NULL);
+			}
+			resolved[resolved_len++] = '/';
+			resolved[resolved_len] = '\0';
+		}
+		if (next_token[0] == '\0')
+			continue;
+		else if (strcmp(next_token, ".") == 0)
+			continue;
+		else if (strcmp(next_token, "..") == 0) {
+			/*
+			 * Strip the last path component except when we have
+			 * single "/"
+			 */
+			if (resolved_len > 1) {
+				resolved[resolved_len - 1] = '\0';
+				q = strrchr(resolved, '/') + 1;
+				*q = '\0';
+				resolved_len = q - resolved;
+			}
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Append the next path component and lstat() it. If
+		 * lstat() fails we still can return successfully if
+		 * there are no more path components left.
+		 */
+		resolved_len = strlcat(resolved, next_token, PATH_MAX);
+		if (resolved_len >= PATH_MAX) {
+			errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+			return (NULL);
+		}
+		if (lstat(resolved, &sb) != 0) {
+			if (errno == ENOENT && p == NULL) {
+				errno = serrno;
+				return (resolved);
+			}
+			return (NULL);
+		}
+		if (S_ISLNK(sb.st_mode)) {
+			if (symlinks++ > MAXSYMLINKS) {
+				errno = ELOOP;
+				return (NULL);
+			}
+			slen = readlink(resolved, symlink, sizeof(symlink) - 1);
+			if (slen < 0)
+				return (NULL);
+			symlink[slen] = '\0';
+			if (symlink[0] == '/') {
+				resolved[1] = 0;
+				resolved_len = 1;
+			} else if (resolved_len > 1) {
+				/* Strip the last path component. */
+				resolved[resolved_len - 1] = '\0';
+				q = strrchr(resolved, '/') + 1;
+				*q = '\0';
+				resolved_len = q - resolved;
+			}
+
+			/*
+			 * If there are any path components left, then
+			 * append them to symlink. The result is placed
+			 * in `left'.
+			 */
+			if (p != NULL) {
+				if (symlink[slen - 1] != '/') {
+					if (slen + 1 >=
+					    (ptrdiff_t)sizeof(symlink)) {
+						errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+						return (NULL);
+					}
+					symlink[slen] = '/';
+					symlink[slen + 1] = 0;
+				}
+				left_len = strlcat(symlink, left, sizeof(left));
+				if (left_len >= sizeof(left)) {
+					errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+					return (NULL);
+				}
+			}
+			left_len = strlcpy(left, symlink, sizeof(left));
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Remove trailing slash except when the resolved pathname
+	 * is a single "/".
+	 */
+	if (resolved_len > 1 && resolved[resolved_len - 1] == '/')
+		resolved[resolved_len - 1] = '\0';
+	return (resolved);
+}
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_REALPATH) || defined(BROKEN_REALPATH) */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/regress/.cvsignore b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/regress/.cvsignore
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..33074f4a3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/regress/.cvsignore
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+Makefile
+snprintftest
+strduptest
+strtonumtest
+closefromtest
+opensslvertest
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6a524e0ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.5 2014/06/17 13:06:08 dtucker Exp $
+
+sysconfdir=${prefix}/etc
+piddir=/var/run
+srcdir=.
+top_srcdir=../..
+
+
+CC=cc
+LD=cc
+CFLAGS=-g -O2 -Qunused-arguments -Wunknown-warning-option -Wall -Wpointer-arith -Wuninitialized -Wsign-compare -Wformat-security -Wsizeof-pointer-memaccess -Wno-pointer-sign -Wno-unused-result -fno-strict-aliasing -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 -ftrapv -fno-builtin-memset -fstack-protector-strong 
+CPPFLAGS=-I. -I.. -I$(srcdir) -I$(srcdir)/..  -DHAVE_CONFIG_H
+EXEEXT=
+LIBCOMPAT=../libopenbsd-compat.a
+LIBS=-lcrypto -lutil -lz 
+LDFLAGS= -Wl,-z,relro -Wl,-z,now -Wl,-z,noexecstack -fstack-protector-strong $(LIBCOMPAT)
+
+TESTPROGS=closefromtest$(EXEEXT) snprintftest$(EXEEXT) strduptest$(EXEEXT) \
+	strtonumtest$(EXEEXT) opensslvertest$(EXEEXT)
+
+all:	t-exec ${OTHERTESTS}
+
+%$(EXEEXT):	%.c $(LIBCOMPAT)
+	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $< $(LIBCOMPAT) $(LIBS)
+
+t-exec:	$(TESTPROGS)
+	@echo running compat regress tests
+	@for TEST in ""$?; do \
+		echo "run test $${TEST}" ... 1>&2; \
+		./$${TEST}$(EXEEXT) || exit $$? ; \
+	done
+	@echo finished compat regress tests
+
+clean:
+	rm -f *.o *.a core $(TESTPROGS) valid.out
+
+distclean: clean
+	rm -f Makefile *~
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile.in b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile.in
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..dabdb0912
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile.in
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.5 2014/06/17 13:06:08 dtucker Exp $
+
+sysconfdir=@sysconfdir@
+piddir=@piddir@
+srcdir=@srcdir@
+top_srcdir=@top_srcdir@
+
+VPATH=@srcdir@
+CC=@CC@
+LD=@LD@
+CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@
+CPPFLAGS=-I. -I.. -I$(srcdir) -I$(srcdir)/.. @CPPFLAGS@ @DEFS@
+EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
+LIBCOMPAT=../libopenbsd-compat.a
+LIBS=@LIBS@
+LDFLAGS=@LDFLAGS@ $(LIBCOMPAT)
+
+TESTPROGS=closefromtest$(EXEEXT) snprintftest$(EXEEXT) strduptest$(EXEEXT) \
+	strtonumtest$(EXEEXT) opensslvertest$(EXEEXT)
+
+all:	t-exec ${OTHERTESTS}
+
+%$(EXEEXT):	%.c $(LIBCOMPAT)
+	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $< $(LIBCOMPAT) $(LIBS)
+
+t-exec:	$(TESTPROGS)
+	@echo running compat regress tests
+	@for TEST in ""$?; do \
+		echo "run test $${TEST}" ... 1>&2; \
+		./$${TEST}$(EXEEXT) || exit $$? ; \
+	done
+	@echo finished compat regress tests
+
+clean:
+	rm -f *.o *.a core $(TESTPROGS) valid.out
+
+distclean: clean
+	rm -f Makefile *~
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/regress/closefromtest.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/regress/closefromtest.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..82ffeb9a7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/regress/closefromtest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 Darren Tucker
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#define NUM_OPENS 10
+
+int closefrom(int);
+
+void
+fail(char *msg)
+{
+	fprintf(stderr, "closefrom: %s\n", msg);
+	exit(1);
+}
+
+int
+main(void)
+{
+	int i, max, fds[NUM_OPENS];
+	char buf[512];
+
+	for (i = 0; i < NUM_OPENS; i++)
+		if ((fds[i] = open("/dev/null", O_RDONLY)) == -1)
+			exit(0);	/* can't test */
+	max = i - 1;
+
+	/* should close last fd only */
+	closefrom(fds[max]);
+	if (close(fds[max]) != -1)
+		fail("failed to close highest fd");
+
+	/* make sure we can still use remaining descriptors */
+	for (i = 0; i < max; i++)
+		if (read(fds[i], buf, sizeof(buf)) == -1)
+			fail("closed descriptors it should not have");
+
+	/* should close all fds */
+	closefrom(fds[0]);
+	for (i = 0; i < NUM_OPENS; i++)
+		if (close(fds[i]) != -1)
+			fail("failed to close from lowest fd");
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5d019b598
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2014 Darren Tucker
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+int ssh_compatible_openssl(long, long);
+
+struct version_test {
+	long headerver;
+	long libver;
+	int result;
+} version_tests[] = {
+	/* built with 0.9.8b release headers */
+	{ 0x0090802fL, 0x0090802fL, 1},	/* exact match */
+	{ 0x0090802fL, 0x0090804fL, 1},	/* newer library fix version: ok */
+	{ 0x0090802fL, 0x0090801fL, 1},	/* older library fix version: ok */
+	{ 0x0090802fL, 0x0090702fL, 0},	/* older library minor version: NO */
+	{ 0x0090802fL, 0x0090902fL, 0},	/* newer library minor version: NO */
+	{ 0x0090802fL, 0x0080802fL, 0},	/* older library major version: NO */
+	{ 0x0090802fL, 0x1000100fL, 0},	/* newer library major version: NO */
+
+	/* built with 1.0.1b release headers */
+	{ 0x1000101fL, 0x1000101fL, 1},/* exact match */
+	{ 0x1000101fL, 0x1000102fL, 1},	/* newer library patch version: ok */
+	{ 0x1000101fL, 0x1000100fL, 1},	/* older library patch version: ok */
+	{ 0x1000101fL, 0x1000201fL, 1},	/* newer library fix version: ok */
+	{ 0x1000101fL, 0x1000001fL, 0},	/* older library fix version: NO */
+	{ 0x1000101fL, 0x1010101fL, 0},	/* newer library minor version: NO */
+	{ 0x1000101fL, 0x0000101fL, 0},	/* older library major version: NO */
+	{ 0x1000101fL, 0x2000101fL, 0},	/* newer library major version: NO */
+};
+
+void
+fail(long hver, long lver, int result)
+{
+	fprintf(stderr, "opensslver: header %lx library %lx != %d \n", hver, lver, result);
+	exit(1);
+}
+
+int
+main(void)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+	int res;
+	long hver, lver;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < sizeof(version_tests) / sizeof(version_tests[0]); i++) {
+		hver = version_tests[i].headerver;
+		lver = version_tests[i].libver;
+		res = version_tests[i].result;
+		if (ssh_compatible_openssl(hver, lver) != res)
+			fail(hver, lver, res);
+	}
+	exit(0);
+}
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/regress/snprintftest.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/regress/snprintftest.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4ca63e180
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/regress/snprintftest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Darren Tucker
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Damien Miller
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#define BUFSZ 2048
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+static int failed = 0;
+
+static void
+fail(const char *m)
+{
+	fprintf(stderr, "snprintftest: %s\n", m);
+	failed = 1;
+}
+
+int x_snprintf(char *str, size_t count, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	size_t ret;
+	va_list ap;
+
+	va_start(ap, fmt);
+	ret = vsnprintf(str, count, fmt, ap);
+	va_end(ap);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int
+main(void)
+{
+	char b[5];
+	char *src;
+
+	snprintf(b,5,"123456789");
+	if (b[4] != '\0')
+		fail("snprintf does not correctly terminate long strings");
+
+	/* check for read overrun on unterminated string */
+	if ((src = malloc(BUFSZ)) == NULL) {
+		fail("malloc failed");
+	} else {
+		memset(src, 'a', BUFSZ);
+		snprintf(b, sizeof(b), "%.*s", 1, src);
+		if (strcmp(b, "a") != 0)
+			fail("failed with length limit '%%.s'");
+	}
+
+	/* check that snprintf and vsnprintf return sane values */
+	if (snprintf(b, 1, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) != 11)
+		fail("snprintf does not return required length");
+	if (x_snprintf(b, 1, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) != 11)
+		fail("vsnprintf does not return required length");
+
+	return failed;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/regress/strduptest.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/regress/strduptest.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7f6d779be
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/regress/strduptest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Darren Tucker
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+static int fail = 0;
+
+void
+test(const char *a)
+{
+	char *b;
+
+	b = strdup(a);
+	if (b == 0) {
+		fail = 1;
+		return;
+	}
+	if (strcmp(a, b) != 0)
+		fail = 1;
+	free(b);
+}
+
+int
+main(void)
+{
+	test("");
+	test("a");
+	test("\0");
+	test("abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz");
+	return fail;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/regress/strtonumtest.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/regress/strtonumtest.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..50ca5bd22
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/regress/strtonumtest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: strtonumtest.c,v 1.1 2004/08/03 20:38:36 otto Exp $	*/
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004 Otto Moerbeek <otto@drijf.net>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: regress/lib/libc/strtonum/strtonumtest.c */
+
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+/* LLONG_MAX is known as LONGLONG_MAX on AIX */
+#if defined(LONGLONG_MAX) && !defined(LLONG_MAX)
+# define LLONG_MAX LONGLONG_MAX
+# define LLONG_MIN LONGLONG_MIN
+#endif
+
+/* LLONG_MAX is known as LONG_LONG_MAX on HP-UX */
+#if defined(LONG_LONG_MAX) && !defined(LLONG_MAX)
+# define LLONG_MAX LONG_LONG_MAX
+# define LLONG_MIN LONG_LONG_MIN
+#endif
+
+long long strtonum(const char *, long long, long long, const char **);
+
+int fail;
+
+void
+test(const char *p, long long lb, long long ub, int ok)
+{
+	long long val;
+	const char *q;
+
+	val = strtonum(p, lb, ub, &q);
+	if (ok && q != NULL) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "%s [%lld-%lld] ", p, lb, ub);
+		fprintf(stderr, "NUMBER NOT ACCEPTED %s\n", q);
+		fail = 1;
+	} else if (!ok && q == NULL) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "%s [%lld-%lld] %lld ", p, lb, ub, val);
+		fprintf(stderr, "NUMBER ACCEPTED\n");
+		fail = 1;
+	}
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+	test("1", 0, 10, 1);
+	test("0", -2, 5, 1);
+	test("0", 2, 5, 0);
+	test("0", 2, LLONG_MAX, 0);
+	test("-2", 0, LLONG_MAX, 0);
+	test("0", -5, LLONG_MAX, 1);
+	test("-3", -3, LLONG_MAX, 1);
+	test("-9223372036854775808", LLONG_MIN, LLONG_MAX, 1);
+	test("9223372036854775807", LLONG_MIN, LLONG_MAX, 1);
+	test("-9223372036854775809", LLONG_MIN, LLONG_MAX, 0);
+	test("9223372036854775808", LLONG_MIN, LLONG_MAX, 0);
+	test("1000000000000000000000000", LLONG_MIN, LLONG_MAX, 0);
+	test("-1000000000000000000000000", LLONG_MIN, LLONG_MAX, 0);
+	test("-2", 10, -1, 0);
+	test("-2", -10, -1, 1);
+	test("-20", -10, -1, 0);
+	test("20", -10, -1, 0);
+
+	return (fail);
+}
+
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/rmd160.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/rmd160.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e915141a5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/rmd160.c
@@ -0,0 +1,378 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+/*
+ * Preneel, Bosselaers, Dobbertin, "The Cryptographic Hash Function RIPEMD-160",
+ * RSA Laboratories, CryptoBytes, Volume 3, Number 2, Autumn 1997,
+ * ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/cryptobytes/crypto3n2.pdf
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_ENDIAN_H
+#include <endian.h>
+#endif
+#include <string.h>
+#include <rmd160.h>
+
+#define PUT_64BIT_LE(cp, value) do {                                    \
+	(cp)[7] = (value) >> 56;                                        \
+	(cp)[6] = (value) >> 48;                                        \
+	(cp)[5] = (value) >> 40;                                        \
+	(cp)[4] = (value) >> 32;                                        \
+	(cp)[3] = (value) >> 24;                                        \
+	(cp)[2] = (value) >> 16;                                        \
+	(cp)[1] = (value) >> 8;                                         \
+	(cp)[0] = (value); } while (0)
+
+#define PUT_32BIT_LE(cp, value) do {                                    \
+	(cp)[3] = (value) >> 24;                                        \
+	(cp)[2] = (value) >> 16;                                        \
+	(cp)[1] = (value) >> 8;                                         \
+	(cp)[0] = (value); } while (0)
+
+#define	H0	0x67452301U
+#define	H1	0xEFCDAB89U
+#define	H2	0x98BADCFEU
+#define	H3	0x10325476U
+#define	H4	0xC3D2E1F0U
+
+#define	K0	0x00000000U
+#define	K1	0x5A827999U
+#define	K2	0x6ED9EBA1U
+#define	K3	0x8F1BBCDCU
+#define	K4	0xA953FD4EU
+
+#define	KK0	0x50A28BE6U
+#define	KK1	0x5C4DD124U
+#define	KK2	0x6D703EF3U
+#define	KK3	0x7A6D76E9U
+#define	KK4	0x00000000U
+
+/* rotate x left n bits.  */
+#define ROL(n, x) (((x) << (n)) | ((x) >> (32-(n))))
+
+#define F0(x, y, z) ((x) ^ (y) ^ (z))
+#define F1(x, y, z) (((x) & (y)) | ((~x) & (z)))
+#define F2(x, y, z) (((x) | (~y)) ^ (z))
+#define F3(x, y, z) (((x) & (z)) | ((y) & (~z)))
+#define F4(x, y, z) ((x) ^ ((y) | (~z)))
+
+#define R(a, b, c, d, e, Fj, Kj, sj, rj)                                \
+	do {                                                            \
+		a = ROL(sj, a + Fj(b,c,d) + X(rj) + Kj) + e;            \
+		c = ROL(10, c);                                         \
+	} while(0)
+
+#define X(i)	x[i]
+
+static u_int8_t PADDING[RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH] = {
+	0x80, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+	0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+	0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
+};
+
+void
+RMD160Init(RMD160_CTX *ctx)
+{
+	ctx->count = 0;
+	ctx->state[0] = H0;
+	ctx->state[1] = H1;
+	ctx->state[2] = H2;
+	ctx->state[3] = H3;
+	ctx->state[4] = H4;
+}
+
+void
+RMD160Update(RMD160_CTX *ctx, const u_int8_t *input, size_t len)
+{
+	size_t have, off, need;
+
+	have = (ctx->count / 8) % RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+	need = RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH - have;
+	ctx->count += 8 * len;
+	off = 0;
+
+	if (len >= need) {
+		if (have) {
+			memcpy(ctx->buffer + have, input, need);
+			RMD160Transform(ctx->state, ctx->buffer);
+			off = need;
+			have = 0;
+		}
+		/* now the buffer is empty */
+		while (off + RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH <= len) {
+			RMD160Transform(ctx->state, input+off);
+			off += RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+		}
+	}
+	if (off < len)
+		memcpy(ctx->buffer + have, input+off, len-off);
+}
+
+void
+RMD160Pad(RMD160_CTX *ctx)
+{
+	u_int8_t size[8];
+	size_t padlen;
+
+	PUT_64BIT_LE(size, ctx->count);
+
+	/*
+	 * pad to RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH byte blocks, at least one byte from
+	 * PADDING plus 8 bytes for the size
+	 */
+	padlen = RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH - ((ctx->count / 8) % RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH);
+	if (padlen < 1 + 8)
+		padlen += RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+	RMD160Update(ctx, PADDING, padlen - 8);		/* padlen - 8 <= 64 */
+	RMD160Update(ctx, size, 8);
+}
+
+void
+RMD160Final(u_int8_t digest[RMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH], RMD160_CTX *ctx)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	RMD160Pad(ctx);
+	for (i = 0; i < 5; i++)
+		PUT_32BIT_LE(digest + i*4, ctx->state[i]);
+	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof (*ctx));
+}
+
+void
+RMD160Transform(u_int32_t state[5], const u_int8_t block[RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH])
+{
+	u_int32_t a, b, c, d, e, aa, bb, cc, dd, ee, t, x[16];
+
+#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
+	memcpy(x, block, RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH);
+#else
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+		x[i] = (u_int32_t)(
+		    (u_int32_t)(block[i*4 + 0]) |
+		    (u_int32_t)(block[i*4 + 1]) <<  8 |
+		    (u_int32_t)(block[i*4 + 2]) << 16 |
+		    (u_int32_t)(block[i*4 + 3]) << 24);
+#endif
+
+	a = state[0];
+	b = state[1];
+	c = state[2];
+	d = state[3];
+	e = state[4];
+
+	/* Round 1 */
+	R(a, b, c, d, e, F0, K0, 11,  0);
+	R(e, a, b, c, d, F0, K0, 14,  1);
+	R(d, e, a, b, c, F0, K0, 15,  2);
+	R(c, d, e, a, b, F0, K0, 12,  3);
+	R(b, c, d, e, a, F0, K0,  5,  4);
+	R(a, b, c, d, e, F0, K0,  8,  5);
+	R(e, a, b, c, d, F0, K0,  7,  6);
+	R(d, e, a, b, c, F0, K0,  9,  7);
+	R(c, d, e, a, b, F0, K0, 11,  8);
+	R(b, c, d, e, a, F0, K0, 13,  9);
+	R(a, b, c, d, e, F0, K0, 14, 10);
+	R(e, a, b, c, d, F0, K0, 15, 11);
+	R(d, e, a, b, c, F0, K0,  6, 12);
+	R(c, d, e, a, b, F0, K0,  7, 13);
+	R(b, c, d, e, a, F0, K0,  9, 14);
+	R(a, b, c, d, e, F0, K0,  8, 15); /* #15 */
+	/* Round 2 */
+	R(e, a, b, c, d, F1, K1,  7,  7);
+	R(d, e, a, b, c, F1, K1,  6,  4);
+	R(c, d, e, a, b, F1, K1,  8, 13);
+	R(b, c, d, e, a, F1, K1, 13,  1);
+	R(a, b, c, d, e, F1, K1, 11, 10);
+	R(e, a, b, c, d, F1, K1,  9,  6);
+	R(d, e, a, b, c, F1, K1,  7, 15);
+	R(c, d, e, a, b, F1, K1, 15,  3);
+	R(b, c, d, e, a, F1, K1,  7, 12);
+	R(a, b, c, d, e, F1, K1, 12,  0);
+	R(e, a, b, c, d, F1, K1, 15,  9);
+	R(d, e, a, b, c, F1, K1,  9,  5);
+	R(c, d, e, a, b, F1, K1, 11,  2);
+	R(b, c, d, e, a, F1, K1,  7, 14);
+	R(a, b, c, d, e, F1, K1, 13, 11);
+	R(e, a, b, c, d, F1, K1, 12,  8); /* #31 */
+	/* Round 3 */
+	R(d, e, a, b, c, F2, K2, 11,  3);
+	R(c, d, e, a, b, F2, K2, 13, 10);
+	R(b, c, d, e, a, F2, K2,  6, 14);
+	R(a, b, c, d, e, F2, K2,  7,  4);
+	R(e, a, b, c, d, F2, K2, 14,  9);
+	R(d, e, a, b, c, F2, K2,  9, 15);
+	R(c, d, e, a, b, F2, K2, 13,  8);
+	R(b, c, d, e, a, F2, K2, 15,  1);
+	R(a, b, c, d, e, F2, K2, 14,  2);
+	R(e, a, b, c, d, F2, K2,  8,  7);
+	R(d, e, a, b, c, F2, K2, 13,  0);
+	R(c, d, e, a, b, F2, K2,  6,  6);
+	R(b, c, d, e, a, F2, K2,  5, 13);
+	R(a, b, c, d, e, F2, K2, 12, 11);
+	R(e, a, b, c, d, F2, K2,  7,  5);
+	R(d, e, a, b, c, F2, K2,  5, 12); /* #47 */
+	/* Round 4 */
+	R(c, d, e, a, b, F3, K3, 11,  1);
+	R(b, c, d, e, a, F3, K3, 12,  9);
+	R(a, b, c, d, e, F3, K3, 14, 11);
+	R(e, a, b, c, d, F3, K3, 15, 10);
+	R(d, e, a, b, c, F3, K3, 14,  0);
+	R(c, d, e, a, b, F3, K3, 15,  8);
+	R(b, c, d, e, a, F3, K3,  9, 12);
+	R(a, b, c, d, e, F3, K3,  8,  4);
+	R(e, a, b, c, d, F3, K3,  9, 13);
+	R(d, e, a, b, c, F3, K3, 14,  3);
+	R(c, d, e, a, b, F3, K3,  5,  7);
+	R(b, c, d, e, a, F3, K3,  6, 15);
+	R(a, b, c, d, e, F3, K3,  8, 14);
+	R(e, a, b, c, d, F3, K3,  6,  5);
+	R(d, e, a, b, c, F3, K3,  5,  6);
+	R(c, d, e, a, b, F3, K3, 12,  2); /* #63 */
+	/* Round 5 */
+	R(b, c, d, e, a, F4, K4,  9,  4);
+	R(a, b, c, d, e, F4, K4, 15,  0);
+	R(e, a, b, c, d, F4, K4,  5,  5);
+	R(d, e, a, b, c, F4, K4, 11,  9);
+	R(c, d, e, a, b, F4, K4,  6,  7);
+	R(b, c, d, e, a, F4, K4,  8, 12);
+	R(a, b, c, d, e, F4, K4, 13,  2);
+	R(e, a, b, c, d, F4, K4, 12, 10);
+	R(d, e, a, b, c, F4, K4,  5, 14);
+	R(c, d, e, a, b, F4, K4, 12,  1);
+	R(b, c, d, e, a, F4, K4, 13,  3);
+	R(a, b, c, d, e, F4, K4, 14,  8);
+	R(e, a, b, c, d, F4, K4, 11, 11);
+	R(d, e, a, b, c, F4, K4,  8,  6);
+	R(c, d, e, a, b, F4, K4,  5, 15);
+	R(b, c, d, e, a, F4, K4,  6, 13); /* #79 */
+
+	aa = a ; bb = b; cc = c; dd = d; ee = e;
+
+	a = state[0];
+	b = state[1];
+	c = state[2];
+	d = state[3];
+	e = state[4];
+
+	/* Parallel round 1 */
+	R(a, b, c, d, e, F4, KK0,  8,  5);
+	R(e, a, b, c, d, F4, KK0,  9, 14);
+	R(d, e, a, b, c, F4, KK0,  9,  7);
+	R(c, d, e, a, b, F4, KK0, 11,  0);
+	R(b, c, d, e, a, F4, KK0, 13,  9);
+	R(a, b, c, d, e, F4, KK0, 15,  2);
+	R(e, a, b, c, d, F4, KK0, 15, 11);
+	R(d, e, a, b, c, F4, KK0,  5,  4);
+	R(c, d, e, a, b, F4, KK0,  7, 13);
+	R(b, c, d, e, a, F4, KK0,  7,  6);
+	R(a, b, c, d, e, F4, KK0,  8, 15);
+	R(e, a, b, c, d, F4, KK0, 11,  8);
+	R(d, e, a, b, c, F4, KK0, 14,  1);
+	R(c, d, e, a, b, F4, KK0, 14, 10);
+	R(b, c, d, e, a, F4, KK0, 12,  3);
+	R(a, b, c, d, e, F4, KK0,  6, 12); /* #15 */
+	/* Parallel round 2 */
+	R(e, a, b, c, d, F3, KK1,  9,  6);
+	R(d, e, a, b, c, F3, KK1, 13, 11);
+	R(c, d, e, a, b, F3, KK1, 15,  3);
+	R(b, c, d, e, a, F3, KK1,  7,  7);
+	R(a, b, c, d, e, F3, KK1, 12,  0);
+	R(e, a, b, c, d, F3, KK1,  8, 13);
+	R(d, e, a, b, c, F3, KK1,  9,  5);
+	R(c, d, e, a, b, F3, KK1, 11, 10);
+	R(b, c, d, e, a, F3, KK1,  7, 14);
+	R(a, b, c, d, e, F3, KK1,  7, 15);
+	R(e, a, b, c, d, F3, KK1, 12,  8);
+	R(d, e, a, b, c, F3, KK1,  7, 12);
+	R(c, d, e, a, b, F3, KK1,  6,  4);
+	R(b, c, d, e, a, F3, KK1, 15,  9);
+	R(a, b, c, d, e, F3, KK1, 13,  1);
+	R(e, a, b, c, d, F3, KK1, 11,  2); /* #31 */
+	/* Parallel round 3 */
+	R(d, e, a, b, c, F2, KK2,  9, 15);
+	R(c, d, e, a, b, F2, KK2,  7,  5);
+	R(b, c, d, e, a, F2, KK2, 15,  1);
+	R(a, b, c, d, e, F2, KK2, 11,  3);
+	R(e, a, b, c, d, F2, KK2,  8,  7);
+	R(d, e, a, b, c, F2, KK2,  6, 14);
+	R(c, d, e, a, b, F2, KK2,  6,  6);
+	R(b, c, d, e, a, F2, KK2, 14,  9);
+	R(a, b, c, d, e, F2, KK2, 12, 11);
+	R(e, a, b, c, d, F2, KK2, 13,  8);
+	R(d, e, a, b, c, F2, KK2,  5, 12);
+	R(c, d, e, a, b, F2, KK2, 14,  2);
+	R(b, c, d, e, a, F2, KK2, 13, 10);
+	R(a, b, c, d, e, F2, KK2, 13,  0);
+	R(e, a, b, c, d, F2, KK2,  7,  4);
+	R(d, e, a, b, c, F2, KK2,  5, 13); /* #47 */
+	/* Parallel round 4 */
+	R(c, d, e, a, b, F1, KK3, 15,  8);
+	R(b, c, d, e, a, F1, KK3,  5,  6);
+	R(a, b, c, d, e, F1, KK3,  8,  4);
+	R(e, a, b, c, d, F1, KK3, 11,  1);
+	R(d, e, a, b, c, F1, KK3, 14,  3);
+	R(c, d, e, a, b, F1, KK3, 14, 11);
+	R(b, c, d, e, a, F1, KK3,  6, 15);
+	R(a, b, c, d, e, F1, KK3, 14,  0);
+	R(e, a, b, c, d, F1, KK3,  6,  5);
+	R(d, e, a, b, c, F1, KK3,  9, 12);
+	R(c, d, e, a, b, F1, KK3, 12,  2);
+	R(b, c, d, e, a, F1, KK3,  9, 13);
+	R(a, b, c, d, e, F1, KK3, 12,  9);
+	R(e, a, b, c, d, F1, KK3,  5,  7);
+	R(d, e, a, b, c, F1, KK3, 15, 10);
+	R(c, d, e, a, b, F1, KK3,  8, 14); /* #63 */
+	/* Parallel round 5 */
+	R(b, c, d, e, a, F0, KK4,  8, 12);
+	R(a, b, c, d, e, F0, KK4,  5, 15);
+	R(e, a, b, c, d, F0, KK4, 12, 10);
+	R(d, e, a, b, c, F0, KK4,  9,  4);
+	R(c, d, e, a, b, F0, KK4, 12,  1);
+	R(b, c, d, e, a, F0, KK4,  5,  5);
+	R(a, b, c, d, e, F0, KK4, 14,  8);
+	R(e, a, b, c, d, F0, KK4,  6,  7);
+	R(d, e, a, b, c, F0, KK4,  8,  6);
+	R(c, d, e, a, b, F0, KK4, 13,  2);
+	R(b, c, d, e, a, F0, KK4,  6, 13);
+	R(a, b, c, d, e, F0, KK4,  5, 14);
+	R(e, a, b, c, d, F0, KK4, 15,  0);
+	R(d, e, a, b, c, F0, KK4, 13,  3);
+	R(c, d, e, a, b, F0, KK4, 11,  9);
+	R(b, c, d, e, a, F0, KK4, 11, 11); /* #79 */
+
+	t =        state[1] + cc + d;
+	state[1] = state[2] + dd + e;
+	state[2] = state[3] + ee + a;
+	state[3] = state[4] + aa + b;
+	state[4] = state[0] + bb + c;
+	state[0] = t;
+}
+
+#endif /* !WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/rmd160.h b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/rmd160.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..99c1dcdc0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/rmd160.h
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: rmd160.h,v 1.17 2012/12/05 23:19:57 deraadt Exp $	*/
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+#ifndef  _RMD160_H
+#define  _RMD160_H
+
+#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL
+
+#define	RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH		64
+#define	RMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH		20
+#define	RMD160_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH	(RMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1)
+
+/* RMD160 context. */
+typedef struct RMD160Context {
+	u_int32_t state[5];			/* state */
+	u_int64_t count;			/* number of bits, mod 2^64 */
+	u_int8_t buffer[RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH];	/* input buffer */
+} RMD160_CTX;
+
+void	 RMD160Init(RMD160_CTX *);
+void	 RMD160Transform(u_int32_t [5], const u_int8_t [RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH])
+		__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,5)))
+		__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH)));
+void	 RMD160Update(RMD160_CTX *, const u_int8_t *, size_t)
+		__attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,2,3)));
+void	 RMD160Pad(RMD160_CTX *);
+void	 RMD160Final(u_int8_t [RMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH], RMD160_CTX *)
+		__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,RMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH)));
+char	*RMD160End(RMD160_CTX *, char *)
+		__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,RMD160_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char	*RMD160File(const char *, char *)
+		__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,RMD160_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char	*RMD160FileChunk(const char *, char *, off_t, off_t)
+		__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,RMD160_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char	*RMD160Data(const u_int8_t *, size_t, char *)
+		__attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,1,2)))
+		__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,3,RMD160_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+
+#endif /* !WITH_OPENSSL */
+#endif  /* _RMD160_H */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/rresvport.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/rresvport.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1cd61e58d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/rresvport.c
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: rresvport.c,v 1.9 2005/11/10 10:00:17 espie Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1998 Theo de Raadt.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1983, 1993, 1994
+ *	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/net/rresvport.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_RRESVPORT_AF
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#if 0
+int
+rresvport(int *alport)
+{
+	return rresvport_af(alport, AF_INET);
+}
+#endif
+
+int
+rresvport_af(int *alport, sa_family_t af)
+{
+	struct sockaddr_storage ss;
+	struct sockaddr *sa;
+	u_int16_t *portp;
+	int s;
+	socklen_t salen;
+
+	memset(&ss, '\0', sizeof ss);
+	sa = (struct sockaddr *)&ss;
+
+	switch (af) {
+	case AF_INET:
+		salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
+		portp = &((struct sockaddr_in *)sa)->sin_port;
+		break;
+	case AF_INET6:
+		salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
+		portp = &((struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa)->sin6_port;
+		break;
+	default:
+		errno = EPFNOSUPPORT;
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	sa->sa_family = af;
+	
+	s = socket(af, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+	if (s < 0)
+		return (-1);
+
+	*portp = htons(*alport);
+	if (*alport < IPPORT_RESERVED - 1) {
+		if (bind(s, sa, salen) >= 0)
+			return (s);
+		if (errno != EADDRINUSE) {
+			(void)close(s);
+			return (-1);
+		}
+	}
+
+	*portp = 0;
+	sa->sa_family = af;
+	if (bindresvport_sa(s, sa) == -1) {
+		(void)close(s);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	*alport = ntohs(*portp);
+	return (s);
+}
+
+#endif /* HAVE_RRESVPORT_AF */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/setenv.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/setenv.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..373b701d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/setenv.c
@@ -0,0 +1,226 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: setenv.c,v 1.13 2010/08/23 22:31:50 millert Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1987 Regents of the University of California.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/stdlib/setenv.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_SETENV) || !defined(HAVE_UNSETENV)
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+extern char **environ;
+static char **lastenv;				/* last value of environ */
+
+/* OpenSSH Portable: __findenv is from getenv.c rev 1.8, made static */
+/*
+ * __findenv --
+ *	Returns pointer to value associated with name, if any, else NULL.
+ *	Starts searching within the environmental array at offset.
+ *	Sets offset to be the offset of the name/value combination in the
+ *	environmental array, for use by putenv(3), setenv(3) and unsetenv(3).
+ *	Explicitly removes '=' in argument name.
+ *
+ *	This routine *should* be a static; don't use it.
+ */
+static char *
+__findenv(const char *name, int len, int *offset)
+{
+	extern char **environ;
+	int i;
+	const char *np;
+	char **p, *cp;
+
+	if (name == NULL || environ == NULL)
+		return (NULL);
+	for (p = environ + *offset; (cp = *p) != NULL; ++p) {
+		for (np = name, i = len; i && *cp; i--)
+			if (*cp++ != *np++)
+				break;
+		if (i == 0 && *cp++ == '=') {
+			*offset = p - environ;
+			return (cp);
+		}
+	}
+	return (NULL);
+}
+
+#if 0 /* nothing uses putenv */
+/*
+ * putenv --
+ *	Add a name=value string directly to the environmental, replacing
+ *	any current value.
+ */
+int
+putenv(char *str)
+{
+	char **P, *cp;
+	size_t cnt;
+	int offset = 0;
+
+	for (cp = str; *cp && *cp != '='; ++cp)
+		;
+	if (*cp != '=') {
+		errno = EINVAL;
+		return (-1);			/* missing `=' in string */
+	}
+
+	if (__findenv(str, (int)(cp - str), &offset) != NULL) {
+		environ[offset++] = str;
+		/* could be set multiple times */
+		while (__findenv(str, (int)(cp - str), &offset)) {
+			for (P = &environ[offset];; ++P)
+				if (!(*P = *(P + 1)))
+					break;
+		}
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	/* create new slot for string */
+	for (P = environ; *P != NULL; P++)
+		;
+	cnt = P - environ;
+	P = (char **)realloc(lastenv, sizeof(char *) * (cnt + 2));
+	if (!P)
+		return (-1);
+	if (lastenv != environ)
+		memcpy(P, environ, cnt * sizeof(char *));
+	lastenv = environ = P;
+	environ[cnt] = str;
+	environ[cnt + 1] = NULL;
+	return (0);
+}
+
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SETENV
+/*
+ * setenv --
+ *	Set the value of the environmental variable "name" to be
+ *	"value".  If rewrite is set, replace any current value.
+ */
+int
+setenv(const char *name, const char *value, int rewrite)
+{
+	char *C, **P;
+	const char *np;
+	int l_value, offset = 0;
+
+	for (np = name; *np && *np != '='; ++np)
+		;
+#ifdef notyet
+	if (*np) {
+		errno = EINVAL;
+		return (-1);			/* has `=' in name */
+	}
+#endif
+
+	l_value = strlen(value);
+	if ((C = __findenv(name, (int)(np - name), &offset)) != NULL) {
+		int tmpoff = offset + 1;
+		if (!rewrite)
+			return (0);
+#if 0 /* XXX - existing entry may not be writable */
+		if (strlen(C) >= l_value) {	/* old larger; copy over */
+			while ((*C++ = *value++))
+				;
+			return (0);
+		}
+#endif
+		/* could be set multiple times */
+		while (__findenv(name, (int)(np - name), &tmpoff)) {
+			for (P = &environ[tmpoff];; ++P)
+				if (!(*P = *(P + 1)))
+					break;
+		}
+	} else {					/* create new slot */
+		size_t cnt;
+
+		for (P = environ; *P != NULL; P++)
+			;
+		cnt = P - environ;
+		P = (char **)realloc(lastenv, sizeof(char *) * (cnt + 2));
+		if (!P)
+			return (-1);
+		if (lastenv != environ)
+			memcpy(P, environ, cnt * sizeof(char *));
+		lastenv = environ = P;
+		offset = cnt;
+		environ[cnt + 1] = NULL;
+	}
+	if (!(environ[offset] =			/* name + `=' + value */
+	    malloc((size_t)((int)(np - name) + l_value + 2))))
+		return (-1);
+	for (C = environ[offset]; (*C = *name++) && *C != '='; ++C)
+		;
+	for (*C++ = '='; (*C++ = *value++); )
+		;
+	return (0);
+}
+
+#endif /* HAVE_SETENV */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_UNSETENV
+/*
+ * unsetenv(name) --
+ *	Delete environmental variable "name".
+ */
+int
+unsetenv(const char *name)
+{
+	char **P;
+	const char *np;
+	int offset = 0;
+
+	if (!name || !*name) {
+		errno = EINVAL;
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	for (np = name; *np && *np != '='; ++np)
+		;
+	if (*np) {
+		errno = EINVAL;
+		return (-1);			/* has `=' in name */
+	}
+
+	/* could be set multiple times */
+	while (__findenv(name, (int)(np - name), &offset)) {
+		for (P = &environ[offset];; ++P)
+			if (!(*P = *(P + 1)))
+				break;
+	}
+	return (0);
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_UNSETENV */
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SETENV) || !defined(HAVE_UNSETENV) */
+
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/setproctitle.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/setproctitle.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9f7ca14c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/setproctitle.c
@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
+/* Based on conf.c from UCB sendmail 8.8.8 */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright 2003 Damien Miller
+ * Copyright (c) 1983, 1995-1997 Eric P. Allman
+ * Copyright (c) 1988, 1993
+ *	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_PSTAT_H
+#include <sys/pstat.h>
+#endif
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <vis.h>
+
+#define SPT_NONE	0	/* don't use it at all */
+#define SPT_PSTAT	1	/* use pstat(PSTAT_SETCMD, ...) */
+#define SPT_REUSEARGV	2	/* cover argv with title information */
+
+#ifndef SPT_TYPE
+# define SPT_TYPE	SPT_NONE
+#endif
+
+#ifndef SPT_PADCHAR
+# define SPT_PADCHAR	'\0'
+#endif
+
+#if SPT_TYPE == SPT_REUSEARGV
+static char *argv_start = NULL;
+static size_t argv_env_len = 0;
+#endif
+
+#endif /* HAVE_SETPROCTITLE */
+
+void
+compat_init_setproctitle(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+#if !defined(HAVE_SETPROCTITLE) && \
+    defined(SPT_TYPE) && SPT_TYPE == SPT_REUSEARGV
+	extern char **environ;
+	char *lastargv = NULL;
+	char **envp = environ;
+	int i;
+
+	/*
+	 * NB: This assumes that argv has already been copied out of the
+	 * way. This is true for sshd, but may not be true for other 
+	 * programs. Beware.
+	 */
+
+	if (argc == 0 || argv[0] == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	/* Fail if we can't allocate room for the new environment */
+	for (i = 0; envp[i] != NULL; i++)
+		;
+	if ((environ = calloc(i + 1, sizeof(*environ))) == NULL) {
+		environ = envp;	/* put it back */
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Find the last argv string or environment variable within 
+	 * our process memory area.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
+		if (lastargv == NULL || lastargv + 1 == argv[i])
+			lastargv = argv[i] + strlen(argv[i]);
+	}
+	for (i = 0; envp[i] != NULL; i++) {
+		if (lastargv + 1 == envp[i])
+			lastargv = envp[i] + strlen(envp[i]);
+	}
+
+	argv[1] = NULL;
+	argv_start = argv[0];
+	argv_env_len = lastargv - argv[0] - 1;
+
+	/* 
+	 * Copy environment 
+	 * XXX - will truncate env on strdup fail
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; envp[i] != NULL; i++)
+		environ[i] = strdup(envp[i]);
+	environ[i] = NULL;
+#endif /* SPT_REUSEARGV */
+}
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
+void
+setproctitle(const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+#if SPT_TYPE != SPT_NONE
+	va_list ap;
+	char buf[1024], ptitle[1024];
+	size_t len;
+	int r;
+	extern char *__progname;
+#if SPT_TYPE == SPT_PSTAT
+	union pstun pst;
+#endif
+
+#if SPT_TYPE == SPT_REUSEARGV
+	if (argv_env_len <= 0)
+		return;
+#endif
+
+	strlcpy(buf, __progname, sizeof(buf));
+
+	r = -1;
+	va_start(ap, fmt);
+	if (fmt != NULL) {
+		len = strlcat(buf, ": ", sizeof(buf));
+		if (len < sizeof(buf))
+			r = vsnprintf(buf + len, sizeof(buf) - len , fmt, ap);
+	}
+	va_end(ap);
+	if (r == -1 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(buf) - len)
+		return;
+	strnvis(ptitle, buf, sizeof(ptitle),
+	    VIS_CSTYLE|VIS_NL|VIS_TAB|VIS_OCTAL);
+
+#if SPT_TYPE == SPT_PSTAT
+	pst.pst_command = ptitle;
+	pstat(PSTAT_SETCMD, pst, strlen(ptitle), 0, 0);
+#elif SPT_TYPE == SPT_REUSEARGV
+/*	debug("setproctitle: copy \"%s\" into len %d", 
+	    buf, argv_env_len); */
+	len = strlcpy(argv_start, ptitle, argv_env_len);
+	for(; len < argv_env_len; len++)
+		argv_start[len] = SPT_PADCHAR;
+#endif
+
+#endif /* SPT_NONE */
+}
+
+#endif /* HAVE_SETPROCTITLE */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/sha1.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/sha1.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4b5381f87
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/sha1.c
@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: sha1.c,v 1.23 2014/01/08 06:14:57 tedu Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * SHA-1 in C
+ * By Steve Reid <steve@edmweb.com>
+ * 100% Public Domain
+ *
+ * Test Vectors (from FIPS PUB 180-1)
+ * "abc"
+ *   A9993E36 4706816A BA3E2571 7850C26C 9CD0D89D
+ * "abcdbcdecdefdefgefghfghighijhijkijkljklmklmnlmnomnopnopq"
+ *   84983E44 1C3BD26E BAAE4AA1 F95129E5 E54670F1
+ * A million repetitions of "a"
+ *   34AA973C D4C4DAA4 F61EEB2B DBAD2731 6534016F
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL
+
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#define rol(value, bits) (((value) << (bits)) | ((value) >> (32 - (bits))))
+
+/*
+ * blk0() and blk() perform the initial expand.
+ * I got the idea of expanding during the round function from SSLeay
+ */
+#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
+# define blk0(i) (block->l[i] = (rol(block->l[i],24)&0xFF00FF00) \
+    |(rol(block->l[i],8)&0x00FF00FF))
+#else
+# define blk0(i) block->l[i]
+#endif
+#define blk(i) (block->l[i&15] = rol(block->l[(i+13)&15]^block->l[(i+8)&15] \
+    ^block->l[(i+2)&15]^block->l[i&15],1))
+
+/*
+ * (R0+R1), R2, R3, R4 are the different operations (rounds) used in SHA1
+ */
+#define R0(v,w,x,y,z,i) z+=((w&(x^y))^y)+blk0(i)+0x5A827999+rol(v,5);w=rol(w,30);
+#define R1(v,w,x,y,z,i) z+=((w&(x^y))^y)+blk(i)+0x5A827999+rol(v,5);w=rol(w,30);
+#define R2(v,w,x,y,z,i) z+=(w^x^y)+blk(i)+0x6ED9EBA1+rol(v,5);w=rol(w,30);
+#define R3(v,w,x,y,z,i) z+=(((w|x)&y)|(w&x))+blk(i)+0x8F1BBCDC+rol(v,5);w=rol(w,30);
+#define R4(v,w,x,y,z,i) z+=(w^x^y)+blk(i)+0xCA62C1D6+rol(v,5);w=rol(w,30);
+
+typedef union {
+	u_int8_t c[64];
+	u_int32_t l[16];
+} CHAR64LONG16;
+
+/*
+ * Hash a single 512-bit block. This is the core of the algorithm.
+ */
+void
+SHA1Transform(u_int32_t state[5], const u_int8_t buffer[SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH])
+{
+	u_int32_t a, b, c, d, e;
+	u_int8_t workspace[SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH];
+	CHAR64LONG16 *block = (CHAR64LONG16 *)workspace;
+
+	(void)memcpy(block, buffer, SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH);
+
+	/* Copy context->state[] to working vars */
+	a = state[0];
+	b = state[1];
+	c = state[2];
+	d = state[3];
+	e = state[4];
+
+	/* 4 rounds of 20 operations each. Loop unrolled. */
+	R0(a,b,c,d,e, 0); R0(e,a,b,c,d, 1); R0(d,e,a,b,c, 2); R0(c,d,e,a,b, 3);
+	R0(b,c,d,e,a, 4); R0(a,b,c,d,e, 5); R0(e,a,b,c,d, 6); R0(d,e,a,b,c, 7);
+	R0(c,d,e,a,b, 8); R0(b,c,d,e,a, 9); R0(a,b,c,d,e,10); R0(e,a,b,c,d,11);
+	R0(d,e,a,b,c,12); R0(c,d,e,a,b,13); R0(b,c,d,e,a,14); R0(a,b,c,d,e,15);
+	R1(e,a,b,c,d,16); R1(d,e,a,b,c,17); R1(c,d,e,a,b,18); R1(b,c,d,e,a,19);
+	R2(a,b,c,d,e,20); R2(e,a,b,c,d,21); R2(d,e,a,b,c,22); R2(c,d,e,a,b,23);
+	R2(b,c,d,e,a,24); R2(a,b,c,d,e,25); R2(e,a,b,c,d,26); R2(d,e,a,b,c,27);
+	R2(c,d,e,a,b,28); R2(b,c,d,e,a,29); R2(a,b,c,d,e,30); R2(e,a,b,c,d,31);
+	R2(d,e,a,b,c,32); R2(c,d,e,a,b,33); R2(b,c,d,e,a,34); R2(a,b,c,d,e,35);
+	R2(e,a,b,c,d,36); R2(d,e,a,b,c,37); R2(c,d,e,a,b,38); R2(b,c,d,e,a,39);
+	R3(a,b,c,d,e,40); R3(e,a,b,c,d,41); R3(d,e,a,b,c,42); R3(c,d,e,a,b,43);
+	R3(b,c,d,e,a,44); R3(a,b,c,d,e,45); R3(e,a,b,c,d,46); R3(d,e,a,b,c,47);
+	R3(c,d,e,a,b,48); R3(b,c,d,e,a,49); R3(a,b,c,d,e,50); R3(e,a,b,c,d,51);
+	R3(d,e,a,b,c,52); R3(c,d,e,a,b,53); R3(b,c,d,e,a,54); R3(a,b,c,d,e,55);
+	R3(e,a,b,c,d,56); R3(d,e,a,b,c,57); R3(c,d,e,a,b,58); R3(b,c,d,e,a,59);
+	R4(a,b,c,d,e,60); R4(e,a,b,c,d,61); R4(d,e,a,b,c,62); R4(c,d,e,a,b,63);
+	R4(b,c,d,e,a,64); R4(a,b,c,d,e,65); R4(e,a,b,c,d,66); R4(d,e,a,b,c,67);
+	R4(c,d,e,a,b,68); R4(b,c,d,e,a,69); R4(a,b,c,d,e,70); R4(e,a,b,c,d,71);
+	R4(d,e,a,b,c,72); R4(c,d,e,a,b,73); R4(b,c,d,e,a,74); R4(a,b,c,d,e,75);
+	R4(e,a,b,c,d,76); R4(d,e,a,b,c,77); R4(c,d,e,a,b,78); R4(b,c,d,e,a,79);
+
+	/* Add the working vars back into context.state[] */
+	state[0] += a;
+	state[1] += b;
+	state[2] += c;
+	state[3] += d;
+	state[4] += e;
+
+	/* Wipe variables */
+	a = b = c = d = e = 0;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * SHA1Init - Initialize new context
+ */
+void
+SHA1Init(SHA1_CTX *context)
+{
+
+	/* SHA1 initialization constants */
+	context->count = 0;
+	context->state[0] = 0x67452301;
+	context->state[1] = 0xEFCDAB89;
+	context->state[2] = 0x98BADCFE;
+	context->state[3] = 0x10325476;
+	context->state[4] = 0xC3D2E1F0;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Run your data through this.
+ */
+void
+SHA1Update(SHA1_CTX *context, const u_int8_t *data, size_t len)
+{
+	size_t i, j;
+
+	j = (size_t)((context->count >> 3) & 63);
+	context->count += (len << 3);
+	if ((j + len) > 63) {
+		(void)memcpy(&context->buffer[j], data, (i = 64-j));
+		SHA1Transform(context->state, context->buffer);
+		for ( ; i + 63 < len; i += 64)
+			SHA1Transform(context->state, (u_int8_t *)&data[i]);
+		j = 0;
+	} else {
+		i = 0;
+	}
+	(void)memcpy(&context->buffer[j], &data[i], len - i);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Add padding and return the message digest.
+ */
+void
+SHA1Pad(SHA1_CTX *context)
+{
+	u_int8_t finalcount[8];
+	u_int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+		finalcount[i] = (u_int8_t)((context->count >>
+		    ((7 - (i & 7)) * 8)) & 255);	/* Endian independent */
+	}
+	SHA1Update(context, (u_int8_t *)"\200", 1);
+	while ((context->count & 504) != 448)
+		SHA1Update(context, (u_int8_t *)"\0", 1);
+	SHA1Update(context, finalcount, 8); /* Should cause a SHA1Transform() */
+}
+
+void
+SHA1Final(u_int8_t digest[SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA1_CTX *context)
+{
+	u_int i;
+
+	SHA1Pad(context);
+	for (i = 0; i < SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++) {
+		digest[i] = (u_int8_t)
+		   ((context->state[i>>2] >> ((3-(i & 3)) * 8) ) & 255);
+	}
+	memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
+}
+#endif /* !WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/sha1.h b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/sha1.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..327d94cd5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/sha1.h
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: sha1.h,v 1.24 2012/12/05 23:19:57 deraadt Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * SHA-1 in C
+ * By Steve Reid <steve@edmweb.com>
+ * 100% Public Domain
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SHA1_H
+#define _SHA1_H
+
+#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL
+
+#define	SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH		64
+#define	SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH		20
+#define	SHA1_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH	(SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1)
+
+typedef struct {
+    u_int32_t state[5];
+    u_int64_t count;
+    u_int8_t buffer[SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH];
+} SHA1_CTX;
+
+void SHA1Init(SHA1_CTX *);
+void SHA1Pad(SHA1_CTX *);
+void SHA1Transform(u_int32_t [5], const u_int8_t [SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH])
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,5)))
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH)));
+void SHA1Update(SHA1_CTX *, const u_int8_t *, size_t)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,2,3)));
+void SHA1Final(u_int8_t [SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA1_CTX *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA1End(SHA1_CTX *, char *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA1_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA1File(const char *, char *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA1_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA1FileChunk(const char *, char *, off_t, off_t)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA1_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA1Data(const u_int8_t *, size_t, char *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,1,2)))
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,3,SHA1_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+
+#define HTONDIGEST(x) do {                                              \
+        x[0] = htonl(x[0]);                                             \
+        x[1] = htonl(x[1]);                                             \
+        x[2] = htonl(x[2]);                                             \
+        x[3] = htonl(x[3]);                                             \
+        x[4] = htonl(x[4]); } while (0)
+
+#define NTOHDIGEST(x) do {                                              \
+        x[0] = ntohl(x[0]);                                             \
+        x[1] = ntohl(x[1]);                                             \
+        x[2] = ntohl(x[2]);                                             \
+        x[3] = ntohl(x[3]);                                             \
+        x[4] = ntohl(x[4]); } while (0)
+
+#endif /* !WITH_OPENSSL */
+#endif /* _SHA1_H */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/sha2.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/sha2.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..737935d46
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/sha2.c
@@ -0,0 +1,904 @@
+/*	from OpenBSD: sha2.c,v 1.11 2005/08/08 08:05:35 espie Exp 	*/
+
+/*
+ * FILE:	sha2.c
+ * AUTHOR:	Aaron D. Gifford <me@aarongifford.com>
+ * 
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001, Aaron D. Gifford
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ * 
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTOR(S) ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTOR(S) BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * $From: sha2.c,v 1.1 2001/11/08 00:01:51 adg Exp adg $
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/hash/sha2.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+# include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+# if !defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) && (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L)
+#  define _NEED_SHA2 1
+# endif
+#else
+# define _NEED_SHA2 1
+#endif
+
+#if defined(_NEED_SHA2) && !defined(HAVE_SHA256_UPDATE)
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+/*
+ * UNROLLED TRANSFORM LOOP NOTE:
+ * You can define SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM to use the unrolled transform
+ * loop version for the hash transform rounds (defined using macros
+ * later in this file).  Either define on the command line, for example:
+ *
+ *   cc -DSHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM -o sha2 sha2.c sha2prog.c
+ *
+ * or define below:
+ *
+ *   #define SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM
+ *
+ */
+
+/*** SHA-256/384/512 Machine Architecture Definitions *****************/
+/*
+ * BYTE_ORDER NOTE:
+ *
+ * Please make sure that your system defines BYTE_ORDER.  If your
+ * architecture is little-endian, make sure it also defines
+ * LITTLE_ENDIAN and that the two (BYTE_ORDER and LITTLE_ENDIAN) are
+ * equivilent.
+ *
+ * If your system does not define the above, then you can do so by
+ * hand like this:
+ *
+ *   #define LITTLE_ENDIAN 1234
+ *   #define BIG_ENDIAN    4321
+ *
+ * And for little-endian machines, add:
+ *
+ *   #define BYTE_ORDER LITTLE_ENDIAN 
+ *
+ * Or for big-endian machines:
+ *
+ *   #define BYTE_ORDER BIG_ENDIAN
+ *
+ * The FreeBSD machine this was written on defines BYTE_ORDER
+ * appropriately by including <sys/types.h> (which in turn includes
+ * <machine/endian.h> where the appropriate definitions are actually
+ * made).
+ */
+#if !defined(BYTE_ORDER) || (BYTE_ORDER != LITTLE_ENDIAN && BYTE_ORDER != BIG_ENDIAN)
+#error Define BYTE_ORDER to be equal to either LITTLE_ENDIAN or BIG_ENDIAN
+#endif
+
+
+/*** SHA-256/384/512 Various Length Definitions ***********************/
+/* NOTE: Most of these are in sha2.h */
+#define SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH	(SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH - 8)
+#define SHA384_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH	(SHA384_BLOCK_LENGTH - 16)
+#define SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH	(SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH - 16)
+
+/*** ENDIAN SPECIFIC COPY MACROS **************************************/
+#define BE_8_TO_32(dst, cp) do {					\
+	(dst) = (u_int32_t)(cp)[3] | ((u_int32_t)(cp)[2] << 8) |	\
+	    ((u_int32_t)(cp)[1] << 16) | ((u_int32_t)(cp)[0] << 24);	\
+} while(0)
+
+#define BE_8_TO_64(dst, cp) do {					\
+	(dst) = (u_int64_t)(cp)[7] | ((u_int64_t)(cp)[6] << 8) |	\
+	    ((u_int64_t)(cp)[5] << 16) | ((u_int64_t)(cp)[4] << 24) |	\
+	    ((u_int64_t)(cp)[3] << 32) | ((u_int64_t)(cp)[2] << 40) |	\
+	    ((u_int64_t)(cp)[1] << 48) | ((u_int64_t)(cp)[0] << 56);	\
+} while (0)
+
+#define BE_64_TO_8(cp, src) do {					\
+	(cp)[0] = (src) >> 56;						\
+        (cp)[1] = (src) >> 48;						\
+	(cp)[2] = (src) >> 40;						\
+	(cp)[3] = (src) >> 32;						\
+	(cp)[4] = (src) >> 24;						\
+	(cp)[5] = (src) >> 16;						\
+	(cp)[6] = (src) >> 8;						\
+	(cp)[7] = (src);						\
+} while (0)
+
+#define BE_32_TO_8(cp, src) do {					\
+	(cp)[0] = (src) >> 24;						\
+	(cp)[1] = (src) >> 16;						\
+	(cp)[2] = (src) >> 8;						\
+	(cp)[3] = (src);						\
+} while (0)
+
+/*
+ * Macro for incrementally adding the unsigned 64-bit integer n to the
+ * unsigned 128-bit integer (represented using a two-element array of
+ * 64-bit words):
+ */
+#define ADDINC128(w,n) do {						\
+	(w)[0] += (u_int64_t)(n);					\
+	if ((w)[0] < (n)) {						\
+		(w)[1]++;						\
+	}								\
+} while (0)
+
+/*** THE SIX LOGICAL FUNCTIONS ****************************************/
+/*
+ * Bit shifting and rotation (used by the six SHA-XYZ logical functions:
+ *
+ *   NOTE:  The naming of R and S appears backwards here (R is a SHIFT and
+ *   S is a ROTATION) because the SHA-256/384/512 description document
+ *   (see http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/shs/sha256-384-512.pdf) uses this
+ *   same "backwards" definition.
+ */
+/* Shift-right (used in SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512): */
+#define R(b,x) 		((x) >> (b))
+/* 32-bit Rotate-right (used in SHA-256): */
+#define S32(b,x)	(((x) >> (b)) | ((x) << (32 - (b))))
+/* 64-bit Rotate-right (used in SHA-384 and SHA-512): */
+#define S64(b,x)	(((x) >> (b)) | ((x) << (64 - (b))))
+
+/* Two of six logical functions used in SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512: */
+#define Ch(x,y,z)	(((x) & (y)) ^ ((~(x)) & (z)))
+#define Maj(x,y,z)	(((x) & (y)) ^ ((x) & (z)) ^ ((y) & (z)))
+
+/* Four of six logical functions used in SHA-256: */
+#define Sigma0_256(x)	(S32(2,  (x)) ^ S32(13, (x)) ^ S32(22, (x)))
+#define Sigma1_256(x)	(S32(6,  (x)) ^ S32(11, (x)) ^ S32(25, (x)))
+#define sigma0_256(x)	(S32(7,  (x)) ^ S32(18, (x)) ^ R(3 ,   (x)))
+#define sigma1_256(x)	(S32(17, (x)) ^ S32(19, (x)) ^ R(10,   (x)))
+
+/* Four of six logical functions used in SHA-384 and SHA-512: */
+#define Sigma0_512(x)	(S64(28, (x)) ^ S64(34, (x)) ^ S64(39, (x)))
+#define Sigma1_512(x)	(S64(14, (x)) ^ S64(18, (x)) ^ S64(41, (x)))
+#define sigma0_512(x)	(S64( 1, (x)) ^ S64( 8, (x)) ^ R( 7,   (x)))
+#define sigma1_512(x)	(S64(19, (x)) ^ S64(61, (x)) ^ R( 6,   (x)))
+
+
+/*** SHA-XYZ INITIAL HASH VALUES AND CONSTANTS ************************/
+/* Hash constant words K for SHA-256: */
+const static u_int32_t K256[64] = {
+	0x428a2f98UL, 0x71374491UL, 0xb5c0fbcfUL, 0xe9b5dba5UL,
+	0x3956c25bUL, 0x59f111f1UL, 0x923f82a4UL, 0xab1c5ed5UL,
+	0xd807aa98UL, 0x12835b01UL, 0x243185beUL, 0x550c7dc3UL,
+	0x72be5d74UL, 0x80deb1feUL, 0x9bdc06a7UL, 0xc19bf174UL,
+	0xe49b69c1UL, 0xefbe4786UL, 0x0fc19dc6UL, 0x240ca1ccUL,
+	0x2de92c6fUL, 0x4a7484aaUL, 0x5cb0a9dcUL, 0x76f988daUL,
+	0x983e5152UL, 0xa831c66dUL, 0xb00327c8UL, 0xbf597fc7UL,
+	0xc6e00bf3UL, 0xd5a79147UL, 0x06ca6351UL, 0x14292967UL,
+	0x27b70a85UL, 0x2e1b2138UL, 0x4d2c6dfcUL, 0x53380d13UL,
+	0x650a7354UL, 0x766a0abbUL, 0x81c2c92eUL, 0x92722c85UL,
+	0xa2bfe8a1UL, 0xa81a664bUL, 0xc24b8b70UL, 0xc76c51a3UL,
+	0xd192e819UL, 0xd6990624UL, 0xf40e3585UL, 0x106aa070UL,
+	0x19a4c116UL, 0x1e376c08UL, 0x2748774cUL, 0x34b0bcb5UL,
+	0x391c0cb3UL, 0x4ed8aa4aUL, 0x5b9cca4fUL, 0x682e6ff3UL,
+	0x748f82eeUL, 0x78a5636fUL, 0x84c87814UL, 0x8cc70208UL,
+	0x90befffaUL, 0xa4506cebUL, 0xbef9a3f7UL, 0xc67178f2UL
+};
+
+/* Initial hash value H for SHA-256: */
+const static u_int32_t sha256_initial_hash_value[8] = {
+	0x6a09e667UL,
+	0xbb67ae85UL,
+	0x3c6ef372UL,
+	0xa54ff53aUL,
+	0x510e527fUL,
+	0x9b05688cUL,
+	0x1f83d9abUL,
+	0x5be0cd19UL
+};
+
+/* Hash constant words K for SHA-384 and SHA-512: */
+const static u_int64_t K512[80] = {
+	0x428a2f98d728ae22ULL, 0x7137449123ef65cdULL,
+	0xb5c0fbcfec4d3b2fULL, 0xe9b5dba58189dbbcULL,
+	0x3956c25bf348b538ULL, 0x59f111f1b605d019ULL,
+	0x923f82a4af194f9bULL, 0xab1c5ed5da6d8118ULL,
+	0xd807aa98a3030242ULL, 0x12835b0145706fbeULL,
+	0x243185be4ee4b28cULL, 0x550c7dc3d5ffb4e2ULL,
+	0x72be5d74f27b896fULL, 0x80deb1fe3b1696b1ULL,
+	0x9bdc06a725c71235ULL, 0xc19bf174cf692694ULL,
+	0xe49b69c19ef14ad2ULL, 0xefbe4786384f25e3ULL,
+	0x0fc19dc68b8cd5b5ULL, 0x240ca1cc77ac9c65ULL,
+	0x2de92c6f592b0275ULL, 0x4a7484aa6ea6e483ULL,
+	0x5cb0a9dcbd41fbd4ULL, 0x76f988da831153b5ULL,
+	0x983e5152ee66dfabULL, 0xa831c66d2db43210ULL,
+	0xb00327c898fb213fULL, 0xbf597fc7beef0ee4ULL,
+	0xc6e00bf33da88fc2ULL, 0xd5a79147930aa725ULL,
+	0x06ca6351e003826fULL, 0x142929670a0e6e70ULL,
+	0x27b70a8546d22ffcULL, 0x2e1b21385c26c926ULL,
+	0x4d2c6dfc5ac42aedULL, 0x53380d139d95b3dfULL,
+	0x650a73548baf63deULL, 0x766a0abb3c77b2a8ULL,
+	0x81c2c92e47edaee6ULL, 0x92722c851482353bULL,
+	0xa2bfe8a14cf10364ULL, 0xa81a664bbc423001ULL,
+	0xc24b8b70d0f89791ULL, 0xc76c51a30654be30ULL,
+	0xd192e819d6ef5218ULL, 0xd69906245565a910ULL,
+	0xf40e35855771202aULL, 0x106aa07032bbd1b8ULL,
+	0x19a4c116b8d2d0c8ULL, 0x1e376c085141ab53ULL,
+	0x2748774cdf8eeb99ULL, 0x34b0bcb5e19b48a8ULL,
+	0x391c0cb3c5c95a63ULL, 0x4ed8aa4ae3418acbULL,
+	0x5b9cca4f7763e373ULL, 0x682e6ff3d6b2b8a3ULL,
+	0x748f82ee5defb2fcULL, 0x78a5636f43172f60ULL,
+	0x84c87814a1f0ab72ULL, 0x8cc702081a6439ecULL,
+	0x90befffa23631e28ULL, 0xa4506cebde82bde9ULL,
+	0xbef9a3f7b2c67915ULL, 0xc67178f2e372532bULL,
+	0xca273eceea26619cULL, 0xd186b8c721c0c207ULL,
+	0xeada7dd6cde0eb1eULL, 0xf57d4f7fee6ed178ULL,
+	0x06f067aa72176fbaULL, 0x0a637dc5a2c898a6ULL,
+	0x113f9804bef90daeULL, 0x1b710b35131c471bULL,
+	0x28db77f523047d84ULL, 0x32caab7b40c72493ULL,
+	0x3c9ebe0a15c9bebcULL, 0x431d67c49c100d4cULL,
+	0x4cc5d4becb3e42b6ULL, 0x597f299cfc657e2aULL,
+	0x5fcb6fab3ad6faecULL, 0x6c44198c4a475817ULL
+};
+
+/* Initial hash value H for SHA-384 */
+const static u_int64_t sha384_initial_hash_value[8] = {
+	0xcbbb9d5dc1059ed8ULL,
+	0x629a292a367cd507ULL,
+	0x9159015a3070dd17ULL,
+	0x152fecd8f70e5939ULL,
+	0x67332667ffc00b31ULL,
+	0x8eb44a8768581511ULL,
+	0xdb0c2e0d64f98fa7ULL,
+	0x47b5481dbefa4fa4ULL
+};
+
+/* Initial hash value H for SHA-512 */
+const static u_int64_t sha512_initial_hash_value[8] = {
+	0x6a09e667f3bcc908ULL,
+	0xbb67ae8584caa73bULL,
+	0x3c6ef372fe94f82bULL,
+	0xa54ff53a5f1d36f1ULL,
+	0x510e527fade682d1ULL,
+	0x9b05688c2b3e6c1fULL,
+	0x1f83d9abfb41bd6bULL,
+	0x5be0cd19137e2179ULL
+};
+
+
+/*** SHA-256: *********************************************************/
+void
+SHA256_Init(SHA256_CTX *context)
+{
+	if (context == NULL)
+		return;
+	memcpy(context->state, sha256_initial_hash_value,
+	    sizeof(sha256_initial_hash_value));
+	memset(context->buffer, 0, sizeof(context->buffer));
+	context->bitcount = 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM
+
+/* Unrolled SHA-256 round macros: */
+
+#define ROUND256_0_TO_15(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) do {				    \
+	BE_8_TO_32(W256[j], data);					    \
+	data += 4;							    \
+	T1 = (h) + Sigma1_256((e)) + Ch((e), (f), (g)) + K256[j] + W256[j]; \
+	(d) += T1;							    \
+	(h) = T1 + Sigma0_256((a)) + Maj((a), (b), (c));		    \
+	j++;								    \
+} while(0)
+
+#define ROUND256(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) do {					    \
+	s0 = W256[(j+1)&0x0f];						    \
+	s0 = sigma0_256(s0);						    \
+	s1 = W256[(j+14)&0x0f];						    \
+	s1 = sigma1_256(s1);						    \
+	T1 = (h) + Sigma1_256((e)) + Ch((e), (f), (g)) + K256[j] +	    \
+	     (W256[j&0x0f] += s1 + W256[(j+9)&0x0f] + s0);		    \
+	(d) += T1;							    \
+	(h) = T1 + Sigma0_256((a)) + Maj((a), (b), (c));		    \
+	j++;								    \
+} while(0)
+
+void
+SHA256_Transform(u_int32_t state[8], const u_int8_t data[SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH])
+{
+	u_int32_t	a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, s0, s1;
+	u_int32_t	T1, W256[16];
+	int		j;
+
+	/* Initialize registers with the prev. intermediate value */
+	a = state[0];
+	b = state[1];
+	c = state[2];
+	d = state[3];
+	e = state[4];
+	f = state[5];
+	g = state[6];
+	h = state[7];
+
+	j = 0;
+	do {
+		/* Rounds 0 to 15 (unrolled): */
+		ROUND256_0_TO_15(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h);
+		ROUND256_0_TO_15(h,a,b,c,d,e,f,g);
+		ROUND256_0_TO_15(g,h,a,b,c,d,e,f);
+		ROUND256_0_TO_15(f,g,h,a,b,c,d,e);
+		ROUND256_0_TO_15(e,f,g,h,a,b,c,d);
+		ROUND256_0_TO_15(d,e,f,g,h,a,b,c);
+		ROUND256_0_TO_15(c,d,e,f,g,h,a,b);
+		ROUND256_0_TO_15(b,c,d,e,f,g,h,a);
+	} while (j < 16);
+
+	/* Now for the remaining rounds up to 63: */
+	do {
+		ROUND256(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h);
+		ROUND256(h,a,b,c,d,e,f,g);
+		ROUND256(g,h,a,b,c,d,e,f);
+		ROUND256(f,g,h,a,b,c,d,e);
+		ROUND256(e,f,g,h,a,b,c,d);
+		ROUND256(d,e,f,g,h,a,b,c);
+		ROUND256(c,d,e,f,g,h,a,b);
+		ROUND256(b,c,d,e,f,g,h,a);
+	} while (j < 64);
+
+	/* Compute the current intermediate hash value */
+	state[0] += a;
+	state[1] += b;
+	state[2] += c;
+	state[3] += d;
+	state[4] += e;
+	state[5] += f;
+	state[6] += g;
+	state[7] += h;
+
+	/* Clean up */
+	a = b = c = d = e = f = g = h = T1 = 0;
+}
+
+#else /* SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM */
+
+void
+SHA256_Transform(u_int32_t state[8], const u_int8_t data[SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH])
+{
+	u_int32_t	a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, s0, s1;
+	u_int32_t	T1, T2, W256[16];
+	int		j;
+
+	/* Initialize registers with the prev. intermediate value */
+	a = state[0];
+	b = state[1];
+	c = state[2];
+	d = state[3];
+	e = state[4];
+	f = state[5];
+	g = state[6];
+	h = state[7];
+
+	j = 0;
+	do {
+		BE_8_TO_32(W256[j], data);
+		data += 4;
+		/* Apply the SHA-256 compression function to update a..h */
+		T1 = h + Sigma1_256(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + K256[j] + W256[j];
+		T2 = Sigma0_256(a) + Maj(a, b, c);
+		h = g;
+		g = f;
+		f = e;
+		e = d + T1;
+		d = c;
+		c = b;
+		b = a;
+		a = T1 + T2;
+
+		j++;
+	} while (j < 16);
+
+	do {
+		/* Part of the message block expansion: */
+		s0 = W256[(j+1)&0x0f];
+		s0 = sigma0_256(s0);
+		s1 = W256[(j+14)&0x0f];	
+		s1 = sigma1_256(s1);
+
+		/* Apply the SHA-256 compression function to update a..h */
+		T1 = h + Sigma1_256(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + K256[j] + 
+		     (W256[j&0x0f] += s1 + W256[(j+9)&0x0f] + s0);
+		T2 = Sigma0_256(a) + Maj(a, b, c);
+		h = g;
+		g = f;
+		f = e;
+		e = d + T1;
+		d = c;
+		c = b;
+		b = a;
+		a = T1 + T2;
+
+		j++;
+	} while (j < 64);
+
+	/* Compute the current intermediate hash value */
+	state[0] += a;
+	state[1] += b;
+	state[2] += c;
+	state[3] += d;
+	state[4] += e;
+	state[5] += f;
+	state[6] += g;
+	state[7] += h;
+
+	/* Clean up */
+	a = b = c = d = e = f = g = h = T1 = T2 = 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM */
+
+void
+SHA256_Update(SHA256_CTX *context, const u_int8_t *data, size_t len)
+{
+	size_t	freespace, usedspace;
+
+	/* Calling with no data is valid (we do nothing) */
+	if (len == 0)
+		return;
+
+	usedspace = (context->bitcount >> 3) % SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+	if (usedspace > 0) {
+		/* Calculate how much free space is available in the buffer */
+		freespace = SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace;
+
+		if (len >= freespace) {
+			/* Fill the buffer completely and process it */
+			memcpy(&context->buffer[usedspace], data, freespace);
+			context->bitcount += freespace << 3;
+			len -= freespace;
+			data += freespace;
+			SHA256_Transform(context->state, context->buffer);
+		} else {
+			/* The buffer is not yet full */
+			memcpy(&context->buffer[usedspace], data, len);
+			context->bitcount += len << 3;
+			/* Clean up: */
+			usedspace = freespace = 0;
+			return;
+		}
+	}
+	while (len >= SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH) {
+		/* Process as many complete blocks as we can */
+		SHA256_Transform(context->state, data);
+		context->bitcount += SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH << 3;
+		len -= SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+		data += SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+	}
+	if (len > 0) {
+		/* There's left-overs, so save 'em */
+		memcpy(context->buffer, data, len);
+		context->bitcount += len << 3;
+	}
+	/* Clean up: */
+	usedspace = freespace = 0;
+}
+
+void
+SHA256_Pad(SHA256_CTX *context)
+{
+	unsigned int	usedspace;
+
+	usedspace = (context->bitcount >> 3) % SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+	if (usedspace > 0) {
+		/* Begin padding with a 1 bit: */
+		context->buffer[usedspace++] = 0x80;
+
+		if (usedspace <= SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH) {
+			/* Set-up for the last transform: */
+			memset(&context->buffer[usedspace], 0,
+			    SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace);
+		} else {
+			if (usedspace < SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH) {
+				memset(&context->buffer[usedspace], 0,
+				    SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace);
+			}
+			/* Do second-to-last transform: */
+			SHA256_Transform(context->state, context->buffer);
+
+			/* Prepare for last transform: */
+			memset(context->buffer, 0, SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH);
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* Set-up for the last transform: */
+		memset(context->buffer, 0, SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH);
+
+		/* Begin padding with a 1 bit: */
+		*context->buffer = 0x80;
+	}
+	/* Store the length of input data (in bits) in big endian format: */
+	BE_64_TO_8(&context->buffer[SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH],
+	    context->bitcount);
+
+	/* Final transform: */
+	SHA256_Transform(context->state, context->buffer);
+
+	/* Clean up: */
+	usedspace = 0;
+}
+
+void
+SHA256_Final(u_int8_t digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA256_CTX *context)
+{
+	SHA256_Pad(context);
+
+	/* If no digest buffer is passed, we don't bother doing this: */
+	if (digest != NULL) {
+#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
+		int	i;
+
+		/* Convert TO host byte order */
+		for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+			BE_32_TO_8(digest + i * 4, context->state[i]);
+#else
+		memcpy(digest, context->state, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+#endif
+		memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
+	}
+}
+
+
+/*** SHA-512: *********************************************************/
+void
+SHA512_Init(SHA512_CTX *context)
+{
+	if (context == NULL)
+		return;
+	memcpy(context->state, sha512_initial_hash_value,
+	    sizeof(sha512_initial_hash_value));
+	memset(context->buffer, 0, sizeof(context->buffer));
+	context->bitcount[0] = context->bitcount[1] =  0;
+}
+
+#ifdef SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM
+
+/* Unrolled SHA-512 round macros: */
+
+#define ROUND512_0_TO_15(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) do {				    \
+	BE_8_TO_64(W512[j], data);					    \
+	data += 8;							    \
+	T1 = (h) + Sigma1_512((e)) + Ch((e), (f), (g)) + K512[j] + W512[j]; \
+	(d) += T1;							    \
+	(h) = T1 + Sigma0_512((a)) + Maj((a), (b), (c));		    \
+	j++;								    \
+} while(0)
+
+
+#define ROUND512(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) do {					    \
+	s0 = W512[(j+1)&0x0f];						    \
+	s0 = sigma0_512(s0);						    \
+	s1 = W512[(j+14)&0x0f];						    \
+	s1 = sigma1_512(s1);						    \
+	T1 = (h) + Sigma1_512((e)) + Ch((e), (f), (g)) + K512[j] +	    \
+             (W512[j&0x0f] += s1 + W512[(j+9)&0x0f] + s0);		    \
+	(d) += T1;							    \
+	(h) = T1 + Sigma0_512((a)) + Maj((a), (b), (c));		    \
+	j++;								    \
+} while(0)
+
+void
+SHA512_Transform(u_int64_t state[8], const u_int8_t data[SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH])
+{
+	u_int64_t	a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, s0, s1;
+	u_int64_t	T1, W512[16];
+	int		j;
+
+	/* Initialize registers with the prev. intermediate value */
+	a = state[0];
+	b = state[1];
+	c = state[2];
+	d = state[3];
+	e = state[4];
+	f = state[5];
+	g = state[6];
+	h = state[7];
+
+	j = 0;
+	do {
+		/* Rounds 0 to 15 (unrolled): */
+		ROUND512_0_TO_15(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h);
+		ROUND512_0_TO_15(h,a,b,c,d,e,f,g);
+		ROUND512_0_TO_15(g,h,a,b,c,d,e,f);
+		ROUND512_0_TO_15(f,g,h,a,b,c,d,e);
+		ROUND512_0_TO_15(e,f,g,h,a,b,c,d);
+		ROUND512_0_TO_15(d,e,f,g,h,a,b,c);
+		ROUND512_0_TO_15(c,d,e,f,g,h,a,b);
+		ROUND512_0_TO_15(b,c,d,e,f,g,h,a);
+	} while (j < 16);
+
+	/* Now for the remaining rounds up to 79: */
+	do {
+		ROUND512(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h);
+		ROUND512(h,a,b,c,d,e,f,g);
+		ROUND512(g,h,a,b,c,d,e,f);
+		ROUND512(f,g,h,a,b,c,d,e);
+		ROUND512(e,f,g,h,a,b,c,d);
+		ROUND512(d,e,f,g,h,a,b,c);
+		ROUND512(c,d,e,f,g,h,a,b);
+		ROUND512(b,c,d,e,f,g,h,a);
+	} while (j < 80);
+
+	/* Compute the current intermediate hash value */
+	state[0] += a;
+	state[1] += b;
+	state[2] += c;
+	state[3] += d;
+	state[4] += e;
+	state[5] += f;
+	state[6] += g;
+	state[7] += h;
+
+	/* Clean up */
+	a = b = c = d = e = f = g = h = T1 = 0;
+}
+
+#else /* SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM */
+
+void
+SHA512_Transform(u_int64_t state[8], const u_int8_t data[SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH])
+{
+	u_int64_t	a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, s0, s1;
+	u_int64_t	T1, T2, W512[16];
+	int		j;
+
+	/* Initialize registers with the prev. intermediate value */
+	a = state[0];
+	b = state[1];
+	c = state[2];
+	d = state[3];
+	e = state[4];
+	f = state[5];
+	g = state[6];
+	h = state[7];
+
+	j = 0;
+	do {
+		BE_8_TO_64(W512[j], data);
+		data += 8;
+		/* Apply the SHA-512 compression function to update a..h */
+		T1 = h + Sigma1_512(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + K512[j] + W512[j];
+		T2 = Sigma0_512(a) + Maj(a, b, c);
+		h = g;
+		g = f;
+		f = e;
+		e = d + T1;
+		d = c;
+		c = b;
+		b = a;
+		a = T1 + T2;
+
+		j++;
+	} while (j < 16);
+
+	do {
+		/* Part of the message block expansion: */
+		s0 = W512[(j+1)&0x0f];
+		s0 = sigma0_512(s0);
+		s1 = W512[(j+14)&0x0f];
+		s1 =  sigma1_512(s1);
+
+		/* Apply the SHA-512 compression function to update a..h */
+		T1 = h + Sigma1_512(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + K512[j] +
+		     (W512[j&0x0f] += s1 + W512[(j+9)&0x0f] + s0);
+		T2 = Sigma0_512(a) + Maj(a, b, c);
+		h = g;
+		g = f;
+		f = e;
+		e = d + T1;
+		d = c;
+		c = b;
+		b = a;
+		a = T1 + T2;
+
+		j++;
+	} while (j < 80);
+
+	/* Compute the current intermediate hash value */
+	state[0] += a;
+	state[1] += b;
+	state[2] += c;
+	state[3] += d;
+	state[4] += e;
+	state[5] += f;
+	state[6] += g;
+	state[7] += h;
+
+	/* Clean up */
+	a = b = c = d = e = f = g = h = T1 = T2 = 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM */
+
+void
+SHA512_Update(SHA512_CTX *context, const u_int8_t *data, size_t len)
+{
+	size_t	freespace, usedspace;
+
+	/* Calling with no data is valid (we do nothing) */
+	if (len == 0)
+		return;
+
+	usedspace = (context->bitcount[0] >> 3) % SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+	if (usedspace > 0) {
+		/* Calculate how much free space is available in the buffer */
+		freespace = SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace;
+
+		if (len >= freespace) {
+			/* Fill the buffer completely and process it */
+			memcpy(&context->buffer[usedspace], data, freespace);
+			ADDINC128(context->bitcount, freespace << 3);
+			len -= freespace;
+			data += freespace;
+			SHA512_Transform(context->state, context->buffer);
+		} else {
+			/* The buffer is not yet full */
+			memcpy(&context->buffer[usedspace], data, len);
+			ADDINC128(context->bitcount, len << 3);
+			/* Clean up: */
+			usedspace = freespace = 0;
+			return;
+		}
+	}
+	while (len >= SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH) {
+		/* Process as many complete blocks as we can */
+		SHA512_Transform(context->state, data);
+		ADDINC128(context->bitcount, SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH << 3);
+		len -= SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+		data += SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+	}
+	if (len > 0) {
+		/* There's left-overs, so save 'em */
+		memcpy(context->buffer, data, len);
+		ADDINC128(context->bitcount, len << 3);
+	}
+	/* Clean up: */
+	usedspace = freespace = 0;
+}
+
+void
+SHA512_Pad(SHA512_CTX *context)
+{
+	unsigned int	usedspace;
+
+	usedspace = (context->bitcount[0] >> 3) % SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+	if (usedspace > 0) {
+		/* Begin padding with a 1 bit: */
+		context->buffer[usedspace++] = 0x80;
+
+		if (usedspace <= SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH) {
+			/* Set-up for the last transform: */
+			memset(&context->buffer[usedspace], 0, SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace);
+		} else {
+			if (usedspace < SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH) {
+				memset(&context->buffer[usedspace], 0, SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace);
+			}
+			/* Do second-to-last transform: */
+			SHA512_Transform(context->state, context->buffer);
+
+			/* And set-up for the last transform: */
+			memset(context->buffer, 0, SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH - 2);
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* Prepare for final transform: */
+		memset(context->buffer, 0, SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH);
+
+		/* Begin padding with a 1 bit: */
+		*context->buffer = 0x80;
+	}
+	/* Store the length of input data (in bits) in big endian format: */
+	BE_64_TO_8(&context->buffer[SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH],
+	    context->bitcount[1]);
+	BE_64_TO_8(&context->buffer[SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH + 8],
+	    context->bitcount[0]);
+
+	/* Final transform: */
+	SHA512_Transform(context->state, context->buffer);
+
+	/* Clean up: */
+	usedspace = 0;
+}
+
+void
+SHA512_Final(u_int8_t digest[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA512_CTX *context)
+{
+	SHA512_Pad(context);
+
+	/* If no digest buffer is passed, we don't bother doing this: */
+	if (digest != NULL) {
+#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
+		int	i;
+
+		/* Convert TO host byte order */
+		for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+			BE_64_TO_8(digest + i * 8, context->state[i]);
+#else
+		memcpy(digest, context->state, SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+#endif
+		memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
+	}
+}
+
+
+/*** SHA-384: *********************************************************/
+void
+SHA384_Init(SHA384_CTX *context)
+{
+	if (context == NULL)
+		return;
+	memcpy(context->state, sha384_initial_hash_value,
+	    sizeof(sha384_initial_hash_value));
+	memset(context->buffer, 0, sizeof(context->buffer));
+	context->bitcount[0] = context->bitcount[1] = 0;
+}
+
+#if 0
+__weak_alias(SHA384_Transform, SHA512_Transform);
+__weak_alias(SHA384_Update, SHA512_Update);
+__weak_alias(SHA384_Pad, SHA512_Pad);
+#endif
+
+void
+SHA384_Transform(u_int64_t state[8], const u_int8_t data[SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH])
+{
+	return SHA512_Transform(state, data);
+}
+
+void
+SHA384_Update(SHA512_CTX *context, const u_int8_t *data, size_t len)
+{
+	SHA512_Update(context, data, len);
+}
+
+void
+SHA384_Pad(SHA512_CTX *context)
+{
+	SHA512_Pad(context);
+}
+
+void
+SHA384_Final(u_int8_t digest[SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA384_CTX *context)
+{
+	SHA384_Pad(context);
+
+	/* If no digest buffer is passed, we don't bother doing this: */
+	if (digest != NULL) {
+#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
+		int	i;
+
+		/* Convert TO host byte order */
+		for (i = 0; i < 6; i++)
+			BE_64_TO_8(digest + i * 8, context->state[i]);
+#else
+		memcpy(digest, context->state, SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+#endif
+	}
+
+	/* Zero out state data */
+	memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
+}
+
+#endif /* defined(_NEED_SHA2) && !defined(HAVE_SHA256_UPDATE) */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/sha2.h b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/sha2.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c8bfc3cd1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/sha2.h
@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+/*	OpenBSD: sha2.h,v 1.6 2004/06/22 01:57:30 jfb Exp 	*/
+
+/*
+ * FILE:	sha2.h
+ * AUTHOR:	Aaron D. Gifford <me@aarongifford.com>
+ * 
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001, Aaron D. Gifford
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ * 
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTOR(S) ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTOR(S) BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * $From: sha2.h,v 1.1 2001/11/08 00:02:01 adg Exp adg $
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: include/sha2.h */
+
+#ifndef _SSHSHA2_H
+#define _SSHSHA2_H
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+# include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+# if !defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) && (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L)
+#  define _NEED_SHA2 1
+# endif
+#else
+# define _NEED_SHA2 1
+#endif
+
+#if defined(_NEED_SHA2) && !defined(HAVE_SHA256_UPDATE)
+
+/*** SHA-256/384/512 Various Length Definitions ***********************/
+#define SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH		64
+#define SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH		32
+#define SHA256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH	(SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1)
+#define SHA384_BLOCK_LENGTH		128
+#define SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH		48
+#define SHA384_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH	(SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1)
+#define SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH		128
+#define SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH		64
+#define SHA512_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH	(SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1)
+
+
+/*** SHA-256/384/512 Context Structures *******************************/
+typedef struct _SHA256_CTX {
+	u_int32_t	state[8];
+	u_int64_t	bitcount;
+	u_int8_t	buffer[SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH];
+} SHA256_CTX;
+typedef struct _SHA512_CTX {
+	u_int64_t	state[8];
+	u_int64_t	bitcount[2];
+	u_int8_t	buffer[SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH];
+} SHA512_CTX;
+
+typedef SHA512_CTX SHA384_CTX;
+
+void SHA256_Init(SHA256_CTX *);
+void SHA256_Transform(u_int32_t state[8], const u_int8_t [SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH]);
+void SHA256_Update(SHA256_CTX *, const u_int8_t *, size_t)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,2,3)));
+void SHA256_Pad(SHA256_CTX *);
+void SHA256_Final(u_int8_t [SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA256_CTX *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA256_End(SHA256_CTX *, char *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA256_File(const char *, char *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA256_FileChunk(const char *, char *, off_t, off_t)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA256_Data(const u_int8_t *, size_t, char *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,1,2)))
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,3,SHA256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+
+void SHA384_Init(SHA384_CTX *);
+void SHA384_Transform(u_int64_t state[8], const u_int8_t [SHA384_BLOCK_LENGTH]);
+void SHA384_Update(SHA384_CTX *, const u_int8_t *, size_t)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,2,3)));
+void SHA384_Pad(SHA384_CTX *);
+void SHA384_Final(u_int8_t [SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA384_CTX *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA384_End(SHA384_CTX *, char *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA384_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA384_File(const char *, char *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA384_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA384_FileChunk(const char *, char *, off_t, off_t)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA384_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA384_Data(const u_int8_t *, size_t, char *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,1,2)))
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,3,SHA384_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+
+void SHA512_Init(SHA512_CTX *);
+void SHA512_Transform(u_int64_t state[8], const u_int8_t [SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH]);
+void SHA512_Update(SHA512_CTX *, const u_int8_t *, size_t)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,2,3)));
+void SHA512_Pad(SHA512_CTX *);
+void SHA512_Final(u_int8_t [SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA512_CTX *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA512_End(SHA512_CTX *, char *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA512_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA512_File(const char *, char *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA512_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA512_FileChunk(const char *, char *, off_t, off_t)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA512_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA512_Data(const u_int8_t *, size_t, char *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,1,2)))
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,3,SHA512_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+
+#endif /* defined(_NEED_SHA2) && !defined(HAVE_SHA256_UPDATE) */
+
+#endif /* _SSHSHA2_H */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/sigact.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/sigact.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d67845cf1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/sigact.c
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: sigaction.c,v 1.4 2001/01/22 18:01:48 millert Exp $	*/
+
+/****************************************************************************
+ * Copyright (c) 1998,2000 Free Software Foundation, Inc.                   *
+ *                                                                          *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a  *
+ * copy of this software and associated documentation files (the            *
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including      *
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,      *
+ * distribute, distribute with modifications, sublicense, and/or sell       *
+ * copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is    *
+ * furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:                 *
+ *                                                                          *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included  *
+ * in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.                   *
+ *                                                                          *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS  *
+ * OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF               *
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT.   *
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE ABOVE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM,   *
+ * DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR    *
+ * OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR    *
+ * THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.                               *
+ *                                                                          *
+ * Except as contained in this notice, the name(s) of the above copyright   *
+ * holders shall not be used in advertising or otherwise to promote the     *
+ * sale, use or other dealings in this Software without prior written       *
+ * authorization.                                                           *
+ ****************************************************************************/
+
+/****************************************************************************
+ *  Author: Zeyd M. Ben-Halim <zmbenhal@netcom.com> 1992,1995               *
+ *     and: Eric S. Raymond <esr@snark.thyrsus.com>                         *
+ ****************************************************************************/
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libcurses/base/sigaction.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include "sigact.h"
+
+/* This file provides sigaction() emulation using sigvec() */
+/* Use only if this is non POSIX system */
+
+#if !HAVE_SIGACTION && HAVE_SIGVEC
+
+int
+sigaction(int sig, struct sigaction *sigact, struct sigaction *osigact)
+{
+	return sigvec(sig, sigact ? &sigact->sv : NULL,
+	    osigact ? &osigact->sv : NULL);
+}
+
+int
+sigemptyset (sigset_t *mask)
+{
+	if (!mask) {
+		errno = EINVAL;
+		return -1;
+	}
+	*mask = 0;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sigprocmask (int mode, sigset_t *mask, sigset_t *omask)
+{
+	sigset_t current = sigsetmask(0);
+
+	if (!mask) {
+		errno = EINVAL;
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	if (omask)
+		*omask = current;
+
+	if (mode == SIG_BLOCK)
+		current |= *mask;
+	else if (mode == SIG_UNBLOCK)
+		current &= ~*mask;
+	else if (mode == SIG_SETMASK)
+	current = *mask;
+
+	sigsetmask(current);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sigsuspend (sigset_t *mask)
+{
+	if (!mask) {
+		errno = EINVAL;
+		return -1;
+	}
+	return sigpause(*mask);
+}
+
+int
+sigdelset (sigset_t *mask, int sig)
+{
+	if (!mask) {
+		errno = EINVAL;
+		return -1;
+	}
+	*mask &= ~sigmask(sig);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sigaddset (sigset_t *mask, int sig)
+{
+	if (!mask) {
+		errno = EINVAL;
+		return -1;
+	}
+	*mask |= sigmask(sig);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sigismember (sigset_t *mask, int sig)
+{
+	if (!mask) {
+		errno = EINVAL;
+		return -1;
+	}
+	return (*mask & sigmask(sig)) != 0;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/sigact.h b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/sigact.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..db96d0a5c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/sigact.h
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: SigAction.h,v 1.3 2001/01/22 18:01:32 millert Exp $	*/
+
+/****************************************************************************
+ * Copyright (c) 1998,2000 Free Software Foundation, Inc.                   *
+ *                                                                          *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a  *
+ * copy of this software and associated documentation files (the            *
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including      *
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,      *
+ * distribute, distribute with modifications, sublicense, and/or sell       *
+ * copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is    *
+ * furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:                 *
+ *                                                                          *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included  *
+ * in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.                   *
+ *                                                                          *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS  *
+ * OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF               *
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT.   *
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE ABOVE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM,   *
+ * DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR    *
+ * OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR    *
+ * THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.                               *
+ *                                                                          *
+ * Except as contained in this notice, the name(s) of the above copyright   *
+ * holders shall not be used in advertising or otherwise to promote the     *
+ * sale, use or other dealings in this Software without prior written       *
+ * authorization.                                                           *
+ ****************************************************************************/
+
+/****************************************************************************
+ *  Author: Zeyd M. Ben-Halim <zmbenhal@netcom.com> 1992,1995               *
+ *     and: Eric S. Raymond <esr@snark.thyrsus.com>                         *
+ ****************************************************************************/
+
+/*
+ * $From: SigAction.h,v 1.6 2000/12/10 02:36:10 tom Exp $
+ *
+ * This file exists to handle non-POSIX systems which don't have <unistd.h>,
+ * and usually no sigaction() nor <termios.h>
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libcurses/SigAction.h */
+
+#ifndef _SIGACTION_H
+#define _SIGACTION_H
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_SIGACTION) && defined(HAVE_SIGVEC)
+
+#undef  SIG_BLOCK
+#define SIG_BLOCK       00
+
+#undef  SIG_UNBLOCK
+#define SIG_UNBLOCK     01
+
+#undef  SIG_SETMASK
+#define SIG_SETMASK     02
+
+/*
+ * <bsd/signal.h> is in the Linux 1.2.8 + gcc 2.7.0 configuration,
+ * and is useful for testing this header file.
+ */
+#if HAVE_BSD_SIGNAL_H
+# include <bsd/signal.h>
+#endif
+
+struct sigaction
+{
+	struct sigvec sv;
+};
+
+typedef unsigned long sigset_t;
+
+#undef  sa_mask
+#define sa_mask sv.sv_mask
+#undef  sa_handler
+#define sa_handler sv.sv_handler
+#undef  sa_flags
+#define sa_flags sv.sv_flags
+
+int sigaction(int sig, struct sigaction *sigact, struct sigaction *osigact);
+int sigprocmask (int how, sigset_t *mask, sigset_t *omask);
+int sigemptyset (sigset_t *mask);
+int sigsuspend (sigset_t *mask);
+int sigdelset (sigset_t *mask, int sig);
+int sigaddset (sigset_t *mask, int sig);
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SIGACTION) && defined(HAVE_SIGVEC) */
+
+#endif /* !defined(_SIGACTION_H) */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/strlcat.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/strlcat.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..bcc1b61ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/strlcat.c
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: strlcat.c,v 1.13 2005/08/08 08:05:37 espie Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1998 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/string/strlcat.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#ifndef HAVE_STRLCAT
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+/*
+ * Appends src to string dst of size siz (unlike strncat, siz is the
+ * full size of dst, not space left).  At most siz-1 characters
+ * will be copied.  Always NUL terminates (unless siz <= strlen(dst)).
+ * Returns strlen(src) + MIN(siz, strlen(initial dst)).
+ * If retval >= siz, truncation occurred.
+ */
+size_t
+strlcat(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz)
+{
+	char *d = dst;
+	const char *s = src;
+	size_t n = siz;
+	size_t dlen;
+
+	/* Find the end of dst and adjust bytes left but don't go past end */
+	while (n-- != 0 && *d != '\0')
+		d++;
+	dlen = d - dst;
+	n = siz - dlen;
+
+	if (n == 0)
+		return(dlen + strlen(s));
+	while (*s != '\0') {
+		if (n != 1) {
+			*d++ = *s;
+			n--;
+		}
+		s++;
+	}
+	*d = '\0';
+
+	return(dlen + (s - src));	/* count does not include NUL */
+}
+
+#endif /* !HAVE_STRLCAT */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/strlcpy.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/strlcpy.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b4b1b6015
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/strlcpy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: strlcpy.c,v 1.11 2006/05/05 15:27:38 millert Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1998 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/string/strlcpy.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#ifndef HAVE_STRLCPY
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+/*
+ * Copy src to string dst of size siz.  At most siz-1 characters
+ * will be copied.  Always NUL terminates (unless siz == 0).
+ * Returns strlen(src); if retval >= siz, truncation occurred.
+ */
+size_t
+strlcpy(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz)
+{
+	char *d = dst;
+	const char *s = src;
+	size_t n = siz;
+
+	/* Copy as many bytes as will fit */
+	if (n != 0) {
+		while (--n != 0) {
+			if ((*d++ = *s++) == '\0')
+				break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Not enough room in dst, add NUL and traverse rest of src */
+	if (n == 0) {
+		if (siz != 0)
+			*d = '\0';		/* NUL-terminate dst */
+		while (*s++)
+			;
+	}
+
+	return(s - src - 1);	/* count does not include NUL */
+}
+
+#endif /* !HAVE_STRLCPY */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/strmode.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/strmode.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4a8161422
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/strmode.c
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: strmode.c,v 1.7 2005/08/08 08:05:37 espie Exp $ */
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 1990 The Regents of the University of California.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/string/strmode.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#ifndef HAVE_STRMODE
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+/* XXX mode should be mode_t */
+
+void
+strmode(int mode, char *p)
+{
+	 /* print type */
+	switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
+	case S_IFDIR:			/* directory */
+		*p++ = 'd';
+		break;
+	case S_IFCHR:			/* character special */
+		*p++ = 'c';
+		break;
+	case S_IFBLK:			/* block special */
+		*p++ = 'b';
+		break;
+	case S_IFREG:			/* regular */
+		*p++ = '-';
+		break;
+	case S_IFLNK:			/* symbolic link */
+		*p++ = 'l';
+		break;
+#ifdef S_IFSOCK
+	case S_IFSOCK:			/* socket */
+		*p++ = 's';
+		break;
+#endif
+#ifdef S_IFIFO
+	case S_IFIFO:			/* fifo */
+		*p++ = 'p';
+		break;
+#endif
+	default:			/* unknown */
+		*p++ = '?';
+		break;
+	}
+	/* usr */
+	if (mode & S_IRUSR)
+		*p++ = 'r';
+	else
+		*p++ = '-';
+	if (mode & S_IWUSR)
+		*p++ = 'w';
+	else
+		*p++ = '-';
+	switch (mode & (S_IXUSR | S_ISUID)) {
+	case 0:
+		*p++ = '-';
+		break;
+	case S_IXUSR:
+		*p++ = 'x';
+		break;
+	case S_ISUID:
+		*p++ = 'S';
+		break;
+	case S_IXUSR | S_ISUID:
+		*p++ = 's';
+		break;
+	}
+	/* group */
+	if (mode & S_IRGRP)
+		*p++ = 'r';
+	else
+		*p++ = '-';
+	if (mode & S_IWGRP)
+		*p++ = 'w';
+	else
+		*p++ = '-';
+	switch (mode & (S_IXGRP | S_ISGID)) {
+	case 0:
+		*p++ = '-';
+		break;
+	case S_IXGRP:
+		*p++ = 'x';
+		break;
+	case S_ISGID:
+		*p++ = 'S';
+		break;
+	case S_IXGRP | S_ISGID:
+		*p++ = 's';
+		break;
+	}
+	/* other */
+	if (mode & S_IROTH)
+		*p++ = 'r';
+	else
+		*p++ = '-';
+	if (mode & S_IWOTH)
+		*p++ = 'w';
+	else
+		*p++ = '-';
+	switch (mode & (S_IXOTH | S_ISVTX)) {
+	case 0:
+		*p++ = '-';
+		break;
+	case S_IXOTH:
+		*p++ = 'x';
+		break;
+	case S_ISVTX:
+		*p++ = 'T';
+		break;
+	case S_IXOTH | S_ISVTX:
+		*p++ = 't';
+		break;
+	}
+	*p++ = ' ';		/* will be a '+' if ACL's implemented */
+	*p = '\0';
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/strnlen.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/strnlen.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..93d515595
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/strnlen.c
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: strnlen.c,v 1.3 2010/06/02 12:58:12 millert Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2010 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/string/strnlen.c */
+
+#include "config.h"
+#ifndef HAVE_STRNLEN
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+size_t
+strnlen(const char *str, size_t maxlen)
+{
+	const char *cp;
+
+	for (cp = str; maxlen != 0 && *cp != '\0'; cp++, maxlen--)
+		;
+
+	return (size_t)(cp - str);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/strptime.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/strptime.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d8d83d907
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/strptime.c
@@ -0,0 +1,401 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: strptime.c,v 1.12 2008/06/26 05:42:05 ray Exp $ */
+/*	$NetBSD: strptime.c,v 1.12 1998/01/20 21:39:40 mycroft Exp $	*/
+
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998 The NetBSD Foundation, Inc.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This code was contributed to The NetBSD Foundation by Klaus Klein.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE NETBSD FOUNDATION, INC. AND CONTRIBUTORS
+ * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
+ * TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE FOUNDATION OR CONTRIBUTORS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
+ * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
+ * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
+ * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
+ * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/time/strptime.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRPTIME
+
+#define TM_YEAR_BASE 1900	/* from tzfile.h */
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <locale.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+
+/* #define	_ctloc(x)		(_CurrentTimeLocale->x) */
+
+/*
+ * We do not implement alternate representations. However, we always
+ * check whether a given modifier is allowed for a certain conversion.
+ */
+#define _ALT_E			0x01
+#define _ALT_O			0x02
+#define	_LEGAL_ALT(x)		{ if (alt_format & ~(x)) return (0); }
+
+
+static	int _conv_num(const unsigned char **, int *, int, int);
+static	char *_strptime(const char *, const char *, struct tm *, int);
+
+
+char *
+strptime(const char *buf, const char *fmt, struct tm *tm)
+{
+	return(_strptime(buf, fmt, tm, 1));
+}
+
+static char *
+_strptime(const char *buf, const char *fmt, struct tm *tm, int initialize)
+{
+	unsigned char c;
+	const unsigned char *bp;
+	size_t len;
+	int alt_format, i;
+	static int century, relyear;
+
+	if (initialize) {
+		century = TM_YEAR_BASE;
+		relyear = -1;
+	}
+
+	bp = (unsigned char *)buf;
+	while ((c = *fmt) != '\0') {
+		/* Clear `alternate' modifier prior to new conversion. */
+		alt_format = 0;
+
+		/* Eat up white-space. */
+		if (isspace(c)) {
+			while (isspace(*bp))
+				bp++;
+
+			fmt++;
+			continue;
+		}
+				
+		if ((c = *fmt++) != '%')
+			goto literal;
+
+
+again:		switch (c = *fmt++) {
+		case '%':	/* "%%" is converted to "%". */
+literal:
+		if (c != *bp++)
+			return (NULL);
+
+		break;
+
+		/*
+		 * "Alternative" modifiers. Just set the appropriate flag
+		 * and start over again.
+		 */
+		case 'E':	/* "%E?" alternative conversion modifier. */
+			_LEGAL_ALT(0);
+			alt_format |= _ALT_E;
+			goto again;
+
+		case 'O':	/* "%O?" alternative conversion modifier. */
+			_LEGAL_ALT(0);
+			alt_format |= _ALT_O;
+			goto again;
+			
+		/*
+		 * "Complex" conversion rules, implemented through recursion.
+		 */
+#if 0
+		case 'c':	/* Date and time, using the locale's format. */
+			_LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_E);
+			if (!(bp = _strptime(bp, _ctloc(d_t_fmt), tm, 0)))
+				return (NULL);
+			break;
+#endif
+		case 'D':	/* The date as "%m/%d/%y". */
+			_LEGAL_ALT(0);
+			if (!(bp = _strptime(bp, "%m/%d/%y", tm, 0)))
+				return (NULL);
+			break;
+	
+		case 'R':	/* The time as "%H:%M". */
+			_LEGAL_ALT(0);
+			if (!(bp = _strptime(bp, "%H:%M", tm, 0)))
+				return (NULL);
+			break;
+
+		case 'r':	/* The time as "%I:%M:%S %p". */
+			_LEGAL_ALT(0);
+			if (!(bp = _strptime(bp, "%I:%M:%S %p", tm, 0)))
+				return (NULL);
+			break;
+
+		case 'T':	/* The time as "%H:%M:%S". */
+			_LEGAL_ALT(0);
+			if (!(bp = _strptime(bp, "%H:%M:%S", tm, 0)))
+				return (NULL);
+			break;
+#if 0
+		case 'X':	/* The time, using the locale's format. */
+			_LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_E);
+			if (!(bp = _strptime(bp, _ctloc(t_fmt), tm, 0)))
+				return (NULL);
+			break;
+
+		case 'x':	/* The date, using the locale's format. */
+			_LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_E);
+			if (!(bp = _strptime(bp, _ctloc(d_fmt), tm, 0)))
+				return (NULL);
+			break;
+#endif
+		/*
+		 * "Elementary" conversion rules.
+		 */
+#if 0
+		case 'A':	/* The day of week, using the locale's form. */
+		case 'a':
+			_LEGAL_ALT(0);
+			for (i = 0; i < 7; i++) {
+				/* Full name. */
+				len = strlen(_ctloc(day[i]));
+				if (strncasecmp(_ctloc(day[i]), bp, len) == 0)
+					break;
+
+				/* Abbreviated name. */
+				len = strlen(_ctloc(abday[i]));
+				if (strncasecmp(_ctloc(abday[i]), bp, len) == 0)
+					break;
+			}
+
+			/* Nothing matched. */
+			if (i == 7)
+				return (NULL);
+
+			tm->tm_wday = i;
+			bp += len;
+			break;
+
+		case 'B':	/* The month, using the locale's form. */
+		case 'b':
+		case 'h':
+			_LEGAL_ALT(0);
+			for (i = 0; i < 12; i++) {
+				/* Full name. */
+				len = strlen(_ctloc(mon[i]));
+				if (strncasecmp(_ctloc(mon[i]), bp, len) == 0)
+					break;
+
+				/* Abbreviated name. */
+				len = strlen(_ctloc(abmon[i]));
+				if (strncasecmp(_ctloc(abmon[i]), bp, len) == 0)
+					break;
+			}
+
+			/* Nothing matched. */
+			if (i == 12)
+				return (NULL);
+
+			tm->tm_mon = i;
+			bp += len;
+			break;
+#endif
+
+		case 'C':	/* The century number. */
+			_LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_E);
+			if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &i, 0, 99)))
+				return (NULL);
+
+			century = i * 100;
+			break;
+
+		case 'd':	/* The day of month. */
+		case 'e':
+			_LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_O);
+			if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &tm->tm_mday, 1, 31)))
+				return (NULL);
+			break;
+
+		case 'k':	/* The hour (24-hour clock representation). */
+			_LEGAL_ALT(0);
+			/* FALLTHROUGH */
+		case 'H':
+			_LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_O);
+			if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &tm->tm_hour, 0, 23)))
+				return (NULL);
+			break;
+
+		case 'l':	/* The hour (12-hour clock representation). */
+			_LEGAL_ALT(0);
+			/* FALLTHROUGH */
+		case 'I':
+			_LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_O);
+			if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &tm->tm_hour, 1, 12)))
+				return (NULL);
+			break;
+
+		case 'j':	/* The day of year. */
+			_LEGAL_ALT(0);
+			if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &tm->tm_yday, 1, 366)))
+				return (NULL);
+			tm->tm_yday--;
+			break;
+
+		case 'M':	/* The minute. */
+			_LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_O);
+			if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &tm->tm_min, 0, 59)))
+				return (NULL);
+			break;
+
+		case 'm':	/* The month. */
+			_LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_O);
+			if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &tm->tm_mon, 1, 12)))
+				return (NULL);
+			tm->tm_mon--;
+			break;
+
+#if 0
+		case 'p':	/* The locale's equivalent of AM/PM. */
+			_LEGAL_ALT(0);
+			/* AM? */
+			len = strlen(_ctloc(am_pm[0]));
+			if (strncasecmp(_ctloc(am_pm[0]), bp, len) == 0) {
+				if (tm->tm_hour > 12)	/* i.e., 13:00 AM ?! */
+					return (NULL);
+				else if (tm->tm_hour == 12)
+					tm->tm_hour = 0;
+
+				bp += len;
+				break;
+			}
+			/* PM? */
+			len = strlen(_ctloc(am_pm[1]));
+			if (strncasecmp(_ctloc(am_pm[1]), bp, len) == 0) {
+				if (tm->tm_hour > 12)	/* i.e., 13:00 PM ?! */
+					return (NULL);
+				else if (tm->tm_hour < 12)
+					tm->tm_hour += 12;
+
+				bp += len;
+				break;
+			}
+
+			/* Nothing matched. */
+			return (NULL);
+#endif
+		case 'S':	/* The seconds. */
+			_LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_O);
+			if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &tm->tm_sec, 0, 61)))
+				return (NULL);
+			break;
+
+		case 'U':	/* The week of year, beginning on sunday. */
+		case 'W':	/* The week of year, beginning on monday. */
+			_LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_O);
+			/*
+			 * XXX This is bogus, as we can not assume any valid
+			 * information present in the tm structure at this
+			 * point to calculate a real value, so just check the
+			 * range for now.
+			 */
+			 if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &i, 0, 53)))
+				return (NULL);
+			 break;
+
+		case 'w':	/* The day of week, beginning on sunday. */
+			_LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_O);
+			if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &tm->tm_wday, 0, 6)))
+				return (NULL);
+			break;
+
+		case 'Y':	/* The year. */
+			_LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_E);
+			if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &i, 0, 9999)))
+				return (NULL);
+
+			relyear = -1;
+			tm->tm_year = i - TM_YEAR_BASE;
+			break;
+
+		case 'y':	/* The year within the century (2 digits). */
+			_LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_E | _ALT_O);
+			if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &relyear, 0, 99)))
+				return (NULL);
+			break;
+
+		/*
+		 * Miscellaneous conversions.
+		 */
+		case 'n':	/* Any kind of white-space. */
+		case 't':
+			_LEGAL_ALT(0);
+			while (isspace(*bp))
+				bp++;
+			break;
+
+
+		default:	/* Unknown/unsupported conversion. */
+			return (NULL);
+		}
+
+
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * We need to evaluate the two digit year spec (%y)
+	 * last as we can get a century spec (%C) at any time.
+	 */
+	if (relyear != -1) {
+		if (century == TM_YEAR_BASE) {
+			if (relyear <= 68)
+				tm->tm_year = relyear + 2000 - TM_YEAR_BASE;
+			else
+				tm->tm_year = relyear + 1900 - TM_YEAR_BASE;
+		} else {
+			tm->tm_year = relyear + century - TM_YEAR_BASE;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return ((char *)bp);
+}
+
+
+static int
+_conv_num(const unsigned char **buf, int *dest, int llim, int ulim)
+{
+	int result = 0;
+	int rulim = ulim;
+
+	if (**buf < '0' || **buf > '9')
+		return (0);
+
+	/* we use rulim to break out of the loop when we run out of digits */
+	do {
+		result *= 10;
+		result += *(*buf)++ - '0';
+		rulim /= 10;
+	} while ((result * 10 <= ulim) && rulim && **buf >= '0' && **buf <= '9');
+
+	if (result < llim || result > ulim)
+		return (0);
+
+	*dest = result;
+	return (1);
+}
+
+#endif /* HAVE_STRPTIME */
+
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/strsep.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/strsep.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b36eb8fda
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/strsep.c
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: strsep.c,v 1.6 2005/08/08 08:05:37 espie Exp $	*/
+
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 1990, 1993
+ *	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/string/strsep.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_STRSEP)
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+/*
+ * Get next token from string *stringp, where tokens are possibly-empty
+ * strings separated by characters from delim.  
+ *
+ * Writes NULs into the string at *stringp to end tokens.
+ * delim need not remain constant from call to call.
+ * On return, *stringp points past the last NUL written (if there might
+ * be further tokens), or is NULL (if there are definitely no more tokens).
+ *
+ * If *stringp is NULL, strsep returns NULL.
+ */
+char *
+strsep(char **stringp, const char *delim)
+{
+	char *s;
+	const char *spanp;
+	int c, sc;
+	char *tok;
+
+	if ((s = *stringp) == NULL)
+		return (NULL);
+	for (tok = s;;) {
+		c = *s++;
+		spanp = delim;
+		do {
+			if ((sc = *spanp++) == c) {
+				if (c == 0)
+					s = NULL;
+				else
+					s[-1] = 0;
+				*stringp = s;
+				return (tok);
+			}
+		} while (sc != 0);
+	}
+	/* NOTREACHED */
+}
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_STRSEP) */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/strtoll.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/strtoll.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f62930388
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/strtoll.c
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: strtoll.c,v 1.6 2005/11/10 10:00:17 espie Exp $ */
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 1992 The Regents of the University of California.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/stdlib/strtoll.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#ifndef HAVE_STRTOLL
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+/*
+ * Convert a string to a long long.
+ *
+ * Ignores `locale' stuff.  Assumes that the upper and lower case
+ * alphabets and digits are each contiguous.
+ */
+long long
+strtoll(const char *nptr, char **endptr, int base)
+{
+	const char *s;
+	long long acc, cutoff;
+	int c;
+	int neg, any, cutlim;
+
+	/*
+	 * Skip white space and pick up leading +/- sign if any.
+	 * If base is 0, allow 0x for hex and 0 for octal, else
+	 * assume decimal; if base is already 16, allow 0x.
+	 */
+	s = nptr;
+	do {
+		c = (unsigned char) *s++;
+	} while (isspace(c));
+	if (c == '-') {
+		neg = 1;
+		c = *s++;
+	} else {
+		neg = 0;
+		if (c == '+')
+			c = *s++;
+	}
+	if ((base == 0 || base == 16) &&
+	    c == '0' && (*s == 'x' || *s == 'X')) {
+		c = s[1];
+		s += 2;
+		base = 16;
+	}
+	if (base == 0)
+		base = c == '0' ? 8 : 10;
+
+	/*
+	 * Compute the cutoff value between legal numbers and illegal
+	 * numbers.  That is the largest legal value, divided by the
+	 * base.  An input number that is greater than this value, if
+	 * followed by a legal input character, is too big.  One that
+	 * is equal to this value may be valid or not; the limit
+	 * between valid and invalid numbers is then based on the last
+	 * digit.  For instance, if the range for long longs is
+	 * [-9223372036854775808..9223372036854775807] and the input base
+	 * is 10, cutoff will be set to 922337203685477580 and cutlim to
+	 * either 7 (neg==0) or 8 (neg==1), meaning that if we have
+	 * accumulated a value > 922337203685477580, or equal but the
+	 * next digit is > 7 (or 8), the number is too big, and we will
+	 * return a range error.
+	 *
+	 * Set any if any `digits' consumed; make it negative to indicate
+	 * overflow.
+	 */
+	cutoff = neg ? LLONG_MIN : LLONG_MAX;
+	cutlim = cutoff % base;
+	cutoff /= base;
+	if (neg) {
+		if (cutlim > 0) {
+			cutlim -= base;
+			cutoff += 1;
+		}
+		cutlim = -cutlim;
+	}
+	for (acc = 0, any = 0;; c = (unsigned char) *s++) {
+		if (isdigit(c))
+			c -= '0';
+		else if (isalpha(c))
+			c -= isupper(c) ? 'A' - 10 : 'a' - 10;
+		else
+			break;
+		if (c >= base)
+			break;
+		if (any < 0)
+			continue;
+		if (neg) {
+			if (acc < cutoff || (acc == cutoff && c > cutlim)) {
+				any = -1;
+				acc = LLONG_MIN;
+				errno = ERANGE;
+			} else {
+				any = 1;
+				acc *= base;
+				acc -= c;
+			}
+		} else {
+			if (acc > cutoff || (acc == cutoff && c > cutlim)) {
+				any = -1;
+				acc = LLONG_MAX;
+				errno = ERANGE;
+			} else {
+				any = 1;
+				acc *= base;
+				acc += c;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if (endptr != 0)
+		*endptr = (char *) (any ? s - 1 : nptr);
+	return (acc);
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_STRTOLL */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/strtonum.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/strtonum.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..87f2f24b2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/strtonum.c
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: strtonum.c,v 1.6 2004/08/03 19:38:01 millert Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004 Ted Unangst and Todd Miller
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/stdlib/strtonum.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRTONUM
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#define INVALID 	1
+#define TOOSMALL 	2
+#define TOOLARGE 	3
+
+long long
+strtonum(const char *numstr, long long minval, long long maxval,
+    const char **errstrp)
+{
+	long long ll = 0;
+	char *ep;
+	int error = 0;
+	struct errval {
+		const char *errstr;
+		int err;
+	} ev[4] = {
+		{ NULL,		0 },
+		{ "invalid",	EINVAL },
+		{ "too small",	ERANGE },
+		{ "too large",	ERANGE },
+	};
+
+	ev[0].err = errno;
+	errno = 0;
+	if (minval > maxval)
+		error = INVALID;
+	else {
+		ll = strtoll(numstr, &ep, 10);
+		if (numstr == ep || *ep != '\0')
+			error = INVALID;
+		else if ((ll == LLONG_MIN && errno == ERANGE) || ll < minval)
+			error = TOOSMALL;
+		else if ((ll == LLONG_MAX && errno == ERANGE) || ll > maxval)
+			error = TOOLARGE;
+	}
+	if (errstrp != NULL)
+		*errstrp = ev[error].errstr;
+	errno = ev[error].err;
+	if (error)
+		ll = 0;
+
+	return (ll);
+}
+
+#endif /* HAVE_STRTONUM */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/strtoul.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/strtoul.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8219c8391
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/strtoul.c
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: strtoul.c,v 1.7 2005/08/08 08:05:37 espie Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1990 Regents of the University of California.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/stdlib/strtoul.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#ifndef HAVE_STRTOUL
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+/*
+ * Convert a string to an unsigned long integer.
+ *
+ * Ignores `locale' stuff.  Assumes that the upper and lower case
+ * alphabets and digits are each contiguous.
+ */
+unsigned long
+strtoul(const char *nptr, char **endptr, int base)
+{
+	const char *s;
+	unsigned long acc, cutoff;
+	int c;
+	int neg, any, cutlim;
+
+	/*
+	 * See strtol for comments as to the logic used.
+	 */
+	s = nptr;
+	do {
+		c = (unsigned char) *s++;
+	} while (isspace(c));
+	if (c == '-') {
+		neg = 1;
+		c = *s++;
+	} else {
+		neg = 0;
+		if (c == '+')
+			c = *s++;
+	}
+	if ((base == 0 || base == 16) &&
+	    c == '0' && (*s == 'x' || *s == 'X')) {
+		c = s[1];
+		s += 2;
+		base = 16;
+	}
+	if (base == 0)
+		base = c == '0' ? 8 : 10;
+
+	cutoff = ULONG_MAX / (unsigned long)base;
+	cutlim = ULONG_MAX % (unsigned long)base;
+	for (acc = 0, any = 0;; c = (unsigned char) *s++) {
+		if (isdigit(c))
+			c -= '0';
+		else if (isalpha(c))
+			c -= isupper(c) ? 'A' - 10 : 'a' - 10;
+		else
+			break;
+		if (c >= base)
+			break;
+		if (any < 0)
+			continue;
+		if (acc > cutoff || acc == cutoff && c > cutlim) {
+			any = -1;
+			acc = ULONG_MAX;
+			errno = ERANGE;
+		} else {
+			any = 1;
+			acc *= (unsigned long)base;
+			acc += c;
+		}
+	}
+	if (neg && any > 0)
+		acc = -acc;
+	if (endptr != 0)
+		*endptr = (char *) (any ? s - 1 : nptr);
+	return (acc);
+}
+#endif /* !HAVE_STRTOUL */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/strtoull.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/strtoull.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f7c818c52
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/strtoull.c
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: strtoull.c,v 1.5 2005/08/08 08:05:37 espie Exp $ */
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 1992 The Regents of the University of California.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/stdlib/strtoull.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#ifndef HAVE_STRTOULL
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+/*
+ * Convert a string to an unsigned long long.
+ *
+ * Ignores `locale' stuff.  Assumes that the upper and lower case
+ * alphabets and digits are each contiguous.
+ */
+unsigned long long
+strtoull(const char *nptr, char **endptr, int base)
+{
+	const char *s;
+	unsigned long long acc, cutoff;
+	int c;
+	int neg, any, cutlim;
+
+	/*
+	 * See strtoq for comments as to the logic used.
+	 */
+	s = nptr;
+	do {
+		c = (unsigned char) *s++;
+	} while (isspace(c));
+	if (c == '-') {
+		neg = 1;
+		c = *s++;
+	} else { 
+		neg = 0;
+		if (c == '+')
+			c = *s++;
+	}
+	if ((base == 0 || base == 16) &&
+	    c == '0' && (*s == 'x' || *s == 'X')) {
+		c = s[1];
+		s += 2;
+		base = 16;
+	}
+	if (base == 0)
+		base = c == '0' ? 8 : 10;
+
+	cutoff = ULLONG_MAX / (unsigned long long)base;
+	cutlim = ULLONG_MAX % (unsigned long long)base;
+	for (acc = 0, any = 0;; c = (unsigned char) *s++) {
+		if (isdigit(c))
+			c -= '0';
+		else if (isalpha(c))
+			c -= isupper(c) ? 'A' - 10 : 'a' - 10;
+		else
+			break;
+		if (c >= base)
+			break;
+		if (any < 0)
+			continue;
+		if (acc > cutoff || (acc == cutoff && c > cutlim)) {
+			any = -1;
+			acc = ULLONG_MAX;
+			errno = ERANGE;
+		} else {
+			any = 1;
+			acc *= (unsigned long long)base;
+			acc += c;
+		}
+	}
+	if (neg && any > 0)
+		acc = -acc;
+	if (endptr != 0)
+		*endptr = (char *) (any ? s - 1 : nptr);
+	return (acc);
+}
+#endif /* !HAVE_STRTOULL */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..28aaaa37a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h
@@ -0,0 +1,653 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: queue.h,v 1.36 2012/04/11 13:29:14 naddy Exp $	*/
+/*	$NetBSD: queue.h,v 1.11 1996/05/16 05:17:14 mycroft Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1991, 1993
+ *	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ *	@(#)queue.h	8.5 (Berkeley) 8/20/94
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: sys/sys/queue.h */
+
+#ifndef	_FAKE_QUEUE_H_
+#define	_FAKE_QUEUE_H_
+
+/*
+ * Require for OS/X and other platforms that have old/broken/incomplete
+ * <sys/queue.h>.
+ */
+#undef SLIST_HEAD
+#undef SLIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER
+#undef SLIST_ENTRY
+#undef SLIST_FOREACH_PREVPTR
+#undef SLIST_FIRST
+#undef SLIST_END
+#undef SLIST_EMPTY
+#undef SLIST_NEXT
+#undef SLIST_FOREACH
+#undef SLIST_INIT
+#undef SLIST_INSERT_AFTER
+#undef SLIST_INSERT_HEAD
+#undef SLIST_REMOVE_HEAD
+#undef SLIST_REMOVE
+#undef SLIST_REMOVE_NEXT
+#undef LIST_HEAD
+#undef LIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER
+#undef LIST_ENTRY
+#undef LIST_FIRST
+#undef LIST_END
+#undef LIST_EMPTY
+#undef LIST_NEXT
+#undef LIST_FOREACH
+#undef LIST_INIT
+#undef LIST_INSERT_AFTER
+#undef LIST_INSERT_BEFORE
+#undef LIST_INSERT_HEAD
+#undef LIST_REMOVE
+#undef LIST_REPLACE
+#undef SIMPLEQ_HEAD
+#undef SIMPLEQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER
+#undef SIMPLEQ_ENTRY
+#undef SIMPLEQ_FIRST
+#undef SIMPLEQ_END
+#undef SIMPLEQ_EMPTY
+#undef SIMPLEQ_NEXT
+#undef SIMPLEQ_FOREACH
+#undef SIMPLEQ_INIT
+#undef SIMPLEQ_INSERT_HEAD
+#undef SIMPLEQ_INSERT_TAIL
+#undef SIMPLEQ_INSERT_AFTER
+#undef SIMPLEQ_REMOVE_HEAD
+#undef TAILQ_HEAD
+#undef TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER
+#undef TAILQ_ENTRY
+#undef TAILQ_FIRST
+#undef TAILQ_END
+#undef TAILQ_NEXT
+#undef TAILQ_LAST
+#undef TAILQ_PREV
+#undef TAILQ_EMPTY
+#undef TAILQ_FOREACH
+#undef TAILQ_FOREACH_REVERSE
+#undef TAILQ_INIT
+#undef TAILQ_INSERT_HEAD
+#undef TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL
+#undef TAILQ_INSERT_AFTER
+#undef TAILQ_INSERT_BEFORE
+#undef TAILQ_REMOVE
+#undef TAILQ_REPLACE
+#undef CIRCLEQ_HEAD
+#undef CIRCLEQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER
+#undef CIRCLEQ_ENTRY
+#undef CIRCLEQ_FIRST
+#undef CIRCLEQ_LAST
+#undef CIRCLEQ_END
+#undef CIRCLEQ_NEXT
+#undef CIRCLEQ_PREV
+#undef CIRCLEQ_EMPTY
+#undef CIRCLEQ_FOREACH
+#undef CIRCLEQ_FOREACH_REVERSE
+#undef CIRCLEQ_INIT
+#undef CIRCLEQ_INSERT_AFTER
+#undef CIRCLEQ_INSERT_BEFORE
+#undef CIRCLEQ_INSERT_HEAD
+#undef CIRCLEQ_INSERT_TAIL
+#undef CIRCLEQ_REMOVE
+#undef CIRCLEQ_REPLACE
+
+/*
+ * This file defines five types of data structures: singly-linked lists, 
+ * lists, simple queues, tail queues, and circular queues.
+ *
+ *
+ * A singly-linked list is headed by a single forward pointer. The elements
+ * are singly linked for minimum space and pointer manipulation overhead at
+ * the expense of O(n) removal for arbitrary elements. New elements can be
+ * added to the list after an existing element or at the head of the list.
+ * Elements being removed from the head of the list should use the explicit
+ * macro for this purpose for optimum efficiency. A singly-linked list may
+ * only be traversed in the forward direction.  Singly-linked lists are ideal
+ * for applications with large datasets and few or no removals or for
+ * implementing a LIFO queue.
+ *
+ * A list is headed by a single forward pointer (or an array of forward
+ * pointers for a hash table header). The elements are doubly linked
+ * so that an arbitrary element can be removed without a need to
+ * traverse the list. New elements can be added to the list before
+ * or after an existing element or at the head of the list. A list
+ * may only be traversed in the forward direction.
+ *
+ * A simple queue is headed by a pair of pointers, one the head of the
+ * list and the other to the tail of the list. The elements are singly
+ * linked to save space, so elements can only be removed from the
+ * head of the list. New elements can be added to the list before or after
+ * an existing element, at the head of the list, or at the end of the
+ * list. A simple queue may only be traversed in the forward direction.
+ *
+ * A tail queue is headed by a pair of pointers, one to the head of the
+ * list and the other to the tail of the list. The elements are doubly
+ * linked so that an arbitrary element can be removed without a need to
+ * traverse the list. New elements can be added to the list before or
+ * after an existing element, at the head of the list, or at the end of
+ * the list. A tail queue may be traversed in either direction.
+ *
+ * A circle queue is headed by a pair of pointers, one to the head of the
+ * list and the other to the tail of the list. The elements are doubly
+ * linked so that an arbitrary element can be removed without a need to
+ * traverse the list. New elements can be added to the list before or after
+ * an existing element, at the head of the list, or at the end of the list.
+ * A circle queue may be traversed in either direction, but has a more
+ * complex end of list detection.
+ *
+ * For details on the use of these macros, see the queue(3) manual page.
+ */
+
+#if defined(QUEUE_MACRO_DEBUG) || (defined(_KERNEL) && defined(DIAGNOSTIC))
+#define _Q_INVALIDATE(a) (a) = ((void *)-1)
+#else
+#define _Q_INVALIDATE(a)
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Singly-linked List definitions.
+ */
+#define SLIST_HEAD(name, type)						\
+struct name {								\
+	struct type *slh_first;	/* first element */			\
+}
+ 
+#define	SLIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER(head)					\
+	{ NULL }
+ 
+#define SLIST_ENTRY(type)						\
+struct {								\
+	struct type *sle_next;	/* next element */			\
+}
+ 
+/*
+ * Singly-linked List access methods.
+ */
+#define	SLIST_FIRST(head)	((head)->slh_first)
+#define	SLIST_END(head)		NULL
+#define	SLIST_EMPTY(head)	(SLIST_FIRST(head) == SLIST_END(head))
+#define	SLIST_NEXT(elm, field)	((elm)->field.sle_next)
+
+#define	SLIST_FOREACH(var, head, field)					\
+	for((var) = SLIST_FIRST(head);					\
+	    (var) != SLIST_END(head);					\
+	    (var) = SLIST_NEXT(var, field))
+
+#define	SLIST_FOREACH_SAFE(var, head, field, tvar)			\
+	for ((var) = SLIST_FIRST(head);				\
+	    (var) && ((tvar) = SLIST_NEXT(var, field), 1);		\
+	    (var) = (tvar))
+
+/*
+ * Singly-linked List functions.
+ */
+#define	SLIST_INIT(head) {						\
+	SLIST_FIRST(head) = SLIST_END(head);				\
+}
+
+#define	SLIST_INSERT_AFTER(slistelm, elm, field) do {			\
+	(elm)->field.sle_next = (slistelm)->field.sle_next;		\
+	(slistelm)->field.sle_next = (elm);				\
+} while (0)
+
+#define	SLIST_INSERT_HEAD(head, elm, field) do {			\
+	(elm)->field.sle_next = (head)->slh_first;			\
+	(head)->slh_first = (elm);					\
+} while (0)
+
+#define	SLIST_REMOVE_AFTER(elm, field) do {				\
+	(elm)->field.sle_next = (elm)->field.sle_next->field.sle_next;	\
+} while (0)
+
+#define	SLIST_REMOVE_HEAD(head, field) do {				\
+	(head)->slh_first = (head)->slh_first->field.sle_next;		\
+} while (0)
+
+#define SLIST_REMOVE(head, elm, type, field) do {			\
+	if ((head)->slh_first == (elm)) {				\
+		SLIST_REMOVE_HEAD((head), field);			\
+	} else {							\
+		struct type *curelm = (head)->slh_first;		\
+									\
+		while (curelm->field.sle_next != (elm))			\
+			curelm = curelm->field.sle_next;		\
+		curelm->field.sle_next =				\
+		    curelm->field.sle_next->field.sle_next;		\
+		_Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.sle_next);			\
+	}								\
+} while (0)
+
+/*
+ * List definitions.
+ */
+#define LIST_HEAD(name, type)						\
+struct name {								\
+	struct type *lh_first;	/* first element */			\
+}
+
+#define LIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER(head)					\
+	{ NULL }
+
+#define LIST_ENTRY(type)						\
+struct {								\
+	struct type *le_next;	/* next element */			\
+	struct type **le_prev;	/* address of previous next element */	\
+}
+
+/*
+ * List access methods
+ */
+#define	LIST_FIRST(head)		((head)->lh_first)
+#define	LIST_END(head)			NULL
+#define	LIST_EMPTY(head)		(LIST_FIRST(head) == LIST_END(head))
+#define	LIST_NEXT(elm, field)		((elm)->field.le_next)
+
+#define LIST_FOREACH(var, head, field)					\
+	for((var) = LIST_FIRST(head);					\
+	    (var)!= LIST_END(head);					\
+	    (var) = LIST_NEXT(var, field))
+
+#define	LIST_FOREACH_SAFE(var, head, field, tvar)			\
+	for ((var) = LIST_FIRST(head);				\
+	    (var) && ((tvar) = LIST_NEXT(var, field), 1);		\
+	    (var) = (tvar))
+
+/*
+ * List functions.
+ */
+#define	LIST_INIT(head) do {						\
+	LIST_FIRST(head) = LIST_END(head);				\
+} while (0)
+
+#define LIST_INSERT_AFTER(listelm, elm, field) do {			\
+	if (((elm)->field.le_next = (listelm)->field.le_next) != NULL)	\
+		(listelm)->field.le_next->field.le_prev =		\
+		    &(elm)->field.le_next;				\
+	(listelm)->field.le_next = (elm);				\
+	(elm)->field.le_prev = &(listelm)->field.le_next;		\
+} while (0)
+
+#define	LIST_INSERT_BEFORE(listelm, elm, field) do {			\
+	(elm)->field.le_prev = (listelm)->field.le_prev;		\
+	(elm)->field.le_next = (listelm);				\
+	*(listelm)->field.le_prev = (elm);				\
+	(listelm)->field.le_prev = &(elm)->field.le_next;		\
+} while (0)
+
+#define LIST_INSERT_HEAD(head, elm, field) do {				\
+	if (((elm)->field.le_next = (head)->lh_first) != NULL)		\
+		(head)->lh_first->field.le_prev = &(elm)->field.le_next;\
+	(head)->lh_first = (elm);					\
+	(elm)->field.le_prev = &(head)->lh_first;			\
+} while (0)
+
+#define LIST_REMOVE(elm, field) do {					\
+	if ((elm)->field.le_next != NULL)				\
+		(elm)->field.le_next->field.le_prev =			\
+		    (elm)->field.le_prev;				\
+	*(elm)->field.le_prev = (elm)->field.le_next;			\
+	_Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.le_prev);				\
+	_Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.le_next);				\
+} while (0)
+
+#define LIST_REPLACE(elm, elm2, field) do {				\
+	if (((elm2)->field.le_next = (elm)->field.le_next) != NULL)	\
+		(elm2)->field.le_next->field.le_prev =			\
+		    &(elm2)->field.le_next;				\
+	(elm2)->field.le_prev = (elm)->field.le_prev;			\
+	*(elm2)->field.le_prev = (elm2);				\
+	_Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.le_prev);				\
+	_Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.le_next);				\
+} while (0)
+
+/*
+ * Simple queue definitions.
+ */
+#define SIMPLEQ_HEAD(name, type)					\
+struct name {								\
+	struct type *sqh_first;	/* first element */			\
+	struct type **sqh_last;	/* addr of last next element */		\
+}
+
+#define SIMPLEQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(head)					\
+	{ NULL, &(head).sqh_first }
+
+#define SIMPLEQ_ENTRY(type)						\
+struct {								\
+	struct type *sqe_next;	/* next element */			\
+}
+
+/*
+ * Simple queue access methods.
+ */
+#define	SIMPLEQ_FIRST(head)	    ((head)->sqh_first)
+#define	SIMPLEQ_END(head)	    NULL
+#define	SIMPLEQ_EMPTY(head)	    (SIMPLEQ_FIRST(head) == SIMPLEQ_END(head))
+#define	SIMPLEQ_NEXT(elm, field)    ((elm)->field.sqe_next)
+
+#define SIMPLEQ_FOREACH(var, head, field)				\
+	for((var) = SIMPLEQ_FIRST(head);				\
+	    (var) != SIMPLEQ_END(head);					\
+	    (var) = SIMPLEQ_NEXT(var, field))
+
+#define	SIMPLEQ_FOREACH_SAFE(var, head, field, tvar)			\
+	for ((var) = SIMPLEQ_FIRST(head);				\
+	    (var) && ((tvar) = SIMPLEQ_NEXT(var, field), 1);		\
+	    (var) = (tvar))
+
+/*
+ * Simple queue functions.
+ */
+#define	SIMPLEQ_INIT(head) do {						\
+	(head)->sqh_first = NULL;					\
+	(head)->sqh_last = &(head)->sqh_first;				\
+} while (0)
+
+#define SIMPLEQ_INSERT_HEAD(head, elm, field) do {			\
+	if (((elm)->field.sqe_next = (head)->sqh_first) == NULL)	\
+		(head)->sqh_last = &(elm)->field.sqe_next;		\
+	(head)->sqh_first = (elm);					\
+} while (0)
+
+#define SIMPLEQ_INSERT_TAIL(head, elm, field) do {			\
+	(elm)->field.sqe_next = NULL;					\
+	*(head)->sqh_last = (elm);					\
+	(head)->sqh_last = &(elm)->field.sqe_next;			\
+} while (0)
+
+#define SIMPLEQ_INSERT_AFTER(head, listelm, elm, field) do {		\
+	if (((elm)->field.sqe_next = (listelm)->field.sqe_next) == NULL)\
+		(head)->sqh_last = &(elm)->field.sqe_next;		\
+	(listelm)->field.sqe_next = (elm);				\
+} while (0)
+
+#define SIMPLEQ_REMOVE_HEAD(head, field) do {			\
+	if (((head)->sqh_first = (head)->sqh_first->field.sqe_next) == NULL) \
+		(head)->sqh_last = &(head)->sqh_first;			\
+} while (0)
+
+#define SIMPLEQ_REMOVE_AFTER(head, elm, field) do {			\
+	if (((elm)->field.sqe_next = (elm)->field.sqe_next->field.sqe_next) \
+	    == NULL)							\
+		(head)->sqh_last = &(elm)->field.sqe_next;		\
+} while (0)
+
+/*
+ * Tail queue definitions.
+ */
+#define TAILQ_HEAD(name, type)						\
+struct name {								\
+	struct type *tqh_first;	/* first element */			\
+	struct type **tqh_last;	/* addr of last next element */		\
+}
+
+#define TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(head)					\
+	{ NULL, &(head).tqh_first }
+
+#define TAILQ_ENTRY(type)						\
+struct {								\
+	struct type *tqe_next;	/* next element */			\
+	struct type **tqe_prev;	/* address of previous next element */	\
+}
+
+/* 
+ * tail queue access methods 
+ */
+#define	TAILQ_FIRST(head)		((head)->tqh_first)
+#define	TAILQ_END(head)			NULL
+#define	TAILQ_NEXT(elm, field)		((elm)->field.tqe_next)
+#define TAILQ_LAST(head, headname)					\
+	(*(((struct headname *)((head)->tqh_last))->tqh_last))
+/* XXX */
+#define TAILQ_PREV(elm, headname, field)				\
+	(*(((struct headname *)((elm)->field.tqe_prev))->tqh_last))
+#define	TAILQ_EMPTY(head)						\
+	(TAILQ_FIRST(head) == TAILQ_END(head))
+
+#define TAILQ_FOREACH(var, head, field)					\
+	for((var) = TAILQ_FIRST(head);					\
+	    (var) != TAILQ_END(head);					\
+	    (var) = TAILQ_NEXT(var, field))
+
+#define	TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(var, head, field, tvar)			\
+	for ((var) = TAILQ_FIRST(head);					\
+	    (var) != TAILQ_END(head) &&					\
+	    ((tvar) = TAILQ_NEXT(var, field), 1);			\
+	    (var) = (tvar))
+
+
+#define TAILQ_FOREACH_REVERSE(var, head, headname, field)		\
+	for((var) = TAILQ_LAST(head, headname);				\
+	    (var) != TAILQ_END(head);					\
+	    (var) = TAILQ_PREV(var, headname, field))
+
+#define	TAILQ_FOREACH_REVERSE_SAFE(var, head, headname, field, tvar)	\
+	for ((var) = TAILQ_LAST(head, headname);			\
+	    (var) != TAILQ_END(head) &&					\
+	    ((tvar) = TAILQ_PREV(var, headname, field), 1);		\
+	    (var) = (tvar))
+
+/*
+ * Tail queue functions.
+ */
+#define	TAILQ_INIT(head) do {						\
+	(head)->tqh_first = NULL;					\
+	(head)->tqh_last = &(head)->tqh_first;				\
+} while (0)
+
+#define TAILQ_INSERT_HEAD(head, elm, field) do {			\
+	if (((elm)->field.tqe_next = (head)->tqh_first) != NULL)	\
+		(head)->tqh_first->field.tqe_prev =			\
+		    &(elm)->field.tqe_next;				\
+	else								\
+		(head)->tqh_last = &(elm)->field.tqe_next;		\
+	(head)->tqh_first = (elm);					\
+	(elm)->field.tqe_prev = &(head)->tqh_first;			\
+} while (0)
+
+#define TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(head, elm, field) do {			\
+	(elm)->field.tqe_next = NULL;					\
+	(elm)->field.tqe_prev = (head)->tqh_last;			\
+	*(head)->tqh_last = (elm);					\
+	(head)->tqh_last = &(elm)->field.tqe_next;			\
+} while (0)
+
+#define TAILQ_INSERT_AFTER(head, listelm, elm, field) do {		\
+	if (((elm)->field.tqe_next = (listelm)->field.tqe_next) != NULL)\
+		(elm)->field.tqe_next->field.tqe_prev =			\
+		    &(elm)->field.tqe_next;				\
+	else								\
+		(head)->tqh_last = &(elm)->field.tqe_next;		\
+	(listelm)->field.tqe_next = (elm);				\
+	(elm)->field.tqe_prev = &(listelm)->field.tqe_next;		\
+} while (0)
+
+#define	TAILQ_INSERT_BEFORE(listelm, elm, field) do {			\
+	(elm)->field.tqe_prev = (listelm)->field.tqe_prev;		\
+	(elm)->field.tqe_next = (listelm);				\
+	*(listelm)->field.tqe_prev = (elm);				\
+	(listelm)->field.tqe_prev = &(elm)->field.tqe_next;		\
+} while (0)
+
+#define TAILQ_REMOVE(head, elm, field) do {				\
+	if (((elm)->field.tqe_next) != NULL)				\
+		(elm)->field.tqe_next->field.tqe_prev =			\
+		    (elm)->field.tqe_prev;				\
+	else								\
+		(head)->tqh_last = (elm)->field.tqe_prev;		\
+	*(elm)->field.tqe_prev = (elm)->field.tqe_next;			\
+	_Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.tqe_prev);				\
+	_Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.tqe_next);				\
+} while (0)
+
+#define TAILQ_REPLACE(head, elm, elm2, field) do {			\
+	if (((elm2)->field.tqe_next = (elm)->field.tqe_next) != NULL)	\
+		(elm2)->field.tqe_next->field.tqe_prev =		\
+		    &(elm2)->field.tqe_next;				\
+	else								\
+		(head)->tqh_last = &(elm2)->field.tqe_next;		\
+	(elm2)->field.tqe_prev = (elm)->field.tqe_prev;			\
+	*(elm2)->field.tqe_prev = (elm2);				\
+	_Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.tqe_prev);				\
+	_Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.tqe_next);				\
+} while (0)
+
+/*
+ * Circular queue definitions.
+ */
+#define CIRCLEQ_HEAD(name, type)					\
+struct name {								\
+	struct type *cqh_first;		/* first element */		\
+	struct type *cqh_last;		/* last element */		\
+}
+
+#define CIRCLEQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(head)					\
+	{ CIRCLEQ_END(&head), CIRCLEQ_END(&head) }
+
+#define CIRCLEQ_ENTRY(type)						\
+struct {								\
+	struct type *cqe_next;		/* next element */		\
+	struct type *cqe_prev;		/* previous element */		\
+}
+
+/*
+ * Circular queue access methods 
+ */
+#define	CIRCLEQ_FIRST(head)		((head)->cqh_first)
+#define	CIRCLEQ_LAST(head)		((head)->cqh_last)
+#define	CIRCLEQ_END(head)		((void *)(head))
+#define	CIRCLEQ_NEXT(elm, field)	((elm)->field.cqe_next)
+#define	CIRCLEQ_PREV(elm, field)	((elm)->field.cqe_prev)
+#define	CIRCLEQ_EMPTY(head)						\
+	(CIRCLEQ_FIRST(head) == CIRCLEQ_END(head))
+
+#define CIRCLEQ_FOREACH(var, head, field)				\
+	for((var) = CIRCLEQ_FIRST(head);				\
+	    (var) != CIRCLEQ_END(head);					\
+	    (var) = CIRCLEQ_NEXT(var, field))
+
+#define	CIRCLEQ_FOREACH_SAFE(var, head, field, tvar)			\
+	for ((var) = CIRCLEQ_FIRST(head);				\
+	    (var) != CIRCLEQ_END(head) &&				\
+	    ((tvar) = CIRCLEQ_NEXT(var, field), 1);			\
+	    (var) = (tvar))
+
+#define CIRCLEQ_FOREACH_REVERSE(var, head, field)			\
+	for((var) = CIRCLEQ_LAST(head);					\
+	    (var) != CIRCLEQ_END(head);					\
+	    (var) = CIRCLEQ_PREV(var, field))
+
+#define	CIRCLEQ_FOREACH_REVERSE_SAFE(var, head, headname, field, tvar)	\
+	for ((var) = CIRCLEQ_LAST(head, headname);			\
+	    (var) != CIRCLEQ_END(head) && 				\
+	    ((tvar) = CIRCLEQ_PREV(var, headname, field), 1);		\
+	    (var) = (tvar))
+
+/*
+ * Circular queue functions.
+ */
+#define	CIRCLEQ_INIT(head) do {						\
+	(head)->cqh_first = CIRCLEQ_END(head);				\
+	(head)->cqh_last = CIRCLEQ_END(head);				\
+} while (0)
+
+#define CIRCLEQ_INSERT_AFTER(head, listelm, elm, field) do {		\
+	(elm)->field.cqe_next = (listelm)->field.cqe_next;		\
+	(elm)->field.cqe_prev = (listelm);				\
+	if ((listelm)->field.cqe_next == CIRCLEQ_END(head))		\
+		(head)->cqh_last = (elm);				\
+	else								\
+		(listelm)->field.cqe_next->field.cqe_prev = (elm);	\
+	(listelm)->field.cqe_next = (elm);				\
+} while (0)
+
+#define CIRCLEQ_INSERT_BEFORE(head, listelm, elm, field) do {		\
+	(elm)->field.cqe_next = (listelm);				\
+	(elm)->field.cqe_prev = (listelm)->field.cqe_prev;		\
+	if ((listelm)->field.cqe_prev == CIRCLEQ_END(head))		\
+		(head)->cqh_first = (elm);				\
+	else								\
+		(listelm)->field.cqe_prev->field.cqe_next = (elm);	\
+	(listelm)->field.cqe_prev = (elm);				\
+} while (0)
+
+#define CIRCLEQ_INSERT_HEAD(head, elm, field) do {			\
+	(elm)->field.cqe_next = (head)->cqh_first;			\
+	(elm)->field.cqe_prev = CIRCLEQ_END(head);			\
+	if ((head)->cqh_last == CIRCLEQ_END(head))			\
+		(head)->cqh_last = (elm);				\
+	else								\
+		(head)->cqh_first->field.cqe_prev = (elm);		\
+	(head)->cqh_first = (elm);					\
+} while (0)
+
+#define CIRCLEQ_INSERT_TAIL(head, elm, field) do {			\
+	(elm)->field.cqe_next = CIRCLEQ_END(head);			\
+	(elm)->field.cqe_prev = (head)->cqh_last;			\
+	if ((head)->cqh_first == CIRCLEQ_END(head))			\
+		(head)->cqh_first = (elm);				\
+	else								\
+		(head)->cqh_last->field.cqe_next = (elm);		\
+	(head)->cqh_last = (elm);					\
+} while (0)
+
+#define	CIRCLEQ_REMOVE(head, elm, field) do {				\
+	if ((elm)->field.cqe_next == CIRCLEQ_END(head))			\
+		(head)->cqh_last = (elm)->field.cqe_prev;		\
+	else								\
+		(elm)->field.cqe_next->field.cqe_prev =			\
+		    (elm)->field.cqe_prev;				\
+	if ((elm)->field.cqe_prev == CIRCLEQ_END(head))			\
+		(head)->cqh_first = (elm)->field.cqe_next;		\
+	else								\
+		(elm)->field.cqe_prev->field.cqe_next =			\
+		    (elm)->field.cqe_next;				\
+	_Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.cqe_prev);				\
+	_Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.cqe_next);				\
+} while (0)
+
+#define CIRCLEQ_REPLACE(head, elm, elm2, field) do {			\
+	if (((elm2)->field.cqe_next = (elm)->field.cqe_next) ==		\
+	    CIRCLEQ_END(head))						\
+		(head).cqh_last = (elm2);				\
+	else								\
+		(elm2)->field.cqe_next->field.cqe_prev = (elm2);	\
+	if (((elm2)->field.cqe_prev = (elm)->field.cqe_prev) ==		\
+	    CIRCLEQ_END(head))						\
+		(head).cqh_first = (elm2);				\
+	else								\
+		(elm2)->field.cqe_prev->field.cqe_next = (elm2);	\
+	_Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.cqe_prev);				\
+	_Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.cqe_next);				\
+} while (0)
+
+#endif	/* !_FAKE_QUEUE_H_ */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7f7546ecd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h
@@ -0,0 +1,755 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: tree.h,v 1.13 2011/07/09 00:19:45 pirofti Exp $	*/
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: sys/sys/tree.h */
+
+#include "config.h"
+#ifdef NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_RETURN_TYPE
+# define __attribute__(x)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef	_SYS_TREE_H_
+#define	_SYS_TREE_H_
+
+/*
+ * This file defines data structures for different types of trees:
+ * splay trees and red-black trees.
+ *
+ * A splay tree is a self-organizing data structure.  Every operation
+ * on the tree causes a splay to happen.  The splay moves the requested
+ * node to the root of the tree and partly rebalances it.
+ *
+ * This has the benefit that request locality causes faster lookups as
+ * the requested nodes move to the top of the tree.  On the other hand,
+ * every lookup causes memory writes.
+ *
+ * The Balance Theorem bounds the total access time for m operations
+ * and n inserts on an initially empty tree as O((m + n)lg n).  The
+ * amortized cost for a sequence of m accesses to a splay tree is O(lg n);
+ *
+ * A red-black tree is a binary search tree with the node color as an
+ * extra attribute.  It fulfills a set of conditions:
+ *	- every search path from the root to a leaf consists of the
+ *	  same number of black nodes,
+ *	- each red node (except for the root) has a black parent,
+ *	- each leaf node is black.
+ *
+ * Every operation on a red-black tree is bounded as O(lg n).
+ * The maximum height of a red-black tree is 2lg (n+1).
+ */
+
+#define SPLAY_HEAD(name, type)						\
+struct name {								\
+	struct type *sph_root; /* root of the tree */			\
+}
+
+#define SPLAY_INITIALIZER(root)						\
+	{ NULL }
+
+#define SPLAY_INIT(root) do {						\
+	(root)->sph_root = NULL;					\
+} while (0)
+
+#define SPLAY_ENTRY(type)						\
+struct {								\
+	struct type *spe_left; /* left element */			\
+	struct type *spe_right; /* right element */			\
+}
+
+#define SPLAY_LEFT(elm, field)		(elm)->field.spe_left
+#define SPLAY_RIGHT(elm, field)		(elm)->field.spe_right
+#define SPLAY_ROOT(head)		(head)->sph_root
+#define SPLAY_EMPTY(head)		(SPLAY_ROOT(head) == NULL)
+
+/* SPLAY_ROTATE_{LEFT,RIGHT} expect that tmp hold SPLAY_{RIGHT,LEFT} */
+#define SPLAY_ROTATE_RIGHT(head, tmp, field) do {			\
+	SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field) = SPLAY_RIGHT(tmp, field);	\
+	SPLAY_RIGHT(tmp, field) = (head)->sph_root;			\
+	(head)->sph_root = tmp;						\
+} while (0)
+	
+#define SPLAY_ROTATE_LEFT(head, tmp, field) do {			\
+	SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field) = SPLAY_LEFT(tmp, field);	\
+	SPLAY_LEFT(tmp, field) = (head)->sph_root;			\
+	(head)->sph_root = tmp;						\
+} while (0)
+
+#define SPLAY_LINKLEFT(head, tmp, field) do {				\
+	SPLAY_LEFT(tmp, field) = (head)->sph_root;			\
+	tmp = (head)->sph_root;						\
+	(head)->sph_root = SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field);		\
+} while (0)
+
+#define SPLAY_LINKRIGHT(head, tmp, field) do {				\
+	SPLAY_RIGHT(tmp, field) = (head)->sph_root;			\
+	tmp = (head)->sph_root;						\
+	(head)->sph_root = SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field);	\
+} while (0)
+
+#define SPLAY_ASSEMBLE(head, node, left, right, field) do {		\
+	SPLAY_RIGHT(left, field) = SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field);	\
+	SPLAY_LEFT(right, field) = SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field);\
+	SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field) = SPLAY_RIGHT(node, field);	\
+	SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field) = SPLAY_LEFT(node, field);	\
+} while (0)
+
+/* Generates prototypes and inline functions */
+
+#define SPLAY_PROTOTYPE(name, type, field, cmp)				\
+void name##_SPLAY(struct name *, struct type *);			\
+void name##_SPLAY_MINMAX(struct name *, int);				\
+struct type *name##_SPLAY_INSERT(struct name *, struct type *);		\
+struct type *name##_SPLAY_REMOVE(struct name *, struct type *);		\
+									\
+/* Finds the node with the same key as elm */				\
+static __inline struct type *						\
+name##_SPLAY_FIND(struct name *head, struct type *elm)			\
+{									\
+	if (SPLAY_EMPTY(head))						\
+		return(NULL);						\
+	name##_SPLAY(head, elm);					\
+	if ((cmp)(elm, (head)->sph_root) == 0)				\
+		return (head->sph_root);				\
+	return (NULL);							\
+}									\
+									\
+static __inline struct type *						\
+name##_SPLAY_NEXT(struct name *head, struct type *elm)			\
+{									\
+	name##_SPLAY(head, elm);					\
+	if (SPLAY_RIGHT(elm, field) != NULL) {				\
+		elm = SPLAY_RIGHT(elm, field);				\
+		while (SPLAY_LEFT(elm, field) != NULL) {		\
+			elm = SPLAY_LEFT(elm, field);			\
+		}							\
+	} else								\
+		elm = NULL;						\
+	return (elm);							\
+}									\
+									\
+static __inline struct type *						\
+name##_SPLAY_MIN_MAX(struct name *head, int val)			\
+{									\
+	name##_SPLAY_MINMAX(head, val);					\
+        return (SPLAY_ROOT(head));					\
+}
+
+/* Main splay operation.
+ * Moves node close to the key of elm to top
+ */
+#define SPLAY_GENERATE(name, type, field, cmp)				\
+struct type *								\
+name##_SPLAY_INSERT(struct name *head, struct type *elm)		\
+{									\
+    if (SPLAY_EMPTY(head)) {						\
+	    SPLAY_LEFT(elm, field) = SPLAY_RIGHT(elm, field) = NULL;	\
+    } else {								\
+	    int __comp;							\
+	    name##_SPLAY(head, elm);					\
+	    __comp = (cmp)(elm, (head)->sph_root);			\
+	    if(__comp < 0) {						\
+		    SPLAY_LEFT(elm, field) = SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field);\
+		    SPLAY_RIGHT(elm, field) = (head)->sph_root;		\
+		    SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field) = NULL;		\
+	    } else if (__comp > 0) {					\
+		    SPLAY_RIGHT(elm, field) = SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field);\
+		    SPLAY_LEFT(elm, field) = (head)->sph_root;		\
+		    SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field) = NULL;	\
+	    } else							\
+		    return ((head)->sph_root);				\
+    }									\
+    (head)->sph_root = (elm);						\
+    return (NULL);							\
+}									\
+									\
+struct type *								\
+name##_SPLAY_REMOVE(struct name *head, struct type *elm)		\
+{									\
+	struct type *__tmp;						\
+	if (SPLAY_EMPTY(head))						\
+		return (NULL);						\
+	name##_SPLAY(head, elm);					\
+	if ((cmp)(elm, (head)->sph_root) == 0) {			\
+		if (SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field) == NULL) {	\
+			(head)->sph_root = SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field);\
+		} else {						\
+			__tmp = SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field);	\
+			(head)->sph_root = SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field);\
+			name##_SPLAY(head, elm);			\
+			SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field) = __tmp;	\
+		}							\
+		return (elm);						\
+	}								\
+	return (NULL);							\
+}									\
+									\
+void									\
+name##_SPLAY(struct name *head, struct type *elm)			\
+{									\
+	struct type __node, *__left, *__right, *__tmp;			\
+	int __comp;							\
+\
+	SPLAY_LEFT(&__node, field) = SPLAY_RIGHT(&__node, field) = NULL;\
+	__left = __right = &__node;					\
+\
+	while ((__comp = (cmp)(elm, (head)->sph_root))) {		\
+		if (__comp < 0) {					\
+			__tmp = SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field);	\
+			if (__tmp == NULL)				\
+				break;					\
+			if ((cmp)(elm, __tmp) < 0){			\
+				SPLAY_ROTATE_RIGHT(head, __tmp, field);	\
+				if (SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field) == NULL)\
+					break;				\
+			}						\
+			SPLAY_LINKLEFT(head, __right, field);		\
+		} else if (__comp > 0) {				\
+			__tmp = SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field);	\
+			if (__tmp == NULL)				\
+				break;					\
+			if ((cmp)(elm, __tmp) > 0){			\
+				SPLAY_ROTATE_LEFT(head, __tmp, field);	\
+				if (SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field) == NULL)\
+					break;				\
+			}						\
+			SPLAY_LINKRIGHT(head, __left, field);		\
+		}							\
+	}								\
+	SPLAY_ASSEMBLE(head, &__node, __left, __right, field);		\
+}									\
+									\
+/* Splay with either the minimum or the maximum element			\
+ * Used to find minimum or maximum element in tree.			\
+ */									\
+void name##_SPLAY_MINMAX(struct name *head, int __comp) \
+{									\
+	struct type __node, *__left, *__right, *__tmp;			\
+\
+	SPLAY_LEFT(&__node, field) = SPLAY_RIGHT(&__node, field) = NULL;\
+	__left = __right = &__node;					\
+\
+	while (1) {							\
+		if (__comp < 0) {					\
+			__tmp = SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field);	\
+			if (__tmp == NULL)				\
+				break;					\
+			if (__comp < 0){				\
+				SPLAY_ROTATE_RIGHT(head, __tmp, field);	\
+				if (SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field) == NULL)\
+					break;				\
+			}						\
+			SPLAY_LINKLEFT(head, __right, field);		\
+		} else if (__comp > 0) {				\
+			__tmp = SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field);	\
+			if (__tmp == NULL)				\
+				break;					\
+			if (__comp > 0) {				\
+				SPLAY_ROTATE_LEFT(head, __tmp, field);	\
+				if (SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field) == NULL)\
+					break;				\
+			}						\
+			SPLAY_LINKRIGHT(head, __left, field);		\
+		}							\
+	}								\
+	SPLAY_ASSEMBLE(head, &__node, __left, __right, field);		\
+}
+
+#define SPLAY_NEGINF	-1
+#define SPLAY_INF	1
+
+#define SPLAY_INSERT(name, x, y)	name##_SPLAY_INSERT(x, y)
+#define SPLAY_REMOVE(name, x, y)	name##_SPLAY_REMOVE(x, y)
+#define SPLAY_FIND(name, x, y)		name##_SPLAY_FIND(x, y)
+#define SPLAY_NEXT(name, x, y)		name##_SPLAY_NEXT(x, y)
+#define SPLAY_MIN(name, x)		(SPLAY_EMPTY(x) ? NULL	\
+					: name##_SPLAY_MIN_MAX(x, SPLAY_NEGINF))
+#define SPLAY_MAX(name, x)		(SPLAY_EMPTY(x) ? NULL	\
+					: name##_SPLAY_MIN_MAX(x, SPLAY_INF))
+
+#define SPLAY_FOREACH(x, name, head)					\
+	for ((x) = SPLAY_MIN(name, head);				\
+	     (x) != NULL;						\
+	     (x) = SPLAY_NEXT(name, head, x))
+
+/* Macros that define a red-black tree */
+#define RB_HEAD(name, type)						\
+struct name {								\
+	struct type *rbh_root; /* root of the tree */			\
+}
+
+#define RB_INITIALIZER(root)						\
+	{ NULL }
+
+#define RB_INIT(root) do {						\
+	(root)->rbh_root = NULL;					\
+} while (0)
+
+#define RB_BLACK	0
+#define RB_RED		1
+#define RB_ENTRY(type)							\
+struct {								\
+	struct type *rbe_left;		/* left element */		\
+	struct type *rbe_right;		/* right element */		\
+	struct type *rbe_parent;	/* parent element */		\
+	int rbe_color;			/* node color */		\
+}
+
+#define RB_LEFT(elm, field)		(elm)->field.rbe_left
+#define RB_RIGHT(elm, field)		(elm)->field.rbe_right
+#define RB_PARENT(elm, field)		(elm)->field.rbe_parent
+#define RB_COLOR(elm, field)		(elm)->field.rbe_color
+#define RB_ROOT(head)			(head)->rbh_root
+#define RB_EMPTY(head)			(RB_ROOT(head) == NULL)
+
+#define RB_SET(elm, parent, field) do {					\
+	RB_PARENT(elm, field) = parent;					\
+	RB_LEFT(elm, field) = RB_RIGHT(elm, field) = NULL;		\
+	RB_COLOR(elm, field) = RB_RED;					\
+} while (0)
+
+#define RB_SET_BLACKRED(black, red, field) do {				\
+	RB_COLOR(black, field) = RB_BLACK;				\
+	RB_COLOR(red, field) = RB_RED;					\
+} while (0)
+
+#ifndef RB_AUGMENT
+#define RB_AUGMENT(x)	do {} while (0)
+#endif
+
+#define RB_ROTATE_LEFT(head, elm, tmp, field) do {			\
+	(tmp) = RB_RIGHT(elm, field);					\
+	if ((RB_RIGHT(elm, field) = RB_LEFT(tmp, field))) {		\
+		RB_PARENT(RB_LEFT(tmp, field), field) = (elm);		\
+	}								\
+	RB_AUGMENT(elm);						\
+	if ((RB_PARENT(tmp, field) = RB_PARENT(elm, field))) {		\
+		if ((elm) == RB_LEFT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field))	\
+			RB_LEFT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field) = (tmp);	\
+		else							\
+			RB_RIGHT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field) = (tmp);	\
+	} else								\
+		(head)->rbh_root = (tmp);				\
+	RB_LEFT(tmp, field) = (elm);					\
+	RB_PARENT(elm, field) = (tmp);					\
+	RB_AUGMENT(tmp);						\
+	if ((RB_PARENT(tmp, field)))					\
+		RB_AUGMENT(RB_PARENT(tmp, field));			\
+} while (0)
+
+#define RB_ROTATE_RIGHT(head, elm, tmp, field) do {			\
+	(tmp) = RB_LEFT(elm, field);					\
+	if ((RB_LEFT(elm, field) = RB_RIGHT(tmp, field))) {		\
+		RB_PARENT(RB_RIGHT(tmp, field), field) = (elm);		\
+	}								\
+	RB_AUGMENT(elm);						\
+	if ((RB_PARENT(tmp, field) = RB_PARENT(elm, field))) {		\
+		if ((elm) == RB_LEFT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field))	\
+			RB_LEFT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field) = (tmp);	\
+		else							\
+			RB_RIGHT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field) = (tmp);	\
+	} else								\
+		(head)->rbh_root = (tmp);				\
+	RB_RIGHT(tmp, field) = (elm);					\
+	RB_PARENT(elm, field) = (tmp);					\
+	RB_AUGMENT(tmp);						\
+	if ((RB_PARENT(tmp, field)))					\
+		RB_AUGMENT(RB_PARENT(tmp, field));			\
+} while (0)
+
+/* Generates prototypes and inline functions */
+#define	RB_PROTOTYPE(name, type, field, cmp)				\
+	RB_PROTOTYPE_INTERNAL(name, type, field, cmp,)
+#define	RB_PROTOTYPE_STATIC(name, type, field, cmp)			\
+	RB_PROTOTYPE_INTERNAL(name, type, field, cmp, __attribute__((__unused__)) static)
+#define RB_PROTOTYPE_INTERNAL(name, type, field, cmp, attr)		\
+attr void name##_RB_INSERT_COLOR(struct name *, struct type *);		\
+attr void name##_RB_REMOVE_COLOR(struct name *, struct type *, struct type *);\
+attr struct type *name##_RB_REMOVE(struct name *, struct type *);	\
+attr struct type *name##_RB_INSERT(struct name *, struct type *);	\
+attr struct type *name##_RB_FIND(struct name *, struct type *);		\
+attr struct type *name##_RB_NFIND(struct name *, struct type *);	\
+attr struct type *name##_RB_NEXT(struct type *);			\
+attr struct type *name##_RB_PREV(struct type *);			\
+attr struct type *name##_RB_MINMAX(struct name *, int);			\
+									\
+
+/* Main rb operation.
+ * Moves node close to the key of elm to top
+ */
+#define	RB_GENERATE(name, type, field, cmp)				\
+	RB_GENERATE_INTERNAL(name, type, field, cmp,)
+#define	RB_GENERATE_STATIC(name, type, field, cmp)			\
+	RB_GENERATE_INTERNAL(name, type, field, cmp, __attribute__((__unused__)) static)
+#define RB_GENERATE_INTERNAL(name, type, field, cmp, attr)		\
+attr void								\
+name##_RB_INSERT_COLOR(struct name *head, struct type *elm)		\
+{									\
+	struct type *parent, *gparent, *tmp;				\
+	while ((parent = RB_PARENT(elm, field)) &&			\
+	    RB_COLOR(parent, field) == RB_RED) {			\
+		gparent = RB_PARENT(parent, field);			\
+		if (parent == RB_LEFT(gparent, field)) {		\
+			tmp = RB_RIGHT(gparent, field);			\
+			if (tmp && RB_COLOR(tmp, field) == RB_RED) {	\
+				RB_COLOR(tmp, field) = RB_BLACK;	\
+				RB_SET_BLACKRED(parent, gparent, field);\
+				elm = gparent;				\
+				continue;				\
+			}						\
+			if (RB_RIGHT(parent, field) == elm) {		\
+				RB_ROTATE_LEFT(head, parent, tmp, field);\
+				tmp = parent;				\
+				parent = elm;				\
+				elm = tmp;				\
+			}						\
+			RB_SET_BLACKRED(parent, gparent, field);	\
+			RB_ROTATE_RIGHT(head, gparent, tmp, field);	\
+		} else {						\
+			tmp = RB_LEFT(gparent, field);			\
+			if (tmp && RB_COLOR(tmp, field) == RB_RED) {	\
+				RB_COLOR(tmp, field) = RB_BLACK;	\
+				RB_SET_BLACKRED(parent, gparent, field);\
+				elm = gparent;				\
+				continue;				\
+			}						\
+			if (RB_LEFT(parent, field) == elm) {		\
+				RB_ROTATE_RIGHT(head, parent, tmp, field);\
+				tmp = parent;				\
+				parent = elm;				\
+				elm = tmp;				\
+			}						\
+			RB_SET_BLACKRED(parent, gparent, field);	\
+			RB_ROTATE_LEFT(head, gparent, tmp, field);	\
+		}							\
+	}								\
+	RB_COLOR(head->rbh_root, field) = RB_BLACK;			\
+}									\
+									\
+attr void								\
+name##_RB_REMOVE_COLOR(struct name *head, struct type *parent, struct type *elm) \
+{									\
+	struct type *tmp;						\
+	while ((elm == NULL || RB_COLOR(elm, field) == RB_BLACK) &&	\
+	    elm != RB_ROOT(head)) {					\
+		if (RB_LEFT(parent, field) == elm) {			\
+			tmp = RB_RIGHT(parent, field);			\
+			if (RB_COLOR(tmp, field) == RB_RED) {		\
+				RB_SET_BLACKRED(tmp, parent, field);	\
+				RB_ROTATE_LEFT(head, parent, tmp, field);\
+				tmp = RB_RIGHT(parent, field);		\
+			}						\
+			if ((RB_LEFT(tmp, field) == NULL ||		\
+			    RB_COLOR(RB_LEFT(tmp, field), field) == RB_BLACK) &&\
+			    (RB_RIGHT(tmp, field) == NULL ||		\
+			    RB_COLOR(RB_RIGHT(tmp, field), field) == RB_BLACK)) {\
+				RB_COLOR(tmp, field) = RB_RED;		\
+				elm = parent;				\
+				parent = RB_PARENT(elm, field);		\
+			} else {					\
+				if (RB_RIGHT(tmp, field) == NULL ||	\
+				    RB_COLOR(RB_RIGHT(tmp, field), field) == RB_BLACK) {\
+					struct type *oleft;		\
+					if ((oleft = RB_LEFT(tmp, field)))\
+						RB_COLOR(oleft, field) = RB_BLACK;\
+					RB_COLOR(tmp, field) = RB_RED;	\
+					RB_ROTATE_RIGHT(head, tmp, oleft, field);\
+					tmp = RB_RIGHT(parent, field);	\
+				}					\
+				RB_COLOR(tmp, field) = RB_COLOR(parent, field);\
+				RB_COLOR(parent, field) = RB_BLACK;	\
+				if (RB_RIGHT(tmp, field))		\
+					RB_COLOR(RB_RIGHT(tmp, field), field) = RB_BLACK;\
+				RB_ROTATE_LEFT(head, parent, tmp, field);\
+				elm = RB_ROOT(head);			\
+				break;					\
+			}						\
+		} else {						\
+			tmp = RB_LEFT(parent, field);			\
+			if (RB_COLOR(tmp, field) == RB_RED) {		\
+				RB_SET_BLACKRED(tmp, parent, field);	\
+				RB_ROTATE_RIGHT(head, parent, tmp, field);\
+				tmp = RB_LEFT(parent, field);		\
+			}						\
+			if ((RB_LEFT(tmp, field) == NULL ||		\
+			    RB_COLOR(RB_LEFT(tmp, field), field) == RB_BLACK) &&\
+			    (RB_RIGHT(tmp, field) == NULL ||		\
+			    RB_COLOR(RB_RIGHT(tmp, field), field) == RB_BLACK)) {\
+				RB_COLOR(tmp, field) = RB_RED;		\
+				elm = parent;				\
+				parent = RB_PARENT(elm, field);		\
+			} else {					\
+				if (RB_LEFT(tmp, field) == NULL ||	\
+				    RB_COLOR(RB_LEFT(tmp, field), field) == RB_BLACK) {\
+					struct type *oright;		\
+					if ((oright = RB_RIGHT(tmp, field)))\
+						RB_COLOR(oright, field) = RB_BLACK;\
+					RB_COLOR(tmp, field) = RB_RED;	\
+					RB_ROTATE_LEFT(head, tmp, oright, field);\
+					tmp = RB_LEFT(parent, field);	\
+				}					\
+				RB_COLOR(tmp, field) = RB_COLOR(parent, field);\
+				RB_COLOR(parent, field) = RB_BLACK;	\
+				if (RB_LEFT(tmp, field))		\
+					RB_COLOR(RB_LEFT(tmp, field), field) = RB_BLACK;\
+				RB_ROTATE_RIGHT(head, parent, tmp, field);\
+				elm = RB_ROOT(head);			\
+				break;					\
+			}						\
+		}							\
+	}								\
+	if (elm)							\
+		RB_COLOR(elm, field) = RB_BLACK;			\
+}									\
+									\
+attr struct type *							\
+name##_RB_REMOVE(struct name *head, struct type *elm)			\
+{									\
+	struct type *child, *parent, *old = elm;			\
+	int color;							\
+	if (RB_LEFT(elm, field) == NULL)				\
+		child = RB_RIGHT(elm, field);				\
+	else if (RB_RIGHT(elm, field) == NULL)				\
+		child = RB_LEFT(elm, field);				\
+	else {								\
+		struct type *left;					\
+		elm = RB_RIGHT(elm, field);				\
+		while ((left = RB_LEFT(elm, field)))			\
+			elm = left;					\
+		child = RB_RIGHT(elm, field);				\
+		parent = RB_PARENT(elm, field);				\
+		color = RB_COLOR(elm, field);				\
+		if (child)						\
+			RB_PARENT(child, field) = parent;		\
+		if (parent) {						\
+			if (RB_LEFT(parent, field) == elm)		\
+				RB_LEFT(parent, field) = child;		\
+			else						\
+				RB_RIGHT(parent, field) = child;	\
+			RB_AUGMENT(parent);				\
+		} else							\
+			RB_ROOT(head) = child;				\
+		if (RB_PARENT(elm, field) == old)			\
+			parent = elm;					\
+		(elm)->field = (old)->field;				\
+		if (RB_PARENT(old, field)) {				\
+			if (RB_LEFT(RB_PARENT(old, field), field) == old)\
+				RB_LEFT(RB_PARENT(old, field), field) = elm;\
+			else						\
+				RB_RIGHT(RB_PARENT(old, field), field) = elm;\
+			RB_AUGMENT(RB_PARENT(old, field));		\
+		} else							\
+			RB_ROOT(head) = elm;				\
+		RB_PARENT(RB_LEFT(old, field), field) = elm;		\
+		if (RB_RIGHT(old, field))				\
+			RB_PARENT(RB_RIGHT(old, field), field) = elm;	\
+		if (parent) {						\
+			left = parent;					\
+			do {						\
+				RB_AUGMENT(left);			\
+			} while ((left = RB_PARENT(left, field)));	\
+		}							\
+		goto color;						\
+	}								\
+	parent = RB_PARENT(elm, field);					\
+	color = RB_COLOR(elm, field);					\
+	if (child)							\
+		RB_PARENT(child, field) = parent;			\
+	if (parent) {							\
+		if (RB_LEFT(parent, field) == elm)			\
+			RB_LEFT(parent, field) = child;			\
+		else							\
+			RB_RIGHT(parent, field) = child;		\
+		RB_AUGMENT(parent);					\
+	} else								\
+		RB_ROOT(head) = child;					\
+color:									\
+	if (color == RB_BLACK)						\
+		name##_RB_REMOVE_COLOR(head, parent, child);		\
+	return (old);							\
+}									\
+									\
+/* Inserts a node into the RB tree */					\
+attr struct type *							\
+name##_RB_INSERT(struct name *head, struct type *elm)			\
+{									\
+	struct type *tmp;						\
+	struct type *parent = NULL;					\
+	int comp = 0;							\
+	tmp = RB_ROOT(head);						\
+	while (tmp) {							\
+		parent = tmp;						\
+		comp = (cmp)(elm, parent);				\
+		if (comp < 0)						\
+			tmp = RB_LEFT(tmp, field);			\
+		else if (comp > 0)					\
+			tmp = RB_RIGHT(tmp, field);			\
+		else							\
+			return (tmp);					\
+	}								\
+	RB_SET(elm, parent, field);					\
+	if (parent != NULL) {						\
+		if (comp < 0)						\
+			RB_LEFT(parent, field) = elm;			\
+		else							\
+			RB_RIGHT(parent, field) = elm;			\
+		RB_AUGMENT(parent);					\
+	} else								\
+		RB_ROOT(head) = elm;					\
+	name##_RB_INSERT_COLOR(head, elm);				\
+	return (NULL);							\
+}									\
+									\
+/* Finds the node with the same key as elm */				\
+attr struct type *							\
+name##_RB_FIND(struct name *head, struct type *elm)			\
+{									\
+	struct type *tmp = RB_ROOT(head);				\
+	int comp;							\
+	while (tmp) {							\
+		comp = cmp(elm, tmp);					\
+		if (comp < 0)						\
+			tmp = RB_LEFT(tmp, field);			\
+		else if (comp > 0)					\
+			tmp = RB_RIGHT(tmp, field);			\
+		else							\
+			return (tmp);					\
+	}								\
+	return (NULL);							\
+}									\
+									\
+/* Finds the first node greater than or equal to the search key */	\
+attr struct type *							\
+name##_RB_NFIND(struct name *head, struct type *elm)			\
+{									\
+	struct type *tmp = RB_ROOT(head);				\
+	struct type *res = NULL;					\
+	int comp;							\
+	while (tmp) {							\
+		comp = cmp(elm, tmp);					\
+		if (comp < 0) {						\
+			res = tmp;					\
+			tmp = RB_LEFT(tmp, field);			\
+		}							\
+		else if (comp > 0)					\
+			tmp = RB_RIGHT(tmp, field);			\
+		else							\
+			return (tmp);					\
+	}								\
+	return (res);							\
+}									\
+									\
+/* ARGSUSED */								\
+attr struct type *							\
+name##_RB_NEXT(struct type *elm)					\
+{									\
+	if (RB_RIGHT(elm, field)) {					\
+		elm = RB_RIGHT(elm, field);				\
+		while (RB_LEFT(elm, field))				\
+			elm = RB_LEFT(elm, field);			\
+	} else {							\
+		if (RB_PARENT(elm, field) &&				\
+		    (elm == RB_LEFT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field)))	\
+			elm = RB_PARENT(elm, field);			\
+		else {							\
+			while (RB_PARENT(elm, field) &&			\
+			    (elm == RB_RIGHT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field)))\
+				elm = RB_PARENT(elm, field);		\
+			elm = RB_PARENT(elm, field);			\
+		}							\
+	}								\
+	return (elm);							\
+}									\
+									\
+/* ARGSUSED */								\
+attr struct type *							\
+name##_RB_PREV(struct type *elm)					\
+{									\
+	if (RB_LEFT(elm, field)) {					\
+		elm = RB_LEFT(elm, field);				\
+		while (RB_RIGHT(elm, field))				\
+			elm = RB_RIGHT(elm, field);			\
+	} else {							\
+		if (RB_PARENT(elm, field) &&				\
+		    (elm == RB_RIGHT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field)))	\
+			elm = RB_PARENT(elm, field);			\
+		else {							\
+			while (RB_PARENT(elm, field) &&			\
+			    (elm == RB_LEFT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field)))\
+				elm = RB_PARENT(elm, field);		\
+			elm = RB_PARENT(elm, field);			\
+		}							\
+	}								\
+	return (elm);							\
+}									\
+									\
+attr struct type *							\
+name##_RB_MINMAX(struct name *head, int val)				\
+{									\
+	struct type *tmp = RB_ROOT(head);				\
+	struct type *parent = NULL;					\
+	while (tmp) {							\
+		parent = tmp;						\
+		if (val < 0)						\
+			tmp = RB_LEFT(tmp, field);			\
+		else							\
+			tmp = RB_RIGHT(tmp, field);			\
+	}								\
+	return (parent);						\
+}
+
+#define RB_NEGINF	-1
+#define RB_INF	1
+
+#define RB_INSERT(name, x, y)	name##_RB_INSERT(x, y)
+#define RB_REMOVE(name, x, y)	name##_RB_REMOVE(x, y)
+#define RB_FIND(name, x, y)	name##_RB_FIND(x, y)
+#define RB_NFIND(name, x, y)	name##_RB_NFIND(x, y)
+#define RB_NEXT(name, x, y)	name##_RB_NEXT(y)
+#define RB_PREV(name, x, y)	name##_RB_PREV(y)
+#define RB_MIN(name, x)		name##_RB_MINMAX(x, RB_NEGINF)
+#define RB_MAX(name, x)		name##_RB_MINMAX(x, RB_INF)
+
+#define RB_FOREACH(x, name, head)					\
+	for ((x) = RB_MIN(name, head);					\
+	     (x) != NULL;						\
+	     (x) = name##_RB_NEXT(x))
+
+#define RB_FOREACH_SAFE(x, name, head, y)				\
+	for ((x) = RB_MIN(name, head);					\
+	    ((x) != NULL) && ((y) = name##_RB_NEXT(x), 1);		\
+	     (x) = (y))
+
+#define RB_FOREACH_REVERSE(x, name, head)				\
+	for ((x) = RB_MAX(name, head);					\
+	     (x) != NULL;						\
+	     (x) = name##_RB_PREV(x))
+
+#define RB_FOREACH_REVERSE_SAFE(x, name, head, y)			\
+	for ((x) = RB_MAX(name, head);					\
+	    ((x) != NULL) && ((y) = name##_RB_PREV(x), 1);		\
+	     (x) = (y))
+
+#endif	/* _SYS_TREE_H_ */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/timingsafe_bcmp.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/timingsafe_bcmp.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7e28c0e2a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/timingsafe_bcmp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: timingsafe_bcmp.c,v 1.1 2010/09/24 13:33:00 matthew Exp $	*/
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/string/timingsafe_bcmp.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#ifndef HAVE_TIMINGSAFE_BCMP
+
+int
+timingsafe_bcmp(const void *b1, const void *b2, size_t n)
+{
+	const unsigned char *p1 = b1, *p2 = b2;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	for (; n > 0; n--)
+		ret |= *p1++ ^ *p2++;
+	return (ret != 0);
+}
+
+#endif /* TIMINGSAFE_BCMP */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/vis.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/vis.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f6f5665c1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/vis.c
@@ -0,0 +1,225 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: vis.c,v 1.19 2005/09/01 17:15:49 millert Exp $ */
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 1989, 1993
+ *	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/vis.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#if !defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) || defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS)
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "vis.h"
+
+#define	isoctal(c)	(((u_char)(c)) >= '0' && ((u_char)(c)) <= '7')
+#define	isvisible(c)							\
+	(((u_int)(c) <= UCHAR_MAX && isascii((u_char)(c)) &&		\
+	(((c) != '*' && (c) != '?' && (c) != '[' && (c) != '#') ||	\
+		(flag & VIS_GLOB) == 0) && isgraph((u_char)(c))) ||	\
+	((flag & VIS_SP) == 0 && (c) == ' ') ||				\
+	((flag & VIS_TAB) == 0 && (c) == '\t') ||			\
+	((flag & VIS_NL) == 0 && (c) == '\n') ||			\
+	((flag & VIS_SAFE) && ((c) == '\b' ||				\
+		(c) == '\007' || (c) == '\r' ||				\
+		isgraph((u_char)(c)))))
+
+/*
+ * vis - visually encode characters
+ */
+char *
+vis(char *dst, int c, int flag, int nextc)
+{
+	if (isvisible(c)) {
+		*dst++ = c;
+		if (c == '\\' && (flag & VIS_NOSLASH) == 0)
+			*dst++ = '\\';
+		*dst = '\0';
+		return (dst);
+	}
+
+	if (flag & VIS_CSTYLE) {
+		switch(c) {
+		case '\n':
+			*dst++ = '\\';
+			*dst++ = 'n';
+			goto done;
+		case '\r':
+			*dst++ = '\\';
+			*dst++ = 'r';
+			goto done;
+		case '\b':
+			*dst++ = '\\';
+			*dst++ = 'b';
+			goto done;
+		case '\a':
+			*dst++ = '\\';
+			*dst++ = 'a';
+			goto done;
+		case '\v':
+			*dst++ = '\\';
+			*dst++ = 'v';
+			goto done;
+		case '\t':
+			*dst++ = '\\';
+			*dst++ = 't';
+			goto done;
+		case '\f':
+			*dst++ = '\\';
+			*dst++ = 'f';
+			goto done;
+		case ' ':
+			*dst++ = '\\';
+			*dst++ = 's';
+			goto done;
+		case '\0':
+			*dst++ = '\\';
+			*dst++ = '0';
+			if (isoctal(nextc)) {
+				*dst++ = '0';
+				*dst++ = '0';
+			}
+			goto done;
+		}
+	}
+	if (((c & 0177) == ' ') || (flag & VIS_OCTAL) ||
+	    ((flag & VIS_GLOB) && (c == '*' || c == '?' || c == '[' || c == '#'))) {
+		*dst++ = '\\';
+		*dst++ = ((u_char)c >> 6 & 07) + '0';
+		*dst++ = ((u_char)c >> 3 & 07) + '0';
+		*dst++ = ((u_char)c & 07) + '0';
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if ((flag & VIS_NOSLASH) == 0)
+		*dst++ = '\\';
+	if (c & 0200) {
+		c &= 0177;
+		*dst++ = 'M';
+	}
+	if (iscntrl((u_char)c)) {
+		*dst++ = '^';
+		if (c == 0177)
+			*dst++ = '?';
+		else
+			*dst++ = c + '@';
+	} else {
+		*dst++ = '-';
+		*dst++ = c;
+	}
+done:
+	*dst = '\0';
+	return (dst);
+}
+
+/*
+ * strvis, strnvis, strvisx - visually encode characters from src into dst
+ *	
+ *	Dst must be 4 times the size of src to account for possible
+ *	expansion.  The length of dst, not including the trailing NULL,
+ *	is returned. 
+ *
+ *	Strnvis will write no more than siz-1 bytes (and will NULL terminate).
+ *	The number of bytes needed to fully encode the string is returned.
+ *
+ *	Strvisx encodes exactly len bytes from src into dst.
+ *	This is useful for encoding a block of data.
+ */
+int
+strvis(char *dst, const char *src, int flag)
+{
+	char c;
+	char *start;
+
+	for (start = dst; (c = *src);)
+		dst = vis(dst, c, flag, *++src);
+	*dst = '\0';
+	return (dst - start);
+}
+
+int
+strnvis(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz, int flag)
+{
+	char *start, *end;
+	char tbuf[5];
+	int c, i;
+
+	i = 0;
+	for (start = dst, end = start + siz - 1; (c = *src) && dst < end; ) {
+		if (isvisible(c)) {
+			i = 1;
+			*dst++ = c;
+			if (c == '\\' && (flag & VIS_NOSLASH) == 0) {
+				/* need space for the extra '\\' */
+				if (dst < end)
+					*dst++ = '\\';
+				else {
+					dst--;
+					i = 2;
+					break;
+				}
+			}
+			src++;
+		} else {
+			i = vis(tbuf, c, flag, *++src) - tbuf;
+			if (dst + i <= end) {
+				memcpy(dst, tbuf, i);
+				dst += i;
+			} else {
+				src--;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if (siz > 0)
+		*dst = '\0';
+	if (dst + i > end) {
+		/* adjust return value for truncation */
+		while ((c = *src))
+			dst += vis(tbuf, c, flag, *++src) - tbuf;
+	}
+	return (dst - start);
+}
+
+int
+strvisx(char *dst, const char *src, size_t len, int flag)
+{
+	char c;
+	char *start;
+
+	for (start = dst; len > 1; len--) {
+		c = *src;
+		dst = vis(dst, c, flag, *++src);
+	}
+	if (len)
+		dst = vis(dst, *src, flag, '\0');
+	*dst = '\0';
+	return (dst - start);
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/vis.h b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/vis.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d1286c99d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/vis.h
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: vis.h,v 1.11 2005/08/09 19:38:31 millert Exp $	*/
+/*	$NetBSD: vis.h,v 1.4 1994/10/26 00:56:41 cgd Exp $	*/
+
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 1990 The Regents of the University of California.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ *	@(#)vis.h	5.9 (Berkeley) 4/3/91
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: include/vis.h */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#if !defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) || defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS)
+
+#ifndef _VIS_H_
+#define	_VIS_H_
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+/*
+ * to select alternate encoding format
+ */
+#define	VIS_OCTAL	0x01	/* use octal \ddd format */
+#define	VIS_CSTYLE	0x02	/* use \[nrft0..] where appropriate */
+
+/*
+ * to alter set of characters encoded (default is to encode all
+ * non-graphic except space, tab, and newline).
+ */
+#define	VIS_SP		0x04	/* also encode space */
+#define	VIS_TAB		0x08	/* also encode tab */
+#define	VIS_NL		0x10	/* also encode newline */
+#define	VIS_WHITE	(VIS_SP | VIS_TAB | VIS_NL)
+#define	VIS_SAFE	0x20	/* only encode "unsafe" characters */
+
+/*
+ * other
+ */
+#define	VIS_NOSLASH	0x40	/* inhibit printing '\' */
+#define	VIS_GLOB	0x100	/* encode glob(3) magics and '#' */
+
+/*
+ * unvis return codes
+ */
+#define	UNVIS_VALID	 1	/* character valid */
+#define	UNVIS_VALIDPUSH	 2	/* character valid, push back passed char */
+#define	UNVIS_NOCHAR	 3	/* valid sequence, no character produced */
+#define	UNVIS_SYNBAD	-1	/* unrecognized escape sequence */
+#define	UNVIS_ERROR	-2	/* decoder in unknown state (unrecoverable) */
+
+/*
+ * unvis flags
+ */
+#define	UNVIS_END	1	/* no more characters */
+
+char	*vis(char *, int, int, int);
+int	strvis(char *, const char *, int);
+int	strnvis(char *, const char *, size_t, int)
+		__attribute__ ((__bounded__(__string__,1,3)));
+int	strvisx(char *, const char *, size_t, int)
+		__attribute__ ((__bounded__(__string__,1,3)));
+int	strunvis(char *, const char *);
+int	unvis(char *, char, int *, int);
+ssize_t strnunvis(char *, const char *, size_t)
+		__attribute__ ((__bounded__(__string__,1,3)));
+
+#endif /* !_VIS_H_ */
+
+#endif /* !HAVE_STRNVIS || BROKEN_STRNVIS */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8577cbd8a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2003 Ben Lindstrom.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+
+# if defined(HAVE_CRYPT_H) && !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
+#  include <crypt.h>
+# endif
+
+# ifdef __hpux
+#  include <hpsecurity.h>
+#  include <prot.h>
+# endif
+
+# ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
+#  include <sys/security.h>
+#  include <sys/audit.h>
+#  include <prot.h>
+# endif 
+
+# if defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW)
+#  include <shadow.h>
+# endif
+
+# if defined(HAVE_GETPWANAM) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW)
+#  include <sys/label.h>
+#  include <sys/audit.h>
+#  include <pwdadj.h>
+# endif
+
+# if defined(HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS) && !defined(HAVE_MD5_CRYPT)
+#  include "md5crypt.h"
+# endif
+
+# if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(HAVE_CRYPT) && defined(HAVE_DES_CRYPT)
+#  include <openssl/des.h>
+#  define crypt DES_crypt
+# endif
+
+char *
+xcrypt(const char *password, const char *salt)
+{
+	char *crypted;
+
+# ifdef HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS
+        if (is_md5_salt(salt))
+                crypted = md5_crypt(password, salt);
+        else
+                crypted = crypt(password, salt);
+# elif defined(__hpux) && !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
+	if (iscomsec())
+                crypted = bigcrypt(password, salt);
+        else
+                crypted = crypt(password, salt);
+# elif defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
+        crypted = bigcrypt(password, salt);
+# else
+        crypted = crypt(password, salt);
+# endif 
+
+	return crypted;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handle shadowed password systems in a cleaner way for portable
+ * version.
+ */
+
+char *
+shadow_pw(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+	char *pw_password = pw->pw_passwd;
+
+# if defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW)
+	struct spwd *spw = getspnam(pw->pw_name);
+
+	if (spw != NULL)
+		pw_password = spw->sp_pwdp;
+# endif
+
+#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
+	return(get_iaf_password(pw));
+#endif
+
+# if defined(HAVE_GETPWANAM) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW)
+	struct passwd_adjunct *spw;
+	if (issecure() && (spw = getpwanam(pw->pw_name)) != NULL)
+		pw_password = spw->pwa_passwd;
+# elif defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
+	struct pr_passwd *spw = getprpwnam(pw->pw_name);
+
+	if (spw != NULL)
+		pw_password = spw->ufld.fd_encrypt;
+# endif
+
+	return pw_password;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/xmmap.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/xmmap.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..04c6babc2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/xmmap.c
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 Tim Rice.  All rights reserved.
+ * MAP_FAILED code by Solar Designer.
+ * 
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* $Id: xmmap.c,v 1.15 2009/02/16 04:21:40 djm Exp $ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MMAN_H
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
+# include <fcntl.h>
+#endif
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+
+void *
+xmmap(size_t size)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_MMAP
+	void *address;
+
+# ifdef MAP_ANON
+	address = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_WRITE|PROT_READ, MAP_ANON|MAP_SHARED,
+	    -1, (off_t)0);
+# else
+	address = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_WRITE|PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED,
+	    open("/dev/zero", O_RDWR), (off_t)0);
+# endif
+
+#define MM_SWAP_TEMPLATE "/var/run/sshd.mm.XXXXXXXX"
+	if (address == (void *)MAP_FAILED) {
+		char tmpname[sizeof(MM_SWAP_TEMPLATE)] = MM_SWAP_TEMPLATE;
+		int tmpfd;
+		mode_t old_umask;
+
+		old_umask = umask(0177);
+		tmpfd = mkstemp(tmpname);
+		umask(old_umask);
+		if (tmpfd == -1)
+			fatal("mkstemp(\"%s\"): %s",
+			    MM_SWAP_TEMPLATE, strerror(errno));
+		unlink(tmpname);
+		if (ftruncate(tmpfd, size) != 0)
+			fatal("%s: ftruncate: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		address = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_WRITE|PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED,
+		    tmpfd, (off_t)0);
+		close(tmpfd);
+	}
+
+	return (address);
+#else
+	fatal("%s: UsePrivilegeSeparation=yes and Compression=yes not supported",
+	    __func__);
+#endif /* HAVE_MMAP */
+
+}
+
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openssh.xml b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openssh.xml
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5417c18c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openssh.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+<?xml version='1.0'?>
+<!DOCTYPE service_bundle SYSTEM '/usr/share/lib/xml/dtd/service_bundle.dtd.1'>
+<!--
+    Copyright (c) 2006 Chad Mynhier.
+
+    Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+    purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+    copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+
+    THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+    WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+    MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+    ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+    WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+    ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+    OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+-->
+
+<service_bundle type='manifest' name='OpenSSH server'>
+
+    <service
+        name='site/__SYSVINIT_NAME__'
+        type='service'
+        version='1'>
+
+<!--
+	We default to disabled so administrator can decide to enable or not.
+-->
+        <create_default_instance enabled='false'/>
+
+        <single_instance/>
+
+        <dependency
+            name='filesystem-local'
+            grouping='require_all'
+            restart_on='none'
+            type='service'>
+            <service_fmri value='svc:/system/filesystem/local'/>
+        </dependency>
+
+        <dependency
+            name='network'
+            grouping='require_all'
+            restart_on='none'
+            type='service'>
+            <service_fmri value='svc:/milestone/network'/>
+        </dependency>
+
+        <dependent
+            name='multi-user-server'
+            restart_on='none'
+            grouping='optional_all'>
+            <service_fmri value='svc:/milestone/multi-user-server'/>
+        </dependent>
+
+        <exec_method
+            name='start'
+            type='method'
+            exec='__SMF_METHOD_DIR__/__SYSVINIT_NAME__ start'
+            timeout_seconds='60'>
+            <method_context/>
+        </exec_method>
+
+        <exec_method
+            name='stop'
+            type='method'
+            exec=':kill'
+            timeout_seconds='60'>
+            <method_context/>
+        </exec_method>
+
+        <property_group
+            name='startd'
+            type='framework'>
+            <propval name='ignore_error' type='astring' value='core,signal'/>
+        </property_group>
+
+        <template>
+            <common_name>
+                <loctext xml:lang='C'>OpenSSH server</loctext>
+            </common_name>
+            <documentation>
+                <manpage
+                    title='sshd'
+                    section='1M'
+                    manpath='/usr/local/man'/>
+            </documentation>
+        </template>
+    </service>
+</service_bundle>
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/opensshd.init b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/opensshd.init
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b2c161fec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/opensshd.init
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# Donated code that was put under PD license.
+#
+# Stripped PRNGd out of it for the time being.
+
+umask 022
+
+CAT=/bin/cat
+KILL=/bin/kill
+
+prefix=/usr/local
+sysconfdir=${prefix}/etc
+piddir=/var/run
+
+SSHD=$prefix/sbin/sshd
+PIDFILE=$piddir/sshd.pid
+PidFile=`grep "^PidFile" ${sysconfdir}/sshd_config | tr "=" " " | awk '{print $2}'`
+[ X$PidFile = X ]  ||  PIDFILE=$PidFile
+SSH_KEYGEN=$prefix/bin/ssh-keygen
+HOST_KEY_RSA1=$sysconfdir/ssh_host_key
+HOST_KEY_DSA=$sysconfdir/ssh_host_dsa_key
+HOST_KEY_RSA=$sysconfdir/ssh_host_rsa_key
+HOST_KEY_ECDSA=$sysconfdir/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
+HOST_KEY_ED25519=$sysconfdir/ssh_host_ed25519_key
+
+
+checkkeys() {
+    if [ ! -f $HOST_KEY_RSA1 ]; then
+	${SSH_KEYGEN} -t rsa1 -f ${HOST_KEY_RSA1} -N ""
+    fi
+    if [ ! -f $HOST_KEY_DSA ]; then
+	${SSH_KEYGEN} -t dsa -f ${HOST_KEY_DSA} -N ""
+    fi
+    if [ ! -f $HOST_KEY_RSA ]; then
+	${SSH_KEYGEN} -t rsa -f ${HOST_KEY_RSA} -N ""
+    fi
+    if [ ! -f $HOST_KEY_ECDSA ]; then
+	${SSH_KEYGEN} -t ecdsa -f ${HOST_KEY_ECDSA} -N ""
+    fi
+    if [ ! -f $HOST_KEY_ED25519 ]; then
+	${SSH_KEYGEN} -t ed25519 -f ${HOST_KEY_ED25519} -N ""
+    fi
+}
+
+stop_service() {
+    if [  -r $PIDFILE  -a  ! -z ${PIDFILE}  ]; then
+	PID=`${CAT} ${PIDFILE}`
+    fi
+    if [  ${PID:=0} -gt 1 -a  ! "X$PID" = "X "  ]; then
+	${KILL} ${PID}
+    else
+	echo "Unable to read PID file"
+    fi
+}
+
+start_service() {
+    # XXX We really should check if the service is already going, but
+    # XXX we will opt out at this time. - Bal
+
+    # Check to see if we have keys that need to be made
+    checkkeys
+
+    # Start SSHD
+    echo "starting $SSHD... \c"         ; $SSHD
+
+    sshd_rc=$?
+    if [ $sshd_rc -ne 0 ]; then
+	echo "$0: Error ${sshd_rc} starting ${SSHD}... bailing."
+	exit $sshd_rc
+    fi
+    echo done.
+}
+
+case $1 in
+
+'start')
+    start_service
+    ;;
+
+'stop')
+    stop_service
+    ;;
+
+'restart')
+    stop_service
+    start_service
+    ;;
+
+*)
+    echo "$0:  usage:  $0 {start|stop|restart}"
+    ;;
+esac
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openssl-compat.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openssl-compat.c
new file mode 120000
index 000000000..23b0a19b6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openssl-compat.c
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openssl-compat.h b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openssl-compat.h
new file mode 120000
index 000000000..7e987ccff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/openssl-compat.h
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/platform.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/platform.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ee313da55
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/platform.c
@@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
+/* $Id: platform.c,v 1.22 2014/07/18 04:11:26 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 Darren Tucker.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "auth-pam.h"
+#include "platform.h"
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h"
+
+extern int use_privsep;
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+void
+platform_pre_listen(void)
+{
+#ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
+	/* Adjust out-of-memory killer so listening process is not killed */
+	oom_adjust_setup();
+#endif
+}
+
+void
+platform_pre_fork(void)
+{
+#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS
+	solaris_contract_pre_fork();
+#endif
+}
+
+void
+platform_pre_restart(void)
+{
+#ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
+	oom_adjust_restore();
+#endif
+}
+
+void
+platform_post_fork_parent(pid_t child_pid)
+{
+#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS
+	solaris_contract_post_fork_parent(child_pid);
+#endif
+}
+
+void
+platform_post_fork_child(void)
+{
+#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS
+	solaris_contract_post_fork_child();
+#endif
+#ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
+	oom_adjust_restore();
+#endif
+}
+
+/* return 1 if we are running with privilege to swap UIDs, 0 otherwise */
+int
+platform_privileged_uidswap(void)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+	/* uid 0 is not special on Cygwin so always try */
+	return 1;
+#else
+	return (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0);
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * This gets called before switching UIDs, and is called even when sshd is
+ * not running as root.
+ */
+void
+platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+	/* Cache selinux status for later use */
+	(void)ssh_selinux_enabled();
+#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS
+	/* if solaris projects were detected, set the default now */
+	if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0)
+		solaris_set_default_project(pw);
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && defined (__bsdi__)
+	if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0)
+		setpgid(0, 0);
+# endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && defined(USE_PAM)
+	/*
+	 * If we have both LOGIN_CAP and PAM, we want to establish creds
+	 * before calling setusercontext (in session.c:do_setusercontext).
+	 */
+	if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0) {
+		if (options.use_pam) {
+			do_pam_setcred(use_privsep);
+		}
+	}
+# endif /* USE_PAM */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && defined(HAVE_GETLUID) && defined(HAVE_SETLUID)
+	if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0) {
+		/* Sets login uid for accounting */
+		if (getluid() == -1 && setluid(pw->pw_uid) == -1)
+			error("setluid: %s", strerror(errno));
+	}
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * This gets called after we've established the user's groups, and is only
+ * called if sshd is running as root.
+ */
+void
+platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+#if !defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && defined(USE_PAM)
+	/*
+	 * PAM credentials may take the form of supplementary groups.
+	 * These will have been wiped by the above initgroups() call.
+	 * Reestablish them here.
+	 */
+	if (options.use_pam) {
+		do_pam_setcred(use_privsep);
+	}
+#endif /* USE_PAM */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && (defined(WITH_IRIX_PROJECT) || \
+    defined(WITH_IRIX_JOBS) || defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY))
+	irix_setusercontext(pw);
+#endif /* defined(WITH_IRIX_PROJECT) || defined(WITH_IRIX_JOBS) || defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY) */
+
+#ifdef _AIX
+	aix_usrinfo(pw);
+#endif /* _AIX */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SETPCRED
+	/*
+	 * If we have a chroot directory, we set all creds except real
+	 * uid which we will need for chroot.  If we don't have a
+	 * chroot directory, we don't override anything.
+	 */
+	{
+		char **creds = NULL, *chroot_creds[] =
+		    { "REAL_USER=root", NULL };
+
+		if (options.chroot_directory != NULL &&
+		    strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0)
+			creds = chroot_creds;
+
+		if (setpcred(pw->pw_name, creds) == -1)
+			fatal("Failed to set process credentials");
+	}
+#endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+	ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
+#endif
+}
+
+char *
+platform_krb5_get_principal_name(const char *pw_name)
+{
+#ifdef USE_AIX_KRB_NAME
+	return aix_krb5_get_principal_name(pw_name);
+#else
+	return NULL;
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * return 1 if the specified uid is a uid that may own a system directory
+ * otherwise 0.
+ */
+int
+platform_sys_dir_uid(uid_t uid)
+{
+	if (uid == 0)
+		return 1;
+#ifdef PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID
+	if (uid == PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID)
+		return 1;
+#endif
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/platform.h b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/platform.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1c7a45d8f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/platform.h
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+/* $Id: platform.h,v 1.9 2013/09/22 09:02:40 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 Darren Tucker.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <pwd.h>
+
+void platform_pre_listen(void);
+void platform_pre_fork(void);
+void platform_pre_restart(void);
+void platform_post_fork_parent(pid_t child_pid);
+void platform_post_fork_child(void);
+int  platform_privileged_uidswap(void);
+void platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *);
+void platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *);
+char *platform_get_krb5_client(const char *);
+char *platform_krb5_get_principal_name(const char *);
+int platform_sys_dir_uid(uid_t);
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/reallocarray.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/reallocarray.c
new file mode 120000
index 000000000..cee09385a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/reallocarray.c
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+openbsd-compat/reallocarray.c
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/realpath.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/realpath.c
new file mode 120000
index 000000000..bc69e29ea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/realpath.c
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+openbsd-compat/realpath.c
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/.cvsignore b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/.cvsignore
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3fd25b02e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/.cvsignore
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+*-agent
+*.copy
+*.log
+*.prv
+*.pub
+actual
+authorized_keys_*
+batch
+copy.dd*
+data
+expect
+host.rsa*
+key.*
+known_hosts
+krl-*
+modpipe
+remote_pid
+revoked-*
+revoked-ca
+revoked-keyid
+revoked-serials
+rsa
+rsa1
+sftp-server.sh
+ssh-log-wrapper.sh
+ssh_config
+ssh_proxy*
+sshd_config
+sshd_proxy*
+t*.out
+t*.out[0-9]
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/Makefile b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cba83f4d6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,221 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.81 2015/05/21 06:44:25 djm Exp $
+
+REGRESS_TARGETS=	unit t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10 t11 t12 t-exec
+tests:		prep $(REGRESS_TARGETS)
+
+# Interop tests are not run by default
+interop interop-tests: t-exec-interop
+
+prep:
+	test "x${USE_VALGRIND}" = "x" || mkdir -p $(OBJ)/valgrind-out
+
+clean:
+	for F in $(CLEANFILES); do rm -f $(OBJ)$$F; done
+	test -z "${SUDO}" || ${SUDO} rm -f ${SUDO_CLEAN}
+	rm -rf $(OBJ).putty
+
+distclean:	clean
+
+LTESTS= 	connect \
+		proxy-connect \
+		connect-privsep \
+		proto-version \
+		proto-mismatch \
+		exit-status \
+		envpass \
+		transfer \
+		banner \
+		rekey \
+		stderr-data \
+		stderr-after-eof \
+		broken-pipe \
+		try-ciphers \
+		yes-head \
+		login-timeout \
+		agent \
+		agent-getpeereid \
+		agent-timeout \
+		agent-ptrace \
+		keyscan \
+		keygen-change \
+		keygen-convert \
+		key-options \
+		scp \
+		sftp \
+		sftp-chroot \
+		sftp-cmds \
+		sftp-badcmds \
+		sftp-batch \
+		sftp-glob \
+		sftp-perm \
+		reconfigure \
+		dynamic-forward \
+		forwarding \
+		multiplex \
+		reexec \
+		brokenkeys \
+		cfgparse \
+		cfgmatch \
+		addrmatch \
+		localcommand \
+		forcecommand \
+		portnum \
+		keytype \
+		kextype \
+		cert-hostkey \
+		cert-userkey \
+		host-expand \
+		keys-command \
+		forward-control \
+		integrity \
+		krl \
+		multipubkey \
+		limit-keytype \
+		hostkey-agent \
+		keygen-knownhosts \
+		hostkey-rotate \
+		principals-command
+
+
+#		dhgex \
+
+INTEROP_TESTS=	putty-transfer putty-ciphers putty-kex conch-ciphers
+#INTEROP_TESTS+=ssh-com ssh-com-client ssh-com-keygen ssh-com-sftp
+
+#LTESTS= 	cipher-speed
+
+USER!=		id -un
+CLEANFILES=	t2.out t3.out t6.out1 t6.out2 t7.out t7.out.pub copy.1 copy.2 \
+		t8.out t8.out.pub t9.out t9.out.pub t10.out t10.out.pub \
+		t12.out t12.out.pub \
+		authorized_keys_${USER} known_hosts pidfile testdata \
+		ssh_config sshd_config.orig ssh_proxy sshd_config sshd_proxy \
+		rsa.pub rsa rsa1.pub rsa1 host.rsa host.rsa1 \
+		rsa-agent rsa-agent.pub rsa1-agent rsa1-agent.pub \
+		ls.copy banner.in banner.out empty.in \
+		scp-ssh-wrapper.scp ssh_proxy_envpass remote_pid \
+		sshd_proxy_bak rsa_ssh2_cr.prv rsa_ssh2_crnl.prv \
+		known_hosts-cert host_ca_key* cert_host_key* cert_user_key* \
+		putty.rsa2 sshd_proxy_orig ssh_proxy_bak \
+		key.rsa-* key.dsa-* key.ecdsa-* \
+		authorized_principals_${USER} expect actual ready \
+		sshd_proxy.* authorized_keys_${USER}.* modpipe revoked-* krl-* \
+		ssh.log failed-ssh.log sshd.log failed-sshd.log \
+		regress.log failed-regress.log ssh-log-wrapper.sh \
+		sftp-server.sh sftp-server.log sftp.log setuid-allowed \
+		data ed25519-agent ed25519-agent.pub key.ed25519-512 \
+		key.ed25519-512.pub netcat host_krl_* host_revoked_* \
+		kh.* user_*key* agent-key.* known_hosts.* hkr.*
+
+SUDO_CLEAN+=	/var/run/testdata_${USER} /var/run/keycommand_${USER}
+
+# Enable all malloc(3) randomisations and checks
+TEST_ENV=      "MALLOC_OPTIONS=AFGJPRX"
+
+TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN?=ssh-keygen
+
+CPPFLAGS=-I..
+
+t1:
+	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.CURDIR}/rsa_ssh2.prv | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.prv
+	tr '\n' '\r' <${.CURDIR}/rsa_ssh2.prv > ${.OBJDIR}/rsa_ssh2_cr.prv
+	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.OBJDIR}/rsa_ssh2_cr.prv | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.prv
+	awk '{print $$0 "\r"}' ${.CURDIR}/rsa_ssh2.prv > ${.OBJDIR}/rsa_ssh2_crnl.prv
+	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.OBJDIR}/rsa_ssh2_crnl.prv | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.prv
+
+t2:
+	cat ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.prv > $(OBJ)/t2.out
+	chmod 600 $(OBJ)/t2.out
+	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -yf $(OBJ)/t2.out | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub
+
+t3:
+	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -ef ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub >$(OBJ)/t3.out
+	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if $(OBJ)/t3.out | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub
+
+t4:
+	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -E md5 -lf ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub |\
+		awk '{print $$2}' | diff - ${.CURDIR}/t4.ok
+
+t5:
+	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub |\
+		awk '{print $$2}' | diff - ${.CURDIR}/t5.ok
+
+t6:
+	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.CURDIR}/dsa_ssh2.prv > $(OBJ)/t6.out1
+	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.CURDIR}/dsa_ssh2.pub > $(OBJ)/t6.out2
+	chmod 600 $(OBJ)/t6.out1
+	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -yf $(OBJ)/t6.out1 | diff - $(OBJ)/t6.out2
+
+$(OBJ)/t7.out:
+	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t rsa -N '' -f $@
+
+t7: $(OBJ)/t7.out
+	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t7.out > /dev/null
+	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t7.out > /dev/null
+
+$(OBJ)/t8.out:
+	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t dsa -N '' -f $@
+
+t8: $(OBJ)/t8.out
+	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t8.out > /dev/null
+	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t8.out > /dev/null
+
+$(OBJ)/t9.out:
+	test "${TEST_SSH_ECC}" != yes || \
+	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t ecdsa -N '' -f $@
+
+t9: $(OBJ)/t9.out
+	test "${TEST_SSH_ECC}" != yes || \
+	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t9.out > /dev/null
+	test "${TEST_SSH_ECC}" != yes || \
+	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t9.out > /dev/null
+
+
+$(OBJ)/t10.out:
+	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t ed25519 -N '' -f $@
+
+t10: $(OBJ)/t10.out
+	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t10.out > /dev/null
+	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t10.out > /dev/null
+
+t11:
+	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -E sha256 -lf ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub |\
+		awk '{print $$2}' | diff - ${.CURDIR}/t11.ok
+
+$(OBJ)/t12.out:
+	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t ed25519 -N '' -C 'test-comment-1234' -f $@
+
+t12: $(OBJ)/t12.out
+	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t12.out.pub | grep test-comment-1234 >/dev/null
+
+t-exec:	${LTESTS:=.sh}
+	@if [ "x$?" = "x" ]; then exit 0; fi; \
+	for TEST in ""$?; do \
+		echo "run test $${TEST}" ... 1>&2; \
+		(env SUDO="${SUDO}" TEST_ENV=${TEST_ENV} ${TEST_SHELL} ${.CURDIR}/test-exec.sh ${.OBJDIR} ${.CURDIR}/$${TEST}) || exit $$?; \
+	done
+
+t-exec-interop:	${INTEROP_TESTS:=.sh}
+	@if [ "x$?" = "x" ]; then exit 0; fi; \
+	for TEST in ""$?; do \
+		echo "run test $${TEST}" ... 1>&2; \
+		(env SUDO="${SUDO}" TEST_ENV=${TEST_ENV} ${TEST_SHELL} ${.CURDIR}/test-exec.sh ${.OBJDIR} ${.CURDIR}/$${TEST}) || exit $$?; \
+	done
+
+# Not run by default
+interop: ${INTEROP_TARGETS}
+
+# Unit tests, built by top-level Makefile
+unit:
+	set -e ; if test -z "${SKIP_UNIT}" ; then \
+		V="" ; \
+		test "x${USE_VALGRIND}" = "x" || \
+		    V=${.CURDIR}/valgrind-unit.sh ; \
+		$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf ; \
+		$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey \
+			-d ${.CURDIR}/unittests/sshkey/testdata ; \
+		$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap ; \
+		$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/kex/test_kex ; \
+		$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys \
+			-d ${.CURDIR}/unittests/hostkeys/testdata ; \
+	fi
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/README.regress b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/README.regress
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9b99bdacb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/README.regress
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+Overview.
+
+$ ./configure && make tests
+
+You'll see some progress info. A failure will cause either the make to
+abort or the driver script to report a "FATAL" failure.
+
+The test consists of 2 parts. The first is the file-based tests which is
+driven by the Makefile, and the second is a set of network or proxycommand
+based tests, which are driven by a driver script (test-exec.sh) which is
+called multiple times by the Makefile.
+
+Failures in the first part will cause the Makefile to return an error.
+Failures in the second part will print a "FATAL" message for the failed
+test and continue.
+
+OpenBSD has a system-wide regression test suite. OpenSSH Portable's test
+suite is based on OpenBSD's with modifications.
+
+
+Environment variables.
+
+SUDO: path to sudo command, if desired. Note that some systems (notably
+	systems using PAM) require sudo to execute some tests.
+TEST_SSH_TRACE: set to "yes" for verbose output from tests 
+TEST_SSH_QUIET: set to "yes" to suppress non-fatal output.
+TEST_SSH_x: path to "ssh" command under test, where x=SSH,SSHD,SSHAGENT,SSHADD
+	SSHKEYGEN,SSHKEYSCAN,SFTP,SFTPSERVER
+OBJ: used by test scripts to access build dir.
+TEST_SHELL: shell used for running the test scripts.
+TEST_SSH_PORT: TCP port to be used for the listening tests.
+TEST_SSH_SSH_CONFOPTS: Configuration directives to be added to ssh_config
+	before running each test.
+TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOPTS: Configuration directives to be added to sshd_config
+	before running each test.
+
+
+Individual tests.
+
+You can run an individual test from the top-level Makefile, eg:
+$ make tests LTESTS=agent-timeout
+
+If you need to manipulate the environment more you can invoke test-exec.sh
+directly if you set up the path to find the binaries under test and the
+test scripts themselves, for example:
+
+$ cd regress
+$ PATH=`pwd`/..:$PATH:. TEST_SHELL=/bin/sh sh test-exec.sh `pwd` \
+    agent-timeout.sh
+ok agent timeout test
+
+
+Files.
+
+test-exec.sh: the main test driver. Sets environment, creates config files
+and keys and runs the specified test.
+
+At the time of writing, the individual tests are:
+agent-timeout.sh:	agent timeout test
+agent.sh:		simple agent test
+broken-pipe.sh:		broken pipe test
+connect-privsep.sh:	proxy connect with privsep
+connect.sh:		simple connect
+exit-status.sh:		remote exit status
+forwarding.sh:		local and remote forwarding
+keygen-change.sh:	change passphrase for key
+keyscan.sh:		keyscan
+proto-mismatch.sh:	protocol version mismatch
+proto-version.sh:	sshd version with different protocol combinations
+proxy-connect.sh:	proxy connect
+sftp.sh:		basic sftp put/get
+ssh-com-client.sh:	connect with ssh.com client
+ssh-com-keygen.sh:	ssh.com key import
+ssh-com-sftp.sh:	basic sftp put/get with ssh.com server
+ssh-com.sh:		connect to ssh.com server
+stderr-after-eof.sh:	stderr data after eof
+stderr-data.sh:		stderr data transfer
+transfer.sh:		transfer data
+try-ciphers.sh:		try ciphers
+yes-head.sh:		yes pipe head
+
+
+Problems?
+
+Run the failing test with shell tracing (-x) turned on:
+$ PATH=`pwd`/..:$PATH:. sh -x test-exec.sh `pwd` agent-timeout.sh
+
+Failed tests can be difficult to diagnose. Suggestions:
+- run the individual test via ./test-exec.sh `pwd` [testname]
+- set LogLevel to VERBOSE in test-exec.sh and enable syslogging of
+  auth.debug (eg to /var/log/authlog).
+
+
+Known Issues.
+
+- Similarly, if you do not have "scp" in your system's $PATH then the
+  multiplex scp tests will fail (since the system's shell startup scripts
+  will determine where the shell started by sshd will look for scp).
+
+- Recent GNU coreutils deprecate "head -[n]": this will cause the yes-head
+  test to fail.  The old behaviour can be restored by setting (and
+  exporting) _POSIX2_VERSION=199209 before running the tests.
+
+$Id: README.regress,v 1.12 2011/05/05 03:48:42 djm Exp $
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/addrmatch.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/addrmatch.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1584bd405
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/addrmatch.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: addrmatch.sh,v 1.4 2012/05/13 01:42:32 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="address match"
+
+mv $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+
+run_trial()
+{
+	user="$1"; addr="$2"; host="$3"; laddr="$4"; lport="$5"
+	expected="$6"; descr="$7"
+
+	verbose "test $descr for $user $addr $host"
+	result=`${SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy -T \
+	    -C user=${user},addr=${addr},host=${host},laddr=${laddr},lport=${lport} | \
+	    awk '/^forcecommand/ {print $2}'`
+	if [ "$result" != "$expected" ]; then
+		fail "failed '$descr' expected $expected got $result"
+	fi
+}
+
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+cat >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy <<EOD
+ForceCommand nomatch
+Match Address 192.168.0.0/16,!192.168.30.0/24,10.0.0.0/8,host.example.com
+	ForceCommand match1
+Match Address 1.1.1.1,::1,!::3,2000::/16
+	ForceCommand match2
+Match LocalAddress 127.0.0.1,::1
+	ForceCommand match3
+Match LocalPort 5678
+	ForceCommand match4
+EOD
+
+run_trial user 192.168.0.1 somehost 1.2.3.4 1234 match1 "first entry"
+run_trial user 192.168.30.1 somehost 1.2.3.4 1234 nomatch "negative match"
+run_trial user 19.0.0.1 somehost 1.2.3.4 1234 nomatch "no match"
+run_trial user 10.255.255.254 somehost 1.2.3.4 1234 match1 "list middle"
+run_trial user 192.168.30.1 192.168.0.1 1.2.3.4 1234 nomatch "faked IP in hostname"
+run_trial user 1.1.1.1 somehost.example.com 1.2.3.4 1234 match2 "bare IP4 address"
+run_trial user 19.0.0.1 somehost 127.0.0.1 1234 match3 "localaddress"
+run_trial user 19.0.0.1 somehost 1.2.3.4 5678 match4 "localport"
+
+if test "$TEST_SSH_IPV6" != "no"; then
+run_trial user ::1 somehost.example.com ::2 1234 match2 "bare IP6 address"
+run_trial user ::2 somehost.exaple.com ::2 1234 nomatch "deny IPv6"
+run_trial user ::3 somehost ::2 1234 nomatch "IP6 negated"
+run_trial user ::4 somehost ::2 1234 nomatch "IP6 no match"
+run_trial user 2000::1 somehost ::2 1234 match2 "IP6 network"
+run_trial user 2001::1 somehost ::2 1234 nomatch "IP6 network"
+run_trial user ::5 somehost ::1 1234 match3 "IP6 localaddress"
+run_trial user ::5 somehost ::2 5678 match4 "IP6 localport"
+fi
+
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+rm $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/agent-getpeereid.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/agent-getpeereid.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d5ae2d6e2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/agent-getpeereid.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: agent-getpeereid.sh,v 1.5 2013/05/17 10:33:09 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="disallow agent attach from other uid"
+
+UNPRIV=nobody
+ASOCK=${OBJ}/agent
+SSH_AUTH_SOCK=/nonexistent
+
+if config_defined HAVE_GETPEEREID HAVE_GETPEERUCRED HAVE_SO_PEERCRED ; then
+	:
+else
+	echo "skipped (not supported on this platform)"
+	exit 0
+fi
+if [ -z "$SUDO" ]; then
+	echo "skipped: need SUDO to switch to uid $UNPRIV"
+	exit 0
+fi
+
+trace "start agent"
+eval `${SSHAGENT} -s -a ${ASOCK}` > /dev/null
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r"
+else
+	chmod 644 ${SSH_AUTH_SOCK}
+
+	ssh-add -l > /dev/null 2>&1
+	r=$?
+	if [ $r -ne 1 ]; then
+		fail "ssh-add failed with $r != 1"
+	fi
+
+	< /dev/null ${SUDO} -S -u ${UNPRIV} ssh-add -l 2>/dev/null
+	r=$?
+	if [ $r -lt 2 ]; then
+		fail "ssh-add did not fail for ${UNPRIV}: $r < 2"
+	fi
+
+	trace "kill agent"
+	${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null
+fi
+
+rm -f ${OBJ}/agent
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3aa20c8b1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: agent-pkcs11.sh,v 1.2 2015/01/12 11:46:32 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="pkcs11 agent test"
+
+TEST_SSH_PIN=""
+TEST_SSH_PKCS11=/usr/local/lib/soft-pkcs11.so.0.0
+
+test -f "$TEST_SSH_PKCS11" || fatal "$TEST_SSH_PKCS11 does not exist"
+
+# setup environment for soft-pkcs11 token
+SOFTPKCS11RC=$OBJ/pkcs11.info
+export SOFTPKCS11RC
+# prevent ssh-agent from calling ssh-askpass
+SSH_ASKPASS=/usr/bin/true
+export SSH_ASKPASS
+unset DISPLAY
+
+# start command w/o tty, so ssh-add accepts pin from stdin
+notty() {
+	perl -e 'use POSIX; POSIX::setsid(); 
+	    if (fork) { wait; exit($? >> 8); } else { exec(@ARGV) }' "$@"
+}
+
+trace "start agent"
+eval `${SSHAGENT} -s` > /dev/null
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r"
+else
+	trace "generating key/cert"
+	rm -f $OBJ/pkcs11.key $OBJ/pkcs11.crt
+	openssl genrsa -out $OBJ/pkcs11.key 2048 > /dev/null 2>&1
+	chmod 600 $OBJ/pkcs11.key 
+	openssl req -key $OBJ/pkcs11.key -new -x509 \
+	    -out $OBJ/pkcs11.crt -text -subj '/CN=pkcs11 test' > /dev/null
+	printf "a\ta\t$OBJ/pkcs11.crt\t$OBJ/pkcs11.key" > $SOFTPKCS11RC
+	# add to authorized keys
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -y -f $OBJ/pkcs11.key > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+
+	trace "add pkcs11 key to agent"
+	echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSHADD} -s ${TEST_SSH_PKCS11} > /dev/null 2>&1
+	r=$?
+	if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh-add -s failed: exit code $r"
+	fi
+
+	trace "pkcs11 list via agent"
+	${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
+	r=$?
+	if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh-add -l failed: exit code $r"
+	fi
+
+	trace "pkcs11 connect via agent"
+	${SSH} -2 -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 5
+	r=$?
+	if [ $r -ne 5 ]; then
+		fail "ssh connect failed (exit code $r)"
+	fi
+
+	trace "remove pkcs11 keys"
+	echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSHADD} -e ${TEST_SSH_PKCS11} > /dev/null 2>&1
+	r=$?
+	if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh-add -e failed: exit code $r"
+	fi
+
+	trace "kill agent"
+	${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null
+fi
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/agent-ptrace.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/agent-ptrace.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1912ca8f9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/agent-ptrace.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: agent-ptrace.sh,v 1.2 2014/02/27 21:21:25 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="disallow agent ptrace attach"
+
+if have_prog uname ; then
+	case `uname` in
+	AIX|CYGWIN*|OSF1)
+		echo "skipped (not supported on this platform)"
+		exit 0
+		;;
+	esac
+fi
+
+if have_prog gdb ; then
+	: ok
+else
+	echo "skipped (gdb not found)"
+	exit 0
+fi
+
+if $OBJ/setuid-allowed ${SSHAGENT} ; then
+	: ok
+else
+	echo "skipped (${SSHAGENT} is mounted on a no-setuid filesystem)"
+	exit 0
+fi
+
+if test -z "$SUDO" ; then
+	echo "skipped (SUDO not set)"
+	exit 0
+else
+	$SUDO chown 0 ${SSHAGENT}
+	$SUDO chgrp 0 ${SSHAGENT}
+	$SUDO chmod 2755 ${SSHAGENT}
+fi
+
+trace "start agent"
+eval `${SSHAGENT} -s` > /dev/null
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r"
+else
+	# ls -l ${SSH_AUTH_SOCK}
+	gdb ${SSHAGENT} ${SSH_AGENT_PID} > ${OBJ}/gdb.out 2>&1 << EOF
+		quit
+EOF
+	r=$?
+	if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "gdb failed: exit code $r"
+	fi
+	egrep 'ptrace: Operation not permitted.|procfs:.*Permission denied.|ttrace.*Permission denied.|procfs:.*: Invalid argument.|Unable to access task ' >/dev/null ${OBJ}/gdb.out
+	r=$?
+	rm -f ${OBJ}/gdb.out
+	if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ptrace succeeded?: exit code $r"
+	fi
+
+	trace "kill agent"
+	${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null
+fi
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/agent-timeout.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/agent-timeout.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9598c2032
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/agent-timeout.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: agent-timeout.sh,v 1.3 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="agent timeout test"
+
+SSHAGENT_TIMEOUT=10
+
+trace "start agent"
+eval `${SSHAGENT} -s` > /dev/null
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r"
+else
+	trace "add keys with timeout"
+	for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do
+		${SSHADD} -t ${SSHAGENT_TIMEOUT} $OBJ/$t > /dev/null 2>&1
+		if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh-add did succeed exit code 0"
+		fi
+	done
+	n=`${SSHADD} -l 2> /dev/null | wc -l`
+	trace "agent has $n keys"
+	if [ $n -ne 2 ]; then
+		fail "ssh-add -l did not return 2 keys: $n"
+	fi
+	trace "sleeping 2*${SSHAGENT_TIMEOUT} seconds"
+	sleep ${SSHAGENT_TIMEOUT}
+	sleep ${SSHAGENT_TIMEOUT}
+	${SSHADD} -l 2> /dev/null | grep 'The agent has no identities.' >/dev/null
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh-add -l still returns keys after timeout"
+	fi
+
+	trace "kill agent"
+	${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null
+fi
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/agent.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/agent.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c5e2794b7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/agent.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: agent.sh,v 1.11 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="simple agent test"
+
+SSH_AUTH_SOCK=/nonexistent ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
+if [ $? -ne 2 ]; then
+	fail "ssh-add -l did not fail with exit code 2"
+fi
+
+trace "start agent"
+eval `${SSHAGENT} -s` > /dev/null
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r"
+else
+	${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
+	if [ $? -ne 1 ]; then
+		fail "ssh-add -l did not fail with exit code 1"
+	fi
+	trace "overwrite authorized keys"
+	printf '' > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+	for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do
+		# generate user key for agent
+		rm -f $OBJ/$t-agent
+		${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $t -f $OBJ/$t-agent ||\
+			 fail "ssh-keygen for $t-agent failed"
+		# add to authorized keys
+		cat $OBJ/$t-agent.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+		# add privat key to agent
+		${SSHADD} $OBJ/$t-agent > /dev/null 2>&1
+		if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh-add did succeed exit code 0"
+		fi
+	done
+	${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
+	r=$?
+	if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh-add -l failed: exit code $r"
+	fi
+	# the same for full pubkey output
+	${SSHADD} -L > /dev/null 2>&1
+	r=$?
+	if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh-add -L failed: exit code $r"
+	fi
+
+	trace "simple connect via agent"
+	for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+		${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 5$p
+		r=$?
+		if [ $r -ne 5$p ]; then
+			fail "ssh connect with protocol $p failed (exit code $r)"
+		fi
+	done
+
+	trace "agent forwarding"
+	for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+		${SSH} -A -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
+		r=$?
+		if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh-add -l via agent fwd proto $p failed (exit code $r)"
+		fi
+		${SSH} -A -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost \
+			"${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 5$p"
+		r=$?
+		if [ $r -ne 5$p ]; then
+			fail "agent fwd proto $p failed (exit code $r)"
+		fi
+	done
+
+	trace "delete all agent keys"
+	${SSHADD} -D > /dev/null 2>&1
+	r=$?
+	if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh-add -D failed: exit code $r"
+	fi
+
+	trace "kill agent"
+	${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null
+fi
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/banner.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/banner.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0b9c95007
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/banner.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: banner.sh,v 1.2 2003/10/11 11:49:49 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="banner"
+echo "Banner $OBJ/banner.in" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+rm -f $OBJ/banner.out $OBJ/banner.in $OBJ/empty.in
+touch $OBJ/empty.in
+
+trace "test missing banner file"
+verbose "test $tid: missing banner file"
+( ${SSH} -2 -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy otherhost true 2>$OBJ/banner.out && \
+	cmp $OBJ/empty.in $OBJ/banner.out ) || \
+	fail "missing banner file"
+
+for s in 0 10 100 1000 10000 100000 ; do
+	if [ "$s" = "0" ]; then
+		# create empty banner
+		touch $OBJ/banner.in
+	elif [ "$s" = "10" ]; then
+		# create 10-byte banner file
+		echo "abcdefghi" >$OBJ/banner.in
+	else
+		# increase size 10x
+		cp $OBJ/banner.in $OBJ/banner.out
+		for i in 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 ; do
+			cat $OBJ/banner.out >> $OBJ/banner.in
+		done
+	fi
+
+	trace "test banner size $s"
+	verbose "test $tid: size $s"
+	( ${SSH} -2 -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy otherhost true 2>$OBJ/banner.out && \
+		cmp $OBJ/banner.in $OBJ/banner.out ) || \
+		fail "banner size $s mismatch"
+done
+
+trace "test suppress banner (-q)"
+verbose "test $tid: suppress banner (-q)"
+( ${SSH} -q -2 -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy otherhost true 2>$OBJ/banner.out && \
+	cmp $OBJ/empty.in $OBJ/banner.out ) || \
+	fail "suppress banner (-q)"
+
+rm -f $OBJ/banner.out $OBJ/banner.in $OBJ/empty.in
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/broken-pipe.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/broken-pipe.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a416f7a3b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/broken-pipe.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: broken-pipe.sh,v 1.5 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="broken pipe test"
+
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+	trace "protocol $p"
+	for i in 1 2 3 4; do
+		${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config_config nexthost echo $i 2> /dev/null | true
+		r=$?
+		if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+			fail "broken pipe returns $r for protocol $p"
+		fi
+	done
+done
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/brokenkeys.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/brokenkeys.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3e70c348a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/brokenkeys.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: brokenkeys.sh,v 1.1 2004/10/29 23:59:22 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="broken keys"
+
+KEYS="$OBJ/authorized_keys_${USER}"
+
+start_sshd
+
+mv ${KEYS} ${KEYS}.bak
+
+# Truncated key
+echo "ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABIwAAAIEABTM= bad key" > $KEYS
+cat ${KEYS}.bak >> ${KEYS}
+cat $OBJ/$t.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+
+${SSH} -2 -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true
+if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "ssh connect with protocol $p failed"
+fi
+
+mv ${KEYS}.bak ${KEYS}
+
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/cert-hostkey.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/cert-hostkey.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3f53922c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/cert-hostkey.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,302 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: cert-hostkey.sh,v 1.13 2015/07/10 06:23:25 markus Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="certified host keys"
+
+rm -f $OBJ/known_hosts-cert* $OBJ/host_ca_key* $OBJ/host_revoked_*
+rm -f $OBJ/cert_host_key* $OBJ/host_krl_*
+
+# Allow all hostkey/pubkey types, prefer certs for the client
+types=""
+for i in `$SSH -Q key`; do
+	if [ -z "$types" ]; then
+		types="$i"
+		continue
+	fi
+	case "$i" in
+	*cert*)	types="$i,$types";;
+	*)	types="$types,$i";;
+	esac
+done
+(
+	echo "HostKeyAlgorithms ${types}"
+	echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes *"
+) >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+(
+	echo "HostKeyAlgorithms *"
+	echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes *"
+) >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+
+HOSTS='localhost-with-alias,127.0.0.1,::1'
+
+# Create a CA key and add it to known hosts. Ed25519 chosed for speed.
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519  -f $OBJ/host_ca_key ||\
+	fail "ssh-keygen of host_ca_key failed"
+(
+	printf '@cert-authority '
+	printf "$HOSTS "
+	cat $OBJ/host_ca_key.pub
+) > $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig
+cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
+
+# Plain text revocation files
+touch $OBJ/host_revoked_empty
+touch $OBJ/host_revoked_plain
+touch $OBJ/host_revoked_cert
+cp $OBJ/host_ca_key.pub $OBJ/host_revoked_ca
+
+PLAIN_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | sed 's/^ssh-dss/ssh-dsa/g;s/^ssh-//'`
+
+# Prepare certificate, plain key and CA KRLs
+${SSHKEYGEN} -kf $OBJ/host_krl_empty || fatal "KRL init failed"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -kf $OBJ/host_krl_plain || fatal "KRL init failed"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -kf $OBJ/host_krl_cert || fatal "KRL init failed"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -kf $OBJ/host_krl_ca $OBJ/host_ca_key.pub \
+	|| fatal "KRL init failed"
+
+# Generate and sign host keys
+serial=1
+for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do 
+	verbose "$tid: sign host ${ktype} cert"
+	# Generate and sign a host key
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ${ktype} \
+	    -f $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype} || \
+		fatal "ssh-keygen of cert_host_key_${ktype} failed"
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -ukf $OBJ/host_krl_plain \
+	    $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}.pub || fatal "KRL update failed"
+	cat $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}.pub >> $OBJ/host_revoked_plain
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -h -q -s $OBJ/host_ca_key -z $serial \
+	    -I "regress host key for $USER" \
+	    -n $HOSTS $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype} ||
+		fatal "couldn't sign cert_host_key_${ktype}"
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -ukf $OBJ/host_krl_cert \
+	    $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}-cert.pub || \
+		fatal "KRL update failed"
+	cat $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}-cert.pub >> $OBJ/host_revoked_cert
+	serial=`expr $serial + 1`
+done
+
+attempt_connect() {
+	_ident="$1"
+	_expect_success="$2"
+	shift; shift
+	verbose "$tid: $_ident expect success $_expect_success"
+	cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
+	${SSH} -2 -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
+	    -oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
+	    "$@" -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true
+	_r=$?
+	if [ "x$_expect_success" = "xyes" ] ; then
+		if [ $_r -ne 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh cert connect $_ident failed"
+		fi
+	else
+		if [ $_r -eq 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh cert connect $_ident succeeded unexpectedly"
+		fi
+	fi
+}
+
+# Basic connect and revocation tests.
+for privsep in yes no ; do
+	for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do 
+		verbose "$tid: host ${ktype} cert connect privsep $privsep"
+		(
+			cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+			echo HostKey $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}
+			echo HostCertificate $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}-cert.pub
+			echo UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep
+		) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+		#               test name                         expect success
+		attempt_connect "$ktype basic connect"			"yes"
+		attempt_connect "$ktype empty KRL"			"yes" \
+		    -oRevokedHostKeys=$OBJ/host_krl_empty
+		attempt_connect "$ktype KRL w/ plain key revoked"	"no" \
+		    -oRevokedHostKeys=$OBJ/host_krl_plain
+		attempt_connect "$ktype KRL w/ cert revoked"		"no" \
+		    -oRevokedHostKeys=$OBJ/host_krl_cert
+		attempt_connect "$ktype KRL w/ CA revoked"		"no" \
+		    -oRevokedHostKeys=$OBJ/host_krl_ca
+		attempt_connect "$ktype empty plaintext revocation"	"yes" \
+		    -oRevokedHostKeys=$OBJ/host_revoked_empty
+		attempt_connect "$ktype plain key plaintext revocation"	"no" \
+		    -oRevokedHostKeys=$OBJ/host_revoked_plain
+		attempt_connect "$ktype cert plaintext revocation"	"no" \
+		    -oRevokedHostKeys=$OBJ/host_revoked_cert
+		attempt_connect "$ktype CA plaintext revocation"	"no" \
+		    -oRevokedHostKeys=$OBJ/host_revoked_ca
+	done
+done
+
+# Revoked certificates with key present
+(
+	printf '@cert-authority '
+	printf "$HOSTS "
+	cat $OBJ/host_ca_key.pub
+	for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do
+		test -f "$OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}.pub" || fatal "no pubkey"
+		printf "@revoked * `cat $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}.pub`\n"
+	done
+) > $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig
+cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
+for privsep in yes no ; do
+	for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do 
+		verbose "$tid: host ${ktype} revoked cert privsep $privsep"
+		(
+			cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+			echo HostKey $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}
+			echo HostCertificate $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}-cert.pub
+			echo UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep
+		) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+		cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
+		${SSH} -2 -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
+		    -oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
+			-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+		if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
+		fi
+	done
+done
+
+# Revoked CA
+(
+	printf '@cert-authority '
+	printf "$HOSTS "
+	cat $OBJ/host_ca_key.pub
+	printf '@revoked '
+	printf "* "
+	cat $OBJ/host_ca_key.pub
+) > $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig
+cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
+for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do 
+	verbose "$tid: host ${ktype} revoked cert"
+	(
+		cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+		echo HostKey $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}
+		echo HostCertificate $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}-cert.pub
+	) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+	cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
+	${SSH} -2 -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
+	    -oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
+		-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+	if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
+	fi
+done
+
+# Create a CA key and add it to known hosts
+(
+	printf '@cert-authority '
+	printf "$HOSTS "
+	cat $OBJ/host_ca_key.pub
+) > $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig
+cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
+
+test_one() {
+	ident=$1
+	result=$2
+	sign_opts=$3
+
+	for kt in rsa ed25519 ; do
+		${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/host_ca_key \
+		    -I "regress host key for $USER" \
+		    $sign_opts $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt} ||
+			fail "couldn't sign cert_host_key_${kt}"
+		(
+			cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+			echo HostKey $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt}
+			echo HostCertificate $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt}-cert.pub
+		) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+	
+		cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
+		${SSH} -2 -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
+		    -oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
+		    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+		rc=$?
+		if [ "x$result" = "xsuccess" ] ; then
+			if [ $rc -ne 0 ]; then
+				fail "ssh cert connect $ident failed unexpectedly"
+			fi
+		else
+			if [ $rc -eq 0 ]; then
+				fail "ssh cert connect $ident succeeded unexpectedly"
+			fi
+		fi
+	done
+}
+
+test_one "user-certificate"	failure "-n $HOSTS"
+test_one "empty principals"	success "-h"
+test_one "wrong principals"	failure "-h -n foo"
+test_one "cert not yet valid"	failure "-h -V20200101:20300101"
+test_one "cert expired"		failure "-h -V19800101:19900101"
+test_one "cert valid interval"	success "-h -V-1w:+2w"
+test_one "cert has constraints"	failure "-h -Oforce-command=false"
+
+# Check downgrade of cert to raw key when no CA found
+for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do 
+	rm -f $OBJ/known_hosts-cert $OBJ/cert_host_key*
+	verbose "$tid: host ${ktype} ${v} cert downgrade to raw key"
+	# Generate and sign a host key
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ${ktype} \
+	    -f $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype} || \
+		fail "ssh-keygen of cert_host_key_${ktype} failed"
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -t ${v} -h -q -s $OBJ/host_ca_key \
+	    -I "regress host key for $USER" \
+	    -n $HOSTS $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype} ||
+		fail "couldn't sign cert_host_key_${ktype}"
+	(
+		printf "$HOSTS "
+		cat $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}.pub
+	) > $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
+	(
+		cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+		echo HostKey $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}
+		echo HostCertificate $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}-cert.pub
+	) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+	
+	${SSH} -2 -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
+	    -oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
+		-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh cert connect failed"
+	fi
+done
+
+# Wrong certificate
+(
+	printf '@cert-authority '
+	printf "$HOSTS "
+	cat $OBJ/host_ca_key.pub
+) > $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig
+cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
+for kt in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do 
+	rm -f $OBJ/cert_host_key*
+	# Self-sign key
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ${kt} \
+	    -f $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt} || \
+		fail "ssh-keygen of cert_host_key_${kt} failed"
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -t ${v} -h -q -s $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt} \
+	    -I "regress host key for $USER" \
+	    -n $HOSTS $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt} ||
+		fail "couldn't sign cert_host_key_${kt}"
+	verbose "$tid: host ${kt} connect wrong cert"
+	(
+		cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+		echo HostKey $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt}
+		echo HostCertificate $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt}-cert.pub
+	) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+	cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
+	${SSH} -2 -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
+	    -oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
+		-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -q somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+	if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh cert connect $ident succeeded unexpectedly"
+	fi
+done
+
+rm -f $OBJ/known_hosts-cert* $OBJ/host_ca_key* $OBJ/cert_host_key*
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/cert-userkey.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/cert-userkey.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c38c00a02
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/cert-userkey.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,362 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: cert-userkey.sh,v 1.14 2015/07/10 06:23:25 markus Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="certified user keys"
+
+rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/cert_user_key*
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+cp $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak
+
+PLAIN_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | sed 's/^ssh-dss/ssh-dsa/;s/^ssh-//'`
+
+kname() {
+	n=`echo "$1" | sed 's/^dsa/ssh-dss/;s/^rsa/ssh-rsa/;s/^ed/ssh-ed/'`
+	echo "$n*,ssh-rsa*,ssh-ed25519*"
+}
+
+# Create a CA key
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t rsa  -f $OBJ/user_ca_key ||\
+	fail "ssh-keygen of user_ca_key failed"
+
+# Generate and sign user keys
+for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do 
+	verbose "$tid: sign user ${ktype} cert"
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ${ktype} \
+	    -f $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} || \
+		fail "ssh-keygen of cert_user_key_${ktype} failed"
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key -I "regress user key for $USER" \
+	    -z $$ -n ${USER},mekmitasdigoat $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} ||
+		fail "couldn't sign cert_user_key_${ktype}"
+done
+
+# Test explicitly-specified principals
+for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do 
+	t=$(kname $ktype)
+	for privsep in yes no ; do
+		_prefix="${ktype} privsep $privsep"
+
+		# Setup for AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
+		rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+		(
+			cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+			echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep"
+			echo "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile " \
+			    "$OBJ/authorized_principals_%u"
+			echo "TrustedUserCAKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub"
+			echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}"
+		) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+		(
+			cat $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak
+			echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}"
+		) > $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+
+		# Missing authorized_principals
+		verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} missing authorized_principals"
+		rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+		${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
+		    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+		if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
+		fi
+
+		# Empty authorized_principals
+		verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} empty authorized_principals"
+		echo > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+		${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
+		    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+		if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
+		fi
+	
+		# Wrong authorized_principals
+		verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} wrong authorized_principals"
+		echo gregorsamsa > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+		${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
+		    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+		if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
+		fi
+
+		# Correct authorized_principals
+		verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} correct authorized_principals"
+		echo mekmitasdigoat > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+		${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
+		    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+		if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh cert connect failed"
+		fi
+
+		# authorized_principals with bad key option
+		verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals bad key opt"
+		echo 'blah mekmitasdigoat' > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+		${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
+		    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+		if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
+		fi
+
+		# authorized_principals with command=false
+		verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals command=false"
+		echo 'command="false" mekmitasdigoat' > \
+		    $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+		${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
+		    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+		if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
+		fi
+
+
+		# authorized_principals with command=true
+		verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals command=true"
+		echo 'command="true" mekmitasdigoat' > \
+		    $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+		${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
+		    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost false >/dev/null 2>&1
+		if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh cert connect failed"
+		fi
+
+		# Setup for principals= key option
+		rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+		(
+			cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+			echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep"
+			echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}"
+		) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+		(
+			cat $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak
+			echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}"
+		) > $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+
+		# Wrong principals list
+		verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} wrong principals key option"
+		(
+			printf 'cert-authority,principals="gregorsamsa" '
+			cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub
+		) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+		${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
+		    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+		if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
+		fi
+
+		# Correct principals list
+		verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} correct principals key option"
+		(
+			printf 'cert-authority,principals="mekmitasdigoat" '
+			cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub
+		) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+		${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
+		    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+		if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh cert connect failed"
+		fi
+	done
+done
+
+basic_tests() {
+	auth=$1
+	if test "x$auth" = "xauthorized_keys" ; then
+		# Add CA to authorized_keys
+		(
+			printf 'cert-authority '
+			cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub
+		) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+	else
+		echo > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+		extra_sshd="TrustedUserCAKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub"
+	fi
+	
+	for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do 
+		t=$(kname $ktype)
+		for privsep in yes no ; do
+			_prefix="${ktype} privsep $privsep $auth"
+			# Simple connect
+			verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} connect"
+			(
+				cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+				echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep"
+				echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}"
+				echo "$extra_sshd"
+			) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+			(
+				cat $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak
+				echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}"
+			) > $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+	
+			${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
+			    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true
+			if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+				fail "ssh cert connect failed"
+			fi
+
+			# Revoked keys
+			verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} revoked key"
+			(
+				cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+				echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep"
+				echo "RevokedKeys $OBJ/cert_user_key_revoked"
+				echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}"
+				echo "$extra_sshd"
+			) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+			cp $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype}.pub \
+			    $OBJ/cert_user_key_revoked
+			${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
+			    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+			if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+				fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpecedly"
+			fi
+			verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} revoked via KRL"
+			rm $OBJ/cert_user_key_revoked
+			${SSHKEYGEN} -kqf $OBJ/cert_user_key_revoked \
+			    $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype}.pub
+			${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
+			    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+			if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+				fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpecedly"
+			fi
+			verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} empty KRL"
+			${SSHKEYGEN} -kqf $OBJ/cert_user_key_revoked
+			${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
+			    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+			if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+				fail "ssh cert connect failed"
+			fi
+		done
+	
+		# Revoked CA
+		verbose "$tid: ${ktype} $auth revoked CA key"
+		(
+			cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+			echo "RevokedKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub"
+			echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}"
+			echo "$extra_sshd"
+		) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+		${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \
+		    somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+		if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpecedly"
+		fi
+	done
+	
+	verbose "$tid: $auth CA does not authenticate"
+	(
+		cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+		echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}"
+		echo "$extra_sshd"
+	) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+	verbose "$tid: ensure CA key does not authenticate user"
+	${SSH} -2i $OBJ/user_ca_key \
+	    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+	if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh cert connect with CA key succeeded unexpectedly"
+	fi
+}
+
+basic_tests authorized_keys
+basic_tests TrustedUserCAKeys
+
+test_one() {
+	ident=$1
+	result=$2
+	sign_opts=$3
+	auth_choice=$4
+	auth_opt=$5
+
+	if test "x$auth_choice" = "x" ; then
+		auth_choice="authorized_keys TrustedUserCAKeys"
+	fi
+
+	for auth in $auth_choice ; do
+		for ktype in rsa ed25519 ; do
+			cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+			if test "x$auth" = "xauthorized_keys" ; then
+				# Add CA to authorized_keys
+				(
+					printf "cert-authority${auth_opt} "
+					cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub
+				) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+			else
+				echo > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+				echo "TrustedUserCAKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub" \
+				    >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+				echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}*" \
+				    >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+				if test "x$auth_opt" != "x" ; then
+					echo $auth_opt >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+				fi
+			fi
+			
+			verbose "$tid: $ident auth $auth expect $result $ktype"
+			${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key \
+			    -I "regress user key for $USER" \
+			    $sign_opts $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} ||
+				fail "couldn't sign cert_user_key_${ktype}"
+
+			${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
+			    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+			rc=$?
+			if [ "x$result" = "xsuccess" ] ; then
+				if [ $rc -ne 0 ]; then
+					fail "$ident failed unexpectedly"
+				fi
+			else
+				if [ $rc -eq 0 ]; then
+					fail "$ident succeeded unexpectedly"
+				fi
+			fi
+		done
+	done
+}
+
+test_one "correct principal"	success "-n ${USER}"
+test_one "host-certificate"	failure "-n ${USER} -h"
+test_one "wrong principals"	failure "-n foo"
+test_one "cert not yet valid"	failure "-n ${USER} -V20200101:20300101"
+test_one "cert expired"		failure "-n ${USER} -V19800101:19900101"
+test_one "cert valid interval"	success "-n ${USER} -V-1w:+2w"
+test_one "wrong source-address"	failure "-n ${USER} -Osource-address=10.0.0.0/8"
+test_one "force-command"	failure "-n ${USER} -Oforce-command=false"
+
+# Behaviour is different here: TrustedUserCAKeys doesn't allow empty principals
+test_one "empty principals"	success "" authorized_keys
+test_one "empty principals"	failure "" TrustedUserCAKeys
+
+# Check explicitly-specified principals: an empty principals list in the cert
+# should always be refused.
+
+# AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
+rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+echo mekmitasdigoat > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+test_one "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile principals" success "-n mekmitasdigoat" \
+    TrustedUserCAKeys "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile $OBJ/authorized_principals_%u"
+test_one "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile no principals" failure "" \
+    TrustedUserCAKeys "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile $OBJ/authorized_principals_%u"
+
+# principals= key option
+rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+test_one "principals key option principals" success "-n mekmitasdigoat" \
+    authorized_keys ',principals="mekmitasdigoat"'
+test_one "principals key option no principals" failure "" \
+    authorized_keys ',principals="mekmitasdigoat"'
+
+# Wrong certificate
+cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do 
+	t=$(kname $ktype)
+	# Self-sign
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} -I \
+	    "regress user key for $USER" \
+	    -n $USER $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} ||
+		fail "couldn't sign cert_user_key_${ktype}"
+	verbose "$tid: user ${ktype} connect wrong cert"
+	${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \
+	    somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+	if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh cert connect $ident succeeded unexpectedly"
+	fi
+done
+
+rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/cert_user_key*
+rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/cfgmatch.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/cfgmatch.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..056296398
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/cfgmatch.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: cfgmatch.sh,v 1.9 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="sshd_config match"
+
+pidfile=$OBJ/remote_pid
+fwdport=3301
+fwd="-L $fwdport:127.0.0.1:$PORT"
+
+echo "ExitOnForwardFailure=yes" >> $OBJ/ssh_config
+echo "ExitOnForwardFailure=yes" >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+
+start_client()
+{
+	rm -f $pidfile
+	${SSH} -q -$p $fwd "$@" somehost \
+	    exec sh -c \'"echo \$\$ > $pidfile; exec sleep 100"\' \
+	    >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 &
+	client_pid=$!
+	# Wait for remote end
+	n=0
+	while test ! -f $pidfile ; do
+		sleep 1
+		n=`expr $n + 1`
+		if test $n -gt 60; then
+			kill $client_pid
+			fatal "timeout waiting for background ssh"
+		fi
+	done	
+}
+
+stop_client()
+{
+	pid=`cat $pidfile`
+	if [ ! -z "$pid" ]; then
+		kill $pid
+	fi
+	wait
+}
+
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:1" >>$OBJ/sshd_config
+echo "Match Address 127.0.0.1" >>$OBJ/sshd_config
+echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:$PORT" >>$OBJ/sshd_config
+
+grep -v AuthorizedKeysFile $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "AuthorizedKeysFile /dev/null" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:1" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "Match user $USER" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "AuthorizedKeysFile /dev/null $OBJ/authorized_keys_%u" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "Match Address 127.0.0.1" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:$PORT" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+start_sshd
+
+#set -x
+
+# Test Match + PermitOpen in sshd_config.  This should be permitted
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+	trace "match permitopen localhost proto $p"
+	start_client -F $OBJ/ssh_config
+	${SSH} -q -$p -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true || \
+	    fail "match permitopen permit proto $p"
+	stop_client
+done
+
+# Same but from different source.  This should not be permitted
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+	trace "match permitopen proxy proto $p"
+	start_client -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+	${SSH} -q -$p -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true && \
+	    fail "match permitopen deny proto $p"
+	stop_client
+done
+
+# Retry previous with key option, should also be denied.
+cp /dev/null $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do
+	printf 'permitopen="127.0.0.1:'$PORT'" ' >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+	cat $OBJ/$t.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+done
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+	trace "match permitopen proxy w/key opts proto $p"
+	start_client -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+	${SSH} -q -$p -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true && \
+	    fail "match permitopen deny w/key opt proto $p"
+	stop_client
+done
+
+# Test both sshd_config and key options permitting the same dst/port pair.
+# Should be permitted.
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+	trace "match permitopen localhost proto $p"
+	start_client -F $OBJ/ssh_config
+	${SSH} -q -$p -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true || \
+	    fail "match permitopen permit proto $p"
+	stop_client
+done
+
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:1 127.0.0.1:$PORT 127.0.0.2:2" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "Match User $USER" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:1 127.0.0.1:2" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+# Test that a Match overrides a PermitOpen in the global section
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+	trace "match permitopen proxy w/key opts proto $p"
+	start_client -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+	${SSH} -q -$p -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true && \
+	    fail "match override permitopen proto $p"
+	stop_client
+done
+
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:1 127.0.0.1:$PORT 127.0.0.2:2" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "Match User NoSuchUser" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:1 127.0.0.1:2" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+# Test that a rule that doesn't match doesn't override, plus test a
+# PermitOpen entry that's not at the start of the list
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+	trace "nomatch permitopen proxy w/key opts proto $p"
+	start_client -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+	${SSH} -q -$p -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true || \
+	    fail "nomatch override permitopen proto $p"
+	stop_client
+done
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/cfgparse.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/cfgparse.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..736f38976
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/cfgparse.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: cfgparse.sh,v 1.5 2015/05/29 03:05:13 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="config parse"
+
+# This is a reasonable proxy for IPv6 support.
+if ! config_defined HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR ; then
+	SKIP_IPV6=yes
+fi
+
+# We need to use the keys generated for the regression test because sshd -T
+# will fail if we're not running with SUDO (no permissions for real keys) or
+# if we are # running tests on a system that has never had sshd installed
+# (keys won't exist).
+
+grep "HostKey " $OBJ/sshd_config > $OBJ/sshd_config_minimal
+SSHD_KEYS="`cat $OBJ/sshd_config_minimal`"
+
+verbose "reparse minimal config"
+($SUDO ${SSHD} -T -f $OBJ/sshd_config_minimal >$OBJ/sshd_config.1 &&
+ $SUDO ${SSHD} -T -f $OBJ/sshd_config.1 >$OBJ/sshd_config.2 &&
+ diff $OBJ/sshd_config.1 $OBJ/sshd_config.2) || fail "reparse minimal config"
+
+verbose "reparse regress config"
+($SUDO ${SSHD} -T -f $OBJ/sshd_config >$OBJ/sshd_config.1 &&
+ $SUDO ${SSHD} -T -f $OBJ/sshd_config.1 >$OBJ/sshd_config.2 &&
+ diff $OBJ/sshd_config.1 $OBJ/sshd_config.2) || fail "reparse regress config"
+
+verbose "listenaddress order"
+# expected output
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.0 <<EOD
+listenaddress 1.2.3.4:1234
+listenaddress 1.2.3.4:5678
+EOD
+[ X${SKIP_IPV6} = Xyes ] || cat >> $OBJ/sshd_config.0 <<EOD
+listenaddress [::1]:1234
+listenaddress [::1]:5678
+EOD
+
+# test input sets.  should all result in the output above.
+# test 1: addressfamily and port first
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.1 <<EOD
+${SSHD_KEYS}
+addressfamily any
+port 1234
+port 5678
+listenaddress 1.2.3.4
+EOD
+[ X${SKIP_IPV6} = Xyes ] || cat >> $OBJ/sshd_config.1 <<EOD
+listenaddress ::1
+EOD
+
+($SUDO ${SSHD} -T -f $OBJ/sshd_config.1 | \
+ grep 'listenaddress ' >$OBJ/sshd_config.2 &&
+ diff $OBJ/sshd_config.0 $OBJ/sshd_config.2) || \
+ fail "listenaddress order 1"
+# test 2: listenaddress first
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.1 <<EOD
+${SSHD_KEYS}
+listenaddress 1.2.3.4
+port 1234
+port 5678
+addressfamily any
+EOD
+[ X${SKIP_IPV6} = Xyes ] || cat >> $OBJ/sshd_config.1 <<EOD
+listenaddress ::1
+EOD
+
+($SUDO ${SSHD} -T -f $OBJ/sshd_config.1 | \
+ grep 'listenaddress ' >$OBJ/sshd_config.2 &&
+ diff $OBJ/sshd_config.0 $OBJ/sshd_config.2) || \
+ fail "listenaddress order 2"
+
+# cleanup
+rm -f $OBJ/sshd_config.[012]
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/cipher-speed.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/cipher-speed.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..575dc2341
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/cipher-speed.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: cipher-speed.sh,v 1.13 2015/03/24 20:22:17 markus Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="cipher speed"
+
+getbytes ()
+{
+	sed -n -e '/transferred/s/.*secs (\(.* bytes.sec\).*/\1/p' \
+	    -e '/copied/s/.*s, \(.* MB.s\).*/\1/p'
+}
+
+tries="1 2"
+
+for c in `${SSH} -Q cipher`; do n=0; for m in `${SSH} -Q mac`; do
+	trace "proto 2 cipher $c mac $m"
+	for x in $tries; do
+		printf "%-60s" "$c/$m:"
+		( ${SSH} -o 'compression no' \
+			-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -2 -m $m -c $c somehost \
+			exec sh -c \'"dd of=/dev/null obs=32k"\' \
+		< ${DATA} ) 2>&1 | getbytes
+
+		if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh -2 failed with mac $m cipher $c"
+		fi
+	done
+	# No point trying all MACs for AEAD ciphers since they are ignored.
+	if ${SSH} -Q cipher-auth | grep "^${c}\$" >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
+		break
+	fi
+	n=`expr $n + 1`
+done; done
+
+if ssh_version 1; then
+	ciphers="3des blowfish"
+else
+	ciphers=""
+fi
+for c in $ciphers; do
+	trace "proto 1 cipher $c"
+	for x in $tries; do
+		printf "%-60s" "$c:"
+		( ${SSH} -o 'compression no' \
+			-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -1 -c $c somehost \
+			exec sh -c \'"dd of=/dev/null obs=32k"\' \
+		< ${DATA} ) 2>&1 | getbytes
+		if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh -1 failed with cipher $c"
+		fi
+	done
+done
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/conch-ciphers.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/conch-ciphers.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..199d863a0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/conch-ciphers.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: conch-ciphers.sh,v 1.3 2013/05/17 04:29:14 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="conch ciphers"
+
+if test "x$REGRESS_INTEROP_CONCH" != "xyes" ; then
+	echo "conch interop tests not enabled"
+	exit 0
+fi
+
+start_sshd
+
+for c in aes256-ctr aes256-cbc aes192-ctr aes192-cbc aes128-ctr aes128-cbc \
+         cast128-cbc blowfish 3des-cbc ; do
+	verbose "$tid: cipher $c"
+	rm -f ${COPY}
+	# XXX the 2nd "cat" seems to be needed because of buggy FD handling
+	# in conch
+	${CONCH} --identity $OBJ/rsa --port $PORT --user $USER  -e none \
+	    --known-hosts $OBJ/known_hosts --notty --noagent --nox11 -n \
+	    127.0.0.1 "cat ${DATA}" 2>/dev/null | cat > ${COPY}
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh cat $DATA failed"
+	fi
+	cmp ${DATA} ${COPY}		|| fail "corrupted copy"
+done
+rm -f ${COPY}
+
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/connect-privsep.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/connect-privsep.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9a51f5690
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/connect-privsep.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: connect-privsep.sh,v 1.6 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="proxy connect with privsep"
+
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
+echo 'UsePrivilegeSeparation yes' >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+	${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy 999.999.999.999 true
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh privsep+proxyconnect protocol $p failed"
+	fi
+done
+
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo 'UsePrivilegeSeparation sandbox' >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+	${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy 999.999.999.999 true
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		# XXX replace this with fail once sandbox has stabilised
+		warn "ssh privsep/sandbox+proxyconnect protocol $p failed"
+	fi
+done
+
+# Because sandbox is sensitive to changes in libc, especially malloc, retest
+# with every malloc.conf option (and none).
+for m in '' A F G H J P R S X '<' '>'; do
+    for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+	env MALLOC_OPTIONS="$m" ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy 999.999.999.999 true
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh privsep/sandbox+proxyconnect protocol $p mopt '$m' failed"
+	fi
+    done
+done
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/connect.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/connect.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f0d55d343
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/connect.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: connect.sh,v 1.5 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="simple connect"
+
+start_sshd
+
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+	${SSH} -o "Protocol=$p" -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh connect with protocol $p failed"
+	fi
+done
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/core.13225 b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/core.13225
new file mode 100755
index 000000000..16ac83fab
Binary files /dev/null and b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/core.13225 differ
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/dhgex.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/dhgex.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..57fca4a32
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/dhgex.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: dhgex.sh,v 1.2 2014/04/21 22:15:37 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="dhgex"
+
+LOG=${TEST_SSH_LOGFILE}
+rm -f ${LOG}
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+
+kexs=`${SSH} -Q kex | grep diffie-hellman-group-exchange`
+
+ssh_test_dhgex()
+{
+	bits="$1"; shift
+	cipher="$1"; shift
+	kex="$1"; shift
+
+	cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+	echo "KexAlgorithms=$kex" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+	echo "Ciphers=$cipher" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+	rm -f ${LOG}
+	opts="-oKexAlgorithms=$kex -oCiphers=$cipher"
+	groupsz="1024<$bits<8192"
+	verbose "$tid bits $bits $kex $cipher"
+	${SSH} ${opts} $@ -vvv -F ${OBJ}/ssh_proxy somehost true
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh failed ($@)"
+	fi
+	# check what we request
+	grep "SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST($groupsz) sent" ${LOG} >/dev/null
+	if [ $? != 0 ]; then
+		got=`egrep "SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST(.*) sent" ${LOG}`
+		fail "$tid unexpected GEX sizes, expected $groupsz, got $got"
+	fi
+	# check what we got (depends on contents of system moduli file)
+	gotbits="`awk '/bits set:/{print $4}' ${LOG} | head -1 | cut -f2 -d/`"
+	if [ "$gotbits" -lt "$bits" ]; then
+		fatal "$tid expected $bits bit group, got $gotbits"
+	fi
+}
+
+check()
+{
+	bits="$1"; shift
+
+	for c in $@; do
+		for k in $kexs; do
+			ssh_test_dhgex $bits $c $k
+		done
+	done
+}
+
+#check 2048 3des-cbc
+check 3072 `${SSH} -Q cipher | grep 128`
+check 3072 arcfour blowfish-cbc
+check 7680 `${SSH} -Q cipher | grep 192`
+check 8192 `${SSH} -Q cipher | grep 256`
+check 8192 rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/dsa_ssh2.prv b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/dsa_ssh2.prv
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c93b40371
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/dsa_ssh2.prv
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+---- BEGIN SSH2 ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY ----
+Subject: ssh-keygen test
+Comment: "1024-bit dsa, Tue Jan 08 2002 22:00:23 +0100"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+---- END SSH2 ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY ----
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/dsa_ssh2.pub b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/dsa_ssh2.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..215d73bae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/dsa_ssh2.pub
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+---- BEGIN SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----
+Subject: ssh-keygen test
+Comment: "1024-bit dsa, Tue Jan 08 2002 22:00:23 +0100"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+---- END SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/dynamic-forward.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/dynamic-forward.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..dd67c9639
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/dynamic-forward.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: dynamic-forward.sh,v 1.11 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="dynamic forwarding"
+
+FWDPORT=`expr $PORT + 1`
+
+if have_prog nc && nc -h 2>&1 | grep "proxy address" >/dev/null; then
+	proxycmd="nc -x 127.0.0.1:$FWDPORT -X"
+elif have_prog connect; then
+	proxycmd="connect -S 127.0.0.1:$FWDPORT -"
+else
+	echo "skipped (no suitable ProxyCommand found)"
+	exit 0
+fi
+trace "will use ProxyCommand $proxycmd"
+
+start_sshd
+
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+	n=0
+	error="1"
+	trace "start dynamic forwarding, fork to background"
+	while [ "$error" -ne 0 -a "$n" -lt 3 ]; do
+		n=`expr $n + 1`
+		${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -f -D $FWDPORT -q \
+		    -oExitOnForwardFailure=yes somehost exec sh -c \
+			\'"echo \$\$ > $OBJ/remote_pid; exec sleep 444"\'
+		error=$?
+		if [ "$error" -ne 0 ]; then
+			trace "forward failed proto $p attempt $n err $error"
+			sleep $n
+		fi
+	done
+	if [ "$error" -ne 0 ]; then
+		fatal "failed to start dynamic forwarding proto $p"
+	fi
+
+	for s in 4 5; do
+	    for h in 127.0.0.1 localhost; do
+		trace "testing ssh protocol $p socks version $s host $h"
+		${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config \
+			-o "ProxyCommand ${proxycmd}${s} $h $PORT" \
+			somehost cat $DATA > $OBJ/ls.copy
+		test -f $OBJ/ls.copy	 || fail "failed copy $DATA"
+		cmp $DATA $OBJ/ls.copy || fail "corrupted copy of $DATA"
+	    done
+	done
+
+	if [ -f $OBJ/remote_pid ]; then
+		remote=`cat $OBJ/remote_pid`
+		trace "terminate remote shell, pid $remote"
+		if [ $remote -gt 1 ]; then
+			kill -HUP $remote
+		fi
+	else
+		fail "no pid file: $OBJ/remote_pid"
+	fi
+done
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/envpass.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/envpass.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..af7eafe3d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/envpass.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: envpass.sh,v 1.4 2005/03/04 08:48:46 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="environment passing"
+
+# NB accepted env vars are in test-exec.sh (_XXX_TEST_* and _XXX_TEST)
+
+# Prepare a custom config to test for a configuration parsing bug fixed in 4.0
+cat << EOF > $OBJ/ssh_proxy_envpass
+Host test-sendenv-confparse-bug
+	SendEnv *
+EOF
+cat $OBJ/ssh_proxy >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy_envpass
+
+trace "pass env, don't accept"
+verbose "test $tid: pass env, don't accept"
+_TEST_ENV=blah ${SSH} -oSendEnv="*" -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy_envpass otherhost \
+	sh << 'EOF'
+	test -z "$_TEST_ENV"
+EOF
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "environment found"
+fi
+
+trace "don't pass env, accept"
+verbose "test $tid: don't pass env, accept"
+_XXX_TEST_A=1 _XXX_TEST_B=2 ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy_envpass otherhost \
+	sh << 'EOF'
+	test -z "$_XXX_TEST_A" && test -z "$_XXX_TEST_B"
+EOF
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "environment found"
+fi
+
+trace "pass single env, accept single env"
+verbose "test $tid: pass single env, accept single env"
+_XXX_TEST=blah ${SSH} -oSendEnv="_XXX_TEST" -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy_envpass \
+    otherhost sh << 'EOF'
+	test X"$_XXX_TEST" = X"blah"
+EOF
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "environment not found"
+fi
+
+trace "pass multiple env, accept multiple env"
+verbose "test $tid: pass multiple env, accept multiple env"
+_XXX_TEST_A=1 _XXX_TEST_B=2 ${SSH} -oSendEnv="_XXX_TEST_*" \
+    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy_envpass otherhost \
+	sh << 'EOF'
+	test X"$_XXX_TEST_A" = X"1" -a X"$_XXX_TEST_B" = X"2"
+EOF
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "environment not found"
+fi
+
+rm -f $OBJ/ssh_proxy_envpass
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/exit-status.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/exit-status.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..397d8d732
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/exit-status.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: exit-status.sh,v 1.7 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="remote exit status"
+
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+	for s in 0 1 4 5 44; do
+		trace "proto $p status $s"
+		verbose "test $tid: proto $p status $s"
+		${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy otherhost exit $s
+		r=$?
+		if [ $r -ne $s ]; then
+			fail "exit code mismatch for protocol $p: $r != $s"
+		fi
+
+		# same with early close of stdout/err
+		${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -n otherhost \
+                	exec sh -c \'"sleep 2; exec > /dev/null 2>&1; sleep 3; exit $s"\'
+		r=$?
+		if [ $r -ne $s ]; then
+			fail "exit code (with sleep) mismatch for protocol $p: $r != $s"
+		fi
+	done
+done
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/forcecommand.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/forcecommand.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8a9b090ea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/forcecommand.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: forcecommand.sh,v 1.3 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="forced command"
+
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+
+cp /dev/null $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do
+	printf 'command="true" ' >>$OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+	cat $OBJ/$t.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+done
+
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+	trace "forced command in key option proto $p"
+	${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost false \ ||
+	    fail "forced command in key proto $p"
+done
+
+cp /dev/null $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do
+	printf 'command="false" ' >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+	cat $OBJ/$t.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+done
+
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "ForceCommand true" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+	trace "forced command in sshd_config overrides key option proto $p"
+	${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost false \ ||
+	    fail "forced command in key proto $p"
+done
+
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "ForceCommand false" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "Match User $USER" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "    ForceCommand true" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+	trace "forced command with match proto $p"
+	${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost false \ ||
+	    fail "forced command in key proto $p"
+done
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/forward-control.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/forward-control.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..91957098f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/forward-control.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: forward-control.sh,v 1.3 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="sshd control of local and remote forwarding"
+
+LFWD_PORT=3320
+RFWD_PORT=3321
+CTL=$OBJ/ctl-sock
+READY=$OBJ/ready
+
+wait_for_file_to_appear() {
+	_path=$1
+	_n=0
+	while test ! -f $_path ; do
+		test $_n -eq 1 && trace "waiting for $_path to appear"
+		_n=`expr $_n + 1`
+		test $_n -ge 20 && return 1
+		sleep 1
+	done
+	return 0
+}
+
+wait_for_process_to_exit() {
+	_pid=$1
+	_n=0
+	while kill -0 $_pid 2>/dev/null ; do
+		test $_n -eq 1 && trace "waiting for $_pid to exit"
+		_n=`expr $_n + 1`
+		test $_n -ge 20 && return 1
+		sleep 1
+	done
+	return 0
+}
+
+# usage: check_lfwd protocol Y|N message
+check_lfwd() {
+	_proto=$1
+	_expected=$2
+	_message=$3
+	rm -f $READY
+	${SSH} -oProtocol=$_proto -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \
+	    -L$LFWD_PORT:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
+	    -o ExitOnForwardFailure=yes \
+	    -n host exec sh -c \'"sleep 60 & echo \$! > $READY ; wait "\' \
+	    >/dev/null 2>&1 &
+	_sshpid=$!
+	wait_for_file_to_appear $READY || \
+		fatal "check_lfwd ssh fail: $_message"
+	${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p $LFWD_PORT \
+	    -oConnectionAttempts=4 host true >/dev/null 2>&1
+	_result=$?
+	kill $_sshpid `cat $READY` 2>/dev/null
+	wait_for_process_to_exit $_sshpid
+	if test "x$_expected" = "xY" -a $_result -ne 0 ; then
+		fail "check_lfwd failed (expecting success): $_message"
+	elif test "x$_expected" = "xN" -a $_result -eq 0 ; then
+		fail "check_lfwd succeeded (expecting failure): $_message"
+	elif test "x$_expected" != "xY" -a "x$_expected" != "xN" ; then
+		fatal "check_lfwd invalid argument \"$_expected\""
+	else
+		verbose "check_lfwd done (expecting $_expected): $_message"
+	fi
+}
+
+# usage: check_rfwd protocol Y|N message
+check_rfwd() {
+	_proto=$1
+	_expected=$2
+	_message=$3
+	rm -f $READY
+	${SSH} -oProtocol=$_proto -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \
+	    -R$RFWD_PORT:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
+	    -o ExitOnForwardFailure=yes \
+	    -n host exec sh -c \'"sleep 60 & echo \$! > $READY ; wait "\' \
+	    >/dev/null 2>&1 &
+	_sshpid=$!
+	wait_for_file_to_appear $READY
+	_result=$?
+	if test $_result -eq 0 ; then
+		${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p $RFWD_PORT \
+		    -oConnectionAttempts=4 host true >/dev/null 2>&1
+		_result=$?
+		kill $_sshpid `cat $READY` 2>/dev/null
+		wait_for_process_to_exit $_sshpid
+	fi
+	if test "x$_expected" = "xY" -a $_result -ne 0 ; then
+		fail "check_rfwd failed (expecting success): $_message"
+	elif test "x$_expected" = "xN" -a $_result -eq 0 ; then
+		fail "check_rfwd succeeded (expecting failure): $_message"
+	elif test "x$_expected" != "xY" -a "x$_expected" != "xN" ; then
+		fatal "check_rfwd invalid argument \"$_expected\""
+	else
+		verbose "check_rfwd done (expecting $_expected): $_message"
+	fi
+}
+
+start_sshd
+cp ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak
+cp ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER} ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}.bak
+
+# Sanity check: ensure the default config allows forwarding
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS} ; do
+	check_lfwd $p Y "proto $p, default configuration"
+	check_rfwd $p Y "proto $p, default configuration"
+done
+
+# Usage: all_tests yes|local|remote|no Y|N Y|N Y|N Y|N Y|N Y|N
+all_tests() {
+	_tcpfwd=$1
+	_plain_lfwd=$2
+	_plain_rfwd=$3
+	_nopermit_lfwd=$4
+	_nopermit_rfwd=$5
+	_permit_lfwd=$6
+	_permit_rfwd=$7
+	_badfwd=127.0.0.1:22
+	_goodfwd=127.0.0.1:${PORT}
+	for _proto in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS} ; do
+		cp ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}.bak \
+		    ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}
+		_prefix="proto $_proto, AllowTcpForwarding=$_tcpfwd"
+		# No PermitOpen
+		( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ;
+		  echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ) \
+		    > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy
+		check_lfwd $_proto $_plain_lfwd "$_prefix"
+		check_rfwd $_proto $_plain_rfwd "$_prefix"
+		# PermitOpen via sshd_config that doesn't match
+		( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ;
+		  echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ;
+		  echo "PermitOpen $_badfwd" ) \
+		    > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy
+		check_lfwd $_proto $_nopermit_lfwd "$_prefix, !PermitOpen"
+		check_rfwd $_proto $_nopermit_rfwd "$_prefix, !PermitOpen"
+		# PermitOpen via sshd_config that does match
+		( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ;
+		  echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ;
+		  echo "PermitOpen $_badfwd $_goodfwd" ) \
+		    > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy
+		# NB. permitopen via authorized_keys should have same
+		# success/fail as via sshd_config
+		# permitopen via authorized_keys that doesn't match
+		sed "s/^/permitopen=\"$_badfwd\" /" \
+		    < ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}.bak \
+		    > ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER} || fatal "sed 1 fail"
+		( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ;
+		  echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ) \
+		    > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy
+		check_lfwd $_proto $_nopermit_lfwd "$_prefix, !permitopen"
+		check_rfwd $_proto $_nopermit_rfwd "$_prefix, !permitopen"
+		# permitopen via authorized_keys that does match
+		sed "s/^/permitopen=\"$_badfwd\",permitopen=\"$_goodfwd\" /" \
+		    < ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}.bak \
+		    > ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER} || fatal "sed 2 fail"
+		( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ;
+		  echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ) \
+		    > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy
+		check_lfwd $_proto $_permit_lfwd "$_prefix, permitopen"
+		check_rfwd $_proto $_permit_rfwd "$_prefix, permitopen"
+	done
+}
+
+#                      no-permitopen mismatch-permitopen match-permitopen
+#   AllowTcpForwarding  local remote        local remote     local remote
+all_tests          yes      Y      Y            N      Y         Y      Y
+all_tests        local      Y      N            N      N         Y      N
+all_tests       remote      N      Y            N      Y         N      Y
+all_tests           no      N      N            N      N         N      N
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/forwarding.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/forwarding.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..fb4f35aff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/forwarding.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: forwarding.sh,v 1.15 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="local and remote forwarding"
+
+DATA=/bin/ls${EXEEXT}
+
+start_sshd
+
+base=33
+last=$PORT
+fwd=""
+CTL=$OBJ/ctl-sock
+rm -f $CTL
+
+for j in 0 1 2; do
+	for i in 0 1 2; do
+		a=$base$j$i
+		b=`expr $a + 50`
+		c=$last
+		# fwd chain: $a -> $b -> $c
+		fwd="$fwd -L$a:127.0.0.1:$b -R$b:127.0.0.1:$c"
+		last=$a
+	done
+done
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+	q=`expr 3 - $p`
+	if ! ssh_version $q; then
+		q=$p
+	fi
+	trace "start forwarding, fork to background"
+	${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -f $fwd somehost sleep 10
+
+	trace "transfer over forwarded channels and check result"
+	${SSH} -$q -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$last -o 'ConnectionAttempts=4' \
+		somehost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY}
+	test -s ${COPY}		|| fail "failed copy of ${DATA}"
+	cmp ${DATA} ${COPY}	|| fail "corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
+
+	sleep 10
+done
+
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+for d in L R; do
+	trace "exit on -$d forward failure, proto $p"
+
+	# this one should succeed
+	${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config \
+	    -$d ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
+	    -$d ${base}02:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
+	    -$d ${base}03:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
+	    -$d ${base}04:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
+	    -oExitOnForwardFailure=yes somehost true
+	if [ $? != 0 ]; then
+		fail "connection failed, should not"
+	else
+		# this one should fail
+		${SSH} -q -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config \
+		    -$d ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
+		    -$d ${base}02:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
+		    -$d ${base}03:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
+		    -$d ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
+		    -$d ${base}04:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
+		    -oExitOnForwardFailure=yes somehost true
+		r=$?
+		if [ $r != 255 ]; then
+			fail "connection not termintated, but should ($r)"
+		fi
+	fi
+done
+done
+
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+	trace "simple clear forwarding proto $p"
+	${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oClearAllForwardings=yes somehost true
+
+	trace "clear local forward proto $p"
+	${SSH} -$p -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
+	    -oClearAllForwardings=yes somehost sleep 10
+	if [ $? != 0 ]; then
+		fail "connection failed with cleared local forwarding"
+	else
+		# this one should fail
+		${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p ${base}01 true \
+		     >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 && \
+			fail "local forwarding not cleared"
+	fi
+	sleep 10
+	
+	trace "clear remote forward proto $p"
+	${SSH} -$p -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
+	    -oClearAllForwardings=yes somehost sleep 10
+	if [ $? != 0 ]; then
+		fail "connection failed with cleared remote forwarding"
+	else
+		# this one should fail
+		${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p ${base}01 true \
+		     >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 && \
+			fail "remote forwarding not cleared"
+	fi
+	sleep 10
+done
+
+for p in 2; do
+	trace "stdio forwarding proto $p"
+	cmd="${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config"
+	$cmd -o "ProxyCommand $cmd -q -W localhost:$PORT somehost" \
+		somehost true
+	if [ $? != 0 ]; then
+		fail "stdio forwarding proto $p"
+	fi
+done
+
+echo "LocalForward ${base}01 127.0.0.1:$PORT" >> $OBJ/ssh_config
+echo "RemoteForward ${base}02 127.0.0.1:${base}01" >> $OBJ/ssh_config
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+	trace "config file: start forwarding, fork to background"
+	${SSH} -S $CTL -M -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -f somehost sleep 10
+
+	trace "config file: transfer over forwarded channels and check result"
+	${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p${base}02 -o 'ConnectionAttempts=4' \
+		somehost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY}
+	test -s ${COPY}		|| fail "failed copy of ${DATA}"
+	cmp ${DATA} ${COPY}	|| fail "corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
+
+	${SSH} -S $CTL -O exit somehost
+done
+
+for p in 2; do
+	trace "transfer over chained unix domain socket forwards and check result"
+	rm -f $OBJ/unix-[123].fwd
+	${SSH} -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R${base}01:[$OBJ/unix-1.fwd] somehost sleep 10
+	${SSH} -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L[$OBJ/unix-1.fwd]:[$OBJ/unix-2.fwd] somehost sleep 10
+	${SSH} -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R[$OBJ/unix-2.fwd]:[$OBJ/unix-3.fwd] somehost sleep 10
+	${SSH} -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L[$OBJ/unix-3.fwd]:127.0.0.1:$PORT somehost sleep 10
+	${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p${base}01 -o 'ConnectionAttempts=4' \
+		somehost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY}
+	test -s ${COPY}			|| fail "failed copy ${DATA}"
+	cmp ${DATA} ${COPY}		|| fail "corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
+
+	#wait
+	sleep 10
+done
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/host-expand.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/host-expand.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2a95bfe1b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/host-expand.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: host-expand.sh,v 1.4 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="expand %h and %n"
+
+echo 'PermitLocalCommand yes' >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+printf 'LocalCommand printf "%%%%s\\n" "%%n" "%%h"\n' >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+
+cat >$OBJ/expect <<EOE
+somehost
+127.0.0.1
+EOE
+
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+	verbose "test $tid: proto $p"
+	${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -$p somehost true >$OBJ/actual
+	diff $OBJ/expect $OBJ/actual || fail "$tid proto $p"
+done
+
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/hostkey-agent.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/hostkey-agent.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..094700da6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/hostkey-agent.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: hostkey-agent.sh,v 1.6 2015/07/10 06:23:25 markus Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="hostkey agent"
+
+rm -f $OBJ/agent-key.* $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig $OBJ/known_hosts.orig
+
+trace "start agent"
+eval `${SSHAGENT} -s` > /dev/null
+r=$?
+[ $r -ne 0 ] && fatal "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r"
+
+grep -vi 'hostkey' $OBJ/sshd_proxy > $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
+echo "HostKeyAgent $SSH_AUTH_SOCK" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
+
+trace "load hostkeys"
+for k in `${SSH} -Q key-plain` ; do
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -qt $k -f $OBJ/agent-key.$k -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen $k"
+	(
+		printf 'localhost-with-alias,127.0.0.1,::1 '
+		cat $OBJ/agent-key.$k.pub
+	) >> $OBJ/known_hosts.orig
+	${SSHADD} $OBJ/agent-key.$k >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
+		fatal "couldn't load key $OBJ/agent-key.$k"
+	echo "Hostkey $OBJ/agent-key.${k}" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
+	# Remove private key so the server can't use it.
+	rm $OBJ/agent-key.$k || fatal "couldn't rm $OBJ/agent-key.$k"
+done
+cp $OBJ/known_hosts.orig $OBJ/known_hosts
+
+unset SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+
+for ps in no yes; do
+	for k in `${SSH} -Q key-plain` ; do
+		verbose "key type $k privsep=$ps"
+		cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+		echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $ps" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+		echo "HostKeyAlgorithms $k" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+		opts="-oHostKeyAlgorithms=$k -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy"
+		cp $OBJ/known_hosts.orig $OBJ/known_hosts
+		SSH_CONNECTION=`${SSH} $opts host 'echo $SSH_CONNECTION'`
+		if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+			fail "protocol $p privsep=$ps failed"
+		fi
+		if [ "$SSH_CONNECTION" != "UNKNOWN 65535 UNKNOWN 65535" ]; then
+			fail "bad SSH_CONNECTION key type $k privsep=$ps"
+		fi
+	done
+done
+
+trace "kill agent"
+${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null
+
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/hostkey-rotate.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/hostkey-rotate.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3aa8c40c0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/hostkey-rotate.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: hostkey-rotate.sh,v 1.4 2015/07/10 06:23:25 markus Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="hostkey rotate"
+
+# Need full names here since they are used in HostKeyAlgorithms
+HOSTKEY_TYPES="ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 ssh-ed25519 ssh-rsa ssh-dss"
+
+rm -f $OBJ/hkr.* $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig
+
+grep -vi 'hostkey' $OBJ/sshd_proxy > $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
+echo "UpdateHostkeys=yes" >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+rm $OBJ/known_hosts
+
+trace "prepare hostkeys"
+nkeys=0
+all_algs=""
+for k in `${SSH} -Q key-plain` ; do
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -qt $k -f $OBJ/hkr.$k -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen $k"
+	echo "Hostkey $OBJ/hkr.${k}" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
+	nkeys=`expr $nkeys + 1`
+	test "x$all_algs" = "x" || all_algs="${all_algs},"
+	all_algs="${all_algs}$k"
+done
+
+dossh() {
+	# All ssh should succeed in this test
+	${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy "$@" x true || fail "ssh $@ failed"
+}
+
+expect_nkeys() {
+	_expected=$1
+	_message=$2
+	_n=`wc -l $OBJ/known_hosts | awk '{ print $1 }'` || fatal "wc failed"
+	[ "x$_n" = "x$_expected" ] || fail "$_message (got $_n wanted $_expected)"
+}
+
+check_key_present() {
+	_type=$1
+	_kfile=$2
+	test "x$_kfile" = "x" && _kfile="$OBJ/hkr.${_type}.pub"
+	_kpub=`awk "/$_type /"' { print $2 }' < $_kfile` || \
+		fatal "awk failed"
+	fgrep "$_kpub" $OBJ/known_hosts > /dev/null
+}
+
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+# Connect to sshd with StrictHostkeyChecking=no
+verbose "learn hostkey with StrictHostKeyChecking=no"
+>$OBJ/known_hosts
+dossh -oHostKeyAlgorithms=ssh-ed25519 -oStrictHostKeyChecking=no
+# Verify no additional keys learned
+expect_nkeys 1 "unstrict connect keys"
+check_key_present ssh-ed25519 || fail "unstrict didn't learn key"
+
+# Connect to sshd as usual
+verbose "learn additional hostkeys"
+dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=$all_algs
+# Check that other keys learned
+expect_nkeys $nkeys "learn hostkeys"
+check_key_present ssh-rsa || fail "didn't learn keys"
+
+# Check each key type
+for k in `${SSH} -Q key-plain` ; do
+	verbose "learn additional hostkeys, type=$k"
+	dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=$k,$all_algs
+	expect_nkeys $nkeys "learn hostkeys $k"
+	check_key_present $k || fail "didn't learn $k"
+done
+
+# Change one hostkey (non primary) and relearn
+verbose "learn changed non-primary hostkey"
+mv $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa.pub $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa.pub.old
+rm -f $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa
+${SSHKEYGEN} -qt ssh-rsa -f $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen $k"
+dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=$all_algs
+# Check that the key was replaced
+expect_nkeys $nkeys "learn hostkeys"
+check_key_present ssh-rsa $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa.pub.old && fail "old key present"
+check_key_present ssh-rsa || fail "didn't learn changed key"
+
+# Add new hostkey (primary type) to sshd and connect
+verbose "learn new primary hostkey"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -qt ssh-rsa -f $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa-new -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen $k"
+( cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig ; echo HostKey $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa-new ) \
+    > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+# Check new hostkey added
+dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=ssh-rsa,$all_algs
+expect_nkeys `expr $nkeys + 1` "learn hostkeys"
+check_key_present ssh-rsa || fail "current key missing"
+check_key_present ssh-rsa $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa-new.pub || fail "new key missing"
+
+# Remove old hostkey (primary type) from sshd
+verbose "rotate primary hostkey"
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+mv $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa.pub $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa.pub.old
+mv $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa-new.pub $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa.pub
+mv $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa-new $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa
+# Check old hostkey removed
+dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=ssh-rsa,$all_algs
+expect_nkeys $nkeys "learn hostkeys"
+check_key_present ssh-rsa $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa.pub.old && fail "old key present"
+check_key_present ssh-rsa || fail "didn't learn changed key"
+
+# Connect again, forcing rotated key
+verbose "check rotate primary hostkey"
+dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=ssh-rsa
+expect_nkeys 1 "learn hostkeys"
+check_key_present ssh-rsa || fail "didn't learn changed key"
+
+#	$OpenBSD: hostkey-rotate.sh,v 1.4 2015/07/10 06:23:25 markus Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="hostkey rotate"
+
+# Prepare hostkeys file with one key
+
+# Connect to sshd
+
+# Check that other keys learned
+
+# Change one hostkey (non primary)
+
+# Connect to sshd
+
+# Check that the key was replaced
+
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/integrity.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/integrity.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1d4976771
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/integrity.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: integrity.sh,v 1.16 2015/03/24 20:22:17 markus Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="integrity"
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+
+# start at byte 2900 (i.e. after kex) and corrupt at different offsets
+# XXX the test hangs if we modify the low bytes of the packet length
+# XXX and ssh tries to read...
+tries=10
+startoffset=2900
+macs=`${SSH} -Q mac`
+# The following are not MACs, but ciphers with integrated integrity. They are
+# handled specially below.
+macs="$macs `${SSH} -Q cipher-auth`"
+
+# avoid DH group exchange as the extra traffic makes it harder to get the
+# offset into the stream right.
+echo "KexAlgorithms diffie-hellman-group14-sha1,diffie-hellman-group1-sha1" \
+	>> $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+
+# sshd-command for proxy (see test-exec.sh)
+cmd="$SUDO sh ${SRC}/sshd-log-wrapper.sh ${TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE} ${SSHD} -i -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy"
+
+for m in $macs; do
+	trace "test $tid: mac $m"
+	elen=0
+	epad=0
+	emac=0
+	ecnt=0
+	skip=0
+	for off in `jot $tries $startoffset`; do
+		skip=`expr $skip - 1`
+		if [ $skip -gt 0 ]; then
+			# avoid modifying the high bytes of the length
+			continue
+		fi
+		cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+		# modify output from sshd at offset $off
+		pxy="proxycommand=$cmd | $OBJ/modpipe -wm xor:$off:1"
+		if ${SSH} -Q cipher-auth | grep "^${m}\$" >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
+			echo "Ciphers=$m" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+			macopt="-c $m"
+		else
+			echo "Ciphers=aes128-ctr" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+			echo "MACs=$m" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+			macopt="-m $m -c aes128-ctr"
+		fi
+		verbose "test $tid: $m @$off"
+		${SSH} $macopt -2F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -o "$pxy" \
+		    -oServerAliveInterval=1 -oServerAliveCountMax=30 \
+		    999.999.999.999 'printf "%4096s" " "' >/dev/null
+		if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh -m $m succeeds with bit-flip at $off"
+		fi
+		ecnt=`expr $ecnt + 1`
+		out=$(tail -2 $TEST_SSH_LOGFILE | egrep -v "^debug" | \
+		     tr -s '\r\n' '.')
+		case "$out" in
+		Bad?packet*)	elen=`expr $elen + 1`; skip=3;;
+		Corrupted?MAC* | *message?authentication?code?incorrect*)
+				emac=`expr $emac + 1`; skip=0;;
+		padding*)	epad=`expr $epad + 1`; skip=0;;
+		*)		fail "unexpected error mac $m at $off: $out";;
+		esac
+	done
+	verbose "test $tid: $ecnt errors: mac $emac padding $epad length $elen"
+	if [ $emac -eq 0 ]; then
+		fail "$m: no mac errors"
+	fi
+	expect=`expr $ecnt - $epad - $elen`
+	if [ $emac -ne $expect ]; then
+		fail "$m: expected $expect mac errors, got $emac"
+	fi
+done
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/kextype.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/kextype.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e27189904
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/kextype.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: kextype.sh,v 1.6 2015/03/24 20:19:15 markus Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="login with different key exchange algorithms"
+
+TIME=/usr/bin/time
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+cp $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak
+
+# Make server accept all key exchanges.
+ALLKEX=`${SSH} -Q kex`
+KEXOPT=`echo $ALLKEX | tr ' ' ,`
+echo "KexAlgorithms=$KEXOPT" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+tries="1 2 3 4"
+for k in `${SSH} -Q kex`; do
+	verbose "kex $k"
+	for i in $tries; do
+		${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -o KexAlgorithms=$k x true
+		if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh kex $k"
+		fi
+	done
+done
+
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/key-options.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/key-options.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7a68ad358
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/key-options.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: key-options.sh,v 1.3 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="key options"
+
+origkeys="$OBJ/authkeys_orig"
+authkeys="$OBJ/authorized_keys_${USER}"
+cp $authkeys $origkeys
+
+# Test command= forced command
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+    for c in 'command="echo bar"' 'no-pty,command="echo bar"'; do
+	sed "s/.*/$c &/" $origkeys >$authkeys
+	verbose "key option proto $p $c"
+	r=`${SSH} -$p -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost echo foo`
+	if [ "$r" = "foo" ]; then
+		fail "key option forced command not restricted"
+	fi
+	if [ "$r" != "bar" ]; then
+		fail "key option forced command not executed"
+	fi
+    done
+done
+
+# Test no-pty
+sed 's/.*/no-pty &/' $origkeys >$authkeys
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+	verbose "key option proto $p no-pty"
+	r=`${SSH} -$p -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost tty`
+	if [ -f "$r" ]; then
+		fail "key option failed proto $p no-pty (pty $r)"
+	fi
+done
+
+# Test environment=
+echo 'PermitUserEnvironment yes' >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+sed 's/.*/environment="FOO=bar" &/' $origkeys >$authkeys
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+	verbose "key option proto $p environment"
+	r=`${SSH} -$p -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost 'echo $FOO'`
+	if [ "$r" != "bar" ]; then
+		fail "key option environment not set"
+	fi
+done
+
+# Test from= restriction
+start_sshd
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+    for f in 127.0.0.1 '127.0.0.0\/8'; do
+	cat  $origkeys >$authkeys
+	${SSH} -$p -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "key option proto $p failed without restriction"
+	fi
+
+	sed 's/.*/from="'"$f"'" &/' $origkeys >$authkeys
+	from=`head -1 $authkeys | cut -f1 -d ' '`
+	verbose "key option proto $p $from"
+	r=`${SSH} -$p -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost 'echo true'`
+	if [ "$r" = "true" ]; then
+		fail "key option proto $p $from not restricted"
+	fi
+
+	r=`${SSH} -$p -q -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost 'echo true'`
+	if [ "$r" != "true" ]; then
+		fail "key option proto $p $from not allowed but should be"
+	fi
+    done
+done
+
+rm -f "$origkeys"
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/keygen-change.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/keygen-change.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e56185050
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/keygen-change.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: keygen-change.sh,v 1.5 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="change passphrase for key"
+
+S1="secret1"
+S2="2secret"
+
+KEYTYPES=`${SSH} -Q key-plain`
+if ssh_version 1; then
+	KEYTYPES="${KEYTYPES} rsa1"
+fi
+
+for t in $KEYTYPES; do
+	# generate user key for agent
+	trace "generating $t key"
+	rm -f $OBJ/$t-key
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N ${S1} -t $t -f $OBJ/$t-key
+	if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+		${SSHKEYGEN} -p -P ${S1} -N ${S2} -f $OBJ/$t-key > /dev/null
+		if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh-keygen -p failed for $t-key"
+		fi
+	else
+		fail "ssh-keygen for $t-key failed"
+	fi
+	rm -f $OBJ/$t-key $OBJ/$t-key.pub
+done
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/keygen-convert.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/keygen-convert.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ad0e9c637
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/keygen-convert.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: keygen-convert.sh,v 1.1 2009/11/09 04:20:04 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="convert keys"
+
+for t in rsa dsa; do
+	# generate user key for agent
+	trace "generating $t key"
+	rm -f $OBJ/$t-key
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N "" -t $t -f $OBJ/$t-key
+
+	trace "export $t private to rfc4716 public"
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -q -e -f $OBJ/$t-key >$OBJ/$t-key-rfc || \
+	    fail "export $t private to rfc4716 public"
+
+	trace "export $t public to rfc4716 public"
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -q -e -f $OBJ/$t-key.pub >$OBJ/$t-key-rfc.pub || \
+	    fail "$t public to rfc4716 public"
+
+	cmp $OBJ/$t-key-rfc $OBJ/$t-key-rfc.pub || \
+	    fail "$t rfc4716 exports differ between public and private"
+
+	trace "import $t rfc4716 public"
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -q -i -f $OBJ/$t-key-rfc >$OBJ/$t-rfc-imported || \
+	    fail "$t import rfc4716 public"
+
+	cut -f1,2 -d " " $OBJ/$t-key.pub >$OBJ/$t-key-nocomment.pub
+	cmp $OBJ/$t-key-nocomment.pub $OBJ/$t-rfc-imported || \
+	    fail "$t imported differs from original"
+
+	rm -f $OBJ/$t-key $OBJ/$t-key.pub $OBJ/$t-key-rfc $OBJ/$t-key-rfc.pub \
+	    $OBJ/$t-rfc-imported $OBJ/$t-key-nocomment.pub
+done
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/keygen-knownhosts.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/keygen-knownhosts.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..693cd0e75
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/keygen-knownhosts.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: keygen-knownhosts.sh,v 1.3 2015/07/17 03:34:27 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="ssh-keygen known_hosts"
+
+rm -f $OBJ/kh.*
+
+# Generate some keys for testing (just ed25519 for speed) and make a hosts file.
+for x in host-a host-b host-c host-d host-e host-f host-a2 host-b2; do
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -qt ed25519 -f $OBJ/kh.$x -C "$x" -N "" || \
+		fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
+	# Add a comment that we expect should be preserved.
+	echo "# $x" >> $OBJ/kh.hosts
+	(
+		case "$x" in
+		host-a|host-b)	printf "$x " ;;
+		host-c)		printf "@cert-authority $x " ;;
+		host-d)		printf "@revoked $x " ;;
+		host-e)		printf "host-e* " ;;
+		host-f)		printf "host-f,host-g,host-h " ;;
+		host-a2)	printf "host-a " ;;
+		host-b2)	printf "host-b " ;;
+		esac
+		cat $OBJ/kh.${x}.pub
+		# Blank line should be preserved.
+		echo "" >> $OBJ/kh.hosts
+	) >> $OBJ/kh.hosts
+done
+
+# Generate a variant with an invalid line. We'll use this for most tests,
+# because keygen should be able to cope and it should be preserved in any
+# output file.
+cat $OBJ/kh.hosts >> $OBJ/kh.invalid
+echo "host-i " >> $OBJ/kh.invalid
+
+cp $OBJ/kh.invalid $OBJ/kh.invalid.orig
+cp $OBJ/kh.hosts $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig
+
+expect_key() {
+	_host=$1
+	_hosts=$2
+	_key=$3
+	_line=$4
+	_mark=$5
+	_marker=""
+	test "x$_mark" = "xCA" && _marker="@cert-authority "
+	test "x$_mark" = "xREVOKED" && _marker="@revoked "
+	test "x$_line" != "x" &&
+	    echo "# Host $_host found: line $_line $_mark" >> $OBJ/kh.expect
+	printf "${_marker}$_hosts " >> $OBJ/kh.expect
+	cat $OBJ/kh.${_key}.pub >> $OBJ/kh.expect ||
+	    fatal "${_key}.pub missing"
+}
+
+check_find() {
+	_host=$1
+	_name=$2
+	_keygenopt=$3
+	${SSHKEYGEN} $_keygenopt -f $OBJ/kh.invalid -F $_host > $OBJ/kh.result
+	if ! diff -w $OBJ/kh.expect $OBJ/kh.result ; then
+		fail "didn't find $_name"
+	fi
+}
+
+# Find key
+rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect
+expect_key host-a host-a host-a 2
+expect_key host-a host-a host-a2 20
+check_find host-a "simple find"
+
+# find CA key
+rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect
+expect_key host-c host-c host-c 8 CA
+check_find host-c "find CA key"
+
+# find revoked key
+rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect
+expect_key host-d host-d host-d 11 REVOKED
+check_find host-d "find revoked key"
+
+# find key with wildcard
+rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect
+expect_key host-e.somedomain "host-e*" host-e 14
+check_find host-e.somedomain "find wildcard key"
+
+# find key among multiple hosts
+rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect
+expect_key host-h "host-f,host-g,host-h " host-f 17
+check_find host-h "find multiple hosts"
+
+check_hashed_find() {
+	_host=$1
+	_name=$2
+	_file=$3
+	test "x$_file" = "x" && _file=$OBJ/kh.invalid
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -f $_file -HF $_host | grep '|1|' | \
+	    sed "s/^[^ ]*/$_host/" > $OBJ/kh.result
+	if ! diff -w $OBJ/kh.expect $OBJ/kh.result ; then
+		fail "didn't find $_name"
+	fi
+}
+
+# Find key and hash
+rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect
+expect_key host-a host-a host-a
+expect_key host-a host-a host-a2
+check_hashed_find host-a "find simple and hash"
+
+# Find CA key and hash
+rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect
+expect_key host-c host-c host-c "" CA
+# CA key output is not hashed.
+check_find host-c "find simple and hash" -H
+
+# Find revoked key and hash
+rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect
+expect_key host-d host-d host-d "" REVOKED
+# Revoked key output is not hashed.
+check_find host-d "find simple and hash" -H
+
+# find key with wildcard and hash
+rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect
+expect_key host-e "host-e*" host-e ""
+# Key with wildcard hostname should not be hashed.
+check_find host-e "find wildcard key" -H
+
+# find key among multiple hosts
+rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect
+# Comma-separated hostnames should be expanded and hashed.
+expect_key host-f "host-h " host-f
+expect_key host-g "host-h " host-f
+expect_key host-h "host-h " host-f
+check_hashed_find host-h "find multiple hosts"
+
+# Attempt remove key on invalid file.
+cp $OBJ/kh.invalid.orig $OBJ/kh.invalid
+${SSHKEYGEN} -qf $OBJ/kh.invalid -R host-a 2>/dev/null
+diff $OBJ/kh.invalid $OBJ/kh.invalid.orig || fail "remove on invalid succeeded"
+
+# Remove key
+cp $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig $OBJ/kh.hosts
+${SSHKEYGEN} -qf $OBJ/kh.hosts -R host-a 2>/dev/null
+grep -v "^host-a " $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig > $OBJ/kh.expect
+diff $OBJ/kh.hosts $OBJ/kh.expect || fail "remove simple"
+
+# Remove CA key
+cp $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig $OBJ/kh.hosts
+${SSHKEYGEN} -qf $OBJ/kh.hosts -R host-c 2>/dev/null
+# CA key should not be removed.
+diff $OBJ/kh.hosts $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig || fail "remove CA"
+
+# Remove revoked key
+cp $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig $OBJ/kh.hosts
+${SSHKEYGEN} -qf $OBJ/kh.hosts -R host-d 2>/dev/null
+# revoked key should not be removed.
+diff $OBJ/kh.hosts $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig || fail "remove revoked"
+
+# Remove wildcard
+cp $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig $OBJ/kh.hosts
+${SSHKEYGEN} -qf $OBJ/kh.hosts -R host-e.blahblah 2>/dev/null
+grep -v "^host-e[*] " $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig > $OBJ/kh.expect
+diff $OBJ/kh.hosts $OBJ/kh.expect || fail "remove wildcard"
+
+# Remove multiple
+cp $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig $OBJ/kh.hosts
+${SSHKEYGEN} -qf $OBJ/kh.hosts -R host-h 2>/dev/null
+grep -v "^host-f," $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig > $OBJ/kh.expect
+diff $OBJ/kh.hosts $OBJ/kh.expect || fail "remove wildcard"
+
+# Attempt hash on invalid file
+cp $OBJ/kh.invalid.orig $OBJ/kh.invalid
+${SSHKEYGEN} -qf $OBJ/kh.invalid -H 2>/dev/null && fail "hash invalid succeeded"
+diff $OBJ/kh.invalid $OBJ/kh.invalid.orig || fail "invalid file modified"
+
+# Hash valid file
+cp $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig $OBJ/kh.hosts
+${SSHKEYGEN} -qf $OBJ/kh.hosts -H 2>/dev/null || fail "hash failed"
+diff $OBJ/kh.hosts.old $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig || fail "backup differs"
+grep "^host-[abfgh]" $OBJ/kh.hosts && fail "original hostnames persist"
+
+cp $OBJ/kh.hosts $OBJ/kh.hashed.orig
+
+# Test lookup
+rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect
+expect_key host-a host-a host-a
+expect_key host-a host-a host-a2
+check_hashed_find host-a "find simple in hashed" $OBJ/kh.hosts
+
+# Test multiple expanded
+rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect
+expect_key host-h host-h host-f
+check_hashed_find host-h "find simple in hashed" $OBJ/kh.hosts
+
+# Test remove
+cp $OBJ/kh.hashed.orig $OBJ/kh.hashed
+${SSHKEYGEN} -qf $OBJ/kh.hashed -R host-a 2>/dev/null
+${SSHKEYGEN} -qf $OBJ/kh.hashed -F host-a && fail "found key after hashed remove"
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/keys-command.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/keys-command.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..700273b66
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/keys-command.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: keys-command.sh,v 1.3 2015/05/21 06:40:02 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="authorized keys from command"
+
+if test -z "$SUDO" ; then
+	echo "skipped (SUDO not set)"
+	echo "need SUDO to create file in /var/run, test won't work without"
+	exit 0
+fi
+
+rm -f $OBJ/keys-command-args
+
+touch $OBJ/keys-command-args
+chmod a+rw $OBJ/keys-command-args
+
+expected_key_text=`awk '{ print $2 }' < $OBJ/rsa.pub`
+expected_key_fp=`$SSHKEYGEN -lf $OBJ/rsa.pub | awk '{ print $2 }'`
+
+# Establish a AuthorizedKeysCommand in /var/run where it will have
+# acceptable directory permissions.
+KEY_COMMAND="/var/run/keycommand_${LOGNAME}"
+cat << _EOF | $SUDO sh -c "rm -f '$KEY_COMMAND' ; cat > '$KEY_COMMAND'"
+#!/bin/sh
+echo args: "\$@" >> $OBJ/keys-command-args
+echo "$PATH" | grep -q mekmitasdigoat && exit 7
+test "x\$1" != "x${LOGNAME}" && exit 1
+if test $# -eq 6 ; then
+	test "x\$2" != "xblah" && exit 2
+	test "x\$3" != "x${expected_key_text}" && exit 3
+	test "x\$4" != "xssh-rsa" && exit 4
+	test "x\$5" != "x${expected_key_fp}" && exit 5
+	test "x\$6" != "xblah" && exit 6
+fi
+exec cat "$OBJ/authorized_keys_${LOGNAME}"
+_EOF
+$SUDO chmod 0755 "$KEY_COMMAND"
+
+if [ -x $KEY_COMMAND ]; then
+	cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy.bak
+
+	verbose "AuthorizedKeysCommand with arguments"
+	(
+		grep -vi AuthorizedKeysFile $OBJ/sshd_proxy.bak
+		echo AuthorizedKeysFile none
+		echo AuthorizedKeysCommand $KEY_COMMAND %u blah %k %t %f blah
+		echo AuthorizedKeysCommandUser ${LOGNAME}
+	) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+	# Ensure that $PATH is sanitised in sshd
+	env PATH=$PATH:/sbin/mekmitasdigoat \
+	    ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "connect failed"
+	fi
+
+	verbose "AuthorizedKeysCommand without arguments"
+	# Check legacy behavior of no-args resulting in username being passed.
+	(
+		grep -vi AuthorizedKeysFile $OBJ/sshd_proxy.bak
+		echo AuthorizedKeysFile none
+		echo AuthorizedKeysCommand $KEY_COMMAND
+		echo AuthorizedKeysCommandUser ${LOGNAME}
+	) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+	# Ensure that $PATH is sanitised in sshd
+	env PATH=$PATH:/sbin/mekmitasdigoat \
+	    ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "connect failed"
+	fi
+else
+	echo "SKIPPED: $KEY_COMMAND not executable (/var/run mounted noexec?)"
+fi
+
+$SUDO rm -f $KEY_COMMAND
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/keyscan.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/keyscan.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..886f3295a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/keyscan.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: keyscan.sh,v 1.4 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="keyscan"
+
+# remove DSA hostkey
+rm -f ${OBJ}/host.dsa
+
+start_sshd
+
+KEYTYPES="rsa dsa"
+if ssh_version 1; then
+	KEYTYPES="${KEYTYPES} rsa1"
+fi
+
+for t in $KEYTYPES; do
+	trace "keyscan type $t"
+	${SSHKEYSCAN} -t $t -p $PORT 127.0.0.1 127.0.0.1 127.0.0.1 \
+		> /dev/null 2>&1
+	r=$?
+	if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh-keyscan -t $t failed with: $r"
+	fi
+done
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/keytype.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/keytype.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8f697788f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/keytype.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: keytype.sh,v 1.4 2015/07/10 06:23:25 markus Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="login with different key types"
+
+TIME=`which time 2>/dev/null`
+if test ! -x "$TIME"; then
+	TIME=""
+fi
+
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+cp $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak
+
+# Traditional and builtin key types.
+ktypes="dsa-1024 rsa-2048 rsa-3072 ed25519-512"
+# Types not present in all OpenSSL versions.
+for i in `$SSH -Q key`; do
+	case "$i" in
+		ecdsa-sha2-nistp256)	ktypes="$ktypes ecdsa-256" ;;
+		ecdsa-sha2-nistp384)	ktypes="$ktypes ecdsa-384" ;;
+		ecdsa-sha2-nistp521)	ktypes="$ktypes ecdsa-521" ;;
+	esac
+done
+
+for kt in $ktypes; do 
+	rm -f $OBJ/key.$kt
+	bits=`echo ${kt} | awk -F- '{print $2}'`
+	type=`echo ${kt}  | awk -F- '{print $1}'`
+	printf "keygen $type, $bits bits:\t"
+	${TIME} ${SSHKEYGEN} -b $bits -q -N '' -t $type  -f $OBJ/key.$kt ||\
+		fail "ssh-keygen for type $type, $bits bits failed"
+done
+
+tries="1 2 3"
+for ut in $ktypes; do 
+	htypes=$ut
+	#htypes=$ktypes
+	for ht in $htypes; do 
+		case $ht in
+		dsa-1024)	t=ssh-dss;;
+		ecdsa-256)	t=ecdsa-sha2-nistp256;;
+		ecdsa-384)	t=ecdsa-sha2-nistp384;;
+		ecdsa-521)	t=ecdsa-sha2-nistp521;;
+		ed25519-512)	t=ssh-ed25519;;
+		rsa-*)		t=ssh-rsa;;
+		esac
+		trace "ssh connect, userkey $ut, hostkey $ht"
+		(
+			grep -v HostKey $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+			echo HostKey $OBJ/key.$ht 
+			echo PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes $t
+			echo HostKeyAlgorithms $t
+		) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+		(
+			grep -v IdentityFile $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak
+			echo IdentityFile $OBJ/key.$ut 
+			echo PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes $t
+			echo HostKeyAlgorithms $t
+		) > $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+		(
+			printf 'localhost-with-alias,127.0.0.1,::1 '
+			cat $OBJ/key.$ht.pub
+		) > $OBJ/known_hosts
+		cat $OBJ/key.$ut.pub > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+		for i in $tries; do
+			printf "userkey $ut, hostkey ${ht}:\t"
+			${TIME} ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy 999.999.999.999 true
+			if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+				fail "ssh userkey $ut, hostkey $ht failed"
+			fi
+		done
+	done
+done
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/krl.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/krl.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1077358ff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/krl.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: krl.sh,v 1.6 2015/01/30 01:11:39 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="key revocation lists"
+
+# If we don't support ecdsa keys then this tell will be much slower.
+ECDSA=ecdsa
+if test "x$TEST_SSH_ECC" != "xyes"; then
+	ECDSA=rsa
+fi
+
+# Do most testing with ssh-keygen; it uses the same verification code as sshd.
+
+# Old keys will interfere with ssh-keygen.
+rm -f $OBJ/revoked-* $OBJ/krl-*
+
+# Generate a CA key
+$SSHKEYGEN -t $ECDSA -f $OBJ/revoked-ca  -C "" -N "" > /dev/null ||
+	fatal "$SSHKEYGEN CA failed"
+$SSHKEYGEN -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/revoked-ca2  -C "" -N "" > /dev/null ||
+	fatal "$SSHKEYGEN CA2 failed"
+
+# A specification that revokes some certificates by serial numbers
+# The serial pattern is chosen to ensure the KRL includes list, range and
+# bitmap sections.
+cat << EOF >> $OBJ/revoked-serials
+serial: 1-4
+serial: 10
+serial: 15
+serial: 30
+serial: 50
+serial: 999
+# The following sum to 500-799
+serial: 500
+serial: 501
+serial: 502
+serial: 503-600
+serial: 700-797
+serial: 798
+serial: 799
+serial: 599-701
+# Some multiple consecutive serial number ranges
+serial: 10000-20000
+serial: 30000-40000
+EOF
+
+# A specification that revokes some certificated by key ID.
+touch $OBJ/revoked-keyid
+for n in 1 2 3 4 10 15 30 50 `jot 500 300` 999 1000 1001 1002; do
+	test "x$n" = "x499" && continue
+	# Fill in by-ID revocation spec.
+	echo "id: revoked $n" >> $OBJ/revoked-keyid
+done
+
+keygen() {
+	N=$1
+	f=$OBJ/revoked-`printf "%04d" $N`
+	# Vary the keytype. We use mostly ECDSA since this is fastest by far.
+	keytype=$ECDSA
+	case $N in
+	2 | 10 | 510 | 1001)	keytype=rsa;;
+	4 | 30 | 520 | 1002)	keytype=ed25519;;
+	esac
+	$SSHKEYGEN -t $keytype -f $f -C "" -N "" > /dev/null \
+		|| fatal "$SSHKEYGEN failed"
+	# Sign cert
+	$SSHKEYGEN -s $OBJ/revoked-ca -z $n -I "revoked $N" $f >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+		|| fatal "$SSHKEYGEN sign failed"
+	echo $f
+}
+
+# Generate some keys.
+verbose "$tid: generating test keys"
+REVOKED_SERIALS="1 4 10 50 500 510 520 799 999"
+for n in $REVOKED_SERIALS ; do
+	f=`keygen $n`
+	RKEYS="$RKEYS ${f}.pub"
+	RCERTS="$RCERTS ${f}-cert.pub"
+done
+UNREVOKED_SERIALS="5 9 14 16 29 49 51 499 800 1010 1011"
+UNREVOKED=""
+for n in $UNREVOKED_SERIALS ; do
+	f=`keygen $n`
+	UKEYS="$UKEYS ${f}.pub"
+	UCERTS="$UCERTS ${f}-cert.pub"
+done
+
+genkrls() {
+	OPTS=$1
+$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-empty - </dev/null \
+	>/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
+$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-keys $RKEYS \
+	>/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
+$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-cert $RCERTS \
+	>/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
+$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-all $RKEYS $RCERTS \
+	>/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
+$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-ca $OBJ/revoked-ca.pub \
+	>/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
+# This should fail as KRLs from serial/key-id spec need the CA specified.
+$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-serial $OBJ/revoked-serials \
+	>/dev/null 2>&1 && fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL succeeded unexpectedly"
+$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-keyid $OBJ/revoked-keyid \
+	>/dev/null 2>&1 && fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL succeeded unexpectedly"
+# These should succeed; they specify an explicit CA key.
+$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-serial -s $OBJ/revoked-ca \
+	$OBJ/revoked-serials >/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
+$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-keyid -s $OBJ/revoked-ca.pub \
+	$OBJ/revoked-keyid >/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
+# These should succeed; they specify an wildcard CA key.
+$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-serial-wild -s NONE $OBJ/revoked-serials \
+	>/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
+$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-keyid-wild -s NONE $OBJ/revoked-keyid \
+	>/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
+# Revoke the same serials with the second CA key to ensure a multi-CA
+# KRL is generated.
+$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-serial -u -s $OBJ/revoked-ca2 \
+	$OBJ/revoked-serials >/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
+}
+
+## XXX dump with trace and grep for set cert serials
+## XXX test ranges near (u64)-1, etc.
+
+verbose "$tid: generating KRLs"
+genkrls
+
+check_krl() {
+	KEY=$1
+	KRL=$2
+	EXPECT_REVOKED=$3
+	TAG=$4
+	$SSHKEYGEN -Qf $KRL $KEY >/dev/null
+	result=$?
+	if test "x$EXPECT_REVOKED" = "xyes" -a $result -eq 0 ; then
+		fatal "key $KEY not revoked by KRL $KRL: $TAG"
+	elif test "x$EXPECT_REVOKED" = "xno" -a $result -ne 0 ; then
+		fatal "key $KEY unexpectedly revoked by KRL $KRL: $TAG"
+	fi
+}
+test_rev() {
+	FILES=$1
+	TAG=$2
+	KEYS_RESULT=$3
+	ALL_RESULT=$4
+	SERIAL_RESULT=$5
+	KEYID_RESULT=$6
+	CERTS_RESULT=$7
+	CA_RESULT=$8
+	SERIAL_WRESULT=$9
+	KEYID_WRESULT=$10
+	verbose "$tid: checking revocations for $TAG"
+	for f in $FILES ; do
+		check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-empty		no		"$TAG"
+		check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-keys		$KEYS_RESULT	"$TAG"
+		check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-all		$ALL_RESULT	"$TAG"
+		check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-serial		$SERIAL_RESULT	"$TAG"
+		check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-keyid		$KEYID_RESULT	"$TAG"
+		check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-cert		$CERTS_RESULT	"$TAG"
+		check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-ca		$CA_RESULT	"$TAG"
+		check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-serial-wild	$SERIAL_WRESULT	"$TAG"
+		check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-keyid-wild	$KEYID_WRESULT	"$TAG"
+	done
+}
+
+test_all() {
+	#                                                               wildcard
+	#                                   keys all sr# k.ID cert  CA sr.# k.ID
+	test_rev "$RKEYS"     "revoked keys" yes yes  no   no   no  no   no   no
+	test_rev "$UKEYS"   "unrevoked keys"  no  no  no   no   no  no   no   no
+	test_rev "$RCERTS"   "revoked certs" yes yes yes  yes  yes yes  yes  yes
+	test_rev "$UCERTS" "unrevoked certs"  no  no  no   no   no yes   no   no
+}
+
+test_all
+
+# Check update. Results should be identical.
+verbose "$tid: testing KRL update"
+for f in $OBJ/krl-keys $OBJ/krl-cert $OBJ/krl-all \
+    $OBJ/krl-ca $OBJ/krl-serial $OBJ/krl-keyid \
+    $OBJ/krl-serial-wild $OBJ/krl-keyid-wild; do
+	cp -f $OBJ/krl-empty $f
+	genkrls -u
+done
+
+test_all
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/limit-keytype.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/limit-keytype.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2de037bd1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/limit-keytype.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: limit-keytype.sh,v 1.1 2015/01/13 07:49:49 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="restrict pubkey type"
+
+rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/user_key*
+rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER $OBJ/cert_user_key*
+
+mv $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
+mv $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig
+
+# Create a CA key
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519  -f $OBJ/user_ca_key ||\
+	fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
+
+# Make some keys and a certificate.
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key1 || \
+	fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t rsa -f $OBJ/user_key2 || \
+	fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t rsa -f $OBJ/user_key3 || \
+	fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key -I "regress user key for $USER" \
+	-z $$ -n ${USER},mekmitasdigoat $OBJ/user_key3 ||
+		fatal "couldn't sign user_key1"
+# Copy the private key alongside the cert to allow better control of when
+# it is offered.
+mv $OBJ/user_key3-cert.pub $OBJ/cert_user_key3.pub
+cp -p $OBJ/user_key3 $OBJ/cert_user_key3
+
+grep -v IdentityFile $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig > $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+
+opts="-oProtocol=2 -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -oIdentitiesOnly=yes"
+fullopts="$opts -i $OBJ/cert_user_key3 -i $OBJ/user_key1 -i $OBJ/user_key2"
+
+echo mekmitasdigoat > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+cat $OBJ/user_key1.pub > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+cat $OBJ/user_key2.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+
+prepare_config() {
+	(
+		grep -v "Protocol"  $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
+		echo "Protocol 2"
+		echo "AuthenticationMethods publickey"
+		echo "TrustedUserCAKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub"
+		echo "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile $OBJ/authorized_principals_%u"
+		for x in "$@" ; do
+			echo "$x"
+		done
+ 	) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+}
+
+prepare_config
+
+# Check we can log in with all key types.
+${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/cert_user_key3 proxy true || fatal "cert failed"
+${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key1 proxy true || fatal "key1 failed"
+${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key2 proxy true || fatal "key2 failed"
+
+# Allow plain Ed25519 and RSA. The certificate should fail.
+verbose "privsep=$privsep allow rsa,ed25519"
+prepare_config "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ssh-rsa,ssh-ed25519"
+${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/cert_user_key3 proxy true && fatal "cert succeeded"
+${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key1 proxy true || fatal "key1 failed"
+${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key2 proxy true || fatal "key2 failed"
+
+# Allow Ed25519 only.
+verbose "privsep=$privsep allow ed25519"
+prepare_config "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ssh-ed25519"
+${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/cert_user_key3 proxy true && fatal "cert succeeded"
+${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key1 proxy true || fatal "key1 failed"
+${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key2 proxy true && fatal "key2 succeeded"
+
+# Allow all certs. Plain keys should fail.
+verbose "privsep=$privsep allow cert only"
+prepare_config "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ssh-*-cert-v01@openssh.com"
+${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/cert_user_key3 proxy true || fatal "cert failed"
+${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key1 proxy true && fatal "key1 succeeded"
+${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key2 proxy true && fatal "key2 succeeded"
+
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/localcommand.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/localcommand.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..220f19a4d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/localcommand.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: localcommand.sh,v 1.3 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="localcommand"
+
+echo 'PermitLocalCommand yes' >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+echo 'LocalCommand echo foo' >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+	verbose "test $tid: proto $p localcommand"
+	a=`${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -$p somehost true`
+	if [ "$a" != "foo" ] ; then
+		fail "$tid proto $p"
+	fi
+done
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/login-timeout.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/login-timeout.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..eb76f554b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/login-timeout.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: login-timeout.sh,v 1.7 2014/03/13 20:44:49 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="connect after login grace timeout"
+
+trace "test login grace with privsep"
+cp $OBJ/sshd_config $OBJ/sshd_config.orig
+grep -vi LoginGraceTime $OBJ/sshd_config.orig > $OBJ/sshd_config
+echo "LoginGraceTime 10s" >> $OBJ/sshd_config
+echo "MaxStartups 1" >> $OBJ/sshd_config
+start_sshd
+
+(echo SSH-2.0-fake; sleep 60) | telnet 127.0.0.1 ${PORT} >/dev/null 2>&1 & 
+sleep 15
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true
+if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "ssh connect after login grace timeout failed with privsep"
+fi
+
+$SUDO kill `$SUDO cat $PIDFILE`
+
+trace "test login grace without privsep"
+echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation no" >> $OBJ/sshd_config
+start_sshd
+sleep 1
+
+(echo SSH-2.0-fake; sleep 60) | telnet 127.0.0.1 ${PORT} >/dev/null 2>&1 & 
+sleep 15
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true
+if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "ssh connect after login grace timeout failed without privsep"
+fi
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/modpipe.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/modpipe.c
new file mode 100755
index 000000000..e854f9e07
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/modpipe.c
@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2012 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* $OpenBSD: modpipe.c,v 1.6 2013/11/21 03:16:47 djm Exp $ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include "openbsd-compat/getopt_long.c"
+
+static void err(int, const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
+static void errx(int, const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
+
+static void
+err(int r, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	va_list args;
+
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", strerror(errno));
+	vfprintf(stderr, fmt, args);
+	fputc('\n', stderr);
+	va_end(args);
+	exit(r);
+}
+
+static void
+errx(int r, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	va_list args;
+
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	vfprintf(stderr, fmt, args);
+	fputc('\n', stderr);
+	va_end(args);
+	exit(r);
+}
+
+static void
+usage(void)
+{
+	fprintf(stderr, "Usage: modpipe -w [-m modspec ...] < in > out\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "modspec is one of:\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "    xor:offset:value       - XOR \"value\" at \"offset\"\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "    andor:offset:val1:val2 - AND \"val1\" then OR \"val2\" at \"offset\"\n");
+	exit(1);
+}
+
+#define MAX_MODIFICATIONS 256
+struct modification {
+	enum { MOD_XOR, MOD_AND_OR } what;
+	unsigned long long offset;
+	u_int8_t m1, m2;
+};
+
+static void
+parse_modification(const char *s, struct modification *m)
+{
+	char what[16+1];
+	int n, m1, m2;
+
+	bzero(m, sizeof(*m));
+	if ((n = sscanf(s, "%16[^:]%*[:]%llu%*[:]%i%*[:]%i",
+	    what, &m->offset, &m1, &m2)) < 3)
+		errx(1, "Invalid modification spec \"%s\"", s);
+	if (strcasecmp(what, "xor") == 0) {
+		if (n > 3)
+			errx(1, "Invalid modification spec \"%s\"", s);
+		if (m1 < 0 || m1 > 0xff)
+			errx(1, "Invalid XOR modification value");
+		m->what = MOD_XOR;
+		m->m1 = m1;
+	} else if (strcasecmp(what, "andor") == 0) {
+		if (n != 4)
+			errx(1, "Invalid modification spec \"%s\"", s);
+		if (m1 < 0 || m1 > 0xff)
+			errx(1, "Invalid AND modification value");
+		if (m2 < 0 || m2 > 0xff)
+			errx(1, "Invalid OR modification value");
+		m->what = MOD_AND_OR;
+		m->m1 = m1;
+		m->m2 = m2;
+	} else
+		errx(1, "Invalid modification type \"%s\"", what);
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	int ch;
+	u_char buf[8192];
+	size_t total;
+	ssize_t r, s, o;
+	struct modification mods[MAX_MODIFICATIONS];
+	u_int i, wflag = 0, num_mods = 0;
+
+	while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "wm:")) != -1) {
+		switch (ch) {
+		case 'm':
+			if (num_mods >= MAX_MODIFICATIONS)
+				errx(1, "Too many modifications");
+			parse_modification(optarg, &(mods[num_mods++]));
+			break;
+		case 'w':
+			wflag = 1;
+			break;
+		default:
+			usage();
+			/* NOTREACHED */
+		}
+	}
+	for (total = 0;;) {
+		r = s = read(STDIN_FILENO, buf, sizeof(buf));
+		if (r == 0)
+			break;
+		if (r < 0) {
+			if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR)
+				continue;
+			err(1, "read");
+		}
+		for (i = 0; i < num_mods; i++) {
+			if (mods[i].offset < total ||
+			    mods[i].offset >= total + s)
+				continue;
+			switch (mods[i].what) {
+			case MOD_XOR:
+				buf[mods[i].offset - total] ^= mods[i].m1;
+				break;
+			case MOD_AND_OR:
+				buf[mods[i].offset - total] &= mods[i].m1;
+				buf[mods[i].offset - total] |= mods[i].m2;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		for (o = 0; o < s; o += r) {
+			r = write(STDOUT_FILENO, buf, s - o);
+			if (r == 0)
+				break;
+			if (r < 0) {
+				if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR)
+					continue;
+				err(1, "write");
+			}
+		}
+		total += s;
+	}
+	/* Warn if modifications not reached in input stream */
+	r = 0;
+	for (i = 0; wflag && i < num_mods; i++) {
+		if (mods[i].offset < total)
+			continue;
+		r = 1;
+		fprintf(stderr, "modpipe: warning - mod %u not reached\n", i);
+	}
+	return r;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/multiplex.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/multiplex.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..acb9234d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/multiplex.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: multiplex.sh,v 1.27 2014/12/22 06:14:29 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+CTL=/tmp/openssh.regress.ctl-sock.$$
+
+tid="connection multiplexing"
+
+NC=$OBJ/netcat
+
+trace "will use ProxyCommand $proxycmd"
+if config_defined DISABLE_FD_PASSING ; then
+	echo "skipped (not supported on this platform)"
+	exit 0
+fi
+
+P=3301  # test port
+
+wait_for_mux_master_ready()
+{
+	for i in 1 2 3 4 5; do
+		${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocheck otherhost \
+		    >/dev/null 2>&1 && return 0
+		sleep $i
+	done
+	fatal "mux master never becomes ready"
+}
+
+start_sshd
+
+start_mux_master()
+{
+	trace "start master, fork to background"
+	${SSH} -Nn2 -MS$CTL -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oSendEnv="_XXX_TEST" somehost \
+	    -E $TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 &
+	# NB. $SSH_PID will be killed by test-exec.sh:cleanup on fatal errors.
+	SSH_PID=$!
+	wait_for_mux_master_ready
+}
+
+start_mux_master
+
+verbose "test $tid: envpass"
+trace "env passing over multiplexed connection"
+_XXX_TEST=blah ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oSendEnv="_XXX_TEST" -S$CTL otherhost sh << 'EOF'
+	test X"$_XXX_TEST" = X"blah"
+EOF
+if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "environment not found"
+fi
+
+verbose "test $tid: transfer"
+rm -f ${COPY}
+trace "ssh transfer over multiplexed connection and check result"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S$CTL otherhost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY}
+test -f ${COPY}			|| fail "ssh -Sctl: failed copy ${DATA}" 
+cmp ${DATA} ${COPY}		|| fail "ssh -Sctl: corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
+
+rm -f ${COPY}
+trace "ssh transfer over multiplexed connection and check result"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL otherhost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY}
+test -f ${COPY}			|| fail "ssh -S ctl: failed copy ${DATA}" 
+cmp ${DATA} ${COPY}		|| fail "ssh -S ctl: corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
+
+rm -f ${COPY}
+trace "sftp transfer over multiplexed connection and check result"
+echo "get ${DATA} ${COPY}" | \
+	${SFTP} -S ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oControlPath=$CTL otherhost >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1
+test -f ${COPY}			|| fail "sftp: failed copy ${DATA}" 
+cmp ${DATA} ${COPY}		|| fail "sftp: corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
+
+rm -f ${COPY}
+trace "scp transfer over multiplexed connection and check result"
+${SCP} -S ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oControlPath=$CTL otherhost:${DATA} ${COPY} >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1
+test -f ${COPY}			|| fail "scp: failed copy ${DATA}" 
+cmp ${DATA} ${COPY}		|| fail "scp: corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
+
+rm -f ${COPY}
+verbose "test $tid: forward"
+trace "forward over TCP/IP and check result"
+$NC -N -l 127.0.0.1 $((${PORT} + 1)) < ${DATA} > /dev/null &
+netcat_pid=$!
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -L127.0.0.1:$((${PORT} + 2)):127.0.0.1:$((${PORT} + 1)) otherhost >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE 2>&1
+$NC 127.0.0.1 $((${PORT} + 2)) < /dev/null > ${COPY}
+cmp ${DATA} ${COPY}		|| fail "ssh: corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
+kill $netcat_pid 2>/dev/null
+rm -f ${COPY} $OBJ/unix-[123].fwd
+
+trace "forward over UNIX and check result"
+$NC -N -Ul $OBJ/unix-1.fwd < ${DATA} > /dev/null &
+netcat_pid=$!
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -L$OBJ/unix-2.fwd:$OBJ/unix-1.fwd otherhost >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE 2>&1
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -R$OBJ/unix-3.fwd:$OBJ/unix-2.fwd otherhost >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE 2>&1
+$NC -U $OBJ/unix-3.fwd < /dev/null > ${COPY} 2>/dev/null
+cmp ${DATA} ${COPY}		|| fail "ssh: corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
+kill $netcat_pid 2>/dev/null
+rm -f ${COPY} $OBJ/unix-[123].fwd
+
+for s in 0 1 4 5 44; do
+	trace "exit status $s over multiplexed connection"
+	verbose "test $tid: status $s"
+	${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL otherhost exit $s
+	r=$?
+	if [ $r -ne $s ]; then
+		fail "exit code mismatch for protocol $p: $r != $s"
+	fi
+
+	# same with early close of stdout/err
+	trace "exit status $s with early close over multiplexed connection"
+	${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -n otherhost \
+                exec sh -c \'"sleep 2; exec > /dev/null 2>&1; sleep 3; exit $s"\'
+	r=$?
+	if [ $r -ne $s ]; then
+		fail "exit code (with sleep) mismatch for protocol $p: $r != $s"
+	fi
+done
+
+verbose "test $tid: cmd check"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocheck otherhost >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 \
+    || fail "check command failed" 
+
+verbose "test $tid: cmd forward local (TCP)"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -L $P:localhost:$PORT otherhost \
+     || fail "request local forward failed"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$P otherhost true \
+     || fail "connect to local forward port failed"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocancel -L $P:localhost:$PORT otherhost \
+     || fail "cancel local forward failed"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$P otherhost true \
+     && fail "local forward port still listening"
+
+verbose "test $tid: cmd forward remote (TCP)"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -R $P:localhost:$PORT otherhost \
+     || fail "request remote forward failed"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$P otherhost true \
+     || fail "connect to remote forwarded port failed"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocancel -R $P:localhost:$PORT otherhost \
+     || fail "cancel remote forward failed"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$P otherhost true \
+     && fail "remote forward port still listening"
+
+verbose "test $tid: cmd forward local (UNIX)"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -L $OBJ/unix-1.fwd:localhost:$PORT otherhost \
+     || fail "request local forward failed"
+echo "" | $NC -U $OBJ/unix-1.fwd | grep "Protocol mismatch" >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+     || fail "connect to local forward path failed"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocancel -L $OBJ/unix-1.fwd:localhost:$PORT otherhost \
+     || fail "cancel local forward failed"
+N=$(echo "xyzzy" | $NC -U $OBJ/unix-1.fwd 2>&1 | grep "xyzzy" | wc -l)
+test ${N} -eq 0 || fail "local forward path still listening"
+rm -f $OBJ/unix-1.fwd
+
+verbose "test $tid: cmd forward remote (UNIX)"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -R $OBJ/unix-1.fwd:localhost:$PORT otherhost \
+     || fail "request remote forward failed"
+echo "" | $NC -U $OBJ/unix-1.fwd | grep "Protocol mismatch" >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+     || fail "connect to remote forwarded path failed"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocancel -R $OBJ/unix-1.fwd:localhost:$PORT otherhost \
+     || fail "cancel remote forward failed"
+N=$(echo "xyzzy" | $NC -U $OBJ/unix-1.fwd 2>&1 | grep "xyzzy" | wc -l)
+test ${N} -eq 0 || fail "remote forward path still listening"
+rm -f $OBJ/unix-1.fwd
+
+verbose "test $tid: cmd exit"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oexit otherhost >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 \
+    || fail "send exit command failed" 
+
+# Wait for master to exit
+wait $SSH_PID
+kill -0 $SSH_PID >/dev/null 2>&1 && fail "exit command failed"
+
+# Restart master and test -O stop command with master using -N
+verbose "test $tid: cmd stop"
+trace "restart master, fork to background"
+start_mux_master
+
+# start a long-running command then immediately request a stop
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL otherhost "sleep 10; exit 0" \
+     >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 &
+SLEEP_PID=$!
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ostop otherhost >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 \
+    || fail "send stop command failed"
+
+# wait until both long-running command and master have exited.
+wait $SLEEP_PID
+[ $! != 0 ] || fail "waiting for concurrent command"
+wait $SSH_PID
+[ $! != 0 ] || fail "waiting for master stop"
+kill -0 $SSH_PID >/dev/null 2>&1 && fatal "stop command failed"
+SSH_PID="" # Already gone, so don't kill in cleanup
+
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/multipubkey.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/multipubkey.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e9d15306f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/multipubkey.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: multipubkey.sh,v 1.1 2014/12/22 08:06:03 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="multiple pubkey"
+
+rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/user_key*
+rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER $OBJ/cert_user_key*
+
+mv $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
+mv $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig
+
+# Create a CA key
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519  -f $OBJ/user_ca_key ||\
+	fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
+
+# Make some keys and a certificate.
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key1 || \
+	fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key2 || \
+	fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key -I "regress user key for $USER" \
+	-z $$ -n ${USER},mekmitasdigoat $OBJ/user_key1 ||
+		fail "couldn't sign user_key1"
+# Copy the private key alongside the cert to allow better control of when
+# it is offered.
+mv $OBJ/user_key1-cert.pub $OBJ/cert_user_key1.pub
+cp -p $OBJ/user_key1 $OBJ/cert_user_key1
+
+grep -v IdentityFile $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig > $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+
+opts="-oProtocol=2 -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -oIdentitiesOnly=yes"
+opts="$opts -i $OBJ/cert_user_key1 -i $OBJ/user_key1 -i $OBJ/user_key2"
+
+for privsep in no yes; do
+	(
+		grep -v "Protocol"  $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
+		echo "Protocol 2"
+		echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep"
+		echo "AuthenticationMethods publickey,publickey"
+		echo "TrustedUserCAKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub"
+		echo "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile $OBJ/authorized_principals_%u"
+ 	) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+	# Single key should fail.
+	rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+	cat $OBJ/user_key1.pub > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+	${SSH} $opts proxy true && fail "ssh succeeded with key"
+
+	# Single key with same-public cert should fail.
+	echo mekmitasdigoat > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+	cat $OBJ/user_key1.pub > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+	${SSH} $opts proxy true && fail "ssh succeeded with key+cert"
+
+	# Multiple plain keys should succeed.
+	rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+	cat $OBJ/user_key1.pub $OBJ/user_key2.pub > \
+	    $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+	${SSH} $opts proxy true || fail "ssh failed with multiple keys"
+	# Cert and different key should succeed
+
+	# Key and different-public cert should succeed.
+	echo mekmitasdigoat > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+	cat $OBJ/user_key2.pub > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+	${SSH} $opts proxy true || fail "ssh failed with key/cert"
+done
+
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/netcat.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/netcat.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6234ba019
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/netcat.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1696 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: netcat.c,v 1.126 2014/10/30 16:08:31 tedu Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Eric Jackson <ericj@monkey.org>
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *   notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *   notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *   documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products
+ *   derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Re-written nc(1) for OpenBSD. Original implementation by
+ * *Hobbit* <hobbit@avian.org>.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+#include <sys/un.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <netinet/tcp.h>
+#include <netinet/ip.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include "atomicio.h"
+
+#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
+#include <poll.h>
+#else
+# ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H
+#  include <sys/poll.h>
+# endif
+#endif
+
+/* Telnet options from arpa/telnet.h */
+#define IAC	255
+#define DONT	254
+#define DO	253
+#define WONT	252
+#define WILL	251
+
+#ifndef SUN_LEN
+#define SUN_LEN(su) \
+	(sizeof(*(su)) - sizeof((su)->sun_path) + strlen((su)->sun_path))
+#endif
+
+#define PORT_MAX	65535
+#define PORT_MAX_LEN	6
+#define UNIX_DG_TMP_SOCKET_SIZE	19
+
+#define POLL_STDIN 0
+#define POLL_NETOUT 1
+#define POLL_NETIN 2
+#define POLL_STDOUT 3
+#define BUFSIZE 16384
+
+/* Command Line Options */
+int	dflag;					/* detached, no stdin */
+int	Fflag;					/* fdpass sock to stdout */
+unsigned int iflag;				/* Interval Flag */
+int	kflag;					/* More than one connect */
+int	lflag;					/* Bind to local port */
+int	Nflag;					/* shutdown() network socket */
+int	nflag;					/* Don't do name look up */
+char   *Pflag;					/* Proxy username */
+char   *pflag;					/* Localport flag */
+int	rflag;					/* Random ports flag */
+char   *sflag;					/* Source Address */
+int	tflag;					/* Telnet Emulation */
+int	uflag;					/* UDP - Default to TCP */
+int	vflag;					/* Verbosity */
+int	xflag;					/* Socks proxy */
+int	zflag;					/* Port Scan Flag */
+int	Dflag;					/* sodebug */
+int	Iflag;					/* TCP receive buffer size */
+int	Oflag;					/* TCP send buffer size */
+int	Sflag;					/* TCP MD5 signature option */
+int	Tflag = -1;				/* IP Type of Service */
+int	rtableid = -1;
+
+int timeout = -1;
+int family = AF_UNSPEC;
+char *portlist[PORT_MAX+1];
+char *unix_dg_tmp_socket;
+
+void	atelnet(int, unsigned char *, unsigned int);
+void	build_ports(char *);
+void	help(void);
+int	local_listen(char *, char *, struct addrinfo);
+void	readwrite(int);
+void	fdpass(int nfd) __attribute__((noreturn));
+int	remote_connect(const char *, const char *, struct addrinfo);
+int	timeout_connect(int, const struct sockaddr *, socklen_t);
+int	socks_connect(const char *, const char *, struct addrinfo,
+	    const char *, const char *, struct addrinfo, int, const char *);
+int	udptest(int);
+int	unix_bind(char *);
+int	unix_connect(char *);
+int	unix_listen(char *);
+void	set_common_sockopts(int);
+int	map_tos(char *, int *);
+void	report_connect(const struct sockaddr *, socklen_t);
+void	usage(int);
+ssize_t drainbuf(int, unsigned char *, size_t *);
+ssize_t fillbuf(int, unsigned char *, size_t *);
+
+static void err(int, const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
+static void errx(int, const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
+static void warn(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+
+static void
+err(int r, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	va_list args;
+
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", strerror(errno));
+	vfprintf(stderr, fmt, args);
+	fputc('\n', stderr);
+	va_end(args);
+	exit(r);
+}
+
+static void
+errx(int r, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	va_list args;
+
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	vfprintf(stderr, fmt, args);
+	fputc('\n', stderr);
+	va_end(args);
+	exit(r);
+}
+
+static void
+warn(const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	va_list args;
+
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", strerror(errno));
+	vfprintf(stderr, fmt, args);
+	fputc('\n', stderr);
+	va_end(args);
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+	int ch, s, ret, socksv;
+	char *host, *uport;
+	struct addrinfo hints;
+	struct servent *sv;
+	socklen_t len;
+	struct sockaddr_storage cliaddr;
+	char *proxy = NULL;
+	const char *errstr, *proxyhost = "", *proxyport = NULL;
+	struct addrinfo proxyhints;
+	char unix_dg_tmp_socket_buf[UNIX_DG_TMP_SOCKET_SIZE];
+
+	ret = 1;
+	s = 0;
+	socksv = 5;
+	host = NULL;
+	uport = NULL;
+	sv = NULL;
+
+	while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv,
+	    "46DdFhI:i:klNnO:P:p:rSs:tT:UuV:vw:X:x:z")) != -1) {
+		switch (ch) {
+		case '4':
+			family = AF_INET;
+			break;
+		case '6':
+			family = AF_INET6;
+			break;
+		case 'U':
+			family = AF_UNIX;
+			break;
+		case 'X':
+			if (strcasecmp(optarg, "connect") == 0)
+				socksv = -1; /* HTTP proxy CONNECT */
+			else if (strcmp(optarg, "4") == 0)
+				socksv = 4; /* SOCKS v.4 */
+			else if (strcmp(optarg, "5") == 0)
+				socksv = 5; /* SOCKS v.5 */
+			else
+				errx(1, "unsupported proxy protocol");
+			break;
+		case 'd':
+			dflag = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'F':
+			Fflag = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'h':
+			help();
+			break;
+		case 'i':
+			iflag = strtonum(optarg, 0, UINT_MAX, &errstr);
+			if (errstr)
+				errx(1, "interval %s: %s", errstr, optarg);
+			break;
+		case 'k':
+			kflag = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'l':
+			lflag = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'N':
+			Nflag = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'n':
+			nflag = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'P':
+			Pflag = optarg;
+			break;
+		case 'p':
+			pflag = optarg;
+			break;
+		case 'r':
+			rflag = 1;
+			break;
+		case 's':
+			sflag = optarg;
+			break;
+		case 't':
+			tflag = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'u':
+			uflag = 1;
+			break;
+#ifdef SO_RTABLE
+		case 'V':
+			rtableid = (int)strtonum(optarg, 0,
+			    RT_TABLEID_MAX, &errstr);
+			if (errstr)
+				errx(1, "rtable %s: %s", errstr, optarg);
+			break;
+#endif
+		case 'v':
+			vflag = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'w':
+			timeout = strtonum(optarg, 0, INT_MAX / 1000, &errstr);
+			if (errstr)
+				errx(1, "timeout %s: %s", errstr, optarg);
+			timeout *= 1000;
+			break;
+		case 'x':
+			xflag = 1;
+			if ((proxy = strdup(optarg)) == NULL)
+				errx(1, "strdup");
+			break;
+		case 'z':
+			zflag = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'D':
+			Dflag = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'I':
+			Iflag = strtonum(optarg, 1, 65536 << 14, &errstr);
+			if (errstr != NULL)
+				errx(1, "TCP receive window %s: %s",
+				    errstr, optarg);
+			break;
+		case 'O':
+			Oflag = strtonum(optarg, 1, 65536 << 14, &errstr);
+			if (errstr != NULL)
+				errx(1, "TCP send window %s: %s",
+				    errstr, optarg);
+			break;
+		case 'S':
+			Sflag = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'T':
+			errstr = NULL;
+			errno = 0;
+			if (map_tos(optarg, &Tflag))
+				break;
+			if (strlen(optarg) > 1 && optarg[0] == '0' &&
+			    optarg[1] == 'x')
+				Tflag = (int)strtol(optarg, NULL, 16);
+			else
+				Tflag = (int)strtonum(optarg, 0, 255,
+				    &errstr);
+			if (Tflag < 0 || Tflag > 255 || errstr || errno)
+				errx(1, "illegal tos value %s", optarg);
+			break;
+		default:
+			usage(1);
+		}
+	}
+	argc -= optind;
+	argv += optind;
+
+	/* Cruft to make sure options are clean, and used properly. */
+	if (argv[0] && !argv[1] && family == AF_UNIX) {
+		host = argv[0];
+		uport = NULL;
+	} else if (argv[0] && !argv[1]) {
+		if  (!lflag)
+			usage(1);
+		uport = argv[0];
+		host = NULL;
+	} else if (argv[0] && argv[1]) {
+		host = argv[0];
+		uport = argv[1];
+	} else
+		usage(1);
+
+	if (lflag && sflag)
+		errx(1, "cannot use -s and -l");
+	if (lflag && pflag)
+		errx(1, "cannot use -p and -l");
+	if (lflag && zflag)
+		errx(1, "cannot use -z and -l");
+	if (!lflag && kflag)
+		errx(1, "must use -l with -k");
+
+	/* Get name of temporary socket for unix datagram client */
+	if ((family == AF_UNIX) && uflag && !lflag) {
+		if (sflag) {
+			unix_dg_tmp_socket = sflag;
+		} else {
+			strlcpy(unix_dg_tmp_socket_buf, "/tmp/nc.XXXXXXXXXX",
+				UNIX_DG_TMP_SOCKET_SIZE);
+			if (mktemp(unix_dg_tmp_socket_buf) == NULL)
+				err(1, "mktemp");
+			unix_dg_tmp_socket = unix_dg_tmp_socket_buf;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Initialize addrinfo structure. */
+	if (family != AF_UNIX) {
+		memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(struct addrinfo));
+		hints.ai_family = family;
+		hints.ai_socktype = uflag ? SOCK_DGRAM : SOCK_STREAM;
+		hints.ai_protocol = uflag ? IPPROTO_UDP : IPPROTO_TCP;
+		if (nflag)
+			hints.ai_flags |= AI_NUMERICHOST;
+	}
+
+	if (xflag) {
+		if (uflag)
+			errx(1, "no proxy support for UDP mode");
+
+		if (lflag)
+			errx(1, "no proxy support for listen");
+
+		if (family == AF_UNIX)
+			errx(1, "no proxy support for unix sockets");
+
+		/* XXX IPv6 transport to proxy would probably work */
+		if (family == AF_INET6)
+			errx(1, "no proxy support for IPv6");
+
+		if (sflag)
+			errx(1, "no proxy support for local source address");
+
+		proxyhost = strsep(&proxy, ":");
+		proxyport = proxy;
+
+		memset(&proxyhints, 0, sizeof(struct addrinfo));
+		proxyhints.ai_family = family;
+		proxyhints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+		proxyhints.ai_protocol = IPPROTO_TCP;
+		if (nflag)
+			proxyhints.ai_flags |= AI_NUMERICHOST;
+	}
+
+	if (lflag) {
+		int connfd;
+		ret = 0;
+
+		if (family == AF_UNIX) {
+			if (uflag)
+				s = unix_bind(host);
+			else
+				s = unix_listen(host);
+		}
+
+		/* Allow only one connection at a time, but stay alive. */
+		for (;;) {
+			if (family != AF_UNIX)
+				s = local_listen(host, uport, hints);
+			if (s < 0)
+				err(1, "local_listen");
+			/*
+			 * For UDP and -k, don't connect the socket, let it
+			 * receive datagrams from multiple socket pairs.
+			 */
+			if (uflag && kflag)
+				readwrite(s);
+			/*
+			 * For UDP and not -k, we will use recvfrom() initially
+			 * to wait for a caller, then use the regular functions
+			 * to talk to the caller.
+			 */
+			else if (uflag && !kflag) {
+				int rv, plen;
+				char buf[16384];
+				struct sockaddr_storage z;
+
+				len = sizeof(z);
+				plen = 2048;
+				rv = recvfrom(s, buf, plen, MSG_PEEK,
+				    (struct sockaddr *)&z, &len);
+				if (rv < 0)
+					err(1, "recvfrom");
+
+				rv = connect(s, (struct sockaddr *)&z, len);
+				if (rv < 0)
+					err(1, "connect");
+
+				if (vflag)
+					report_connect((struct sockaddr *)&z, len);
+
+				readwrite(s);
+			} else {
+				len = sizeof(cliaddr);
+				connfd = accept(s, (struct sockaddr *)&cliaddr,
+				    &len);
+				if (connfd == -1) {
+					/* For now, all errnos are fatal */
+					err(1, "accept");
+				}
+				if (vflag)
+					report_connect((struct sockaddr *)&cliaddr, len);
+
+				readwrite(connfd);
+				close(connfd);
+			}
+
+			if (family != AF_UNIX)
+				close(s);
+			else if (uflag) {
+				if (connect(s, NULL, 0) < 0)
+					err(1, "connect");
+			}
+
+			if (!kflag)
+				break;
+		}
+	} else if (family == AF_UNIX) {
+		ret = 0;
+
+		if ((s = unix_connect(host)) > 0 && !zflag) {
+			readwrite(s);
+			close(s);
+		} else
+			ret = 1;
+
+		if (uflag)
+			unlink(unix_dg_tmp_socket);
+		exit(ret);
+
+	} else {
+		int i = 0;
+
+		/* Construct the portlist[] array. */
+		build_ports(uport);
+
+		/* Cycle through portlist, connecting to each port. */
+		for (i = 0; portlist[i] != NULL; i++) {
+			if (s)
+				close(s);
+
+			if (xflag)
+				s = socks_connect(host, portlist[i], hints,
+				    proxyhost, proxyport, proxyhints, socksv,
+				    Pflag);
+			else
+				s = remote_connect(host, portlist[i], hints);
+
+			if (s < 0)
+				continue;
+
+			ret = 0;
+			if (vflag || zflag) {
+				/* For UDP, make sure we are connected. */
+				if (uflag) {
+					if (udptest(s) == -1) {
+						ret = 1;
+						continue;
+					}
+				}
+
+				/* Don't look up port if -n. */
+				if (nflag)
+					sv = NULL;
+				else {
+					sv = getservbyport(
+					    ntohs(atoi(portlist[i])),
+					    uflag ? "udp" : "tcp");
+				}
+
+				fprintf(stderr,
+				    "Connection to %s %s port [%s/%s] "
+				    "succeeded!\n", host, portlist[i],
+				    uflag ? "udp" : "tcp",
+				    sv ? sv->s_name : "*");
+			}
+			if (Fflag)
+				fdpass(s);
+			else if (!zflag)
+				readwrite(s);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (s)
+		close(s);
+
+	exit(ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * unix_bind()
+ * Returns a unix socket bound to the given path
+ */
+int
+unix_bind(char *path)
+{
+	struct sockaddr_un sun_sa;
+	int s;
+
+	/* Create unix domain socket. */
+	if ((s = socket(AF_UNIX, uflag ? SOCK_DGRAM : SOCK_STREAM,
+	     0)) < 0)
+		return (-1);
+
+	memset(&sun_sa, 0, sizeof(struct sockaddr_un));
+	sun_sa.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+
+	if (strlcpy(sun_sa.sun_path, path, sizeof(sun_sa.sun_path)) >=
+	    sizeof(sun_sa.sun_path)) {
+		close(s);
+		errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+		return (-1);
+	}
+
+	if (bind(s, (struct sockaddr *)&sun_sa, SUN_LEN(&sun_sa)) < 0) {
+		close(s);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	return (s);
+}
+
+/*
+ * unix_connect()
+ * Returns a socket connected to a local unix socket. Returns -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+unix_connect(char *path)
+{
+	struct sockaddr_un sun_sa;
+	int s;
+
+	if (uflag) {
+		if ((s = unix_bind(unix_dg_tmp_socket)) < 0)
+			return (-1);
+	} else {
+		if ((s = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0)
+			return (-1);
+	}
+	(void)fcntl(s, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
+
+	memset(&sun_sa, 0, sizeof(struct sockaddr_un));
+	sun_sa.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+
+	if (strlcpy(sun_sa.sun_path, path, sizeof(sun_sa.sun_path)) >=
+	    sizeof(sun_sa.sun_path)) {
+		close(s);
+		errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	if (connect(s, (struct sockaddr *)&sun_sa, SUN_LEN(&sun_sa)) < 0) {
+		close(s);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	return (s);
+
+}
+
+/*
+ * unix_listen()
+ * Create a unix domain socket, and listen on it.
+ */
+int
+unix_listen(char *path)
+{
+	int s;
+	if ((s = unix_bind(path)) < 0)
+		return (-1);
+
+	if (listen(s, 5) < 0) {
+		close(s);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	return (s);
+}
+
+/*
+ * remote_connect()
+ * Returns a socket connected to a remote host. Properly binds to a local
+ * port or source address if needed. Returns -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+remote_connect(const char *host, const char *port, struct addrinfo hints)
+{
+	struct addrinfo *res, *res0;
+	int s, error;
+#if defined(SO_RTABLE) || defined(SO_BINDANY)
+	int on = 1;
+#endif
+
+	if ((error = getaddrinfo(host, port, &hints, &res)))
+		errx(1, "getaddrinfo: %s", gai_strerror(error));
+
+	res0 = res;
+	do {
+		if ((s = socket(res0->ai_family, res0->ai_socktype,
+		    res0->ai_protocol)) < 0)
+			continue;
+
+#ifdef SO_RTABLE
+		if (rtableid >= 0 && (setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RTABLE,
+		    &rtableid, sizeof(rtableid)) == -1))
+			err(1, "setsockopt SO_RTABLE");
+#endif
+		/* Bind to a local port or source address if specified. */
+		if (sflag || pflag) {
+			struct addrinfo ahints, *ares;
+
+#ifdef SO_BINDANY
+			/* try SO_BINDANY, but don't insist */
+			setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_BINDANY, &on, sizeof(on));
+#endif
+			memset(&ahints, 0, sizeof(struct addrinfo));
+			ahints.ai_family = res0->ai_family;
+			ahints.ai_socktype = uflag ? SOCK_DGRAM : SOCK_STREAM;
+			ahints.ai_protocol = uflag ? IPPROTO_UDP : IPPROTO_TCP;
+			ahints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
+			if ((error = getaddrinfo(sflag, pflag, &ahints, &ares)))
+				errx(1, "getaddrinfo: %s", gai_strerror(error));
+
+			if (bind(s, (struct sockaddr *)ares->ai_addr,
+			    ares->ai_addrlen) < 0)
+				err(1, "bind failed");
+			freeaddrinfo(ares);
+		}
+
+		set_common_sockopts(s);
+
+		if (timeout_connect(s, res0->ai_addr, res0->ai_addrlen) == 0)
+			break;
+		else if (vflag)
+			warn("connect to %s port %s (%s) failed", host, port,
+			    uflag ? "udp" : "tcp");
+
+		close(s);
+		s = -1;
+	} while ((res0 = res0->ai_next) != NULL);
+
+	freeaddrinfo(res);
+
+	return (s);
+}
+
+int
+timeout_connect(int s, const struct sockaddr *name, socklen_t namelen)
+{
+	struct pollfd pfd;
+	socklen_t optlen;
+	int flags = 0, optval;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (timeout != -1) {
+		flags = fcntl(s, F_GETFL, 0);
+		if (fcntl(s, F_SETFL, flags | O_NONBLOCK) == -1)
+			err(1, "set non-blocking mode");
+	}
+
+	if ((ret = connect(s, name, namelen)) != 0 && errno == EINPROGRESS) {
+		pfd.fd = s;
+		pfd.events = POLLOUT;
+		if ((ret = poll(&pfd, 1, timeout)) == 1) {
+			optlen = sizeof(optval);
+			if ((ret = getsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR,
+			    &optval, &optlen)) == 0) {
+				errno = optval;
+				ret = optval == 0 ? 0 : -1;
+			}
+		} else if (ret == 0) {
+			errno = ETIMEDOUT;
+			ret = -1;
+		} else
+			err(1, "poll failed");
+	}
+
+	if (timeout != -1 && fcntl(s, F_SETFL, flags) == -1)
+		err(1, "restoring flags");
+
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * local_listen()
+ * Returns a socket listening on a local port, binds to specified source
+ * address. Returns -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+local_listen(char *host, char *port, struct addrinfo hints)
+{
+	struct addrinfo *res, *res0;
+	int s, ret, x = 1;
+	int error;
+
+	/* Allow nodename to be null. */
+	hints.ai_flags |= AI_PASSIVE;
+
+	/*
+	 * In the case of binding to a wildcard address
+	 * default to binding to an ipv4 address.
+	 */
+	if (host == NULL && hints.ai_family == AF_UNSPEC)
+		hints.ai_family = AF_INET;
+
+	if ((error = getaddrinfo(host, port, &hints, &res)))
+		errx(1, "getaddrinfo: %s", gai_strerror(error));
+
+	res0 = res;
+	do {
+		if ((s = socket(res0->ai_family, res0->ai_socktype,
+		    res0->ai_protocol)) < 0)
+			continue;
+
+#ifdef SO_RTABLE
+		if (rtableid >= 0 && (setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RTABLE,
+		    &rtableid, sizeof(rtableid)) == -1))
+			err(1, "setsockopt SO_RTABLE");
+#endif
+#ifdef SO_REUSEPORT
+		ret = setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEPORT, &x, sizeof(x));
+		if (ret == -1)
+			err(1, "setsockopt");
+#endif
+		set_common_sockopts(s);
+
+		if (bind(s, (struct sockaddr *)res0->ai_addr,
+		    res0->ai_addrlen) == 0)
+			break;
+
+		close(s);
+		s = -1;
+	} while ((res0 = res0->ai_next) != NULL);
+
+	if (!uflag && s != -1) {
+		if (listen(s, 1) < 0)
+			err(1, "listen");
+	}
+
+	freeaddrinfo(res);
+
+	return (s);
+}
+
+/*
+ * readwrite()
+ * Loop that polls on the network file descriptor and stdin.
+ */
+void
+readwrite(int net_fd)
+{
+	struct pollfd pfd[4];
+	int stdin_fd = STDIN_FILENO;
+	int stdout_fd = STDOUT_FILENO;
+	unsigned char netinbuf[BUFSIZE];
+	size_t netinbufpos = 0;
+	unsigned char stdinbuf[BUFSIZE];
+	size_t stdinbufpos = 0;
+	int n, num_fds;
+	ssize_t ret;
+
+	/* don't read from stdin if requested */
+	if (dflag)
+		stdin_fd = -1;
+
+	/* stdin */
+	pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd = stdin_fd;
+	pfd[POLL_STDIN].events = POLLIN;
+
+	/* network out */
+	pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd = net_fd;
+	pfd[POLL_NETOUT].events = 0;
+
+	/* network in */
+	pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd = net_fd;
+	pfd[POLL_NETIN].events = POLLIN;
+
+	/* stdout */
+	pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd = stdout_fd;
+	pfd[POLL_STDOUT].events = 0;
+
+	while (1) {
+		/* both inputs are gone, buffers are empty, we are done */
+		if (pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd == -1 && pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd == -1
+		    && stdinbufpos == 0 && netinbufpos == 0) {
+			close(net_fd);
+			return;
+		}
+		/* both outputs are gone, we can't continue */
+		if (pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd == -1 && pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd == -1) {
+			close(net_fd);
+			return;
+		}
+		/* listen and net in gone, queues empty, done */
+		if (lflag && pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd == -1
+		    && stdinbufpos == 0 && netinbufpos == 0) {
+			close(net_fd);
+			return;
+		}
+
+		/* help says -i is for "wait between lines sent". We read and
+		 * write arbitrary amounts of data, and we don't want to start
+		 * scanning for newlines, so this is as good as it gets */
+		if (iflag)
+			sleep(iflag);
+
+		/* poll */
+		num_fds = poll(pfd, 4, timeout);
+
+		/* treat poll errors */
+		if (num_fds == -1) {
+			close(net_fd);
+			err(1, "polling error");
+		}
+
+		/* timeout happened */
+		if (num_fds == 0)
+			return;
+
+		/* treat socket error conditions */
+		for (n = 0; n < 4; n++) {
+			if (pfd[n].revents & (POLLERR|POLLNVAL)) {
+				pfd[n].fd = -1;
+			}
+		}
+		/* reading is possible after HUP */
+		if (pfd[POLL_STDIN].events & POLLIN &&
+		    pfd[POLL_STDIN].revents & POLLHUP &&
+		    ! (pfd[POLL_STDIN].revents & POLLIN))
+				pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd = -1;
+
+		if (pfd[POLL_NETIN].events & POLLIN &&
+		    pfd[POLL_NETIN].revents & POLLHUP &&
+		    ! (pfd[POLL_NETIN].revents & POLLIN))
+				pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd = -1;
+
+		if (pfd[POLL_NETOUT].revents & POLLHUP) {
+			if (Nflag)
+				shutdown(pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd, SHUT_WR);
+			pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd = -1;
+		}
+		/* if HUP, stop watching stdout */
+		if (pfd[POLL_STDOUT].revents & POLLHUP)
+			pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd = -1;
+		/* if no net out, stop watching stdin */
+		if (pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd == -1)
+			pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd = -1;
+		/* if no stdout, stop watching net in */
+		if (pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd == -1) {
+			if (pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd != -1)
+				shutdown(pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd, SHUT_RD);
+			pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd = -1;
+		}
+
+		/* try to read from stdin */
+		if (pfd[POLL_STDIN].revents & POLLIN && stdinbufpos < BUFSIZE) {
+			ret = fillbuf(pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd, stdinbuf,
+			    &stdinbufpos);
+			/* error or eof on stdin - remove from pfd */
+			if (ret == 0 || ret == -1)
+				pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd = -1;
+			/* read something - poll net out */
+			if (stdinbufpos > 0)
+				pfd[POLL_NETOUT].events = POLLOUT;
+			/* filled buffer - remove self from polling */
+			if (stdinbufpos == BUFSIZE)
+				pfd[POLL_STDIN].events = 0;
+		}
+		/* try to write to network */
+		if (pfd[POLL_NETOUT].revents & POLLOUT && stdinbufpos > 0) {
+			ret = drainbuf(pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd, stdinbuf,
+			    &stdinbufpos);
+			if (ret == -1)
+				pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd = -1;
+			/* buffer empty - remove self from polling */
+			if (stdinbufpos == 0)
+				pfd[POLL_NETOUT].events = 0;
+			/* buffer no longer full - poll stdin again */
+			if (stdinbufpos < BUFSIZE)
+				pfd[POLL_STDIN].events = POLLIN;
+		}
+		/* try to read from network */
+		if (pfd[POLL_NETIN].revents & POLLIN && netinbufpos < BUFSIZE) {
+			ret = fillbuf(pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd, netinbuf,
+			    &netinbufpos);
+			if (ret == -1)
+				pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd = -1;
+			/* eof on net in - remove from pfd */
+			if (ret == 0) {
+				shutdown(pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd, SHUT_RD);
+				pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd = -1;
+			}
+			/* read something - poll stdout */
+			if (netinbufpos > 0)
+				pfd[POLL_STDOUT].events = POLLOUT;
+			/* filled buffer - remove self from polling */
+			if (netinbufpos == BUFSIZE)
+				pfd[POLL_NETIN].events = 0;
+			/* handle telnet */
+			if (tflag)
+				atelnet(pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd, netinbuf,
+				    netinbufpos);
+		}
+		/* try to write to stdout */
+		if (pfd[POLL_STDOUT].revents & POLLOUT && netinbufpos > 0) {
+			ret = drainbuf(pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd, netinbuf,
+			    &netinbufpos);
+			if (ret == -1)
+				pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd = -1;
+			/* buffer empty - remove self from polling */
+			if (netinbufpos == 0)
+				pfd[POLL_STDOUT].events = 0;
+			/* buffer no longer full - poll net in again */
+			if (netinbufpos < BUFSIZE)
+				pfd[POLL_NETIN].events = POLLIN;
+		}
+
+		/* stdin gone and queue empty? */
+		if (pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd == -1 && stdinbufpos == 0) {
+			if (pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd != -1 && Nflag)
+				shutdown(pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd, SHUT_WR);
+			pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd = -1;
+		}
+		/* net in gone and queue empty? */
+		if (pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd == -1 && netinbufpos == 0) {
+			pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd = -1;
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+ssize_t
+drainbuf(int fd, unsigned char *buf, size_t *bufpos)
+{
+	ssize_t n;
+	ssize_t adjust;
+
+	n = write(fd, buf, *bufpos);
+	/* don't treat EAGAIN, EINTR as error */
+	if (n == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR))
+		n = -2;
+	if (n <= 0)
+		return n;
+	/* adjust buffer */
+	adjust = *bufpos - n;
+	if (adjust > 0)
+		memmove(buf, buf + n, adjust);
+	*bufpos -= n;
+	return n;
+}
+
+
+ssize_t
+fillbuf(int fd, unsigned char *buf, size_t *bufpos)
+{
+	size_t num = BUFSIZE - *bufpos;
+	ssize_t n;
+
+	n = read(fd, buf + *bufpos, num);
+	/* don't treat EAGAIN, EINTR as error */
+	if (n == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR))
+		n = -2;
+	if (n <= 0)
+		return n;
+	*bufpos += n;
+	return n;
+}
+
+/*
+ * fdpass()
+ * Pass the connected file descriptor to stdout and exit.
+ */
+void
+fdpass(int nfd)
+{
+#if defined(HAVE_SENDMSG) && (defined(HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR) || defined(HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR))
+	struct msghdr msg;
+#ifndef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR
+	union {
+		struct cmsghdr hdr;
+		char buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))];
+	} cmsgbuf;
+	struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
+#endif
+	struct iovec vec;
+	char ch = '\0';
+	struct pollfd pfd;
+	ssize_t r;
+
+	memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
+#ifdef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR
+	msg.msg_accrights = (caddr_t)&nfd;
+	msg.msg_accrightslen = sizeof(nfd);
+#else
+	memset(&cmsgbuf, 0, sizeof(cmsgbuf));
+	msg.msg_control = (caddr_t)&cmsgbuf.buf;
+	msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(cmsgbuf.buf);
+	cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
+	cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(int));
+	cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET;
+	cmsg->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS;
+	*(int *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg) = nfd;
+#endif
+
+	vec.iov_base = &ch;
+	vec.iov_len = 1;
+	msg.msg_iov = &vec;
+	msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
+
+	bzero(&pfd, sizeof(pfd));
+	pfd.fd = STDOUT_FILENO;
+	for (;;) {
+		r = sendmsg(STDOUT_FILENO, &msg, 0);
+		if (r == -1) {
+			if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR) {
+				pfd.events = POLLOUT;
+				if (poll(&pfd, 1, -1) == -1)
+					err(1, "poll");
+				continue;
+			}
+			err(1, "sendmsg");
+		} else if (r == -1)
+			errx(1, "sendmsg: unexpected return value %zd", r);
+		else
+			break;
+	}
+	exit(0);
+#else
+	errx(1, "%s: file descriptor passing not supported", __func__);
+#endif
+}
+
+/* Deal with RFC 854 WILL/WONT DO/DONT negotiation. */
+void
+atelnet(int nfd, unsigned char *buf, unsigned int size)
+{
+	unsigned char *p, *end;
+	unsigned char obuf[4];
+
+	if (size < 3)
+		return;
+	end = buf + size - 2;
+
+	for (p = buf; p < end; p++) {
+		if (*p != IAC)
+			continue;
+
+		obuf[0] = IAC;
+		p++;
+		if ((*p == WILL) || (*p == WONT))
+			obuf[1] = DONT;
+		else if ((*p == DO) || (*p == DONT))
+			obuf[1] = WONT;
+		else
+			continue;
+
+		p++;
+		obuf[2] = *p;
+		if (atomicio(vwrite, nfd, obuf, 3) != 3)
+			warn("Write Error!");
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * build_ports()
+ * Build an array of ports in portlist[], listing each port
+ * that we should try to connect to.
+ */
+void
+build_ports(char *p)
+{
+	const char *errstr;
+	char *n;
+	int hi, lo, cp;
+	int x = 0;
+
+	if ((n = strchr(p, '-')) != NULL) {
+		*n = '\0';
+		n++;
+
+		/* Make sure the ports are in order: lowest->highest. */
+		hi = strtonum(n, 1, PORT_MAX, &errstr);
+		if (errstr)
+			errx(1, "port number %s: %s", errstr, n);
+		lo = strtonum(p, 1, PORT_MAX, &errstr);
+		if (errstr)
+			errx(1, "port number %s: %s", errstr, p);
+
+		if (lo > hi) {
+			cp = hi;
+			hi = lo;
+			lo = cp;
+		}
+
+		/* Load ports sequentially. */
+		for (cp = lo; cp <= hi; cp++) {
+			portlist[x] = calloc(1, PORT_MAX_LEN);
+			if (portlist[x] == NULL)
+				errx(1, "calloc");
+			snprintf(portlist[x], PORT_MAX_LEN, "%d", cp);
+			x++;
+		}
+
+		/* Randomly swap ports. */
+		if (rflag) {
+			int y;
+			char *c;
+
+			for (x = 0; x <= (hi - lo); x++) {
+				y = (arc4random() & 0xFFFF) % (hi - lo);
+				c = portlist[x];
+				portlist[x] = portlist[y];
+				portlist[y] = c;
+			}
+		}
+	} else {
+		hi = strtonum(p, 1, PORT_MAX, &errstr);
+		if (errstr)
+			errx(1, "port number %s: %s", errstr, p);
+		portlist[0] = strdup(p);
+		if (portlist[0] == NULL)
+			errx(1, "strdup");
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * udptest()
+ * Do a few writes to see if the UDP port is there.
+ * Fails once PF state table is full.
+ */
+int
+udptest(int s)
+{
+	int i, ret;
+
+	for (i = 0; i <= 3; i++) {
+		if (write(s, "X", 1) == 1)
+			ret = 1;
+		else
+			ret = -1;
+	}
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+void
+set_common_sockopts(int s)
+{
+	int x = 1;
+
+#ifdef TCP_MD5SIG
+	if (Sflag) {
+		if (setsockopt(s, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_MD5SIG,
+			&x, sizeof(x)) == -1)
+			err(1, "setsockopt");
+	}
+#endif
+	if (Dflag) {
+		if (setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_DEBUG,
+			&x, sizeof(x)) == -1)
+			err(1, "setsockopt");
+	}
+	if (Tflag != -1) {
+		if (setsockopt(s, IPPROTO_IP, IP_TOS,
+		    &Tflag, sizeof(Tflag)) == -1)
+			err(1, "set IP ToS");
+	}
+	if (Iflag) {
+		if (setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF,
+		    &Iflag, sizeof(Iflag)) == -1)
+			err(1, "set TCP receive buffer size");
+	}
+	if (Oflag) {
+		if (setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDBUF,
+		    &Oflag, sizeof(Oflag)) == -1)
+			err(1, "set TCP send buffer size");
+	}
+}
+
+int
+map_tos(char *s, int *val)
+{
+	/* DiffServ Codepoints and other TOS mappings */
+	const struct toskeywords {
+		const char	*keyword;
+		int		 val;
+	} *t, toskeywords[] = {
+		{ "af11",		IPTOS_DSCP_AF11 },
+		{ "af12",		IPTOS_DSCP_AF12 },
+		{ "af13",		IPTOS_DSCP_AF13 },
+		{ "af21",		IPTOS_DSCP_AF21 },
+		{ "af22",		IPTOS_DSCP_AF22 },
+		{ "af23",		IPTOS_DSCP_AF23 },
+		{ "af31",		IPTOS_DSCP_AF31 },
+		{ "af32",		IPTOS_DSCP_AF32 },
+		{ "af33",		IPTOS_DSCP_AF33 },
+		{ "af41",		IPTOS_DSCP_AF41 },
+		{ "af42",		IPTOS_DSCP_AF42 },
+		{ "af43",		IPTOS_DSCP_AF43 },
+		{ "critical",		IPTOS_PREC_CRITIC_ECP },
+		{ "cs0",		IPTOS_DSCP_CS0 },
+		{ "cs1",		IPTOS_DSCP_CS1 },
+		{ "cs2",		IPTOS_DSCP_CS2 },
+		{ "cs3",		IPTOS_DSCP_CS3 },
+		{ "cs4",		IPTOS_DSCP_CS4 },
+		{ "cs5",		IPTOS_DSCP_CS5 },
+		{ "cs6",		IPTOS_DSCP_CS6 },
+		{ "cs7",		IPTOS_DSCP_CS7 },
+		{ "ef",			IPTOS_DSCP_EF },
+		{ "inetcontrol",	IPTOS_PREC_INTERNETCONTROL },
+		{ "lowdelay",		IPTOS_LOWDELAY },
+		{ "netcontrol",		IPTOS_PREC_NETCONTROL },
+		{ "reliability",	IPTOS_RELIABILITY },
+		{ "throughput",		IPTOS_THROUGHPUT },
+		{ NULL, 		-1 },
+	};
+
+	for (t = toskeywords; t->keyword != NULL; t++) {
+		if (strcmp(s, t->keyword) == 0) {
+			*val = t->val;
+			return (1);
+		}
+	}
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+void
+report_connect(const struct sockaddr *sa, socklen_t salen)
+{
+	char remote_host[NI_MAXHOST];
+	char remote_port[NI_MAXSERV];
+	int herr;
+	int flags = NI_NUMERICSERV;
+	
+	if (nflag)
+		flags |= NI_NUMERICHOST;
+	
+	if ((herr = getnameinfo(sa, salen,
+	    remote_host, sizeof(remote_host),
+	    remote_port, sizeof(remote_port),
+	    flags)) != 0) {
+		if (herr == EAI_SYSTEM)
+			err(1, "getnameinfo");
+		else
+			errx(1, "getnameinfo: %s", gai_strerror(herr));
+	}
+	
+	fprintf(stderr,
+	    "Connection from %s %s "
+	    "received!\n", remote_host, remote_port);
+}
+
+void
+help(void)
+{
+	usage(0);
+	fprintf(stderr, "\tCommand Summary:\n\
+	\t-4		Use IPv4\n\
+	\t-6		Use IPv6\n\
+	\t-D		Enable the debug socket option\n\
+	\t-d		Detach from stdin\n\
+	\t-F		Pass socket fd\n\
+	\t-h		This help text\n\
+	\t-I length	TCP receive buffer length\n\
+	\t-i secs\t	Delay interval for lines sent, ports scanned\n\
+	\t-k		Keep inbound sockets open for multiple connects\n\
+	\t-l		Listen mode, for inbound connects\n\
+	\t-N		Shutdown the network socket after EOF on stdin\n\
+	\t-n		Suppress name/port resolutions\n\
+	\t-O length	TCP send buffer length\n\
+	\t-P proxyuser\tUsername for proxy authentication\n\
+	\t-p port\t	Specify local port for remote connects\n\
+	\t-r		Randomize remote ports\n\
+	\t-S		Enable the TCP MD5 signature option\n\
+	\t-s addr\t	Local source address\n\
+	\t-T toskeyword\tSet IP Type of Service\n\
+	\t-t		Answer TELNET negotiation\n\
+	\t-U		Use UNIX domain socket\n\
+	\t-u		UDP mode\n\
+	\t-V rtable	Specify alternate routing table\n\
+	\t-v		Verbose\n\
+	\t-w secs\t	Timeout for connects and final net reads\n\
+	\t-X proto	Proxy protocol: \"4\", \"5\" (SOCKS) or \"connect\"\n\
+	\t-x addr[:port]\tSpecify proxy address and port\n\
+	\t-z		Zero-I/O mode [used for scanning]\n\
+	Port numbers can be individual or ranges: lo-hi [inclusive]\n");
+	exit(1);
+}
+
+void
+usage(int ret)
+{
+	fprintf(stderr,
+	    "usage: nc [-46DdFhklNnrStUuvz] [-I length] [-i interval] [-O length]\n"
+	    "\t  [-P proxy_username] [-p source_port] [-s source] [-T ToS]\n"
+	    "\t  [-V rtable] [-w timeout] [-X proxy_protocol]\n"
+	    "\t  [-x proxy_address[:port]] [destination] [port]\n");
+	if (ret)
+		exit(1);
+}
+
+/* *** src/usr.bin/nc/socks.c *** */
+
+
+/*	$OpenBSD: socks.c,v 1.20 2012/03/08 09:56:28 espie Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 Niklas Hallqvist.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004, 2005 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <resolv.h>
+
+#define SOCKS_PORT	"1080"
+#define HTTP_PROXY_PORT	"3128"
+#define HTTP_MAXHDRS	64
+#define SOCKS_V5	5
+#define SOCKS_V4	4
+#define SOCKS_NOAUTH	0
+#define SOCKS_NOMETHOD	0xff
+#define SOCKS_CONNECT	1
+#define SOCKS_IPV4	1
+#define SOCKS_DOMAIN	3
+#define SOCKS_IPV6	4
+
+int	remote_connect(const char *, const char *, struct addrinfo);
+int	socks_connect(const char *, const char *, struct addrinfo,
+	    const char *, const char *, struct addrinfo, int,
+	    const char *);
+
+static int
+decode_addrport(const char *h, const char *p, struct sockaddr *addr,
+    socklen_t addrlen, int v4only, int numeric)
+{
+	int r;
+	struct addrinfo hints, *res;
+
+	bzero(&hints, sizeof(hints));
+	hints.ai_family = v4only ? PF_INET : PF_UNSPEC;
+	hints.ai_flags = numeric ? AI_NUMERICHOST : 0;
+	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+	r = getaddrinfo(h, p, &hints, &res);
+	/* Don't fatal when attempting to convert a numeric address */
+	if (r != 0) {
+		if (!numeric) {
+			errx(1, "getaddrinfo(\"%.64s\", \"%.64s\"): %s", h, p,
+			    gai_strerror(r));
+		}
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	if (addrlen < res->ai_addrlen) {
+		freeaddrinfo(res);
+		errx(1, "internal error: addrlen < res->ai_addrlen");
+	}
+	memcpy(addr, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen);
+	freeaddrinfo(res);
+	return (0);
+}
+
+static int
+proxy_read_line(int fd, char *buf, size_t bufsz)
+{
+	size_t off;
+
+	for(off = 0;;) {
+		if (off >= bufsz)
+			errx(1, "proxy read too long");
+		if (atomicio(read, fd, buf + off, 1) != 1)
+			err(1, "proxy read");
+		/* Skip CR */
+		if (buf[off] == '\r')
+			continue;
+		if (buf[off] == '\n') {
+			buf[off] = '\0';
+			break;
+		}
+		off++;
+	}
+	return (off);
+}
+
+static const char *
+getproxypass(const char *proxyuser, const char *proxyhost)
+{
+	char prompt[512];
+	static char pw[256];
+
+	snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "Proxy password for %s@%s: ",
+	   proxyuser, proxyhost);
+	if (readpassphrase(prompt, pw, sizeof(pw), RPP_REQUIRE_TTY) == NULL)
+		errx(1, "Unable to read proxy passphrase");
+	return (pw);
+}
+
+int
+socks_connect(const char *host, const char *port,
+    struct addrinfo hints __attribute__ ((__unused__)),
+    const char *proxyhost, const char *proxyport, struct addrinfo proxyhints,
+    int socksv, const char *proxyuser)
+{
+	int proxyfd, r, authretry = 0;
+	size_t hlen, wlen = 0;
+	unsigned char buf[1024];
+	size_t cnt;
+	struct sockaddr_storage addr;
+	struct sockaddr_in *in4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)&addr;
+	struct sockaddr_in6 *in6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&addr;
+	in_port_t serverport;
+	const char *proxypass = NULL;
+
+	if (proxyport == NULL)
+		proxyport = (socksv == -1) ? HTTP_PROXY_PORT : SOCKS_PORT;
+
+	/* Abuse API to lookup port */
+	if (decode_addrport("0.0.0.0", port, (struct sockaddr *)&addr,
+	    sizeof(addr), 1, 1) == -1)
+		errx(1, "unknown port \"%.64s\"", port);
+	serverport = in4->sin_port;
+
+ again:
+	if (authretry++ > 3)
+		errx(1, "Too many authentication failures");
+
+	proxyfd = remote_connect(proxyhost, proxyport, proxyhints);
+
+	if (proxyfd < 0)
+		return (-1);
+
+	if (socksv == 5) {
+		if (decode_addrport(host, port, (struct sockaddr *)&addr,
+		    sizeof(addr), 0, 1) == -1)
+			addr.ss_family = 0; /* used in switch below */
+
+		/* Version 5, one method: no authentication */
+		buf[0] = SOCKS_V5;
+		buf[1] = 1;
+		buf[2] = SOCKS_NOAUTH;
+		cnt = atomicio(vwrite, proxyfd, buf, 3);
+		if (cnt != 3)
+			err(1, "write failed (%zu/3)", cnt);
+
+		cnt = atomicio(read, proxyfd, buf, 2);
+		if (cnt != 2)
+			err(1, "read failed (%zu/3)", cnt);
+
+		if (buf[1] == SOCKS_NOMETHOD)
+			errx(1, "authentication method negotiation failed");
+
+		switch (addr.ss_family) {
+		case 0:
+			/* Version 5, connect: domain name */
+
+			/* Max domain name length is 255 bytes */
+			hlen = strlen(host);
+			if (hlen > 255)
+				errx(1, "host name too long for SOCKS5");
+			buf[0] = SOCKS_V5;
+			buf[1] = SOCKS_CONNECT;
+			buf[2] = 0;
+			buf[3] = SOCKS_DOMAIN;
+			buf[4] = hlen;
+			memcpy(buf + 5, host, hlen);			
+			memcpy(buf + 5 + hlen, &serverport, sizeof serverport);
+			wlen = 7 + hlen;
+			break;
+		case AF_INET:
+			/* Version 5, connect: IPv4 address */
+			buf[0] = SOCKS_V5;
+			buf[1] = SOCKS_CONNECT;
+			buf[2] = 0;
+			buf[3] = SOCKS_IPV4;
+			memcpy(buf + 4, &in4->sin_addr, sizeof in4->sin_addr);
+			memcpy(buf + 8, &in4->sin_port, sizeof in4->sin_port);
+			wlen = 10;
+			break;
+		case AF_INET6:
+			/* Version 5, connect: IPv6 address */
+			buf[0] = SOCKS_V5;
+			buf[1] = SOCKS_CONNECT;
+			buf[2] = 0;
+			buf[3] = SOCKS_IPV6;
+			memcpy(buf + 4, &in6->sin6_addr, sizeof in6->sin6_addr);
+			memcpy(buf + 20, &in6->sin6_port,
+			    sizeof in6->sin6_port);
+			wlen = 22;
+			break;
+		default:
+			errx(1, "internal error: silly AF");
+		}
+
+		cnt = atomicio(vwrite, proxyfd, buf, wlen);
+		if (cnt != wlen)
+			err(1, "write failed (%zu/%zu)", cnt, wlen);
+
+		cnt = atomicio(read, proxyfd, buf, 4);
+		if (cnt != 4)
+			err(1, "read failed (%zu/4)", cnt);
+		if (buf[1] != 0)
+			errx(1, "connection failed, SOCKS error %d", buf[1]);
+		switch (buf[3]) {
+		case SOCKS_IPV4:
+			cnt = atomicio(read, proxyfd, buf + 4, 6);
+			if (cnt != 6)
+				err(1, "read failed (%zu/6)", cnt);
+			break;
+		case SOCKS_IPV6:
+			cnt = atomicio(read, proxyfd, buf + 4, 18);
+			if (cnt != 18)
+				err(1, "read failed (%zu/18)", cnt);
+			break;
+		default:
+			errx(1, "connection failed, unsupported address type");
+		}
+	} else if (socksv == 4) {
+		/* This will exit on lookup failure */
+		decode_addrport(host, port, (struct sockaddr *)&addr,
+		    sizeof(addr), 1, 0);
+
+		/* Version 4 */
+		buf[0] = SOCKS_V4;
+		buf[1] = SOCKS_CONNECT;	/* connect */
+		memcpy(buf + 2, &in4->sin_port, sizeof in4->sin_port);
+		memcpy(buf + 4, &in4->sin_addr, sizeof in4->sin_addr);
+		buf[8] = 0;	/* empty username */
+		wlen = 9;
+
+		cnt = atomicio(vwrite, proxyfd, buf, wlen);
+		if (cnt != wlen)
+			err(1, "write failed (%zu/%zu)", cnt, wlen);
+
+		cnt = atomicio(read, proxyfd, buf, 8);
+		if (cnt != 8)
+			err(1, "read failed (%zu/8)", cnt);
+		if (buf[1] != 90)
+			errx(1, "connection failed, SOCKS error %d", buf[1]);
+	} else if (socksv == -1) {
+		/* HTTP proxy CONNECT */
+
+		/* Disallow bad chars in hostname */
+		if (strcspn(host, "\r\n\t []:") != strlen(host))
+			errx(1, "Invalid hostname");
+
+		/* Try to be sane about numeric IPv6 addresses */
+		if (strchr(host, ':') != NULL) {
+			r = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
+			    "CONNECT [%s]:%d HTTP/1.0\r\n",
+			    host, ntohs(serverport));
+		} else {
+			r = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
+			    "CONNECT %s:%d HTTP/1.0\r\n",
+			    host, ntohs(serverport));
+		}
+		if (r == -1 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(buf))
+			errx(1, "hostname too long");
+		r = strlen(buf);
+
+		cnt = atomicio(vwrite, proxyfd, buf, r);
+		if (cnt != (size_t)r)
+			err(1, "write failed (%zu/%d)", cnt, r);
+
+		if (authretry > 1) {
+			char resp[1024];
+
+			proxypass = getproxypass(proxyuser, proxyhost);
+			r = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s:%s",
+			    proxyuser, proxypass);
+			if (r == -1 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(buf) ||
+			    b64_ntop(buf, strlen(buf), resp,
+			    sizeof(resp)) == -1)
+				errx(1, "Proxy username/password too long");
+			r = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "Proxy-Authorization: "
+			    "Basic %s\r\n", resp);
+			if (r == -1 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(buf))
+				errx(1, "Proxy auth response too long");
+			r = strlen(buf);
+			if ((cnt = atomicio(vwrite, proxyfd, buf, r)) != (size_t)r)
+				err(1, "write failed (%zu/%d)", cnt, r);
+		}
+
+		/* Terminate headers */
+		if ((r = atomicio(vwrite, proxyfd, "\r\n", 2)) != 2)
+			err(1, "write failed (2/%d)", r);
+
+		/* Read status reply */
+		proxy_read_line(proxyfd, buf, sizeof(buf));
+		if (proxyuser != NULL &&
+		    strncmp(buf, "HTTP/1.0 407 ", 12) == 0) {
+			if (authretry > 1) {
+				fprintf(stderr, "Proxy authentication "
+				    "failed\n");
+			}
+			close(proxyfd);
+			goto again;
+		} else if (strncmp(buf, "HTTP/1.0 200 ", 12) != 0 &&
+		    strncmp(buf, "HTTP/1.1 200 ", 12) != 0)
+			errx(1, "Proxy error: \"%s\"", buf);
+
+		/* Headers continue until we hit an empty line */
+		for (r = 0; r < HTTP_MAXHDRS; r++) {
+			proxy_read_line(proxyfd, buf, sizeof(buf));
+			if (*buf == '\0')
+				break;
+		}
+		if (*buf != '\0')
+			errx(1, "Too many proxy headers received");
+	} else
+		errx(1, "Unknown proxy protocol %d", socksv);
+
+	return (proxyfd);
+}
+
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/portnum.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/portnum.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c56b869a3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/portnum.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: portnum.sh,v 1.2 2013/05/17 10:34:30 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="port number parsing"
+
+badport() {
+	port=$1
+	verbose "$tid: invalid port $port"
+	if ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -p $port somehost true 2>/dev/null ; then
+		fail "$tid accepted invalid port $port"
+	fi
+}
+goodport() {
+	port=$1
+	verbose "$tid: valid port $port"
+	if ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -p $port somehost true 2>/dev/null ; then
+		:
+	else
+		fail "$tid rejected valid port $port"
+	fi
+}
+
+badport 0
+badport 65536
+badport 131073
+badport 2000blah
+badport blah2000
+
+goodport 1
+goodport 22
+goodport 2222
+goodport 22222
+goodport 65535
+
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/principals-command.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/principals-command.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b90a8cf2c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/principals-command.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: principals-command.sh,v 1.1 2015/05/21 06:44:25 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="authorized principals command"
+
+rm -f $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/cert_user_key*
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+
+if test -z "$SUDO" ; then
+	echo "skipped (SUDO not set)"
+	echo "need SUDO to create file in /var/run, test won't work without"
+	exit 0
+fi
+
+# Establish a AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand in /var/run where it will have
+# acceptable directory permissions.
+PRINCIPALS_CMD="/var/run/principals_command_${LOGNAME}"
+cat << _EOF | $SUDO sh -c "cat > '$PRINCIPALS_CMD'"
+#!/bin/sh
+test "x\$1" != "x${LOGNAME}" && exit 1
+test -f "$OBJ/authorized_principals_${LOGNAME}" &&
+	exec cat "$OBJ/authorized_principals_${LOGNAME}"
+_EOF
+test $? -eq 0 || fatal "couldn't prepare principals command"
+$SUDO chmod 0755 "$PRINCIPALS_CMD"
+
+# Create a CA key and a user certificate.
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519  -f $OBJ/user_ca_key || \
+	fatal "ssh-keygen of user_ca_key failed"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/cert_user_key || \
+	fatal "ssh-keygen of cert_user_key failed"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key -I "regress user key for $USER" \
+    -z $$ -n ${USER},mekmitasdigoat $OBJ/cert_user_key || \
+	fatal "couldn't sign cert_user_key"
+
+if [ -x $PRINCIPALS_CMD ]; then
+	# Test explicitly-specified principals
+	for privsep in yes no ; do
+		_prefix="privsep $privsep"
+
+		# Setup for AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
+		rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+		(
+			cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+			echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep"
+			echo "AuthorizedKeysFile none"
+			echo "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand $PRINCIPALS_CMD %u"
+			echo "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser ${LOGNAME}"
+			echo "TrustedUserCAKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub"
+		) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+		# XXX test missing command
+		# XXX test failing command
+
+		# Empty authorized_principals
+		verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} empty authorized_principals"
+		echo > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+		${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
+		    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+		if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
+		fi
+
+		# Wrong authorized_principals
+		verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} wrong authorized_principals"
+		echo gregorsamsa > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+		${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
+		    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+		if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
+		fi
+
+		# Correct authorized_principals
+		verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} correct authorized_principals"
+		echo mekmitasdigoat > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+		${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
+		    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+		if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh cert connect failed"
+		fi
+
+		# authorized_principals with bad key option
+		verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals bad key opt"
+		echo 'blah mekmitasdigoat' > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+		${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
+		    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+		if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
+		fi
+
+		# authorized_principals with command=false
+		verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals command=false"
+		echo 'command="false" mekmitasdigoat' > \
+		    $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+		${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
+		    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+		if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
+		fi
+
+		# authorized_principals with command=true
+		verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals command=true"
+		echo 'command="true" mekmitasdigoat' > \
+		    $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+		${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
+		    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost false >/dev/null 2>&1
+		if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh cert connect failed"
+		fi
+
+		# Setup for principals= key option
+		rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+		(
+			cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+			echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep"
+		) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+		# Wrong principals list
+		verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} wrong principals key option"
+		(
+			printf 'cert-authority,principals="gregorsamsa" '
+			cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub
+		) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+		${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
+		    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+		if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
+		fi
+
+		# Correct principals list
+		verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} correct principals key option"
+		(
+			printf 'cert-authority,principals="mekmitasdigoat" '
+			cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub
+		) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+		${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
+		    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+		if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh cert connect failed"
+		fi
+	done
+else
+	echo "SKIPPED: $PRINCIPALS_COMMAND not executable " \
+	    "(/var/run mounted noexec?)"
+fi
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/proto-mismatch.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/proto-mismatch.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9e8024beb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/proto-mismatch.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: proto-mismatch.sh,v 1.4 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="protocol version mismatch"
+
+mismatch ()
+{
+	server=$1
+	client=$2
+	banner=`echo ${client} | ${SSHD} -o "Protocol=${server}" -i -f ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy`
+	r=$?
+	trace "sshd prints ${banner}"
+	if [ $r -ne 255 ]; then
+		fail "sshd prints ${banner} and accepts connect with version ${client}"
+	fi
+}
+
+mismatch	2	SSH-1.5-HALLO
+if ssh_version 1; then
+	mismatch	1	SSH-2.0-HALLO
+fi
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/proto-version.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/proto-version.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cf4946115
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/proto-version.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: proto-version.sh,v 1.5 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="sshd version with different protocol combinations"
+
+# we just start sshd in inetd mode and check the banner
+check_version ()
+{
+	version=$1
+	expect=$2
+	banner=`printf '' | ${SSHD} -o "Protocol=${version}" -i -f ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy`
+	case ${banner} in
+	SSH-1.99-*)
+		proto=199
+		;;
+	SSH-2.0-*)
+		proto=20
+		;;
+	SSH-1.5-*)
+		proto=15
+		;;
+	*)
+		proto=0
+		;;
+	esac
+	if [ ${expect} -ne ${proto} ]; then
+		fail "wrong protocol version ${banner} for ${version}"
+	fi
+}
+
+check_version	2	20
+if ssh_version 1; then
+	check_version	2,1	199
+	check_version	1,2	199
+	check_version	1	15
+fi
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/proxy-connect.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/proxy-connect.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f816962b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/proxy-connect.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: proxy-connect.sh,v 1.8 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="proxy connect"
+
+mv $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
+
+for ps in no yes; do
+  cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+  echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $ps" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+  for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+    for c in no yes; do
+	verbose "plain username protocol $p privsep=$ps comp=$c"
+	opts="-$p -oCompression=$c -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy"
+	SSH_CONNECTION=`${SSH} $opts 999.999.999.999 'echo $SSH_CONNECTION'`
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh proxyconnect protocol $p privsep=$ps comp=$c failed"
+	fi
+	if [ "$SSH_CONNECTION" != "UNKNOWN 65535 UNKNOWN 65535" ]; then
+		fail "bad SSH_CONNECTION protocol $p privsep=$ps comp=$c"
+	fi
+    done
+  done
+done
+
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+	verbose "username with style protocol $p"
+	${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy ${USER}:style@999.999.999.999 true || \
+		fail "ssh proxyconnect protocol $p failed"
+done
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/putty-ciphers.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/putty-ciphers.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..724a98cc1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/putty-ciphers.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: putty-ciphers.sh,v 1.4 2013/05/17 04:29:14 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="putty ciphers"
+
+if test "x$REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY" != "xyes" ; then
+	echo "putty interop tests not enabled"
+	exit 0
+fi
+
+for c in aes blowfish 3des arcfour aes128-ctr aes192-ctr aes256-ctr ; do
+	verbose "$tid: cipher $c"
+	cp ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy \
+	    ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/cipher_$c
+	echo "Cipher=$c" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/cipher_$c
+
+	rm -f ${COPY}
+	env HOME=$PWD ${PLINK} -load cipher_$c -batch -i putty.rsa2 \
+	    127.0.0.1 cat ${DATA} > ${COPY}
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh cat $DATA failed"
+	fi
+	cmp ${DATA} ${COPY}		|| fail "corrupted copy"
+done
+rm -f ${COPY}
+
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/putty-kex.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/putty-kex.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1844d6599
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/putty-kex.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: putty-kex.sh,v 1.3 2013/05/17 04:29:14 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="putty KEX"
+
+if test "x$REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY" != "xyes" ; then
+	echo "putty interop tests not enabled"
+	exit 0
+fi
+
+for k in dh-gex-sha1 dh-group1-sha1 dh-group14-sha1 ; do
+	verbose "$tid: kex $k"
+	cp ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy \
+	    ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/kex_$k
+	echo "KEX=$k" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/kex_$k
+
+	env HOME=$PWD ${PLINK} -load kex_$k -batch -i putty.rsa2 \
+	    127.0.0.1 true
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "KEX $k failed"
+	fi
+done
+
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/putty-transfer.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/putty-transfer.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..aec0e04ee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/putty-transfer.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: putty-transfer.sh,v 1.3 2013/05/17 04:29:14 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="putty transfer data"
+
+if test "x$REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY" != "xyes" ; then
+	echo "putty interop tests not enabled"
+	exit 0
+fi
+
+# XXX support protocol 1 too
+for p in 2; do
+	for c in 0 1 ; do 
+	verbose "$tid: proto $p compression $c"
+		rm -f ${COPY}
+		cp ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy \
+		    ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/compression_$c
+		echo "Compression=$c" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/kex_$k
+		env HOME=$PWD ${PLINK} -load compression_$c -batch \
+		    -i putty.rsa$p 127.0.0.1 cat ${DATA} > ${COPY}
+		if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh cat $DATA failed"
+		fi
+		cmp ${DATA} ${COPY}		|| fail "corrupted copy"
+	
+		for s in 10 100 1k 32k 64k 128k 256k; do
+			trace "proto $p compression $c dd-size ${s}"
+			rm -f ${COPY}
+			dd if=$DATA obs=${s} 2> /dev/null | \
+				env HOME=$PWD ${PLINK} -load compression_$c \
+				    -batch -i putty.rsa$p 127.0.0.1 \
+				    "cat > ${COPY}"
+			if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+				fail "ssh cat $DATA failed"
+			fi
+			cmp $DATA ${COPY}	|| fail "corrupted copy"
+		done
+	done
+done
+rm -f ${COPY}
+
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/reconfigure.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/reconfigure.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..eecddd3c7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/reconfigure.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: reconfigure.sh,v 1.5 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="simple connect after reconfigure"
+
+# we need the full path to sshd for -HUP
+if test "x$USE_VALGRIND" = "x" ; then
+	case $SSHD in
+	/*)
+		# full path is OK
+		;;
+	*)
+		# otherwise make fully qualified
+		SSHD=$OBJ/$SSHD
+	esac
+fi
+
+start_sshd
+
+trace "connect before restart"
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS} ; do
+	${SSH} -o "Protocol=$p" -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh connect with protocol $p failed before reconfigure"
+	fi
+done
+
+PID=`$SUDO cat $PIDFILE`
+rm -f $PIDFILE
+$SUDO kill -HUP $PID
+
+trace "wait for sshd to restart"
+i=0;
+while [ ! -f $PIDFILE -a $i -lt 10 ]; do
+	i=`expr $i + 1`
+	sleep $i
+done
+
+test -f $PIDFILE || fatal "sshd did not restart"
+
+trace "connect after restart"
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS} ; do
+	${SSH} -o "Protocol=$p" -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh connect with protocol $p failed after reconfigure"
+	fi
+done
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/reexec.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/reexec.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5c0a7b46f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/reexec.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: reexec.sh,v 1.8 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="reexec tests"
+
+SSHD_ORIG=$SSHD
+SSHD_COPY=$OBJ/sshd
+
+# Start a sshd and then delete it
+start_sshd_copy ()
+{
+	cp $SSHD_ORIG $SSHD_COPY
+	SSHD=$SSHD_COPY
+	start_sshd
+	SSHD=$SSHD_ORIG
+}
+
+# Do basic copy tests
+copy_tests ()
+{
+	rm -f ${COPY}
+	for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS} ; do
+		verbose "$tid: proto $p"
+		${SSH} -nqo "Protocol=$p" -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost \
+		    cat ${DATA} > ${COPY}
+		if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh cat $DATA failed"
+		fi
+		cmp ${DATA} ${COPY}		|| fail "corrupted copy"
+		rm -f ${COPY}
+	done
+}
+
+verbose "test config passing"
+
+cp $OBJ/sshd_config $OBJ/sshd_config.orig
+start_sshd
+echo "InvalidXXX=no" >> $OBJ/sshd_config
+
+copy_tests
+
+$SUDO kill `$SUDO cat $PIDFILE`
+rm -f $PIDFILE
+
+cp $OBJ/sshd_config.orig $OBJ/sshd_config
+
+# cygwin can't fork a deleted binary
+if [ "$os" != "cygwin" ]; then
+
+verbose "test reexec fallback"
+
+start_sshd_copy
+rm -f $SSHD_COPY
+
+copy_tests
+
+$SUDO kill `$SUDO cat $PIDFILE`
+rm -f $PIDFILE
+
+verbose "test reexec fallback without privsep"
+
+cp $OBJ/sshd_config.orig $OBJ/sshd_config
+echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation=no" >> $OBJ/sshd_config
+
+start_sshd_copy
+rm -f $SSHD_COPY
+
+copy_tests
+
+$SUDO kill `$SUDO cat $PIDFILE`
+rm -f $PIDFILE
+
+fi
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/rekey.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/rekey.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0d4444d03
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/rekey.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: rekey.sh,v 1.16 2015/02/14 12:43:16 markus Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="rekey"
+
+LOG=${TEST_SSH_LOGFILE}
+
+rm -f ${LOG}
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+
+# Test rekeying based on data volume only.
+# Arguments will be passed to ssh.
+ssh_data_rekeying()
+{
+	_kexopt=$1 ; shift
+	_opts="$@"
+	if ! test -z "$_kexopts" ; then
+		cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+		echo "$_kexopt" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+		_opts="$_opts -o$_kexopt"
+	fi
+	rm -f ${COPY} ${LOG}
+	_opts="$_opts -oCompression=no"
+	${SSH} <${DATA} $_opts -v -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "cat > ${COPY}"
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh failed ($@)"
+	fi
+	cmp ${DATA} ${COPY}		|| fail "corrupted copy ($@)"
+	n=`grep 'NEWKEYS sent' ${LOG} | wc -l`
+	n=`expr $n - 1`
+	trace "$n rekeying(s)"
+	if [ $n -lt 1 ]; then
+		fail "no rekeying occured ($@)"
+	fi
+}
+
+increase_datafile_size 300
+
+opts=""
+for i in `${SSH} -Q kex`; do
+	opts="$opts KexAlgorithms=$i"
+done
+for i in `${SSH} -Q cipher`; do
+	opts="$opts Ciphers=$i"
+done
+for i in `${SSH} -Q mac`; do
+	opts="$opts MACs=$i"
+done
+
+for opt in $opts; do
+	verbose "client rekey $opt"
+	ssh_data_rekeying "$opt" -oRekeyLimit=256k
+done
+
+# AEAD ciphers are magical so test with all KexAlgorithms
+if ${SSH} -Q cipher-auth | grep '^.*$' >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
+  for c in `${SSH} -Q cipher-auth`; do
+    for kex in `${SSH} -Q kex`; do
+	verbose "client rekey $c $kex"
+	ssh_data_rekeying "KexAlgorithms=$kex" -oRekeyLimit=256k -oCiphers=$c
+    done
+  done
+fi
+
+for s in 16 1k 128k 256k; do
+	verbose "client rekeylimit ${s}"
+	ssh_data_rekeying "" -oCompression=no -oRekeyLimit=$s
+done
+
+for s in 5 10; do
+	verbose "client rekeylimit default ${s}"
+	rm -f ${COPY} ${LOG}
+	${SSH} < ${DATA} -oCompression=no -oRekeyLimit="default $s" -F \
+		$OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "cat >${COPY};sleep $s;sleep 3"
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh failed"
+	fi
+	cmp ${DATA} ${COPY}		|| fail "corrupted copy"
+	n=`grep 'NEWKEYS sent' ${LOG} | wc -l`
+	n=`expr $n - 1`
+	trace "$n rekeying(s)"
+	if [ $n -lt 1 ]; then
+		fail "no rekeying occured"
+	fi
+done
+
+for s in 5 10; do
+	verbose "client rekeylimit default ${s} no data"
+	rm -f ${COPY} ${LOG}
+	${SSH} -oCompression=no -oRekeyLimit="default $s" -F \
+		$OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "sleep $s;sleep 3"
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh failed"
+	fi
+	n=`grep 'NEWKEYS sent' ${LOG} | wc -l`
+	n=`expr $n - 1`
+	trace "$n rekeying(s)"
+	if [ $n -lt 1 ]; then
+		fail "no rekeying occured"
+	fi
+done
+
+for s in 16 1k 128k 256k; do
+	verbose "server rekeylimit ${s}"
+	cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+	echo "rekeylimit ${s}" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+	rm -f ${COPY} ${LOG}
+	${SSH} -oCompression=no -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "cat ${DATA}" \
+	    > ${COPY}
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh failed"
+	fi
+	cmp ${DATA} ${COPY}		|| fail "corrupted copy"
+	n=`grep 'NEWKEYS sent' ${LOG} | wc -l`
+	n=`expr $n - 1`
+	trace "$n rekeying(s)"
+	if [ $n -lt 1 ]; then
+		fail "no rekeying occured"
+	fi
+done
+
+for s in 5 10; do
+	verbose "server rekeylimit default ${s} no data"
+	cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+	echo "rekeylimit default ${s}" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+	rm -f ${COPY} ${LOG}
+	${SSH} -oCompression=no -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "sleep $s;sleep 3"
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh failed"
+	fi
+	n=`grep 'NEWKEYS sent' ${LOG} | wc -l`
+	n=`expr $n - 1`
+	trace "$n rekeying(s)"
+	if [ $n -lt 1 ]; then
+		fail "no rekeying occured"
+	fi
+done
+
+verbose "rekeylimit parsing"
+for size in 16 1k 1K 1m 1M 1g 1G; do
+    for time in 1 1m 1M 1h 1H 1d 1D 1w 1W; do
+	case $size in
+		16)	bytes=16 ;;
+		1k|1K)	bytes=1024 ;;
+		1m|1M)	bytes=1048576 ;;
+		1g|1G)	bytes=1073741824 ;;
+	esac
+	case $time in
+		1)	seconds=1 ;;
+		1m|1M)	seconds=60 ;;
+		1h|1H)	seconds=3600 ;;
+		1d|1D)	seconds=86400 ;;
+		1w|1W)	seconds=604800 ;;
+	esac
+
+	b=`$SUDO ${SSHD} -T -o "rekeylimit $size $time" -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy | \
+	    awk '/rekeylimit/{print $2}'`
+	s=`$SUDO ${SSHD} -T -o "rekeylimit $size $time" -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy | \
+	    awk '/rekeylimit/{print $3}'`
+
+	if [ "$bytes" != "$b" ]; then
+		fatal "rekeylimit size: expected $bytes bytes got $b"
+	fi
+	if [ "$seconds" != "$s" ]; then
+		fatal "rekeylimit time: expected $time seconds got $s"
+	fi
+    done
+done
+
+rm -f ${COPY} ${DATA}
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/rsa_openssh.prv b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/rsa_openssh.prv
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..267555572
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/rsa_openssh.prv
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/rsa_openssh.pub b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/rsa_openssh.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b504730f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/rsa_openssh.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQDsilwKcaKN6wSMNd1WgQ9+HRqQEkD0kCTVttrazGu0OhBU3Uko+dFD1Ip0CxdXmN25JQWxOYF7h/Ocu8P3jzv3RTX87xKR0YzlXTLX+SLtF/ySebS3xWPrlfRUDhh03hR5V+8xxvvy9widPYKw/oItwGSueOsEq1LTczCDv2dAjQ==
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/rsa_ssh2.prv b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/rsa_ssh2.prv
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1ece3d7de
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/rsa_ssh2.prv
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+---- BEGIN SSH2 ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY ----
+Subject: ssh-keygen test
+Comment: "1024-bit rsa, Sat Jun 23 2001 12:21:26 -0400"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+---- END SSH2 ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY ----
+---
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/scp-ssh-wrapper.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/scp-ssh-wrapper.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..59f1ff63e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/scp-ssh-wrapper.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+#       $OpenBSD: scp-ssh-wrapper.sh,v 1.3 2014/01/26 10:49:17 djm Exp $
+#       Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+printname () {
+	NAME=$1
+	save_IFS=$IFS
+	IFS=/
+	set -- `echo "$NAME"`
+	IFS="$save_IFS"
+	while [ $# -ge 1 ] ; do
+		if [ "x$1" != "x" ]; then
+			echo "D0755 0 $1"
+		fi
+		shift;
+	done
+}
+
+# Discard all but last argument.  We use arg later.
+while test "x$1" != "x"; do
+	arg="$1"
+	shift
+done
+
+BAD="../../../../../../../../../../../../../${DIR}/dotpathdir"
+
+case "$SCPTESTMODE" in
+badserver_0)
+	echo "D0755 0 /${DIR}/rootpathdir"
+	echo "C755 2 rootpathfile"
+	echo "X"
+	;;
+badserver_1)
+	echo "D0755 0 $BAD"
+	echo "C755 2 file"
+	echo "X"
+	;;
+badserver_2)
+	echo "D0755 0 $BAD"
+	echo "C755 2 file"
+	echo "X"
+	;;
+badserver_3)
+	printname $BAD
+	echo "C755 2 file"
+	echo "X"
+	;;
+badserver_4)
+	printname $BAD
+	echo "D0755 0 .."
+	echo "C755 2 file"
+	echo "X"
+	;;
+*)
+	set -- $arg
+	shift
+	exec $SCP "$@"
+	;;
+esac
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/scp.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/scp.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..57cc77066
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/scp.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: scp.sh,v 1.10 2014/01/26 10:49:17 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="scp"
+
+#set -x
+
+# Figure out if diff understands "-N"
+if diff -N ${SRC}/scp.sh ${SRC}/scp.sh 2>/dev/null; then
+	DIFFOPT="-rN"
+else
+	DIFFOPT="-r"
+fi
+
+COPY2=${OBJ}/copy2
+DIR=${COPY}.dd
+DIR2=${COPY}.dd2
+
+SRC=`dirname ${SCRIPT}`
+cp ${SRC}/scp-ssh-wrapper.sh ${OBJ}/scp-ssh-wrapper.scp
+chmod 755 ${OBJ}/scp-ssh-wrapper.scp
+scpopts="-q -S ${OBJ}/scp-ssh-wrapper.scp"
+export SCP # used in scp-ssh-wrapper.scp
+
+scpclean() {
+	rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY2} ${DIR} ${DIR2}
+	mkdir ${DIR} ${DIR2}
+}
+
+verbose "$tid: simple copy local file to local file"
+scpclean
+$SCP $scpopts ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "copy failed"
+cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy"
+
+verbose "$tid: simple copy local file to remote file"
+scpclean
+$SCP $scpopts ${DATA} somehost:${COPY} || fail "copy failed"
+cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy"
+
+verbose "$tid: simple copy remote file to local file"
+scpclean
+$SCP $scpopts somehost:${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "copy failed"
+cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy"
+
+verbose "$tid: simple copy local file to remote dir"
+scpclean
+cp ${DATA} ${COPY}
+$SCP $scpopts ${COPY} somehost:${DIR} || fail "copy failed"
+cmp ${COPY} ${DIR}/copy || fail "corrupted copy"
+
+verbose "$tid: simple copy local file to local dir"
+scpclean
+cp ${DATA} ${COPY}
+$SCP $scpopts ${COPY} ${DIR} || fail "copy failed"
+cmp ${COPY} ${DIR}/copy || fail "corrupted copy"
+
+verbose "$tid: simple copy remote file to local dir"
+scpclean
+cp ${DATA} ${COPY}
+$SCP $scpopts somehost:${COPY} ${DIR} || fail "copy failed"
+cmp ${COPY} ${DIR}/copy || fail "corrupted copy"
+
+verbose "$tid: recursive local dir to remote dir"
+scpclean
+rm -rf ${DIR2}
+cp ${DATA} ${DIR}/copy
+$SCP $scpopts -r ${DIR} somehost:${DIR2} || fail "copy failed"
+diff ${DIFFOPT} ${DIR} ${DIR2} || fail "corrupted copy"
+
+verbose "$tid: recursive local dir to local dir"
+scpclean
+rm -rf ${DIR2}
+cp ${DATA} ${DIR}/copy
+$SCP $scpopts -r ${DIR} ${DIR2} || fail "copy failed"
+diff ${DIFFOPT} ${DIR} ${DIR2} || fail "corrupted copy"
+
+verbose "$tid: recursive remote dir to local dir"
+scpclean
+rm -rf ${DIR2}
+cp ${DATA} ${DIR}/copy
+$SCP $scpopts -r somehost:${DIR} ${DIR2} || fail "copy failed"
+diff ${DIFFOPT} ${DIR} ${DIR2} || fail "corrupted copy"
+
+verbose "$tid: shell metacharacters"
+scpclean
+(cd ${DIR} && \
+touch '`touch metachartest`' && \
+$SCP $scpopts *metachar* ${DIR2} 2>/dev/null; \
+[ ! -f metachartest ] ) || fail "shell metacharacters"
+
+if [ ! -z "$SUDO" ]; then
+	verbose "$tid: skipped file after scp -p with failed chown+utimes"
+	scpclean
+	cp -p ${DATA} ${DIR}/copy
+	cp -p ${DATA} ${DIR}/copy2
+	cp ${DATA} ${DIR2}/copy
+	chmod 660 ${DIR2}/copy
+	$SUDO chown root ${DIR2}/copy
+	$SCP -p $scpopts somehost:${DIR}/\* ${DIR2} >/dev/null 2>&1
+	$SUDO diff ${DIFFOPT} ${DIR} ${DIR2} || fail "corrupted copy"
+	$SUDO rm ${DIR2}/copy
+fi
+
+for i in 0 1 2 3 4; do
+	verbose "$tid: disallow bad server #$i"
+	SCPTESTMODE=badserver_$i
+	export DIR SCPTESTMODE
+	scpclean
+	$SCP $scpopts somehost:${DATA} ${DIR} >/dev/null 2>/dev/null
+	[ -d {$DIR}/rootpathdir ] && fail "allows dir relative to root dir"
+	[ -d ${DIR}/dotpathdir ] && fail "allows dir creation in non-recursive mode"
+
+	scpclean
+	$SCP -r $scpopts somehost:${DATA} ${DIR2} >/dev/null 2>/dev/null
+	[ -d ${DIR}/dotpathdir ] && fail "allows dir creation outside of subdir"
+done
+
+verbose "$tid: detect non-directory target"
+scpclean
+echo a > ${COPY}
+echo b > ${COPY2}
+$SCP $scpopts ${DATA} ${COPY} ${COPY2}
+cmp ${COPY} ${COPY2} >/dev/null && fail "corrupt target"
+
+scpclean
+rm -f ${OBJ}/scp-ssh-wrapper.scp
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/setuid-allowed.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/setuid-allowed.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..676d2661c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/setuid-allowed.c
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2013 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* $OpenBSD$ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
+# include <sys/statvfs.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+void
+usage(void)
+{
+	fprintf(stderr, "check-setuid [path]\n");
+	exit(1);
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	const char *path = ".";
+	struct statvfs sb;
+
+	if (argc > 2)
+		usage();
+	else if (argc == 2)
+		path = argv[1];
+
+	if (statvfs(path, &sb) != 0) {
+		/* Don't return an error if the host doesn't support statvfs */
+		if (errno == ENOSYS)
+			return 0;
+		fprintf(stderr, "statvfs for \"%s\" failed: %s\n",
+		     path, strerror(errno));
+	}
+	return (sb.f_flag & ST_NOSUID) ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/sftp-badcmds.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/sftp-badcmds.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7f85c4f22
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/sftp-badcmds.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: sftp-badcmds.sh,v 1.6 2013/05/17 10:26:26 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="sftp invalid commands"
+
+DATA2=/bin/sh${EXEEXT}
+NONEXIST=/NONEXIST.$$
+GLOBFILES=`(cd /bin;echo l*)`
+
+rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2 ${COPY}.dd
+
+rm -f ${COPY}
+verbose "$tid: get nonexistent"
+echo "get $NONEXIST $COPY" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+	|| fail "get nonexistent failed"
+test -f ${COPY} && fail "existing copy after get nonexistent"
+
+rm -f ${COPY}.dd/*
+verbose "$tid: glob get to nonexistent directory"
+echo "get /bin/l* $NONEXIST" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+        || fail "get nonexistent failed"
+for x in $GLOBFILES; do
+        test -f ${COPY}.dd/$x && fail "existing copy after get nonexistent"
+done
+
+rm -f ${COPY}
+verbose "$tid: put nonexistent"
+echo "put $NONEXIST $COPY" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+	|| fail "put nonexistent failed"
+test -f ${COPY} && fail "existing copy after put nonexistent"
+
+rm -f ${COPY}.dd/*
+verbose "$tid: glob put to nonexistent directory"
+echo "put /bin/l* ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+        || fail "put nonexistent failed"
+for x in $GLOBFILES; do
+        test -f ${COPY}.dd/$x && fail "existing copy after nonexistent"
+done
+
+rm -f ${COPY}
+verbose "$tid: rename nonexistent"
+echo "rename $NONEXIST ${COPY}.1" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+	|| fail "rename nonexist failed"
+test -f ${COPY}.1 && fail "file exists after rename nonexistent"
+
+rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY}.dd
+cp $DATA $COPY
+mkdir ${COPY}.dd
+verbose "$tid: rename target exists (directory)"
+echo "rename $COPY ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+	|| fail "rename target exists (directory) failed"
+test -f ${COPY} || fail "oldname missing after rename target exists (directory)"
+test -d ${COPY}.dd || fail "newname missing after rename target exists (directory)"
+cmp $DATA ${COPY} >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "corrupted oldname after rename target exists (directory)"
+
+rm -f ${COPY}.dd/*
+rm -rf ${COPY}
+cp ${DATA2} ${COPY}
+verbose "$tid: glob put files to local file"
+echo "put /bin/l* $COPY" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 
+cmp ${DATA2} ${COPY} || fail "put successed when it should have failed"
+
+rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2 ${COPY}.dd
+
+
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/sftp-batch.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/sftp-batch.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..41011549b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/sftp-batch.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: sftp-batch.sh,v 1.5 2013/05/17 04:29:14 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="sftp batchfile"
+
+BATCH=${OBJ}/sftp.bb
+
+rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2 ${COPY}.dd ${BATCH}.*
+
+cat << EOF > ${BATCH}.pass.1
+	get $DATA $COPY
+	put ${COPY} ${COPY}.1
+	rm ${COPY}
+	-put ${COPY} ${COPY}.2
+EOF
+
+cat << EOF > ${BATCH}.pass.2
+	# This is a comment
+
+	# That was a blank line
+	ls
+EOF
+
+cat << EOF > ${BATCH}.fail.1
+	get $DATA $COPY
+	put ${COPY} ${COPY}.3
+	rm ${COPY}.*
+	# The next command should fail
+	put ${COPY}.3 ${COPY}.4
+EOF
+
+cat << EOF > ${BATCH}.fail.2
+	# The next command should fail
+	jajajajaja
+EOF
+
+verbose "$tid: good commands"
+${SFTP} -b ${BATCH}.pass.1 -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+	|| fail "good commands failed"
+
+verbose "$tid: bad commands"
+${SFTP} -b ${BATCH}.fail.1 -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+	&& fail "bad commands succeeded"
+
+verbose "$tid: comments and blanks"
+${SFTP} -b ${BATCH}.pass.2 -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+	|| fail "comments & blanks failed"
+
+verbose "$tid: junk command"
+${SFTP} -b ${BATCH}.fail.2 -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+	&& fail "junk command succeeded"
+
+rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2 ${COPY}.dd ${BATCH}.*
+
+
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/sftp-chroot.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/sftp-chroot.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..23f7456e8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/sftp-chroot.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: sftp-chroot.sh,v 1.4 2014/01/20 00:00:30 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="sftp in chroot"
+
+CHROOT=/var/run
+FILENAME=testdata_${USER}
+PRIVDATA=${CHROOT}/${FILENAME}
+
+if [ -z "$SUDO" ]; then
+  echo "skipped: need SUDO to create file in /var/run, test won't work without"
+  exit 0
+fi
+
+$SUDO sh -c "echo mekmitastdigoat > $PRIVDATA" || \
+	fatal "create $PRIVDATA failed"
+
+start_sshd -oChrootDirectory=$CHROOT -oForceCommand="internal-sftp -d /"
+
+verbose "test $tid: get"
+${SFTP} -S "$SSH" -F $OBJ/ssh_config host:/${FILENAME} $COPY \
+    >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 || \
+	fatal "Fetch ${FILENAME} failed"
+cmp $PRIVDATA $COPY || fail "$PRIVDATA $COPY differ"
+
+$SUDO rm $PRIVDATA
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/sftp-cmds.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/sftp-cmds.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..aad7fcac2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/sftp-cmds.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,232 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: sftp-cmds.sh,v 1.14 2013/06/21 02:26:26 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+# XXX - TODO: 
+# - chmod / chown / chgrp
+# - -p flag for get & put
+
+tid="sftp commands"
+
+# test that these files are readable!
+for i in `(cd /bin;echo l*)`
+do
+	if [ -r $i ]; then
+		GLOBFILES="$GLOBFILES $i"
+	fi
+done
+
+# Path with embedded quote
+QUOTECOPY=${COPY}".\"blah\""
+QUOTECOPY_ARG=${COPY}'.\"blah\"'
+# File with spaces
+SPACECOPY="${COPY} this has spaces.txt"
+SPACECOPY_ARG="${COPY}\ this\ has\ spaces.txt"
+# File with glob metacharacters
+GLOBMETACOPY="${COPY} [metachar].txt"
+
+rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2 ${COPY}.dd ${COPY}.dd2
+mkdir ${COPY}.dd
+
+verbose "$tid: lls"
+(echo "lcd ${OBJ}" ; echo "lls") | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} 2>&1 | \
+	grep copy.dd >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "lls failed"
+
+verbose "$tid: lls w/path"
+echo "lls ${OBJ}" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} 2>&1 | \
+	grep copy.dd >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "lls w/path failed"
+
+verbose "$tid: ls"
+echo "ls ${OBJ}" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+	|| fail "ls failed"
+# XXX always successful
+
+verbose "$tid: shell"
+echo "!echo hi there" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+	|| fail "shell failed"
+# XXX always successful
+
+verbose "$tid: pwd"
+echo "pwd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+	|| fail "pwd failed"
+# XXX always successful
+
+verbose "$tid: lpwd"
+echo "lpwd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+	|| fail "lpwd failed"
+# XXX always successful
+
+verbose "$tid: quit"
+echo "quit" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+	|| fail "quit failed"
+# XXX always successful
+
+verbose "$tid: help"
+echo "help" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+	|| fail "help failed"
+# XXX always successful
+
+rm -f ${COPY}
+verbose "$tid: get"
+echo "get $DATA $COPY" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+	|| fail "get failed"
+cmp $DATA ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy after get"
+
+rm -f ${COPY}
+verbose "$tid: get quoted"
+echo "get \"$DATA\" $COPY" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+	|| fail "get failed"
+cmp $DATA ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy after get"
+
+if [ "$os" != "cygwin" ]; then
+rm -f ${QUOTECOPY}
+cp $DATA ${QUOTECOPY}
+verbose "$tid: get filename with quotes"
+echo "get \"$QUOTECOPY_ARG\" ${COPY}" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+	|| fail "get failed"
+cmp ${COPY} ${QUOTECOPY} || fail "corrupted copy after get with quotes"
+rm -f ${QUOTECOPY} ${COPY}
+fi
+
+rm -f "$SPACECOPY" ${COPY}
+cp $DATA "$SPACECOPY"
+verbose "$tid: get filename with spaces"
+echo "get ${SPACECOPY_ARG} ${COPY}" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+        || fail "get failed"
+cmp ${COPY} "$SPACECOPY" || fail "corrupted copy after get with spaces"
+
+rm -f "$GLOBMETACOPY" ${COPY}
+cp $DATA "$GLOBMETACOPY"
+verbose "$tid: get filename with glob metacharacters"
+echo "get \"${GLOBMETACOPY}\" ${COPY}" | \
+	${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "get failed"
+cmp ${COPY} "$GLOBMETACOPY" || \
+	fail "corrupted copy after get with glob metacharacters"
+
+rm -f ${COPY}.dd/*
+verbose "$tid: get to directory"
+echo "get $DATA ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+        || fail "get failed"
+cmp $DATA ${COPY}.dd/$DATANAME || fail "corrupted copy after get"
+
+rm -f ${COPY}.dd/*
+verbose "$tid: glob get to directory"
+echo "get /bin/l* ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+        || fail "get failed"
+for x in $GLOBFILES; do
+        cmp /bin/$x ${COPY}.dd/$x || fail "corrupted copy after get"
+done
+
+rm -f ${COPY}.dd/*
+verbose "$tid: get to local dir"
+(echo "lcd ${COPY}.dd"; echo "get $DATA" ) | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+        || fail "get failed"
+cmp $DATA ${COPY}.dd/$DATANAME || fail "corrupted copy after get"
+
+rm -f ${COPY}.dd/*
+verbose "$tid: glob get to local dir"
+(echo "lcd ${COPY}.dd"; echo "get /bin/l*") | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+        || fail "get failed"
+for x in $GLOBFILES; do
+        cmp /bin/$x ${COPY}.dd/$x || fail "corrupted copy after get"
+done
+
+rm -f ${COPY}
+verbose "$tid: put"
+echo "put $DATA $COPY" | \
+	${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "put failed"
+cmp $DATA ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy after put"
+
+if [ "$os" != "cygwin" ]; then
+rm -f ${QUOTECOPY}
+verbose "$tid: put filename with quotes"
+echo "put $DATA \"$QUOTECOPY_ARG\"" | \
+	${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "put failed"
+cmp $DATA ${QUOTECOPY} || fail "corrupted copy after put with quotes"
+fi
+
+rm -f "$SPACECOPY"
+verbose "$tid: put filename with spaces"
+echo "put $DATA ${SPACECOPY_ARG}" | \
+	${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "put failed"
+cmp $DATA "$SPACECOPY" || fail "corrupted copy after put with spaces"
+
+rm -f ${COPY}.dd/*
+verbose "$tid: put to directory"
+echo "put $DATA ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+	|| fail "put failed"
+cmp $DATA ${COPY}.dd/$DATANAME || fail "corrupted copy after put"
+
+rm -f ${COPY}.dd/*
+verbose "$tid: glob put to directory"
+echo "put /bin/l? ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+	|| fail "put failed"
+for x in $GLOBFILES; do
+	cmp /bin/$x ${COPY}.dd/$x || fail "corrupted copy after put"
+done
+
+rm -f ${COPY}.dd/*
+verbose "$tid: put to local dir"
+(echo "cd ${COPY}.dd"; echo "put $DATA") | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+	|| fail "put failed"
+cmp $DATA ${COPY}.dd/$DATANAME || fail "corrupted copy after put"
+
+rm -f ${COPY}.dd/*
+verbose "$tid: glob put to local dir"
+(echo "cd ${COPY}.dd"; echo "put /bin/l?") | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+	|| fail "put failed"
+for x in $GLOBFILES; do
+        cmp /bin/$x ${COPY}.dd/$x || fail "corrupted copy after put"
+done
+
+verbose "$tid: rename"
+echo "rename $COPY ${COPY}.1" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+	|| fail "rename failed"
+test -f ${COPY}.1 || fail "missing file after rename"
+cmp $DATA ${COPY}.1 >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "corrupted copy after rename"
+
+verbose "$tid: rename directory"
+echo "rename ${COPY}.dd ${COPY}.dd2" | \
+	${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
+	fail "rename directory failed"
+test -d ${COPY}.dd && fail "oldname exists after rename directory"
+test -d ${COPY}.dd2 || fail "missing newname after rename directory"
+
+verbose "$tid: ln"
+echo "ln ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "ln failed"
+test -f ${COPY}.2 || fail "missing file after ln"
+cmp ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2 || fail "created file is not equal after ln"
+
+verbose "$tid: ln -s"
+rm -f ${COPY}.2
+echo "ln -s ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "ln -s failed"
+test -h ${COPY}.2 || fail "missing file after ln -s"
+
+verbose "$tid: mkdir"
+echo "mkdir ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+	|| fail "mkdir failed"
+test -d ${COPY}.dd || fail "missing directory after mkdir"
+
+# XXX do more here
+verbose "$tid: chdir"
+echo "chdir ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+	|| fail "chdir failed"
+
+verbose "$tid: rmdir"
+echo "rmdir ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+	|| fail "rmdir failed"
+test -d ${COPY}.1 && fail "present directory after rmdir"
+
+verbose "$tid: lmkdir"
+echo "lmkdir ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+	|| fail "lmkdir failed"
+test -d ${COPY}.dd || fail "missing directory after lmkdir"
+
+# XXX do more here
+verbose "$tid: lchdir"
+echo "lchdir ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+	|| fail "lchdir failed"
+
+rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2 ${COPY}.dd ${COPY}.dd2
+rm -rf ${QUOTECOPY} "$SPACECOPY" "$GLOBMETACOPY"
+
+
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/sftp-glob.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/sftp-glob.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8d4df2c98
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/sftp-glob.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: sftp-glob.sh,v 1.4 2009/08/13 01:11:55 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="sftp glob"
+
+config_defined FILESYSTEM_NO_BACKSLASH && nobs="not supported on this platform"
+
+sftp_ls() {
+	target=$1
+	errtag=$2
+	expected=$3
+	unexpected=$4
+	skip=$5
+	if test "x$skip" != "x" ; then
+		verbose "$tid: $errtag (skipped: $skip)"
+		return
+	fi
+	verbose "$tid: $errtag"
+	printf "ls -l %s" "${target}" | \
+		${SFTP} -b - -D ${SFTPSERVER} 2>/dev/null | \
+		grep -v "^sftp>" > ${RESULTS}
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "$errtag failed"
+	fi
+	if test "x$expected" != "x" ; then
+	    if fgrep "$expected" ${RESULTS} >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
+		:
+	    else
+		fail "$expected missing from $errtag results"
+	    fi
+	fi
+	if test "x$unexpected" != "x" && \
+	   fgrep "$unexpected" ${RESULTS} >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
+		fail "$unexpected present in $errtag results"
+	fi
+	rm -f ${RESULTS}
+}
+
+BASE=${OBJ}/glob
+RESULTS=${OBJ}/results
+DIR=${BASE}/dir
+DATA=${DIR}/file
+
+GLOB1="${DIR}/g-wild*"
+GLOB2="${DIR}/g-wildx"
+QUOTE="${DIR}/g-quote\""
+SLASH="${DIR}/g-sl\\ash"
+ESLASH="${DIR}/g-slash\\"
+QSLASH="${DIR}/g-qs\\\""
+SPACE="${DIR}/g-q space"
+
+rm -rf ${BASE}
+mkdir -p ${DIR}
+touch "${DATA}" "${GLOB1}" "${GLOB2}" "${QUOTE}" "${SPACE}"
+test "x$nobs" = "x" && touch "${QSLASH}" "${ESLASH}" "${SLASH}"
+
+#       target                   message                expected     unexpected
+sftp_ls "${DIR}/fil*"            "file glob"            "${DATA}"    ""
+sftp_ls "${BASE}/d*"             "dir glob"             "`basename ${DATA}`" ""
+sftp_ls "${DIR}/g-wild\"*\""     "quoted glob"          "g-wild*"    "g-wildx"
+sftp_ls "${DIR}/g-wild\*"        "escaped glob"         "g-wild*"    "g-wildx"
+sftp_ls "${DIR}/g-quote\\\""     "escaped quote"        "g-quote\""  ""
+sftp_ls "\"${DIR}/g-quote\\\"\"" "quoted quote"         "g-quote\""  ""
+sftp_ls "'${DIR}/g-quote\"'"     "single-quoted quote"  "g-quote\""  ""
+sftp_ls "${DIR}/g-q\\ space"     "escaped space"        "g-q space"  ""
+sftp_ls "'${DIR}/g-q space'"     "quoted space"         "g-q space"  ""
+sftp_ls "${DIR}/g-sl\\\\ash"     "escaped slash"        "g-sl\\ash"  "" "$nobs"
+sftp_ls "'${DIR}/g-sl\\\\ash'"   "quoted slash"         "g-sl\\ash"  "" "$nobs"
+sftp_ls "${DIR}/g-slash\\\\"     "escaped slash at EOL" "g-slash\\"  "" "$nobs"
+sftp_ls "'${DIR}/g-slash\\\\'"   "quoted slash at EOL"  "g-slash\\"  "" "$nobs"
+sftp_ls "${DIR}/g-qs\\\\\\\""    "escaped slash+quote"  "g-qs\\\""   "" "$nobs"
+sftp_ls "'${DIR}/g-qs\\\\\"'"    "quoted slash+quote"   "g-qs\\\""   "" "$nobs"
+
+rm -rf ${BASE}
+
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/sftp-perm.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/sftp-perm.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..304ca0ac5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/sftp-perm.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,269 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: sftp-perm.sh,v 1.2 2013/10/17 22:00:18 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="sftp permissions"
+
+SERVER_LOG=${OBJ}/sftp-server.log
+CLIENT_LOG=${OBJ}/sftp.log
+TEST_SFTP_SERVER=${OBJ}/sftp-server.sh
+
+prepare_server() {
+	printf "#!/bin/sh\nexec $SFTPSERVER -el debug3 $* 2>$SERVER_LOG\n" \
+	> $TEST_SFTP_SERVER
+	chmod a+x $TEST_SFTP_SERVER
+}
+
+run_client() {
+	echo "$@" | ${SFTP} -D ${TEST_SFTP_SERVER} -vvvb - >$CLIENT_LOG 2>&1
+}
+
+prepare_files() {
+	_prep="$1"
+	rm -f ${COPY} ${COPY}.1
+	test -d ${COPY}.dd && { rmdir ${COPY}.dd || fatal "rmdir ${COPY}.dd"; }
+	test -z "$_prep" && return
+	sh -c "$_prep" || fail "preparation failed: \"$_prep\""
+}
+
+postcondition() {
+	_title="$1"
+	_check="$2"
+	test -z "$_check" && return
+	${TEST_SHELL} -c "$_check" || fail "postcondition check failed: $_title"
+}
+
+ro_test() {
+	_desc=$1
+	_cmd="$2"
+	_prep="$3"
+	_expect_success_post="$4"
+	_expect_fail_post="$5"
+	verbose "$tid: read-only $_desc"
+	# Plain (no options, mostly to test that _cmd is good)
+	prepare_files "$_prep"
+	prepare_server
+	run_client "$_cmd" || fail "plain $_desc failed"
+	postcondition "$_desc no-readonly" "$_expect_success_post"
+	# Read-only enabled
+	prepare_files "$_prep"
+	prepare_server -R
+	run_client "$_cmd" && fail "read-only $_desc succeeded"
+	postcondition "$_desc readonly" "$_expect_fail_post"
+}
+
+perm_test() {
+	_op=$1
+	_whitelist_ops=$2
+	_cmd="$3"
+	_prep="$4"
+	_expect_success_post="$5"
+	_expect_fail_post="$6"
+	verbose "$tid: explicit $_op"
+	# Plain (no options, mostly to test that _cmd is good)
+	prepare_files "$_prep"
+	prepare_server
+	run_client "$_cmd" || fail "plain $_op failed"
+	postcondition "$_op no white/blacklists" "$_expect_success_post"
+	# Whitelist
+	prepare_files "$_prep"
+	prepare_server -p $_op,$_whitelist_ops
+	run_client "$_cmd" || fail "whitelisted $_op failed"
+	postcondition "$_op whitelisted" "$_expect_success_post"
+	# Blacklist
+	prepare_files "$_prep"
+	prepare_server -P $_op
+	run_client "$_cmd" && fail "blacklisted $_op succeeded"
+	postcondition "$_op blacklisted" "$_expect_fail_post"
+	# Whitelist with op missing.
+	prepare_files "$_prep"
+	prepare_server -p $_whitelist_ops
+	run_client "$_cmd" && fail "no whitelist $_op succeeded"
+	postcondition "$_op not in whitelist" "$_expect_fail_post"
+}
+
+ro_test \
+	"upload" \
+	"put $DATA $COPY" \
+	"" \
+	"cmp $DATA $COPY" \
+	"test ! -f $COPY"
+
+ro_test \
+	"setstat" \
+	"chmod 0700 $COPY" \
+	"touch $COPY; chmod 0400 $COPY" \
+	"test -x $COPY" \
+	"test ! -x $COPY"
+
+ro_test \
+	"rm" \
+	"rm $COPY" \
+	"touch $COPY" \
+	"test ! -f $COPY" \
+	"test -f $COPY"
+
+ro_test \
+	"mkdir" \
+	"mkdir ${COPY}.dd" \
+	"" \
+	"test -d ${COPY}.dd" \
+	"test ! -d ${COPY}.dd"
+
+ro_test \
+	"rmdir" \
+	"rmdir ${COPY}.dd" \
+	"mkdir ${COPY}.dd" \
+	"test ! -d ${COPY}.dd" \
+	"test -d ${COPY}.dd"
+
+ro_test \
+	"posix-rename" \
+	"rename $COPY ${COPY}.1" \
+	"touch $COPY" \
+	"test -f ${COPY}.1 -a ! -f $COPY" \
+	"test -f $COPY -a ! -f ${COPY}.1"
+
+ro_test \
+	"oldrename" \
+	"rename -l $COPY ${COPY}.1" \
+	"touch $COPY" \
+	"test -f ${COPY}.1 -a ! -f $COPY" \
+	"test -f $COPY -a ! -f ${COPY}.1"
+
+ro_test \
+	"symlink" \
+	"ln -s $COPY ${COPY}.1" \
+	"touch $COPY" \
+	"test -h ${COPY}.1" \
+	"test ! -h ${COPY}.1"
+
+ro_test \
+	"hardlink" \
+	"ln $COPY ${COPY}.1" \
+	"touch $COPY" \
+	"test -f ${COPY}.1" \
+	"test ! -f ${COPY}.1"
+
+# Test explicit permissions
+
+perm_test \
+	"open" \
+	"realpath,stat,lstat,read,close" \
+	"get $DATA $COPY" \
+	"" \
+	"cmp $DATA $COPY" \
+	"! cmp $DATA $COPY 2>/dev/null"
+
+perm_test \
+	"read" \
+	"realpath,stat,lstat,open,close" \
+	"get $DATA $COPY" \
+	"" \
+	"cmp $DATA $COPY" \
+	"! cmp $DATA $COPY 2>/dev/null"
+
+perm_test \
+	"write" \
+	"realpath,stat,lstat,open,close" \
+	"put $DATA $COPY" \
+	"" \
+	"cmp $DATA $COPY" \
+	"! cmp $DATA $COPY 2>/dev/null"
+
+perm_test \
+	"lstat" \
+	"realpath,stat,open,read,close" \
+	"get $DATA $COPY" \
+	"" \
+	"cmp $DATA $COPY" \
+	"! cmp $DATA $COPY 2>/dev/null"
+
+perm_test \
+	"opendir" \
+	"realpath,readdir,stat,lstat" \
+	"ls -ln $OBJ"
+
+perm_test \
+	"readdir" \
+	"realpath,opendir,stat,lstat" \
+	"ls -ln $OBJ"
+
+perm_test \
+	"setstat" \
+	"realpath,stat,lstat" \
+	"chmod 0700 $COPY" \
+	"touch $COPY; chmod 0400 $COPY" \
+	"test -x $COPY" \
+	"test ! -x $COPY"
+
+perm_test \
+	"remove" \
+	"realpath,stat,lstat" \
+	"rm $COPY" \
+	"touch $COPY" \
+	"test ! -f $COPY" \
+	"test -f $COPY"
+
+perm_test \
+	"mkdir" \
+	"realpath,stat,lstat" \
+	"mkdir ${COPY}.dd" \
+	"" \
+	"test -d ${COPY}.dd" \
+	"test ! -d ${COPY}.dd"
+
+perm_test \
+	"rmdir" \
+	"realpath,stat,lstat" \
+	"rmdir ${COPY}.dd" \
+	"mkdir ${COPY}.dd" \
+	"test ! -d ${COPY}.dd" \
+	"test -d ${COPY}.dd"
+
+perm_test \
+	"posix-rename" \
+	"realpath,stat,lstat" \
+	"rename $COPY ${COPY}.1" \
+	"touch $COPY" \
+	"test -f ${COPY}.1 -a ! -f $COPY" \
+	"test -f $COPY -a ! -f ${COPY}.1"
+
+perm_test \
+	"rename" \
+	"realpath,stat,lstat" \
+	"rename -l $COPY ${COPY}.1" \
+	"touch $COPY" \
+	"test -f ${COPY}.1 -a ! -f $COPY" \
+	"test -f $COPY -a ! -f ${COPY}.1"
+
+perm_test \
+	"symlink" \
+	"realpath,stat,lstat" \
+	"ln -s $COPY ${COPY}.1" \
+	"touch $COPY" \
+	"test -h ${COPY}.1" \
+	"test ! -h ${COPY}.1"
+
+perm_test \
+	"hardlink" \
+	"realpath,stat,lstat" \
+	"ln $COPY ${COPY}.1" \
+	"touch $COPY" \
+	"test -f ${COPY}.1" \
+	"test ! -f ${COPY}.1"
+
+perm_test \
+	"statvfs" \
+	"realpath,stat,lstat" \
+	"df /"
+
+# XXX need good tests for:
+# fstat
+# fsetstat
+# realpath
+# stat
+# readlink
+# fstatvfs
+
+rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.dd
+
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/sftp.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/sftp.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b8e9f7527
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/sftp.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: sftp.sh,v 1.5 2013/05/17 10:28:11 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="basic sftp put/get"
+
+SFTPCMDFILE=${OBJ}/batch
+cat >$SFTPCMDFILE <<EOF
+version
+get $DATA ${COPY}.1
+put $DATA ${COPY}.2
+EOF
+
+BUFFERSIZE="5 1000 32000 64000"
+REQUESTS="1 2 10"
+
+for B in ${BUFFERSIZE}; do
+	for R in ${REQUESTS}; do
+                verbose "test $tid: buffer_size $B num_requests $R"
+		rm -f ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2
+		${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} -B $B -R $R -b $SFTPCMDFILE \
+		> /dev/null 2>&1
+		r=$?
+		if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+			fail "sftp failed with $r"
+		else 
+			cmp $DATA ${COPY}.1 || fail "corrupted copy after get"
+			cmp $DATA ${COPY}.2 || fail "corrupted copy after put"
+		fi
+	done
+done
+rm -f ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2                
+rm -f $SFTPCMDFILE
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/ssh-com-client.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/ssh-com-client.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e4f80cf0a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/ssh-com-client.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: ssh-com-client.sh,v 1.7 2013/05/17 04:29:14 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="connect with ssh.com client"
+
+#TEST_COMBASE=/path/to/ssh/com/binaries
+if [ "X${TEST_COMBASE}" = "X" ]; then
+	fatal '$TEST_COMBASE is not set'
+fi
+
+VERSIONS="
+	2.1.0
+	2.2.0
+	2.3.0
+	2.3.1
+	2.4.0
+	3.0.0
+	3.1.0
+	3.2.0
+	3.2.2
+	3.2.3
+	3.2.5
+	3.2.9
+	3.2.9.1
+	3.3.0"
+
+# 2.0.10 2.0.12 2.0.13 don't like the test setup
+
+# setup authorized keys
+SRC=`dirname ${SCRIPT}`
+cp ${SRC}/dsa_ssh2.prv ${OBJ}/id.com
+chmod 600 ${OBJ}/id.com
+${SSHKEYGEN} -i -f ${OBJ}/id.com	> $OBJ/id.openssh
+chmod 600 ${OBJ}/id.openssh
+${SSHKEYGEN} -y -f ${OBJ}/id.openssh	> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+${SSHKEYGEN} -e -f ${OBJ}/id.openssh	> $OBJ/id.com.pub
+echo IdKey ${OBJ}/id.com > ${OBJ}/id.list
+
+# we need a DSA host key
+t=dsa
+rm -f                             ${OBJ}/$t ${OBJ}/$t.pub
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $t -f	  ${OBJ}/$t
+$SUDO cp $OBJ/$t $OBJ/host.$t
+echo HostKey $OBJ/host.$t >> $OBJ/sshd_config
+
+# add hostkeys to known hosts
+mkdir -p ${OBJ}/${USER}/hostkeys
+HK=${OBJ}/${USER}/hostkeys/key_${PORT}_127.0.0.1
+${SSHKEYGEN} -e -f ${OBJ}/rsa.pub > ${HK}.ssh-rsa.pub
+${SSHKEYGEN} -e -f ${OBJ}/dsa.pub > ${HK}.ssh-dss.pub
+
+cat > ${OBJ}/ssh2_config << EOF
+*:
+	QuietMode			yes
+	StrictHostKeyChecking		yes
+	Port				${PORT}
+	User				${USER}
+	Host				127.0.0.1
+	IdentityFile			${OBJ}/id.list
+	RandomSeedFile			${OBJ}/random_seed
+        UserConfigDirectory             ${OBJ}/%U
+	AuthenticationSuccessMsg	no
+	BatchMode			yes
+	ForwardX11			no
+EOF
+
+# we need a real server (no ProxyConnect option)
+start_sshd
+
+# go for it
+for v in ${VERSIONS}; do
+	ssh2=${TEST_COMBASE}/${v}/ssh2
+	if [ ! -x ${ssh2} ]; then
+		continue
+	fi
+	verbose "ssh2 ${v}"
+	key=ssh-dss
+	skipcat=0
+        case $v in
+        2.1.*|2.3.0)
+                skipcat=1
+                ;;
+        3.0.*)
+                key=ssh-rsa
+                ;;
+        esac
+	cp ${HK}.$key.pub ${HK}.pub
+
+	# check exit status
+	${ssh2} -q -F ${OBJ}/ssh2_config somehost exit 42
+	r=$?
+        if [ $r -ne 42 ]; then
+                fail "ssh2 ${v} exit code test failed (got $r, expected 42)"
+        fi
+
+	# data transfer
+	rm -f ${COPY}
+	${ssh2} -F ${OBJ}/ssh2_config somehost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY}
+        if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+                fail "ssh2 ${v} cat test (receive) failed"
+        fi
+	cmp ${DATA} ${COPY}	|| fail "ssh2 ${v} cat test (receive) data mismatch"
+
+	# data transfer, again
+	if [ $skipcat -eq 0 ]; then
+		rm -f ${COPY}
+		cat ${DATA} | \
+			${ssh2} -F ${OBJ}/ssh2_config host "cat > ${COPY}"
+		if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh2 ${v} cat test (send) failed"
+		fi
+		cmp ${DATA} ${COPY}	|| \
+			fail "ssh2 ${v} cat test (send) data mismatch"
+	fi
+
+	# no stderr after eof
+	rm -f ${COPY}
+	${ssh2} -F ${OBJ}/ssh2_config somehost \
+		exec sh -c \'"exec > /dev/null; sleep 1; echo bla 1>&2; exit 0"\' \
+		2> /dev/null
+        if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+                fail "ssh2 ${v} stderr test failed"
+        fi
+done
+
+rm -rf ${OBJ}/${USER}
+for i in ssh2_config random_seed dsa.pub dsa host.dsa \
+    id.list id.com id.com.pub id.openssh; do
+	rm -f ${OBJ}/$i
+done
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/ssh-com-keygen.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/ssh-com-keygen.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..29b02d946
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/ssh-com-keygen.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: ssh-com-keygen.sh,v 1.4 2004/02/24 17:06:52 markus Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="ssh.com key import"
+
+#TEST_COMBASE=/path/to/ssh/com/binaries
+if [ "X${TEST_COMBASE}" = "X" ]; then
+	fatal '$TEST_COMBASE is not set'
+fi
+
+VERSIONS="
+	2.0.10
+	2.0.12
+	2.0.13
+	2.1.0
+	2.2.0
+	2.3.0
+	2.3.1
+	2.4.0
+	3.0.0
+	3.1.0
+	3.2.0
+	3.2.2
+	3.2.3
+	3.2.5
+	3.2.9
+	3.2.9.1
+	3.3.0"
+
+COMPRV=${OBJ}/comkey
+COMPUB=${COMPRV}.pub
+OPENSSHPRV=${OBJ}/opensshkey
+OPENSSHPUB=${OPENSSHPRV}.pub
+
+# go for it
+for v in ${VERSIONS}; do
+	keygen=${TEST_COMBASE}/${v}/ssh-keygen2
+	if [ ! -x ${keygen} ]; then
+		continue
+	fi
+	types="dss"
+        case $v in
+        2.3.1|3.*)
+                types="$types rsa"
+                ;;
+        esac
+	for t in $types; do
+		verbose "ssh-keygen $v/$t"
+		rm -f $COMPRV $COMPUB $OPENSSHPRV $OPENSSHPUB
+		${keygen} -q -P -t $t ${COMPRV} > /dev/null 2>&1
+		if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+			fail "${keygen} -t $t failed"
+			continue
+		fi
+		${SSHKEYGEN} -if ${COMPUB} > ${OPENSSHPUB}
+		if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+			fail "import public key ($v/$t) failed"
+			continue
+		fi
+		${SSHKEYGEN} -if ${COMPRV} > ${OPENSSHPRV}
+		if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+			fail "import private key ($v/$t) failed"
+			continue
+		fi
+		chmod 600 ${OPENSSHPRV}
+		${SSHKEYGEN} -yf ${OPENSSHPRV} |\
+			diff - ${OPENSSHPUB}
+		if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+			fail "public keys ($v/$t) differ"
+		fi
+	done
+done
+
+rm -f $COMPRV $COMPUB $OPENSSHPRV $OPENSSHPUB
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/ssh-com-sftp.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/ssh-com-sftp.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..fabfa4983
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/ssh-com-sftp.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: ssh-com-sftp.sh,v 1.7 2013/05/17 04:29:14 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="basic sftp put/get with ssh.com server"
+
+SFTPCMDFILE=${OBJ}/batch
+
+cat >$SFTPCMDFILE <<EOF
+version
+get $DATA ${COPY}.1
+put $DATA ${COPY}.2
+EOF
+
+BUFFERSIZE="5 1000 32000 64000"
+REQUESTS="1 2 10"
+
+#TEST_COMBASE=/path/to/ssh/com/binaries
+if [ "X${TEST_COMBASE}" = "X" ]; then
+	fatal '$TEST_COMBASE is not set'
+fi
+
+VERSIONS="
+	2.0.10
+	2.0.12
+	2.0.13
+	2.1.0
+	2.2.0
+	2.3.0
+	2.3.1
+	2.4.0
+	3.0.0
+	3.1.0
+	3.2.0
+	3.2.2
+	3.2.3
+	3.2.5
+	3.2.9
+	3.2.9.1
+	3.3.0"
+
+# go for it
+for v in ${VERSIONS}; do
+	server=${TEST_COMBASE}/${v}/sftp-server2
+	if [ ! -x ${server} ]; then
+		continue
+	fi
+	verbose "sftp-server $v"
+	for B in ${BUFFERSIZE}; do
+		for R in ${REQUESTS}; do
+			verbose "test $tid: buffer_size $B num_requests $R"
+			rm -f ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2
+			${SFTP} -D ${server} -B $B -R $R -b $SFTPCMDFILE \
+			> /dev/null 2>&1
+			r=$?
+			if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+				fail "sftp failed with $r"
+			else                                
+				cmp $DATA ${COPY}.1 || fail "corrupted copy after get"
+				cmp $DATA ${COPY}.2 || fail "corrupted copy after put"
+			fi
+		done
+	done
+done
+rm -f ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2                
+rm -f $SFTPCMDFILE
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/ssh-com.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/ssh-com.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4371d5279
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/ssh-com.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: ssh-com.sh,v 1.9 2015/05/08 07:29:00 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="connect to ssh.com server"
+
+#TEST_COMBASE=/path/to/ssh/com/binaries
+if [ "X${TEST_COMBASE}" = "X" ]; then
+	fatal '$TEST_COMBASE is not set'
+fi
+
+VERSIONS="
+	2.0.12
+	2.0.13
+	2.1.0
+	2.2.0
+	2.3.0
+	2.4.0
+	3.0.0
+	3.1.0
+	3.2.0
+	3.2.2
+	3.2.3
+	3.2.5
+	3.2.9
+	3.2.9.1
+	3.3.0"
+# 2.0.10 does not support UserConfigDirectory
+# 2.3.1 requires a config in $HOME/.ssh2
+
+SRC=`dirname ${SCRIPT}`
+
+# ssh.com
+cat << EOF > $OBJ/sshd2_config
+#*:
+	# Port and ListenAddress are not used.
+	QuietMode			yes
+	Port				4343
+	ListenAddress			127.0.0.1
+	UserConfigDirectory		${OBJ}/%U
+	Ciphers				AnyCipher
+	PubKeyAuthentication		yes
+	#AllowedAuthentications		publickey
+	AuthorizationFile		authorization
+	HostKeyFile			${SRC}/dsa_ssh2.prv
+	PublicHostKeyFile		${SRC}/dsa_ssh2.pub
+	RandomSeedFile			${OBJ}/random_seed
+	MaxConnections			0
+	PermitRootLogin			yes
+	VerboseMode			no
+	CheckMail			no
+	Ssh1Compatibility		no
+EOF
+
+# create client config
+sed "s/HostKeyAlias.*/HostKeyAlias ssh2-localhost-with-alias/" \
+	< $OBJ/ssh_config > $OBJ/ssh_config_com
+
+# we need a DSA key for
+rm -f                             ${OBJ}/dsa ${OBJ}/dsa.pub
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t dsa -f	  ${OBJ}/dsa
+
+# setup userdir, try rsa first
+mkdir -p ${OBJ}/${USER}
+cp /dev/null ${OBJ}/${USER}/authorization
+for t in rsa dsa; do
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -e -f ${OBJ}/$t.pub	>  ${OBJ}/${USER}/$t.com
+	echo Key $t.com			>> ${OBJ}/${USER}/authorization
+	echo IdentityFile ${OBJ}/$t	>> ${OBJ}/ssh_config_com
+done
+
+# convert and append DSA hostkey
+(
+	printf 'ssh2-localhost-with-alias,127.0.0.1,::1 '
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -if ${SRC}/dsa_ssh2.pub
+) >> $OBJ/known_hosts
+
+# go for it
+for v in ${VERSIONS}; do
+	sshd2=${TEST_COMBASE}/${v}/sshd2
+	if [ ! -x ${sshd2} ]; then
+		continue
+	fi
+	trace "sshd2 ${v}"
+	PROXY="proxycommand ${sshd2} -qif ${OBJ}/sshd2_config 2> /dev/null"
+	${SSH} -qF ${OBJ}/ssh_config_com -o "${PROXY}" dummy exit 0
+        if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+                fail "ssh connect to sshd2 ${v} failed"
+        fi
+
+	ciphers="3des-cbc blowfish-cbc arcfour"
+	macs="hmac-md5"
+	case $v in
+	2.4.*)
+		ciphers="$ciphers cast128-cbc"
+		macs="$macs hmac-sha1 hmac-sha1-96 hmac-md5-96"
+		;;
+	3.*)
+		ciphers="$ciphers aes128-cbc cast128-cbc"
+		macs="$macs hmac-sha1 hmac-sha1-96 hmac-md5-96"
+		;;
+	esac
+	#ciphers="3des-cbc"
+	for m in $macs; do
+	for c in $ciphers; do
+		trace "sshd2 ${v} cipher $c mac $m"
+		verbose "test ${tid}: sshd2 ${v} cipher $c mac $m"
+		${SSH} -c $c -m $m -qF ${OBJ}/ssh_config_com -o "${PROXY}" dummy exit 0
+		if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh connect to sshd2 ${v} with $c/$m failed"
+		fi
+	done
+	done
+done
+
+rm -rf ${OBJ}/${USER}
+for i in sshd_config_proxy ssh_config_proxy random_seed \
+	sshd2_config dsa.pub dsa ssh_config_com; do
+	rm -f ${OBJ}/$i
+done
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/ssh2putty.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/ssh2putty.sh
new file mode 100755
index 000000000..bcf83afe9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/ssh2putty.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+#	$OpenBSD: ssh2putty.sh,v 1.3 2015/05/08 07:26:13 djm Exp $
+
+if test "x$1" = "x" -o "x$2" = "x" -o "x$3" = "x" ; then
+	echo "Usage: ssh2putty hostname port ssh-private-key"
+	exit 1
+fi
+
+HOST=$1
+PORT=$2
+KEYFILE=$3
+
+# XXX - support DSA keys too
+if grep "BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY" $KEYFILE >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
+	:
+else
+	echo "Unsupported private key format"
+	exit 1
+fi
+
+public_exponent=`
+	openssl rsa -noout -text -in $KEYFILE | grep ^publicExponent |
+	sed 's/.*(//;s/).*//'
+`
+test $? -ne 0 && exit 1
+
+modulus=`
+	openssl rsa -noout -modulus -in $KEYFILE | grep ^Modulus= |
+	sed 's/^Modulus=/0x/' | tr A-Z a-z
+`
+test $? -ne 0 && exit 1
+
+echo "rsa2@$PORT:$HOST $public_exponent,$modulus"
+
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/sshd-log-wrapper.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/sshd-log-wrapper.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c00934c78
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/sshd-log-wrapper.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+#       $OpenBSD: sshd-log-wrapper.sh,v 1.3 2013/04/07 02:16:03 dtucker Exp $
+#       Placed in the Public Domain.
+#
+# simple wrapper for sshd proxy mode to catch stderr output
+# sh sshd-log-wrapper.sh /path/to/logfile /path/to/sshd [args...]
+
+log=$1
+shift
+
+exec "$@" -E$log
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/stderr-after-eof.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/stderr-after-eof.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..218ac6b68
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/stderr-after-eof.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: stderr-after-eof.sh,v 1.2 2013/05/17 04:29:14 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="stderr data after eof"
+
+# setup data
+rm -f ${DATA} ${COPY}
+cp /dev/null ${DATA}
+for i in 1 2 3 4 5 6; do
+	(date;echo $i) | md5 >> ${DATA}
+done
+
+${SSH} -2 -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy otherhost \
+	exec sh -c \'"exec > /dev/null; sleep 2; cat ${DATA} 1>&2 $s"\' \
+	2> ${COPY}
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "ssh failed with exit code $r"
+fi
+egrep 'Disconnecting: Received extended_data after EOF' ${COPY} &&
+	fail "ext data received after eof"
+cmp ${DATA} ${COPY}	|| fail "stderr corrupt"
+
+rm -f ${DATA} ${COPY}
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/stderr-data.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/stderr-data.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8c8149a73
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/stderr-data.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: stderr-data.sh,v 1.4 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="stderr data transfer"
+
+for n in '' -n; do
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+	verbose "test $tid: proto $p ($n)"
+	${SSH} $n -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy otherhost \
+		exec sh -c \'"exec > /dev/null; sleep 3; cat ${DATA} 1>&2 $s"\' \
+		2> ${COPY}
+	r=$?
+	if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh failed with exit code $r"
+	fi
+	cmp ${DATA} ${COPY}	|| fail "stderr corrupt"
+	rm -f ${COPY}
+
+	${SSH} $n -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy otherhost \
+		exec sh -c \'"echo a; exec > /dev/null; sleep 3; cat ${DATA} 1>&2 $s"\' \
+		> /dev/null 2> ${COPY}
+	r=$?
+	if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh failed with exit code $r"
+	fi
+	cmp ${DATA} ${COPY}	|| fail "stderr corrupt"
+	rm -f ${COPY}
+done
+done
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/t11.ok b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/t11.ok
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1925bb470
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/t11.ok
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+SHA256:4w1rnrek3klTJOTVhwuCIFd5k+pq9Bfo5KTxxb8BqbY
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/t4.ok b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/t4.ok
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4631ea8c7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/t4.ok
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+MD5:3b:dd:44:e9:49:18:84:95:f1:e7:33:6b:9d:93:b1:36
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/t5.ok b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/t5.ok
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..bd622f300
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/t5.ok
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+xokes-lylis-byleh-zebib-kalus-bihas-tevah-haroz-suhar-foved-noxex
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/test-exec.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/test-exec.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..114e129f2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/test-exec.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,564 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: test-exec.sh,v 1.51 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+#SUDO=sudo
+
+# Unbreak GNU head(1)
+_POSIX2_VERSION=199209
+export _POSIX2_VERSION
+
+case `uname -s 2>/dev/null` in
+OSF1*)
+	BIN_SH=xpg4
+	export BIN_SH
+	;;
+CYGWIN_NT-5.0)
+	os=cygwin
+	TEST_SSH_IPV6=no
+	;;
+CYGWIN*)
+	os=cygwin
+	;;
+esac
+
+if [ ! -z "$TEST_SSH_PORT" ]; then
+	PORT="$TEST_SSH_PORT"
+else
+	PORT=4242
+fi
+
+if [ -x /usr/ucb/whoami ]; then
+	USER=`/usr/ucb/whoami`
+elif whoami >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+	USER=`whoami`
+elif logname >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+	USER=`logname`
+else
+	USER=`id -un`
+fi
+
+OBJ=$1
+if [ "x$OBJ" = "x" ]; then
+	echo '$OBJ not defined'
+	exit 2
+fi
+if [ ! -d $OBJ ]; then
+	echo "not a directory: $OBJ"
+	exit 2
+fi
+SCRIPT=$2
+if [ "x$SCRIPT" = "x" ]; then
+	echo '$SCRIPT not defined'
+	exit 2
+fi
+if [ ! -f $SCRIPT ]; then
+	echo "not a file: $SCRIPT"
+	exit 2
+fi
+if $TEST_SHELL -n $SCRIPT; then
+	true
+else
+	echo "syntax error in $SCRIPT"
+	exit 2
+fi
+unset SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+
+SRC=`dirname ${SCRIPT}`
+
+# defaults
+SSH=ssh
+SSHD=sshd
+SSHAGENT=ssh-agent
+SSHADD=ssh-add
+SSHKEYGEN=ssh-keygen
+SSHKEYSCAN=ssh-keyscan
+SFTP=sftp
+SFTPSERVER=/usr/libexec/openssh/sftp-server
+SCP=scp
+
+# Interop testing
+PLINK=plink
+PUTTYGEN=puttygen
+CONCH=conch
+
+if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSH" != "x" ]; then
+	SSH="${TEST_SSH_SSH}"
+fi
+if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHD" != "x" ]; then
+	SSHD="${TEST_SSH_SSHD}"
+fi
+if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT" != "x" ]; then
+	SSHAGENT="${TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT}"
+fi
+if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHADD" != "x" ]; then
+	SSHADD="${TEST_SSH_SSHADD}"
+fi
+if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN" != "x" ]; then
+	SSHKEYGEN="${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN}"
+fi
+if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHKEYSCAN" != "x" ]; then
+	SSHKEYSCAN="${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYSCAN}"
+fi
+if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SFTP" != "x" ]; then
+	SFTP="${TEST_SSH_SFTP}"
+fi
+if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER" != "x" ]; then
+	SFTPSERVER="${TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER}"
+fi
+if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SCP" != "x" ]; then
+	SCP="${TEST_SSH_SCP}"
+fi
+if [ "x$TEST_SSH_PLINK" != "x" ]; then
+	# Find real binary, if it exists
+	case "${TEST_SSH_PLINK}" in
+	/*) PLINK="${TEST_SSH_PLINK}" ;;
+	*) PLINK=`which ${TEST_SSH_PLINK} 2>/dev/null` ;;
+	esac
+fi
+if [ "x$TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN" != "x" ]; then
+	# Find real binary, if it exists
+	case "${TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN}" in
+	/*) PUTTYGEN="${TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN}" ;;
+	*) PUTTYGEN=`which ${TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN} 2>/dev/null` ;;
+	esac
+fi
+if [ "x$TEST_SSH_CONCH" != "x" ]; then
+	# Find real binary, if it exists
+	case "${TEST_SSH_CONCH}" in
+	/*) CONCH="${TEST_SSH_CONCH}" ;;
+	*) CONCH=`which ${TEST_SSH_CONCH} 2>/dev/null` ;;
+	esac
+fi
+
+SSH_PROTOCOLS=`$SSH -Q protocol-version`
+if [ "x$TEST_SSH_PROTOCOLS" != "x" ]; then
+	SSH_PROTOCOLS="${TEST_SSH_PROTOCOLS}"
+fi
+
+# Path to sshd must be absolute for rexec
+case "$SSHD" in
+/*) ;;
+*) SSHD=`which $SSHD` ;;
+esac
+
+case "$SSHAGENT" in
+/*) ;;
+*) SSHAGENT=`which $SSHAGENT` ;;
+esac
+
+# Record the actual binaries used.
+SSH_BIN=${SSH}
+SSHD_BIN=${SSHD}
+SSHAGENT_BIN=${SSHAGENT}
+SSHADD_BIN=${SSHADD}
+SSHKEYGEN_BIN=${SSHKEYGEN}
+SSHKEYSCAN_BIN=${SSHKEYSCAN}
+SFTP_BIN=${SFTP}
+SFTPSERVER_BIN=${SFTPSERVER}
+SCP_BIN=${SCP}
+
+if [ "x$USE_VALGRIND" != "x" ]; then
+	mkdir -p $OBJ/valgrind-out
+	VG_TEST=`basename $SCRIPT .sh`
+
+	# Some tests are difficult to fix.
+	case "$VG_TEST" in
+	connect-privsep|reexec)
+		VG_SKIP=1 ;;
+	esac
+
+	if [ x"$VG_SKIP" = "x" ]; then
+		VG_IGNORE="/bin/*,/sbin/*,/usr/*,/var/*"
+		VG_LOG="$OBJ/valgrind-out/${VG_TEST}."
+		VG_OPTS="--track-origins=yes --leak-check=full"
+		VG_OPTS="$VG_OPTS --trace-children=yes"
+		VG_OPTS="$VG_OPTS --trace-children-skip=${VG_IGNORE}"
+		VG_PATH="valgrind"
+		if [ "x$VALGRIND_PATH" != "x" ]; then
+			VG_PATH="$VALGRIND_PATH"
+		fi
+		VG="$VG_PATH $VG_OPTS"
+		SSH="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}ssh.%p $SSH"
+		SSHD="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}sshd.%p $SSHD"
+		SSHAGENT="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}ssh-agent.%p $SSHAGENT"
+		SSHADD="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}ssh-add.%p $SSHADD"
+		SSHKEYGEN="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}ssh-keygen.%p $SSHKEYGEN"
+		SSHKEYSCAN="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}ssh-keyscan.%p $SSHKEYSCAN"
+		SFTP="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}sftp.%p ${SFTP}"
+		SCP="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}scp.%p $SCP"
+		cat > $OBJ/valgrind-sftp-server.sh << EOF
+#!/bin/sh
+exec $VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}sftp-server.%p $SFTPSERVER "\$@"
+EOF
+		chmod a+rx $OBJ/valgrind-sftp-server.sh
+		SFTPSERVER="$OBJ/valgrind-sftp-server.sh"
+	fi
+fi
+
+# Logfiles.
+# SSH_LOGFILE should be the debug output of ssh(1) only
+# SSHD_LOGFILE should be the debug output of sshd(8) only
+# REGRESS_LOGFILE is the output of the test itself stdout and stderr
+if [ "x$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE" = "x" ]; then
+	TEST_SSH_LOGFILE=$OBJ/ssh.log
+fi
+if [ "x$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE" = "x" ]; then
+	TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE=$OBJ/sshd.log
+fi
+if [ "x$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE" = "x" ]; then
+	TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE=$OBJ/regress.log
+fi
+
+# truncate logfiles
+>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE
+>$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE
+>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE
+
+# Create wrapper ssh with logging.  We can't just specify "SSH=ssh -E..."
+# because sftp and scp don't handle spaces in arguments.
+SSHLOGWRAP=$OBJ/ssh-log-wrapper.sh
+echo "#!/bin/sh" > $SSHLOGWRAP
+echo "exec ${SSH} -E${TEST_SSH_LOGFILE} "'"$@"' >>$SSHLOGWRAP
+
+chmod a+rx $OBJ/ssh-log-wrapper.sh
+SSH="$SSHLOGWRAP"
+
+# Some test data.  We make a copy because some tests will overwrite it.
+# The tests may assume that $DATA exists and is writable and $COPY does
+# not exist.  Tests requiring larger data files can call increase_datafile_size
+# [kbytes] to ensure the file is at least that large.
+DATANAME=data
+DATA=$OBJ/${DATANAME}
+cat ${SSHAGENT_BIN} >${DATA}
+chmod u+w ${DATA}
+COPY=$OBJ/copy
+rm -f ${COPY}
+
+increase_datafile_size()
+{
+	while [ `du -k ${DATA} | cut -f1` -lt $1 ]; do
+		cat ${SSHAGENT_BIN} >>${DATA}
+	done
+}
+
+# these should be used in tests
+export SSH SSHD SSHAGENT SSHADD SSHKEYGEN SSHKEYSCAN SFTP SFTPSERVER SCP
+#echo $SSH $SSHD $SSHAGENT $SSHADD $SSHKEYGEN $SSHKEYSCAN $SFTP $SFTPSERVER $SCP
+
+# Portable specific functions
+have_prog()
+{
+	saved_IFS="$IFS"
+	IFS=":"
+	for i in $PATH
+	do
+		if [ -x $i/$1 ]; then
+			IFS="$saved_IFS"
+			return 0
+		fi
+	done
+	IFS="$saved_IFS"
+	return 1
+}
+
+jot() {
+	awk "BEGIN { for (i = $2; i < $2 + $1; i++) { printf \"%d\n\", i } exit }"
+}
+
+# Check whether preprocessor symbols are defined in config.h.
+config_defined ()
+{
+	str=$1
+	while test "x$2" != "x" ; do
+		str="$str|$2"
+		shift
+	done
+	egrep "^#define.*($str)" ${BUILDDIR}/config.h >/dev/null 2>&1
+}
+
+md5 () {
+	if have_prog md5sum; then
+		md5sum
+	elif have_prog openssl; then
+		openssl md5
+	elif have_prog cksum; then
+		cksum
+	elif have_prog sum; then
+		sum
+	else
+		wc -c
+	fi
+}
+# End of portable specific functions
+
+# helper
+cleanup ()
+{
+	if [ "x$SSH_PID" != "x" ]; then
+		if [ $SSH_PID -lt 2 ]; then
+			echo bad pid for ssh: $SSH_PID
+		else
+			kill $SSH_PID
+		fi
+	fi
+	if [ -f $PIDFILE ]; then
+		pid=`$SUDO cat $PIDFILE`
+		if [ "X$pid" = "X" ]; then
+			echo no sshd running
+		else
+			if [ $pid -lt 2 ]; then
+				echo bad pid for sshd: $pid
+			else
+				$SUDO kill $pid
+				trace "wait for sshd to exit"
+				i=0;
+				while [ -f $PIDFILE -a $i -lt 5 ]; do
+					i=`expr $i + 1`
+					sleep $i
+				done
+				test -f $PIDFILE && \
+				    fatal "sshd didn't exit port $PORT pid $pid"
+			fi
+		fi
+	fi
+}
+
+start_debug_log ()
+{
+	echo "trace: $@" >$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE
+	echo "trace: $@" >$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE
+	echo "trace: $@" >$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE
+}
+
+save_debug_log ()
+{
+	echo $@ >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE
+	echo $@ >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE
+	echo $@ >>$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE
+	(cat $TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE; echo) >>$OBJ/failed-regress.log
+	(cat $TEST_SSH_LOGFILE; echo) >>$OBJ/failed-ssh.log
+	(cat $TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE; echo) >>$OBJ/failed-sshd.log
+}
+
+trace ()
+{
+	start_debug_log $@
+	if [ "X$TEST_SSH_TRACE" = "Xyes" ]; then
+		echo "$@"
+	fi
+}
+
+verbose ()
+{
+	start_debug_log $@
+	if [ "X$TEST_SSH_QUIET" != "Xyes" ]; then
+		echo "$@"
+	fi
+}
+
+warn ()
+{
+	echo "WARNING: $@" >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE
+	echo "WARNING: $@"
+}
+
+fail ()
+{
+	save_debug_log "FAIL: $@"
+	RESULT=1
+	echo "$@"
+
+}
+
+fatal ()
+{
+	save_debug_log "FATAL: $@"
+	printf "FATAL: "
+	fail "$@"
+	cleanup
+	exit $RESULT
+}
+
+ssh_version ()
+{
+	echo ${SSH_PROTOCOLS} | grep "$1" >/dev/null
+}
+
+RESULT=0
+PIDFILE=$OBJ/pidfile
+
+trap fatal 3 2
+
+if ssh_version 1; then
+	PROTO="2,1"
+else
+	PROTO="2"
+fi
+
+# create server config
+cat << EOF > $OBJ/sshd_config
+	StrictModes		no
+	Port			$PORT
+	Protocol		$PROTO
+	AddressFamily		inet
+	ListenAddress		127.0.0.1
+	#ListenAddress		::1
+	PidFile			$PIDFILE
+	AuthorizedKeysFile	$OBJ/authorized_keys_%u
+	LogLevel		DEBUG3
+	AcceptEnv		_XXX_TEST_*
+	AcceptEnv		_XXX_TEST
+	Subsystem	sftp	$SFTPSERVER
+EOF
+
+if [ ! -z "$TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOPTS" ]; then
+	trace "adding sshd_config option $TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOPTS"
+	echo "$TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOPTS" >> $OBJ/sshd_config
+fi
+
+# server config for proxy connects
+cp $OBJ/sshd_config $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+# allow group-writable directories in proxy-mode
+echo 'StrictModes no' >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+# create client config
+cat << EOF > $OBJ/ssh_config
+Host *
+	Protocol		$PROTO
+	Hostname		127.0.0.1
+	HostKeyAlias		localhost-with-alias
+	Port			$PORT
+	User			$USER
+	GlobalKnownHostsFile	$OBJ/known_hosts
+	UserKnownHostsFile	$OBJ/known_hosts
+	RSAAuthentication	yes
+	PubkeyAuthentication	yes
+	ChallengeResponseAuthentication	no
+	HostbasedAuthentication	no
+	PasswordAuthentication	no
+	RhostsRSAAuthentication	no
+	BatchMode		yes
+	StrictHostKeyChecking	yes
+	LogLevel		DEBUG3
+EOF
+
+if [ ! -z "$TEST_SSH_SSH_CONFOPTS" ]; then
+	trace "adding ssh_config option $TEST_SSH_SSH_CONFOPTS"
+	echo "$TEST_SSH_SSH_CONFOPTS" >> $OBJ/ssh_config
+fi
+
+rm -f $OBJ/known_hosts $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+
+if ssh_version 1; then
+	SSH_KEYTYPES="rsa rsa1"
+else
+	SSH_KEYTYPES="rsa ed25519"
+fi
+trace "generate keys"
+for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do
+	# generate user key
+	if [ ! -f $OBJ/$t ] || [ ${SSHKEYGEN_BIN} -nt $OBJ/$t ]; then
+		rm -f $OBJ/$t
+		${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $t  -f $OBJ/$t ||\
+			fail "ssh-keygen for $t failed"
+	fi
+
+	# known hosts file for client
+	(
+		printf 'localhost-with-alias,127.0.0.1,::1 '
+		cat $OBJ/$t.pub
+	) >> $OBJ/known_hosts
+
+	# setup authorized keys
+	cat $OBJ/$t.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+	echo IdentityFile $OBJ/$t >> $OBJ/ssh_config
+
+	# use key as host key, too
+	$SUDO cp $OBJ/$t $OBJ/host.$t
+	echo HostKey $OBJ/host.$t >> $OBJ/sshd_config
+
+	# don't use SUDO for proxy connect
+	echo HostKey $OBJ/$t >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+done
+chmod 644 $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+
+# Activate Twisted Conch tests if the binary is present
+REGRESS_INTEROP_CONCH=no
+if test -x "$CONCH" ; then
+	REGRESS_INTEROP_CONCH=yes
+fi
+
+# If PuTTY is present and we are running a PuTTY test, prepare keys and
+# configuration
+REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY=no
+if test -x "$PUTTYGEN" -a -x "$PLINK" ; then
+	REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY=yes
+fi
+case "$SCRIPT" in
+*putty*)	;;
+*)		REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY=no ;;
+esac
+
+if test "$REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY" = "yes" ; then
+	mkdir -p ${OBJ}/.putty
+
+	# Add a PuTTY key to authorized_keys
+	rm -f ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2
+	puttygen -t rsa -o ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 < /dev/null > /dev/null
+	puttygen -O public-openssh ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 \
+	    >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+
+	# Convert rsa2 host key to PuTTY format
+	${SRC}/ssh2putty.sh 127.0.0.1 $PORT $OBJ/rsa > \
+	    ${OBJ}/.putty/sshhostkeys
+	${SRC}/ssh2putty.sh 127.0.0.1 22 $OBJ/rsa >> \
+	    ${OBJ}/.putty/sshhostkeys
+
+	# Setup proxied session
+	mkdir -p ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions
+	rm -f ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy
+	echo "Hostname=127.0.0.1" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy
+	echo "PortNumber=$PORT" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy
+	echo "ProxyMethod=5" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy
+	echo "ProxyTelnetCommand=sh ${SRC}/sshd-log-wrapper.sh ${TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE} ${SSHD} -i -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy
+
+	REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY=yes
+fi
+
+# create a proxy version of the client config
+(
+	cat $OBJ/ssh_config
+	echo proxycommand ${SUDO} sh ${SRC}/sshd-log-wrapper.sh ${TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE} ${SSHD} -i -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+) > $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+
+# check proxy config
+${SSHD} -t -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy	|| fatal "sshd_proxy broken"
+
+start_sshd ()
+{
+	# start sshd
+	$SUDO ${SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config "$@" -t || fatal "sshd_config broken"
+	$SUDO ${SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config "$@" -E$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE
+
+	trace "wait for sshd"
+	i=0;
+	while [ ! -f $PIDFILE -a $i -lt 10 ]; do
+		i=`expr $i + 1`
+		sleep $i
+	done
+
+	test -f $PIDFILE || fatal "no sshd running on port $PORT"
+}
+
+# source test body
+. $SCRIPT
+
+# kill sshd
+cleanup
+if [ $RESULT -eq 0 ]; then
+	verbose ok $tid
+else
+	echo failed $tid
+fi
+exit $RESULT
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/transfer.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/transfer.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..36c14634a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/transfer.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: transfer.sh,v 1.3 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="transfer data"
+
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+	verbose "$tid: proto $p"
+	rm -f ${COPY}
+	${SSH} -n -q -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY}
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh cat $DATA failed"
+	fi
+	cmp ${DATA} ${COPY}		|| fail "corrupted copy"
+
+	for s in 10 100 1k 32k 64k 128k 256k; do
+		trace "proto $p dd-size ${s}"
+		rm -f ${COPY}
+		dd if=$DATA obs=${s} 2> /dev/null | \
+			${SSH} -q -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "cat > ${COPY}"
+		if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh cat $DATA failed"
+		fi
+		cmp $DATA ${COPY}		|| fail "corrupted copy"
+	done
+done
+rm -f ${COPY}
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/try-ciphers.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/try-ciphers.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..889a735d2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/try-ciphers.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: try-ciphers.sh,v 1.25 2015/03/24 20:22:17 markus Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="try ciphers"
+
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+
+for c in `${SSH} -Q cipher`; do
+	n=0
+	for m in `${SSH} -Q mac`; do
+		trace "proto 2 cipher $c mac $m"
+		verbose "test $tid: proto 2 cipher $c mac $m"
+		cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+		echo "Ciphers=$c" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+		echo "MACs=$m" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+		${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -2 -m $m -c $c somehost true
+		if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh -2 failed with mac $m cipher $c"
+		fi
+		# No point trying all MACs for AEAD ciphers since they
+		# are ignored.
+		if ${SSH} -Q cipher-auth | grep "^${c}\$" >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
+			break
+		fi
+		n=`expr $n + 1`
+	done
+done
+
+if ssh_version 1; then
+	ciphers="3des blowfish"
+else
+	ciphers=""
+fi
+for c in $ciphers; do
+	trace "proto 1 cipher $c"
+	verbose "test $tid: proto 1 cipher $c"
+	${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -1 -c $c somehost true
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh -1 failed with cipher $c"
+	fi
+done
+
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/Makefile b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d3d90823f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.5 2015/02/16 22:21:03 djm Exp $
+REGRESS_FAIL_EARLY= yes
+SUBDIR=	test_helper sshbuf sshkey bitmap kex hostkeys
+
+.include <bsd.subdir.mk>
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/Makefile.inc b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/Makefile.inc
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7385e2ba3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/Makefile.inc
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: Makefile.inc,v 1.6 2015/07/01 23:11:18 djm Exp $
+
+.include <bsd.own.mk>
+.include <bsd.obj.mk>
+
+# enable warnings
+WARNINGS=Yes
+
+DEBUG=-g
+CFLAGS+=	-fstack-protector-all
+CDIAGFLAGS=	-Wall
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wextra
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Werror
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wchar-subscripts
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wcomment
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wformat
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wformat-security
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wimplicit
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Winline
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wmissing-declarations
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wmissing-prototypes
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wparentheses
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wpointer-arith
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wreturn-type
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wshadow
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wsign-compare
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wstrict-aliasing
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wstrict-prototypes
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wswitch
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wtrigraphs
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wuninitialized
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wunused
+.if ${COMPILER_VERSION} == "gcc4"
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wpointer-sign
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wold-style-definition
+.endif
+
+SSHREL=../../../../../usr.bin/ssh
+
+CFLAGS+=-I${.CURDIR}/../test_helper -I${.CURDIR}/${SSHREL}
+
+.if exists(${.CURDIR}/../test_helper/${__objdir})
+LDADD+=-L${.CURDIR}/../test_helper/${__objdir} -ltest_helper
+DPADD+=${.CURDIR}/../test_helper/${__objdir}/libtest_helper.a
+.else
+LDADD+=-L${.CURDIR}/../test_helper -ltest_helper
+DPADD+=${.CURDIR}/../test_helper/libtest_helper.a
+.endif
+
+.if exists(${.CURDIR}/${SSHREL}/lib/${__objdir})
+LDADD+=-L${.CURDIR}/${SSHREL}/lib/${__objdir} -lssh
+DPADD+=${.CURDIR}/${SSHREL}/lib/${__objdir}/libssh.a
+.else
+LDADD+=-L${.CURDIR}/${SSHREL}/lib -lssh
+DPADD+=${.CURDIR}/${SSHREL}/lib/libssh.a
+.endif
+
+LDADD+= -lcrypto
+DPADD+= ${LIBCRYPTO}
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/bitmap/Makefile b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/bitmap/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b704d22d6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/bitmap/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.1 2015/01/15 07:36:28 djm Exp $
+
+TEST_ENV=      "MALLOC_OPTIONS=AFGJPRX"
+
+PROG=test_bitmap
+SRCS=tests.c
+REGRESS_TARGETS=run-regress-${PROG}
+
+run-regress-${PROG}: ${PROG}
+	env ${TEST_ENV} ./${PROG}
+
+.include <bsd.regress.mk>
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/bitmap/tests.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/bitmap/tests.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..23025f90a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/bitmap/tests.c
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+/* 	$OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.1 2015/01/15 07:36:28 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Regress test for bitmap.h bitmap API
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
+
+#include "bitmap.h"
+
+#define NTESTS 131
+
+void
+tests(void)
+{
+	struct bitmap *b;
+	BIGNUM *bn;
+	size_t len;
+	int i, j, k, n;
+	u_char bbuf[1024], bnbuf[1024];
+	int r;
+
+	TEST_START("bitmap_new");
+	b = bitmap_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(b, NULL);
+	bn = BN_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(bn, NULL);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("bitmap_set_bit / bitmap_test_bit");
+	for (i = -1; i < NTESTS; i++) {
+		for (j = -1; j < NTESTS; j++) {
+			for (k = -1; k < NTESTS; k++) {
+				bitmap_zero(b);
+				BN_clear(bn);
+
+				test_subtest_info("set %d/%d/%d", i, j, k);
+				/* Set bits */
+				if (i >= 0) {
+					ASSERT_INT_EQ(bitmap_set_bit(b, i), 0);
+					ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_set_bit(bn, i), 1);
+				}
+				if (j >= 0) {
+					ASSERT_INT_EQ(bitmap_set_bit(b, j), 0);
+					ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_set_bit(bn, j), 1);
+				}
+				if (k >= 0) {
+					ASSERT_INT_EQ(bitmap_set_bit(b, k), 0);
+					ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_set_bit(bn, k), 1);
+				}
+
+				/* Check perfect match between bitmap and bn */
+				test_subtest_info("match %d/%d/%d", i, j, k);
+				for (n = 0; n < NTESTS; n++) {
+					ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_is_bit_set(bn, n),
+					    bitmap_test_bit(b, n));
+				}
+
+				/* Test length calculations */
+				test_subtest_info("length %d/%d/%d", i, j, k);
+				ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_num_bits(bn),
+				    (int)bitmap_nbits(b));
+				ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_num_bytes(bn),
+				    (int)bitmap_nbytes(b));
+
+				/* Test serialisation */
+				test_subtest_info("serialise %d/%d/%d",
+				    i, j, k);
+				len = bitmap_nbytes(b);
+				memset(bbuf, 0xfc, sizeof(bbuf));
+				ASSERT_INT_EQ(bitmap_to_string(b, bbuf,
+				    sizeof(bbuf)), 0);
+				for (n = len; n < (int)sizeof(bbuf); n++)
+					ASSERT_U8_EQ(bbuf[n], 0xfc);
+				r = BN_bn2bin(bn, bnbuf);
+				ASSERT_INT_GE(r, 0);
+				ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, (int)len);
+				ASSERT_MEM_EQ(bbuf, bnbuf, len);
+
+				/* Test deserialisation */
+				test_subtest_info("deserialise %d/%d/%d",
+				    i, j, k);
+				bitmap_zero(b);
+				ASSERT_INT_EQ(bitmap_from_string(b, bnbuf,
+				    len), 0);
+				for (n = 0; n < NTESTS; n++) {
+					ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_is_bit_set(bn, n),
+					    bitmap_test_bit(b, n));
+				}
+
+				/* Test clearing bits */
+				test_subtest_info("clear %d/%d/%d",
+				    i, j, k);
+				for (n = 0; n < NTESTS; n++) {
+					ASSERT_INT_EQ(bitmap_set_bit(b, n), 0);
+					ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_set_bit(bn, n), 1);
+				}
+				if (i >= 0) {
+					bitmap_clear_bit(b, i);
+					BN_clear_bit(bn, i);
+				}
+				if (j >= 0) {
+					bitmap_clear_bit(b, j);
+					BN_clear_bit(bn, j);
+				}
+				if (k >= 0) {
+					bitmap_clear_bit(b, k);
+					BN_clear_bit(bn, k);
+				}
+				for (n = 0; n < NTESTS; n++) {
+					ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_is_bit_set(bn, n),
+					    bitmap_test_bit(b, n));
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	bitmap_free(b);
+	BN_free(bn);
+	TEST_DONE();
+}
+
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/Makefile b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f52a85fb1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.1 2015/02/16 22:18:34 djm Exp $
+
+TEST_ENV=      "MALLOC_OPTIONS=AFGJPRX"
+
+PROG=test_hostkeys
+SRCS=tests.c test_iterate.c
+REGRESS_TARGETS=run-regress-${PROG}
+
+run-regress-${PROG}: ${PROG}
+	env ${TEST_ENV} ./${PROG} -d ${.CURDIR}/testdata
+
+.include <bsd.regress.mk>
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/mktestdata.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/mktestdata.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..36890ba11
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/mktestdata.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# $OpenBSD: mktestdata.sh,v 1.1 2015/02/16 22:18:34 djm Exp $
+
+set -ex
+
+cd testdata
+
+rm -f rsa1* rsa* dsa* ecdsa* ed25519*
+rm -f known_hosts*
+
+gen_all() {
+	_n=$1
+	_ecdsa_bits=256
+	test "x$_n" = "x1" && _ecdsa_bits=384
+	test "x$_n" = "x2" && _ecdsa_bits=521
+	ssh-keygen -qt rsa1 -b 1024 -C "RSA1 #$_n" -N "" -f rsa1_$_n
+	ssh-keygen -qt rsa -b 1024 -C "RSA #$_n" -N "" -f rsa_$_n
+	ssh-keygen -qt dsa -b 1024 -C "DSA #$_n" -N "" -f dsa_$_n
+	ssh-keygen -qt ecdsa -b $_ecdsa_bits -C "ECDSA #$_n" -N "" -f ecdsa_$_n
+	ssh-keygen -qt ed25519 -C "ED25519 #$_n" -N "" -f ed25519_$_n
+	# Don't need private keys
+	rm -f rsa1_$_n  rsa_$_n dsa_$_n ecdsa_$_n ed25519_$_n
+}
+
+hentries() {
+	_preamble=$1
+	_kspec=$2
+	for k in `ls -1 $_kspec | sort` ; do
+		printf "$_preamble "
+		cat $k
+	done
+	echo
+}
+
+gen_all 1
+gen_all 2
+gen_all 3
+gen_all 4
+gen_all 5
+gen_all 6
+
+# A section of known_hosts with hashed hostnames.
+(
+	hentries "sisyphus.example.com" "*_5.pub"
+	hentries "prometheus.example.com,192.0.2.1,2001:db8::1" "*_6.pub"
+) > known_hosts_hash_frag
+ssh-keygen -Hf known_hosts_hash_frag
+rm -f known_hosts_hash_frag.old
+
+# Populated known_hosts, including comments, hashed names and invalid lines
+(
+	echo "# Plain host keys, plain host names"
+	hentries "sisyphus.example.com" "*_1.pub"
+
+	echo "# Plain host keys, hostnames + addresses"
+	hentries "prometheus.example.com,192.0.2.1,2001:db8::1" "*_2.pub"
+
+	echo "# Some hosts with wildcard names / IPs"
+	hentries "*.example.com,192.0.2.*,2001:*" "*_3.pub"
+
+	echo "# Hashed hostname and address entries"
+	cat known_hosts_hash_frag
+	rm -f known_hosts_hash_frag
+	echo
+
+	echo "# Revoked and CA keys"
+	printf "@revoked sisyphus.example.com " ; cat rsa1_4.pub
+	printf "@revoked sisyphus.example.com " ; cat ed25519_4.pub
+	printf "@cert-authority prometheus.example.com " ; cat ecdsa_4.pub
+	printf "@cert-authority *.example.com " ; cat dsa_4.pub
+
+	printf "\n"
+	echo "# Some invalid lines"
+	# Invalid marker
+	printf "@what sisyphus.example.com " ; cat rsa1_1.pub
+	# Key missing
+	echo "sisyphus.example.com      "
+	# Key blob missing
+	echo "prometheus.example.com ssh-ed25519 "
+	# Key blob truncated
+	echo "sisyphus.example.com ssh-dsa AAAATgAAAAdz"
+	# RSA1 key truncated after key bits
+	echo "prometheus.example.com 1024   "
+	# RSA1 key truncated after exponent
+	echo "sisyphus.example.com 1024 65535   "
+	# RSA1 key incorrect key bits
+	printf "prometheus.example.com 1025 " ; cut -d' ' -f2- < rsa1_1.pub
+	# Invalid type
+	echo "sisyphus.example.com ssh-XXX AAAATgAAAAdzc2gtWFhYAAAAP0ZVQ0tPRkZGVUNLT0ZGRlVDS09GRkZVQ0tPRkZGVUNLT0ZGRlVDS09GRkZVQ0tPRkZGVUNLT0ZGRlVDS09GRg=="
+	# Type mismatch with blob
+	echo "prometheus.example.com ssh-rsa AAAATgAAAAdzc2gtWFhYAAAAP0ZVQ0tPRkZGVUNLT0ZGRlVDS09GRkZVQ0tPRkZGVUNLT0ZGRlVDS09GRkZVQ0tPRkZGVUNLT0ZGRlVDS09GRg=="
+) > known_hosts
+
+echo OK
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_iterate.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_iterate.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2eaaf063a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_iterate.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1171 @@
+/* 	$OpenBSD: test_iterate.c,v 1.4 2015/03/31 22:59:01 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Regress test for hostfile.h hostkeys_foreach()
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
+
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+
+struct expected {
+	const char *key_file;		/* Path for key, NULL for none */
+	int no_parse_status;		/* Expected status w/o key parsing */
+	int no_parse_keytype;		/* Expected keytype w/o key parsing */
+	int match_host_p;		/* Match 'prometheus.example.com' */
+	int match_host_s;		/* Match 'sisyphus.example.com' */
+	int match_ipv4;			/* Match '192.0.2.1' */
+	int match_ipv6;			/* Match '2001:db8::1' */
+	int match_flags;		/* Expected flags from match */
+	struct hostkey_foreach_line l;	/* Expected line contents */
+};
+
+struct cbctx {
+	const struct expected *expected;
+	size_t nexpected;
+	size_t i;
+	int flags;
+	int match_host_p;
+	int match_host_s;
+	int match_ipv4;
+	int match_ipv6;
+};
+
+/*
+ * hostkeys_foreach() iterator callback that verifies the line passed
+ * against an array of expected entries.
+ */
+static int
+check(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
+{
+	struct cbctx *ctx = (struct cbctx *)_ctx;
+	const struct expected *expected;
+	int parse_key = (ctx->flags & HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY) != 0;
+	const int matching = (ctx->flags & HKF_WANT_MATCH) != 0;
+	u_int expected_status, expected_match;
+	int expected_keytype;
+
+	test_subtest_info("entry %zu/%zu, file line %ld",
+	    ctx->i + 1, ctx->nexpected, l->linenum);
+
+	for (;;) {
+		ASSERT_SIZE_T_LT(ctx->i, ctx->nexpected);
+		expected = ctx->expected + ctx->i++;
+		/* If we are matching host/IP then skip entries that don't */
+		if (!matching)
+			break;
+		if (ctx->match_host_p && expected->match_host_p)
+			break;
+		if (ctx->match_host_s && expected->match_host_s)
+			break;
+		if (ctx->match_ipv4 && expected->match_ipv4)
+			break;
+		if (ctx->match_ipv6 && expected->match_ipv6)
+			break;
+	}
+	expected_status = (parse_key || expected->no_parse_status < 0) ?
+	    expected->l.status : (u_int)expected->no_parse_status;
+	expected_match = expected->l.match;
+#define UPDATE_MATCH_STATUS(x) do { \
+		if (ctx->x && expected->x) { \
+			expected_match |= expected->x; \
+			if (expected_status == HKF_STATUS_OK) \
+				expected_status = HKF_STATUS_MATCHED; \
+		} \
+	} while (0)
+	expected_keytype = (parse_key || expected->no_parse_keytype < 0) ?
+	    expected->l.keytype : expected->no_parse_keytype;
+
+#ifndef WITH_SSH1
+	if (parse_key && (expected->l.keytype == KEY_RSA1 ||
+	    expected->no_parse_keytype == KEY_RSA1)) {
+		expected_status = HKF_STATUS_INVALID;
+		expected_keytype = KEY_UNSPEC;
+		parse_key = 0;
+	}
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+	if (expected->l.keytype == KEY_ECDSA ||
+	    expected->no_parse_keytype == KEY_ECDSA) {
+		expected_status = HKF_STATUS_INVALID;
+		expected_keytype = KEY_UNSPEC;
+		parse_key = 0;
+	}
+#endif
+
+	UPDATE_MATCH_STATUS(match_host_p);
+	UPDATE_MATCH_STATUS(match_host_s);
+	UPDATE_MATCH_STATUS(match_ipv4);
+	UPDATE_MATCH_STATUS(match_ipv6);
+
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(l->path, NULL); /* Don't care about path */
+	ASSERT_LONG_LONG_EQ(l->linenum, expected->l.linenum);
+	ASSERT_U_INT_EQ(l->status, expected_status);
+	ASSERT_U_INT_EQ(l->match, expected_match);
+	/* Not all test entries contain fulltext */
+	if (expected->l.line != NULL)
+		ASSERT_STRING_EQ(l->line, expected->l.line);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(l->marker, expected->l.marker);
+	/* XXX we skip hashed hostnames for now; implement checking */
+	if (expected->l.hosts != NULL)
+		ASSERT_STRING_EQ(l->hosts, expected->l.hosts);
+	/* Not all test entries contain raw keys */
+	if (expected->l.rawkey != NULL)
+		ASSERT_STRING_EQ(l->rawkey, expected->l.rawkey);
+	/* XXX synthesise raw key for cases lacking and compare */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(l->keytype, expected_keytype);
+	if (parse_key) {
+		if (expected->l.key == NULL)
+			ASSERT_PTR_EQ(l->key, NULL);
+		if (expected->l.key != NULL) {
+			ASSERT_PTR_NE(l->key, NULL);
+			ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(l->key, expected->l.key), 1);
+		}
+	}
+	if (parse_key && !(l->comment == NULL && expected->l.comment == NULL))
+		ASSERT_STRING_EQ(l->comment, expected->l.comment);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Loads public keys for a set of expected results */
+static void
+prepare_expected(struct expected *expected, size_t n)
+{
+	size_t i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+		if (expected[i].key_file == NULL)
+			continue;
+#ifndef WITH_SSH1
+		if (expected[i].l.keytype == KEY_RSA1)
+			continue;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+		if (expected[i].l.keytype == KEY_ECDSA)
+			continue;
+#endif
+		ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(
+		    test_data_file(expected[i].key_file), &expected[i].l.key,
+		    NULL), 0);
+	}
+}
+
+struct expected expected_full[] = {
+	{ NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,				/* path, don't care */
+		1,				/* line number */
+		HKF_STATUS_COMMENT,		/* status */
+		0,				/* match flags */
+		"# Plain host keys, plain host names", /* full line, optional */
+		MRK_NONE,			/* marker (CA / revoked) */
+		NULL,				/* hosts text */
+		NULL,				/* raw key, optional */
+		KEY_UNSPEC,			/* key type */
+		NULL,				/* deserialised key */
+		NULL,				/* comment */
+	} },
+	{ "dsa_1.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		2,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		"sisyphus.example.com",
+		NULL,
+		KEY_DSA,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"DSA #1",
+	} },
+	{ "ecdsa_1.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		3,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		"sisyphus.example.com",
+		NULL,
+		KEY_ECDSA,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"ECDSA #1",
+	} },
+	{ "ed25519_1.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		4,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		"sisyphus.example.com",
+		NULL,
+		KEY_ED25519,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"ED25519 #1",
+	} },
+	{ "rsa1_1.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		5,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		"sisyphus.example.com",
+		NULL,
+		KEY_RSA1,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"RSA1 #1",
+	} },
+	{ "rsa_1.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		6,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		"sisyphus.example.com",
+		NULL,
+		KEY_RSA,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"RSA #1",
+	} },
+	{ NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		7,
+		HKF_STATUS_COMMENT,
+		0,
+		"",
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_UNSPEC,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+	} },
+	{ NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		8,
+		HKF_STATUS_COMMENT,
+		0,
+		"# Plain host keys, hostnames + addresses",
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_UNSPEC,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+	} },
+	{ "dsa_2.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		9,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		"prometheus.example.com,192.0.2.1,2001:db8::1",
+		NULL,
+		KEY_DSA,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"DSA #2",
+	} },
+	{ "ecdsa_2.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		10,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		"prometheus.example.com,192.0.2.1,2001:db8::1",
+		NULL,
+		KEY_ECDSA,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"ECDSA #2",
+	} },
+	{ "ed25519_2.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		11,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		"prometheus.example.com,192.0.2.1,2001:db8::1",
+		NULL,
+		KEY_ED25519,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"ED25519 #2",
+	} },
+	{ "rsa1_2.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		12,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		"prometheus.example.com,192.0.2.1,2001:db8::1",
+		NULL,
+		KEY_RSA1,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"RSA1 #2",
+	} },
+	{ "rsa_2.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		13,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		"prometheus.example.com,192.0.2.1,2001:db8::1",
+		NULL,
+		KEY_RSA,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"RSA #2",
+	} },
+	{ NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		14,
+		HKF_STATUS_COMMENT,
+		0,
+		"",
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_UNSPEC,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+	} },
+	{ NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		15,
+		HKF_STATUS_COMMENT,
+		0,
+		"# Some hosts with wildcard names / IPs",
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_UNSPEC,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+	} },
+	{ "dsa_3.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		16,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		"*.example.com,192.0.2.*,2001:*",
+		NULL,
+		KEY_DSA,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"DSA #3",
+	} },
+	{ "ecdsa_3.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		17,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		"*.example.com,192.0.2.*,2001:*",
+		NULL,
+		KEY_ECDSA,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"ECDSA #3",
+	} },
+	{ "ed25519_3.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		18,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		"*.example.com,192.0.2.*,2001:*",
+		NULL,
+		KEY_ED25519,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"ED25519 #3",
+	} },
+	{ "rsa1_3.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		19,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		"*.example.com,192.0.2.*,2001:*",
+		NULL,
+		KEY_RSA1,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"RSA1 #3",
+	} },
+	{ "rsa_3.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		20,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		"*.example.com,192.0.2.*,2001:*",
+		NULL,
+		KEY_RSA,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"RSA #3",
+	} },
+	{ NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		21,
+		HKF_STATUS_COMMENT,
+		0,
+		"",
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_UNSPEC,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+	} },
+	{ NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		22,
+		HKF_STATUS_COMMENT,
+		0,
+		"# Hashed hostname and address entries",
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_UNSPEC,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+	} },
+	{ "dsa_5.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		23,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_DSA,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"DSA #5",
+	} },
+	{ "ecdsa_5.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		24,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_ECDSA,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"ECDSA #5",
+	} },
+	{ "ed25519_5.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		25,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_ED25519,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"ED25519 #5",
+	} },
+	{ "rsa1_5.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		26,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_RSA1,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"RSA1 #5",
+	} },
+	{ "rsa_5.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		27,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_RSA,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"RSA #5",
+	} },
+	{ NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		28,
+		HKF_STATUS_COMMENT,
+		0,
+		"",
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_UNSPEC,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+	} },
+	/*
+	 * The next series have each key listed multiple times, as the
+	 * hostname and addresses in the pre-hashed known_hosts are split
+	 * to separate lines.
+	 */
+	{ "dsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		29,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_DSA,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"DSA #6",
+	} },
+	{ "dsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		30,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_DSA,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"DSA #6",
+	} },
+	{ "dsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		31,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_DSA,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"DSA #6",
+	} },
+	{ "ecdsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		32,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_ECDSA,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"ECDSA #6",
+	} },
+	{ "ecdsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		33,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_ECDSA,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"ECDSA #6",
+	} },
+	{ "ecdsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		34,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_ECDSA,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"ECDSA #6",
+	} },
+	{ "ed25519_6.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		35,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_ED25519,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"ED25519 #6",
+	} },
+	{ "ed25519_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		36,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_ED25519,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"ED25519 #6",
+	} },
+	{ "ed25519_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		37,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_ED25519,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"ED25519 #6",
+	} },
+	{ "rsa1_6.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		38,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_RSA1,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"RSA1 #6",
+	} },
+	{ "rsa1_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		39,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_RSA1,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"RSA1 #6",
+	} },
+	{ "rsa1_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		40,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_RSA1,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"RSA1 #6",
+	} },
+	{ "rsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		41,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_RSA,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"RSA #6",
+	} },
+	{ "rsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		42,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_RSA,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"RSA #6",
+	} },
+	{ "rsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		43,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_RSA,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"RSA #6",
+	} },
+	{ NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		44,
+		HKF_STATUS_COMMENT,
+		0,
+		"",
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_UNSPEC,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+	} },
+	{ NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		45,
+		HKF_STATUS_COMMENT,
+		0,
+		"",
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_UNSPEC,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+	} },
+	{ NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		46,
+		HKF_STATUS_COMMENT,
+		0,
+		"# Revoked and CA keys",
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_UNSPEC,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+	} },
+	{ "rsa1_4.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		47,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_REVOKE,
+		"sisyphus.example.com",
+		NULL,
+		KEY_RSA1,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"RSA1 #4",
+	} },
+	{ "ed25519_4.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		48,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_REVOKE,
+		"sisyphus.example.com",
+		NULL,
+		KEY_ED25519,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"ED25519 #4",
+	} },
+	{ "ecdsa_4.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		49,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_CA,
+		"prometheus.example.com",
+		NULL,
+		KEY_ECDSA,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"ECDSA #4",
+	} },
+	{ "dsa_4.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		50,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_CA,
+		"*.example.com",
+		NULL,
+		KEY_DSA,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"DSA #4",
+	} },
+	{ NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		51,
+		HKF_STATUS_COMMENT,
+		0,
+		"",
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_UNSPEC,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+	} },
+	{ NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		52,
+		HKF_STATUS_COMMENT,
+		0,
+		"# Some invalid lines",
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_UNSPEC,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+	} },
+	{ NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		53,
+		HKF_STATUS_INVALID,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_ERROR,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_UNSPEC,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+	} },
+	{ NULL, -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		54,
+		HKF_STATUS_INVALID,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		"sisyphus.example.com",
+		NULL,
+		KEY_UNSPEC,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+	} },
+	{ NULL, -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		55,
+		HKF_STATUS_INVALID,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		"prometheus.example.com",
+		NULL,
+		KEY_UNSPEC,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+	} },
+	{ NULL, -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		56,
+		HKF_STATUS_INVALID,	/* Would be ok if key not parsed */
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		"sisyphus.example.com",
+		NULL,
+		KEY_UNSPEC,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+	} },
+	{ NULL, -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		57,
+		HKF_STATUS_INVALID,	/* Would be ok if key not parsed */
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		"prometheus.example.com",
+		NULL,
+		KEY_UNSPEC,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+	} },
+	{ NULL, HKF_STATUS_OK, KEY_RSA1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		58,
+		HKF_STATUS_INVALID,	/* Would be ok if key not parsed */
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		"sisyphus.example.com",
+		NULL,
+		KEY_UNSPEC,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+	} },
+	{ NULL, HKF_STATUS_OK, KEY_RSA1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		59,
+		HKF_STATUS_INVALID,	/* Would be ok if key not parsed */
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		"prometheus.example.com",
+		NULL,
+		KEY_UNSPEC,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		NULL,
+	} },
+	{ NULL, -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		60,
+		HKF_STATUS_INVALID,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		"sisyphus.example.com",
+		NULL,
+		KEY_UNSPEC,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		NULL,
+	} },
+	{ NULL, HKF_STATUS_OK, KEY_RSA, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		61,
+		HKF_STATUS_INVALID,	/* Would be ok if key not parsed */
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		"prometheus.example.com",
+		NULL,
+		KEY_UNSPEC,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		NULL,
+	} },
+};
+
+void test_iterate(void);
+
+void
+test_iterate(void)
+{
+	struct cbctx ctx;
+
+	TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate all with key parse");
+	memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+	ctx.expected = expected_full;
+	ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full);
+	ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY;
+	prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"),
+	    check, &ctx, NULL, NULL, ctx.flags), 0);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate all without key parse");
+	memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+	ctx.expected = expected_full;
+	ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full);
+	ctx.flags = 0;
+	prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"),
+	    check, &ctx, NULL, NULL, ctx.flags), 0);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate specify host 1");
+	memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+	ctx.expected = expected_full;
+	ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full);
+	ctx.flags = 0;
+	ctx.match_host_p = 1;
+	prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"),
+	    check, &ctx, "prometheus.example.com", NULL, ctx.flags), 0);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate specify host 2");
+	memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+	ctx.expected = expected_full;
+	ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full);
+	ctx.flags = 0;
+	ctx.match_host_s = 1;
+	prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"),
+	    check, &ctx, "sisyphus.example.com", NULL, ctx.flags), 0);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate match host 1");
+	memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+	ctx.expected = expected_full;
+	ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full);
+	ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_MATCH;
+	ctx.match_host_p = 1;
+	prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"),
+	    check, &ctx, "prometheus.example.com", NULL, ctx.flags), 0);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate match host 2");
+	memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+	ctx.expected = expected_full;
+	ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full);
+	ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_MATCH;
+	ctx.match_host_s = 1;
+	prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"),
+	    check, &ctx, "sisyphus.example.com", NULL, ctx.flags), 0);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate specify host missing");
+	memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+	ctx.expected = expected_full;
+	ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full);
+	ctx.flags = 0;
+	prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"),
+	    check, &ctx, "actaeon.example.org", NULL, ctx.flags), 0);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate match host missing");
+	memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+	ctx.expected = expected_full;
+	ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full);
+	ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_MATCH;
+	prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"),
+	    check, &ctx, "actaeon.example.org", NULL, ctx.flags), 0);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate specify IPv4");
+	memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+	ctx.expected = expected_full;
+	ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full);
+	ctx.flags = 0;
+	ctx.match_ipv4 = 1;
+	prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"),
+	    check, &ctx, "tiresias.example.org", "192.0.2.1", ctx.flags), 0);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate specify IPv6");
+	memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+	ctx.expected = expected_full;
+	ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full);
+	ctx.flags = 0;
+	ctx.match_ipv6 = 1;
+	prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"),
+	    check, &ctx, "tiresias.example.org", "2001:db8::1", ctx.flags), 0);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate match IPv4");
+	memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+	ctx.expected = expected_full;
+	ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full);
+	ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_MATCH;
+	ctx.match_ipv4 = 1;
+	prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"),
+	    check, &ctx, "tiresias.example.org", "192.0.2.1", ctx.flags), 0);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate match IPv6");
+	memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+	ctx.expected = expected_full;
+	ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full);
+	ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_MATCH;
+	ctx.match_ipv6 = 1;
+	prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"),
+	    check, &ctx, "tiresias.example.org", "2001:db8::1", ctx.flags), 0);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate specify addr missing");
+	memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+	ctx.expected = expected_full;
+	ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full);
+	ctx.flags = 0;
+	prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"),
+	    check, &ctx, "tiresias.example.org", "192.168.0.1", ctx.flags), 0);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate match addr missing");
+	memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+	ctx.expected = expected_full;
+	ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full);
+	ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_MATCH;
+	prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"),
+	    check, &ctx, "tiresias.example.org", "::1", ctx.flags), 0);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate specify host 2 and IPv4");
+	memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+	ctx.expected = expected_full;
+	ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full);
+	ctx.flags = 0;
+	ctx.match_host_s = 1;
+	ctx.match_ipv4 = 1;
+	prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"),
+	    check, &ctx, "sisyphus.example.com", "192.0.2.1", ctx.flags), 0);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate match host 1 and IPv6");
+	memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+	ctx.expected = expected_full;
+	ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full);
+	ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_MATCH;
+	ctx.match_host_p = 1;
+	ctx.match_ipv6 = 1;
+	prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"),
+	    check, &ctx, "prometheus.example.com", "2001:db8::1", ctx.flags), 0);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate specify host 2 and IPv4 w/ key parse");
+	memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+	ctx.expected = expected_full;
+	ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full);
+	ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY;
+	ctx.match_host_s = 1;
+	ctx.match_ipv4 = 1;
+	prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"),
+	    check, &ctx, "sisyphus.example.com", "192.0.2.1", ctx.flags), 0);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate match host 1 and IPv6 w/ key parse");
+	memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+	ctx.expected = expected_full;
+	ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full);
+	ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_MATCH|HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY;
+	ctx.match_host_p = 1;
+	ctx.match_ipv6 = 1;
+	prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"),
+	    check, &ctx, "prometheus.example.com", "2001:db8::1", ctx.flags), 0);
+	TEST_DONE();
+}
+
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_1.pub b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_1.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..56e1e3714
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_1.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-dss AAAAB3NzaC1kc3MAAACBAOqffHxEW4c+Z9q/r3l4sYK8F7qrBsU8XF9upGsW62T9InROFFq9IO0x3pQ6mDA0Wtw0sqcDmkPCHPyP4Ok/fU3/drLaZusHoVYu8pBBrWsIDrKgkeX9TEodBsSrYdl4Sqtqq9EZv9+DttV6LStZrgYyUTOKwOF95wGantpLynX5AAAAFQDdt+zjRNlETDsgmxcSYFgREirJrQAAAIBQlrPaiPhR24FhnMLcHH4016vL7AqDDID6Qw7PhbXGa4/XlxWMIigjBKrIPKvnZ6p712LSnCKtcbfdx0MtmJlNa01CYqPaRhgRaf+uGdvTkTUcdaq8R5lLJL+JMNwUhcC8ijm3NqEjXjffuebGe1EzIeiITbA7Nndcd+GytwRDegAAAIEAkRYPjSVcUxfUHhHdpP6V8CuY1+CYSs9EPJ7iiWTDuXWVIBTU32oJLAnrmAcOwtIzEfPvm+rff5FI/Yhon2pB3VTXhPPEBjYzE5qANanAT4e6tzAVc5f3DUhHaDknwRYfDz86GFvuLtDjeE/UZ9t6OofYoEsCBpYozLAprBvNIQY= DSA #1
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_2.pub b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_2.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..394e0bf00
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_2.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-dss 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 DSA #2
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_3.pub b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_3.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e506ea422
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_3.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-dss 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 DSA #3
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_4.pub b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_4.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8552c3819
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_4.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-dss 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 DSA #4
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_5.pub b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_5.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..149e1efd1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_5.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-dss 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 DSA #5
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_6.pub b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_6.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..edbb97643
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_6.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-dss 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 DSA #6
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_1.pub b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_1.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..16a535bcc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_1.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAzODQAAAAIbmlzdHAzODQAAABhBF6yQEtD9yBw9gmDRf477WBBzvWhAa0ioBI3nbA4emKykj0RbuQd5C4XdQAEOZGzE7v//FcCjwB2wi+JH5eKkxCtN6CjohDASZ1huoIV2UVyYIicZJEEOg1IWjjphvaxtw== ECDSA #1
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_2.pub b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_2.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d2bad11e2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_2.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHA1MjEAAAAIbmlzdHA1MjEAAACFBAB8qVcXwgBM92NCmReQlPrZAoui4Bz/mW0VUBFOpHXXW1n+15b/Y7Pc6UBd/ITTZmaBciXY+PWaSBGdwc5GdqGdLgFyJ/QAGrFMPNpVutm/82gNQzlxpNwjbMcKyiZEXzSgnjS6DzMQ0WuSMdzIBXq8OW/Kafxg4ZkU6YqALUXxlQMZuQ== ECDSA #2
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_3.pub b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_3.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e3ea9254e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_3.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBIb3BhJZk+vUQPg5TQc1koIzuGqloCq7wjr9LjlhG24IBeiFHLsdWw74HDlH4DrOmlxToVYk2lTdnjARleRByjk= ECDSA #3
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_4.pub b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_4.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2d616f5c6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_4.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBHZd0OXHIWwK3xnjAdMZ1tojxWycdu38pORO/UX5cqsKMgGCKQVBWWO3TFk1ePkGIE9VMWT1hCGqWRRwYlH+dSE= ECDSA #4
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_5.pub b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_5.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a3df9b3f4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_5.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBPIudcagzq4QPtP1jkpje34+0POLB0jwT64hqrbCqhTH2T800KDZ0h2vwlJYa3OP3Oqru9AB5pnuHsKw7mAhUGY= ECDSA #5
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_6.pub b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_6.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..139f5a7bf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_6.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBK1wRLyKtvK3Mmhd0XPkKwW4ev1KBVf8J4aG8lESq1TsaqqfOXYGyxMq5pN8fCGiD5UPOqyTYz/ZNzClRhJRHao= ECDSA #6
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_1.pub b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_1.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0b12efedb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_1.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIK9ks7jkua5YWIwByRnnnc6UPJQWI75O0e/UJdPYU1JI ED25519 #1
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_2.pub b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_2.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..78e262bcc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_2.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIIBp6PVW0z2o9C4Ukv/JOgmK7QMFe1pD1s3ADFF7IQob ED25519 #2
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_3.pub b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_3.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..64e5f12a6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_3.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIBlYfExtYZAPqYvYdrlpGlSWhh/XNHcH3v3c2JzsVNbB ED25519 #3
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_4.pub b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_4.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..47b6724ec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_4.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIDFP8L9REfN/iYy1KIRtFqSCn3V2+vOCpoZYENFGLdOF ED25519 #4
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_5.pub b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_5.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..72ccae6fe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_5.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAINf63qSV8rD57N+digID8t28WVhd3Yf2K2UhaoG8TsWQ ED25519 #5
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_6.pub b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_6.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0f719731d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_6.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIPLW0ZwCkRQldpLa4I5BpwGa/om+WE6OgC8jdVqakt0Z ED25519 #6
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/known_hosts b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/known_hosts
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3740f674b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/known_hosts
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+# Plain host keys, plain host names
+sisyphus.example.com ssh-dss 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 DSA #1
+sisyphus.example.com ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAzODQAAAAIbmlzdHAzODQAAABhBF6yQEtD9yBw9gmDRf477WBBzvWhAa0ioBI3nbA4emKykj0RbuQd5C4XdQAEOZGzE7v//FcCjwB2wi+JH5eKkxCtN6CjohDASZ1huoIV2UVyYIicZJEEOg1IWjjphvaxtw== ECDSA #1
+sisyphus.example.com ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIK9ks7jkua5YWIwByRnnnc6UPJQWI75O0e/UJdPYU1JI ED25519 #1
+sisyphus.example.com 1024 65537 153895431603677073925890314548566704948446776958334195280085080329934839226701954473292358821568047724356487621573742372399387931887004184139835510820577359977148363519970774657801798872789118894962853659233045778161859413980935372685480527355016624825696983269800574755126132814333241868538220824608980319407 RSA1 #1
+sisyphus.example.com ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQDg4hB4vAZHJ0PVRiJajOv/GlytFWNpv5/9xgB9+5BIbvp8LOrFZ5D9K0Gsmwpd4G4rfaAz8j896DhMArg0vtkilIPPGt/6VzWMERgvaIQPJ/IE99X3+fjcAG56oAWwy29JX10lQMzBPU6XJIaN/zqpkb6qUBiAHBdLpxrFBBU0/w== RSA #1
+
+# Plain host keys, hostnames + addresses
+prometheus.example.com,192.0.2.1,2001:db8::1 ssh-dss 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 DSA #2
+prometheus.example.com,192.0.2.1,2001:db8::1 ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHA1MjEAAAAIbmlzdHA1MjEAAACFBAB8qVcXwgBM92NCmReQlPrZAoui4Bz/mW0VUBFOpHXXW1n+15b/Y7Pc6UBd/ITTZmaBciXY+PWaSBGdwc5GdqGdLgFyJ/QAGrFMPNpVutm/82gNQzlxpNwjbMcKyiZEXzSgnjS6DzMQ0WuSMdzIBXq8OW/Kafxg4ZkU6YqALUXxlQMZuQ== ECDSA #2
+prometheus.example.com,192.0.2.1,2001:db8::1 ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIIBp6PVW0z2o9C4Ukv/JOgmK7QMFe1pD1s3ADFF7IQob ED25519 #2
+prometheus.example.com,192.0.2.1,2001:db8::1 1024 65537 135970715082947442639683969597180728933388298633245835186618852623800675939308729462220235058285909679252157995530180587329132927339620517781785310829060832352381015614725360278571924286986474946772141568893116432268565829418506866604294073334978275702221949783314402806080929601995102334442541344606109853641 RSA1 #2
+prometheus.example.com,192.0.2.1,2001:db8::1 ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQDmbUhNabB5AmBDX6GNHZ3lbn7pRxqfpW+f53QqNGlK0sLV+0gkMIrOfUp1kdE2ZLE6tfzdicatj/RlH6/wuo4yyYb+Pyx3G0vxdmAIiA4aANq38XweDucBC0TZkRWVHK+Gs5V/uV0z7N0axJvkkJujMLvST3CRiiWwlficBc6yVQ== RSA #2
+
+# Some hosts with wildcard names / IPs
+*.example.com,192.0.2.*,2001:* ssh-dss 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 DSA #3
+*.example.com,192.0.2.*,2001:* ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBIb3BhJZk+vUQPg5TQc1koIzuGqloCq7wjr9LjlhG24IBeiFHLsdWw74HDlH4DrOmlxToVYk2lTdnjARleRByjk= ECDSA #3
+*.example.com,192.0.2.*,2001:* ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIBlYfExtYZAPqYvYdrlpGlSWhh/XNHcH3v3c2JzsVNbB ED25519 #3
+*.example.com,192.0.2.*,2001:* 1024 65537 125895605498029643697051635076028105429632810811904702876152645261610759866299221305725069141163240694267669117205342283569102183636228981857946763978553664895308762890072813014496700601576921921752482059207749978374872713540759920335553799711267170948655579130584031555334229966603000896364091459595522912269 RSA1 #3
+*.example.com,192.0.2.*,2001:* ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQDX8F93W3SH4ZSus4XUQ2cw9dqcuyUETTlKEeGv3zlknV3YCoe2Mp04naDhiuwj8sOsytrZSESzLY1ZEyzrjxE6ZFVv8NKgck/AbRjcwlRFOcx9oKUxOrXRa0IoXlTq0kyjKCJfaHBKnGitZThknCPTbVmpATkm5xx6J0WEDozfoQ== RSA #3
+
+# Hashed hostname and address entries
+|1|6FWxoqTCAfm8sZ7T/q73OmxCFGM=|S4eQmusok4cbyDzzGEFGIAthDbw= ssh-dss AAAAB3NzaC1kc3MAAACBALrFy7w5ihlaOG+qR+6fj+vm5EQaO3qwxgACLcgH+VfShuOG4mkx8qFJmf+OZ3fh5iKngjNZfKtfcqI7zHWdk6378TQfQC52/kbZukjNXOLCpyNkogahcjA00onIoTK1RUDuMW28edAHwPFbpttXDTaqis+8JPMY8hZwsZGENCzTAAAAFQD6+It5vozwGgaN9ROYPMlByhi6jwAAAIBz2mcAC694vNzz9b6614gkX9d9E99PzJYfU1MPkXDziKg7MrjBw7Opd5y1jL09S3iL6lSTlHkKwVKvQ3pOwWRwXXRrKVus4I0STveoApm526jmp6mY0YEtqR98vMJ0v97h1ydt8FikKlihefCsnXVicb8887PXs2Y8C6GuFT3tfQAAAIBbmHtV5tPcrMRDkULhaQ/Whap2VKvT2DUhIHA7lx6oy/KpkltOpxDZOIGUHKqffGbiR7Jh01/y090AY5L2eCf0S2Ytx93+eADwVVpJbFJo6zSwfeey2Gm6L2oA+rCz9zTdmtZoekpD3/RAOQjnJIAPwbs7mXwabZTw4xRtiYIRrw== DSA #5
+|1|hTrfD0CuuB9ZbOa1CHFYvIk/gKE=|tPmW50t7flncm1UyM+DR97ubDNU= ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBPIudcagzq4QPtP1jkpje34+0POLB0jwT64hqrbCqhTH2T800KDZ0h2vwlJYa3OP3Oqru9AB5pnuHsKw7mAhUGY= ECDSA #5
+|1|fOGqe75X5ZpTz4c7DitP4E8/y30=|Lmcch2fh54bUYoV//S2VqDFVeiY= ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAINf63qSV8rD57N+digID8t28WVhd3Yf2K2UhaoG8TsWQ ED25519 #5
+|1|0RVzLjY3lwE3MRweguaAXaCCWk8=|DbcIgJQcRZJMYI6NYDOM6oJycPk= 1024 65537 127931411493401587586867047972295564331543694182352197506125410692673654572057908999642645524647232712160516076508316152810117209181150078352725299319149726341058893406440426414316276977768958023952319602422835879783057966985348561111880658922724668687074412548487722084792283453716871417610020757212399252171 RSA1 #5
+|1|4q79XnHpKBNQhyMLAqbPPDN+JKo=|k1Wvjjb52zDdrXWM801+wX5oH8U= ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQC/C15Q4sfnk7BZff1er8bscay+5s51oD4eWArlHWMK/ZfYeeTAccTy+7B7Jv+MS4nKCpflrvJI2RQz4kS8vF0ATdBbi4jeWefStlHNg0HLhnCY7NAfDIlRdaN9lm3Pqm2vmr+CkqwcJaSpycDg8nPN9yNAuD6pv7NDuUnECezojQ== RSA #5
+
+|1|0M6PIx6THA3ipIOvTl3fcgn2z+A=|bwEJAOwJz+Sm7orFdgj170mD/zY= ssh-dss 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 DSA #6
+|1|a6WGHcL+9gX3e96tMlgDSDJwtSg=|5Dqlb/yqNEf7jgfllrp/ygLmRV8= ssh-dss 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 DSA #6
+|1|OeCpi7Pn5Q6c8la4fPf9G8YctT8=|sC6D7lDXTafIpokZJ1+1xWg2R6Q= ssh-dss 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 DSA #6
+|1|BHESVyiJ7G2NN0lxrw7vT109jmk=|TKof+015J77bXqibsh0N1Lp0MKk= ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBK1wRLyKtvK3Mmhd0XPkKwW4ev1KBVf8J4aG8lESq1TsaqqfOXYGyxMq5pN8fCGiD5UPOqyTYz/ZNzClRhJRHao= ECDSA #6
+|1|wY53mZNASDJ5/P3JYCJ4FUNa6WQ=|v8p0MfV5lqlZB2J0yLxl/gsWVQo= ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBK1wRLyKtvK3Mmhd0XPkKwW4ev1KBVf8J4aG8lESq1TsaqqfOXYGyxMq5pN8fCGiD5UPOqyTYz/ZNzClRhJRHao= ECDSA #6
+|1|horeoyFPwfKhyFN+zJZ5LCfOo/I=|2ofvp0tNwCbKsV8FuiFA4gQG2Z8= ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBK1wRLyKtvK3Mmhd0XPkKwW4ev1KBVf8J4aG8lESq1TsaqqfOXYGyxMq5pN8fCGiD5UPOqyTYz/ZNzClRhJRHao= ECDSA #6
+|1|Aw4fXumZfx6jEIJuDGIyeEMd81A=|5FdLtdm2JeKNsS8IQeQlGYIadOE= ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIPLW0ZwCkRQldpLa4I5BpwGa/om+WE6OgC8jdVqakt0Z ED25519 #6
+|1|+dGUNpv6GblrDd5fgHLlOWpSbEo=|He/pQ1yJjtiCyTNWpGwjBD4sZFI= ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIPLW0ZwCkRQldpLa4I5BpwGa/om+WE6OgC8jdVqakt0Z ED25519 #6
+|1|E/PACGl8m1T7QnPedOoooozstP0=|w6DQAFT8yZgj0Hlkz5R1TppYHCA= ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIPLW0ZwCkRQldpLa4I5BpwGa/om+WE6OgC8jdVqakt0Z ED25519 #6
+|1|SaoyMStgxpYfwedSXBAghi8Zo0s=|Gz78k69GaE6iViV3OOvbStKqyTA= 1024 65537 140883028436203600354693376066567741282115117509696517282419557936340193768851493584179972504103033755515036493433917203732876685813283050574208967197963391667532902202382549275760997891673884333346000558018002659506756213191532156293935482587878596032743105911487673274674568768638010598205190227631909167257 RSA1 #6
+|1|8qfGeiT5WTCzWYbXPQ+lsLg7km4=|1sIBwiSUr8IGkvrUGm3/9QYurmA= 1024 65537 140883028436203600354693376066567741282115117509696517282419557936340193768851493584179972504103033755515036493433917203732876685813283050574208967197963391667532902202382549275760997891673884333346000558018002659506756213191532156293935482587878596032743105911487673274674568768638010598205190227631909167257 RSA1 #6
+|1|87M1OtyHg1BZiDY3rT6lYsZFnAU=|eddAQVcMNbn2OB87XWXFQnYo6R4= 1024 65537 140883028436203600354693376066567741282115117509696517282419557936340193768851493584179972504103033755515036493433917203732876685813283050574208967197963391667532902202382549275760997891673884333346000558018002659506756213191532156293935482587878596032743105911487673274674568768638010598205190227631909167257 RSA1 #6
+|1|60w3wFfC0XWI+rRmRlxIRhh8lwE=|yMhsGrzBJKiesAdSQ/PVgkCrDKk= ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQClu/3I6GG1Ai89Imnw0vXmWJ2OW0ftQwRrsbIAD0qzLFYpkJ76QWnzpCehvK9u0L5hcw7z2Y6mRLcSBsqONc+HVU73Qi7M4zHRvtjprPs3SOyLpf0J9sL1WiHBDwg2P0miHMCdqHDd5nVXkJB2d4eeecmgezGLa29NOHZjbza5yw== RSA #6
+|1|5gdEMmLUJC7grqWhRJPy2OTaSyE=|/XTfmLMa/B8npcVCGFRdaHl+d/0= ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQClu/3I6GG1Ai89Imnw0vXmWJ2OW0ftQwRrsbIAD0qzLFYpkJ76QWnzpCehvK9u0L5hcw7z2Y6mRLcSBsqONc+HVU73Qi7M4zHRvtjprPs3SOyLpf0J9sL1WiHBDwg2P0miHMCdqHDd5nVXkJB2d4eeecmgezGLa29NOHZjbza5yw== RSA #6
+|1|6FGCWUr42GHdMB/eifnHNCuwgdk=|ONJvYZ/ANmi59R5HrOhLPmvYENM= ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQClu/3I6GG1Ai89Imnw0vXmWJ2OW0ftQwRrsbIAD0qzLFYpkJ76QWnzpCehvK9u0L5hcw7z2Y6mRLcSBsqONc+HVU73Qi7M4zHRvtjprPs3SOyLpf0J9sL1WiHBDwg2P0miHMCdqHDd5nVXkJB2d4eeecmgezGLa29NOHZjbza5yw== RSA #6
+
+
+# Revoked and CA keys
+@revoked sisyphus.example.com 1024 65537 174143366122697048196335388217056770310345753698079464367148030836533360510864881734142526411160017107552815906024399248049666856133771656680462456979369587903909343046704480897527203474513676654933090991684252819423129896444427656841613263783484827101210734799449281639493127615902427443211183258155381810593 RSA1 #4
+@revoked sisyphus.example.com ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIDFP8L9REfN/iYy1KIRtFqSCn3V2+vOCpoZYENFGLdOF ED25519 #4
+@cert-authority prometheus.example.com ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBHZd0OXHIWwK3xnjAdMZ1tojxWycdu38pORO/UX5cqsKMgGCKQVBWWO3TFk1ePkGIE9VMWT1hCGqWRRwYlH+dSE= ECDSA #4
+@cert-authority *.example.com ssh-dss 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 DSA #4
+
+# Some invalid lines
+@what sisyphus.example.com 1024 65537 153895431603677073925890314548566704948446776958334195280085080329934839226701954473292358821568047724356487621573742372399387931887004184139835510820577359977148363519970774657801798872789118894962853659233045778161859413980935372685480527355016624825696983269800574755126132814333241868538220824608980319407 RSA1 #1
+sisyphus.example.com      
+prometheus.example.com ssh-ed25519 
+sisyphus.example.com ssh-dsa AAAATgAAAAdz
+prometheus.example.com 1024   
+sisyphus.example.com 1024 65535   
+prometheus.example.com 1025 65537 153895431603677073925890314548566704948446776958334195280085080329934839226701954473292358821568047724356487621573742372399387931887004184139835510820577359977148363519970774657801798872789118894962853659233045778161859413980935372685480527355016624825696983269800574755126132814333241868538220824608980319407 RSA1 #1
+sisyphus.example.com ssh-XXX AAAATgAAAAdzc2gtWFhYAAAAP0ZVQ0tPRkZGVUNLT0ZGRlVDS09GRkZVQ0tPRkZGVUNLT0ZGRlVDS09GRkZVQ0tPRkZGVUNLT0ZGRlVDS09GRg==
+prometheus.example.com ssh-rsa AAAATgAAAAdzc2gtWFhYAAAAP0ZVQ0tPRkZGVUNLT0ZGRlVDS09GRkZVQ0tPRkZGVUNLT0ZGRlVDS09GRkZVQ0tPRkZGVUNLT0ZGRlVDS09GRg==
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_1.pub b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_1.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..772ce9c05
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_1.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+1024 65537 153895431603677073925890314548566704948446776958334195280085080329934839226701954473292358821568047724356487621573742372399387931887004184139835510820577359977148363519970774657801798872789118894962853659233045778161859413980935372685480527355016624825696983269800574755126132814333241868538220824608980319407 RSA1 #1
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_2.pub b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_2.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..78794b941
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_2.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+1024 65537 135970715082947442639683969597180728933388298633245835186618852623800675939308729462220235058285909679252157995530180587329132927339620517781785310829060832352381015614725360278571924286986474946772141568893116432268565829418506866604294073334978275702221949783314402806080929601995102334442541344606109853641 RSA1 #2
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_3.pub b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_3.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0c035fe0a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_3.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+1024 65537 125895605498029643697051635076028105429632810811904702876152645261610759866299221305725069141163240694267669117205342283569102183636228981857946763978553664895308762890072813014496700601576921921752482059207749978374872713540759920335553799711267170948655579130584031555334229966603000896364091459595522912269 RSA1 #3
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_4.pub b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_4.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..00064423e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_4.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+1024 65537 174143366122697048196335388217056770310345753698079464367148030836533360510864881734142526411160017107552815906024399248049666856133771656680462456979369587903909343046704480897527203474513676654933090991684252819423129896444427656841613263783484827101210734799449281639493127615902427443211183258155381810593 RSA1 #4
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_5.pub b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_5.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..bb53c2642
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_5.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+1024 65537 127931411493401587586867047972295564331543694182352197506125410692673654572057908999642645524647232712160516076508316152810117209181150078352725299319149726341058893406440426414316276977768958023952319602422835879783057966985348561111880658922724668687074412548487722084792283453716871417610020757212399252171 RSA1 #5
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_6.pub b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_6.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..85d6576b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_6.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+1024 65537 140883028436203600354693376066567741282115117509696517282419557936340193768851493584179972504103033755515036493433917203732876685813283050574208967197963391667532902202382549275760997891673884333346000558018002659506756213191532156293935482587878596032743105911487673274674568768638010598205190227631909167257 RSA1 #6
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_1.pub b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_1.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2b87885a1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_1.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQDg4hB4vAZHJ0PVRiJajOv/GlytFWNpv5/9xgB9+5BIbvp8LOrFZ5D9K0Gsmwpd4G4rfaAz8j896DhMArg0vtkilIPPGt/6VzWMERgvaIQPJ/IE99X3+fjcAG56oAWwy29JX10lQMzBPU6XJIaN/zqpkb6qUBiAHBdLpxrFBBU0/w== RSA #1
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_2.pub b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_2.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..33f1fd93b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_2.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQDmbUhNabB5AmBDX6GNHZ3lbn7pRxqfpW+f53QqNGlK0sLV+0gkMIrOfUp1kdE2ZLE6tfzdicatj/RlH6/wuo4yyYb+Pyx3G0vxdmAIiA4aANq38XweDucBC0TZkRWVHK+Gs5V/uV0z7N0axJvkkJujMLvST3CRiiWwlficBc6yVQ== RSA #2
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_3.pub b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_3.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c2f6b208c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_3.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQDX8F93W3SH4ZSus4XUQ2cw9dqcuyUETTlKEeGv3zlknV3YCoe2Mp04naDhiuwj8sOsytrZSESzLY1ZEyzrjxE6ZFVv8NKgck/AbRjcwlRFOcx9oKUxOrXRa0IoXlTq0kyjKCJfaHBKnGitZThknCPTbVmpATkm5xx6J0WEDozfoQ== RSA #3
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_4.pub b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_4.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..35545a713
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_4.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQDI8AdjBAozcdRnIikVlt69iyDHKyrtxmpdkbRy9bWaL86OH+PTmLUk5e+T/ufiakpeE2pm0hkE3e4Sh/FsY+rsQdRoraWVNFfchcMeVlKvuy5RZN0ElvmaQebOJUeNeBn2LLw8aL8bJ4CP/bQRKrmrSSqjz3+4H9YNVyyk1OGBPQ== RSA #4
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_5.pub b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_5.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..befbaa7d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_5.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQC/C15Q4sfnk7BZff1er8bscay+5s51oD4eWArlHWMK/ZfYeeTAccTy+7B7Jv+MS4nKCpflrvJI2RQz4kS8vF0ATdBbi4jeWefStlHNg0HLhnCY7NAfDIlRdaN9lm3Pqm2vmr+CkqwcJaSpycDg8nPN9yNAuD6pv7NDuUnECezojQ== RSA #5
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_6.pub b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_6.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..393e11672
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_6.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQClu/3I6GG1Ai89Imnw0vXmWJ2OW0ftQwRrsbIAD0qzLFYpkJ76QWnzpCehvK9u0L5hcw7z2Y6mRLcSBsqONc+HVU73Qi7M4zHRvtjprPs3SOyLpf0J9sL1WiHBDwg2P0miHMCdqHDd5nVXkJB2d4eeecmgezGLa29NOHZjbza5yw== RSA #6
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/tests.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/tests.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..92c7646ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/hostkeys/tests.c
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+/* 	$OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.1 2015/02/16 22:18:34 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Regress test for known_hosts-related API.
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain
+ */
+
+void tests(void);
+void test_iterate(void); /* test_iterate.c */
+
+void
+tests(void)
+{
+	test_iterate();
+}
+
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/kex/Makefile b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/kex/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6532cb00a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/kex/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.2 2015/01/24 10:39:21 miod Exp $
+
+TEST_ENV=      "MALLOC_OPTIONS=AFGJPRX"
+
+PROG=test_kex
+SRCS=tests.c test_kex.c
+REGRESS_TARGETS=run-regress-${PROG}
+
+run-regress-${PROG}: ${PROG}
+	env ${TEST_ENV} ./${PROG}
+
+.include <bsd.regress.mk>
+
+LDADD+=-lz
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6e5999bb9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c
@@ -0,0 +1,202 @@
+/* 	$OpenBSD: test_kex.c,v 1.2 2015/07/10 06:23:25 markus Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Regress test KEX
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
+
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "ssh_api.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "myproposal.h"
+
+struct ssh *active_state = NULL; /* XXX - needed for linking */
+
+void kex_tests(void);
+static int do_debug = 0;
+
+static int
+do_send_and_receive(struct ssh *from, struct ssh *to)
+{
+	u_char type;
+	size_t len;
+	const u_char *buf;
+	int r;
+
+	for (;;) {
+		if ((r = ssh_packet_next(from, &type)) != 0) {
+			fprintf(stderr, "ssh_packet_next: %s\n", ssh_err(r));
+			return r;
+		}
+		if (type != 0)
+			return 0;
+		buf = ssh_output_ptr(from, &len);
+		if (do_debug)
+			printf("%zu", len);
+		if (len == 0)
+			return 0;
+		if ((r = ssh_output_consume(from, len)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = ssh_input_append(to, buf, len)) != 0)
+			return r;
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+run_kex(struct ssh *client, struct ssh *server)
+{
+	int r = 0;
+
+	while (!server->kex->done || !client->kex->done) {
+		if (do_debug)
+			printf(" S:");
+		if ((r = do_send_and_receive(server, client)))
+			break;
+		if (do_debug)
+			printf(" C:");
+		if ((r = do_send_and_receive(client, server)))
+			break;
+	}
+	if (do_debug)
+		printf("done: %s\n", ssh_err(r));
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(server->kex->done, 1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(client->kex->done, 1);
+}
+
+static void
+do_kex_with_key(char *kex, int keytype, int bits)
+{
+	struct ssh *client = NULL, *server = NULL, *server2 = NULL;
+	struct sshkey *private, *public;
+	struct sshbuf *state;
+	struct kex_params kex_params;
+	char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT };
+	char *keyname = NULL;
+
+	TEST_START("sshkey_generate");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(keytype, bits, &private), 0);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshkey_from_private");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_private(private, &public), 0);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("ssh_init");
+	memcpy(kex_params.proposal, myproposal, sizeof(myproposal));
+	if (kex != NULL)
+		kex_params.proposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = kex;
+	keyname = strdup(sshkey_ssh_name(private));
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(keyname, NULL);
+	kex_params.proposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = keyname;
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_init(&client, 0, &kex_params), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_init(&server, 1, &kex_params), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(client, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(server, NULL);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("ssh_add_hostkey");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_add_hostkey(server, private), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_add_hostkey(client, public), 0);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("kex");
+	run_kex(client, server);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("rekeying client");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(kex_send_kexinit(client), 0);
+	run_kex(client, server);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("rekeying server");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(kex_send_kexinit(server), 0);
+	run_kex(client, server);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("ssh_packet_get_state");
+	state = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(state, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_packet_get_state(server, state), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_GE(sshbuf_len(state), 1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("ssh_packet_set_state");
+	server2 = NULL;
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_init(&server2, 1, NULL), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(server2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_add_hostkey(server2, private), 0);
+	kex_free(server2->kex);	/* XXX or should ssh_packet_set_state()? */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_packet_set_state(server2, state), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_len(state), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(state);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(server2->kex, NULL);
+	/* XXX we need to set the callbacks */
+	server2->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
+	server2->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
+	server2->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
+	server2->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+	server2->kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
+#endif
+	server2->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
+	server2->kex->load_host_public_key = server->kex->load_host_public_key;
+	server2->kex->load_host_private_key = server->kex->load_host_private_key;
+	server2->kex->sign = server->kex->sign;
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("rekeying server2");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(kex_send_kexinit(server2), 0);
+	run_kex(client, server2);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(kex_send_kexinit(client), 0);
+	run_kex(client, server2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("cleanup");
+	sshkey_free(private);
+	sshkey_free(public);
+	ssh_free(client);
+	ssh_free(server);
+	ssh_free(server2);
+	free(keyname);
+	TEST_DONE();
+}
+
+static void
+do_kex(char *kex)
+{
+	do_kex_with_key(kex, KEY_RSA, 2048);
+	do_kex_with_key(kex, KEY_DSA, 1024);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+	do_kex_with_key(kex, KEY_ECDSA, 256);
+#endif
+	do_kex_with_key(kex, KEY_ED25519, 256);
+}
+
+void
+kex_tests(void)
+{
+	do_kex("curve25519-sha256@libssh.org");
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+	do_kex("ecdh-sha2-nistp256");
+	do_kex("ecdh-sha2-nistp384");
+	do_kex("ecdh-sha2-nistp521");
+#endif
+	do_kex("diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256");
+	do_kex("diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1");
+	do_kex("diffie-hellman-group14-sha1");
+	do_kex("diffie-hellman-group1-sha1");
+}
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/kex/tests.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/kex/tests.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e7036ec17
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/kex/tests.c
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+/* 	$OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.1 2015/01/15 23:41:29 markus Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Placed in the public domain
+ */
+
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
+
+void kex_tests(void);
+
+void
+tests(void)
+{
+	kex_tests();
+}
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshbuf/Makefile b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshbuf/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..85f99ac38
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshbuf/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.1 2014/04/30 05:32:00 djm Exp $
+
+PROG=test_sshbuf
+SRCS=tests.c
+SRCS+=test_sshbuf.c
+SRCS+=test_sshbuf_getput_basic.c
+SRCS+=test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.c
+SRCS+=test_sshbuf_misc.c
+SRCS+=test_sshbuf_fuzz.c
+SRCS+=test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.c
+SRCS+=test_sshbuf_fixed.c
+
+.include <bsd.regress.mk>
+
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ee77d6934
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
+/* 	$OpenBSD: test_sshbuf.c,v 1.1 2014/04/30 05:32:00 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Regress test for sshbuf.h buffer API
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain
+ */
+
+#define SSHBUF_INTERNAL 1	/* access internals for testing */
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
+
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+
+void sshbuf_tests(void);
+
+void
+sshbuf_tests(void)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *p1;
+	const u_char *cdp;
+	u_char *dp;
+	size_t sz;
+	int r;
+
+	TEST_START("allocate sshbuf");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("max size on fresh buffer");
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(sshbuf_max_size(p1), 0);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("available on fresh buffer");
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(sshbuf_avail(p1), 0);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("len = 0 on empty buffer");
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("set valid max size");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 65536), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_max_size(p1), 65536);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("available on limited buffer");
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), 65536);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("free");
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("consume on empty buffer");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume(p1, 0), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume(p1, 1), SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("consume_end on empty buffer");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume_end(p1, 0), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume_end(p1, 1), SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("reserve space");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	r = sshbuf_reserve(p1, 1, &dp);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(dp, NULL);
+	*dp = 0x11;
+	r = sshbuf_reserve(p1, 3, &dp);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(dp, NULL);
+	*dp++ = 0x22;
+	*dp++ = 0x33;
+	*dp++ = 0x44;
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_len on filled buffer");
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_ptr on filled buffer");
+	cdp = sshbuf_ptr(p1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(cdp, NULL);
+	ASSERT_U8_EQ(cdp[0], 0x11);
+	ASSERT_U8_EQ(cdp[1], 0x22);
+	ASSERT_U8_EQ(cdp[2], 0x33);
+	ASSERT_U8_EQ(cdp[3], 0x44);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("consume on filled buffer");
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume(p1, 0), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4);
+	r = sshbuf_consume(p1, 64);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume(p1, 1), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 3);
+	cdp = sshbuf_ptr(p1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_U8_EQ(cdp[0], 0x22);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume(p1, 2), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1);
+	cdp = sshbuf_ptr(p1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_U8_EQ(cdp[0], 0x44);
+	r = sshbuf_consume(p1, 2);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume(p1, 1), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0);
+	r = sshbuf_consume(p1, 1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("consume_end on filled buffer");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	r = sshbuf_reserve(p1, 4, &dp);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(dp, NULL);
+	*dp++ = 0x11;
+	*dp++ = 0x22;
+	*dp++ = 0x33;
+	*dp++ = 0x44;
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4);
+	r = sshbuf_consume_end(p1, 5);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume_end(p1, 3), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1);
+	cdp = sshbuf_ptr(p1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(cdp, NULL);
+	ASSERT_U8_EQ(*cdp, 0x11);
+	r = sshbuf_consume_end(p1, 2);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume_end(p1, 1), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("fill limited buffer");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 1223), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_max_size(p1), 1223);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), 1223);
+	r = sshbuf_reserve(p1, 1223, &dp);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(dp, NULL);
+	memset(dp, 0xd7, 1223);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1223);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), 0);
+	r = sshbuf_reserve(p1, 1, &dp);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(dp, NULL);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("consume and force compaction");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume(p1, 223), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1000);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), 223);
+	r = sshbuf_reserve(p1, 224, &dp);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(dp, NULL);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1000);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), 223);
+	r = sshbuf_reserve(p1, 223, &dp);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(dp, NULL);
+	memset(dp, 0x7d, 223);
+	cdp = sshbuf_ptr(p1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(cdp, NULL);
+	ASSERT_MEM_FILLED_EQ(cdp, 0xd7, 1000);
+	ASSERT_MEM_FILLED_EQ(cdp + 1000, 0x7d, 223);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("resize full buffer");
+	r = sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 1000);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
+	sz = roundup(1223 + SSHBUF_SIZE_INC * 3, SSHBUF_SIZE_INC);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, sz), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_max_size(p1), sz);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), sz - 1223);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1223);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	/* NB. uses sshbuf internals */
+	TEST_START("alloc chunking");
+	r = sshbuf_reserve(p1, 1, &dp);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(dp, NULL);
+	*dp = 0xff;
+	cdp = sshbuf_ptr(p1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(cdp, NULL);
+	ASSERT_MEM_FILLED_EQ(cdp, 0xd7, 1000);
+	ASSERT_MEM_FILLED_EQ(cdp + 1000, 0x7d, 223);
+	ASSERT_MEM_FILLED_EQ(cdp + 1223, 0xff, 1);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_alloc(p1) % SSHBUF_SIZE_INC, 0);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("reset buffer");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 1223), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_max_size(p1), 1223);
+	r = sshbuf_reserve(p1, 1223, &dp);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(dp, NULL);
+	memset(dp, 0xd7, 1223);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1223);
+	sshbuf_reset(p1);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_max_size(p1), 1223);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), 1223);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+}
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fixed.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fixed.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..df4925f7c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fixed.c
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+/* 	$OpenBSD: test_sshbuf_fixed.c,v 1.1 2014/04/30 05:32:00 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Regress test for sshbuf.h buffer API
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain
+ */
+
+#define SSHBUF_INTERNAL 1  /* access internals for testing */
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
+
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+
+void sshbuf_fixed(void);
+
+const u_char test_buf[] = "\x01\x12\x34\x56\x78\x00\x00\x00\x05hello";
+
+void
+sshbuf_fixed(void)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *p1, *p2, *p3;
+	u_char c;
+	char *s;
+	u_int i;
+	size_t l;
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_from");
+	p1 = sshbuf_from(test_buf, sizeof(test_buf));
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_mutable_ptr(p1), NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_check_reserve(p1, 1), SSH_ERR_BUFFER_READ_ONLY);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 1, NULL), SSH_ERR_BUFFER_READ_ONLY);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 200), SSH_ERR_BUFFER_READ_ONLY);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, 0x12345678), SSH_ERR_BUFFER_READ_ONLY);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), test_buf);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_from data");
+	p1 = sshbuf_from(test_buf, sizeof(test_buf) - 1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), test_buf);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u8(p1, &c), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), test_buf + 1);
+	ASSERT_U8_EQ(c, 1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u32(p1, &i), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), test_buf + 5);
+	ASSERT_U32_EQ(i, 0x12345678);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_cstring(p1, &s, &l), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(s, "hello");
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(l, 5);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	free(s);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_fromb ");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_U_INT_EQ(sshbuf_refcount(p1), 1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_parent(p1), NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, test_buf, sizeof(test_buf) - 1), 0);
+	p2 = sshbuf_fromb(p1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_U_INT_EQ(sshbuf_refcount(p1), 2);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_parent(p1), NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_parent(p2), p1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p2), sshbuf_ptr(p1));
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(sshbuf_ptr(p1), NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(sshbuf_ptr(p2), NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_mutable_ptr(p1), NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_mutable_ptr(p2), NULL);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sshbuf_len(p2));
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u8(p2, &c), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p2), sshbuf_ptr(p1) + 1);
+	ASSERT_U8_EQ(c, 1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u32(p2, &i), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p2), sshbuf_ptr(p1) + 5);
+	ASSERT_U32_EQ(i, 0x12345678);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_cstring(p2, &s, &l), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p2), 0);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(s, "hello");
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(l, 5);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	ASSERT_U_INT_EQ(sshbuf_refcount(p1), 1);
+	sshbuf_free(p2);
+	free(s);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_froms");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x01), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, 0x12345678), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(p1, "hello"), 0);
+	p2 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(test_buf) - 1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(p2, p1), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p2), sizeof(test_buf) + 4 - 1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_froms(p2, &p3), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p2), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p3, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(sshbuf_ptr(p3), NULL);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p3), sizeof(test_buf) - 1);
+	ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p3), test_buf, sizeof(test_buf) - 1);
+	sshbuf_free(p3);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(p2, p1), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume_end(p2, 1), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_froms(p2, &p3), SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(p3, NULL);
+	sshbuf_free(p2);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+}
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fuzz.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fuzz.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c52376b53
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fuzz.c
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+/* 	$OpenBSD: test_sshbuf_fuzz.c,v 1.1 2014/04/30 05:32:00 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Regress test for sshbuf.h buffer API
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
+
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+
+#define NUM_FUZZ_TESTS (1 << 18)
+
+void sshbuf_fuzz_tests(void);
+
+void
+sshbuf_fuzz_tests(void)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *p1;
+	u_char *dp;
+	size_t sz, sz2, i;
+	u_int32_t r;
+	int ret;
+
+	/* NB. uses sshbuf internals */
+	TEST_START("fuzz alloc/dealloc");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 16 * 1024), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(sshbuf_ptr(p1), NULL);
+	ASSERT_MEM_ZERO_NE(sshbuf_ptr(p1), sshbuf_len(p1));
+	for (i = 0; i < NUM_FUZZ_TESTS; i++) {
+		r = arc4random_uniform(10);
+		if (r == 0) {
+			/* 10% chance: small reserve */
+			r = arc4random_uniform(10);
+ fuzz_reserve:
+			sz = sshbuf_avail(p1);
+			sz2 = sshbuf_len(p1);
+			ret = sshbuf_reserve(p1, r, &dp);
+			if (ret < 0) {
+				ASSERT_PTR_EQ(dp, NULL);
+				ASSERT_SIZE_T_LT(sz, r);
+				ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), sz);
+				ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sz2);
+			} else {
+				ASSERT_PTR_NE(dp, NULL);
+				ASSERT_SIZE_T_GE(sz, r);
+				ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), sz - r);
+				ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sz2 + r);
+				memset(dp, arc4random_uniform(255) + 1, r);
+			}
+		} else if (r < 3) {
+			/* 20% chance: big reserve */
+			r = arc4random_uniform(8 * 1024);
+			goto fuzz_reserve;
+		} else if (r == 3) {
+			/* 10% chance: small consume */
+			r = arc4random_uniform(10);
+ fuzz_consume:
+			sz = sshbuf_avail(p1);
+			sz2 = sshbuf_len(p1);
+			/* 50% change consume from end, otherwise start */
+			ret = ((arc4random() & 1) ?
+			    sshbuf_consume : sshbuf_consume_end)(p1, r);
+			if (ret < 0) {
+				ASSERT_SIZE_T_LT(sz2, r);
+				ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), sz);
+				ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sz2);
+			} else {
+				ASSERT_SIZE_T_GE(sz2, r);
+				ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), sz + r);
+				ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sz2 - r);
+			}
+		} else if (r < 8) {
+			/* 40% chance: big consume */
+			r = arc4random_uniform(2 * 1024);
+			goto fuzz_consume;
+		} else if (r == 8) {
+			/* 10% chance: reset max size */
+			r = arc4random_uniform(16 * 1024);
+			sz = sshbuf_max_size(p1);
+			if (sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, r) < 0)
+				ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_max_size(p1), sz);
+			else
+				ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_max_size(p1), r);
+		} else {
+			if (arc4random_uniform(8192) == 0) {
+				/* tiny chance: new buffer */
+				ASSERT_PTR_NE(sshbuf_ptr(p1), NULL);
+				ASSERT_MEM_ZERO_NE(sshbuf_ptr(p1), sshbuf_len(p1));
+				sshbuf_free(p1);
+				p1 = sshbuf_new();
+				ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+				ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1,
+				    16 * 1024), 0);
+			} else {
+				/* Almost 10%: giant reserve */
+				/* use arc4random_buf for r > 2^32 on 64 bit */
+				arc4random_buf(&r, sizeof(r));
+				while (r < SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX / 2) {
+					r <<= 1;
+					r |= arc4random() & 1;
+				}
+				goto fuzz_reserve;
+			}
+		}
+		ASSERT_PTR_NE(sshbuf_ptr(p1), NULL);
+		ASSERT_SIZE_T_LE(sshbuf_max_size(p1), 16 * 1024);
+	}
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(sshbuf_ptr(p1), NULL);
+	ASSERT_MEM_ZERO_NE(sshbuf_ptr(p1), sshbuf_len(p1));
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+}
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_basic.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_basic.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..966e8432b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_basic.c
@@ -0,0 +1,484 @@
+/* 	$OpenBSD: test_sshbuf_getput_basic.c,v 1.1 2014/04/30 05:32:00 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Regress test for sshbuf.h buffer API
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+
+void sshbuf_getput_basic_tests(void);
+
+void
+sshbuf_getput_basic_tests(void)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *p1, *p2;
+	const u_char *cd;
+	u_char *d, d2[32], x[] = {
+		0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, 0x88, 0x00, 0x99
+	};
+	u_int64_t v64;
+	u_int32_t v32;
+	u_int16_t v16;
+	u_char v8;
+	size_t s;
+	char *s2;
+	int r;
+	u_char bn1[] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 };
+	u_char bn2[] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x02 };
+	u_char bn3[] = { 0x00, 0x80, 0x09 };
+	u_char bn_exp1[] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 };
+	u_char bn_exp2[] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02 };
+	u_char bn_exp3[] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03, 0x00, 0x80, 0x09 };
+
+	TEST_START("PEEK_U64");
+	ASSERT_U64_EQ(PEEK_U64(x), 0x1122334455667788ULL);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("PEEK_U32");
+	ASSERT_U32_EQ(PEEK_U32(x), 0x11223344);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("PEEK_U16");
+	ASSERT_U16_EQ(PEEK_U16(x), 0x1122);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("POKE_U64");
+	bzero(d2, sizeof(d2));
+	POKE_U64(d2, 0x1122334455667788ULL);
+	ASSERT_MEM_EQ(d2, x, 8);
+	TEST_DONE();
+	
+	TEST_START("POKE_U32");
+	bzero(d2, sizeof(d2));
+	POKE_U32(d2, 0x11223344);
+	ASSERT_MEM_EQ(d2, x, 4);
+	TEST_DONE();
+	
+	TEST_START("POKE_U16");
+	bzero(d2, sizeof(d2));
+	POKE_U16(d2, 0x1122);
+	ASSERT_MEM_EQ(d2, x, 2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_put");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, 5), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 5);
+	cd = sshbuf_ptr(p1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(cd, NULL);
+	ASSERT_U8_EQ(cd[0], 0x11);
+	ASSERT_U8_EQ(cd[1], 0x22);
+	ASSERT_U8_EQ(cd[2], 0x33);
+	ASSERT_U8_EQ(cd[3], 0x44);
+	ASSERT_U8_EQ(cd[4], 0x55);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_get");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get(p1, d2, 4), 0);
+	ASSERT_MEM_EQ(d2, x, 4);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1);
+	ASSERT_U8_EQ(*(sshbuf_ptr(p1)), 0x55);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_get truncated");
+	r = sshbuf_get(p1, d2, 4);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1);
+	ASSERT_U8_EQ(*(sshbuf_ptr(p1)), 0x55);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_put truncated");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 4), 0);
+	r = sshbuf_put(p1, x, 5);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_get_u64");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, 10), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 10);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u64(p1, &v64), 0);
+	ASSERT_U64_EQ(v64, 0x1122334455667788ULL);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_get_u64 truncated");
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2);
+	r = sshbuf_get_u64(p1, &v64);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_get_u32");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, 10), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 10);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u32(p1, &v32), 0);
+	ASSERT_U32_EQ(v32, 0x11223344);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 6);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u32(p1, &v32), 0);
+	ASSERT_U32_EQ(v32, 0x55667788);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_get_u32 truncated");
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2);
+	r = sshbuf_get_u32(p1, &v32);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_get_u16");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, 9), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 9);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u16(p1, &v16), 0);
+	ASSERT_U16_EQ(v16, 0x1122);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 7);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u16(p1, &v16), 0);
+	ASSERT_U16_EQ(v16, 0x3344);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 5);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u16(p1, &v16), 0);
+	ASSERT_U16_EQ(v16, 0x5566);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 3);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u16(p1, &v16), 0);
+	ASSERT_U16_EQ(v16, 0x7788);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_get_u16 truncated");
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1);
+	r = sshbuf_get_u16(p1, &v16);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_get_u8");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, 2), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u8(p1, &v8), 0);
+	ASSERT_U8_EQ(v8, 0x11);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u8(p1, &v8), 0);
+	ASSERT_U8_EQ(v8, 0x22);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_get_u8 truncated");
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0);
+	r = sshbuf_get_u8(p1, &v8);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_put_u64");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u64(p1, 0x1122334455667788ULL), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 8);
+	ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), x, 8);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_put_u64 exact");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 8), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u64(p1, 0x1122334455667788ULL), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 8);
+	ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), x, 8);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_put_u64 limited");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 7), 0);
+	r = sshbuf_put_u64(p1, 0x1122334455667788ULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+	
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_put_u32");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, 0x11223344), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4);
+	ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), x, 4);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_put_u32 exact");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 4), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, 0x11223344), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4);
+	ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), x, 4);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_put_u32 limited");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 3), 0);
+	r = sshbuf_put_u32(p1, 0x11223344);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+	
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_put_u16");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u16(p1, 0x1122), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2);
+	ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), x, 2);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_put_u16");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 2), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u16(p1, 0x1122), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2);
+	ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), x, 2);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_put_u16 limited");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 1), 0);
+	r = sshbuf_put_u16(p1, 0x1122);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_get_string");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, sizeof(x)), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, sizeof(x)), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, sizeof(x)), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4 + 4);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_string(p1, &d, &s), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(s, sizeof(x));
+	ASSERT_MEM_EQ(d, x, sizeof(x));
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4);
+	free(d);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_get_string exact");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, sizeof(x) + 4), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, sizeof(x)), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, sizeof(x)), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_string(p1, &d, &s), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(s, sizeof(x));
+	ASSERT_MEM_EQ(d, x, sizeof(x));
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0);
+	free(d);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_get_string truncated");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, sizeof(x)), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, sizeof(x)), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume_end(p1, 1), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 3);
+	r = sshbuf_get_string(p1, &d, &s);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 3);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_get_string giant");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, 0xffffffff), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, sizeof(x)), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4);
+	r = sshbuf_get_string(p1, &d, &s);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_STRING_TOO_LARGE);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_get_cstring giant");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, 0xffffffff), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, sizeof(x)), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4);
+	r = sshbuf_get_cstring(p1, &s2, &s);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_STRING_TOO_LARGE);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_get_cstring embedded \\0");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, sizeof(x)), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, sizeof(x)), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4);
+	r = sshbuf_get_cstring(p1, &s2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_get_cstring trailing \\0");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, sizeof(x) - 1), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, sizeof(x) - 1), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4 - 1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_cstring(p1, &s2, &s), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(s, sizeof(x) - 1);
+	ASSERT_MEM_EQ(s2, x, s);
+	free(s2);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_put_string");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(p1, x, sizeof(x)), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4);
+	ASSERT_U32_EQ(PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(p1)), sizeof(x));
+	ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1) + 4, x, sizeof(x));
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_put_string limited");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, sizeof(x) + 4 - 1), 0);
+	r = sshbuf_put_string(p1, x, sizeof(x));
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_put_string giant");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	r = sshbuf_put_string(p1, (void *)0x01, 0xfffffffc);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_putf");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	r = sshbuf_putf(p1, "%s %d %x", "hello", 23, 0x5f);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 11);
+	ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), "hello 23 5f", 11);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_putb");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	p2 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, "blahblahblah", 12), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_putb(p2, p1), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p2), 12);
+	ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p2), "blahblahblah", 12);
+	sshbuf_free(p2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes empty buf");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(p1, NULL, 0), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(bn_exp1));
+	ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), bn_exp1, sizeof(bn_exp1));
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes all zeroes");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(p1, bn1, sizeof(bn1)), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(bn_exp1));
+	ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), bn_exp1, sizeof(bn_exp1));
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes simple");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(p1, bn2+2, sizeof(bn2)-2), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(bn_exp2));
+	ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), bn_exp2, sizeof(bn_exp2));
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes leading zero");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(p1, bn2, sizeof(bn2)), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(bn_exp2));
+	ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), bn_exp2, sizeof(bn_exp2));
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes neg");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(p1, bn3+1, sizeof(bn3)-1), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(bn_exp3));
+	ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), bn_exp3, sizeof(bn_exp3));
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes neg and leading zero");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(p1, bn3, sizeof(bn3)), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(bn_exp3));
+	ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), bn_exp3, sizeof(bn_exp3));
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+}
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a68e1329e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.c
@@ -0,0 +1,409 @@
+/* 	$OpenBSD: test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.c,v 1.1 2014/04/30 05:32:00 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Regress test for sshbuf.h buffer API
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256
+# include <openssl/ec.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+
+void sshbuf_getput_crypto_tests(void);
+
+void
+sshbuf_getput_crypto_tests(void)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *p1;
+	BIGNUM *bn, *bn2;
+	/* This one has num_bits != num_bytes * 8 to test bignum1 encoding */
+	const char *hexbn1 = "0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10";
+	/* This one has MSB set to test bignum2 encoding negative-avoidance */
+	const char *hexbn2 = "f0e0d0c0b0a0908070605040302010007fff11";
+	u_char expbn1[] = {
+		0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08,
+		0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0x10,
+	};
+	u_char expbn2[] = {
+		0xf0, 0xe0, 0xd0, 0xc0, 0xb0, 0xa0, 0x90, 0x80,
+		0x70, 0x60, 0x50, 0x40, 0x30, 0x20, 0x10, 0x00,
+		0x7f, 0xff, 0x11
+	};
+#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256)
+	const u_char *d;
+	size_t s;
+	BIGNUM *bn_x, *bn_y;
+	int ec256_nid = NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
+	char *ec256_x = "0C828004839D0106AA59575216191357"
+		        "34B451459DADB586677EF9DF55784999";
+	char *ec256_y = "4D196B50F0B4E94B3C73E3A9D4CD9DF2"
+	                "C8F9A35E42BDD047550F69D80EC23CD4";
+	u_char expec256[] = {
+		0x04,
+		0x0c, 0x82, 0x80, 0x04, 0x83, 0x9d, 0x01, 0x06,
+		0xaa, 0x59, 0x57, 0x52, 0x16, 0x19, 0x13, 0x57,
+		0x34, 0xb4, 0x51, 0x45, 0x9d, 0xad, 0xb5, 0x86,
+		0x67, 0x7e, 0xf9, 0xdf, 0x55, 0x78, 0x49, 0x99,
+		0x4d, 0x19, 0x6b, 0x50, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe9, 0x4b,
+		0x3c, 0x73, 0xe3, 0xa9, 0xd4, 0xcd, 0x9d, 0xf2,
+		0xc8, 0xf9, 0xa3, 0x5e, 0x42, 0xbd, 0xd0, 0x47,
+		0x55, 0x0f, 0x69, 0xd8, 0x0e, 0xc2, 0x3c, 0xd4
+	};
+	EC_KEY *eck;
+	EC_POINT *ecp;
+#endif
+	int r;
+
+#define MKBN(b, bnn) \
+	do { \
+		bnn = NULL; \
+		ASSERT_INT_GT(BN_hex2bn(&bnn, b), 0); \
+	} while (0)
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum1");
+	MKBN(hexbn1, bn);
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_bignum1(p1, bn), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(expbn1) + 2);
+	ASSERT_U16_EQ(PEEK_U16(sshbuf_ptr(p1)), (u_int16_t)BN_num_bits(bn));
+	ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1) + 2, expbn1, sizeof(expbn1));
+	BN_free(bn);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum1 limited");
+	MKBN(hexbn1, bn);
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, sizeof(expbn1) + 1), 0);
+	r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(p1, bn);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0);
+	BN_free(bn);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum1 bn2");
+	MKBN(hexbn2, bn);
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_bignum1(p1, bn), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(expbn2) + 2);
+	ASSERT_U16_EQ(PEEK_U16(sshbuf_ptr(p1)), (u_int16_t)BN_num_bits(bn));
+	ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1) + 2, expbn2, sizeof(expbn2));
+	BN_free(bn);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum1 bn2 limited");
+	MKBN(hexbn2, bn);
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, sizeof(expbn1) + 1), 0);
+	r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(p1, bn);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0);
+	BN_free(bn);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2");
+	MKBN(hexbn1, bn);
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_bignum2(p1, bn), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(expbn1) + 4);
+	ASSERT_U32_EQ(PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(p1)), (u_int32_t)BN_num_bytes(bn));
+	ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1) + 4, expbn1, sizeof(expbn1));
+	BN_free(bn);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2 limited");
+	MKBN(hexbn1, bn);
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, sizeof(expbn1) + 3), 0);
+	r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(p1, bn);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0);
+	BN_free(bn);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2 bn2");
+	MKBN(hexbn2, bn);
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_bignum2(p1, bn), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(expbn2) + 4 + 1); /* MSB */
+	ASSERT_U32_EQ(PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(p1)), (u_int32_t)BN_num_bytes(bn) + 1);
+	ASSERT_U8_EQ(*(sshbuf_ptr(p1) + 4), 0x00);
+	ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1) + 5, expbn2, sizeof(expbn2));
+	BN_free(bn);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2 bn2 limited");
+	MKBN(hexbn2, bn);
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, sizeof(expbn2) + 3), 0);
+	r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(p1, bn);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0);
+	BN_free(bn);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_get_bignum1");
+	MKBN(hexbn1, bn);
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u16(p1, BN_num_bits(bn)), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, expbn1, sizeof(expbn1)), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2 + sizeof(expbn1));
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u16(p1, 0xd00f), 0);
+	bn2 = BN_new();
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_bignum1(p1, bn2), 0);
+	ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(bn, bn2);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2);
+	BN_free(bn);
+	BN_free(bn2);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_get_bignum1 truncated");
+	MKBN(hexbn1, bn);
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u16(p1, BN_num_bits(bn)), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, expbn1, sizeof(expbn1) - 1), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2 + sizeof(expbn1) - 1);
+	bn2 = BN_new();
+	r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(p1, bn2);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2 + sizeof(expbn1) - 1);
+	BN_free(bn);
+	BN_free(bn2);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_get_bignum1 giant");
+	MKBN(hexbn1, bn);
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u16(p1, 0xffff), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, (0xffff + 7) / 8, NULL), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2 + ((0xffff + 7) / 8));
+	bn2 = BN_new();
+	r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(p1, bn2);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_TOO_LARGE);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2 + ((0xffff + 7) / 8));
+	BN_free(bn);
+	BN_free(bn2);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_get_bignum1 bn2");
+	MKBN(hexbn2, bn);
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u16(p1, BN_num_bits(bn)), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, expbn2, sizeof(expbn2)), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2 + sizeof(expbn2));
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u16(p1, 0xd00f), 0);
+	bn2 = BN_new();
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_bignum1(p1, bn2), 0);
+	ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(bn, bn2);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2);
+	BN_free(bn);
+	BN_free(bn2);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_get_bignum1 bn2 truncated");
+	MKBN(hexbn2, bn);
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u16(p1, BN_num_bits(bn)), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, expbn2, sizeof(expbn2) - 1), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2 + sizeof(expbn2) - 1);
+	bn2 = BN_new();
+	r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(p1, bn2);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2 + sizeof(expbn2) - 1);
+	BN_free(bn);
+	BN_free(bn2);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_get_bignum2");
+	MKBN(hexbn1, bn);
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, BN_num_bytes(bn)), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, expbn1, sizeof(expbn1)), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4 + sizeof(expbn1));
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u16(p1, 0xd00f), 0);
+	bn2 = BN_new();
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_bignum2(p1, bn2), 0);
+	ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(bn, bn2);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2);
+	BN_free(bn);
+	BN_free(bn2);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_get_bignum2 truncated");
+	MKBN(hexbn1, bn);
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, BN_num_bytes(bn)), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, expbn1, sizeof(expbn1) - 1), 0);
+	bn2 = BN_new();
+	r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(p1, bn2);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(expbn1) + 3);
+	BN_free(bn);
+	BN_free(bn2);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_get_bignum2 giant");
+	MKBN(hexbn1, bn);
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, 65536), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 65536, NULL), 0);
+	bn2 = BN_new();
+	r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(p1, bn2);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_TOO_LARGE);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 65536 + 4);
+	BN_free(bn);
+	BN_free(bn2);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_get_bignum2 bn2");
+	MKBN(hexbn2, bn);
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, BN_num_bytes(bn) + 1), 0); /* MSB */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x00), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, expbn2, sizeof(expbn2)), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4 + 1 + sizeof(expbn2));
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u16(p1, 0xd00f), 0);
+	bn2 = BN_new();
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_bignum2(p1, bn2), 0);
+	ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(bn, bn2);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2);
+	BN_free(bn);
+	BN_free(bn2);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_get_bignum2 bn2 truncated");
+	MKBN(hexbn2, bn);
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, BN_num_bytes(bn) + 1), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x00), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, expbn2, sizeof(expbn2) - 1), 0);
+	bn2 = BN_new();
+	r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(p1, bn2);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(expbn2) + 1 + 4 - 1);
+	BN_free(bn);
+	BN_free(bn2);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_get_bignum2 bn2 negative");
+	MKBN(hexbn2, bn);
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, BN_num_bytes(bn)), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, expbn2, sizeof(expbn2)), 0);
+	bn2 = BN_new();
+	r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(p1, bn2);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_IS_NEGATIVE);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(expbn2) + 4);
+	BN_free(bn);
+	BN_free(bn2);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256)
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_put_ec");
+	eck = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(ec256_nid);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(eck, NULL);
+	ecp = EC_POINT_new(EC_KEY_get0_group(eck));
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(ecp, NULL);
+	MKBN(ec256_x, bn_x);
+	MKBN(ec256_y, bn_y);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(
+	    EC_KEY_get0_group(eck), ecp, bn_x, bn_y, NULL), 1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(EC_KEY_set_public_key(eck, ecp), 1);
+	BN_free(bn_x);
+	BN_free(bn_y);
+	EC_POINT_free(ecp);
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_eckey(p1, eck), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_string_direct(p1, &d, &s), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(s, sizeof(expec256));
+	ASSERT_MEM_EQ(d, expec256, sizeof(expec256));
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	EC_KEY_free(eck);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_get_ec");
+	eck = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(ec256_nid);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(eck, NULL);
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(p1, expec256, sizeof(expec256)), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(expec256) + 4);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x00), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_eckey(p1, eck), 0);
+	bn_x = BN_new();
+	bn_y = BN_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(bn_x, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(bn_y, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(
+	    EC_KEY_get0_group(eck), EC_KEY_get0_public_key(eck),
+	    bn_x, bn_y, NULL), 1);
+	MKBN(ec256_x, bn);
+	MKBN(ec256_y, bn2);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_cmp(bn_x, bn), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_cmp(bn_y, bn2), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	EC_KEY_free(eck);
+	BN_free(bn_x);
+	BN_free(bn_y);
+	BN_free(bn);
+	BN_free(bn2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+#endif
+}
+
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c6b5c29d1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.c
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+/* 	$OpenBSD: test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.c,v 1.2 2014/05/02 02:54:00 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Regress test for sshbuf.h buffer API
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256
+# include <openssl/ec.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+
+void sshbuf_getput_fuzz_tests(void);
+
+static void
+attempt_parse_blob(u_char *blob, size_t len)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *p1;
+	BIGNUM *bn;
+#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256)
+	EC_KEY *eck;
+#endif
+	u_char *s;
+	size_t l;
+	u_int8_t u8;
+	u_int16_t u16;
+	u_int32_t u32;
+	u_int64_t u64;
+
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, blob, len), 0);
+	sshbuf_get_u8(p1, &u8);
+	sshbuf_get_u16(p1, &u16);
+	sshbuf_get_u32(p1, &u32);
+	sshbuf_get_u64(p1, &u64);
+	if (sshbuf_get_string(p1, &s, &l) == 0) {
+		bzero(s, l);
+		free(s);
+	}
+	bn = BN_new();
+	sshbuf_get_bignum1(p1, bn);
+	BN_clear_free(bn);
+	bn = BN_new();
+	sshbuf_get_bignum2(p1, bn);
+	BN_clear_free(bn);
+#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256)
+	eck = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(eck, NULL);
+	sshbuf_get_eckey(p1, eck);
+	EC_KEY_free(eck);
+#endif
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+}
+
+
+static void
+onerror(void *fuzz)
+{
+	fprintf(stderr, "Failed during fuzz:\n");
+	fuzz_dump((struct fuzz *)fuzz);
+}
+
+void
+sshbuf_getput_fuzz_tests(void)
+{
+	u_char blob[] = {
+		/* u8 */
+		0xd0,
+		/* u16 */
+		0xc0, 0xde,
+		/* u32 */
+		0xfa, 0xce, 0xde, 0xad,
+		/* u64 */
+		0xfe, 0xed, 0xac, 0x1d, 0x1f, 0x1c, 0xbe, 0xef,
+		/* string */
+		0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x09,
+		'O', ' ', 'G', 'o', 'r', 'g', 'o', 'n', '!',
+		/* bignum1 */
+		0x79,
+		0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08,
+		0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0x10,
+		/* bignum2 */
+		0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x14,
+		0x00,
+		0xf0, 0xe0, 0xd0, 0xc0, 0xb0, 0xa0, 0x90, 0x80,
+		0x70, 0x60, 0x50, 0x40, 0x30, 0x20, 0x10, 0x00,
+		0x7f, 0xff, 0x11,
+		/* EC point (NIST-256 curve) */
+		0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x41,
+		0x04,
+		0x0c, 0x82, 0x80, 0x04, 0x83, 0x9d, 0x01, 0x06,
+		0xaa, 0x59, 0x57, 0x52, 0x16, 0x19, 0x13, 0x57,
+		0x34, 0xb4, 0x51, 0x45, 0x9d, 0xad, 0xb5, 0x86,
+		0x67, 0x7e, 0xf9, 0xdf, 0x55, 0x78, 0x49, 0x99,
+		0x4d, 0x19, 0x6b, 0x50, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe9, 0x4b,
+		0x3c, 0x73, 0xe3, 0xa9, 0xd4, 0xcd, 0x9d, 0xf2,
+		0xc8, 0xf9, 0xa3, 0x5e, 0x42, 0xbd, 0xd0, 0x47,
+		0x55, 0x0f, 0x69, 0xd8, 0x0e, 0xc2, 0x3c, 0xd4,
+	};
+	struct fuzz *fuzz;
+
+	TEST_START("fuzz blob parsing");
+	fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP | FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP |
+	    FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP | FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP |
+	    FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START | FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END, blob, sizeof(blob));
+	TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz);
+	for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz))
+		attempt_parse_blob(blob, sizeof(blob));
+	fuzz_cleanup(fuzz);
+	TEST_DONE();
+	TEST_ONERROR(NULL, NULL);
+}
+
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_misc.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_misc.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f155491a0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_misc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+/* 	$OpenBSD: test_sshbuf_misc.c,v 1.1 2014/04/30 05:32:00 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Regress test for sshbuf.h buffer API
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
+
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+
+void sshbuf_misc_tests(void);
+
+void
+sshbuf_misc_tests(void)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *p1;
+	char tmp[512], *p;
+	FILE *out;
+	size_t sz;
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_dump");
+	out = tmpfile();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(out, NULL);
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, 0x12345678), 0);
+	sshbuf_dump(p1, out);
+	fflush(out);
+	rewind(out);
+	sz = fread(tmp, 1, sizeof(tmp), out);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(ferror(out), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_NE(feof(out), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(sz, 0);
+	tmp[sz] = '\0';
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(strstr(tmp, "12 34 56 78"), NULL);
+	fclose(out);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_dtob16");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, 0x12345678), 0);
+	p = sshbuf_dtob16(p1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(p, "12345678");
+	free(p);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_dtob64 len 1");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x11), 0);
+	p = sshbuf_dtob64(p1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(p, "EQ==");
+	free(p);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_dtob64 len 2");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x11), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x22), 0);
+	p = sshbuf_dtob64(p1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(p, "ESI=");
+	free(p);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_dtob64 len 3");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x11), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x22), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x33), 0);
+	p = sshbuf_dtob64(p1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(p, "ESIz");
+	free(p);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_dtob64 len 8191");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 8192, NULL), 0);
+	bzero(sshbuf_mutable_ptr(p1), 8192);
+	p = sshbuf_dtob64(p1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p, NULL);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(strlen(p), ((8191 + 2) / 3) * 4);
+	free(p);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_b64tod len 1");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_b64tod(p1, "0A=="), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1);
+	ASSERT_U8_EQ(*sshbuf_ptr(p1), 0xd0);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_b64tod len 2");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_b64tod(p1, "0A8="), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2);
+	ASSERT_U16_EQ(PEEK_U16(sshbuf_ptr(p1)), 0xd00f);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_b64tod len 4");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_b64tod(p1, "0A/QDw=="), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4);
+	ASSERT_U32_EQ(PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(p1)), 0xd00fd00f);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+}
+
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshbuf/tests.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshbuf/tests.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1557e4342
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshbuf/tests.c
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+/* 	$OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.1 2014/04/30 05:32:00 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Regress test for sshbuf.h buffer API
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain
+ */
+
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
+
+void sshbuf_tests(void);
+void sshbuf_getput_basic_tests(void);
+void sshbuf_getput_crypto_tests(void);
+void sshbuf_misc_tests(void);
+void sshbuf_fuzz_tests(void);
+void sshbuf_getput_fuzz_tests(void);
+void sshbuf_fixed(void);
+
+void
+tests(void)
+{
+	sshbuf_tests();
+	sshbuf_getput_basic_tests();
+	sshbuf_getput_crypto_tests();
+	sshbuf_misc_tests();
+	sshbuf_fuzz_tests();
+	sshbuf_getput_fuzz_tests();
+	sshbuf_fixed();
+}
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/Makefile b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1bcd26676
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.1 2014/06/24 01:14:18 djm Exp $
+
+TEST_ENV=      "MALLOC_OPTIONS=AFGJPRX"
+
+PROG=test_sshkey
+SRCS=tests.c test_sshkey.c test_file.c test_fuzz.c common.c
+REGRESS_TARGETS=run-regress-${PROG}
+
+run-regress-${PROG}: ${PROG}
+	env ${TEST_ENV} ./${PROG} -d ${.CURDIR}/testdata
+
+.include <bsd.regress.mk>
+
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/common.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/common.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b598f05cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/common.c
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+/* 	$OpenBSD: common.c,v 1.2 2015/01/08 13:10:58 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Helpers for key API tests
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256
+# include <openssl/ec.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
+
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+struct sshbuf *
+load_file(const char *name)
+{
+	int fd;
+	struct sshbuf *ret;
+
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(ret = sshbuf_new(), NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_NE(fd = open(test_data_file(name), O_RDONLY), -1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_file(fd, ret), 0);
+	close(fd);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+struct sshbuf *
+load_text_file(const char *name)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *ret = load_file(name);
+	const u_char *p;
+
+	/* Trim whitespace at EOL */
+	for (p = sshbuf_ptr(ret); sshbuf_len(ret) > 0;) {
+		if (p[sshbuf_len(ret) - 1] == '\r' ||
+		    p[sshbuf_len(ret) - 1] == '\t' ||
+		    p[sshbuf_len(ret) - 1] == ' ' ||
+		    p[sshbuf_len(ret) - 1] == '\n')
+			ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume_end(ret, 1), 0);
+		else
+			break;
+	}
+	/* \0 terminate */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(ret, 0), 0);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+BIGNUM *
+load_bignum(const char *name)
+{
+	BIGNUM *ret = NULL;
+	struct sshbuf *buf;
+
+	buf = load_text_file(name);
+	ASSERT_INT_NE(BN_hex2bn(&ret, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	return ret;
+}
+
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/common.h b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/common.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..bf7d19dce
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/common.h
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+/* 	$OpenBSD: common.h,v 1.1 2014/06/24 01:14:18 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Helpers for key API tests
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain
+ */
+
+/* Load a binary file into a buffer */
+struct sshbuf *load_file(const char *name);
+
+/* Load a text file into a buffer */
+struct sshbuf *load_text_file(const char *name);
+
+/* Load a bignum from a file */
+BIGNUM *load_bignum(const char *name);
+
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/mktestdata.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/mktestdata.sh
new file mode 100755
index 000000000..e11100145
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/mktestdata.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# $OpenBSD: mktestdata.sh,v 1.5 2015/07/07 14:53:30 markus Exp $
+
+PW=mekmitasdigoat
+
+rsa1_params() {
+	_in="$1"
+	_outbase="$2"
+	set -e
+	ssh-keygen -f $_in -e -m pkcs8 | \
+	    openssl rsa -noout -text -pubin | \
+	    awk '/^Modulus:$/,/^Exponent:/' | \
+	    grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.n
+	# XXX need conversion support in ssh-keygen for the other params
+	for x in n ; do
+		echo "" >> ${_outbase}.$x
+		echo ============ ${_outbase}.$x
+		cat ${_outbase}.$x
+		echo ============
+	done
+}
+
+rsa_params() {
+	_in="$1"
+	_outbase="$2"
+	set -e
+	openssl rsa -noout -text -in $_in | \
+	    awk '/^modulus:$/,/^publicExponent:/' | \
+	    grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.n
+	openssl rsa -noout -text -in $_in | \
+	    awk '/^prime1:$/,/^prime2:/' | \
+	    grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.p
+	openssl rsa -noout -text -in $_in | \
+	    awk '/^prime2:$/,/^exponent1:/' | \
+	    grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.q
+	for x in n p q ; do
+		echo "" >> ${_outbase}.$x
+		echo ============ ${_outbase}.$x
+		cat ${_outbase}.$x
+		echo ============
+	done
+}
+
+dsa_params() {
+	_in="$1"
+	_outbase="$2"
+	set -e
+	openssl dsa -noout -text -in $_in | \
+	    awk '/^priv:$/,/^pub:/' | \
+	    grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.priv
+	openssl dsa -noout -text -in $_in | \
+	    awk '/^pub:/,/^P:/' | #\
+	    grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.pub
+	openssl dsa -noout -text -in $_in | \
+	    awk '/^G:/,0' | \
+	    grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.g
+	for x in priv pub g ; do
+		echo "" >> ${_outbase}.$x
+		echo ============ ${_outbase}.$x
+		cat ${_outbase}.$x
+		echo ============
+	done
+}
+
+ecdsa_params() {
+	_in="$1"
+	_outbase="$2"
+	set -e
+	openssl ec -noout -text -in $_in | \
+	    awk '/^priv:$/,/^pub:/' | \
+	    grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.priv
+	openssl ec -noout -text -in $_in | \
+	    awk '/^pub:/,/^ASN1 OID:/' | #\
+	    grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.pub
+	openssl ec -noout -text -in $_in | \
+	    grep "ASN1 OID:" | tr -d '\n' | \
+	    sed 's/.*: //;s/ *$//' > ${_outbase}.curve
+	for x in priv pub curve ; do
+		echo "" >> ${_outbase}.$x
+		echo ============ ${_outbase}.$x
+		cat ${_outbase}.$x
+		echo ============
+	done
+}
+
+set -ex
+
+cd testdata
+
+rm -f rsa1_1 rsa_1 dsa_1 ecdsa_1 ed25519_1
+rm -f rsa1_2 rsa_2 dsa_2 ecdsa_2 ed25519_2
+rm -f rsa_n dsa_n ecdsa_n # new-format keys
+rm -f rsa1_1_pw rsa_1_pw dsa_1_pw ecdsa_1_pw ed25519_1_pw
+rm -f rsa_n_pw dsa_n_pw ecdsa_n_pw
+rm -f pw *.pub *.bn.* *.param.* *.fp *.fp.bb
+
+ssh-keygen -t rsa1 -b 1024 -C "RSA1 test key #1" -N "" -f rsa1_1
+ssh-keygen -t rsa -b 1024 -C "RSA test key #1" -N "" -f rsa_1
+ssh-keygen -t dsa -b 1024 -C "DSA test key #1" -N "" -f dsa_1
+ssh-keygen -t ecdsa -b 256 -C "ECDSA test key #1" -N "" -f ecdsa_1
+ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -C "ED25519 test key #1" -N "" -f ed25519_1
+
+ssh-keygen -t rsa1 -b 2048 -C "RSA1 test key #2" -N "" -f rsa1_2
+ssh-keygen -t rsa -b 2048 -C "RSA test key #2" -N "" -f rsa_2
+ssh-keygen -t dsa -b 1024 -C "DSA test key #2" -N "" -f dsa_2
+ssh-keygen -t ecdsa -b 521 -C "ECDSA test key #2" -N "" -f ecdsa_2
+ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -C "ED25519 test key #1" -N "" -f ed25519_2
+
+cp rsa_1 rsa_n
+cp dsa_1 dsa_n
+cp ecdsa_1 ecdsa_n
+
+cp rsa1_1 rsa1_1_pw
+cp rsa_1 rsa_1_pw
+cp dsa_1 dsa_1_pw
+cp ecdsa_1 ecdsa_1_pw
+cp ed25519_1 ed25519_1_pw
+cp rsa_1 rsa_n_pw
+cp dsa_1 dsa_n_pw
+cp ecdsa_1 ecdsa_n_pw
+
+ssh-keygen -pf rsa1_1_pw -N "$PW"
+ssh-keygen -pf rsa_1_pw -N "$PW"
+ssh-keygen -pf dsa_1_pw -N "$PW"
+ssh-keygen -pf ecdsa_1_pw -N "$PW"
+ssh-keygen -pf ed25519_1_pw -N "$PW"
+ssh-keygen -opf rsa_n_pw -N "$PW"
+ssh-keygen -opf dsa_n_pw -N "$PW"
+ssh-keygen -opf ecdsa_n_pw -N "$PW"
+
+rsa1_params rsa1_1 rsa1_1.param
+rsa1_params rsa1_2 rsa1_2.param
+rsa_params rsa_1 rsa_1.param
+rsa_params rsa_2 rsa_2.param
+dsa_params dsa_1 dsa_1.param
+dsa_params dsa_1 dsa_1.param
+ecdsa_params ecdsa_1 ecdsa_1.param
+ecdsa_params ecdsa_2 ecdsa_2.param
+# XXX ed25519 params
+
+ssh-keygen -s rsa_2 -I hugo -n user1,user2 \
+    -Oforce-command=/bin/ls -Ono-port-forwarding -Osource-address=10.0.0.0/8 \
+    -V 19990101:20110101 -z 1 rsa_1.pub
+ssh-keygen -s rsa_2 -I hugo -n user1,user2 \
+    -Oforce-command=/bin/ls -Ono-port-forwarding -Osource-address=10.0.0.0/8 \
+    -V 19990101:20110101 -z 2 dsa_1.pub
+ssh-keygen -s rsa_2 -I hugo -n user1,user2 \
+    -Oforce-command=/bin/ls -Ono-port-forwarding -Osource-address=10.0.0.0/8 \
+    -V 19990101:20110101 -z 3 ecdsa_1.pub
+ssh-keygen -s rsa_2 -I hugo -n user1,user2 \
+    -Oforce-command=/bin/ls -Ono-port-forwarding -Osource-address=10.0.0.0/8 \
+    -V 19990101:20110101 -z 4 ed25519_1.pub
+
+ssh-keygen -s ed25519_1 -I julius -n host1,host2 -h \
+    -V 19990101:20110101 -z 5 rsa_1.pub
+ssh-keygen -s ed25519_1 -I julius -n host1,host2 -h \
+    -V 19990101:20110101 -z 6 dsa_1.pub
+ssh-keygen -s ecdsa_1 -I julius -n host1,host2 -h \
+    -V 19990101:20110101 -z 7 ecdsa_1.pub
+ssh-keygen -s ed25519_1 -I julius -n host1,host2 -h \
+    -V 19990101:20110101 -z 8 ed25519_1.pub
+
+ssh-keygen -lf rsa1_1 | awk '{print $2}' > rsa1_1.fp
+ssh-keygen -lf rsa_1 | awk '{print $2}' > rsa_1.fp
+ssh-keygen -lf dsa_1 | awk '{print $2}' > dsa_1.fp
+ssh-keygen -lf ecdsa_1 | awk '{print $2}' > ecdsa_1.fp
+ssh-keygen -lf ed25519_1 | awk '{print $2}' > ed25519_1.fp
+ssh-keygen -lf rsa1_2 | awk '{print $2}' > rsa1_2.fp
+ssh-keygen -lf rsa_2 | awk '{print $2}' > rsa_2.fp
+ssh-keygen -lf dsa_2 | awk '{print $2}' > dsa_2.fp
+ssh-keygen -lf ecdsa_2 | awk '{print $2}' > ecdsa_2.fp
+ssh-keygen -lf ed25519_2 | awk '{print $2}' > ed25519_2.fp
+
+ssh-keygen -lf dsa_1-cert.pub  | awk '{print $2}' > dsa_1-cert.fp
+ssh-keygen -lf ecdsa_1-cert.pub  | awk '{print $2}' > ecdsa_1-cert.fp
+ssh-keygen -lf ed25519_1-cert.pub  | awk '{print $2}' > ed25519_1-cert.fp
+ssh-keygen -lf rsa_1-cert.pub  | awk '{print $2}' > rsa_1-cert.fp
+
+ssh-keygen -Bf rsa1_1 | awk '{print $2}' > rsa1_1.fp.bb
+ssh-keygen -Bf rsa_1 | awk '{print $2}' > rsa_1.fp.bb
+ssh-keygen -Bf dsa_1 | awk '{print $2}' > dsa_1.fp.bb
+ssh-keygen -Bf ecdsa_1 | awk '{print $2}' > ecdsa_1.fp.bb
+ssh-keygen -Bf ed25519_1 | awk '{print $2}' > ed25519_1.fp.bb
+ssh-keygen -Bf rsa1_2 | awk '{print $2}' > rsa1_2.fp.bb
+ssh-keygen -Bf rsa_2 | awk '{print $2}' > rsa_2.fp.bb
+ssh-keygen -Bf dsa_2 | awk '{print $2}' > dsa_2.fp.bb
+ssh-keygen -Bf ecdsa_2 | awk '{print $2}' > ecdsa_2.fp.bb
+ssh-keygen -Bf ed25519_2 | awk '{print $2}' > ed25519_2.fp.bb
+
+# XXX Extend ssh-keygen to do detached signatures (better to test/fuzz against)
+
+echo "$PW" > pw
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c8a236937
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c
@@ -0,0 +1,460 @@
+/* 	$OpenBSD: test_file.c,v 1.4 2015/07/07 14:53:30 markus Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Regress test for sshkey.h key management API
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256
+# include <openssl/ec.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
+
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+void sshkey_file_tests(void);
+
+void
+sshkey_file_tests(void)
+{
+	struct sshkey *k1, *k2;
+	struct sshbuf *buf, *pw;
+	BIGNUM *a, *b, *c;
+	char *cp;
+
+	TEST_START("load passphrase");
+	pw = load_text_file("pw");
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+	TEST_START("parse RSA1 from private");
+	buf = load_file("rsa1_1");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "rsa1_1",
+	    &k1, NULL), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
+	a = load_bignum("rsa1_1.param.n");
+	ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(k1->rsa->n, a);
+	BN_free(a);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("parse RSA1 from private w/ passphrase");
+	buf = load_file("rsa1_1_pw");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf,
+	    (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), "rsa1_1_pw", &k2, NULL), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("load RSA1 from public");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa1_1.pub"), &k2,
+	    NULL), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("RSA1 key hex fingerprint");
+	buf = load_text_file("rsa1_1.fp");
+	cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	free(cp);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("RSA1 key bubblebabble fingerprint");
+	buf = load_text_file("rsa1_1.fp.bb");
+	cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	free(cp);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+#endif
+
+	TEST_START("parse RSA from private");
+	buf = load_file("rsa_1");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "rsa_1",
+	    &k1, NULL), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
+	a = load_bignum("rsa_1.param.n");
+	b = load_bignum("rsa_1.param.p");
+	c = load_bignum("rsa_1.param.q");
+	ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(k1->rsa->n, a);
+	ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(k1->rsa->p, b);
+	ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(k1->rsa->q, c);
+	BN_free(a);
+	BN_free(b);
+	BN_free(c);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("parse RSA from private w/ passphrase");
+	buf = load_file("rsa_1_pw");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf,
+	    (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), "rsa_1_pw", &k2, NULL), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("parse RSA from new-format");
+	buf = load_file("rsa_n");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf,
+	    "", "rsa_n", &k2, NULL), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("parse RSA from new-format w/ passphrase");
+	buf = load_file("rsa_n_pw");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf,
+	    (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), "rsa_n_pw", &k2, NULL), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("load RSA from public");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa_1.pub"), &k2,
+	    NULL), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("load RSA cert");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1"), &k2), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(k2->type, KEY_RSA_CERT);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("RSA key hex fingerprint");
+	buf = load_text_file("rsa_1.fp");
+	cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	free(cp);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("RSA cert hex fingerprint");
+	buf = load_text_file("rsa_1-cert.fp");
+	cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k2, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	free(cp);
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("RSA key bubblebabble fingerprint");
+	buf = load_text_file("rsa_1.fp.bb");
+	cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	free(cp);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+
+	TEST_START("parse DSA from private");
+	buf = load_file("dsa_1");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "dsa_1",
+	    &k1, NULL), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
+	a = load_bignum("dsa_1.param.g");
+	b = load_bignum("dsa_1.param.priv");
+	c = load_bignum("dsa_1.param.pub");
+	ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(k1->dsa->g, a);
+	ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(k1->dsa->priv_key, b);
+	ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(k1->dsa->pub_key, c);
+	BN_free(a);
+	BN_free(b);
+	BN_free(c);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("parse DSA from private w/ passphrase");
+	buf = load_file("dsa_1_pw");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf,
+	    (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), "dsa_1_pw", &k2, NULL), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("parse DSA from new-format");
+	buf = load_file("dsa_n");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf,
+	    "", "dsa_n", &k2, NULL), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("parse DSA from new-format w/ passphrase");
+	buf = load_file("dsa_n_pw");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf,
+	    (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), "dsa_n_pw", &k2, NULL), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("load DSA from public");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("dsa_1.pub"), &k2,
+	    NULL), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("load DSA cert");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("dsa_1"), &k2), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(k2->type, KEY_DSA_CERT);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("DSA key hex fingerprint");
+	buf = load_text_file("dsa_1.fp");
+	cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	free(cp);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("DSA cert hex fingerprint");
+	buf = load_text_file("dsa_1-cert.fp");
+	cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k2, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	free(cp);
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("DSA key bubblebabble fingerprint");
+	buf = load_text_file("dsa_1.fp.bb");
+	cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	free(cp);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+	TEST_START("parse ECDSA from private");
+	buf = load_file("ecdsa_1");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "ecdsa_1",
+	    &k1, NULL), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
+	buf = load_text_file("ecdsa_1.param.curve");
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ((const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf),
+	    OBJ_nid2sn(k1->ecdsa_nid));
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	a = load_bignum("ecdsa_1.param.priv");
+	b = load_bignum("ecdsa_1.param.pub");
+	c = EC_POINT_point2bn(EC_KEY_get0_group(k1->ecdsa),
+	    EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k1->ecdsa), POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
+	    NULL, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(c, NULL);
+	ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k1->ecdsa), a);
+	ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(b, c);
+	BN_free(a);
+	BN_free(b);
+	BN_free(c);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("parse ECDSA from private w/ passphrase");
+	buf = load_file("ecdsa_1_pw");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf,
+	    (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), "ecdsa_1_pw", &k2, NULL), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("parse ECDSA from new-format");
+	buf = load_file("ecdsa_n");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf,
+	    "", "ecdsa_n", &k2, NULL), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("parse ECDSA from new-format w/ passphrase");
+	buf = load_file("ecdsa_n_pw");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf,
+	    (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), "ecdsa_n_pw", &k2, NULL), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("load ECDSA from public");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("ecdsa_1.pub"), &k2,
+	    NULL), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("load ECDSA cert");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("ecdsa_1"), &k2), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(k2->type, KEY_ECDSA_CERT);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("ECDSA key hex fingerprint");
+	buf = load_text_file("ecdsa_1.fp");
+	cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	free(cp);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("ECDSA cert hex fingerprint");
+	buf = load_text_file("ecdsa_1-cert.fp");
+	cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k2, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	free(cp);
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("ECDSA key bubblebabble fingerprint");
+	buf = load_text_file("ecdsa_1.fp.bb");
+	cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	free(cp);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+
+	TEST_START("parse Ed25519 from private");
+	buf = load_file("ed25519_1");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "ed25519_1",
+	    &k1, NULL), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_ED25519);
+	/* XXX check key contents */
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("parse Ed25519 from private w/ passphrase");
+	buf = load_file("ed25519_1_pw");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf,
+	    (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), "ed25519_1_pw", &k2, NULL), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("load Ed25519 from public");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("ed25519_1.pub"), &k2,
+	    NULL), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("load Ed25519 cert");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("ed25519_1"), &k2), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(k2->type, KEY_ED25519_CERT);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("Ed25519 key hex fingerprint");
+	buf = load_text_file("ed25519_1.fp");
+	cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	free(cp);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("Ed25519 cert hex fingerprint");
+	buf = load_text_file("ed25519_1-cert.fp");
+	cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k2, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	free(cp);
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("Ed25519 key bubblebabble fingerprint");
+	buf = load_text_file("ed25519_1.fp.bb");
+	cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	free(cp);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+
+	sshbuf_free(pw);
+
+}
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1f08a2e43
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c
@@ -0,0 +1,411 @@
+/* 	$OpenBSD: test_fuzz.c,v 1.4 2015/03/04 23:22:35 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Fuzz tests for key parsing
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256
+# include <openssl/ec.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
+
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+void sshkey_fuzz_tests(void);
+
+static void
+onerror(void *fuzz)
+{
+	fprintf(stderr, "Failed during fuzz:\n");
+	fuzz_dump((struct fuzz *)fuzz);
+}
+
+static void
+public_fuzz(struct sshkey *k)
+{
+	struct sshkey *k1;
+	struct sshbuf *buf;
+	struct fuzz *fuzz;
+
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(buf = sshbuf_new(), NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_putb(k, buf), 0);
+	/* XXX need a way to run the tests in "slow, but complete" mode */
+	fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP | /* XXX too slow FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP | */
+	    FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP | /* XXX too slow FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP | */
+	    FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START | FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END,
+	    sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_blob(sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf),
+	    &k1), 0);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz);
+	for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) {
+		if (sshkey_from_blob(fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz), &k1) == 0)
+			sshkey_free(k1);
+	}
+	fuzz_cleanup(fuzz);
+}
+
+static void
+sig_fuzz(struct sshkey *k)
+{
+	struct fuzz *fuzz;
+	u_char *sig, c[] = "some junk to be signed";
+	size_t l;
+
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &l, c, sizeof(c), 0), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(l, 0);
+	fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP | /* too slow FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP | */
+	    FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP | FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP |
+	    FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START | FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END, sig, l);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_verify(k, sig, l, c, sizeof(c), 0), 0);
+	free(sig);
+	TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz);
+	for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) {
+		/* Ensure 1-bit difference at least */
+		if (fuzz_matches_original(fuzz))
+			continue;
+		ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(k, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz),
+		    c, sizeof(c), 0), 0);
+	}
+	fuzz_cleanup(fuzz);
+}
+
+void
+sshkey_fuzz_tests(void)
+{
+	struct sshkey *k1;
+	struct sshbuf *buf, *fuzzed;
+	struct fuzz *fuzz;
+	int r;
+
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+	TEST_START("fuzz RSA1 private");
+	buf = load_file("rsa1_1");
+	fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP | FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP |
+	    FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START | FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END,
+	    sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "key",
+	    &k1, NULL), 0);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL);
+	TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz);
+	for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) {
+		r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz));
+		ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
+		if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", "key",
+		    &k1, NULL) == 0)
+			sshkey_free(k1);
+		sshbuf_reset(fuzzed);
+	}
+	sshbuf_free(fuzzed);
+	fuzz_cleanup(fuzz);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("fuzz RSA1 public");
+	buf = load_file("rsa1_1_pw");
+	fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP | FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP |
+	    FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START | FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END,
+	    sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_public_rsa1_fileblob(buf, &k1, NULL), 0);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL);
+	TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz);
+	for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) {
+		r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz));
+		ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
+		if (sshkey_parse_public_rsa1_fileblob(fuzzed, &k1, NULL) == 0)
+			sshkey_free(k1);
+		sshbuf_reset(fuzzed);
+	}
+	sshbuf_free(fuzzed);
+	fuzz_cleanup(fuzz);
+	TEST_DONE();
+#endif
+
+	TEST_START("fuzz RSA private");
+	buf = load_file("rsa_1");
+	fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf),
+	    sshbuf_len(buf));
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "key",
+	    &k1, NULL), 0);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL);
+	TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz);
+	for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) {
+		r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz));
+		ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
+		if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", "key",
+		    &k1, NULL) == 0)
+			sshkey_free(k1);
+		sshbuf_reset(fuzzed);
+	}
+	sshbuf_free(fuzzed);
+	fuzz_cleanup(fuzz);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("fuzz RSA new-format private");
+	buf = load_file("rsa_n");
+	fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf),
+	    sshbuf_len(buf));
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "key",
+	    &k1, NULL), 0);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL);
+	TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz);
+	for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) {
+		r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz));
+		ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
+		if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", "key",
+		    &k1, NULL) == 0)
+			sshkey_free(k1);
+		sshbuf_reset(fuzzed);
+	}
+	sshbuf_free(fuzzed);
+	fuzz_cleanup(fuzz);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("fuzz DSA private");
+	buf = load_file("dsa_1");
+	fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf),
+	    sshbuf_len(buf));
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "key",
+	    &k1, NULL), 0);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL);
+	TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz);
+	for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) {
+		r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz));
+		ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
+		if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", "key",
+		    &k1, NULL) == 0)
+			sshkey_free(k1);
+		sshbuf_reset(fuzzed);
+	}
+	sshbuf_free(fuzzed);
+	fuzz_cleanup(fuzz);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("fuzz DSA new-format private");
+	buf = load_file("dsa_n");
+	fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf),
+	    sshbuf_len(buf));
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "key",
+	    &k1, NULL), 0);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL);
+	TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz);
+	for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) {
+		r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz));
+		ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
+		if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", "key",
+		    &k1, NULL) == 0)
+			sshkey_free(k1);
+		sshbuf_reset(fuzzed);
+	}
+	sshbuf_free(fuzzed);
+	fuzz_cleanup(fuzz);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+	TEST_START("fuzz ECDSA private");
+	buf = load_file("ecdsa_1");
+	fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf),
+	    sshbuf_len(buf));
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "key",
+	    &k1, NULL), 0);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL);
+	TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz);
+	for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) {
+		r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz));
+		ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
+		if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", "key",
+		    &k1, NULL) == 0)
+			sshkey_free(k1);
+		sshbuf_reset(fuzzed);
+	}
+	sshbuf_free(fuzzed);
+	fuzz_cleanup(fuzz);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("fuzz ECDSA new-format private");
+	buf = load_file("ecdsa_n");
+	fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf),
+	    sshbuf_len(buf));
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "key",
+	    &k1, NULL), 0);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL);
+	TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz);
+	for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) {
+		r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz));
+		ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
+		if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", "key",
+		    &k1, NULL) == 0)
+			sshkey_free(k1);
+		sshbuf_reset(fuzzed);
+	}
+	sshbuf_free(fuzzed);
+	fuzz_cleanup(fuzz);
+	TEST_DONE();
+#endif
+
+	TEST_START("fuzz Ed25519 private");
+	buf = load_file("ed25519_1");
+	fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf),
+	    sshbuf_len(buf));
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "key",
+	    &k1, NULL), 0);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL);
+	TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz);
+	for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) {
+		r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz));
+		ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
+		if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", "key",
+		    &k1, NULL) == 0)
+			sshkey_free(k1);
+		sshbuf_reset(fuzzed);
+	}
+	sshbuf_free(fuzzed);
+	fuzz_cleanup(fuzz);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("fuzz RSA public");
+	buf = load_file("rsa_1");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "key",
+	    &k1, NULL), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	public_fuzz(k1);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("fuzz RSA cert");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1"), &k1), 0);
+	public_fuzz(k1);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("fuzz DSA public");
+	buf = load_file("dsa_1");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "key",
+	    &k1, NULL), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	public_fuzz(k1);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("fuzz DSA cert");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("dsa_1"), &k1), 0);
+	public_fuzz(k1);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+	TEST_START("fuzz ECDSA public");
+	buf = load_file("ecdsa_1");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "key",
+	    &k1, NULL), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	public_fuzz(k1);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("fuzz ECDSA cert");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("ecdsa_1"), &k1), 0);
+	public_fuzz(k1);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+#endif
+
+	TEST_START("fuzz Ed25519 public");
+	buf = load_file("ed25519_1");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "key",
+	    &k1, NULL), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	public_fuzz(k1);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("fuzz Ed25519 cert");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("ed25519_1"), &k1), 0);
+	public_fuzz(k1);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("fuzz RSA sig");
+	buf = load_file("rsa_1");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "key",
+	    &k1, NULL), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	sig_fuzz(k1);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("fuzz DSA sig");
+	buf = load_file("dsa_1");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "key",
+	    &k1, NULL), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	sig_fuzz(k1);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+	TEST_START("fuzz ECDSA sig");
+	buf = load_file("ecdsa_1");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "key",
+	    &k1, NULL), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	sig_fuzz(k1);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+#endif
+
+	TEST_START("fuzz Ed25519 sig");
+	buf = load_file("ed25519_1");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "key",
+	    &k1, NULL), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	sig_fuzz(k1);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+/* XXX fuzz decoded new-format blobs too */
+
+}
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9b3ce7ee4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c
@@ -0,0 +1,521 @@
+/* 	$OpenBSD: test_sshkey.c,v 1.7 2015/08/05 05:27:33 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Regress test for sshkey.h key management API
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256)
+# include <openssl/ec.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
+
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#define SSHBUF_INTERNAL 1	/* access internals for testing */
+#include "sshkey.h"
+
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "common.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+
+void sshkey_tests(void);
+
+static void
+put_opt(struct sshbuf *b, const char *name, const char *value)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *sect;
+
+	sect = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(sect, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(b, name), 0);
+	if (value != NULL)
+		ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(sect, value), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, sect), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(sect);
+}
+
+static void
+build_cert(struct sshbuf *b, const struct sshkey *k, const char *type,
+    const struct sshkey *sign_key, const struct sshkey *ca_key)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *ca_buf, *pk, *principals, *critopts, *exts;
+	u_char *sigblob;
+	size_t siglen;
+
+	ca_buf = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(ca_buf, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_putb(ca_key, ca_buf), 0);
+
+	/*
+	 * Get the public key serialisation by rendering the key and skipping
+	 * the type string. This is a bit of a hack :/
+	 */
+	pk = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(pk, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_putb_plain(k, pk), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_skip_string(pk), 0);
+
+	principals = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(principals, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(principals, "gsamsa"), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(principals, "gregor"), 0);
+
+	critopts = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(critopts, NULL);
+	put_opt(critopts, "force-command", "/usr/local/bin/nethack");
+	put_opt(critopts, "source-address", "192.168.0.0/24,127.0.0.1,::1");
+
+	exts = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(exts, NULL);
+	put_opt(critopts, "permit-X11-forwarding", NULL);
+
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(b, type), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "noncenoncenonce!"), 0); /* nonce */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_putb(b, pk), 0); /* public key serialisation */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u64(b, 1234), 0); /* serial */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(b, SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER), 0); /* type */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "gregor"), 0); /* key ID */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, principals), 0); /* principals */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u64(b, 0), 0); /* start */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u64(b, 0xffffffffffffffffULL), 0); /* end */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, critopts), 0); /* options */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, exts), 0); /* extensions */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, NULL, 0), 0); /* reserved */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, ca_buf), 0); /* signature key */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(sign_key, &sigblob, &siglen,
+	    sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), 0), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, sigblob, siglen), 0); /* signature */
+
+	free(sigblob);
+	sshbuf_free(ca_buf);
+	sshbuf_free(exts);
+	sshbuf_free(critopts);
+	sshbuf_free(principals);
+	sshbuf_free(pk);
+}
+
+static void
+signature_test(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *bad, const u_char *d, size_t l)
+{
+	size_t len;
+	u_char *sig;
+
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &len, d, l, 0), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(len, 8);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(sig, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, 0), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(bad, sig, len, d, l, 0), 0);
+	/* Fuzz test is more comprehensive, this is just a smoke test */
+	sig[len - 5] ^= 0x10;
+	ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, 0), 0);
+	free(sig);
+}
+
+static void
+banana(u_char *s, size_t l)
+{
+	size_t o;
+	const u_char the_banana[] = { 'b', 'a', 'n', 'a', 'n', 'a' };
+
+	for (o = 0; o < l; o += sizeof(the_banana)) {
+		if (l - o < sizeof(the_banana)) {
+			memcpy(s + o, "nanananana", l - o);
+			break;
+		}
+		memcpy(s + o, banana, sizeof(the_banana));
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+signature_tests(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *bad)
+{
+	u_char i, buf[2049];
+	size_t lens[] = {
+		1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 15, 16, 17, 31, 32, 33, 127, 128, 129,
+		255, 256, 257, 1023, 1024, 1025, 2047, 2048, 2049
+	};
+
+	for (i = 0; i < (sizeof(lens)/sizeof(lens[0])); i++) {
+		test_subtest_info("%s key, banana length %zu",
+		    sshkey_type(k), lens[i]);
+		banana(buf, lens[i]);
+		signature_test(k, bad, buf, lens[i]);
+	}
+}
+
+static struct sshkey *
+get_private(const char *n)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *b;
+	struct sshkey *ret;
+
+	b = load_file(n);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(b, "", n, &ret, NULL), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+void
+sshkey_tests(void)
+{
+	struct sshkey *k1, *k2, *k3, *k4, *kr, *kd, *kf;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+	struct sshkey *ke;
+#endif
+	struct sshbuf *b;
+
+	TEST_START("new invalid");
+	k1 = sshkey_new(-42);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1, NULL);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("new/free KEY_UNSPEC");
+	k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("new/free KEY_RSA1");
+	k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->n, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->e, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->rsa->p, NULL);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("new/free KEY_RSA");
+	k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->n, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->e, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->rsa->p, NULL);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("new/free KEY_DSA");
+	k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_DSA);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa->g, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->dsa->priv_key, NULL);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+	TEST_START("new/free KEY_ECDSA");
+	k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_ECDSA);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->ecdsa, NULL);  /* Can't allocate without NID */
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+#endif
+
+	TEST_START("new/free KEY_ED25519");
+	k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_ED25519);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
+	/* These should be blank until key loaded or generated */
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->ed25519_sk, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->ed25519_pk, NULL);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("new_private KEY_RSA");
+	k1 = sshkey_new_private(KEY_RSA);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->n, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->e, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->p, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_add_private(k1), 0);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("new_private KEY_DSA");
+	k1 = sshkey_new_private(KEY_DSA);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa->g, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa->priv_key, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_add_private(k1), 0);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("generate KEY_RSA too small modulus");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_RSA, 128, &k1),
+	    SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1, NULL);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("generate KEY_RSA too large modulus");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_RSA, 1 << 20, &k1),
+	    SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1, NULL);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("generate KEY_DSA wrong bits");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_DSA, 2048, &k1),
+	    SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1, NULL);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+	TEST_START("generate KEY_ECDSA wrong bits");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_ECDSA, 42, &k1),
+	    SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1, NULL);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+#endif
+
+	TEST_START("generate KEY_RSA");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_RSA, 767, &kr),
+	    SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_RSA, 1024, &kr), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr->rsa, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr->rsa->n, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr->rsa->e, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr->rsa->p, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_num_bits(kr->rsa->n), 1024);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("generate KEY_DSA");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_DSA, 1024, &kd), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(kd, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(kd->dsa, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(kd->dsa->g, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(kd->dsa->priv_key, NULL);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+	TEST_START("generate KEY_ECDSA");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_ECDSA, 256, &ke), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(ke, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(ke->ecdsa, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ke->ecdsa), NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ke->ecdsa), NULL);
+	TEST_DONE();
+#endif
+
+	TEST_START("generate KEY_ED25519");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_ED25519, 256, &kf), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(kf, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(kf->type, KEY_ED25519);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(kf->ed25519_pk, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(kf->ed25519_sk, NULL);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("demote KEY_RSA");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_demote(kr, &k1), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr, k1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_RSA);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->n, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->e, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->rsa->p, NULL);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("equal KEY_RSA/demoted KEY_RSA");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kr, k1), 1);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("demote KEY_DSA");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_demote(kd, &k1), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(kd, k1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_DSA);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa->g, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->dsa->priv_key, NULL);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("equal KEY_DSA/demoted KEY_DSA");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kd, k1), 1);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+	TEST_START("demote KEY_ECDSA");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_demote(ke, &k1), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(ke, k1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_ECDSA);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->ecdsa, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->ecdsa_nid, ke->ecdsa_nid);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ke->ecdsa), NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k1->ecdsa), NULL);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("equal KEY_ECDSA/demoted KEY_ECDSA");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(ke, k1), 1);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+#endif
+
+	TEST_START("demote KEY_ED25519");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_demote(kf, &k1), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(kf, k1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_ED25519);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->ed25519_pk, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->ed25519_sk, NULL);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("equal KEY_ED25519/demoted KEY_ED25519");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kf, k1), 1);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("equal mismatched key types");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kd, kr), 0);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kd, ke), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kr, ke), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(ke, kf), 0);
+#endif
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kd, kf), 0);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("equal different keys");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_RSA, 1024, &k1), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kr, k1), 0);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_DSA, 1024, &k1), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kd, k1), 0);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_ECDSA, 256, &k1), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(ke, k1), 0);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+#endif
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_ED25519, 256, &k1), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kf, k1), 0);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	sshkey_free(kr);
+	sshkey_free(kd);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+	sshkey_free(ke);
+#endif
+	sshkey_free(kf);
+
+	TEST_START("certify key");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("ed25519_1.pub"),
+	    &k1, NULL), 0);
+	k2 = get_private("ed25519_2");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_to_certified(k1), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert, NULL);
+	k1->cert->type = SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER;
+	k1->cert->serial = 1234;
+	k1->cert->key_id = strdup("estragon");
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->key_id, NULL);
+	k1->cert->principals = calloc(4, sizeof(*k1->cert->principals));
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->principals, NULL);
+	k1->cert->principals[0] = strdup("estragon");
+	k1->cert->principals[1] = strdup("vladimir");
+	k1->cert->principals[2] = strdup("pozzo");
+	k1->cert->principals[3] = strdup("lucky");
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->principals[0], NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->principals[1], NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->principals[2], NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->principals[3], NULL);
+	k1->cert->valid_after = 0;
+	k1->cert->valid_before = (u_int64_t)-1;
+	k1->cert->critical = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->critical, NULL);
+	k1->cert->extensions = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->extensions, NULL);
+	put_opt(k1->cert->critical, "force-command", "/usr/bin/true");
+	put_opt(k1->cert->critical, "source-address", "127.0.0.1");
+	put_opt(k1->cert->extensions, "permit-X11-forwarding", NULL);
+	put_opt(k1->cert->extensions, "permit-agent-forwarding", NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_private(k2, &k1->cert->signature_key), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_certify(k1, k2), 0);
+	b = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(b, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_putb(k1, b), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_blob(sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), &k3), 0);
+
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	sshkey_free(k3);
+	sshbuf_reset(b);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sign and verify RSA");
+	k1 = get_private("rsa_1");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa_2.pub"), &k2,
+	    NULL), 0);
+	signature_tests(k1, k2);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sign and verify DSA");
+	k1 = get_private("dsa_1");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("dsa_2.pub"), &k2,
+	    NULL), 0);
+	signature_tests(k1, k2);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+	TEST_START("sign and verify ECDSA");
+	k1 = get_private("ecdsa_1");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("ecdsa_2.pub"), &k2,
+	    NULL), 0);
+	signature_tests(k1, k2);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+#endif
+
+	TEST_START("sign and verify ED25519");
+	k1 = get_private("ed25519_1");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("ed25519_2.pub"), &k2,
+	    NULL), 0);
+	signature_tests(k1, k2);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("nested certificate");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1"), &k1), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa_1.pub"), &k2,
+	    NULL), 0);
+	k3 = get_private("rsa_1");
+	build_cert(b, k2, "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com", k3, k1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_blob(sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), &k4),
+	    SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k4, NULL);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	sshkey_free(k3);
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+}
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1 b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d3f24824f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIBvAIBAAKBgQD6kutNFRsHTwEAv6d39Lhsqy1apdHBZ9c2HfyRr7WmypyGIy2m
+Ka43vzXI8CNwmRSYs+A6d0vJC7Pl+f9QzJ/04NWOA+MiwfurwrR3CRe61QRYb8Py
+mcHOxueHs95IcjrbIPNn86cjnPP5qvv/guUzCjuww4zBdJOXpligrGt2XwIVAKMD
+/50qQy7j8JaMk+1+Xtg1pK01AoGBAO7l9QVVbSSoy5lq6cOtvpf8UlwOa6+zBwbl
+o4gmFd1RwX1yWkA8kQ7RrhCSg8Hc6mIGnKRgKRli/3LgbSfZ0obFJehkRtEWtN4P
+h8fVUeS74iQbIwFQeKlYHIlNTRoGtAbdi3nHdV+BBkEQc1V3rjqYqhjOoz/yNsgz
+LND26HrdAoGBAOdXpyfmobEBaOqZAuvgj1P0uhjG2P31Ufurv22FWPBU3A9qrkxb
+OXwE0LwvjCvrsQV/lrYhJz/tiys40VeahulWZE5SAHMXGIf95LiLSgaXMjko7joo
+t+LK84ltLymwZ4QMnYjnZSSclf1UuyQMcUtb34+I0u9Ycnyhp2mSFsQtAhRYIbQ5
+KfXsZuBPuWe5FJz3ldaEgw==
+-----END DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1-cert.fp b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1-cert.fp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..75ff0e9cd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1-cert.fp
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+SHA256:kOLgXSoAT8O5T6r36n5NJUYigbux1d7gdH/rmWiJm6s
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1-cert.pub b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1-cert.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e768db1e7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1-cert.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 DSA test key #1
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.fp b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.fp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..75ff0e9cd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.fp
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+SHA256:kOLgXSoAT8O5T6r36n5NJUYigbux1d7gdH/rmWiJm6s
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.fp.bb b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.fp.bb
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ba37776ee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.fp.bb
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+xetag-todiz-mifah-torec-mynyv-cyvit-gopon-pygag-rupic-cenav-bexax
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.param.g b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.param.g
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e51c3f9fd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.param.g
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+00eee5f505556d24a8cb996ae9c3adbe97fc525c0e6bafb30706e5a3882615dd51c17d725a403c910ed1ae109283c1dcea62069ca460291962ff72e06d27d9d286c525e86446d116b4de0f87c7d551e4bbe2241b23015078a9581c894d4d1a06b406dd8b79c7755f81064110735577ae3a98aa18cea33ff236c8332cd0f6e87add
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.param.priv b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.param.priv
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4f743314c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.param.priv
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+5821b43929f5ec66e04fb967b9149cf795d68483
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.param.pub b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.param.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ba0313bee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.param.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+00e757a727e6a1b10168ea9902ebe08f53f4ba18c6d8fdf551fbabbf6d8558f054dc0f6aae4c5b397c04d0bc2f8c2bebb1057f96b621273fed8b2b38d1579a86e956644e520073171887fde4b88b4a0697323928ee3a28b7e2caf3896d2f29b067840c9d88e765249c95fd54bb240c714b5bdf8f88d2ef58727ca1a7699216c42d
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.pub b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..41cae2f69
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-dss 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 DSA test key #1
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1_pw b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1_pw
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..24c73039f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1_pw
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED
+DEK-Info: AES-128-CBC,BC8386C373B22EB7F00ADC821D5D8BE9
+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+-----END DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2 b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3cc9631af
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2.fp b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2.fp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..51fbeb4d8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2.fp
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+SHA256:ecwhWcXgpdBxZ2e+OjpRRY7dqXHHCD62BGtoVQQBwCk
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2.fp.bb b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2.fp.bb
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4d908ee30
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2.fp.bb
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+xeser-megad-pocan-rozit-belup-tapoh-fapif-kyvit-vonav-cehab-naxax
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2.pub b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..77bb555d5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-dss 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 DSA test key #2
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_n b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_n
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d3f24824f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_n
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_n_pw b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_n_pw
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..24ac299a4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_n_pw
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----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==
+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1 b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..80382b62d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
+MHcCAQEEIPPNyUAnjvFr+eT/7t/IyjuQQd/aLFiTY92LB9gIjyrMoAoGCCqGSM49
+AwEHoUQDQgAEDFlblkOrW9ydKVhtM+9AY3c9saBE7SG3lFx38nBavkADDaI9jh3/
+kvG/Jt9vpm22qwoklTCGDfzCkXkIKaWlBw==
+-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1-cert.fp b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1-cert.fp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e48304f6f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1-cert.fp
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+SHA256:8ty77fOpABat1y88aNdclQTfU+lVvWe7jYZGw8VYtfg
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1-cert.pub b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1-cert.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..55e2a2568
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1-cert.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 ECDSA test key #1
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.fp b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.fp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e48304f6f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.fp
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+SHA256:8ty77fOpABat1y88aNdclQTfU+lVvWe7jYZGw8VYtfg
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.fp.bb b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.fp.bb
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..fa23c33c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.fp.bb
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+xibah-vocun-sogyn-byhen-rivem-hegyh-luneh-dozyr-vatyf-dufid-myxyx
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.param.curve b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.param.curve
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..fa0400467
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.param.curve
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+prime256v1
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.param.priv b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.param.priv
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..dc908ad71
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.param.priv
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+00f3cdc940278ef16bf9e4ffeedfc8ca3b9041dfda2c589363dd8b07d8088f2acc
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.param.pub b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.param.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..71c9584d6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.param.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+040c595b9643ab5bdc9d29586d33ef4063773db1a044ed21b7945c77f2705abe40030da23d8e1dff92f1bf26df6fa66db6ab0a249530860dfcc291790829a5a507
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.pub b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..84a71f976
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBAxZW5ZDq1vcnSlYbTPvQGN3PbGgRO0ht5Rcd/JwWr5AAw2iPY4d/5Lxvybfb6ZttqsKJJUwhg38wpF5CCmlpQc= ECDSA test key #1
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1_pw b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1_pw
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5c83a658c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1_pw
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
+Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED
+DEK-Info: AES-128-CBC,7BA38DE00F67851E4207216809C3BB15
+
+8QkFoZHQkj9a2mt032sp+WKaJ1fwteqWDd4RpAW9OzDgqzMx1QO43qJgBDTfhzjt
+M2Q8YfiGjfBEYpg4kCbacfcV68DEV4z6Ll7rIzzzO7OfWUNL++brD64vKx4z6f46
++sn4nbZTXilpkzi/nmPDVzrNmTSywA8T7Yf0QcBUxks=
+-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2 b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0f4e844d1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIHcAgEBBEIBqBtN7e6Essd3dlsgISViPCXXC0atlNkGtoMgSQdBTKVUfeJOi4lc
+RZaXJdXnqWUqI/KEsH8h8QN4YcB8ugmAcc+gBwYFK4EEACOhgYkDgYYABAHZ2VNy
+oDedBwqsdzY+kkNptc9DrtRCVmO6cULLj+691MhItqVqTMJbTFlI4MnAg9PoGTF/
+0KmLJfy8vSffXGKqqwGKcFNtd1XCo+7Qu9tXbxron9g6Dmu7y8jaLkixcwZwnwLs
+6GmA9qZGuiAfOGV0Gf9/u98sr+vikOa4Ow5JFDTw5g==
+-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.fp b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.fp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..581e48aec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.fp
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+SHA256:ed8YniRHA6qCrErCRnzrWxPHxYuA62a+CAFYUVxJgaI
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.fp.bb b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.fp.bb
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e1cc664c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.fp.bb
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+xufag-danul-putub-mokin-pugaz-covid-dofag-nihuz-sysab-genar-zaxyx
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.param.curve b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.param.curve
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..617ea2fb8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.param.curve
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+secp521r1
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.param.priv b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.param.priv
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..dd898d9ab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.param.priv
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+01a81b4dedee84b2c777765b202125623c25d70b46ad94d906b683204907414ca5547de24e8b895c45969725d5e7a9652a23f284b07f21f1037861c07cba098071cf
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.param.pub b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.param.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..94301c991
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.param.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+0401d9d95372a0379d070aac77363e924369b5cf43aed4425663ba7142cb8feebdd4c848b6a56a4cc25b4c5948e0c9c083d3e819317fd0a98b25fcbcbd27df5c62aaab018a70536d7755c2a3eed0bbdb576f1ae89fd83a0e6bbbcbc8da2e48b17306709f02ece86980f6a646ba201f38657419ff7fbbdf2cafebe290e6b83b0e491434f0e6
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.pub b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..be9d84bf5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHA1MjEAAAAIbmlzdHA1MjEAAACFBAHZ2VNyoDedBwqsdzY+kkNptc9DrtRCVmO6cULLj+691MhItqVqTMJbTFlI4MnAg9PoGTF/0KmLJfy8vSffXGKqqwGKcFNtd1XCo+7Qu9tXbxron9g6Dmu7y8jaLkixcwZwnwLs6GmA9qZGuiAfOGV0Gf9/u98sr+vikOa4Ow5JFDTw5g== ECDSA test key #2
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_n b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_n
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..80382b62d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_n
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
+MHcCAQEEIPPNyUAnjvFr+eT/7t/IyjuQQd/aLFiTY92LB9gIjyrMoAoGCCqGSM49
+AwEHoUQDQgAEDFlblkOrW9ydKVhtM+9AY3c9saBE7SG3lFx38nBavkADDaI9jh3/
+kvG/Jt9vpm22qwoklTCGDfzCkXkIKaWlBw==
+-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_n_pw b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_n_pw
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..36b7fa787
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_n_pw
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
+b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAACmFlczI1Ni1jYmMAAAAGYmNyeXB0AAAAGAAAABC4UwEov5
+z0RrCm7AMCxbuiAAAAEAAAAAEAAABoAAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlz
+dHAyNTYAAABBBAxZW5ZDq1vcnSlYbTPvQGN3PbGgRO0ht5Rcd/JwWr5AAw2iPY4d/5Lxvy
+bfb6ZttqsKJJUwhg38wpF5CCmlpQcAAACgbCnAklQTHrf5qiHiMxKYwQJ7k/X9mp4fXD4v
+xUbgNZiXSxN26mn8mC2rH+WA6Lk3CexR/hrtLI2ndpBsYu1h6HhVkOwwm3Kd/PMKArCupW
+l6sYEabrT0EghXR/3aDEZvj79hgKSdu3RpayLvMdbCR8k1cg0/mDmR9hicWfeJ61n/IH05
+tUR268+0BVRW9kDhh/cuv8tVY4L09jCCQ6CpsA==
+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1 b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6b0ae01cf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
+b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAAMwAAAAtzc2gtZW
+QyNTUxOQAAACBThupGO0X+FLQhbz8CoKPwc7V3JNsQuGtlsgN+F7SMGQAAAJjnj4Ao54+A
+KAAAAAtzc2gtZWQyNTUxOQAAACBThupGO0X+FLQhbz8CoKPwc7V3JNsQuGtlsgN+F7SMGQ
+AAAED3KgoDbjR54V7bdNpfKlQY5m20UK1QaHytkCR+6rZEDFOG6kY7Rf4UtCFvPwKgo/Bz
+tXck2xC4a2WyA34XtIwZAAAAE0VEMjU1MTkgdGVzdCBrZXkgIzEBAg==
+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1-cert.fp b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1-cert.fp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a9674e2b0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1-cert.fp
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+SHA256:L3k/oJubblSY0lB9Ulsl7emDMnRPKm/8udf2ccwk560
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1-cert.pub b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1-cert.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..649b4e804
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1-cert.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com AAAAIHNzaC1lZDI1NTE5LWNlcnQtdjAxQG9wZW5zc2guY29tAAAAIIxzuxl4z3uwAIslne8Huft+1n1IhHAlNbWZkQyyECCGAAAAIFOG6kY7Rf4UtCFvPwKgo/BztXck2xC4a2WyA34XtIwZAAAAAAAAAAgAAAACAAAABmp1bGl1cwAAABIAAAAFaG9zdDEAAAAFaG9zdDIAAAAANowB8AAAAABNHmBwAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAMwAAAAtzc2gtZWQyNTUxOQAAACBThupGO0X+FLQhbz8CoKPwc7V3JNsQuGtlsgN+F7SMGQAAAFMAAAALc3NoLWVkMjU1MTkAAABABGTn+Bmz86Ajk+iqKCSdP5NClsYzn4alJd0V5bizhP0Kumc/HbqQfSt684J1WdSzih+EjvnTgBhK9jTBKb90AQ== ED25519 test key #1
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1.fp b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1.fp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a9674e2b0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1.fp
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+SHA256:L3k/oJubblSY0lB9Ulsl7emDMnRPKm/8udf2ccwk560
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1.fp.bb b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1.fp.bb
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..309f2dafc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1.fp.bb
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+xubop-rekyd-bakal-nubuf-pahaf-gicuh-logeb-gocif-petod-galip-fuxux
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1.pub b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e533059ea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIFOG6kY7Rf4UtCFvPwKgo/BztXck2xC4a2WyA34XtIwZ ED25519 test key #1
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1_pw b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1_pw
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c3b7ae7f8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1_pw
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
+b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAACmFlczI1Ni1jYmMAAAAGYmNyeXB0AAAAGAAAABCus+kaow
+AUjHphacvRp98dAAAAEAAAAAEAAAAzAAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIFOG6kY7Rf4UtCFv
+PwKgo/BztXck2xC4a2WyA34XtIwZAAAAoJaqqgiYQuElraJAmYOm7Tb4nJ3eI4oj9mQ52M
+/Yd+ION2Ur1v8BDewpDX+LHEYgKHo3Mlmcn2UyF+QJ+7xUCW7QCtk/4szrJzw74DlEl6mH
+T8PT/f/av7PpECBD/YD3NoDlB9OWm/Q4sHcxfBEKfTGD7s2Onn71HgrdEOPqd4Sj/IQigR
+drfjtXEMlD32k9n3dd2eS9x7AHWYaGFEMkOcY=
+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2 b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e4aed6398
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
+b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAAMwAAAAtzc2gtZW
+QyNTUxOQAAACDPVKyLnm3eZE0lm0IfM3Uy9AsdGSBtozcoCt21blYBCwAAAJix1mBGsdZg
+RgAAAAtzc2gtZWQyNTUxOQAAACDPVKyLnm3eZE0lm0IfM3Uy9AsdGSBtozcoCt21blYBCw
+AAAECZEQHXs18o3DKjhUYaTyt+bUbhqfMeqmsKjYyFvzGVgs9UrIuebd5kTSWbQh8zdTL0
+Cx0ZIG2jNygK3bVuVgELAAAAE0VEMjU1MTkgdGVzdCBrZXkgIzEBAg==
+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2.fp b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2.fp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..049662672
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2.fp
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+SHA256:vMbaARqVciRgXyZPNHDo+P5p5WK5yWG1Oo6VC35Bomw
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2.fp.bb b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2.fp.bb
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..abba78901
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2.fp.bb
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+xuces-bapyb-vikob-zesyv-budod-nupip-kebon-tacyc-fofed-lezic-soxax
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2.pub b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..af34236e7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIM9UrIuebd5kTSWbQh8zdTL0Cx0ZIG2jNygK3bVuVgEL ED25519 test key #1
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/pw b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/pw
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8a1dff98a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/pw
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+mekmitasdigoat
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1 b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..161cc04dc
Binary files /dev/null and b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1 differ
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.fp b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.fp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..21b3d1a9a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.fp
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+SHA256:/kk7K9S9kwYFiFilnZYFwCsQJweI/SGQVR2nIa8VBhE
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.fp.bb b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.fp.bb
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..62991b3e0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.fp.bb
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+xilil-nabyf-gynih-duheb-gokyp-bofet-nekac-bosod-lozin-kuvyh-poxix
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.param.n b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.param.n
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9a2549bbb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.param.n
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+00ce8ca77a556eba887f9a866c084a6402785354a81c10854d343181fa09351223a65f99915f8433d11a9c41677d307c03c3a39865b83e7172d2c1d878333c980438d6e4462106a0065cd75cfea7ca7f21538bf2f43f2af49cacee51b22e3bdcc5e87b59cc691f7c6942a77ef13bfdfb24300777b727348d0ba7900ba06b886729
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.pub b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f665b0d64
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+1024 65537 145043942670517902781741650890610683756045780348507433188994725700923246927874581962206512480287863636935077725837494808988986557337885675565086448774391442851909709751605441036910145362277967349042489937363543710406342212883803780768870873303921572812138116796733586484633244057911618360651775855949808953129 RSA1 test key #1
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1_pw b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1_pw
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e73c6794a
Binary files /dev/null and b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1_pw differ
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2 b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1d672ddea
Binary files /dev/null and b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2 differ
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.fp b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.fp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..00516d521
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.fp
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+SHA256:JaOeRCnLl/TLe7vn1+aQ4ONyKZCUhK5x3k4VHilmbpE
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.fp.bb b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.fp.bb
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b4989a588
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.fp.bb
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+xipag-zohut-zepuk-pisyv-kamog-pupus-netud-tudis-melup-cynov-gaxox
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.param.n b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.param.n
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..25d438d06
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.param.n
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.pub b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..acab6dda6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+2048 65537 25587207108642486834576012232250034427766229965612147538722032399009467293691448851087324679403117563681753304072089087252850866332601294130674473984011813227791089686736237645788471744456489819306046398653719249100878753563464696688916667605969658659855996383142110932332560049231682024775766802333675397528993897914717996946881193454997890776063024953924432026083898531677702536941151535135950834711001926404724453460085864892836473957600610133803037286539329764689125111700732309717375455919436557475211197800228646235077584780367991159670572954337165006813357814232200750568307753718414790655085790471723847208627 RSA1 test key #2
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1 b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5de3f8422
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1-cert.fp b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1-cert.fp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..79f380a25
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1-cert.fp
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+SHA256:l6itGumSMcRBBAFteCgmjQBIXqLK/jFGUH3viHX1RmE
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1-cert.pub b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1-cert.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3bacf3c8f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1-cert.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 RSA test key #1
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.fp b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.fp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..79f380a25
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.fp
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+SHA256:l6itGumSMcRBBAFteCgmjQBIXqLK/jFGUH3viHX1RmE
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.fp.bb b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.fp.bb
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..45bacd519
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.fp.bb
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+xosis-fodod-votot-dibum-ryvac-rediz-naruf-votun-kevis-halis-gexux
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.param.n b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.param.n
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..493371213
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.param.n
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+00cb5799544edec5ac00ec781fc21a1119ce9a288e3116e72f3e78fbcba6998adcc98c235f2e77abf1ce92b76f064b624552c9f2582341e622e1a176eef232b5bac1bf3881babc0b7d57a1ef4439170852e192bc329d3523354a39610eab916e50c507c913a2a5f2c7596aad779c5f297121438bd2313ebb4ad4d7debba43271fb
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.param.p b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.param.p
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4783d215e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.param.p
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+00f56077ef05be4574906f52175ed8897e8da1626bc9b055534d6a20f6102c57c7a0b31b3e7864b101f4d3d57c35192bc949e14243a9e956361de23c5dd179f583
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.param.q b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.param.q
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..00fc8a2df
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.param.q
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+00d42541cc014be26370a657953f3adfcbaf713f781639adba33133f184eb3c7d8c2ec7810dca3da58a746fc5b87b34f396934436832e619c67c22f32ebbb36029
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.pub b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..23ef872e0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQDLV5lUTt7FrADseB/CGhEZzpoojjEW5y8+ePvLppmK3MmMI18ud6vxzpK3bwZLYkVSyfJYI0HmIuGhdu7yMrW6wb84gbq8C31Xoe9EORcIUuGSvDKdNSM1SjlhDquRblDFB8kToqXyx1lqrXecXylxIUOL0jE+u0rU1967pDJx+w== RSA test key #1
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1_pw b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1_pw
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b4c067458
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1_pw
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED
+DEK-Info: AES-128-CBC,0C3F819F6EEA66A471BAEEDDA8171606
+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-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2 b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2441d52bf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.fp b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.fp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4659639db
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.fp
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+SHA256:NoQh0XBUuYUSWqnzOzOBnfpgJTRWLMj7BlWAb8IbjeE
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.fp.bb b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.fp.bb
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e9d1e4a57
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.fp.bb
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+xogit-gupof-mydon-hocep-zuval-feson-rarif-cefar-tobar-ryvap-kuxex
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.param.n b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.param.n
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a669dbf0b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.param.n
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.param.p b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.param.p
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..be7c1c36c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.param.p
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+00fb82dee3474e88898acebcf23b8a970737490ea07abe5f7c0837c9a36111ca4792f3ad759945fc27d7f78c5accca2ffd8a85c24be949274ab17f8f797b9aaa76f584f28d617e6de3953d46307fa31ec12108ffdab3f105fb3df54156f4728fe07b1598bbb5c5e260d4f73d8b29532bfc6b9f07d8899f87ec819571c8b38e7a87
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.param.q b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.param.q
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6f2c542df
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.param.q
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+00f92f9f57e501dc41cc91ff3b4ad7a2283612d66c0d130f639d4c18376a54e5b5e1939f4d5966bb43929e448a426dadc1fae84cf0d56f64d8df04d1badcfc1fdc8e156d5cd4dcf860ec936fc166261136156010f6df10a70525867d7989fef6752fd8db6faf3fe018bbbc1fa862fb4155445e1a398468d78b4e77884bdf5c197d
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.pub b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3322fbc9b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQD00RRenvxICSYvj54CPiYHM86OT5xwI9XORNH6Zkl3JPCQkAEdQ3hyfhraROaHsSv43wJcKyKrEg5XUZ8fZ/BoKIGU4Rd5AmL9wyPGv2RVY7gWELqXVSpu89R2tQJRmMVMD38CH0wqCTuoZirlKMTen6yfgYuFEpuqar0uOIeAyaQG6/9rVKWK36tcfM7YXx8fmGSN4eK/JhWDDjlo28YJ7ZFF9umh5baZG2Ai/vL3BJ7C3pqaEQNdKj8XqaSoDvFWKfOujk1620Rcuj3W0D0dvp/rH8xz8YkM1dMqGlYIZ4nrF5acB58Nk5FYBjtj1hu4DGEQlWL1Avk1agU4DQLr RSA test key #2
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_n b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_n
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5de3f8422
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_n
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_n_pw b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_n_pw
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..dc18373bc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_n_pw
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/tests.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/tests.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..13f265cdb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/tests.c
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+/* 	$OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.1 2014/06/24 01:14:18 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Regress test for sshbuf.h buffer API
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
+
+void sshkey_tests(void);
+void sshkey_file_tests(void);
+void sshkey_fuzz_tests(void);
+
+void
+tests(void)
+{
+	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+	ERR_load_CRYPTO_strings();
+
+	sshkey_tests();
+	sshkey_file_tests();
+	sshkey_fuzz_tests();
+}
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/test_helper/Makefile b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/test_helper/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5b3894cbf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/test_helper/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.2 2015/01/20 22:58:57 djm Exp $
+
+LIB=	test_helper
+SRCS=	test_helper.c fuzz.c
+
+DEBUGLIBS= no
+NOPROFILE= yes
+NOPIC=	yes
+
+# Hack to allow building with SUBDIR in ../../Makefile
+regress: all
+
+install:
+	@echo -n
+
+.include <bsd.lib.mk>
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/test_helper/fuzz.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/test_helper/fuzz.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..99f1d036c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/test_helper/fuzz.c
@@ -0,0 +1,438 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: fuzz.c,v 1.8 2015/03/03 20:42:49 djm Exp $	*/
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* Utility functions/framework for fuzz tests */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "test_helper.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+
+/* #define FUZZ_DEBUG */
+
+#ifdef FUZZ_DEBUG
+# define FUZZ_DBG(x) do { \
+		printf("%s:%d %s: ", __FILE__, __LINE__, __func__); \
+		printf x; \
+		printf("\n"); \
+		fflush(stdout); \
+	} while (0)
+#else
+# define FUZZ_DBG(x)
+#endif
+
+/* For brevity later */
+typedef unsigned long long fuzz_ullong;
+
+/* For base-64 fuzzing */
+static const char fuzz_b64chars[] =
+    "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/";
+
+struct fuzz {
+	/* Fuzz method currently in use */
+	int strategy;
+
+	/* Fuzz methods remaining */
+	int strategies;
+
+	/* Original seed data blob */
+	void *seed;
+	size_t slen;
+
+	/* Current working copy of seed with fuzz mutations applied */
+	u_char *fuzzed;
+
+	/* Used by fuzz methods */
+	size_t o1, o2;
+};
+
+static const char *
+fuzz_ntop(u_int n)
+{
+	switch (n) {
+	case 0:
+		return "NONE";
+	case FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP:
+		return "FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP";
+	case FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP:
+		return "FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP";
+	case FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP:
+		return "FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP";
+	case FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP:
+		return "FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP";
+	case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START:
+		return "FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START";
+	case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END:
+		return "FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END";
+	case FUZZ_BASE64:
+		return "FUZZ_BASE64";
+	default:
+		abort();
+	}
+}
+
+static int
+fuzz_fmt(struct fuzz *fuzz, char *s, size_t n)
+{
+	if (fuzz == NULL)
+		return -1;
+
+	switch (fuzz->strategy) {
+	case FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP:
+		snprintf(s, n, "%s case %zu of %zu (bit: %zu)\n",
+		    fuzz_ntop(fuzz->strategy),
+		    fuzz->o1, fuzz->slen * 8, fuzz->o1);
+		return 0;
+	case FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP:
+		snprintf(s, n, "%s case %llu of %llu (bits: %zu, %zu)\n",
+		    fuzz_ntop(fuzz->strategy),
+		    (((fuzz_ullong)fuzz->o2) * fuzz->slen * 8) + fuzz->o1,
+		    ((fuzz_ullong)fuzz->slen * 8) * fuzz->slen * 8,
+		    fuzz->o1, fuzz->o2);
+		return 0;
+	case FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP:
+		snprintf(s, n, "%s case %zu of %zu (byte: %zu)\n",
+		    fuzz_ntop(fuzz->strategy),
+		    fuzz->o1, fuzz->slen, fuzz->o1);
+		return 0;
+	case FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP:
+		snprintf(s, n, "%s case %llu of %llu (bytes: %zu, %zu)\n",
+		    fuzz_ntop(fuzz->strategy),
+		    (((fuzz_ullong)fuzz->o2) * fuzz->slen) + fuzz->o1,
+		    ((fuzz_ullong)fuzz->slen) * fuzz->slen,
+		    fuzz->o1, fuzz->o2);
+		return 0;
+	case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START:
+		snprintf(s, n, "%s case %zu of %zu (offset: %zu)\n",
+		    fuzz_ntop(fuzz->strategy),
+		    fuzz->o1, fuzz->slen, fuzz->o1);
+		return 0;
+	case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END:
+		snprintf(s, n, "%s case %zu of %zu (offset: %zu)\n",
+		    fuzz_ntop(fuzz->strategy),
+		    fuzz->o1, fuzz->slen, fuzz->o1);
+		return 0;
+	case FUZZ_BASE64:
+		assert(fuzz->o2 < sizeof(fuzz_b64chars) - 1);
+		snprintf(s, n, "%s case %llu of %llu (offset: %zu char: %c)\n",
+		    fuzz_ntop(fuzz->strategy),
+		    (fuzz->o1 * (fuzz_ullong)64) + fuzz->o2,
+		    fuzz->slen * (fuzz_ullong)64, fuzz->o1,
+		    fuzz_b64chars[fuzz->o2]);
+		return 0;
+	default:
+		return -1;
+		abort();
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+dump(u_char *p, size_t len)
+{
+	size_t i, j;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i += 16) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "%.4zd: ", i);
+		for (j = i; j < i + 16; j++) {
+			if (j < len)
+				fprintf(stderr, "%02x ", p[j]);
+			else
+				fprintf(stderr, "   ");
+		}
+		fprintf(stderr, " ");
+		for (j = i; j < i + 16; j++) {
+			if (j < len) {
+				if  (isascii(p[j]) && isprint(p[j]))
+					fprintf(stderr, "%c", p[j]);
+				else
+					fprintf(stderr, ".");
+			}
+		}
+		fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+	}
+}
+
+void
+fuzz_dump(struct fuzz *fuzz)
+{
+	char buf[256];
+
+	if (fuzz_fmt(fuzz, buf, sizeof(buf)) != 0) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "%s: fuzz invalid\n", __func__);
+		abort();
+	}
+	fputs(buf, stderr);
+	fprintf(stderr, "fuzz original %p len = %zu\n", fuzz->seed, fuzz->slen);
+	dump(fuzz->seed, fuzz->slen);
+	fprintf(stderr, "fuzz context %p len = %zu\n", fuzz, fuzz_len(fuzz));
+	dump(fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz));
+}
+
+#ifdef SIGINFO
+static struct fuzz *last_fuzz;
+
+static void
+siginfo(int unused __attribute__((__unused__)))
+{
+	char buf[256];
+
+	test_info(buf, sizeof(buf));
+	atomicio(vwrite, STDERR_FILENO, buf, strlen(buf));
+	if (last_fuzz != NULL) {
+		fuzz_fmt(last_fuzz, buf, sizeof(buf));
+		atomicio(vwrite, STDERR_FILENO, buf, strlen(buf));
+	}
+}
+#endif
+
+struct fuzz *
+fuzz_begin(u_int strategies, const void *p, size_t l)
+{
+	struct fuzz *ret = calloc(sizeof(*ret), 1);
+
+	assert(p != NULL);
+	assert(ret != NULL);
+	ret->seed = malloc(l);
+	assert(ret->seed != NULL);
+	memcpy(ret->seed, p, l);
+	ret->slen = l;
+	ret->strategies = strategies;
+
+	assert(ret->slen < SIZE_MAX / 8);
+	assert(ret->strategies <= (FUZZ_MAX|(FUZZ_MAX-1)));
+
+	FUZZ_DBG(("begin, ret = %p", ret));
+
+	fuzz_next(ret);
+
+#ifdef SIGINFO
+	last_fuzz = ret;
+	signal(SIGINFO, siginfo);
+#endif
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+void
+fuzz_cleanup(struct fuzz *fuzz)
+{
+	FUZZ_DBG(("cleanup, fuzz = %p", fuzz));
+#ifdef SIGINFO
+	last_fuzz = NULL;
+	signal(SIGINFO, SIG_DFL);
+#endif
+	assert(fuzz != NULL);
+	assert(fuzz->seed != NULL);
+	assert(fuzz->fuzzed != NULL);
+	free(fuzz->seed);
+	free(fuzz->fuzzed);
+	free(fuzz);
+}
+
+static int
+fuzz_strategy_done(struct fuzz *fuzz)
+{
+	FUZZ_DBG(("fuzz = %p, strategy = %s, o1 = %zu, o2 = %zu, slen = %zu",
+	    fuzz, fuzz_ntop(fuzz->strategy), fuzz->o1, fuzz->o2, fuzz->slen));
+
+	switch (fuzz->strategy) {
+	case FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP:
+		return fuzz->o1 >= fuzz->slen * 8;
+	case FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP:
+		return fuzz->o2 >= fuzz->slen * 8;
+	case FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP:
+		return fuzz->o2 >= fuzz->slen;
+	case FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP:
+	case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START:
+	case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END:
+	case FUZZ_BASE64:
+		return fuzz->o1 >= fuzz->slen;
+	default:
+		abort();
+	}
+}
+
+void
+fuzz_next(struct fuzz *fuzz)
+{
+	u_int i;
+
+	FUZZ_DBG(("start, fuzz = %p, strategy = %s, strategies = 0x%lx, "
+	    "o1 = %zu, o2 = %zu, slen = %zu", fuzz, fuzz_ntop(fuzz->strategy),
+	    (u_long)fuzz->strategies, fuzz->o1, fuzz->o2, fuzz->slen));
+
+	if (fuzz->strategy == 0 || fuzz_strategy_done(fuzz)) {
+		/* If we are just starting out, we need to allocate too */
+		if (fuzz->fuzzed == NULL) {
+			FUZZ_DBG(("alloc"));
+			fuzz->fuzzed = calloc(fuzz->slen, 1);
+		}
+		/* Pick next strategy */
+		FUZZ_DBG(("advance"));
+		for (i = 1; i <= FUZZ_MAX; i <<= 1) {
+			if ((fuzz->strategies & i) != 0) {
+				fuzz->strategy = i;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		FUZZ_DBG(("selected = %u", fuzz->strategy));
+		if (fuzz->strategy == 0) {
+			FUZZ_DBG(("done, no more strategies"));
+			return;
+		}
+		fuzz->strategies &= ~(fuzz->strategy);
+		fuzz->o1 = fuzz->o2 = 0;
+	}
+
+	assert(fuzz->fuzzed != NULL);
+
+	switch (fuzz->strategy) {
+	case FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP:
+		assert(fuzz->o1 / 8 < fuzz->slen);
+		memcpy(fuzz->fuzzed, fuzz->seed, fuzz->slen);
+		fuzz->fuzzed[fuzz->o1 / 8] ^= 1 << (fuzz->o1 % 8);
+		fuzz->o1++;
+		break;
+	case FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP:
+		assert(fuzz->o1 / 8 < fuzz->slen);
+		assert(fuzz->o2 / 8 < fuzz->slen);
+		memcpy(fuzz->fuzzed, fuzz->seed, fuzz->slen);
+		fuzz->fuzzed[fuzz->o1 / 8] ^= 1 << (fuzz->o1 % 8);
+		fuzz->fuzzed[fuzz->o2 / 8] ^= 1 << (fuzz->o2 % 8);
+		fuzz->o1++;
+		if (fuzz->o1 >= fuzz->slen * 8) {
+			fuzz->o1 = 0;
+			fuzz->o2++;
+		}
+		break;
+	case FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP:
+		assert(fuzz->o1 < fuzz->slen);
+		memcpy(fuzz->fuzzed, fuzz->seed, fuzz->slen);
+		fuzz->fuzzed[fuzz->o1] ^= 0xff;
+		fuzz->o1++;
+		break;
+	case FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP:
+		assert(fuzz->o1 < fuzz->slen);
+		assert(fuzz->o2 < fuzz->slen);
+		memcpy(fuzz->fuzzed, fuzz->seed, fuzz->slen);
+		fuzz->fuzzed[fuzz->o1] ^= 0xff;
+		fuzz->fuzzed[fuzz->o2] ^= 0xff;
+		fuzz->o1++;
+		if (fuzz->o1 >= fuzz->slen) {
+			fuzz->o1 = 0;
+			fuzz->o2++;
+		}
+		break;
+	case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START:
+	case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END:
+		assert(fuzz->o1 < fuzz->slen);
+		memcpy(fuzz->fuzzed, fuzz->seed, fuzz->slen);
+		fuzz->o1++;
+		break;
+	case FUZZ_BASE64:
+		assert(fuzz->o1 < fuzz->slen);
+		assert(fuzz->o2 < sizeof(fuzz_b64chars) - 1);
+		memcpy(fuzz->fuzzed, fuzz->seed, fuzz->slen);
+		fuzz->fuzzed[fuzz->o1] = fuzz_b64chars[fuzz->o2];
+		fuzz->o2++;
+		if (fuzz->o2 >= sizeof(fuzz_b64chars) - 1) {
+			fuzz->o2 = 0;
+			fuzz->o1++;
+		}
+		break;
+	default:
+		abort();
+	}
+
+	FUZZ_DBG(("done, fuzz = %p, strategy = %s, strategies = 0x%lx, "
+	    "o1 = %zu, o2 = %zu, slen = %zu", fuzz, fuzz_ntop(fuzz->strategy),
+	    (u_long)fuzz->strategies, fuzz->o1, fuzz->o2, fuzz->slen));
+}
+
+int
+fuzz_matches_original(struct fuzz *fuzz)
+{
+	if (fuzz_len(fuzz) != fuzz->slen)
+		return 0;
+	return memcmp(fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz->seed, fuzz->slen) == 0;
+}
+
+int
+fuzz_done(struct fuzz *fuzz)
+{
+	FUZZ_DBG(("fuzz = %p, strategies = 0x%lx", fuzz,
+	    (u_long)fuzz->strategies));
+
+	return fuzz_strategy_done(fuzz) && fuzz->strategies == 0;
+}
+
+size_t
+fuzz_len(struct fuzz *fuzz)
+{
+	assert(fuzz->fuzzed != NULL);
+	switch (fuzz->strategy) {
+	case FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP:
+	case FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP:
+	case FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP:
+	case FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP:
+	case FUZZ_BASE64:
+		return fuzz->slen;
+	case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START:
+	case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END:
+		assert(fuzz->o1 <= fuzz->slen);
+		return fuzz->slen - fuzz->o1;
+	default:
+		abort();
+	}
+}
+
+u_char *
+fuzz_ptr(struct fuzz *fuzz)
+{
+	assert(fuzz->fuzzed != NULL);
+	switch (fuzz->strategy) {
+	case FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP:
+	case FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP:
+	case FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP:
+	case FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP:
+	case FUZZ_BASE64:
+		return fuzz->fuzzed;
+	case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START:
+		assert(fuzz->o1 <= fuzz->slen);
+		return fuzz->fuzzed + fuzz->o1;
+	case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END:
+		assert(fuzz->o1 <= fuzz->slen);
+		return fuzz->fuzzed;
+	default:
+		abort();
+	}
+}
+
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..26ca26b5e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.c
@@ -0,0 +1,526 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: test_helper.c,v 1.6 2015/03/03 20:42:49 djm Exp $	*/
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* Utility functions/framework for regress tests */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+#if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS)
+# include <vis.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "test_helper.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+
+#define TEST_CHECK_INT(r, pred) do {		\
+		switch (pred) {			\
+		case TEST_EQ:			\
+			if (r == 0)		\
+				return;		\
+			break;			\
+		case TEST_NE:			\
+			if (r != 0)		\
+				return;		\
+			break;			\
+		case TEST_LT:			\
+			if (r < 0)		\
+				return;		\
+			break;			\
+		case TEST_LE:			\
+			if (r <= 0)		\
+				return;		\
+			break;			\
+		case TEST_GT:			\
+			if (r > 0)		\
+				return;		\
+			break;			\
+		case TEST_GE:			\
+			if (r >= 0)		\
+				return;		\
+			break;			\
+		default:			\
+			abort();		\
+		}				\
+	} while (0)
+
+#define TEST_CHECK(x1, x2, pred) do {		\
+		switch (pred) {			\
+		case TEST_EQ:			\
+			if (x1 == x2)		\
+				return;		\
+			break;			\
+		case TEST_NE:			\
+			if (x1 != x2)		\
+				return;		\
+			break;			\
+		case TEST_LT:			\
+			if (x1 < x2)		\
+				return;		\
+			break;			\
+		case TEST_LE:			\
+			if (x1 <= x2)		\
+				return;		\
+			break;			\
+		case TEST_GT:			\
+			if (x1 > x2)		\
+				return;		\
+			break;			\
+		case TEST_GE:			\
+			if (x1 >= x2)		\
+				return;		\
+			break;			\
+		default:			\
+			abort();		\
+		}				\
+	} while (0)
+
+extern char *__progname;
+
+static int verbose_mode = 0;
+static int quiet_mode = 0;
+static char *active_test_name = NULL;
+static u_int test_number = 0;
+static test_onerror_func_t *test_onerror = NULL;
+static void *onerror_ctx = NULL;
+static const char *data_dir = NULL;
+static char subtest_info[512];
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	int ch;
+
+	/* Handle systems without __progname */
+	if (__progname == NULL) {
+		__progname = strrchr(argv[0], '/');
+		if (__progname == NULL || __progname[1] == '\0')
+			__progname = argv[0];	
+		else
+			__progname++;
+		if ((__progname = strdup(__progname)) == NULL) {
+			fprintf(stderr, "strdup failed\n");
+			exit(1);
+		}
+	}
+
+	while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "vqd:")) != -1) {
+		switch (ch) {
+		case 'd':
+			data_dir = optarg;
+			break;
+		case 'q':
+			verbose_mode = 0;
+			quiet_mode = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'v':
+			verbose_mode = 1;
+			quiet_mode = 0;
+			break;
+		default:
+			fprintf(stderr, "Unrecognised command line option\n");
+			fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [-v]\n", __progname);
+			exit(1);
+		}
+	}
+	setvbuf(stdout, NULL, _IONBF, 0);
+	if (!quiet_mode)
+		printf("%s: ", __progname);
+	if (verbose_mode)
+		printf("\n");
+
+	tests();
+
+	if (!quiet_mode)
+		printf(" %u tests ok\n", test_number);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+const char *
+test_data_file(const char *name)
+{
+	static char ret[PATH_MAX];
+
+	if (data_dir != NULL)
+		snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "%s/%s", data_dir, name);
+	else
+		strlcpy(ret, name, sizeof(ret));
+	if (access(ret, F_OK) != 0) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Cannot access data file %s: %s\n",
+		    ret, strerror(errno));
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+void
+test_info(char *s, size_t len)
+{
+	snprintf(s, len, "In test %u: \"%s\"%s%s\n", test_number,
+	    active_test_name == NULL ? "<none>" : active_test_name,
+	    *subtest_info != '\0' ? " - " : "", subtest_info);
+}
+
+#ifdef SIGINFO
+static void
+siginfo(int unused __attribute__((__unused__)))
+{
+	char buf[256];
+
+	test_info(buf, sizeof(buf));
+	atomicio(vwrite, STDERR_FILENO, buf, strlen(buf));
+}
+#endif
+
+void
+test_start(const char *n)
+{
+	assert(active_test_name == NULL);
+	assert((active_test_name = strdup(n)) != NULL);
+	*subtest_info = '\0';
+	if (verbose_mode)
+		printf("test %u - \"%s\": ", test_number, active_test_name);
+	test_number++;
+#ifdef SIGINFO
+	signal(SIGINFO, siginfo);
+#endif
+}
+
+void
+set_onerror_func(test_onerror_func_t *f, void *ctx)
+{
+	test_onerror = f;
+	onerror_ctx = ctx;
+}
+
+void
+test_done(void)
+{
+	*subtest_info = '\0';
+	assert(active_test_name != NULL);
+	free(active_test_name);
+	active_test_name = NULL;
+	if (verbose_mode)
+		printf("OK\n");
+	else if (!quiet_mode) {
+		printf(".");
+		fflush(stdout);
+	}
+}
+
+void
+test_subtest_info(const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	va_list ap;
+
+	va_start(ap, fmt);
+	vsnprintf(subtest_info, sizeof(subtest_info), fmt, ap);
+	va_end(ap);
+}
+
+void
+ssl_err_check(const char *file, int line)
+{
+	long openssl_error = ERR_get_error();
+
+	if (openssl_error == 0)
+		return;
+
+	fprintf(stderr, "\n%s:%d: uncaught OpenSSL error: %s",
+	    file, line, ERR_error_string(openssl_error, NULL));
+	abort();
+}
+
+static const char *
+pred_name(enum test_predicate p)
+{
+	switch (p) {
+	case TEST_EQ:
+		return "EQ";
+	case TEST_NE:
+		return "NE";
+	case TEST_LT:
+		return "LT";
+	case TEST_LE:
+		return "LE";
+	case TEST_GT:
+		return "GT";
+	case TEST_GE:
+		return "GE";
+	default:
+		return "UNKNOWN";
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+test_die(void)
+{
+	if (test_onerror != NULL)
+		test_onerror(onerror_ctx);
+	abort();
+}
+
+static void
+test_header(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    const char *name, enum test_predicate pred)
+{
+	fprintf(stderr, "\n%s:%d test #%u \"%s\"%s%s\n", 
+	    file, line, test_number, active_test_name,
+	    *subtest_info != '\0' ? " - " : "", subtest_info);
+	fprintf(stderr, "ASSERT_%s_%s(%s%s%s) failed:\n",
+	    name, pred_name(pred), a1,
+	    a2 != NULL ? ", " : "", a2 != NULL ? a2 : "");
+}
+
+void
+assert_bignum(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    const BIGNUM *aa1, const BIGNUM *aa2, enum test_predicate pred)
+{
+	int r = BN_cmp(aa1, aa2);
+
+	TEST_CHECK_INT(r, pred);
+	test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "BIGNUM", pred);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%s\n", a1, BN_bn2hex(aa1));
+	fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%s\n", a2, BN_bn2hex(aa2));
+	test_die();
+}
+
+void
+assert_string(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    const char *aa1, const char *aa2, enum test_predicate pred)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	/* Verify pointers are not NULL */
+	assert_ptr(file, line, a1, "NULL", aa1, NULL, TEST_NE);
+	assert_ptr(file, line, a2, "NULL", aa2, NULL, TEST_NE);
+
+	r = strcmp(aa1, aa2);
+	TEST_CHECK_INT(r, pred);
+	test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "STRING", pred);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %s (len %zu)\n", a1, aa1, strlen(aa1));
+	fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %s (len %zu)\n", a2, aa2, strlen(aa2));
+	test_die();
+}
+
+static char *
+tohex(const void *_s, size_t l)
+{
+	u_int8_t *s = (u_int8_t *)_s;
+	size_t i, j;
+	const char *hex = "0123456789abcdef";
+	char *r = malloc((l * 2) + 1);
+
+	assert(r != NULL);
+	for (i = j = 0; i < l; i++) {
+		r[j++] = hex[(s[i] >> 4) & 0xf];
+		r[j++] = hex[s[i] & 0xf];
+	}
+	r[j] = '\0';
+	return r;
+}
+
+void
+assert_mem(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    const void *aa1, const void *aa2, size_t l, enum test_predicate pred)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (l == 0)
+		return;
+	/* If length is >0, then verify pointers are not NULL */
+	assert_ptr(file, line, a1, "NULL", aa1, NULL, TEST_NE);
+	assert_ptr(file, line, a2, "NULL", aa2, NULL, TEST_NE);
+
+	r = memcmp(aa1, aa2, l);
+	TEST_CHECK_INT(r, pred);
+	test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "STRING", pred);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %s (len %zu)\n", a1, tohex(aa1, MIN(l, 256)), l);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %s (len %zu)\n", a2, tohex(aa2, MIN(l, 256)), l);
+	test_die();
+}
+
+static int
+memvalcmp(const u_int8_t *s, u_char v, size_t l, size_t *where)
+{
+	size_t i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < l; i++) {
+		if (s[i] != v) {
+			*where = i;
+			return 1;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void
+assert_mem_filled(const char *file, int line, const char *a1,
+    const void *aa1, u_char v, size_t l, enum test_predicate pred)
+{
+	size_t where = -1;
+	int r;
+	char tmp[64];
+
+	if (l == 0)
+		return;
+	/* If length is >0, then verify the pointer is not NULL */
+	assert_ptr(file, line, a1, "NULL", aa1, NULL, TEST_NE);
+
+	r = memvalcmp(aa1, v, l, &where);
+	TEST_CHECK_INT(r, pred);
+	test_header(file, line, a1, NULL, "MEM_ZERO", pred);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%20s = %s%s (len %zu)\n", a1,
+	    tohex(aa1, MIN(l, 20)), l > 20 ? "..." : "", l);
+	snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "(%s)[%zu]", a1, where);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%20s = 0x%02x (expected 0x%02x)\n", tmp,
+	    ((u_char *)aa1)[where], v);
+	test_die();
+}
+
+void
+assert_int(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    int aa1, int aa2, enum test_predicate pred)
+{
+	TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred);
+	test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "INT", pred);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %d\n", a1, aa1);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %d\n", a2, aa2);
+	test_die();
+}
+
+void
+assert_size_t(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    size_t aa1, size_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred)
+{
+	TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred);
+	test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "SIZE_T", pred);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %zu\n", a1, aa1);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %zu\n", a2, aa2);
+	test_die();
+}
+
+void
+assert_u_int(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    u_int aa1, u_int aa2, enum test_predicate pred)
+{
+	TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred);
+	test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "U_INT", pred);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %u / 0x%x\n", a1, aa1, aa1);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %u / 0x%x\n", a2, aa2, aa2);
+	test_die();
+}
+
+void
+assert_long_long(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    long long aa1, long long aa2, enum test_predicate pred)
+{
+	TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred);
+	test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "LONG LONG", pred);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %lld / 0x%llx\n", a1, aa1, aa1);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %lld / 0x%llx\n", a2, aa2, aa2);
+	test_die();
+}
+
+void
+assert_char(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    char aa1, char aa2, enum test_predicate pred)
+{
+	char buf[8];
+
+	TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred);
+	test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "CHAR", pred);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%12s = '%s' / 0x02%x\n", a1,
+	    vis(buf, aa1, VIS_SAFE|VIS_NL|VIS_TAB|VIS_OCTAL, 0), aa1);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%12s = '%s' / 0x02%x\n", a1,
+	    vis(buf, aa2, VIS_SAFE|VIS_NL|VIS_TAB|VIS_OCTAL, 0), aa2);
+	test_die();
+}
+
+void
+assert_u8(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    u_int8_t aa1, u_int8_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred)
+{
+	TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred);
+	test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "U8", pred);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%02x %u\n", a1, aa1, aa1);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%02x %u\n", a2, aa2, aa2);
+	test_die();
+}
+
+void
+assert_u16(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    u_int16_t aa1, u_int16_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred)
+{
+	TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred);
+	test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "U16", pred);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%04x %u\n", a1, aa1, aa1);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%04x %u\n", a2, aa2, aa2);
+	test_die();
+}
+
+void
+assert_u32(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    u_int32_t aa1, u_int32_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred)
+{
+	TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred);
+	test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "U32", pred);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%08x %u\n", a1, aa1, aa1);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%08x %u\n", a2, aa2, aa2);
+	test_die();
+}
+
+void
+assert_u64(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    u_int64_t aa1, u_int64_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred)
+{
+	TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred);
+	test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "U64", pred);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%016llx %llu\n", a1,
+	    (unsigned long long)aa1, (unsigned long long)aa1);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%016llx %llu\n", a2,
+	    (unsigned long long)aa2, (unsigned long long)aa2);
+	test_die();
+}
+
+void
+assert_ptr(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    const void *aa1, const void *aa2, enum test_predicate pred)
+{
+	TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred);
+	test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "PTR", pred);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %p\n", a1, aa1);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %p\n", a2, aa2);
+	test_die();
+}
+
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.h b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1d9c66986
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.h
@@ -0,0 +1,303 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: test_helper.h,v 1.6 2015/01/18 19:52:44 djm Exp $	*/
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* Utility functions/framework for regress tests */
+
+#ifndef _TEST_HELPER_H
+#define _TEST_HELPER_H
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+enum test_predicate {
+	TEST_EQ, TEST_NE, TEST_LT, TEST_LE, TEST_GT, TEST_GE
+};
+typedef void (test_onerror_func_t)(void *);
+
+/* Supplied by test suite */
+void tests(void);
+
+const char *test_data_file(const char *name);
+void test_start(const char *n);
+void test_info(char *s, size_t len);
+void set_onerror_func(test_onerror_func_t *f, void *ctx);
+void test_done(void);
+void test_subtest_info(const char *fmt, ...)
+    __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+void ssl_err_check(const char *file, int line);
+void assert_bignum(const char *file, int line,
+    const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    const BIGNUM *aa1, const BIGNUM *aa2, enum test_predicate pred);
+void assert_string(const char *file, int line,
+    const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    const char *aa1, const char *aa2, enum test_predicate pred);
+void assert_mem(const char *file, int line,
+    const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    const void *aa1, const void *aa2, size_t l, enum test_predicate pred);
+void assert_mem_filled(const char *file, int line,
+    const char *a1,
+    const void *aa1, u_char v, size_t l, enum test_predicate pred);
+void assert_int(const char *file, int line,
+    const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    int aa1, int aa2, enum test_predicate pred);
+void assert_size_t(const char *file, int line,
+    const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    size_t aa1, size_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred);
+void assert_u_int(const char *file, int line,
+    const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    u_int aa1, u_int aa2, enum test_predicate pred);
+void assert_long_long(const char *file, int line,
+    const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    long long aa1, long long aa2, enum test_predicate pred);
+void assert_char(const char *file, int line,
+    const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    char aa1, char aa2, enum test_predicate pred);
+void assert_ptr(const char *file, int line,
+    const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    const void *aa1, const void *aa2, enum test_predicate pred);
+void assert_u8(const char *file, int line,
+    const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    u_int8_t aa1, u_int8_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred);
+void assert_u16(const char *file, int line,
+    const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    u_int16_t aa1, u_int16_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred);
+void assert_u32(const char *file, int line,
+    const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    u_int32_t aa1, u_int32_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred);
+void assert_u64(const char *file, int line,
+    const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    u_int64_t aa1, u_int64_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred);
+
+#define TEST_START(n)			test_start(n)
+#define TEST_DONE()			test_done()
+#define TEST_ONERROR(f, c)		set_onerror_func(f, c)
+#define SSL_ERR_CHECK() 		ssl_err_check(__FILE__, __LINE__)
+
+#define ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(a1, a2) \
+	assert_bignum(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ)
+#define ASSERT_STRING_EQ(a1, a2) \
+	assert_string(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ)
+#define ASSERT_MEM_EQ(a1, a2, l) \
+	assert_mem(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, l, TEST_EQ)
+#define ASSERT_MEM_FILLED_EQ(a1, c, l) \
+	assert_mem_filled(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, a1, c, l, TEST_EQ)
+#define ASSERT_MEM_ZERO_EQ(a1, l) \
+	assert_mem_filled(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, a1, '\0', l, TEST_EQ)
+#define ASSERT_INT_EQ(a1, a2) \
+	assert_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ)
+#define ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(a1, a2) \
+	assert_size_t(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ)
+#define ASSERT_U_INT_EQ(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ)
+#define ASSERT_LONG_LONG_EQ(a1, a2) \
+	assert_long_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ)
+#define ASSERT_CHAR_EQ(a1, a2) \
+	assert_char(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ)
+#define ASSERT_PTR_EQ(a1, a2) \
+	assert_ptr(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ)
+#define ASSERT_U8_EQ(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u8(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ)
+#define ASSERT_U16_EQ(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u16(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ)
+#define ASSERT_U32_EQ(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u32(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ)
+#define ASSERT_U64_EQ(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u64(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ)
+
+#define ASSERT_BIGNUM_NE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_bignum(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE)
+#define ASSERT_STRING_NE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_string(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE)
+#define ASSERT_MEM_NE(a1, a2, l) \
+	assert_mem(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, l, TEST_NE)
+#define ASSERT_MEM_ZERO_NE(a1, l) \
+	assert_mem_filled(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, a1, '\0', l, TEST_NE)
+#define ASSERT_INT_NE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE)
+#define ASSERT_SIZE_T_NE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_size_t(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE)
+#define ASSERT_U_INT_NE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE)
+#define ASSERT_LONG_LONG_NE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_long_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE)
+#define ASSERT_CHAR_NE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_char(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE)
+#define ASSERT_PTR_NE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_ptr(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE)
+#define ASSERT_U8_NE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u8(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE)
+#define ASSERT_U16_NE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u16(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE)
+#define ASSERT_U32_NE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u32(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE)
+#define ASSERT_U64_NE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u64(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE)
+
+#define ASSERT_BIGNUM_LT(a1, a2) \
+	assert_bignum(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT)
+#define ASSERT_STRING_LT(a1, a2) \
+	assert_string(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT)
+#define ASSERT_MEM_LT(a1, a2, l) \
+	assert_mem(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, l, TEST_LT)
+#define ASSERT_INT_LT(a1, a2) \
+	assert_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT)
+#define ASSERT_SIZE_T_LT(a1, a2) \
+	assert_size_t(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT)
+#define ASSERT_U_INT_LT(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT)
+#define ASSERT_LONG_LONG_LT(a1, a2) \
+	assert_long_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT)
+#define ASSERT_CHAR_LT(a1, a2) \
+	assert_char(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT)
+#define ASSERT_PTR_LT(a1, a2) \
+	assert_ptr(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT)
+#define ASSERT_U8_LT(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u8(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT)
+#define ASSERT_U16_LT(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u16(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT)
+#define ASSERT_U32_LT(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u32(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT)
+#define ASSERT_U64_LT(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u64(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT)
+
+#define ASSERT_BIGNUM_LE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_bignum(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE)
+#define ASSERT_STRING_LE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_string(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE)
+#define ASSERT_MEM_LE(a1, a2, l) \
+	assert_mem(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, l, TEST_LE)
+#define ASSERT_INT_LE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE)
+#define ASSERT_SIZE_T_LE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_size_t(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE)
+#define ASSERT_U_INT_LE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE)
+#define ASSERT_LONG_LONG_LE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_long_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE)
+#define ASSERT_CHAR_LE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_char(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE)
+#define ASSERT_PTR_LE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_ptr(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE)
+#define ASSERT_U8_LE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u8(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE)
+#define ASSERT_U16_LE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u16(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE)
+#define ASSERT_U32_LE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u32(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE)
+#define ASSERT_U64_LE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u64(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE)
+
+#define ASSERT_BIGNUM_GT(a1, a2) \
+	assert_bignum(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT)
+#define ASSERT_STRING_GT(a1, a2) \
+	assert_string(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT)
+#define ASSERT_MEM_GT(a1, a2, l) \
+	assert_mem(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, l, TEST_GT)
+#define ASSERT_INT_GT(a1, a2) \
+	assert_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT)
+#define ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(a1, a2) \
+	assert_size_t(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT)
+#define ASSERT_U_INT_GT(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT)
+#define ASSERT_LONG_LONG_GT(a1, a2) \
+	assert_long_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT)
+#define ASSERT_CHAR_GT(a1, a2) \
+	assert_char(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT)
+#define ASSERT_PTR_GT(a1, a2) \
+	assert_ptr(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT)
+#define ASSERT_U8_GT(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u8(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT)
+#define ASSERT_U16_GT(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u16(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT)
+#define ASSERT_U32_GT(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u32(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT)
+#define ASSERT_U64_GT(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u64(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT)
+
+#define ASSERT_BIGNUM_GE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_bignum(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE)
+#define ASSERT_STRING_GE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_string(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE)
+#define ASSERT_MEM_GE(a1, a2, l) \
+	assert_mem(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, l, TEST_GE)
+#define ASSERT_INT_GE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE)
+#define ASSERT_SIZE_T_GE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_size_t(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE)
+#define ASSERT_U_INT_GE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE)
+#define ASSERT_LONG_LONG_GE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_long_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE)
+#define ASSERT_CHAR_GE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_char(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE)
+#define ASSERT_PTR_GE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_ptr(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE)
+#define ASSERT_U8_GE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u8(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE)
+#define ASSERT_U16_GE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u16(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE)
+#define ASSERT_U32_GE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u32(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE)
+#define ASSERT_U64_GE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u64(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE)
+
+/* Fuzzing support */
+
+struct fuzz;
+#define FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP		0x00000001	/* Flip one bit at a time */
+#define FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP		0x00000002	/* Flip two bits at a time */
+#define FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP	0x00000004	/* Flip one byte at a time */
+#define FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP	0x00000008	/* Flip two bytes at a time */
+#define FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START	0x00000010	/* Truncate from beginning */
+#define FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END	0x00000020	/* Truncate from end */
+#define FUZZ_BASE64		0x00000040	/* Try all base64 chars */
+#define FUZZ_MAX		FUZZ_BASE64
+
+/* Start fuzzing a blob of data with selected strategies (bitmask) */
+struct fuzz *fuzz_begin(u_int strategies, const void *p, size_t l);
+
+/* Free a fuzz context */
+void fuzz_cleanup(struct fuzz *fuzz);
+
+/* Prepare the next fuzz case in the series */
+void fuzz_next(struct fuzz *fuzz);
+
+/*
+ * Check whether this fuzz case is identical to the original
+ * This is slow, but useful if the caller needs to ensure that all tests
+ * generated change the input (e.g. when fuzzing signatures).
+ */
+int fuzz_matches_original(struct fuzz *fuzz);
+
+/* Determine whether the current fuzz sequence is exhausted (nonzero = yes) */
+int fuzz_done(struct fuzz *fuzz);
+
+/* Return the length and a pointer to the current fuzzed case */
+size_t fuzz_len(struct fuzz *fuzz);
+u_char *fuzz_ptr(struct fuzz *fuzz);
+
+/* Dump the current fuzz case to stderr */
+void fuzz_dump(struct fuzz *fuzz);
+
+#endif /* _TEST_HELPER_H */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/valgrind-unit.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/valgrind-unit.sh
new file mode 100755
index 000000000..433cb069a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/valgrind-unit.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+UNIT_BINARY="$1"
+shift
+UNIT_ARGS="$@"
+
+test "x$OBJ" = "x" && OBJ=$PWD
+
+# This mostly replicates the logic in test-exec.sh for running the
+# regress tests under valgrind.
+VG_TEST=`basename $UNIT_BINARY`
+VG_LOG="$OBJ/valgrind-out/${VG_TEST}.%p"
+VG_OPTS="--track-origins=yes --leak-check=full --log-file=${VG_LOG}"
+VG_OPTS="$VG_OPTS --trace-children=yes"
+VG_PATH="valgrind"
+if [ "x$VALGRIND_PATH" != "x" ]; then
+	VG_PATH="$VALGRIND_PATH"
+fi
+
+exec $VG_PATH $VG_OPTS $UNIT_BINARY $UNIT_ARGS
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/yes-head.sh b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/yes-head.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1fc754211
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/regress/yes-head.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: yes-head.sh,v 1.5 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="yes pipe head"
+
+for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+	lines=`${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy thishost 'sh -c "while true;do echo yes;done | _POSIX2_VERSION=199209 head -2000"' | (sleep 3 ; wc -l)`
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "yes|head test failed"
+		lines = 0;
+	fi
+	if [ $lines -ne 2000 ]; then
+		fail "yes|head returns $lines lines instead of 2000"
+	fi
+done
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/sandbox-capsicum.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/sandbox-capsicum.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..655f0d217
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/sandbox-capsicum.c
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2011 Dag-Erling Smorgrav
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef SANDBOX_CAPSICUM
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#include <sys/capability.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "monitor.h"
+#include "ssh-sandbox.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+/*
+ * Capsicum sandbox that sets zero nfiles, nprocs and filesize rlimits,
+ * limits rights on stdout, stdin, stderr, monitor and switches to
+ * capability mode.
+ */
+
+struct ssh_sandbox {
+	struct monitor *monitor;
+	pid_t child_pid;
+};
+
+struct ssh_sandbox *
+ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *monitor)
+{
+	struct ssh_sandbox *box;
+
+	/*
+	 * Strictly, we don't need to maintain any state here but we need
+	 * to return non-NULL to satisfy the API.
+	 */
+	debug3("%s: preparing capsicum sandbox", __func__);
+	box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box));
+	box->monitor = monitor;
+	box->child_pid = 0;
+
+	return box;
+}
+
+void
+ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
+{
+	struct rlimit rl_zero;
+	cap_rights_t rights;
+
+	rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0;
+
+	if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, { 0, 0 }): %s",
+			__func__, strerror(errno));
+#ifndef SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_NOFILE
+	if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, { 0, 0 }): %s",
+			__func__, strerror(errno));
+#endif
+	if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &rl_zero) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, { 0, 0 }): %s",
+			__func__, strerror(errno));
+
+	cap_rights_init(&rights);
+
+	if (cap_rights_limit(STDIN_FILENO, &rights) < 0 && errno != ENOSYS)
+		fatal("can't limit stdin: %m");
+	if (cap_rights_limit(STDOUT_FILENO, &rights) < 0 && errno != ENOSYS)
+		fatal("can't limit stdout: %m");
+	if (cap_rights_limit(STDERR_FILENO, &rights) < 0 && errno != ENOSYS)
+		fatal("can't limit stderr: %m");
+
+	cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE);
+	if (cap_rights_limit(box->monitor->m_recvfd, &rights) < 0 &&
+	    errno != ENOSYS)
+		fatal("%s: failed to limit the network socket", __func__);
+	cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_WRITE);
+	if (cap_rights_limit(box->monitor->m_log_sendfd, &rights) < 0 &&
+	    errno != ENOSYS)
+		fatal("%s: failed to limit the logging socket", __func__);
+	if (cap_enter() < 0 && errno != ENOSYS)
+		fatal("%s: failed to enter capability mode", __func__);
+
+}
+
+void
+ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
+{
+	free(box);
+	debug3("%s: finished", __func__);
+}
+
+void
+ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid)
+{
+	box->child_pid = child_pid;
+}
+
+#endif /* SANDBOX_CAPSICUM */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/sandbox-darwin.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/sandbox-darwin.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..35f0c4d1a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/sandbox-darwin.c
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef SANDBOX_DARWIN
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <sandbox.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "sandbox.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+/* Darwin/OS X sandbox */
+
+struct ssh_sandbox {
+	pid_t child_pid;
+};
+
+struct ssh_sandbox *
+ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *monitor)
+{
+	struct ssh_sandbox *box;
+
+	/*
+	 * Strictly, we don't need to maintain any state here but we need
+	 * to return non-NULL to satisfy the API.
+	 */
+	debug3("%s: preparing Darwin sandbox", __func__);
+	box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box));
+	box->child_pid = 0;
+
+	return box;
+}
+
+void
+ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
+{
+	char *errmsg;
+	struct rlimit rl_zero;
+
+	debug3("%s: starting Darwin sandbox", __func__);
+	if (sandbox_init(kSBXProfilePureComputation, SANDBOX_NAMED,
+	    &errmsg) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: sandbox_init: %s", __func__, errmsg);
+
+	/*
+	 * The kSBXProfilePureComputation still allows sockets, so
+	 * we must disable these using rlimit.
+	 */
+	rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0;
+	if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, { 0, 0 }): %s",
+			__func__, strerror(errno));
+	if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, { 0, 0 }): %s",
+			__func__, strerror(errno));
+	if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &rl_zero) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, { 0, 0 }): %s",
+			__func__, strerror(errno));
+}
+
+void
+ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
+{
+	free(box);
+	debug3("%s: finished", __func__);
+}
+
+void
+ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid)
+{
+	box->child_pid = child_pid;
+}
+
+#endif /* SANDBOX_DARWIN */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/sandbox-null.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/sandbox-null.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d4cb9188b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/sandbox-null.c
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+/* $OpenBSD$ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef SANDBOX_NULL
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "ssh-sandbox.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+/* dummy sandbox */
+
+struct ssh_sandbox {
+	int junk;
+};
+
+struct ssh_sandbox *
+ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *monitor)
+{
+	struct ssh_sandbox *box;
+
+	/*
+	 * Strictly, we don't need to maintain any state here but we need
+	 * to return non-NULL to satisfy the API.
+	 */
+	box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box));
+	return box;
+}
+
+void
+ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
+{
+	/* Nothing to do here */
+}
+
+void
+ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
+{
+	free(box);
+}
+
+void
+ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid)
+{
+	/* Nothing to do here */
+}
+
+#endif /* SANDBOX_NULL */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2462bcc88
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
@@ -0,0 +1,318 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2012 Will Drewry <wad@dataspill.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Uncomment the SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG macro below to help diagnose
+ * filter breakage during development. *Do not* use this in production,
+ * as it relies on making library calls that are unsafe in signal context.
+ *
+ * Instead, live systems the auditctl(8) may be used to monitor failures.
+ * E.g.
+ *   auditctl -a task,always -F uid=<privsep uid>
+ */
+/* #define SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG 1 */
+
+/* XXX it should be possible to do logging via the log socket safely */
+
+#ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG
+/* Use the kernel headers in case of an older toolchain. */
+# include <asm/siginfo.h>
+# define __have_siginfo_t 1
+# define __have_sigval_t 1
+# define __have_sigevent_t 1
+#endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#include <sys/prctl.h>
+
+#include <linux/net.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/filter.h>
+#include <linux/seccomp.h>
+#include <elf.h>
+
+#include <asm/unistd.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stddef.h>  /* for offsetof */
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "ssh-sandbox.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+/* Linux seccomp_filter sandbox */
+#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL SECCOMP_RET_KILL
+
+/* Use a signal handler to emit violations when debugging */
+#ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG
+# undef SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL
+# define SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL SECCOMP_RET_TRAP
+#endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */
+
+/* Simple helpers to avoid manual errors (but larger BPF programs). */
+#define SC_DENY(_nr, _errno) \
+	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_ ## _nr, 0, 1), \
+	BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO|(_errno))
+#define SC_ALLOW(_nr) \
+	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_ ## _nr, 0, 1), \
+	BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW)
+#define SC_ALLOW_ARG(_nr, _arg_nr, _arg_val) \
+	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_ ## _nr, 0, 4), \
+	/* load first syscall argument */ \
+	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
+	    offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)])), \
+	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_arg_val), 0, 1), \
+	BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), \
+	/* reload syscall number; all rules expect it in accumulator */ \
+	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
+		offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr))
+
+/* Syscall filtering set for preauth. */
+static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
+	/* Ensure the syscall arch convention is as expected. */
+	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS,
+		offsetof(struct seccomp_data, arch)),
+	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH, 1, 0),
+	BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL),
+	/* Load the syscall number for checking. */
+	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS,
+		offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
+
+	/* Syscalls to non-fatally deny */
+#ifdef __NR_fstat
+	SC_DENY(fstat, EACCES),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_fstat64
+	SC_DENY(fstat64, EACCES),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_open
+	SC_DENY(open, EACCES),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_openat
+	SC_DENY(openat, EACCES),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_newfstatat
+	SC_DENY(newfstatat, EACCES),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_stat
+	SC_DENY(stat, EACCES),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_stat64
+	SC_DENY(stat64, EACCES),
+#endif
+
+	/* Syscalls to permit */
+#ifdef __NR_brk
+	SC_ALLOW(brk),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_clock_gettime
+	SC_ALLOW(clock_gettime),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_close
+	SC_ALLOW(close),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_exit
+	SC_ALLOW(exit),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_exit_group
+	SC_ALLOW(exit_group),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_getpgid
+	SC_ALLOW(getpgid),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_getpid
+	SC_ALLOW(getpid),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_gettimeofday
+	SC_ALLOW(gettimeofday),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_madvise
+	SC_ALLOW(madvise),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_mmap
+	SC_ALLOW(mmap),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_mmap2
+	SC_ALLOW(mmap2),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_mremap
+	SC_ALLOW(mremap),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_munmap
+	SC_ALLOW(munmap),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR__newselect
+	SC_ALLOW(_newselect),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_poll
+	SC_ALLOW(poll),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_pselect6
+	SC_ALLOW(pselect6),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_read
+	SC_ALLOW(read),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_rt_sigprocmask
+	SC_ALLOW(rt_sigprocmask),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_select
+	SC_ALLOW(select),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_shutdown
+	SC_ALLOW(shutdown),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_sigprocmask
+	SC_ALLOW(sigprocmask),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_time
+	SC_ALLOW(time),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_write
+	SC_ALLOW(write),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_socketcall
+	SC_ALLOW_ARG(socketcall, 0, SYS_SHUTDOWN),
+#endif
+
+	/* Default deny */
+	BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL),
+};
+
+static const struct sock_fprog preauth_program = {
+	.len = (unsigned short)(sizeof(preauth_insns)/sizeof(preauth_insns[0])),
+	.filter = (struct sock_filter *)preauth_insns,
+};
+
+struct ssh_sandbox {
+	pid_t child_pid;
+};
+
+struct ssh_sandbox *
+ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *monitor)
+{
+	struct ssh_sandbox *box;
+
+	/*
+	 * Strictly, we don't need to maintain any state here but we need
+	 * to return non-NULL to satisfy the API.
+	 */
+	debug3("%s: preparing seccomp filter sandbox", __func__);
+	box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box));
+	box->child_pid = 0;
+
+	return box;
+}
+
+#ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG
+extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
+void mm_log_handler(LogLevel level, const char *msg, void *ctx);
+
+static void
+ssh_sandbox_violation(int signum, siginfo_t *info, void *void_context)
+{
+	char msg[256];
+
+	snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg),
+	    "%s: unexpected system call (arch:0x%x,syscall:%d @ %p)",
+	    __func__, info->si_arch, info->si_syscall, info->si_call_addr);
+	mm_log_handler(SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, msg, pmonitor);
+	_exit(1);
+}
+
+static void
+ssh_sandbox_child_debugging(void)
+{
+	struct sigaction act;
+	sigset_t mask;
+
+	debug3("%s: installing SIGSYS handler", __func__);
+	memset(&act, 0, sizeof(act));
+	sigemptyset(&mask);
+	sigaddset(&mask, SIGSYS);
+
+	act.sa_sigaction = &ssh_sandbox_violation;
+	act.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
+	if (sigaction(SIGSYS, &act, NULL) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: sigaction(SIGSYS): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+	if (sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, &mask, NULL) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: sigprocmask(SIGSYS): %s",
+		      __func__, strerror(errno));
+}
+#endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */
+
+void
+ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
+{
+	struct rlimit rl_zero;
+	int nnp_failed = 0;
+
+	/* Set rlimits for completeness if possible. */
+	rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0;
+	if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, { 0, 0 }): %s",
+			__func__, strerror(errno));
+	if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, { 0, 0 }): %s",
+			__func__, strerror(errno));
+	if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &rl_zero) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, { 0, 0 }): %s",
+			__func__, strerror(errno));
+
+#ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG
+	ssh_sandbox_child_debugging();
+#endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */
+
+	debug3("%s: setting PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS", __func__);
+	if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) == -1) {
+		debug("%s: prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS): %s",
+		      __func__, strerror(errno));
+		nnp_failed = 1;
+	}
+	debug3("%s: attaching seccomp filter program", __func__);
+	if (prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &preauth_program) == -1)
+		debug("%s: prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP): %s",
+		      __func__, strerror(errno));
+	else if (nnp_failed)
+		fatal("%s: SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER activated but "
+		    "PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS failed", __func__);
+}
+
+void
+ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
+{
+	free(box);
+	debug3("%s: finished", __func__);
+}
+
+void
+ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid)
+{
+	box->child_pid = child_pid;
+}
+
+#endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER */
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/scard/.cvsignore b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/scard/.cvsignore
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5349d34ae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/scard/.cvsignore
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+Makefile
+Ssh.bin
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/scp.0 b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/scp.0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8f41f6140
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/scp.0
@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
+SCP(1)                      General Commands Manual                     SCP(1)
+
+NAME
+     scp M-bM-^@M-^S secure copy (remote file copy program)
+
+SYNOPSIS
+     scp [-12346BCpqrv] [-c cipher] [-F ssh_config] [-i identity_file]
+         [-l limit] [-o ssh_option] [-P port] [-S program]
+         [[user@]host1:]file1 ... [[user@]host2:]file2
+
+DESCRIPTION
+     scp copies files between hosts on a network.  It uses ssh(1) for data
+     transfer, and uses the same authentication and provides the same security
+     as ssh(1).  scp will ask for passwords or passphrases if they are needed
+     for authentication.
+
+     File names may contain a user and host specification to indicate that the
+     file is to be copied to/from that host.  Local file names can be made
+     explicit using absolute or relative pathnames to avoid scp treating file
+     names containing M-bM-^@M-^X:M-bM-^@M-^Y as host specifiers.  Copies between two remote hosts
+     are also permitted.
+
+     The options are as follows:
+
+     -1      Forces scp to use protocol 1.
+
+     -2      Forces scp to use protocol 2.
+
+     -3      Copies between two remote hosts are transferred through the local
+             host.  Without this option the data is copied directly between
+             the two remote hosts.  Note that this option disables the
+             progress meter.
+
+     -4      Forces scp to use IPv4 addresses only.
+
+     -6      Forces scp to use IPv6 addresses only.
+
+     -B      Selects batch mode (prevents asking for passwords or
+             passphrases).
+
+     -C      Compression enable.  Passes the -C flag to ssh(1) to enable
+             compression.
+
+     -c cipher
+             Selects the cipher to use for encrypting the data transfer.  This
+             option is directly passed to ssh(1).
+
+     -F ssh_config
+             Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file for ssh.
+             This option is directly passed to ssh(1).
+
+     -i identity_file
+             Selects the file from which the identity (private key) for public
+             key authentication is read.  This option is directly passed to
+             ssh(1).
+
+     -l limit
+             Limits the used bandwidth, specified in Kbit/s.
+
+     -o ssh_option
+             Can be used to pass options to ssh in the format used in
+             ssh_config(5).  This is useful for specifying options for which
+             there is no separate scp command-line flag.  For full details of
+             the options listed below, and their possible values, see
+             ssh_config(5).
+
+                   AddressFamily
+                   BatchMode
+                   BindAddress
+                   CanonicalDomains
+                   CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
+                   CanonicalizeHostname
+                   CanonicalizeMaxDots
+                   CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
+                   ChallengeResponseAuthentication
+                   CheckHostIP
+                   Cipher
+                   Ciphers
+                   Compression
+                   CompressionLevel
+                   ConnectionAttempts
+                   ConnectTimeout
+                   ControlMaster
+                   ControlPath
+                   ControlPersist
+                   GlobalKnownHostsFile
+                   GSSAPIAuthentication
+                   GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
+                   HashKnownHosts
+                   Host
+                   HostbasedAuthentication
+                   HostbasedKeyTypes
+                   HostKeyAlgorithms
+                   HostKeyAlias
+                   HostName
+                   IdentityFile
+                   IdentitiesOnly
+                   IPQoS
+                   KbdInteractiveAuthentication
+                   KbdInteractiveDevices
+                   KexAlgorithms
+                   LogLevel
+                   MACs
+                   NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
+                   NumberOfPasswordPrompts
+                   PasswordAuthentication
+                   PKCS11Provider
+                   Port
+                   PreferredAuthentications
+                   Protocol
+                   ProxyCommand
+                   PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
+                   PubkeyAuthentication
+                   RekeyLimit
+                   RhostsRSAAuthentication
+                   RSAAuthentication
+                   SendEnv
+                   ServerAliveInterval
+                   ServerAliveCountMax
+                   StrictHostKeyChecking
+                   TCPKeepAlive
+                   UpdateHostKeys
+                   UsePrivilegedPort
+                   User
+                   UserKnownHostsFile
+                   VerifyHostKeyDNS
+
+     -P port
+             Specifies the port to connect to on the remote host.  Note that
+             this option is written with a capital M-bM-^@M-^XPM-bM-^@M-^Y, because -p is already
+             reserved for preserving the times and modes of the file.
+
+     -p      Preserves modification times, access times, and modes from the
+             original file.
+
+     -q      Quiet mode: disables the progress meter as well as warning and
+             diagnostic messages from ssh(1).
+
+     -r      Recursively copy entire directories.  Note that scp follows
+             symbolic links encountered in the tree traversal.
+
+     -S program
+             Name of program to use for the encrypted connection.  The program
+             must understand ssh(1) options.
+
+     -v      Verbose mode.  Causes scp and ssh(1) to print debugging messages
+             about their progress.  This is helpful in debugging connection,
+             authentication, and configuration problems.
+
+EXIT STATUS
+     The scp utility exitsM-BM- 0 on success, andM-BM- >0 if an error occurs.
+
+SEE ALSO
+     sftp(1), ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-keygen(1), ssh_config(5),
+     sshd(8)
+
+HISTORY
+     scp is based on the rcp program in BSD source code from the Regents of
+     the University of California.
+
+AUTHORS
+     Timo Rinne <tri@iki.fi>
+     Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+
+OpenBSD 5.8                      July 10, 2015                     OpenBSD 5.8
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/sftp-server.0 b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/sftp-server.0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b971cef40
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/sftp-server.0
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+SFTP-SERVER(8)              System Manager's Manual             SFTP-SERVER(8)
+
+NAME
+     sftp-server M-bM-^@M-^S SFTP server subsystem
+
+SYNOPSIS
+     sftp-server [-ehR] [-d start_directory] [-f log_facility] [-l log_level]
+                 [-P blacklisted_requests] [-p whitelisted_requests]
+                 [-u umask]
+     sftp-server -Q protocol_feature
+
+DESCRIPTION
+     sftp-server is a program that speaks the server side of SFTP protocol to
+     stdout and expects client requests from stdin.  sftp-server is not
+     intended to be called directly, but from sshd(8) using the Subsystem
+     option.
+
+     Command-line flags to sftp-server should be specified in the Subsystem
+     declaration.  See sshd_config(5) for more information.
+
+     Valid options are:
+
+     -d start_directory
+             specifies an alternate starting directory for users.  The
+             pathname may contain the following tokens that are expanded at
+             runtime: %% is replaced by a literal '%', %d is replaced by the
+             home directory of the user being authenticated, and %u is
+             replaced by the username of that user.  The default is to use the
+             user's home directory.  This option is useful in conjunction with
+             the sshd_config(5) ChrootDirectory option.
+
+     -e      Causes sftp-server to print logging information to stderr instead
+             of syslog for debugging.
+
+     -f log_facility
+             Specifies the facility code that is used when logging messages
+             from sftp-server.  The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH,
+             LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
+             The default is AUTH.
+
+     -h      Displays sftp-server usage information.
+
+     -l log_level
+             Specifies which messages will be logged by sftp-server.  The
+             possible values are: QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG,
+             DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3.  INFO and VERBOSE log transactions
+             that sftp-server performs on behalf of the client.  DEBUG and
+             DEBUG1 are equivalent.  DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher
+             levels of debugging output.  The default is ERROR.
+
+     -P blacklisted_requests
+             Specify a comma-separated list of SFTP protocol requests that are
+             banned by the server.  sftp-server will reply to any blacklisted
+             request with a failure.  The -Q flag can be used to determine the
+             supported request types.  If both a blacklist and a whitelist are
+             specified, then the blacklist is applied before the whitelist.
+
+     -p whitelisted_requests
+             Specify a comma-separated list of SFTP protocol requests that are
+             permitted by the server.  All request types that are not on the
+             whitelist will be logged and replied to with a failure message.
+
+             Care must be taken when using this feature to ensure that
+             requests made implicitly by SFTP clients are permitted.
+
+     -Q protocol_feature
+             Query protocol features supported by sftp-server.  At present the
+             only feature that may be queried is M-bM-^@M-^\requestsM-bM-^@M-^], which may be used
+             for black or whitelisting (flags -P and -p respectively).
+
+     -R      Places this instance of sftp-server into a read-only mode.
+             Attempts to open files for writing, as well as other operations
+             that change the state of the filesystem, will be denied.
+
+     -u umask
+             Sets an explicit umask(2) to be applied to newly-created files
+             and directories, instead of the user's default mask.
+
+     On some systems, sftp-server must be able to access /dev/log for logging
+     to work, and use of sftp-server in a chroot configuration therefore
+     requires that syslogd(8) establish a logging socket inside the chroot
+     directory.
+
+SEE ALSO
+     sftp(1), ssh(1), sshd_config(5), sshd(8)
+
+     T. Ylonen and S. Lehtinen, SSH File Transfer Protocol, draft-ietf-secsh-
+     filexfer-02.txt, October 2001, work in progress material.
+
+HISTORY
+     sftp-server first appeared in OpenBSD 2.8.
+
+AUTHORS
+     Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
+
+OpenBSD 5.8                    December 11, 2014                   OpenBSD 5.8
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/sftp.0 b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/sftp.0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..550f27648
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/sftp.0
@@ -0,0 +1,383 @@
+SFTP(1)                     General Commands Manual                    SFTP(1)
+
+NAME
+     sftp M-bM-^@M-^S secure file transfer program
+
+SYNOPSIS
+     sftp [-1246aCfpqrv] [-B buffer_size] [-b batchfile] [-c cipher]
+          [-D sftp_server_path] [-F ssh_config] [-i identity_file] [-l limit]
+          [-o ssh_option] [-P port] [-R num_requests] [-S program]
+          [-s subsystem | sftp_server] host
+     sftp [user@]host[:file ...]
+     sftp [user@]host[:dir[/]]
+     sftp -b batchfile [user@]host
+
+DESCRIPTION
+     sftp is an interactive file transfer program, similar to ftp(1), which
+     performs all operations over an encrypted ssh(1) transport.  It may also
+     use many features of ssh, such as public key authentication and
+     compression.  sftp connects and logs into the specified host, then enters
+     an interactive command mode.
+
+     The second usage format will retrieve files automatically if a non-
+     interactive authentication method is used; otherwise it will do so after
+     successful interactive authentication.
+
+     The third usage format allows sftp to start in a remote directory.
+
+     The final usage format allows for automated sessions using the -b option.
+     In such cases, it is necessary to configure non-interactive
+     authentication to obviate the need to enter a password at connection time
+     (see sshd(8) and ssh-keygen(1) for details).
+
+     Since some usage formats use colon characters to delimit host names from
+     path names, IPv6 addresses must be enclosed in square brackets to avoid
+     ambiguity.
+
+     The options are as follows:
+
+     -1      Specify the use of protocol version 1.
+
+     -2      Specify the use of protocol version 2.
+
+     -4      Forces sftp to use IPv4 addresses only.
+
+     -6      Forces sftp to use IPv6 addresses only.
+
+     -a      Attempt to continue interrupted transfers rather than overwriting
+             existing partial or complete copies of files.  If the partial
+             contents differ from those being transferred, then the resultant
+             file is likely to be corrupt.
+
+     -B buffer_size
+             Specify the size of the buffer that sftp uses when transferring
+             files.  Larger buffers require fewer round trips at the cost of
+             higher memory consumption.  The default is 32768 bytes.
+
+     -b batchfile
+             Batch mode reads a series of commands from an input batchfile
+             instead of stdin.  Since it lacks user interaction it should be
+             used in conjunction with non-interactive authentication.  A
+             batchfile of M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y may be used to indicate standard input.  sftp
+             will abort if any of the following commands fail: get, put,
+             reget, reput, rename, ln, rm, mkdir, chdir, ls, lchdir, chmod,
+             chown, chgrp, lpwd, df, symlink, and lmkdir.  Termination on
+             error can be suppressed on a command by command basis by
+             prefixing the command with a M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character (for example, -rm
+             /tmp/blah*).
+
+     -C      Enables compression (via ssh's -C flag).
+
+     -c cipher
+             Selects the cipher to use for encrypting the data transfers.
+             This option is directly passed to ssh(1).
+
+     -D sftp_server_path
+             Connect directly to a local sftp server (rather than via ssh(1)).
+             This option may be useful in debugging the client and server.
+
+     -F ssh_config
+             Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file for ssh(1).
+             This option is directly passed to ssh(1).
+
+     -f      Requests that files be flushed to disk immediately after
+             transfer.  When uploading files, this feature is only enabled if
+             the server implements the "fsync@openssh.com" extension.
+
+     -i identity_file
+             Selects the file from which the identity (private key) for public
+             key authentication is read.  This option is directly passed to
+             ssh(1).
+
+     -l limit
+             Limits the used bandwidth, specified in Kbit/s.
+
+     -o ssh_option
+             Can be used to pass options to ssh in the format used in
+             ssh_config(5).  This is useful for specifying options for which
+             there is no separate sftp command-line flag.  For example, to
+             specify an alternate port use: sftp -oPort=24.  For full details
+             of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
+             ssh_config(5).
+
+                   AddressFamily
+                   BatchMode
+                   BindAddress
+                   CanonicalDomains
+                   CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
+                   CanonicalizeHostname
+                   CanonicalizeMaxDots
+                   CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
+                   ChallengeResponseAuthentication
+                   CheckHostIP
+                   Cipher
+                   Ciphers
+                   Compression
+                   CompressionLevel
+                   ConnectionAttempts
+                   ConnectTimeout
+                   ControlMaster
+                   ControlPath
+                   ControlPersist
+                   GlobalKnownHostsFile
+                   GSSAPIAuthentication
+                   GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
+                   HashKnownHosts
+                   Host
+                   HostbasedAuthentication
+                   HostbasedKeyTypes
+                   HostKeyAlgorithms
+                   HostKeyAlias
+                   HostName
+                   IdentityFile
+                   IdentitiesOnly
+                   IPQoS
+                   KbdInteractiveAuthentication
+                   KbdInteractiveDevices
+                   KexAlgorithms
+                   LogLevel
+                   MACs
+                   NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
+                   NumberOfPasswordPrompts
+                   PasswordAuthentication
+                   PKCS11Provider
+                   Port
+                   PreferredAuthentications
+                   Protocol
+                   ProxyCommand
+                   PubkeyAuthentication
+                   RekeyLimit
+                   RhostsRSAAuthentication
+                   RSAAuthentication
+                   SendEnv
+                   ServerAliveInterval
+                   ServerAliveCountMax
+                   StrictHostKeyChecking
+                   TCPKeepAlive
+                   UpdateHostKeys
+                   UsePrivilegedPort
+                   User
+                   UserKnownHostsFile
+                   VerifyHostKeyDNS
+
+     -P port
+             Specifies the port to connect to on the remote host.
+
+     -p      Preserves modification times, access times, and modes from the
+             original files transferred.
+
+     -q      Quiet mode: disables the progress meter as well as warning and
+             diagnostic messages from ssh(1).
+
+     -R num_requests
+             Specify how many requests may be outstanding at any one time.
+             Increasing this may slightly improve file transfer speed but will
+             increase memory usage.  The default is 64 outstanding requests.
+
+     -r      Recursively copy entire directories when uploading and
+             downloading.  Note that sftp does not follow symbolic links
+             encountered in the tree traversal.
+
+     -S program
+             Name of the program to use for the encrypted connection.  The
+             program must understand ssh(1) options.
+
+     -s subsystem | sftp_server
+             Specifies the SSH2 subsystem or the path for an sftp server on
+             the remote host.  A path is useful for using sftp over protocol
+             version 1, or when the remote sshd(8) does not have an sftp
+             subsystem configured.
+
+     -v      Raise logging level.  This option is also passed to ssh.
+
+INTERACTIVE COMMANDS
+     Once in interactive mode, sftp understands a set of commands similar to
+     those of ftp(1).  Commands are case insensitive.  Pathnames that contain
+     spaces must be enclosed in quotes.  Any special characters contained
+     within pathnames that are recognized by glob(3) must be escaped with
+     backslashes (M-bM-^@M-^X\M-bM-^@M-^Y).
+
+     bye     Quit sftp.
+
+     cd path
+             Change remote directory to path.
+
+     chgrp grp path
+             Change group of file path to grp.  path may contain glob(3)
+             characters and may match multiple files.  grp must be a numeric
+             GID.
+
+     chmod mode path
+             Change permissions of file path to mode.  path may contain
+             glob(3) characters and may match multiple files.
+
+     chown own path
+             Change owner of file path to own.  path may contain glob(3)
+             characters and may match multiple files.  own must be a numeric
+             UID.
+
+     df [-hi] [path]
+             Display usage information for the filesystem holding the current
+             directory (or path if specified).  If the -h flag is specified,
+             the capacity information will be displayed using "human-readable"
+             suffixes.  The -i flag requests display of inode information in
+             addition to capacity information.  This command is only supported
+             on servers that implement the M-bM-^@M-^\statvfs@openssh.comM-bM-^@M-^] extension.
+
+     exit    Quit sftp.
+
+     get [-afPpr] remote-path [local-path]
+             Retrieve the remote-path and store it on the local machine.  If
+             the local path name is not specified, it is given the same name
+             it has on the remote machine.  remote-path may contain glob(3)
+             characters and may match multiple files.  If it does and
+             local-path is specified, then local-path must specify a
+             directory.
+
+             If the -a flag is specified, then attempt to resume partial
+             transfers of existing files.  Note that resumption assumes that
+             any partial copy of the local file matches the remote copy.  If
+             the remote file contents differ from the partial local copy then
+             the resultant file is likely to be corrupt.
+
+             If the -f flag is specified, then fsync(2) will be called after
+             the file transfer has completed to flush the file to disk.
+
+             If either the -P or -p flag is specified, then full file
+             permissions and access times are copied too.
+
+             If the -r flag is specified then directories will be copied
+             recursively.  Note that sftp does not follow symbolic links when
+             performing recursive transfers.
+
+     help    Display help text.
+
+     lcd path
+             Change local directory to path.
+
+     lls [ls-options [path]]
+             Display local directory listing of either path or current
+             directory if path is not specified.  ls-options may contain any
+             flags supported by the local system's ls(1) command.  path may
+             contain glob(3) characters and may match multiple files.
+
+     lmkdir path
+             Create local directory specified by path.
+
+     ln [-s] oldpath newpath
+             Create a link from oldpath to newpath.  If the -s flag is
+             specified the created link is a symbolic link, otherwise it is a
+             hard link.
+
+     lpwd    Print local working directory.
+
+     ls [-1afhlnrSt] [path]
+             Display a remote directory listing of either path or the current
+             directory if path is not specified.  path may contain glob(3)
+             characters and may match multiple files.
+
+             The following flags are recognized and alter the behaviour of ls
+             accordingly:
+
+             -1      Produce single columnar output.
+
+             -a      List files beginning with a dot (M-bM-^@M-^X.M-bM-^@M-^Y).
+
+             -f      Do not sort the listing.  The default sort order is
+                     lexicographical.
+
+             -h      When used with a long format option, use unit suffixes:
+                     Byte, Kilobyte, Megabyte, Gigabyte, Terabyte, Petabyte,
+                     and Exabyte in order to reduce the number of digits to
+                     four or fewer using powers of 2 for sizes (K=1024,
+                     M=1048576, etc.).
+
+             -l      Display additional details including permissions and
+                     ownership information.
+
+             -n      Produce a long listing with user and group information
+                     presented numerically.
+
+             -r      Reverse the sort order of the listing.
+
+             -S      Sort the listing by file size.
+
+             -t      Sort the listing by last modification time.
+
+     lumask umask
+             Set local umask to umask.
+
+     mkdir path
+             Create remote directory specified by path.
+
+     progress
+             Toggle display of progress meter.
+
+     put [-afPpr] local-path [remote-path]
+             Upload local-path and store it on the remote machine.  If the
+             remote path name is not specified, it is given the same name it
+             has on the local machine.  local-path may contain glob(3)
+             characters and may match multiple files.  If it does and
+             remote-path is specified, then remote-path must specify a
+             directory.
+
+             If the -a flag is specified, then attempt to resume partial
+             transfers of existing files.  Note that resumption assumes that
+             any partial copy of the remote file matches the local copy.  If
+             the local file contents differ from the remote local copy then
+             the resultant file is likely to be corrupt.
+
+             If the -f flag is specified, then a request will be sent to the
+             server to call fsync(2) after the file has been transferred.
+             Note that this is only supported by servers that implement the
+             "fsync@openssh.com" extension.
+
+             If either the -P or -p flag is specified, then full file
+             permissions and access times are copied too.
+
+             If the -r flag is specified then directories will be copied
+             recursively.  Note that sftp does not follow symbolic links when
+             performing recursive transfers.
+
+     pwd     Display remote working directory.
+
+     quit    Quit sftp.
+
+     reget [-Ppr] remote-path [local-path]
+             Resume download of remote-path.  Equivalent to get with the -a
+             flag set.
+
+     reput [-Ppr] [local-path] remote-path
+             Resume upload of [local-path].  Equivalent to put with the -a
+             flag set.
+
+     rename oldpath newpath
+             Rename remote file from oldpath to newpath.
+
+     rm path
+             Delete remote file specified by path.
+
+     rmdir path
+             Remove remote directory specified by path.
+
+     symlink oldpath newpath
+             Create a symbolic link from oldpath to newpath.
+
+     version
+             Display the sftp protocol version.
+
+     !command
+             Execute command in local shell.
+
+     !       Escape to local shell.
+
+     ?       Synonym for help.
+
+SEE ALSO
+     ftp(1), ls(1), scp(1), ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-keygen(1), glob(3),
+     ssh_config(5), sftp-server(8), sshd(8)
+
+     T. Ylonen and S. Lehtinen, SSH File Transfer Protocol, draft-ietf-secsh-
+     filexfer-00.txt, January 2001, work in progress material.
+
+OpenBSD 5.8                    January 30, 2015                    OpenBSD 5.8
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/ssh-add.0 b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/ssh-add.0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..29db710ab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/ssh-add.0
@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+SSH-ADD(1)                  General Commands Manual                 SSH-ADD(1)
+
+NAME
+     ssh-add M-bM-^@M-^S adds private key identities to the authentication agent
+
+SYNOPSIS
+     ssh-add [-cDdkLlXx] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-t life] [file ...]
+     ssh-add -s pkcs11
+     ssh-add -e pkcs11
+
+DESCRIPTION
+     ssh-add adds private key identities to the authentication agent,
+     ssh-agent(1).  When run without arguments, it adds the files
+     ~/.ssh/id_rsa, ~/.ssh/id_dsa, ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 and
+     ~/.ssh/identity.  After loading a private key, ssh-add will try to load
+     corresponding certificate information from the filename obtained by
+     appending -cert.pub to the name of the private key file.  Alternative
+     file names can be given on the command line.
+
+     If any file requires a passphrase, ssh-add asks for the passphrase from
+     the user.  The passphrase is read from the user's tty.  ssh-add retries
+     the last passphrase if multiple identity files are given.
+
+     The authentication agent must be running and the SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+     environment variable must contain the name of its socket for ssh-add to
+     work.
+
+     The options are as follows:
+
+     -c      Indicates that added identities should be subject to confirmation
+             before being used for authentication.  Confirmation is performed
+             by ssh-askpass(1).  Successful confirmation is signaled by a zero
+             exit status from ssh-askpass(1), rather than text entered into
+             the requester.
+
+     -D      Deletes all identities from the agent.
+
+     -d      Instead of adding identities, removes identities from the agent.
+             If ssh-add has been run without arguments, the keys for the
+             default identities and their corresponding certificates will be
+             removed.  Otherwise, the argument list will be interpreted as a
+             list of paths to public key files to specify keys and
+             certificates to be removed from the agent.  If no public key is
+             found at a given path, ssh-add will append .pub and retry.
+
+     -E fingerprint_hash
+             Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key
+             fingerprints.  Valid options are: M-bM-^@M-^\md5M-bM-^@M-^] and M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^].  The
+             default is M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^].
+
+     -e pkcs11
+             Remove keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library pkcs11.
+
+     -k      When loading keys into or deleting keys from the agent, process
+             plain private keys only and skip certificates.
+
+     -L      Lists public key parameters of all identities currently
+             represented by the agent.
+
+     -l      Lists fingerprints of all identities currently represented by the
+             agent.
+
+     -s pkcs11
+             Add keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library pkcs11.
+
+     -t life
+             Set a maximum lifetime when adding identities to an agent.  The
+             lifetime may be specified in seconds or in a time format
+             specified in sshd_config(5).
+
+     -X      Unlock the agent.
+
+     -x      Lock the agent with a password.
+
+ENVIRONMENT
+     DISPLAY and SSH_ASKPASS
+             If ssh-add needs a passphrase, it will read the passphrase from
+             the current terminal if it was run from a terminal.  If ssh-add
+             does not have a terminal associated with it but DISPLAY and
+             SSH_ASKPASS are set, it will execute the program specified by
+             SSH_ASKPASS (by default M-bM-^@M-^\ssh-askpassM-bM-^@M-^]) and open an X11 window to
+             read the passphrase.  This is particularly useful when calling
+             ssh-add from a .xsession or related script.  (Note that on some
+             machines it may be necessary to redirect the input from /dev/null
+             to make this work.)
+
+     SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+             Identifies the path of a UNIX-domain socket used to communicate
+             with the agent.
+
+FILES
+     ~/.ssh/identity
+             Contains the protocol version 1 RSA authentication identity of
+             the user.
+
+     ~/.ssh/id_dsa
+             Contains the protocol version 2 DSA authentication identity of
+             the user.
+
+     ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
+             Contains the protocol version 2 ECDSA authentication identity of
+             the user.
+
+     ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
+             Contains the protocol version 2 Ed25519 authentication identity
+             of the user.
+
+     ~/.ssh/id_rsa
+             Contains the protocol version 2 RSA authentication identity of
+             the user.
+
+     Identity files should not be readable by anyone but the user.  Note that
+     ssh-add ignores identity files if they are accessible by others.
+
+EXIT STATUS
+     Exit status is 0 on success, 1 if the specified command fails, and 2 if
+     ssh-add is unable to contact the authentication agent.
+
+SEE ALSO
+     ssh(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-askpass(1), ssh-keygen(1), sshd(8)
+
+AUTHORS
+     OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
+     Tatu Ylonen.  Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo
+     de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
+     created OpenSSH.  Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
+     versions 1.5 and 2.0.
+
+OpenBSD 5.8                     March 30, 2015                     OpenBSD 5.8
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/ssh-keygen.0 b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/ssh-keygen.0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..07a45b36b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/ssh-keygen.0
@@ -0,0 +1,566 @@
+SSH-KEYGEN(1)               General Commands Manual              SSH-KEYGEN(1)
+
+NAME
+     ssh-keygen M-bM-^@M-^S authentication key generation, management and conversion
+
+SYNOPSIS
+     ssh-keygen [-q] [-b bits] [-t dsa | ecdsa | ed25519 | rsa | rsa1]
+                [-N new_passphrase] [-C comment] [-f output_keyfile]
+     ssh-keygen -p [-P old_passphrase] [-N new_passphrase] [-f keyfile]
+     ssh-keygen -i [-m key_format] [-f input_keyfile]
+     ssh-keygen -e [-m key_format] [-f input_keyfile]
+     ssh-keygen -y [-f input_keyfile]
+     ssh-keygen -c [-P passphrase] [-C comment] [-f keyfile]
+     ssh-keygen -l [-v] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-f input_keyfile]
+     ssh-keygen -B [-f input_keyfile]
+     ssh-keygen -D pkcs11
+     ssh-keygen -F hostname [-f known_hosts_file] [-l]
+     ssh-keygen -H [-f known_hosts_file]
+     ssh-keygen -R hostname [-f known_hosts_file]
+     ssh-keygen -r hostname [-f input_keyfile] [-g]
+     ssh-keygen -G output_file [-v] [-b bits] [-M memory] [-S start_point]
+     ssh-keygen -T output_file -f input_file [-v] [-a rounds] [-J num_lines]
+                [-j start_line] [-K checkpt] [-W generator]
+     ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I certificate_identity [-h] [-n principals]
+                [-O option] [-V validity_interval] [-z serial_number] file ...
+     ssh-keygen -L [-f input_keyfile]
+     ssh-keygen -A
+     ssh-keygen -k -f krl_file [-u] [-s ca_public] [-z version_number]
+                file ...
+     ssh-keygen -Q -f krl_file file ...
+
+DESCRIPTION
+     ssh-keygen generates, manages and converts authentication keys for
+     ssh(1).  ssh-keygen can create RSA keys for use by SSH protocol version 1
+     and DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA keys for use by SSH protocol version 2.
+     The type of key to be generated is specified with the -t option.  If
+     invoked without any arguments, ssh-keygen will generate an RSA key for
+     use in SSH protocol 2 connections.
+
+     ssh-keygen is also used to generate groups for use in Diffie-Hellman
+     group exchange (DH-GEX).  See the MODULI GENERATION section for details.
+
+     Finally, ssh-keygen can be used to generate and update Key Revocation
+     Lists, and to test whether given keys have been revoked by one.  See the
+     KEY REVOCATION LISTS section for details.
+
+     Normally each user wishing to use SSH with public key authentication runs
+     this once to create the authentication key in ~/.ssh/identity,
+     ~/.ssh/id_dsa, ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 or ~/.ssh/id_rsa.
+     Additionally, the system administrator may use this to generate host
+     keys, as seen in /etc/rc.
+
+     Normally this program generates the key and asks for a file in which to
+     store the private key.  The public key is stored in a file with the same
+     name but M-bM-^@M-^\.pubM-bM-^@M-^] appended.  The program also asks for a passphrase.  The
+     passphrase may be empty to indicate no passphrase (host keys must have an
+     empty passphrase), or it may be a string of arbitrary length.  A
+     passphrase is similar to a password, except it can be a phrase with a
+     series of words, punctuation, numbers, whitespace, or any string of
+     characters you want.  Good passphrases are 10-30 characters long, are not
+     simple sentences or otherwise easily guessable (English prose has only
+     1-2 bits of entropy per character, and provides very bad passphrases),
+     and contain a mix of upper and lowercase letters, numbers, and non-
+     alphanumeric characters.  The passphrase can be changed later by using
+     the -p option.
+
+     There is no way to recover a lost passphrase.  If the passphrase is lost
+     or forgotten, a new key must be generated and the corresponding public
+     key copied to other machines.
+
+     For RSA1 keys, there is also a comment field in the key file that is only
+     for convenience to the user to help identify the key.  The comment can
+     tell what the key is for, or whatever is useful.  The comment is
+     initialized to M-bM-^@M-^\user@hostM-bM-^@M-^] when the key is created, but can be changed
+     using the -c option.
+
+     After a key is generated, instructions below detail where the keys should
+     be placed to be activated.
+
+     The options are as follows:
+
+     -A      For each of the key types (rsa1, rsa, dsa, ecdsa and ed25519) for
+             which host keys do not exist, generate the host keys with the
+             default key file path, an empty passphrase, default bits for the
+             key type, and default comment.  This is used by /etc/rc to
+             generate new host keys.
+
+     -a rounds
+             When saving a new-format private key (i.e. an ed25519 key or any
+             SSH protocol 2 key when the -o flag is set), this option
+             specifies the number of KDF (key derivation function) rounds
+             used.  Higher numbers result in slower passphrase verification
+             and increased resistance to brute-force password cracking (should
+             the keys be stolen).
+
+             When screening DH-GEX candidates ( using the -T command).  This
+             option specifies the number of primality tests to perform.
+
+     -B      Show the bubblebabble digest of specified private or public key
+             file.
+
+     -b bits
+             Specifies the number of bits in the key to create.  For RSA keys,
+             the minimum size is 1024 bits and the default is 2048 bits.
+             Generally, 2048 bits is considered sufficient.  DSA keys must be
+             exactly 1024 bits as specified by FIPS 186-2.  For ECDSA keys,
+             the -b flag determines the key length by selecting from one of
+             three elliptic curve sizes: 256, 384 or 521 bits.  Attempting to
+             use bit lengths other than these three values for ECDSA keys will
+             fail.  Ed25519 keys have a fixed length and the -b flag will be
+             ignored.
+
+     -C comment
+             Provides a new comment.
+
+     -c      Requests changing the comment in the private and public key
+             files.  This operation is only supported for RSA1 keys.  The
+             program will prompt for the file containing the private keys, for
+             the passphrase if the key has one, and for the new comment.
+
+     -D pkcs11
+             Download the RSA public keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared
+             library pkcs11.  When used in combination with -s, this option
+             indicates that a CA key resides in a PKCS#11 token (see the
+             CERTIFICATES section for details).
+
+     -E fingerprint_hash
+             Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key
+             fingerprints.  Valid options are: M-bM-^@M-^\md5M-bM-^@M-^] and M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^].  The
+             default is M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^].
+
+     -e      This option will read a private or public OpenSSH key file and
+             print to stdout the key in one of the formats specified by the -m
+             option.  The default export format is M-bM-^@M-^\RFC4716M-bM-^@M-^].  This option
+             allows exporting OpenSSH keys for use by other programs,
+             including several commercial SSH implementations.
+
+     -F hostname
+             Search for the specified hostname in a known_hosts file, listing
+             any occurrences found.  This option is useful to find hashed host
+             names or addresses and may also be used in conjunction with the
+             -H option to print found keys in a hashed format.
+
+     -f filename
+             Specifies the filename of the key file.
+
+     -G output_file
+             Generate candidate primes for DH-GEX.  These primes must be
+             screened for safety (using the -T option) before use.
+
+     -g      Use generic DNS format when printing fingerprint resource records
+             using the -r command.
+
+     -H      Hash a known_hosts file.  This replaces all hostnames and
+             addresses with hashed representations within the specified file;
+             the original content is moved to a file with a .old suffix.
+             These hashes may be used normally by ssh and sshd, but they do
+             not reveal identifying information should the file's contents be
+             disclosed.  This option will not modify existing hashed hostnames
+             and is therefore safe to use on files that mix hashed and non-
+             hashed names.
+
+     -h      When signing a key, create a host certificate instead of a user
+             certificate.  Please see the CERTIFICATES section for details.
+
+     -I certificate_identity
+             Specify the key identity when signing a public key.  Please see
+             the CERTIFICATES section for details.
+
+     -i      This option will read an unencrypted private (or public) key file
+             in the format specified by the -m option and print an OpenSSH
+             compatible private (or public) key to stdout.  This option allows
+             importing keys from other software, including several commercial
+             SSH implementations.  The default import format is M-bM-^@M-^\RFC4716M-bM-^@M-^].
+
+     -J num_lines
+             Exit after screening the specified number of lines while
+             performing DH candidate screening using the -T option.
+
+     -j start_line
+             Start screening at the specified line number while performing DH
+             candidate screening using the -T option.
+
+     -K checkpt
+             Write the last line processed to the file checkpt while
+             performing DH candidate screening using the -T option.  This will
+             be used to skip lines in the input file that have already been
+             processed if the job is restarted.
+
+     -k      Generate a KRL file.  In this mode, ssh-keygen will generate a
+             KRL file at the location specified via the -f flag that revokes
+             every key or certificate presented on the command line.
+             Keys/certificates to be revoked may be specified by public key
+             file or using the format described in the KEY REVOCATION LISTS
+             section.
+
+     -L      Prints the contents of a certificate.
+
+     -l      Show fingerprint of specified public key file.  Private RSA1 keys
+             are also supported.  For RSA and DSA keys ssh-keygen tries to
+             find the matching public key file and prints its fingerprint.  If
+             combined with -v, an ASCII art representation of the key is
+             supplied with the fingerprint.
+
+     -M memory
+             Specify the amount of memory to use (in megabytes) when
+             generating candidate moduli for DH-GEX.
+
+     -m key_format
+             Specify a key format for the -i (import) or -e (export)
+             conversion options.  The supported key formats are: M-bM-^@M-^\RFC4716M-bM-^@M-^]
+             (RFC 4716/SSH2 public or private key), M-bM-^@M-^\PKCS8M-bM-^@M-^] (PEM PKCS8 public
+             key) or M-bM-^@M-^\PEMM-bM-^@M-^] (PEM public key).  The default conversion format is
+             M-bM-^@M-^\RFC4716M-bM-^@M-^].
+
+     -N new_passphrase
+             Provides the new passphrase.
+
+     -n principals
+             Specify one or more principals (user or host names) to be
+             included in a certificate when signing a key.  Multiple
+             principals may be specified, separated by commas.  Please see the
+             CERTIFICATES section for details.
+
+     -O option
+             Specify a certificate option when signing a key.  This option may
+             be specified multiple times.  Please see the CERTIFICATES section
+             for details.  The options that are valid for user certificates
+             are:
+
+             clear   Clear all enabled permissions.  This is useful for
+                     clearing the default set of permissions so permissions
+                     may be added individually.
+
+             force-command=command
+                     Forces the execution of command instead of any shell or
+                     command specified by the user when the certificate is
+                     used for authentication.
+
+             no-agent-forwarding
+                     Disable ssh-agent(1) forwarding (permitted by default).
+
+             no-port-forwarding
+                     Disable port forwarding (permitted by default).
+
+             no-pty  Disable PTY allocation (permitted by default).
+
+             no-user-rc
+                     Disable execution of ~/.ssh/rc by sshd(8) (permitted by
+                     default).
+
+             no-x11-forwarding
+                     Disable X11 forwarding (permitted by default).
+
+             permit-agent-forwarding
+                     Allows ssh-agent(1) forwarding.
+
+             permit-port-forwarding
+                     Allows port forwarding.
+
+             permit-pty
+                     Allows PTY allocation.
+
+             permit-user-rc
+                     Allows execution of ~/.ssh/rc by sshd(8).
+
+             permit-x11-forwarding
+                     Allows X11 forwarding.
+
+             source-address=address_list
+                     Restrict the source addresses from which the certificate
+                     is considered valid.  The address_list is a comma-
+                     separated list of one or more address/netmask pairs in
+                     CIDR format.
+
+             At present, no options are valid for host keys.
+
+     -o      Causes ssh-keygen to save SSH protocol 2 private keys using the
+             new OpenSSH format rather than the more compatible PEM format.
+             The new format has increased resistance to brute-force password
+             cracking but is not supported by versions of OpenSSH prior to
+             6.5.  Ed25519 keys always use the new private key format.
+
+     -P passphrase
+             Provides the (old) passphrase.
+
+     -p      Requests changing the passphrase of a private key file instead of
+             creating a new private key.  The program will prompt for the file
+             containing the private key, for the old passphrase, and twice for
+             the new passphrase.
+
+     -Q      Test whether keys have been revoked in a KRL.
+
+     -q      Silence ssh-keygen.
+
+     -R hostname
+             Removes all keys belonging to hostname from a known_hosts file.
+             This option is useful to delete hashed hosts (see the -H option
+             above).
+
+     -r hostname
+             Print the SSHFP fingerprint resource record named hostname for
+             the specified public key file.
+
+     -S start
+             Specify start point (in hex) when generating candidate moduli for
+             DH-GEX.
+
+     -s ca_key
+             Certify (sign) a public key using the specified CA key.  Please
+             see the CERTIFICATES section for details.
+
+             When generating a KRL, -s specifies a path to a CA public key
+             file used to revoke certificates directly by key ID or serial
+             number.  See the KEY REVOCATION LISTS section for details.
+
+     -T output_file
+             Test DH group exchange candidate primes (generated using the -G
+             option) for safety.
+
+     -t dsa | ecdsa | ed25519 | rsa | rsa1
+             Specifies the type of key to create.  The possible values are
+             M-bM-^@M-^\rsa1M-bM-^@M-^] for protocol version 1 and M-bM-^@M-^\dsaM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ecdsaM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ed25519M-bM-^@M-^], or
+             M-bM-^@M-^\rsaM-bM-^@M-^] for protocol version 2.
+
+     -u      Update a KRL.  When specified with -k, keys listed via the
+             command line are added to the existing KRL rather than a new KRL
+             being created.
+
+     -V validity_interval
+             Specify a validity interval when signing a certificate.  A
+             validity interval may consist of a single time, indicating that
+             the certificate is valid beginning now and expiring at that time,
+             or may consist of two times separated by a colon to indicate an
+             explicit time interval.  The start time may be specified as a
+             date in YYYYMMDD format, a time in YYYYMMDDHHMMSS format or a
+             relative time (to the current time) consisting of a minus sign
+             followed by a relative time in the format described in the TIME
+             FORMATS section of sshd_config(5).  The end time may be specified
+             as a YYYYMMDD date, a YYYYMMDDHHMMSS time or a relative time
+             starting with a plus character.
+
+             For example: M-bM-^@M-^\+52w1dM-bM-^@M-^] (valid from now to 52 weeks and one day
+             from now), M-bM-^@M-^\-4w:+4wM-bM-^@M-^] (valid from four weeks ago to four weeks
+             from now), M-bM-^@M-^\20100101123000:20110101123000M-bM-^@M-^] (valid from 12:30 PM,
+             January 1st, 2010 to 12:30 PM, January 1st, 2011), M-bM-^@M-^\-1d:20110101M-bM-^@M-^]
+             (valid from yesterday to midnight, January 1st, 2011).
+
+     -v      Verbose mode.  Causes ssh-keygen to print debugging messages
+             about its progress.  This is helpful for debugging moduli
+             generation.  Multiple -v options increase the verbosity.  The
+             maximum is 3.
+
+     -W generator
+             Specify desired generator when testing candidate moduli for DH-
+             GEX.
+
+     -y      This option will read a private OpenSSH format file and print an
+             OpenSSH public key to stdout.
+
+     -z serial_number
+             Specifies a serial number to be embedded in the certificate to
+             distinguish this certificate from others from the same CA.  The
+             default serial number is zero.
+
+             When generating a KRL, the -z flag is used to specify a KRL
+             version number.
+
+MODULI GENERATION
+     ssh-keygen may be used to generate groups for the Diffie-Hellman Group
+     Exchange (DH-GEX) protocol.  Generating these groups is a two-step
+     process: first, candidate primes are generated using a fast, but memory
+     intensive process.  These candidate primes are then tested for
+     suitability (a CPU-intensive process).
+
+     Generation of primes is performed using the -G option.  The desired
+     length of the primes may be specified by the -b option.  For example:
+
+           # ssh-keygen -G moduli-2048.candidates -b 2048
+
+     By default, the search for primes begins at a random point in the desired
+     length range.  This may be overridden using the -S option, which
+     specifies a different start point (in hex).
+
+     Once a set of candidates have been generated, they must be screened for
+     suitability.  This may be performed using the -T option.  In this mode
+     ssh-keygen will read candidates from standard input (or a file specified
+     using the -f option).  For example:
+
+           # ssh-keygen -T moduli-2048 -f moduli-2048.candidates
+
+     By default, each candidate will be subjected to 100 primality tests.
+     This may be overridden using the -a option.  The DH generator value will
+     be chosen automatically for the prime under consideration.  If a specific
+     generator is desired, it may be requested using the -W option.  Valid
+     generator values are 2, 3, and 5.
+
+     Screened DH groups may be installed in /etc/moduli.  It is important that
+     this file contains moduli of a range of bit lengths and that both ends of
+     a connection share common moduli.
+
+CERTIFICATES
+     ssh-keygen supports signing of keys to produce certificates that may be
+     used for user or host authentication.  Certificates consist of a public
+     key, some identity information, zero or more principal (user or host)
+     names and a set of options that are signed by a Certification Authority
+     (CA) key.  Clients or servers may then trust only the CA key and verify
+     its signature on a certificate rather than trusting many user/host keys.
+     Note that OpenSSH certificates are a different, and much simpler, format
+     to the X.509 certificates used in ssl(8).
+
+     ssh-keygen supports two types of certificates: user and host.  User
+     certificates authenticate users to servers, whereas host certificates
+     authenticate server hosts to users.  To generate a user certificate:
+
+           $ ssh-keygen -s /path/to/ca_key -I key_id /path/to/user_key.pub
+
+     The resultant certificate will be placed in /path/to/user_key-cert.pub.
+     A host certificate requires the -h option:
+
+           $ ssh-keygen -s /path/to/ca_key -I key_id -h /path/to/host_key.pub
+
+     The host certificate will be output to /path/to/host_key-cert.pub.
+
+     It is possible to sign using a CA key stored in a PKCS#11 token by
+     providing the token library using -D and identifying the CA key by
+     providing its public half as an argument to -s:
+
+           $ ssh-keygen -s ca_key.pub -D libpkcs11.so -I key_id user_key.pub
+
+     In all cases, key_id is a "key identifier" that is logged by the server
+     when the certificate is used for authentication.
+
+     Certificates may be limited to be valid for a set of principal
+     (user/host) names.  By default, generated certificates are valid for all
+     users or hosts.  To generate a certificate for a specified set of
+     principals:
+
+           $ ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I key_id -n user1,user2 user_key.pub
+           $ ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I key_id -h -n host.domain host_key.pub
+
+     Additional limitations on the validity and use of user certificates may
+     be specified through certificate options.  A certificate option may
+     disable features of the SSH session, may be valid only when presented
+     from particular source addresses or may force the use of a specific
+     command.  For a list of valid certificate options, see the documentation
+     for the -O option above.
+
+     Finally, certificates may be defined with a validity lifetime.  The -V
+     option allows specification of certificate start and end times.  A
+     certificate that is presented at a time outside this range will not be
+     considered valid.  By default, certificates are valid from UNIX Epoch to
+     the distant future.
+
+     For certificates to be used for user or host authentication, the CA
+     public key must be trusted by sshd(8) or ssh(1).  Please refer to those
+     manual pages for details.
+
+KEY REVOCATION LISTS
+     ssh-keygen is able to manage OpenSSH format Key Revocation Lists (KRLs).
+     These binary files specify keys or certificates to be revoked using a
+     compact format, taking as little as one bit per certificate if they are
+     being revoked by serial number.
+
+     KRLs may be generated using the -k flag.  This option reads one or more
+     files from the command line and generates a new KRL.  The files may
+     either contain a KRL specification (see below) or public keys, listed one
+     per line.  Plain public keys are revoked by listing their hash or
+     contents in the KRL and certificates revoked by serial number or key ID
+     (if the serial is zero or not available).
+
+     Revoking keys using a KRL specification offers explicit control over the
+     types of record used to revoke keys and may be used to directly revoke
+     certificates by serial number or key ID without having the complete
+     original certificate on hand.  A KRL specification consists of lines
+     containing one of the following directives followed by a colon and some
+     directive-specific information.
+
+     serial: serial_number[-serial_number]
+             Revokes a certificate with the specified serial number.  Serial
+             numbers are 64-bit values, not including zero and may be
+             expressed in decimal, hex or octal.  If two serial numbers are
+             specified separated by a hyphen, then the range of serial numbers
+             including and between each is revoked.  The CA key must have been
+             specified on the ssh-keygen command line using the -s option.
+
+     id: key_id
+             Revokes a certificate with the specified key ID string.  The CA
+             key must have been specified on the ssh-keygen command line using
+             the -s option.
+
+     key: public_key
+             Revokes the specified key.  If a certificate is listed, then it
+             is revoked as a plain public key.
+
+     sha1: public_key
+             Revokes the specified key by its SHA1 hash.
+
+     KRLs may be updated using the -u flag in addition to -k.  When this
+     option is specified, keys listed via the command line are merged into the
+     KRL, adding to those already there.
+
+     It is also possible, given a KRL, to test whether it revokes a particular
+     key (or keys).  The -Q flag will query an existing KRL, testing each key
+     specified on the commandline.  If any key listed on the command line has
+     been revoked (or an error encountered) then ssh-keygen will exit with a
+     non-zero exit status.  A zero exit status will only be returned if no key
+     was revoked.
+
+FILES
+     ~/.ssh/identity
+             Contains the protocol version 1 RSA authentication identity of
+             the user.  This file should not be readable by anyone but the
+             user.  It is possible to specify a passphrase when generating the
+             key; that passphrase will be used to encrypt the private part of
+             this file using 3DES.  This file is not automatically accessed by
+             ssh-keygen but it is offered as the default file for the private
+             key.  ssh(1) will read this file when a login attempt is made.
+
+     ~/.ssh/identity.pub
+             Contains the protocol version 1 RSA public key for
+             authentication.  The contents of this file should be added to
+             ~/.ssh/authorized_keys on all machines where the user wishes to
+             log in using RSA authentication.  There is no need to keep the
+             contents of this file secret.
+
+     ~/.ssh/id_dsa
+     ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
+     ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
+     ~/.ssh/id_rsa
+             Contains the protocol version 2 DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA
+             authentication identity of the user.  This file should not be
+             readable by anyone but the user.  It is possible to specify a
+             passphrase when generating the key; that passphrase will be used
+             to encrypt the private part of this file using 128-bit AES.  This
+             file is not automatically accessed by ssh-keygen but it is
+             offered as the default file for the private key.  ssh(1) will
+             read this file when a login attempt is made.
+
+     ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub
+     ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub
+     ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub
+     ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
+             Contains the protocol version 2 DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA public
+             key for authentication.  The contents of this file should be
+             added to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys on all machines where the user
+             wishes to log in using public key authentication.  There is no
+             need to keep the contents of this file secret.
+
+     /etc/moduli
+             Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for DH-GEX.  The file format
+             is described in moduli(5).
+
+SEE ALSO
+     ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1), moduli(5), sshd(8)
+
+     The Secure Shell (SSH) Public Key File Format, RFC 4716, 2006.
+
+AUTHORS
+     OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
+     Tatu Ylonen.  Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo
+     de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
+     created OpenSSH.  Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
+     versions 1.5 and 2.0.
+
+OpenBSD 5.8                     August 20, 2015                    OpenBSD 5.8
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/ssh-keyscan.0 b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/ssh-keyscan.0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..500c1dd30
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/ssh-keyscan.0
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+SSH-KEYSCAN(1)              General Commands Manual             SSH-KEYSCAN(1)
+
+NAME
+     ssh-keyscan M-bM-^@M-^S gather ssh public keys
+
+SYNOPSIS
+     ssh-keyscan [-46Hv] [-f file] [-p port] [-T timeout] [-t type]
+                 [host | addrlist namelist] ...
+
+DESCRIPTION
+     ssh-keyscan is a utility for gathering the public ssh host keys of a
+     number of hosts.  It was designed to aid in building and verifying
+     ssh_known_hosts files.  ssh-keyscan provides a minimal interface suitable
+     for use by shell and perl scripts.
+
+     ssh-keyscan uses non-blocking socket I/O to contact as many hosts as
+     possible in parallel, so it is very efficient.  The keys from a domain of
+     1,000 hosts can be collected in tens of seconds, even when some of those
+     hosts are down or do not run ssh.  For scanning, one does not need login
+     access to the machines that are being scanned, nor does the scanning
+     process involve any encryption.
+
+     The options are as follows:
+
+     -4      Forces ssh-keyscan to use IPv4 addresses only.
+
+     -6      Forces ssh-keyscan to use IPv6 addresses only.
+
+     -f file
+             Read hosts or M-bM-^@M-^\addrlist namelistM-bM-^@M-^] pairs from file, one per line.
+             If - is supplied instead of a filename, ssh-keyscan will read
+             hosts or M-bM-^@M-^\addrlist namelistM-bM-^@M-^] pairs from the standard input.
+
+     -H      Hash all hostnames and addresses in the output.  Hashed names may
+             be used normally by ssh and sshd, but they do not reveal
+             identifying information should the file's contents be disclosed.
+
+     -p port
+             Port to connect to on the remote host.
+
+     -T timeout
+             Set the timeout for connection attempts.  If timeout seconds have
+             elapsed since a connection was initiated to a host or since the
+             last time anything was read from that host, then the connection
+             is closed and the host in question considered unavailable.
+             Default is 5 seconds.
+
+     -t type
+             Specifies the type of the key to fetch from the scanned hosts.
+             The possible values are M-bM-^@M-^\rsa1M-bM-^@M-^] for protocol version 1 and M-bM-^@M-^\dsaM-bM-^@M-^],
+             M-bM-^@M-^\ecdsaM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ed25519M-bM-^@M-^], or M-bM-^@M-^\rsaM-bM-^@M-^] for protocol version 2.  Multiple
+             values may be specified by separating them with commas.  The
+             default is to fetch M-bM-^@M-^\rsaM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ecdsaM-bM-^@M-^], and M-bM-^@M-^\ed25519M-bM-^@M-^] keys.
+
+     -v      Verbose mode.  Causes ssh-keyscan to print debugging messages
+             about its progress.
+
+SECURITY
+     If an ssh_known_hosts file is constructed using ssh-keyscan without
+     verifying the keys, users will be vulnerable to man in the middle
+     attacks.  On the other hand, if the security model allows such a risk,
+     ssh-keyscan can help in the detection of tampered keyfiles or man in the
+     middle attacks which have begun after the ssh_known_hosts file was
+     created.
+
+FILES
+     Input format:
+
+     1.2.3.4,1.2.4.4 name.my.domain,name,n.my.domain,n,1.2.3.4,1.2.4.4
+
+     Output format for RSA1 keys:
+
+     host-or-namelist bits exponent modulus
+
+     Output format for RSA, DSA, ECDSA, and Ed25519 keys:
+
+     host-or-namelist keytype base64-encoded-key
+
+     Where keytype is either M-bM-^@M-^\ecdsa-sha2-nistp256M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ecdsa-sha2-nistp384M-bM-^@M-^],
+     M-bM-^@M-^\ecdsa-sha2-nistp521M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ssh-ed25519M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ssh-dssM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\ssh-rsaM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+     /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
+
+EXAMPLES
+     Print the rsa host key for machine hostname:
+
+     $ ssh-keyscan hostname
+
+     Find all hosts from the file ssh_hosts which have new or different keys
+     from those in the sorted file ssh_known_hosts:
+
+     $ ssh-keyscan -t rsa,dsa,ecdsa,ed25519 -f ssh_hosts | \
+             sort -u - ssh_known_hosts | diff ssh_known_hosts -
+
+SEE ALSO
+     ssh(1), sshd(8)
+
+AUTHORS
+     David Mazieres <dm@lcs.mit.edu> wrote the initial version, and Wayne
+     Davison <wayned@users.sourceforge.net> added support for protocol version
+     2.
+
+BUGS
+     It generates "Connection closed by remote host" messages on the consoles
+     of all the machines it scans if the server is older than version 2.9.
+     This is because it opens a connection to the ssh port, reads the public
+     key, and drops the connection as soon as it gets the key.
+
+OpenBSD 5.8                     August 30, 2014                    OpenBSD 5.8
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/ssh-pkcs11-helper.0 b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/ssh-pkcs11-helper.0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7fac805ff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/ssh-pkcs11-helper.0
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+SSH-PKCS11-HELPER(8)        System Manager's Manual       SSH-PKCS11-HELPER(8)
+
+NAME
+     ssh-pkcs11-helper M-bM-^@M-^S ssh-agent helper program for PKCS#11 support
+
+SYNOPSIS
+     ssh-pkcs11-helper
+
+DESCRIPTION
+     ssh-pkcs11-helper is used by ssh-agent(1) to access keys provided by a
+     PKCS#11 token.
+
+     ssh-pkcs11-helper is not intended to be invoked by the user, but from
+     ssh-agent(1).
+
+SEE ALSO
+     ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1)
+
+HISTORY
+     ssh-pkcs11-helper first appeared in OpenBSD 4.7.
+
+AUTHORS
+     Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
+
+OpenBSD 5.8                      July 16, 2013                     OpenBSD 5.8
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/ssh.0 b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/ssh.0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ad4817aff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/ssh.0
@@ -0,0 +1,972 @@
+SSH(1)                      General Commands Manual                     SSH(1)
+
+NAME
+     ssh M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH SSH client (remote login program)
+
+SYNOPSIS
+     ssh [-1246AaCfGgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYy] [-b bind_address] [-c cipher_spec]
+         [-D [bind_address:]port] [-E log_file] [-e escape_char]
+         [-F configfile] [-I pkcs11] [-i identity_file] [-L address]
+         [-l login_name] [-m mac_spec] [-O ctl_cmd] [-o option] [-p port]
+         [-Q cipher | cipher-auth | mac | kex | key | protocol-version]
+         [-R address] [-S ctl_path] [-W host:port] [-w local_tun[:remote_tun]]
+         [user@]hostname [command]
+
+DESCRIPTION
+     ssh (SSH client) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for
+     executing commands on a remote machine.  It is intended to replace rlogin
+     and rsh, and provide secure encrypted communications between two
+     untrusted hosts over an insecure network.  X11 connections, arbitrary TCP
+     ports and UNIX-domain sockets can also be forwarded over the secure
+     channel.
+
+     ssh connects and logs into the specified hostname (with optional user
+     name).  The user must prove his/her identity to the remote machine using
+     one of several methods depending on the protocol version used (see
+     below).
+
+     If command is specified, it is executed on the remote host instead of a
+     login shell.
+
+     The options are as follows:
+
+     -1      Forces ssh to try protocol version 1 only.
+
+     -2      Forces ssh to try protocol version 2 only.
+
+     -4      Forces ssh to use IPv4 addresses only.
+
+     -6      Forces ssh to use IPv6 addresses only.
+
+     -A      Enables forwarding of the authentication agent connection.  This
+             can also be specified on a per-host basis in a configuration
+             file.
+
+             Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution.  Users with the
+             ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the
+             agent's UNIX-domain socket) can access the local agent through
+             the forwarded connection.  An attacker cannot obtain key material
+             from the agent, however they can perform operations on the keys
+             that enable them to authenticate using the identities loaded into
+             the agent.
+
+     -a      Disables forwarding of the authentication agent connection.
+
+     -b bind_address
+             Use bind_address on the local machine as the source address of
+             the connection.  Only useful on systems with more than one
+             address.
+
+     -C      Requests compression of all data (including stdin, stdout,
+             stderr, and data for forwarded X11, TCP and UNIX-domain
+             connections).  The compression algorithm is the same used by
+             gzip(1), and the M-bM-^@M-^\levelM-bM-^@M-^] can be controlled by the
+             CompressionLevel option for protocol version 1.  Compression is
+             desirable on modem lines and other slow connections, but will
+             only slow down things on fast networks.  The default value can be
+             set on a host-by-host basis in the configuration files; see the
+             Compression option.
+
+     -c cipher_spec
+             Selects the cipher specification for encrypting the session.
+
+             Protocol version 1 allows specification of a single cipher.  The
+             supported values are M-bM-^@M-^\3desM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\blowfishM-bM-^@M-^], and M-bM-^@M-^\desM-bM-^@M-^].  For protocol
+             version 2, cipher_spec is a comma-separated list of ciphers
+             listed in order of preference.  See the Ciphers keyword in
+             ssh_config(5) for more information.
+
+     -D [bind_address:]port
+             Specifies a local M-bM-^@M-^\dynamicM-bM-^@M-^] application-level port forwarding.
+             This works by allocating a socket to listen to port on the local
+             side, optionally bound to the specified bind_address.  Whenever a
+             connection is made to this port, the connection is forwarded over
+             the secure channel, and the application protocol is then used to
+             determine where to connect to from the remote machine.  Currently
+             the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are supported, and ssh will act
+             as a SOCKS server.  Only root can forward privileged ports.
+             Dynamic port forwardings can also be specified in the
+             configuration file.
+
+             IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in
+             square brackets.  Only the superuser can forward privileged
+             ports.  By default, the local port is bound in accordance with
+             the GatewayPorts setting.  However, an explicit bind_address may
+             be used to bind the connection to a specific address.  The
+             bind_address of M-bM-^@M-^\localhostM-bM-^@M-^] indicates that the listening port be
+             bound for local use only, while an empty address or M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y indicates
+             that the port should be available from all interfaces.
+
+     -E log_file
+             Append debug logs to log_file instead of standard error.
+
+     -e escape_char
+             Sets the escape character for sessions with a pty (default: M-bM-^@M-^X~M-bM-^@M-^Y).
+             The escape character is only recognized at the beginning of a
+             line.  The escape character followed by a dot (M-bM-^@M-^X.M-bM-^@M-^Y) closes the
+             connection; followed by control-Z suspends the connection; and
+             followed by itself sends the escape character once.  Setting the
+             character to M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] disables any escapes and makes the session
+             fully transparent.
+
+     -F configfile
+             Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file.  If a
+             configuration file is given on the command line, the system-wide
+             configuration file (/etc/ssh/ssh_config) will be ignored.  The
+             default for the per-user configuration file is ~/.ssh/config.
+
+     -f      Requests ssh to go to background just before command execution.
+             This is useful if ssh is going to ask for passwords or
+             passphrases, but the user wants it in the background.  This
+             implies -n.  The recommended way to start X11 programs at a
+             remote site is with something like ssh -f host xterm.
+
+             If the ExitOnForwardFailure configuration option is set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^],
+             then a client started with -f will wait for all remote port
+             forwards to be successfully established before placing itself in
+             the background.
+
+     -G      Causes ssh to print its configuration after evaluating Host and
+             Match blocks and exit.
+
+     -g      Allows remote hosts to connect to local forwarded ports.  If used
+             on a multiplexed connection, then this option must be specified
+             on the master process.
+
+     -I pkcs11
+             Specify the PKCS#11 shared library ssh should use to communicate
+             with a PKCS#11 token providing the user's private RSA key.
+
+     -i identity_file
+             Selects a file from which the identity (private key) for public
+             key authentication is read.  The default is ~/.ssh/identity for
+             protocol version 1, and ~/.ssh/id_dsa, ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa,
+             ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 and ~/.ssh/id_rsa for protocol version 2.
+             Identity files may also be specified on a per-host basis in the
+             configuration file.  It is possible to have multiple -i options
+             (and multiple identities specified in configuration files).  ssh
+             will also try to load certificate information from the filename
+             obtained by appending -cert.pub to identity filenames.
+
+     -K      Enables GSSAPI-based authentication and forwarding (delegation)
+             of GSSAPI credentials to the server.
+
+     -k      Disables forwarding (delegation) of GSSAPI credentials to the
+             server.
+
+     -L [bind_address:]port:host:hostport
+     -L [bind_address:]port:remote_socket
+     -L local_socket:host:hostport
+     -L local_socket:remote_socket
+             Specifies that connections to the given TCP port or Unix socket
+             on the local (client) host are to be forwarded to the given host
+             and port, or Unix socket, on the remote side.  This works by
+             allocating a socket to listen to either a TCP port on the local
+             side, optionally bound to the specified bind_address, or to a
+             Unix socket.  Whenever a connection is made to the local port or
+             socket, the connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and
+             a connection is made to either host port hostport, or the Unix
+             socket remote_socket, from the remote machine.
+
+             Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file.
+             Only the superuser can forward privileged ports.  IPv6 addresses
+             can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets.
+
+             By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the
+             GatewayPorts setting.  However, an explicit bind_address may be
+             used to bind the connection to a specific address.  The
+             bind_address of M-bM-^@M-^\localhostM-bM-^@M-^] indicates that the listening port be
+             bound for local use only, while an empty address or M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y indicates
+             that the port should be available from all interfaces.
+
+     -l login_name
+             Specifies the user to log in as on the remote machine.  This also
+             may be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file.
+
+     -M      Places the ssh client into M-bM-^@M-^\masterM-bM-^@M-^] mode for connection sharing.
+             Multiple -M options places ssh into M-bM-^@M-^\masterM-bM-^@M-^] mode with
+             confirmation required before slave connections are accepted.
+             Refer to the description of ControlMaster in ssh_config(5) for
+             details.
+
+     -m mac_spec
+             Additionally, for protocol version 2 a comma-separated list of
+             MAC (message authentication code) algorithms can be specified in
+             order of preference.  See the MACs keyword for more information.
+
+     -N      Do not execute a remote command.  This is useful for just
+             forwarding ports (protocol version 2 only).
+
+     -n      Redirects stdin from /dev/null (actually, prevents reading from
+             stdin).  This must be used when ssh is run in the background.  A
+             common trick is to use this to run X11 programs on a remote
+             machine.  For example, ssh -n shadows.cs.hut.fi emacs & will
+             start an emacs on shadows.cs.hut.fi, and the X11 connection will
+             be automatically forwarded over an encrypted channel.  The ssh
+             program will be put in the background.  (This does not work if
+             ssh needs to ask for a password or passphrase; see also the -f
+             option.)
+
+     -O ctl_cmd
+             Control an active connection multiplexing master process.  When
+             the -O option is specified, the ctl_cmd argument is interpreted
+             and passed to the master process.  Valid commands are: M-bM-^@M-^\checkM-bM-^@M-^]
+             (check that the master process is running), M-bM-^@M-^\forwardM-bM-^@M-^] (request
+             forwardings without command execution), M-bM-^@M-^\cancelM-bM-^@M-^] (cancel
+             forwardings), M-bM-^@M-^\exitM-bM-^@M-^] (request the master to exit), and M-bM-^@M-^\stopM-bM-^@M-^]
+             (request the master to stop accepting further multiplexing
+             requests).
+
+     -o option
+             Can be used to give options in the format used in the
+             configuration file.  This is useful for specifying options for
+             which there is no separate command-line flag.  For full details
+             of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
+             ssh_config(5).
+
+                   AddressFamily
+                   BatchMode
+                   BindAddress
+                   CanonicalDomains
+                   CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
+                   CanonicalizeHostname
+                   CanonicalizeMaxDots
+                   CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
+                   ChallengeResponseAuthentication
+                   CheckHostIP
+                   Cipher
+                   Ciphers
+                   ClearAllForwardings
+                   Compression
+                   CompressionLevel
+                   ConnectionAttempts
+                   ConnectTimeout
+                   ControlMaster
+                   ControlPath
+                   ControlPersist
+                   DynamicForward
+                   EscapeChar
+                   ExitOnForwardFailure
+                   FingerprintHash
+                   ForwardAgent
+                   ForwardX11
+                   ForwardX11Timeout
+                   ForwardX11Trusted
+                   GatewayPorts
+                   GlobalKnownHostsFile
+                   GSSAPIAuthentication
+                   GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
+                   HashKnownHosts
+                   Host
+                   HostbasedAuthentication
+                   HostbasedKeyTypes
+                   HostKeyAlgorithms
+                   HostKeyAlias
+                   HostName
+                   IdentityFile
+                   IdentitiesOnly
+                   IPQoS
+                   KbdInteractiveAuthentication
+                   KbdInteractiveDevices
+                   KexAlgorithms
+                   LocalCommand
+                   LocalForward
+                   LogLevel
+                   MACs
+                   Match
+                   NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
+                   NumberOfPasswordPrompts
+                   PasswordAuthentication
+                   PermitLocalCommand
+                   PKCS11Provider
+                   Port
+                   PreferredAuthentications
+                   Protocol
+                   ProxyCommand
+                   ProxyUseFdpass
+                   PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
+                   PubkeyAuthentication
+                   RekeyLimit
+                   RemoteForward
+                   RequestTTY
+                   RhostsRSAAuthentication
+                   RSAAuthentication
+                   SendEnv
+                   ServerAliveInterval
+                   ServerAliveCountMax
+                   StreamLocalBindMask
+                   StreamLocalBindUnlink
+                   StrictHostKeyChecking
+                   TCPKeepAlive
+                   Tunnel
+                   TunnelDevice
+                   UpdateHostKeys
+                   UsePrivilegedPort
+                   User
+                   UserKnownHostsFile
+                   VerifyHostKeyDNS
+                   VisualHostKey
+                   XAuthLocation
+
+     -p port
+             Port to connect to on the remote host.  This can be specified on
+             a per-host basis in the configuration file.
+
+     -Q cipher | cipher-auth | mac | kex | key | protocol-version
+             Queries ssh for the algorithms supported for the specified
+             version 2.  The available features are: cipher (supported
+             symmetric ciphers), cipher-auth (supported symmetric ciphers that
+             support authenticated encryption), mac (supported message
+             integrity codes), kex (key exchange algorithms), key (key types)
+             and protocol-version (supported SSH protocol versions).
+
+     -q      Quiet mode.  Causes most warning and diagnostic messages to be
+             suppressed.
+
+     -R [bind_address:]port:host:hostport
+     -R [bind_address:]port:local_socket
+     -R remote_socket:host:hostport
+     -R remote_socket:local_socket
+             Specifies that connections to the given TCP port or Unix socket
+             on the remote (server) host are to be forwarded to the given host
+             and port, or Unix socket, on the local side.  This works by
+             allocating a socket to listen to either a TCP port or to a Unix
+             socket on the remote side.  Whenever a connection is made to this
+             port or Unix socket, the connection is forwarded over the secure
+             channel, and a connection is made to either host port hostport,
+             or local_socket, from the local machine.
+
+             Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file.
+             Privileged ports can be forwarded only when logging in as root on
+             the remote machine.  IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing
+             the address in square brackets.
+
+             By default, TCP listening sockets on the server will be bound to
+             the loopback interface only.  This may be overridden by
+             specifying a bind_address.  An empty bind_address, or the address
+             M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y, indicates that the remote socket should listen on all
+             interfaces.  Specifying a remote bind_address will only succeed
+             if the server's GatewayPorts option is enabled (see
+             sshd_config(5)).
+
+             If the port argument is M-bM-^@M-^X0M-bM-^@M-^Y, the listen port will be dynamically
+             allocated on the server and reported to the client at run time.
+             When used together with -O forward the allocated port will be
+             printed to the standard output.
+
+     -S ctl_path
+             Specifies the location of a control socket for connection
+             sharing, or the string M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] to disable connection sharing.
+             Refer to the description of ControlPath and ControlMaster in
+             ssh_config(5) for details.
+
+     -s      May be used to request invocation of a subsystem on the remote
+             system.  Subsystems are a feature of the SSH2 protocol which
+             facilitate the use of SSH as a secure transport for other
+             applications (eg. sftp(1)).  The subsystem is specified as the
+             remote command.
+
+     -T      Disable pseudo-terminal allocation.
+
+     -t      Force pseudo-terminal allocation.  This can be used to execute
+             arbitrary screen-based programs on a remote machine, which can be
+             very useful, e.g. when implementing menu services.  Multiple -t
+             options force tty allocation, even if ssh has no local tty.
+
+     -V      Display the version number and exit.
+
+     -v      Verbose mode.  Causes ssh to print debugging messages about its
+             progress.  This is helpful in debugging connection,
+             authentication, and configuration problems.  Multiple -v options
+             increase the verbosity.  The maximum is 3.
+
+     -W host:port
+             Requests that standard input and output on the client be
+             forwarded to host on port over the secure channel.  Implies -N,
+             -T, ExitOnForwardFailure and ClearAllForwardings.  Works with
+             Protocol version 2 only.
+
+     -w local_tun[:remote_tun]
+             Requests tunnel device forwarding with the specified tun(4)
+             devices between the client (local_tun) and the server
+             (remote_tun).
+
+             The devices may be specified by numerical ID or the keyword
+             M-bM-^@M-^\anyM-bM-^@M-^], which uses the next available tunnel device.  If
+             remote_tun is not specified, it defaults to M-bM-^@M-^\anyM-bM-^@M-^].  See also the
+             Tunnel and TunnelDevice directives in ssh_config(5).  If the
+             Tunnel directive is unset, it is set to the default tunnel mode,
+             which is M-bM-^@M-^\point-to-pointM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+     -X      Enables X11 forwarding.  This can also be specified on a per-host
+             basis in a configuration file.
+
+             X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution.  Users with the
+             ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the
+             user's X authorization database) can access the local X11 display
+             through the forwarded connection.  An attacker may then be able
+             to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring.
+
+             For this reason, X11 forwarding is subjected to X11 SECURITY
+             extension restrictions by default.  Please refer to the ssh -Y
+             option and the ForwardX11Trusted directive in ssh_config(5) for
+             more information.
+
+     -x      Disables X11 forwarding.
+
+     -Y      Enables trusted X11 forwarding.  Trusted X11 forwardings are not
+             subjected to the X11 SECURITY extension controls.
+
+     -y      Send log information using the syslog(3) system module.  By
+             default this information is sent to stderr.
+
+     ssh may additionally obtain configuration data from a per-user
+     configuration file and a system-wide configuration file.  The file format
+     and configuration options are described in ssh_config(5).
+
+AUTHENTICATION
+     The OpenSSH SSH client supports SSH protocols 1 and 2.  The default is to
+     use protocol 2 only, though this can be changed via the Protocol option
+     in ssh_config(5) or the -1 and -2 options (see above).  Both protocols
+     support similar authentication methods, but protocol 2 is the default
+     since it provides additional mechanisms for confidentiality (the traffic
+     is encrypted using AES, 3DES, Blowfish, CAST128, or Arcfour) and
+     integrity (hmac-md5, hmac-sha1, hmac-sha2-256, hmac-sha2-512, umac-64,
+     umac-128, hmac-ripemd160).  Protocol 1 lacks a strong mechanism for
+     ensuring the integrity of the connection.
+
+     The methods available for authentication are: GSSAPI-based
+     authentication, host-based authentication, public key authentication,
+     challenge-response authentication, and password authentication.
+     Authentication methods are tried in the order specified above, though
+     protocol 2 has a configuration option to change the default order:
+     PreferredAuthentications.
+
+     Host-based authentication works as follows: If the machine the user logs
+     in from is listed in /etc/hosts.equiv or /etc/shosts.equiv on the remote
+     machine, and the user names are the same on both sides, or if the files
+     ~/.rhosts or ~/.shosts exist in the user's home directory on the remote
+     machine and contain a line containing the name of the client machine and
+     the name of the user on that machine, the user is considered for login.
+     Additionally, the server must be able to verify the client's host key
+     (see the description of /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts and ~/.ssh/known_hosts,
+     below) for login to be permitted.  This authentication method closes
+     security holes due to IP spoofing, DNS spoofing, and routing spoofing.
+     [Note to the administrator: /etc/hosts.equiv, ~/.rhosts, and the
+     rlogin/rsh protocol in general, are inherently insecure and should be
+     disabled if security is desired.]
+
+     Public key authentication works as follows: The scheme is based on
+     public-key cryptography, using cryptosystems where encryption and
+     decryption are done using separate keys, and it is unfeasible to derive
+     the decryption key from the encryption key.  The idea is that each user
+     creates a public/private key pair for authentication purposes.  The
+     server knows the public key, and only the user knows the private key.
+     ssh implements public key authentication protocol automatically, using
+     one of the DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA algorithms.  Protocol 1 is
+     restricted to using only RSA keys, but protocol 2 may use any.  The
+     HISTORY section of ssl(8) contains a brief discussion of the DSA and RSA
+     algorithms.
+
+     The file ~/.ssh/authorized_keys lists the public keys that are permitted
+     for logging in.  When the user logs in, the ssh program tells the server
+     which key pair it would like to use for authentication.  The client
+     proves that it has access to the private key and the server checks that
+     the corresponding public key is authorized to accept the account.
+
+     The user creates his/her key pair by running ssh-keygen(1).  This stores
+     the private key in ~/.ssh/identity (protocol 1), ~/.ssh/id_dsa (protocol
+     2 DSA), ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa (protocol 2 ECDSA), ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 (protocol 2
+     Ed25519), or ~/.ssh/id_rsa (protocol 2 RSA) and stores the public key in
+     ~/.ssh/identity.pub (protocol 1), ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub (protocol 2 DSA),
+     ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub (protocol 2 ECDSA), ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub (protocol 2
+     Ed25519), or ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub (protocol 2 RSA) in the user's home
+     directory.  The user should then copy the public key to
+     ~/.ssh/authorized_keys in his/her home directory on the remote machine.
+     The authorized_keys file corresponds to the conventional ~/.rhosts file,
+     and has one key per line, though the lines can be very long.  After this,
+     the user can log in without giving the password.
+
+     A variation on public key authentication is available in the form of
+     certificate authentication: instead of a set of public/private keys,
+     signed certificates are used.  This has the advantage that a single
+     trusted certification authority can be used in place of many
+     public/private keys.  See the CERTIFICATES section of ssh-keygen(1) for
+     more information.
+
+     The most convenient way to use public key or certificate authentication
+     may be with an authentication agent.  See ssh-agent(1) for more
+     information.
+
+     Challenge-response authentication works as follows: The server sends an
+     arbitrary "challenge" text, and prompts for a response.  Protocol 2
+     allows multiple challenges and responses; protocol 1 is restricted to
+     just one challenge/response.  Examples of challenge-response
+     authentication include BSD Authentication (see login.conf(5)) and PAM
+     (some non-OpenBSD systems).
+
+     Finally, if other authentication methods fail, ssh prompts the user for a
+     password.  The password is sent to the remote host for checking; however,
+     since all communications are encrypted, the password cannot be seen by
+     someone listening on the network.
+
+     ssh automatically maintains and checks a database containing
+     identification for all hosts it has ever been used with.  Host keys are
+     stored in ~/.ssh/known_hosts in the user's home directory.  Additionally,
+     the file /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts is automatically checked for known
+     hosts.  Any new hosts are automatically added to the user's file.  If a
+     host's identification ever changes, ssh warns about this and disables
+     password authentication to prevent server spoofing or man-in-the-middle
+     attacks, which could otherwise be used to circumvent the encryption.  The
+     StrictHostKeyChecking option can be used to control logins to machines
+     whose host key is not known or has changed.
+
+     When the user's identity has been accepted by the server, the server
+     either executes the given command in a non-interactive session or, if no
+     command has been specified, logs into the machine and gives the user a
+     normal shell as an interactive session.  All communication with the
+     remote command or shell will be automatically encrypted.
+
+     If an interactive session is requested ssh by default will only request a
+     pseudo-terminal (pty) for interactive sessions when the client has one.
+     The flags -T and -t can be used to override this behaviour.
+
+     If a pseudo-terminal has been allocated the user may use the escape
+     characters noted below.
+
+     If no pseudo-terminal has been allocated, the session is transparent and
+     can be used to reliably transfer binary data.  On most systems, setting
+     the escape character to M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] will also make the session transparent
+     even if a tty is used.
+
+     The session terminates when the command or shell on the remote machine
+     exits and all X11 and TCP connections have been closed.
+
+ESCAPE CHARACTERS
+     When a pseudo-terminal has been requested, ssh supports a number of
+     functions through the use of an escape character.
+
+     A single tilde character can be sent as ~~ or by following the tilde by a
+     character other than those described below.  The escape character must
+     always follow a newline to be interpreted as special.  The escape
+     character can be changed in configuration files using the EscapeChar
+     configuration directive or on the command line by the -e option.
+
+     The supported escapes (assuming the default M-bM-^@M-^X~M-bM-^@M-^Y) are:
+
+     ~.      Disconnect.
+
+     ~^Z     Background ssh.
+
+     ~#      List forwarded connections.
+
+     ~&      Background ssh at logout when waiting for forwarded connection /
+             X11 sessions to terminate.
+
+     ~?      Display a list of escape characters.
+
+     ~B      Send a BREAK to the remote system (only useful for SSH protocol
+             version 2 and if the peer supports it).
+
+     ~C      Open command line.  Currently this allows the addition of port
+             forwardings using the -L, -R and -D options (see above).  It also
+             allows the cancellation of existing port-forwardings with
+             -KL[bind_address:]port for local, -KR[bind_address:]port for
+             remote and -KD[bind_address:]port for dynamic port-forwardings.
+             !command allows the user to execute a local command if the
+             PermitLocalCommand option is enabled in ssh_config(5).  Basic
+             help is available, using the -h option.
+
+     ~R      Request rekeying of the connection (only useful for SSH protocol
+             version 2 and if the peer supports it).
+
+     ~V      Decrease the verbosity (LogLevel) when errors are being written
+             to stderr.
+
+     ~v      Increase the verbosity (LogLevel) when errors are being written
+             to stderr.
+
+TCP FORWARDING
+     Forwarding of arbitrary TCP connections over the secure channel can be
+     specified either on the command line or in a configuration file.  One
+     possible application of TCP forwarding is a secure connection to a mail
+     server; another is going through firewalls.
+
+     In the example below, we look at encrypting communication between an IRC
+     client and server, even though the IRC server does not directly support
+     encrypted communications.  This works as follows: the user connects to
+     the remote host using ssh, specifying a port to be used to forward
+     connections to the remote server.  After that it is possible to start the
+     service which is to be encrypted on the client machine, connecting to the
+     same local port, and ssh will encrypt and forward the connection.
+
+     The following example tunnels an IRC session from client machine
+     M-bM-^@M-^\127.0.0.1M-bM-^@M-^] (localhost) to remote server M-bM-^@M-^\server.example.comM-bM-^@M-^]:
+
+         $ ssh -f -L 1234:localhost:6667 server.example.com sleep 10
+         $ irc -c '#users' -p 1234 pinky 127.0.0.1
+
+     This tunnels a connection to IRC server M-bM-^@M-^\server.example.comM-bM-^@M-^], joining
+     channel M-bM-^@M-^\#usersM-bM-^@M-^], nickname M-bM-^@M-^\pinkyM-bM-^@M-^], using port 1234.  It doesn't matter
+     which port is used, as long as it's greater than 1023 (remember, only
+     root can open sockets on privileged ports) and doesn't conflict with any
+     ports already in use.  The connection is forwarded to port 6667 on the
+     remote server, since that's the standard port for IRC services.
+
+     The -f option backgrounds ssh and the remote command M-bM-^@M-^\sleep 10M-bM-^@M-^] is
+     specified to allow an amount of time (10 seconds, in the example) to
+     start the service which is to be tunnelled.  If no connections are made
+     within the time specified, ssh will exit.
+
+X11 FORWARDING
+     If the ForwardX11 variable is set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] (or see the description of the
+     -X, -x, and -Y options above) and the user is using X11 (the DISPLAY
+     environment variable is set), the connection to the X11 display is
+     automatically forwarded to the remote side in such a way that any X11
+     programs started from the shell (or command) will go through the
+     encrypted channel, and the connection to the real X server will be made
+     from the local machine.  The user should not manually set DISPLAY.
+     Forwarding of X11 connections can be configured on the command line or in
+     configuration files.
+
+     The DISPLAY value set by ssh will point to the server machine, but with a
+     display number greater than zero.  This is normal, and happens because
+     ssh creates a M-bM-^@M-^\proxyM-bM-^@M-^] X server on the server machine for forwarding the
+     connections over the encrypted channel.
+
+     ssh will also automatically set up Xauthority data on the server machine.
+     For this purpose, it will generate a random authorization cookie, store
+     it in Xauthority on the server, and verify that any forwarded connections
+     carry this cookie and replace it by the real cookie when the connection
+     is opened.  The real authentication cookie is never sent to the server
+     machine (and no cookies are sent in the plain).
+
+     If the ForwardAgent variable is set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] (or see the description of
+     the -A and -a options above) and the user is using an authentication
+     agent, the connection to the agent is automatically forwarded to the
+     remote side.
+
+VERIFYING HOST KEYS
+     When connecting to a server for the first time, a fingerprint of the
+     server's public key is presented to the user (unless the option
+     StrictHostKeyChecking has been disabled).  Fingerprints can be determined
+     using ssh-keygen(1):
+
+           $ ssh-keygen -l -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+
+     If the fingerprint is already known, it can be matched and the key can be
+     accepted or rejected.  If only legacy (MD5) fingerprints for the server
+     are available, the ssh-keygen(1) -E option may be used to downgrade the
+     fingerprint algorithm to match.
+
+     Because of the difficulty of comparing host keys just by looking at
+     fingerprint strings, there is also support to compare host keys visually,
+     using random art.  By setting the VisualHostKey option to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], a small
+     ASCII graphic gets displayed on every login to a server, no matter if the
+     session itself is interactive or not.  By learning the pattern a known
+     server produces, a user can easily find out that the host key has changed
+     when a completely different pattern is displayed.  Because these patterns
+     are not unambiguous however, a pattern that looks similar to the pattern
+     remembered only gives a good probability that the host key is the same,
+     not guaranteed proof.
+
+     To get a listing of the fingerprints along with their random art for all
+     known hosts, the following command line can be used:
+
+           $ ssh-keygen -lv -f ~/.ssh/known_hosts
+
+     If the fingerprint is unknown, an alternative method of verification is
+     available: SSH fingerprints verified by DNS.  An additional resource
+     record (RR), SSHFP, is added to a zonefile and the connecting client is
+     able to match the fingerprint with that of the key presented.
+
+     In this example, we are connecting a client to a server,
+     M-bM-^@M-^\host.example.comM-bM-^@M-^].  The SSHFP resource records should first be added to
+     the zonefile for host.example.com:
+
+           $ ssh-keygen -r host.example.com.
+
+     The output lines will have to be added to the zonefile.  To check that
+     the zone is answering fingerprint queries:
+
+           $ dig -t SSHFP host.example.com
+
+     Finally the client connects:
+
+           $ ssh -o "VerifyHostKeyDNS ask" host.example.com
+           [...]
+           Matching host key fingerprint found in DNS.
+           Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)?
+
+     See the VerifyHostKeyDNS option in ssh_config(5) for more information.
+
+SSH-BASED VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORKS
+     ssh contains support for Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunnelling using
+     the tun(4) network pseudo-device, allowing two networks to be joined
+     securely.  The sshd_config(5) configuration option PermitTunnel controls
+     whether the server supports this, and at what level (layer 2 or 3
+     traffic).
+
+     The following example would connect client network 10.0.50.0/24 with
+     remote network 10.0.99.0/24 using a point-to-point connection from
+     10.1.1.1 to 10.1.1.2, provided that the SSH server running on the gateway
+     to the remote network, at 192.168.1.15, allows it.
+
+     On the client:
+
+           # ssh -f -w 0:1 192.168.1.15 true
+           # ifconfig tun0 10.1.1.1 10.1.1.2 netmask 255.255.255.252
+           # route add 10.0.99.0/24 10.1.1.2
+
+     On the server:
+
+           # ifconfig tun1 10.1.1.2 10.1.1.1 netmask 255.255.255.252
+           # route add 10.0.50.0/24 10.1.1.1
+
+     Client access may be more finely tuned via the /root/.ssh/authorized_keys
+     file (see below) and the PermitRootLogin server option.  The following
+     entry would permit connections on tun(4) device 1 from user M-bM-^@M-^\janeM-bM-^@M-^] and on
+     tun device 2 from user M-bM-^@M-^\johnM-bM-^@M-^], if PermitRootLogin is set to
+     M-bM-^@M-^\forced-commands-onlyM-bM-^@M-^]:
+
+       tunnel="1",command="sh /etc/netstart tun1" ssh-rsa ... jane
+       tunnel="2",command="sh /etc/netstart tun2" ssh-rsa ... john
+
+     Since an SSH-based setup entails a fair amount of overhead, it may be
+     more suited to temporary setups, such as for wireless VPNs.  More
+     permanent VPNs are better provided by tools such as ipsecctl(8) and
+     isakmpd(8).
+
+ENVIRONMENT
+     ssh will normally set the following environment variables:
+
+     DISPLAY               The DISPLAY variable indicates the location of the
+                           X11 server.  It is automatically set by ssh to
+                           point to a value of the form M-bM-^@M-^\hostname:nM-bM-^@M-^], where
+                           M-bM-^@M-^\hostnameM-bM-^@M-^] indicates the host where the shell runs,
+                           and M-bM-^@M-^XnM-bM-^@M-^Y is an integer M-bM-^IM-% 1.  ssh uses this special
+                           value to forward X11 connections over the secure
+                           channel.  The user should normally not set DISPLAY
+                           explicitly, as that will render the X11 connection
+                           insecure (and will require the user to manually
+                           copy any required authorization cookies).
+
+     HOME                  Set to the path of the user's home directory.
+
+     LOGNAME               Synonym for USER; set for compatibility with
+                           systems that use this variable.
+
+     MAIL                  Set to the path of the user's mailbox.
+
+     PATH                  Set to the default PATH, as specified when
+                           compiling ssh.
+
+     SSH_ASKPASS           If ssh needs a passphrase, it will read the
+                           passphrase from the current terminal if it was run
+                           from a terminal.  If ssh does not have a terminal
+                           associated with it but DISPLAY and SSH_ASKPASS are
+                           set, it will execute the program specified by
+                           SSH_ASKPASS and open an X11 window to read the
+                           passphrase.  This is particularly useful when
+                           calling ssh from a .xsession or related script.
+                           (Note that on some machines it may be necessary to
+                           redirect the input from /dev/null to make this
+                           work.)
+
+     SSH_AUTH_SOCK         Identifies the path of a UNIX-domain socket used to
+                           communicate with the agent.
+
+     SSH_CONNECTION        Identifies the client and server ends of the
+                           connection.  The variable contains four space-
+                           separated values: client IP address, client port
+                           number, server IP address, and server port number.
+
+     SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND  This variable contains the original command line if
+                           a forced command is executed.  It can be used to
+                           extract the original arguments.
+
+     SSH_TTY               This is set to the name of the tty (path to the
+                           device) associated with the current shell or
+                           command.  If the current session has no tty, this
+                           variable is not set.
+
+     TZ                    This variable is set to indicate the present time
+                           zone if it was set when the daemon was started
+                           (i.e. the daemon passes the value on to new
+                           connections).
+
+     USER                  Set to the name of the user logging in.
+
+     Additionally, ssh reads ~/.ssh/environment, and adds lines of the format
+     M-bM-^@M-^\VARNAME=valueM-bM-^@M-^] to the environment if the file exists and users are
+     allowed to change their environment.  For more information, see the
+     PermitUserEnvironment option in sshd_config(5).
+
+FILES
+     ~/.rhosts
+             This file is used for host-based authentication (see above).  On
+             some machines this file may need to be world-readable if the
+             user's home directory is on an NFS partition, because sshd(8)
+             reads it as root.  Additionally, this file must be owned by the
+             user, and must not have write permissions for anyone else.  The
+             recommended permission for most machines is read/write for the
+             user, and not accessible by others.
+
+     ~/.shosts
+             This file is used in exactly the same way as .rhosts, but allows
+             host-based authentication without permitting login with
+             rlogin/rsh.
+
+     ~/.ssh/
+             This directory is the default location for all user-specific
+             configuration and authentication information.  There is no
+             general requirement to keep the entire contents of this directory
+             secret, but the recommended permissions are read/write/execute
+             for the user, and not accessible by others.
+
+     ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+             Lists the public keys (DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519, RSA) that can be used
+             for logging in as this user.  The format of this file is
+             described in the sshd(8) manual page.  This file is not highly
+             sensitive, but the recommended permissions are read/write for the
+             user, and not accessible by others.
+
+     ~/.ssh/config
+             This is the per-user configuration file.  The file format and
+             configuration options are described in ssh_config(5).  Because of
+             the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions:
+             read/write for the user, and not writable by others.
+
+     ~/.ssh/environment
+             Contains additional definitions for environment variables; see
+             ENVIRONMENT, above.
+
+     ~/.ssh/identity
+     ~/.ssh/id_dsa
+     ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
+     ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
+     ~/.ssh/id_rsa
+             Contains the private key for authentication.  These files contain
+             sensitive data and should be readable by the user but not
+             accessible by others (read/write/execute).  ssh will simply
+             ignore a private key file if it is accessible by others.  It is
+             possible to specify a passphrase when generating the key which
+             will be used to encrypt the sensitive part of this file using
+             3DES.
+
+     ~/.ssh/identity.pub
+     ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub
+     ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub
+     ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub
+     ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
+             Contains the public key for authentication.  These files are not
+             sensitive and can (but need not) be readable by anyone.
+
+     ~/.ssh/known_hosts
+             Contains a list of host keys for all hosts the user has logged
+             into that are not already in the systemwide list of known host
+             keys.  See sshd(8) for further details of the format of this
+             file.
+
+     ~/.ssh/rc
+             Commands in this file are executed by ssh when the user logs in,
+             just before the user's shell (or command) is started.  See the
+             sshd(8) manual page for more information.
+
+     /etc/hosts.equiv
+             This file is for host-based authentication (see above).  It
+             should only be writable by root.
+
+     /etc/shosts.equiv
+             This file is used in exactly the same way as hosts.equiv, but
+             allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
+             rlogin/rsh.
+
+     /etc/ssh/ssh_config
+             Systemwide configuration file.  The file format and configuration
+             options are described in ssh_config(5).
+
+     /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
+     /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
+     /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
+     /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
+     /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+             These files contain the private parts of the host keys and are
+             used for host-based authentication.  If protocol version 1 is
+             used, ssh must be setuid root, since the host key is readable
+             only by root.  For protocol version 2, ssh uses ssh-keysign(8) to
+             access the host keys, eliminating the requirement that ssh be
+             setuid root when host-based authentication is used.  By default
+             ssh is not setuid root.
+
+     /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
+             Systemwide list of known host keys.  This file should be prepared
+             by the system administrator to contain the public host keys of
+             all machines in the organization.  It should be world-readable.
+             See sshd(8) for further details of the format of this file.
+
+     /etc/ssh/sshrc
+             Commands in this file are executed by ssh when the user logs in,
+             just before the user's shell (or command) is started.  See the
+             sshd(8) manual page for more information.
+
+EXIT STATUS
+     ssh exits with the exit status of the remote command or with 255 if an
+     error occurred.
+
+SEE ALSO
+     scp(1), sftp(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-keygen(1), ssh-keyscan(1),
+     tun(4), ssh_config(5), ssh-keysign(8), sshd(8)
+
+STANDARDS
+     S. Lehtinen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Assigned
+     Numbers, RFC 4250, January 2006.
+
+     T. Ylonen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Architecture,
+     RFC 4251, January 2006.
+
+     T. Ylonen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication Protocol,
+     RFC 4252, January 2006.
+
+     T. Ylonen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer
+     Protocol, RFC 4253, January 2006.
+
+     T. Ylonen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Connection Protocol, RFC
+     4254, January 2006.
+
+     J. Schlyter and W. Griffin, Using DNS to Securely Publish Secure Shell
+     (SSH) Key Fingerprints, RFC 4255, January 2006.
+
+     F. Cusack and M. Forssen, Generic Message Exchange Authentication for the
+     Secure Shell Protocol (SSH), RFC 4256, January 2006.
+
+     J. Galbraith and P. Remaker, The Secure Shell (SSH) Session Channel Break
+     Extension, RFC 4335, January 2006.
+
+     M. Bellare, T. Kohno, and C. Namprempre, The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport
+     Layer Encryption Modes, RFC 4344, January 2006.
+
+     B. Harris, Improved Arcfour Modes for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport
+     Layer Protocol, RFC 4345, January 2006.
+
+     M. Friedl, N. Provos, and W. Simpson, Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for
+     the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol, RFC 4419, March 2006.
+
+     J. Galbraith and R. Thayer, The Secure Shell (SSH) Public Key File
+     Format, RFC 4716, November 2006.
+
+     D. Stebila and J. Green, Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the
+     Secure Shell Transport Layer, RFC 5656, December 2009.
+
+     A. Perrig and D. Song, Hash Visualization: a New Technique to improve
+     Real-World Security, 1999, International Workshop on Cryptographic
+     Techniques and E-Commerce (CrypTEC '99).
+
+AUTHORS
+     OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
+     Tatu Ylonen.  Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo
+     de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
+     created OpenSSH.  Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
+     versions 1.5 and 2.0.
+
+OpenBSD 5.8                      July 20, 2015                     OpenBSD 5.8
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/ssh_config.0 b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/ssh_config.0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..67133cd4d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/ssh_config.0
@@ -0,0 +1,1026 @@
+SSH_CONFIG(5)                 File Formats Manual                SSH_CONFIG(5)
+
+NAME
+     ssh_config M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH SSH client configuration files
+
+SYNOPSIS
+     ~/.ssh/config
+     /etc/ssh/ssh_config
+
+DESCRIPTION
+     ssh(1) obtains configuration data from the following sources in the
+     following order:
+
+           1.   command-line options
+           2.   user's configuration file (~/.ssh/config)
+           3.   system-wide configuration file (/etc/ssh/ssh_config)
+
+     For each parameter, the first obtained value will be used.  The
+     configuration files contain sections separated by M-bM-^@M-^\HostM-bM-^@M-^] specifications,
+     and that section is only applied for hosts that match one of the patterns
+     given in the specification.  The matched host name is usually the one
+     given on the command line (see the CanonicalizeHostname option for
+     exceptions.)
+
+     Since the first obtained value for each parameter is used, more host-
+     specific declarations should be given near the beginning of the file, and
+     general defaults at the end.
+
+     The configuration file has the following format:
+
+     Empty lines and lines starting with M-bM-^@M-^X#M-bM-^@M-^Y are comments.  Otherwise a line
+     is of the format M-bM-^@M-^\keyword argumentsM-bM-^@M-^].  Configuration options may be
+     separated by whitespace or optional whitespace and exactly one M-bM-^@M-^X=M-bM-^@M-^Y; the
+     latter format is useful to avoid the need to quote whitespace when
+     specifying configuration options using the ssh, scp, and sftp -o option.
+     Arguments may optionally be enclosed in double quotes (") in order to
+     represent arguments containing spaces.
+
+     The possible keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that
+     keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive):
+
+     Host    Restricts the following declarations (up to the next Host or
+             Match keyword) to be only for those hosts that match one of the
+             patterns given after the keyword.  If more than one pattern is
+             provided, they should be separated by whitespace.  A single M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y
+             as a pattern can be used to provide global defaults for all
+             hosts.  The host is usually the hostname argument given on the
+             command line (see the CanonicalizeHostname option for
+             exceptions.)
+
+             A pattern entry may be negated by prefixing it with an
+             exclamation mark (M-bM-^@M-^X!M-bM-^@M-^Y).  If a negated entry is matched, then the
+             Host entry is ignored, regardless of whether any other patterns
+             on the line match.  Negated matches are therefore useful to
+             provide exceptions for wildcard matches.
+
+             See PATTERNS for more information on patterns.
+
+     Match   Restricts the following declarations (up to the next Host or
+             Match keyword) to be used only when the conditions following the
+             Match keyword are satisfied.  Match conditions are specified
+             using one or more critera or the single token all which always
+             matches.  The available criteria keywords are: canonical, exec,
+             host, originalhost, user, and localuser.  The all criteria must
+             appear alone or immediately after canonical.  Other criteria may
+             be combined arbitrarily.  All criteria but all and canonical
+             require an argument.  Criteria may be negated by prepending an
+             exclamation mark (M-bM-^@M-^X!M-bM-^@M-^Y).
+
+             The canonical keyword matches only when the configuration file is
+             being re-parsed after hostname canonicalization (see the
+             CanonicalizeHostname option.)  This may be useful to specify
+             conditions that work with canonical host names only.  The exec
+             keyword executes the specified command under the user's shell.
+             If the command returns a zero exit status then the condition is
+             considered true.  Commands containing whitespace characters must
+             be quoted.  The following character sequences in the command will
+             be expanded prior to execution: M-bM-^@M-^X%LM-bM-^@M-^Y will be substituted by the
+             first component of the local host name, M-bM-^@M-^X%lM-bM-^@M-^Y will be substituted
+             by the local host name (including any domain name), M-bM-^@M-^X%hM-bM-^@M-^Y will be
+             substituted by the target host name, M-bM-^@M-^X%nM-bM-^@M-^Y will be substituted by
+             the original target host name specified on the command-line, M-bM-^@M-^X%pM-bM-^@M-^Y
+             the destination port, M-bM-^@M-^X%rM-bM-^@M-^Y by the remote login username, and M-bM-^@M-^X%uM-bM-^@M-^Y
+             by the username of the user running ssh(1).
+
+             The other keywords' criteria must be single entries or comma-
+             separated lists and may use the wildcard and negation operators
+             described in the PATTERNS section.  The criteria for the host
+             keyword are matched against the target hostname, after any
+             substitution by the Hostname or CanonicalizeHostname options.
+             The originalhost keyword matches against the hostname as it was
+             specified on the command-line.  The user keyword matches against
+             the target username on the remote host.  The localuser keyword
+             matches against the name of the local user running ssh(1) (this
+             keyword may be useful in system-wide ssh_config files).
+
+     AddressFamily
+             Specifies which address family to use when connecting.  Valid
+             arguments are M-bM-^@M-^\anyM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\inetM-bM-^@M-^] (use IPv4 only), or M-bM-^@M-^\inet6M-bM-^@M-^] (use IPv6
+             only).
+
+     BatchMode
+             If set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], passphrase/password querying will be disabled.
+             This option is useful in scripts and other batch jobs where no
+             user is present to supply the password.  The argument must be
+             M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].  The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+     BindAddress
+             Use the specified address on the local machine as the source
+             address of the connection.  Only useful on systems with more than
+             one address.  Note that this option does not work if
+             UsePrivilegedPort is set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+     CanonicalDomains
+             When CanonicalizeHostname is enabled, this option specifies the
+             list of domain suffixes in which to search for the specified
+             destination host.
+
+     CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
+             Specifies whether to fail with an error when hostname
+             canonicalization fails.  The default, M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], will attempt to look
+             up the unqualified hostname using the system resolver's search
+             rules.  A value of M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^] will cause ssh(1) to fail instantly if
+             CanonicalizeHostname is enabled and the target hostname cannot be
+             found in any of the domains specified by CanonicalDomains.
+
+     CanonicalizeHostname
+             Controls whether explicit hostname canonicalization is performed.
+             The default, M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^], is not to perform any name rewriting and let
+             the system resolver handle all hostname lookups.  If set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^]
+             then, for connections that do not use a ProxyCommand, ssh(1) will
+             attempt to canonicalize the hostname specified on the command
+             line using the CanonicalDomains suffixes and
+             CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs rules.  If CanonicalizeHostname is
+             set to M-bM-^@M-^\alwaysM-bM-^@M-^], then canonicalization is applied to proxied
+             connections too.
+
+             If this option is enabled, then the configuration files are
+             processed again using the new target name to pick up any new
+             configuration in matching Host and Match stanzas.
+
+     CanonicalizeMaxDots
+             Specifies the maximum number of dot characters in a hostname
+             before canonicalization is disabled.  The default, M-bM-^@M-^\1M-bM-^@M-^], allows a
+             single dot (i.e. hostname.subdomain).
+
+     CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
+             Specifies rules to determine whether CNAMEs should be followed
+             when canonicalizing hostnames.  The rules consist of one or more
+             arguments of source_domain_list:target_domain_list, where
+             source_domain_list is a pattern-list of domains that may follow
+             CNAMEs in canonicalization, and target_domain_list is a pattern-
+             list of domains that they may resolve to.
+
+             For example, M-bM-^@M-^\*.a.example.com:*.b.example.com,*.c.example.comM-bM-^@M-^]
+             will allow hostnames matching M-bM-^@M-^\*.a.example.comM-bM-^@M-^] to be
+             canonicalized to names in the M-bM-^@M-^\*.b.example.comM-bM-^@M-^] or
+             M-bM-^@M-^\*.c.example.comM-bM-^@M-^] domains.
+
+     ChallengeResponseAuthentication
+             Specifies whether to use challenge-response authentication.  The
+             argument to this keyword must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].  The default is
+             M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+     CheckHostIP
+             If this flag is set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], ssh(1) will additionally check the
+             host IP address in the known_hosts file.  This allows ssh to
+             detect if a host key changed due to DNS spoofing and will add
+             addresses of destination hosts to ~/.ssh/known_hosts in the
+             process, regardless of the setting of StrictHostKeyChecking.  If
+             the option is set to M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^], the check will not be executed.  The
+             default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+     Cipher  Specifies the cipher to use for encrypting the session in
+             protocol version 1.  Currently, M-bM-^@M-^\blowfishM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\3desM-bM-^@M-^], and M-bM-^@M-^\desM-bM-^@M-^] are
+             supported.  des is only supported in the ssh(1) client for
+             interoperability with legacy protocol 1 implementations that do
+             not support the 3des cipher.  Its use is strongly discouraged due
+             to cryptographic weaknesses.  The default is M-bM-^@M-^\3desM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+     Ciphers
+             Specifies the ciphers allowed for protocol version 2 in order of
+             preference.  Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated.  If the
+             specified value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified
+             ciphers will be appended to the default set instead of replacing
+             them.
+
+             The supported ciphers are:
+
+                   3des-cbc
+                   aes128-cbc
+                   aes192-cbc
+                   aes256-cbc
+                   aes128-ctr
+                   aes192-ctr
+                   aes256-ctr
+                   aes128-gcm@openssh.com
+                   aes256-gcm@openssh.com
+                   arcfour
+                   arcfour128
+                   arcfour256
+                   blowfish-cbc
+                   cast128-cbc
+                   chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
+
+             The default is:
+
+                   chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,
+                   aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,
+                   aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com,
+                   arcfour256,arcfour128,
+                   aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,
+                   aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,arcfour
+
+             The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using the -Q
+             option of ssh(1) with an argument of M-bM-^@M-^\cipherM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+     ClearAllForwardings
+             Specifies that all local, remote, and dynamic port forwardings
+             specified in the configuration files or on the command line be
+             cleared.  This option is primarily useful when used from the
+             ssh(1) command line to clear port forwardings set in
+             configuration files, and is automatically set by scp(1) and
+             sftp(1).  The argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].  The default is
+             M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+     Compression
+             Specifies whether to use compression.  The argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^]
+             or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].  The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+     CompressionLevel
+             Specifies the compression level to use if compression is enabled.
+             The argument must be an integer from 1 (fast) to 9 (slow, best).
+             The default level is 6, which is good for most applications.  The
+             meaning of the values is the same as in gzip(1).  Note that this
+             option applies to protocol version 1 only.
+
+     ConnectionAttempts
+             Specifies the number of tries (one per second) to make before
+             exiting.  The argument must be an integer.  This may be useful in
+             scripts if the connection sometimes fails.  The default is 1.
+
+     ConnectTimeout
+             Specifies the timeout (in seconds) used when connecting to the
+             SSH server, instead of using the default system TCP timeout.
+             This value is used only when the target is down or really
+             unreachable, not when it refuses the connection.
+
+     ControlMaster
+             Enables the sharing of multiple sessions over a single network
+             connection.  When set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], ssh(1) will listen for
+             connections on a control socket specified using the ControlPath
+             argument.  Additional sessions can connect to this socket using
+             the same ControlPath with ControlMaster set to M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^] (the
+             default).  These sessions will try to reuse the master instance's
+             network connection rather than initiating new ones, but will fall
+             back to connecting normally if the control socket does not exist,
+             or is not listening.
+
+             Setting this to M-bM-^@M-^\askM-bM-^@M-^] will cause ssh to listen for control
+             connections, but require confirmation using ssh-askpass(1).  If
+             the ControlPath cannot be opened, ssh will continue without
+             connecting to a master instance.
+
+             X11 and ssh-agent(1) forwarding is supported over these
+             multiplexed connections, however the display and agent forwarded
+             will be the one belonging to the master connection i.e. it is not
+             possible to forward multiple displays or agents.
+
+             Two additional options allow for opportunistic multiplexing: try
+             to use a master connection but fall back to creating a new one if
+             one does not already exist.  These options are: M-bM-^@M-^\autoM-bM-^@M-^] and
+             M-bM-^@M-^\autoaskM-bM-^@M-^].  The latter requires confirmation like the M-bM-^@M-^\askM-bM-^@M-^]
+             option.
+
+     ControlPath
+             Specify the path to the control socket used for connection
+             sharing as described in the ControlMaster section above or the
+             string M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] to disable connection sharing.  In the path, M-bM-^@M-^X%LM-bM-^@M-^Y
+             will be substituted by the first component of the local host
+             name, M-bM-^@M-^X%lM-bM-^@M-^Y will be substituted by the local host name (including
+             any domain name), M-bM-^@M-^X%hM-bM-^@M-^Y will be substituted by the target host
+             name, M-bM-^@M-^X%nM-bM-^@M-^Y will be substituted by the original target host name
+             specified on the command line, M-bM-^@M-^X%pM-bM-^@M-^Y the destination port, M-bM-^@M-^X%rM-bM-^@M-^Y by
+             the remote login username, M-bM-^@M-^X%uM-bM-^@M-^Y by the username of the user
+             running ssh(1), and M-bM-^@M-^X%CM-bM-^@M-^Y by a hash of the concatenation:
+             %l%h%p%r.  It is recommended that any ControlPath used for
+             opportunistic connection sharing include at least %h, %p, and %r
+             (or alternatively %C) and be placed in a directory that is not
+             writable by other users.  This ensures that shared connections
+             are uniquely identified.
+
+     ControlPersist
+             When used in conjunction with ControlMaster, specifies that the
+             master connection should remain open in the background (waiting
+             for future client connections) after the initial client
+             connection has been closed.  If set to M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^], then the master
+             connection will not be placed into the background, and will close
+             as soon as the initial client connection is closed.  If set to
+             M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\0M-bM-^@M-^], then the master connection will remain in the
+             background indefinitely (until killed or closed via a mechanism
+             such as the ssh(1) M-bM-^@M-^\-O exitM-bM-^@M-^] option).  If set to a time in
+             seconds, or a time in any of the formats documented in
+             sshd_config(5), then the backgrounded master connection will
+             automatically terminate after it has remained idle (with no
+             client connections) for the specified time.
+
+     DynamicForward
+             Specifies that a TCP port on the local machine be forwarded over
+             the secure channel, and the application protocol is then used to
+             determine where to connect to from the remote machine.
+
+             The argument must be [bind_address:]port.  IPv6 addresses can be
+             specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets.  By default,
+             the local port is bound in accordance with the GatewayPorts
+             setting.  However, an explicit bind_address may be used to bind
+             the connection to a specific address.  The bind_address of
+             M-bM-^@M-^\localhostM-bM-^@M-^] indicates that the listening port be bound for local
+             use only, while an empty address or M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y indicates that the port
+             should be available from all interfaces.
+
+             Currently the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are supported, and
+             ssh(1) will act as a SOCKS server.  Multiple forwardings may be
+             specified, and additional forwardings can be given on the command
+             line.  Only the superuser can forward privileged ports.
+
+     EnableSSHKeysign
+             Setting this option to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] in the global client configuration
+             file /etc/ssh/ssh_config enables the use of the helper program
+             ssh-keysign(8) during HostbasedAuthentication.  The argument must
+             be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].  The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].  This option should be
+             placed in the non-hostspecific section.  See ssh-keysign(8) for
+             more information.
+
+     EscapeChar
+             Sets the escape character (default: M-bM-^@M-^X~M-bM-^@M-^Y).  The escape character
+             can also be set on the command line.  The argument should be a
+             single character, M-bM-^@M-^X^M-bM-^@M-^Y followed by a letter, or M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] to disable
+             the escape character entirely (making the connection transparent
+             for binary data).
+
+     ExitOnForwardFailure
+             Specifies whether ssh(1) should terminate the connection if it
+             cannot set up all requested dynamic, tunnel, local, and remote
+             port forwardings.  The argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].  The
+             default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+     FingerprintHash
+             Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key
+             fingerprints.  Valid options are: M-bM-^@M-^\md5M-bM-^@M-^] and M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^].  The
+             default is M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^].
+
+     ForwardAgent
+             Specifies whether the connection to the authentication agent (if
+             any) will be forwarded to the remote machine.  The argument must
+             be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].  The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+             Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution.  Users with the
+             ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the
+             agent's Unix-domain socket) can access the local agent through
+             the forwarded connection.  An attacker cannot obtain key material
+             from the agent, however they can perform operations on the keys
+             that enable them to authenticate using the identities loaded into
+             the agent.
+
+     ForwardX11
+             Specifies whether X11 connections will be automatically
+             redirected over the secure channel and DISPLAY set.  The argument
+             must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].  The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+             X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution.  Users with the
+             ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the
+             user's X11 authorization database) can access the local X11
+             display through the forwarded connection.  An attacker may then
+             be able to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring if the
+             ForwardX11Trusted option is also enabled.
+
+     ForwardX11Timeout
+             Specify a timeout for untrusted X11 forwarding using the format
+             described in the TIME FORMATS section of sshd_config(5).  X11
+             connections received by ssh(1) after this time will be refused.
+             The default is to disable untrusted X11 forwarding after twenty
+             minutes has elapsed.
+
+     ForwardX11Trusted
+             If this option is set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], remote X11 clients will have full
+             access to the original X11 display.
+
+             If this option is set to M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^], remote X11 clients will be
+             considered untrusted and prevented from stealing or tampering
+             with data belonging to trusted X11 clients.  Furthermore, the
+             xauth(1) token used for the session will be set to expire after
+             20 minutes.  Remote clients will be refused access after this
+             time.
+
+             The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+             See the X11 SECURITY extension specification for full details on
+             the restrictions imposed on untrusted clients.
+
+     GatewayPorts
+             Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to local
+             forwarded ports.  By default, ssh(1) binds local port forwardings
+             to the loopback address.  This prevents other remote hosts from
+             connecting to forwarded ports.  GatewayPorts can be used to
+             specify that ssh should bind local port forwardings to the
+             wildcard address, thus allowing remote hosts to connect to
+             forwarded ports.  The argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].  The
+             default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+     GlobalKnownHostsFile
+             Specifies one or more files to use for the global host key
+             database, separated by whitespace.  The default is
+             /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts, /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts2.
+
+     GSSAPIAuthentication
+             Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
+             The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].  Note that this option applies to protocol
+             version 2 only.
+
+     GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
+             Forward (delegate) credentials to the server.  The default is
+             M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].  Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+
+     HashKnownHosts
+             Indicates that ssh(1) should hash host names and addresses when
+             they are added to ~/.ssh/known_hosts.  These hashed names may be
+             used normally by ssh(1) and sshd(8), but they do not reveal
+             identifying information should the file's contents be disclosed.
+             The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].  Note that existing names and addresses in
+             known hosts files will not be converted automatically, but may be
+             manually hashed using ssh-keygen(1).
+
+     HostbasedAuthentication
+             Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with public
+             key authentication.  The argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].  The
+             default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].  This option applies to protocol version 2 only
+             and is similar to RhostsRSAAuthentication.
+
+     HostbasedKeyTypes
+             Specifies the key types that will be used for hostbased
+             authentication as a comma-separated pattern list.  Alternately if
+             the specified value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the
+             specified key types will be appended to the default set instead
+             of replacing them.  The default for this option is:
+
+                ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+                ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa
+
+             The -Q option of ssh(1) may be used to list supported key types.
+
+     HostKeyAlgorithms
+             Specifies the protocol version 2 host key algorithms that the
+             client wants to use in order of preference.  Alternately if the
+             specified value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified
+             key types will be appended to the default set instead of
+             replacing them.  The default for this option is:
+
+                ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+                ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa
+
+             If hostkeys are known for the destination host then this default
+             is modified to prefer their algorithms.
+
+             The list of available key types may also be obtained using the -Q
+             option of ssh(1) with an argument of M-bM-^@M-^\keyM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+     HostKeyAlias
+             Specifies an alias that should be used instead of the real host
+             name when looking up or saving the host key in the host key
+             database files.  This option is useful for tunneling SSH
+             connections or for multiple servers running on a single host.
+
+     HostName
+             Specifies the real host name to log into.  This can be used to
+             specify nicknames or abbreviations for hosts.  If the hostname
+             contains the character sequence M-bM-^@M-^X%hM-bM-^@M-^Y, then this will be replaced
+             with the host name specified on the command line (this is useful
+             for manipulating unqualified names).  The character sequence M-bM-^@M-^X%%M-bM-^@M-^Y
+             will be replaced by a single M-bM-^@M-^X%M-bM-^@M-^Y character, which may be used
+             when specifying IPv6 link-local addresses.
+
+             The default is the name given on the command line.  Numeric IP
+             addresses are also permitted (both on the command line and in
+             HostName specifications).
+
+     IdentitiesOnly
+             Specifies that ssh(1) should only use the authentication identity
+             files configured in the ssh_config files, even if ssh-agent(1) or
+             a PKCS11Provider offers more identities.  The argument to this
+             keyword must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].  This option is intended for
+             situations where ssh-agent offers many different identities.  The
+             default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+     IdentityFile
+             Specifies a file from which the user's DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA
+             authentication identity is read.  The default is ~/.ssh/identity
+             for protocol version 1, and ~/.ssh/id_dsa, ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa,
+             ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 and ~/.ssh/id_rsa for protocol version 2.
+             Additionally, any identities represented by the authentication
+             agent will be used for authentication unless IdentitiesOnly is
+             set.  ssh(1) will try to load certificate information from the
+             filename obtained by appending -cert.pub to the path of a
+             specified IdentityFile.
+
+             The file name may use the tilde syntax to refer to a user's home
+             directory or one of the following escape characters: M-bM-^@M-^X%dM-bM-^@M-^Y (local
+             user's home directory), M-bM-^@M-^X%uM-bM-^@M-^Y (local user name), M-bM-^@M-^X%lM-bM-^@M-^Y (local host
+             name), M-bM-^@M-^X%hM-bM-^@M-^Y (remote host name) or M-bM-^@M-^X%rM-bM-^@M-^Y (remote user name).
+
+             It is possible to have multiple identity files specified in
+             configuration files; all these identities will be tried in
+             sequence.  Multiple IdentityFile directives will add to the list
+             of identities tried (this behaviour differs from that of other
+             configuration directives).
+
+             IdentityFile may be used in conjunction with IdentitiesOnly to
+             select which identities in an agent are offered during
+             authentication.
+
+     IgnoreUnknown
+             Specifies a pattern-list of unknown options to be ignored if they
+             are encountered in configuration parsing.  This may be used to
+             suppress errors if ssh_config contains options that are
+             unrecognised by ssh(1).  It is recommended that IgnoreUnknown be
+             listed early in the configuration file as it will not be applied
+             to unknown options that appear before it.
+
+     IPQoS   Specifies the IPv4 type-of-service or DSCP class for connections.
+             Accepted values are M-bM-^@M-^\af11M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\af12M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\af13M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\af21M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\af22M-bM-^@M-^],
+             M-bM-^@M-^\af23M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\af31M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\af32M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\af33M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\af41M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\af42M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\af43M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\cs0M-bM-^@M-^],
+             M-bM-^@M-^\cs1M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\cs2M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\cs3M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\cs4M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\cs5M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\cs6M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\cs7M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\efM-bM-^@M-^],
+             M-bM-^@M-^\lowdelayM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\throughputM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\reliabilityM-bM-^@M-^], or a numeric value.
+             This option may take one or two arguments, separated by
+             whitespace.  If one argument is specified, it is used as the
+             packet class unconditionally.  If two values are specified, the
+             first is automatically selected for interactive sessions and the
+             second for non-interactive sessions.  The default is M-bM-^@M-^\lowdelayM-bM-^@M-^]
+             for interactive sessions and M-bM-^@M-^\throughputM-bM-^@M-^] for non-interactive
+             sessions.
+
+     KbdInteractiveAuthentication
+             Specifies whether to use keyboard-interactive authentication.
+             The argument to this keyword must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].  The default
+             is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+     KbdInteractiveDevices
+             Specifies the list of methods to use in keyboard-interactive
+             authentication.  Multiple method names must be comma-separated.
+             The default is to use the server specified list.  The methods
+             available vary depending on what the server supports.  For an
+             OpenSSH server, it may be zero or more of: M-bM-^@M-^\bsdauthM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\pamM-bM-^@M-^], and
+             M-bM-^@M-^\skeyM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+     KexAlgorithms
+             Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.  Multiple
+             algorithms must be comma-separated.  Alternately if the specified
+             value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified methods
+             will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them.
+             The default is:
+
+                   curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
+                   ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
+                   diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
+                   diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1,
+                   diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
+
+             The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be
+             obtained using the -Q option of ssh(1) with an argument of M-bM-^@M-^\kexM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+     LocalCommand
+             Specifies a command to execute on the local machine after
+             successfully connecting to the server.  The command string
+             extends to the end of the line, and is executed with the user's
+             shell.  The following escape character substitutions will be
+             performed: M-bM-^@M-^X%dM-bM-^@M-^Y (local user's home directory), M-bM-^@M-^X%hM-bM-^@M-^Y (remote host
+             name), M-bM-^@M-^X%lM-bM-^@M-^Y (local host name), M-bM-^@M-^X%nM-bM-^@M-^Y (host name as provided on the
+             command line), M-bM-^@M-^X%pM-bM-^@M-^Y (remote port), M-bM-^@M-^X%rM-bM-^@M-^Y (remote user name) or
+             M-bM-^@M-^X%uM-bM-^@M-^Y (local user name) or M-bM-^@M-^X%CM-bM-^@M-^Y by a hash of the concatenation:
+             %l%h%p%r.
+
+             The command is run synchronously and does not have access to the
+             session of the ssh(1) that spawned it.  It should not be used for
+             interactive commands.
+
+             This directive is ignored unless PermitLocalCommand has been
+             enabled.
+
+     LocalForward
+             Specifies that a TCP port on the local machine be forwarded over
+             the secure channel to the specified host and port from the remote
+             machine.  The first argument must be [bind_address:]port and the
+             second argument must be host:hostport.  IPv6 addresses can be
+             specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets.  Multiple
+             forwardings may be specified, and additional forwardings can be
+             given on the command line.  Only the superuser can forward
+             privileged ports.  By default, the local port is bound in
+             accordance with the GatewayPorts setting.  However, an explicit
+             bind_address may be used to bind the connection to a specific
+             address.  The bind_address of M-bM-^@M-^\localhostM-bM-^@M-^] indicates that the
+             listening port be bound for local use only, while an empty
+             address or M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y indicates that the port should be available from
+             all interfaces.
+
+     LogLevel
+             Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from
+             ssh(1).  The possible values are: QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO,
+             VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3.  The default is INFO.
+             DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent.  DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify
+             higher levels of verbose output.
+
+     MACs    Specifies the MAC (message authentication code) algorithms in
+             order of preference.  The MAC algorithm is used in protocol
+             version 2 for data integrity protection.  Multiple algorithms
+             must be comma-separated.  If the specified value begins with a
+             M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to
+             the default set instead of replacing them.
+
+             The algorithms that contain M-bM-^@M-^\-etmM-bM-^@M-^] calculate the MAC after
+             encryption (encrypt-then-mac).  These are considered safer and
+             their use recommended.
+
+             The default is:
+
+                   umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,
+                   hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,
+                   umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com,
+                   hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,
+                   hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com,
+                   hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com,
+                   hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com,hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com,
+                   hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,hmac-ripemd160,
+                   hmac-sha1-96,hmac-md5-96
+
+             The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
+             the -Q option of ssh(1) with an argument of M-bM-^@M-^\macM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+     NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
+             This option can be used if the home directory is shared across
+             machines.  In this case localhost will refer to a different
+             machine on each of the machines and the user will get many
+             warnings about changed host keys.  However, this option disables
+             host authentication for localhost.  The argument to this keyword
+             must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].  The default is to check the host key for
+             localhost.
+
+     NumberOfPasswordPrompts
+             Specifies the number of password prompts before giving up.  The
+             argument to this keyword must be an integer.  The default is 3.
+
+     PasswordAuthentication
+             Specifies whether to use password authentication.  The argument
+             to this keyword must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].  The default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+     PermitLocalCommand
+             Allow local command execution via the LocalCommand option or
+             using the !command escape sequence in ssh(1).  The argument must
+             be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].  The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+     PKCS11Provider
+             Specifies which PKCS#11 provider to use.  The argument to this
+             keyword is the PKCS#11 shared library ssh(1) should use to
+             communicate with a PKCS#11 token providing the user's private RSA
+             key.
+
+     Port    Specifies the port number to connect on the remote host.  The
+             default is 22.
+
+     PreferredAuthentications
+             Specifies the order in which the client should try protocol 2
+             authentication methods.  This allows a client to prefer one
+             method (e.g. keyboard-interactive) over another method (e.g.
+             password).  The default is:
+
+                   gssapi-with-mic,hostbased,publickey,
+                   keyboard-interactive,password
+
+     Protocol
+             Specifies the protocol versions ssh(1) should support in order of
+             preference.  The possible values are M-bM-^@M-^X1M-bM-^@M-^Y and M-bM-^@M-^X2M-bM-^@M-^Y.  Multiple
+             versions must be comma-separated.  When this option is set to
+             M-bM-^@M-^\2,1M-bM-^@M-^] ssh will try version 2 and fall back to version 1 if
+             version 2 is not available.  The default is M-bM-^@M-^X2M-bM-^@M-^Y.
+
+     ProxyCommand
+             Specifies the command to use to connect to the server.  The
+             command string extends to the end of the line, and is executed
+             using the user's shell M-bM-^@M-^XexecM-bM-^@M-^Y directive to avoid a lingering
+             shell process.
+
+             In the command string, any occurrence of M-bM-^@M-^X%hM-bM-^@M-^Y will be substituted
+             by the host name to connect, M-bM-^@M-^X%pM-bM-^@M-^Y by the port, and M-bM-^@M-^X%rM-bM-^@M-^Y by the
+             remote user name.  The command can be basically anything, and
+             should read from its standard input and write to its standard
+             output.  It should eventually connect an sshd(8) server running
+             on some machine, or execute sshd -i somewhere.  Host key
+             management will be done using the HostName of the host being
+             connected (defaulting to the name typed by the user).  Setting
+             the command to M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] disables this option entirely.  Note that
+             CheckHostIP is not available for connects with a proxy command.
+
+             This directive is useful in conjunction with nc(1) and its proxy
+             support.  For example, the following directive would connect via
+             an HTTP proxy at 192.0.2.0:
+
+                ProxyCommand /usr/bin/nc -X connect -x 192.0.2.0:8080 %h %p
+
+     ProxyUseFdpass
+             Specifies that ProxyCommand will pass a connected file descriptor
+             back to ssh(1) instead of continuing to execute and pass data.
+             The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+     PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
+             Specifies the key types that will be used for public key
+             authentication as a comma-separated pattern list.  Alternately if
+             the specified value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the key
+             types after it will be appended to the default instead of
+             replacing it.  The default for this option is:
+
+                ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+                ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa
+
+             The -Q option of ssh(1) may be used to list supported key types.
+
+     PubkeyAuthentication
+             Specifies whether to try public key authentication.  The argument
+             to this keyword must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].  The default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^].
+             This option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+
+     RekeyLimit
+             Specifies the maximum amount of data that may be transmitted
+             before the session key is renegotiated, optionally followed a
+             maximum amount of time that may pass before the session key is
+             renegotiated.  The first argument is specified in bytes and may
+             have a suffix of M-bM-^@M-^XKM-bM-^@M-^Y, M-bM-^@M-^XMM-bM-^@M-^Y, or M-bM-^@M-^XGM-bM-^@M-^Y to indicate Kilobytes,
+             Megabytes, or Gigabytes, respectively.  The default is between
+             M-bM-^@M-^X1GM-bM-^@M-^Y and M-bM-^@M-^X4GM-bM-^@M-^Y, depending on the cipher.  The optional second
+             value is specified in seconds and may use any of the units
+             documented in the TIME FORMATS section of sshd_config(5).  The
+             default value for RekeyLimit is M-bM-^@M-^\default noneM-bM-^@M-^], which means that
+             rekeying is performed after the cipher's default amount of data
+             has been sent or received and no time based rekeying is done.
+             This option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+
+     RemoteForward
+             Specifies that a TCP port on the remote machine be forwarded over
+             the secure channel to the specified host and port from the local
+             machine.  The first argument must be [bind_address:]port and the
+             second argument must be host:hostport.  IPv6 addresses can be
+             specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets.  Multiple
+             forwardings may be specified, and additional forwardings can be
+             given on the command line.  Privileged ports can be forwarded
+             only when logging in as root on the remote machine.
+
+             If the port argument is M-bM-^@M-^X0M-bM-^@M-^Y, the listen port will be dynamically
+             allocated on the server and reported to the client at run time.
+
+             If the bind_address is not specified, the default is to only bind
+             to loopback addresses.  If the bind_address is M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y or an empty
+             string, then the forwarding is requested to listen on all
+             interfaces.  Specifying a remote bind_address will only succeed
+             if the server's GatewayPorts option is enabled (see
+             sshd_config(5)).
+
+     RequestTTY
+             Specifies whether to request a pseudo-tty for the session.  The
+             argument may be one of: M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^] (never request a TTY), M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] (always
+             request a TTY when standard input is a TTY), M-bM-^@M-^\forceM-bM-^@M-^] (always
+             request a TTY) or M-bM-^@M-^\autoM-bM-^@M-^] (request a TTY when opening a login
+             session).  This option mirrors the -t and -T flags for ssh(1).
+
+     RevokedHostKeys
+             Specifies revoked host public keys.  Keys listed in this file
+             will be refused for host authentication.  Note that if this file
+             does not exist or is not readable, then host authentication will
+             be refused for all hosts.  Keys may be specified as a text file,
+             listing one public key per line, or as an OpenSSH Key Revocation
+             List (KRL) as generated by ssh-keygen(1).  For more information
+             on KRLs, see the KEY REVOCATION LISTS section in ssh-keygen(1).
+
+     RhostsRSAAuthentication
+             Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with RSA
+             host authentication.  The argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].  The
+             default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].  This option applies to protocol version 1 only
+             and requires ssh(1) to be setuid root.
+
+     RSAAuthentication
+             Specifies whether to try RSA authentication.  The argument to
+             this keyword must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].  RSA authentication will only
+             be attempted if the identity file exists, or an authentication
+             agent is running.  The default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^].  Note that this option
+             applies to protocol version 1 only.
+
+     SendEnv
+             Specifies what variables from the local environ(7) should be sent
+             to the server.  Note that environment passing is only supported
+             for protocol 2.  The server must also support it, and the server
+             must be configured to accept these environment variables.  Note
+             that the TERM environment variable is always sent whenever a
+             pseudo-terminal is requested as it is required by the protocol.
+             Refer to AcceptEnv in sshd_config(5) for how to configure the
+             server.  Variables are specified by name, which may contain
+             wildcard characters.  Multiple environment variables may be
+             separated by whitespace or spread across multiple SendEnv
+             directives.  The default is not to send any environment
+             variables.
+
+             See PATTERNS for more information on patterns.
+
+     ServerAliveCountMax
+             Sets the number of server alive messages (see below) which may be
+             sent without ssh(1) receiving any messages back from the server.
+             If this threshold is reached while server alive messages are
+             being sent, ssh will disconnect from the server, terminating the
+             session.  It is important to note that the use of server alive
+             messages is very different from TCPKeepAlive (below).  The server
+             alive messages are sent through the encrypted channel and
+             therefore will not be spoofable.  The TCP keepalive option
+             enabled by TCPKeepAlive is spoofable.  The server alive mechanism
+             is valuable when the client or server depend on knowing when a
+             connection has become inactive.
+
+             The default value is 3.  If, for example, ServerAliveInterval
+             (see below) is set to 15 and ServerAliveCountMax is left at the
+             default, if the server becomes unresponsive, ssh will disconnect
+             after approximately 45 seconds.  This option applies to protocol
+             version 2 only.
+
+     ServerAliveInterval
+             Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has
+             been received from the server, ssh(1) will send a message through
+             the encrypted channel to request a response from the server.  The
+             default is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to
+             the server.  This option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+
+     StreamLocalBindMask
+             Sets the octal file creation mode mask (umask) used when creating
+             a Unix-domain socket file for local or remote port forwarding.
+             This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain
+             socket file.
+
+             The default value is 0177, which creates a Unix-domain socket
+             file that is readable and writable only by the owner.  Note that
+             not all operating systems honor the file mode on Unix-domain
+             socket files.
+
+     StreamLocalBindUnlink
+             Specifies whether to remove an existing Unix-domain socket file
+             for local or remote port forwarding before creating a new one.
+             If the socket file already exists and StreamLocalBindUnlink is
+             not enabled, ssh will be unable to forward the port to the Unix-
+             domain socket file.  This option is only used for port forwarding
+             to a Unix-domain socket file.
+
+             The argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].  The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+     StrictHostKeyChecking
+             If this flag is set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], ssh(1) will never automatically add
+             host keys to the ~/.ssh/known_hosts file, and refuses to connect
+             to hosts whose host key has changed.  This provides maximum
+             protection against trojan horse attacks, though it can be
+             annoying when the /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts file is poorly
+             maintained or when connections to new hosts are frequently made.
+             This option forces the user to manually add all new hosts.  If
+             this flag is set to M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^], ssh will automatically add new host
+             keys to the user known hosts files.  If this flag is set to
+             M-bM-^@M-^\askM-bM-^@M-^], new host keys will be added to the user known host files
+             only after the user has confirmed that is what they really want
+             to do, and ssh will refuse to connect to hosts whose host key has
+             changed.  The host keys of known hosts will be verified
+             automatically in all cases.  The argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^], or
+             M-bM-^@M-^\askM-bM-^@M-^].  The default is M-bM-^@M-^\askM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+     TCPKeepAlive
+             Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages
+             to the other side.  If they are sent, death of the connection or
+             crash of one of the machines will be properly noticed.  However,
+             this means that connections will die if the route is down
+             temporarily, and some people find it annoying.
+
+             The default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] (to send TCP keepalive messages), and the
+             client will notice if the network goes down or the remote host
+             dies.  This is important in scripts, and many users want it too.
+
+             To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to
+             M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+     Tunnel  Request tun(4) device forwarding between the client and the
+             server.  The argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\point-to-pointM-bM-^@M-^] (layer 3),
+             M-bM-^@M-^\ethernetM-bM-^@M-^] (layer 2), or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].  Specifying M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] requests the
+             default tunnel mode, which is M-bM-^@M-^\point-to-pointM-bM-^@M-^].  The default is
+             M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+     TunnelDevice
+             Specifies the tun(4) devices to open on the client (local_tun)
+             and the server (remote_tun).
+
+             The argument must be local_tun[:remote_tun].  The devices may be
+             specified by numerical ID or the keyword M-bM-^@M-^\anyM-bM-^@M-^], which uses the
+             next available tunnel device.  If remote_tun is not specified, it
+             defaults to M-bM-^@M-^\anyM-bM-^@M-^].  The default is M-bM-^@M-^\any:anyM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+     UpdateHostKeys
+             Specifies whether ssh(1) should accept notifications of
+             additional hostkeys from the server sent after authentication has
+             completed and add them to UserKnownHostsFile.  The argument must
+             be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^] (the default) or M-bM-^@M-^\askM-bM-^@M-^].  Enabling this option
+             allows learning alternate hostkeys for a server and supports
+             graceful key rotation by allowing a server to send replacement
+             public keys before old ones are removed.  Additional hostkeys are
+             only accepted if the key used to authenticate the host was
+             already trusted or explicity accepted by the user.  If
+             UpdateHostKeys is set to M-bM-^@M-^\askM-bM-^@M-^], then the user is asked to confirm
+             the modifications to the known_hosts file.  Confirmation is
+             currently incompatible with ControlPersist, and will be disabled
+             if it is enabled.
+
+             Presently, only sshd(8) from OpenSSH 6.8 and greater support the
+             M-bM-^@M-^\hostkeys@openssh.comM-bM-^@M-^] protocol extension used to inform the
+             client of all the server's hostkeys.
+
+     UsePrivilegedPort
+             Specifies whether to use a privileged port for outgoing
+             connections.  The argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].  The default is
+             M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].  If set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], ssh(1) must be setuid root.  Note that
+             this option must be set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] for RhostsRSAAuthentication with
+             older servers.
+
+     User    Specifies the user to log in as.  This can be useful when a
+             different user name is used on different machines.  This saves
+             the trouble of having to remember to give the user name on the
+             command line.
+
+     UserKnownHostsFile
+             Specifies one or more files to use for the user host key
+             database, separated by whitespace.  The default is
+             ~/.ssh/known_hosts, ~/.ssh/known_hosts2.
+
+     VerifyHostKeyDNS
+             Specifies whether to verify the remote key using DNS and SSHFP
+             resource records.  If this option is set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], the client
+             will implicitly trust keys that match a secure fingerprint from
+             DNS.  Insecure fingerprints will be handled as if this option was
+             set to M-bM-^@M-^\askM-bM-^@M-^].  If this option is set to M-bM-^@M-^\askM-bM-^@M-^], information on
+             fingerprint match will be displayed, but the user will still need
+             to confirm new host keys according to the StrictHostKeyChecking
+             option.  The argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^], or M-bM-^@M-^\askM-bM-^@M-^].  The default
+             is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].  Note that this option applies to protocol version 2
+             only.
+
+             See also VERIFYING HOST KEYS in ssh(1).
+
+     VisualHostKey
+             If this flag is set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], an ASCII art representation of the
+             remote host key fingerprint is printed in addition to the
+             fingerprint string at login and for unknown host keys.  If this
+             flag is set to M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^], no fingerprint strings are printed at login
+             and only the fingerprint string will be printed for unknown host
+             keys.  The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+     XAuthLocation
+             Specifies the full pathname of the xauth(1) program.  The default
+             is /usr/X11R6/bin/xauth.
+
+PATTERNS
+     A pattern consists of zero or more non-whitespace characters, M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y (a
+     wildcard that matches zero or more characters), or M-bM-^@M-^X?M-bM-^@M-^Y (a wildcard that
+     matches exactly one character).  For example, to specify a set of
+     declarations for any host in the M-bM-^@M-^\.co.ukM-bM-^@M-^] set of domains, the following
+     pattern could be used:
+
+           Host *.co.uk
+
+     The following pattern would match any host in the 192.168.0.[0-9] network
+     range:
+
+           Host 192.168.0.?
+
+     A pattern-list is a comma-separated list of patterns.  Patterns within
+     pattern-lists may be negated by preceding them with an exclamation mark
+     (M-bM-^@M-^X!M-bM-^@M-^Y).  For example, to allow a key to be used from anywhere within an
+     organization except from the M-bM-^@M-^\dialupM-bM-^@M-^] pool, the following entry (in
+     authorized_keys) could be used:
+
+           from="!*.dialup.example.com,*.example.com"
+
+FILES
+     ~/.ssh/config
+             This is the per-user configuration file.  The format of this file
+             is described above.  This file is used by the SSH client.
+             Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict
+             permissions: read/write for the user, and not accessible by
+             others.
+
+     /etc/ssh/ssh_config
+             Systemwide configuration file.  This file provides defaults for
+             those values that are not specified in the user's configuration
+             file, and for those users who do not have a configuration file.
+             This file must be world-readable.
+
+SEE ALSO
+     ssh(1)
+
+AUTHORS
+     OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
+     Tatu Ylonen.  Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo
+     de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
+     created OpenSSH.  Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
+     versions 1.5 and 2.0.
+
+OpenBSD 5.8                     August 14, 2015                    OpenBSD 5.8
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/strtonum.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/strtonum.c
new file mode 120000
index 000000000..240446e7b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/strtonum.c
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+openbsd-compat/strtonum.c
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/timingsafe_bcmp.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/timingsafe_bcmp.c
new file mode 120000
index 000000000..166489b19
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/timingsafe_bcmp.c
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+openbsd-compat/timingsafe_bcmp.c
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/xcrypt.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/xcrypt.c
new file mode 120000
index 000000000..3e329834e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/xcrypt.c
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/xmmap.c b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/xmmap.c
new file mode 120000
index 000000000..4fbd1b64e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/xmmap.c
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+openbsd-compat/xmmap.c
\ No newline at end of file