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This commit is contained in:
Lionel Sambuc
2016-10-14 07:49:11 +02:00
committed by Lionel Sambuc
parent 9d819b6d54
commit 1242aa1e36
35952 changed files with 949749 additions and 377083 deletions
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14
sysutils/xenkernel46/DESCR Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
Xen is a hypervisor which supports running multiple guest operating
systems on a single machine. Guest OSes (also called "domains")
can be either paravirtualised (i.e. make hypercalls in order to
access hardware), run in HVM (Hardware Virtualisation Mode) where
they will be presented with virtual devices, or a combination where
they use hypercalls to access hardware but manage memory themselves.
At boot, the xen kernel is loaded along with the guest kernel for
the first domain (called domain0). domain0 has privileges to access
the physical hardware (PCI and ISA devices), administrate other
domains and provide virtual devices (disks and network) to other
domains.
This package contains the 4.6 Xen kernel itself. PCI passthrough is
not supported. PAE is mandatory; on i386 one must use XEN3PAE_DOM[0U].

7
sysutils/xenkernel46/MESSAGE Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
===========================================================================
$NetBSD: MESSAGE,v 1.1.1.1 2016/07/04 07:25:13 jnemeth Exp $
The Xen hypervisor is installed under the following locations:
${XENKERNELDIR}/xen.gz (standard hypervisor)
${XENKERNELDIR}/xen-debug.gz (debug hypervisor)
===========================================================================

56
sysutils/xenkernel46/Makefile Normal file
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# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.3 2016/09/08 15:44:07 bouyer Exp $
VERSION= 4.6.3
DISTNAME= xen-${VERSION}
PKGNAME= xenkernel46-${VERSION}
PKGREVISION= 1
CATEGORIES= sysutils
MASTER_SITES= http://bits.xensource.com/oss-xen/release/${VERSION}/
MAINTAINER= pkgsrc-users@NetBSD.org
HOMEPAGE= http://xenproject.org/
COMMENT= Xen 4.6.x Kernel
LICENSE= gnu-gpl-v2
ONLY_FOR_PLATFORM= Linux-2.6*-i386 Linux-2.6*-x86_64
ONLY_FOR_PLATFORM+= NetBSD-[5-9].*-x86_64 NetBSD-[5-9].*-i386
NO_CONFIGURE= yes
USE_TOOLS+= gmake
PYTHON_FOR_BUILD_ONLY= YES
PYTHON_VERSIONS_INCOMPATIBLE= 34 35
MAKE_ENV+= OCAML_TOOLS=no
INSTALLATION_DIRS= xen46-kernel
XENKERNELDIR= ${PREFIX}/${INSTALLATION_DIRS}
MESSAGE_SUBST+= XENKERNELDIR=${XENKERNELDIR}
.include "../../mk/compiler.mk"
.if !empty(PKGSRC_COMPILER:Mclang)
EXTRA_CFLAGS+= -Qunused-arguments -no-integrated-as -Wno-error=format \
-Wno-error=parentheses-equality -Wno-error=enum-conversion \
-Wno-error=unused-function -Wno-error=unused-const-variable \
-Wno-error=ignored-attributes -Wno-error=initializer-overrides
.endif
MAKE_ENV+= EXTRA_CFLAGS=${EXTRA_CFLAGS:Q}
do-build:
cd ${WRKSRC}/xen && ${BUILD_MAKE_CMD} debug=n build
${CP} ${WRKSRC}/xen/xen.gz ${WRKDIR}/xen.gz
cd ${WRKSRC}/xen && ${MAKE_PROGRAM} clean
cd ${WRKSRC}/xen && ${BUILD_MAKE_CMD} debug=y build
${CP} ${WRKSRC}/xen/xen.gz ${WRKDIR}/xen-debug.gz
do-install:
${INSTALL_DATA} ${WRKDIR}/xen.gz \
${DESTDIR}${XENKERNELDIR}/xen.gz
${INSTALL_DATA} ${WRKDIR}/xen-debug.gz \
${DESTDIR}${XENKERNELDIR}/xen-debug.gz
.include "../../lang/python/application.mk"
.include "../../mk/bsd.pkg.mk"

3
sysutils/xenkernel46/PLIST Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
@comment $NetBSD: PLIST,v 1.1.1.1 2016/07/04 07:25:13 jnemeth Exp $
xen46-kernel/xen-debug.gz
xen46-kernel/xen.gz

18
sysutils/xenkernel46/distinfo Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.2 2016/09/08 15:44:07 bouyer Exp $
SHA1 (xen-4.6.3.tar.gz) = 2aa59d0a05a6c5ac7f336f2069c66a54f95c4349
RMD160 (xen-4.6.3.tar.gz) = 2798bd888ee001a4829165e55feb705a86af4f74
SHA512 (xen-4.6.3.tar.gz) = 187a860b40c05139f22b8498a5fae1db173c3110d957147af29a56cb83b7111c9dc4946d65f9dffc847001fc01c5e9bf51886eaa1194bb9cfd0b6dbcd43a2c5c
Size (xen-4.6.3.tar.gz) = 19707041 bytes
SHA1 (patch-Config.mk) = a2a104d023cea4e551a3ad40927d4884d6c610bf
SHA1 (patch-XSA-185) = a2313922aa4dad734b96c80f64fe54eca3c14019
SHA1 (patch-XSA-186-1) = 71e4a6c4c683891bac50682a3ab69a204fb681ad
SHA1 (patch-XSA-186-2) = 6094c2efe468e3f31712659be9a71af2cbe8dc1f
SHA1 (patch-XSA-187-1) = 55ea0c2d9c7d8d9476a5ab97342ff552be4faf56
SHA1 (patch-XSA-187-2) = f5308fee03a5d73c8aa283eb82cc36a6a3d3bc06
SHA1 (patch-xen_Makefile) = be3f4577a205b23187b91319f91c50720919f70b
SHA1 (patch-xen_arch_x86_Rules.mk) = 7b0894ba7311edb02118a021671f304cf3872154
SHA1 (patch-xen_common_page__alloc.c) = c4d606de1cada8cf89b5abd16efada3d58c68a03
SHA1 (patch-xen_drivers_passthrough_vtd_x86_ats.c) = f72fd4bb2aeeaeb0b167031dfd5498e73666aa4e
SHA1 (patch-xen_include_asm-x86_current.h) = 8a21577be06383c0c7f53c15ba828f77fb6314ad
SHA1 (patch-xen_include_xen_lib.h) = 82a219b7d9c5deaa2b8e0adc774f60395adc4815

13
sysutils/xenkernel46/patches/patch-Config.mk Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
$NetBSD: patch-Config.mk,v 1.1.1.1 2016/07/04 07:25:13 jnemeth Exp $
--- Config.mk.orig 2015-01-12 17:53:24.000000000 +0100
+++ Config.mk 2015-01-19 12:29:14.000000000 +0100
@@ -39,6 +39,8 @@
HOSTCC = gcc
HOSTCFLAGS = -Wall -Werror -Wstrict-prototypes -O2 -fomit-frame-pointer
HOSTCFLAGS += -fno-strict-aliasing
+HOSTCFLAGS += ${EXTRA_CFLAGS}
+CFLAGS += ${EXTRA_CFLAGS}
DISTDIR ?= $(XEN_ROOT)/dist
DESTDIR ?= /

37
sysutils/xenkernel46/patches/patch-XSA-185 Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
$NetBSD: patch-XSA-185,v 1.1 2016/09/08 15:44:07 bouyer Exp $
From 30aba4992b18245c436f16df7326a16c01a51570 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Date: Mon, 8 Aug 2016 10:58:12 +0100
Subject: x86/32on64: don't allow recursive page tables from L3
L3 entries are special in PAE mode, and hence can't reasonably be used
for setting up recursive (and hence linear) page table mappings. Since
abuse is possible when the guest in fact gets run on 4-level page
tables, this needs to be excluded explicitly.
This is XSA-185.
Reported-by: Jérémie Boutoille <jboutoille@ext.quarkslab.com>
Reported-by: 栾尚聪(好风) <shangcong.lsc@alibaba-inc.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
---
xen/arch/x86/mm.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
index 109b8be..69b8b8d 100644
--- xen/arch/x86/mm.c.orig
+++ xen/arch/x86/mm.c
@@ -1122,7 +1122,9 @@ get_page_from_l3e(
rc = get_page_and_type_from_pagenr(
l3e_get_pfn(l3e), PGT_l2_page_table, d, partial, 1);
- if ( unlikely(rc == -EINVAL) && get_l3_linear_pagetable(l3e, pfn, d) )
+ if ( unlikely(rc == -EINVAL) &&
+ !is_pv_32bit_domain(d) &&
+ get_l3_linear_pagetable(l3e, pfn, d) )
rc = 0;
return rc;

43
sysutils/xenkernel46/patches/patch-XSA-186-1 Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
$NetBSD: patch-XSA-186-1,v 1.1 2016/09/08 15:44:07 bouyer Exp $
From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Subject: hvm/fep: Allow testing of instructions crossing the -1 -> 0 virtual boundary
The Force Emulation Prefix is named to follow its PV counterpart for cpuid or
rdtsc, but isn't really an instruction prefix. It behaves as a break-out into
Xen, with the purpose of emulating the next instruction in the current state.
It is important to be able to test legal situations which occur in real
hardware, including instruction which cross certain boundaries, and
instructions starting at 0.
Reported-by: Brian Marcotte <marcotte@panix.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
--- xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c.orig
+++ xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -2139,6 +2139,10 @@ static void svm_vmexit_ud_intercept(stru
{
regs->eip += sizeof(sig);
regs->eflags &= ~X86_EFLAGS_RF;
+
+ /* Zero the upper 32 bits of %rip if not in long mode. */
+ if ( svm_guest_x86_mode(current) != 8 )
+ regs->eip = regs->_eip;
}
}
--- xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c.orig
+++ xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -2757,6 +2757,10 @@ static void vmx_vmexit_ud_intercept(stru
{
regs->eip += sizeof(sig);
regs->eflags &= ~X86_EFLAGS_RF;
+
+ /* Zero the upper 32 bits of %rip if not in long mode. */
+ if ( vmx_guest_x86_mode(current) != 8 )
+ regs->eip = regs->_eip;
}
}

73
sysutils/xenkernel46/patches/patch-XSA-186-2 Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
From e938be013ba73ff08fa4f1d8670501aacefde7fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Date: Fri, 22 Jul 2016 16:02:54 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] x86/emulate: Correct boundary interactions of emulated
instructions
This reverts most of c/s 0640ffb6 "x86emul: fix rIP handling".
Experimentally, in long mode processors will execute an instruction stream
which crosses the 64bit -1 -> 0 virtual boundary, whether the instruction
boundary is aligned on the virtual boundary, or is misaligned.
In compatibility mode, Intel processors will execute an instruction stream
which crosses the 32bit -1 -> 0 virtual boundary, while AMD processors raise a
segmentation fault. Xen's segmentation behaviour matches AMD.
For 16bit code, hardware does not ever truncated %ip. %eip is always used and
behaves normally as a 32bit register, including in 16bit protected mode
segments, as well as in Real and Unreal mode.
This is XSA-186
Reported-by: Brian Marcotte <marcotte@panix.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
---
xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c | 22 ++++------------------
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c b/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
index d5a56cf..bf3529a 100644
--- xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c.orig
+++ xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
@@ -1570,10 +1570,6 @@ x86_emulate(
#endif
}
- /* Truncate rIP to def_ad_bytes (2 or 4) if necessary. */
- if ( def_ad_bytes < sizeof(_regs.eip) )
- _regs.eip &= (1UL << (def_ad_bytes * 8)) - 1;
-
/* Prefix bytes. */
for ( ; ; )
{
@@ -3906,21 +3902,11 @@ x86_emulate(
/* Commit shadow register state. */
_regs.eflags &= ~EFLG_RF;
- switch ( __builtin_expect(def_ad_bytes, sizeof(_regs.eip)) )
- {
- uint16_t ip;
- case 2:
- ip = _regs.eip;
- _regs.eip = ctxt->regs->eip;
- *(uint16_t *)&_regs.eip = ip;
- break;
-#ifdef __x86_64__
- case 4:
- _regs.rip = _regs._eip;
- break;
-#endif
- }
+ /* Zero the upper 32 bits of %rip if not in long mode. */
+ if ( def_ad_bytes < sizeof(_regs.eip) )
+ _regs.eip = (uint32_t)_regs.eip;
+
*ctxt->regs = _regs;
done:
--
2.1.4

44
sysutils/xenkernel46/patches/patch-XSA-187-1 Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
$NetBSD: patch-XSA-187-1,v 1.1 2016/09/08 15:44:07 bouyer Exp $
From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Subject: x86/shadow: Avoid overflowing sh_ctxt->seg_reg[]
hvm_get_seg_reg() does not perform a range check on its input segment, calls
hvm_get_segment_register() and writes straight into sh_ctxt->seg_reg[].
x86_seg_none is outside the bounds of sh_ctxt->seg_reg[], and will hit a BUG()
in {vmx,svm}_get_segment_register().
HVM guests running with shadow paging can end up performing a virtual to
linear translation with x86_seg_none. This is used for addresses which are
already linear. However, none of this is a legitimate pagetable update, so
fail the emulation in such a case.
This is XSA-187
Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
--- xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c.orig
+++ xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
@@ -140,9 +140,18 @@ static int hvm_translate_linear_addr(
struct sh_emulate_ctxt *sh_ctxt,
unsigned long *paddr)
{
- struct segment_register *reg = hvm_get_seg_reg(seg, sh_ctxt);
+ struct segment_register *reg;
int okay;
+ /*
+ * Can arrive here with non-user segments. However, no such cirucmstance
+ * is part of a legitimate pagetable update, so fail the emulation.
+ */
+ if ( !is_x86_user_segment(seg) )
+ return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
+
+ reg = hvm_get_seg_reg(seg, sh_ctxt);
+
okay = hvm_virtual_to_linear_addr(
seg, reg, offset, bytes, access_type, sh_ctxt->ctxt.addr_size, paddr);

144
sysutils/xenkernel46/patches/patch-XSA-187-2 Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
$NetBSD: patch-XSA-187-2,v 1.1 2016/09/08 15:44:07 bouyer Exp $
From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Subject: x86/segment: Bounds check accesses to emulation ctxt->seg_reg[]
HVM HAP codepaths have space for all segment registers in the seg_reg[]
cache (with x86_seg_none still risking an array overrun), while the shadow
codepaths only have space for the user segments.
Range check the input segment of *_get_seg_reg() against the size of the array
used to cache the results, to avoid overruns in the case that the callers
don't filter their input suitably.
Subsume the is_x86_user_segment(seg) checks from the shadow code, which were
an incomplete attempt at range checking, and are now superceeded. Make
hvm_get_seg_reg() static, as it is not used outside of shadow/common.c
No functional change, but far easier to reason that no overflow is possible.
Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
--- xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c.orig
+++ xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c
@@ -526,6 +526,8 @@ static int hvmemul_virtual_to_linear(
? 1 : 4096);
reg = hvmemul_get_seg_reg(seg, hvmemul_ctxt);
+ if ( IS_ERR(reg) )
+ return -PTR_ERR(reg);
if ( (hvmemul_ctxt->ctxt.regs->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_DF) && (*reps > 1) )
{
@@ -1360,6 +1362,10 @@ static int hvmemul_read_segment(
struct hvm_emulate_ctxt *hvmemul_ctxt =
container_of(ctxt, struct hvm_emulate_ctxt, ctxt);
struct segment_register *sreg = hvmemul_get_seg_reg(seg, hvmemul_ctxt);
+
+ if ( IS_ERR(sreg) )
+ return -PTR_ERR(sreg);
+
memcpy(reg, sreg, sizeof(struct segment_register));
return X86EMUL_OKAY;
}
@@ -1373,6 +1379,9 @@ static int hvmemul_write_segment(
container_of(ctxt, struct hvm_emulate_ctxt, ctxt);
struct segment_register *sreg = hvmemul_get_seg_reg(seg, hvmemul_ctxt);
+ if ( IS_ERR(sreg) )
+ return -PTR_ERR(sreg);
+
memcpy(sreg, reg, sizeof(struct segment_register));
__set_bit(seg, &hvmemul_ctxt->seg_reg_dirty);
@@ -1911,10 +1920,17 @@ void hvm_emulate_writeback(
}
}
+/*
+ * Callers which pass a known in-range x86_segment can rely on the return
+ * pointer being valid. Other callers must explicitly check for errors.
+ */
struct segment_register *hvmemul_get_seg_reg(
enum x86_segment seg,
struct hvm_emulate_ctxt *hvmemul_ctxt)
{
+ if ( seg < 0 || seg >= ARRAY_SIZE(hvmemul_ctxt->seg_reg) )
+ return ERR_PTR(-X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE);
+
if ( !__test_and_set_bit(seg, &hvmemul_ctxt->seg_reg_accessed) )
hvm_get_segment_register(current, seg, &hvmemul_ctxt->seg_reg[seg]);
return &hvmemul_ctxt->seg_reg[seg];
--- xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c.orig
+++ xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
@@ -125,10 +125,19 @@ __initcall(shadow_audit_key_init);
/* x86 emulator support for the shadow code
*/
+/*
+ * Callers which pass a known in-range x86_segment can rely on the return
+ * pointer being valid. Other callers must explicitly check for errors.
+ */
struct segment_register *hvm_get_seg_reg(
enum x86_segment seg, struct sh_emulate_ctxt *sh_ctxt)
{
- struct segment_register *seg_reg = &sh_ctxt->seg_reg[seg];
+ struct segment_register *seg_reg;
+
+ if ( seg < 0 || seg >= ARRAY_SIZE(sh_ctxt->seg_reg) )
+ return ERR_PTR(-X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE);
+
+ seg_reg = &sh_ctxt->seg_reg[seg];
if ( !__test_and_set_bit(seg, &sh_ctxt->valid_seg_regs) )
hvm_get_segment_register(current, seg, seg_reg);
return seg_reg;
@@ -145,14 +154,9 @@ static int hvm_translate_linear_addr(
struct segment_register *reg;
int okay;
- /*
- * Can arrive here with non-user segments. However, no such cirucmstance
- * is part of a legitimate pagetable update, so fail the emulation.
- */
- if ( !is_x86_user_segment(seg) )
- return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
-
reg = hvm_get_seg_reg(seg, sh_ctxt);
+ if ( IS_ERR(reg) )
+ return -PTR_ERR(reg);
okay = hvm_virtual_to_linear_addr(
seg, reg, offset, bytes, access_type, sh_ctxt->ctxt.addr_size, paddr);
@@ -254,9 +258,6 @@ hvm_emulate_write(enum x86_segment seg,
unsigned long addr;
int rc;
- if ( !is_x86_user_segment(seg) )
- return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
-
/* How many emulations could we save if we unshadowed on stack writes? */
if ( seg == x86_seg_ss )
perfc_incr(shadow_fault_emulate_stack);
@@ -284,9 +285,6 @@ hvm_emulate_cmpxchg(enum x86_segment seg
unsigned long addr, old[2], new[2];
int rc;
- if ( !is_x86_user_segment(seg) )
- return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
-
rc = hvm_translate_linear_addr(
seg, offset, bytes, hvm_access_write, sh_ctxt, &addr);
if ( rc )
--- xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/emulate.h.orig
+++ xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/emulate.h
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
#define __ASM_X86_HVM_EMULATE_H__
#include <xen/config.h>
+#include <xen/err.h>
#include <asm/hvm/hvm.h>
#include <asm/x86_emulate.h>

13
sysutils/xenkernel46/patches/patch-xen_Makefile Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
$NetBSD: patch-xen_Makefile,v 1.1.1.1 2016/07/04 07:25:13 jnemeth Exp $
--- xen/Makefile.orig 2016-02-09 14:44:19.000000000 +0000
+++ xen/Makefile
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ include/xen/compile.h: include/xen/compi
-e 's/@@whoami@@/$(XEN_WHOAMI)/g' \
-e 's/@@domain@@/$(XEN_DOMAIN)/g' \
-e 's/@@hostname@@/$(XEN_BUILD_HOST)/g' \
- -e 's!@@compiler@@!$(shell $(CC) $(CFLAGS) --version 2>&1 | head -1)!g' \
+ -e 's!@@compiler@@!$(shell $(CC) $(EXTRA_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) --version 2>&1 | head -1)!g' \
-e 's/@@version@@/$(XEN_VERSION)/g' \
-e 's/@@subversion@@/$(XEN_SUBVERSION)/g' \
-e 's/@@extraversion@@/$(XEN_EXTRAVERSION)/g' \

12
sysutils/xenkernel46/patches/patch-xen_arch_x86_Rules.mk Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
$NetBSD: patch-xen_arch_x86_Rules.mk,v 1.1.1.1 2016/07/04 07:25:14 jnemeth Exp $
--- xen/arch/x86/Rules.mk.orig 2015-01-12 17:53:24.000000000 +0100
+++ xen/arch/x86/Rules.mk 2015-01-19 12:29:14.000000000 +0100
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
CFLAGS += -I$(BASEDIR)/include
CFLAGS += -I$(BASEDIR)/include/asm-x86/mach-generic
CFLAGS += -I$(BASEDIR)/include/asm-x86/mach-default
+CFLAGS += $(EXTRA_CFLAGS)
# Prevent floating-point variables from creeping into Xen.
CFLAGS += -msoft-float

13
sysutils/xenkernel46/patches/patch-xen_common_page__alloc.c Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
$NetBSD: patch-xen_common_page__alloc.c,v 1.1.1.1 2016/07/04 07:25:13 jnemeth Exp $
--- xen/common/page_alloc.c.orig 2015-09-13 17:37:09.000000000 +0000
+++ xen/common/page_alloc.c
@@ -1561,7 +1561,7 @@ void *alloc_xenheap_pages(unsigned int o
ASSERT(!in_irq());
if ( xenheap_bits && (memflags >> _MEMF_bits) > xenheap_bits )
- memflags &= ~MEMF_bits(~0);
+ memflags &= ~MEMF_bits(~0U);
if ( !(memflags >> _MEMF_bits) )
memflags |= MEMF_bits(xenheap_bits);

22
sysutils/xenkernel46/patches/patch-xen_drivers_passthrough_vtd_x86_ats.c Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
$NetBSD: patch-xen_drivers_passthrough_vtd_x86_ats.c,v 1.1.1.1 2016/07/04 07:25:14 jnemeth Exp $
--- xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/x86/ats.c.orig 2015-06-22 13:41:35.000000000 +0000
+++ xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/x86/ats.c
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ int dev_invalidate_iotlb(struct iommu *i
case DMA_TLB_GLOBAL_FLUSH:
/* invalidate all translations: sbit=1,bit_63=0,bit[62:12]=1 */
sbit = 1;
- addr = (~0 << PAGE_SHIFT_4K) & 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFF;
+ addr = (~0ULL << PAGE_SHIFT_4K) & 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFF;
rc = qinval_device_iotlb(iommu, pdev->ats_queue_depth,
sid, sbit, addr);
break;
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ int dev_invalidate_iotlb(struct iommu *i
sbit = size_order ? 1 : 0;
/* clear lower bits */
- addr &= ~0 << PAGE_SHIFT_4K;
+ addr &= ~0ULL << PAGE_SHIFT_4K;
/* if sbit == 1, zero out size_order bit and set lower bits to 1 */
if ( sbit )

13
sysutils/xenkernel46/patches/patch-xen_include_asm-x86_current.h Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
$NetBSD: patch-xen_include_asm-x86_current.h,v 1.1.1.1 2016/07/04 07:25:13 jnemeth Exp $
--- xen/include/asm-x86/current.h.orig 2015-01-30 12:45:05.000000000 +0000
+++ xen/include/asm-x86/current.h
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ struct cpu_info {
static inline struct cpu_info *get_cpu_info(void)
{
- register unsigned long sp asm("rsp");
+ unsigned long sp = (unsigned long)__builtin_frame_address(0);
return (struct cpu_info *)((sp & ~(STACK_SIZE-1)) + STACK_SIZE) - 1;
}

13
sysutils/xenkernel46/patches/patch-xen_include_xen_lib.h Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
$NetBSD: patch-xen_include_xen_lib.h,v 1.1.1.1 2016/07/04 07:25:13 jnemeth Exp $
--- xen/include/xen/lib.h.orig 2015-06-22 15:41:35.000000000 +0200
+++ xen/include/xen/lib.h 2015-06-23 18:32:26.000000000 +0200
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@
#define ASSERT_UNREACHABLE() assert_failed("unreachable")
#define debug_build() 1
#else
-#define ASSERT(p) do { if ( 0 && (p) ); } while (0)
+#define ASSERT(p) do { if ( 0 && (p) ) (void)0; } while (0)
#define ASSERT_UNREACHABLE() do { } while (0)
#define debug_build() 0
#endif