IPC privileges fixes
Kernel: o Remove s_ipc_sendrec, instead using s_ipc_to for all send primitives o Centralize s_ipc_to bit manipulation, - disallowing assignment of bits pointing to unused priv structs; - preventing send-to-self by not setting bit for own priv struct; - preserving send mask matrix symmetry in all cases o Add IPC send mask checks to SENDA, which were missing entirely somehow o Slightly improve IPC stats accounting for SENDA o Remove SYSTEM from user processes' send mask o Half-fix the dependency between boot image order and process numbers, - correcting the table order of the boot processes; - documenting the order requirement needed for proper send masks; - warning at boot time if the order is violated RS: o Add support in /etc/drivers.conf for servers that talk to user processes, - disallowing IPC to user processes if no "ipc" field is present - adding a special "USER" label to explicitly allow IPC to user processes o Always apply IPC masks when specified; remove -i flag from service(8) o Use kernel send mask symmetry to delay adding IPC permissions for labels that do not exist yet, adding them to that label's process upon creation o Add VM to ipc permissions list for rtl8139 and fxp in drivers.conf Left to future fixes: o Removal of the table order vs process numbers dependency altogether, possibly using per-process send list structures as used for SYSTEM calls o Proper assignment of send masks to boot processes; some of the assigned (~0) masks are much wider than necessary o Proper assignment of IPC send masks for many more servers in drivers.conf o Removal of the debugging warning about the now legitimate case where RS's add_forward_ipc cannot find the IPC destination's label yet
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@@ -70,25 +70,15 @@ message *m_ptr; /* pointer to request message */
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/* Now update the process' privileges as requested. */
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rp->p_priv->s_trap_mask = FILLED_MASK;
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for (i=0; i<BITMAP_CHUNKS(NR_SYS_PROCS); i++) {
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rp->p_priv->s_ipc_to.chunk[i] = FILLED_MASK;
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}
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unset_sys_bit(rp->p_priv->s_ipc_to, USER_PRIV_ID);
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/* All process that this process can send to must be able to reply.
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* Therefore, their send masks should be updated as well.
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*/
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for (i=0; i<NR_SYS_PROCS; i++) {
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if (get_sys_bit(rp->p_priv->s_ipc_to, i)) {
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set_sys_bit(priv_addr(i)->s_ipc_to, priv_id(rp));
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}
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/* Set a default send mask. */
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for (i=0; i < NR_SYS_PROCS; i++) {
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if (i != USER_PRIV_ID)
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set_sendto_bit(rp, i);
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else
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unset_sendto_bit(rp, i);
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}
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for (i=0; i<BITMAP_CHUNKS(NR_SYS_PROCS); i++) {
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rp->p_priv->s_ipc_sendrec.chunk[i] = FILLED_MASK;
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}
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unset_sys_bit(rp->p_priv->s_ipc_sendrec, USER_PRIV_ID);
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/* No I/O resources, no memory resources, no IRQs, no grant table */
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priv(rp)->s_nr_io_range= 0;
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priv(rp)->s_nr_mem_range= 0;
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@@ -142,10 +132,14 @@ message *m_ptr; /* pointer to request message */
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memcpy(priv(rp)->s_k_call_mask, priv.s_k_call_mask,
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sizeof(priv(rp)->s_k_call_mask));
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memcpy(&priv(rp)->s_ipc_to, &priv.s_ipc_to,
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sizeof(priv(rp)->s_ipc_to));
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memcpy(&priv(rp)->s_ipc_sendrec, &priv.s_ipc_sendrec,
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sizeof(priv(rp)->s_ipc_sendrec));
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/* Set a custom send mask. */
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for (i=0; i < NR_SYS_PROCS; i++) {
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if (get_sys_bit(priv.s_ipc_to, i))
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set_sendto_bit(rp, i);
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else
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unset_sendto_bit(rp, i);
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}
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}
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/* Done. Privileges have been set. Allow process to run again. */
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