Import of pkgsrc-2015Q2

This commit is contained in:
2015-08-30 02:56:09 -07:00
committed by Lionel Sambuc
parent 4af1cdf7a9
commit f641581404
15409 changed files with 267784 additions and 121624 deletions

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@@ -1,9 +1,8 @@
# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.5 2015/03/10 20:08:43 spz Exp $
# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.9 2015/06/23 17:45:33 bouyer Exp $
VERSION= 4.5.0
VERSION= 4.5.1
DISTNAME= xen-${VERSION}
PKGNAME= xenkernel45-${VERSION}
PKGREVISION= 2
CATEGORIES= sysutils
MASTER_SITES= http://bits.xensource.com/oss-xen/release/${VERSION}/

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@@ -1,13 +1,10 @@
$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.4 2015/03/10 20:08:43 spz Exp $
$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.8 2015/06/23 17:45:33 bouyer Exp $
SHA1 (xen-4.5.0.tar.gz) = c4aab5fb366496ad1edc7fe0a935a0d604335637
RMD160 (xen-4.5.0.tar.gz) = e35ba0cb484492c1a289218eb9bf53b57dbd3a45
Size (xen-4.5.0.tar.gz) = 18404933 bytes
SHA1 (patch-CVE-2015-2044) = 354fe44df0c3b464137f50e2b9de3930f3910c0d
SHA1 (patch-CVE-2015-2045) = 98e3f8064b7c190b2ae69c7d4c8f71febf8fbf52
SHA1 (patch-CVE-2015-2151) = 30344d233eade872fa7062493d754f8bccaf9d2a
SHA1 (xen-4.5.1.tar.gz) = f10328ce63625a5a7bfa3af5899c4432a467c051
RMD160 (xen-4.5.1.tar.gz) = 4c449d799e041a52a94c00ee43a8c28fd4af1b96
Size (xen-4.5.1.tar.gz) = 18410400 bytes
SHA1 (patch-Config.mk) = a2a104d023cea4e551a3ad40927d4884d6c610bf
SHA1 (patch-xen_Makefile) = 750d0c8d4fea14d3ef3f872de5242a1f5104cbbe
SHA1 (patch-xen_arch_x86_Rules.mk) = 7b0894ba7311edb02118a021671f304cf3872154
SHA1 (patch-xen_include_asm-x86_current.h) = 8a21577be06383c0c7f53c15ba828f77fb6314ad
SHA1 (patch-xen_include_xen_lib.h) = b9f5dff5b4cf11333d95d9835941c6bc19b776ad
SHA1 (patch-xen_include_xen_lib.h) = 82a219b7d9c5deaa2b8e0adc774f60395adc4815

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@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
$NetBSD: patch-CVE-2015-2044,v 1.1 2015/03/05 14:21:31 spz Exp $
x86/HVM: return all ones on wrong-sized reads of system device I/O ports
So far the value presented to the guest remained uninitialized.
This is CVE-2015-2044 / XSA-121.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
--- xen/arch/x86/hvm/rtc.c.orig 2014-09-02 06:22:57.000000000 +0000
+++ xen/arch/x86/hvm/rtc.c
@@ -703,7 +703,8 @@ static int handle_rtc_io(
if ( bytes != 1 )
{
- gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, "HVM_RTC bas access\n");
+ gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, "HVM_RTC bad access\n");
+ *val = ~0;
return X86EMUL_OKAY;
}
--- xen/arch/x86/hvm/i8254.c.orig 2014-09-02 06:22:57.000000000 +0000
+++ xen/arch/x86/hvm/i8254.c
@@ -486,6 +486,7 @@ static int handle_pit_io(
if ( bytes != 1 )
{
gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, "PIT bad access\n");
+ *val = ~0;
return X86EMUL_OKAY;
}
--- xen/arch/x86/hvm/pmtimer.c.orig 2014-09-02 06:22:57.000000000 +0000
+++ xen/arch/x86/hvm/pmtimer.c
@@ -213,6 +213,7 @@ static int handle_pmt_io(
if ( bytes != 4 )
{
gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, "HVM_PMT bad access\n");
+ *val = ~0;
return X86EMUL_OKAY;
}
--- xen/arch/x86/hvm/vpic.c.orig 2014-09-02 06:22:57.000000000 +0000
+++ xen/arch/x86/hvm/vpic.c
@@ -331,6 +331,7 @@ static int vpic_intercept_pic_io(
if ( bytes != 1 )
{
gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, "PIC_IO bad access size %d\n", bytes);
+ *val = ~0;
return X86EMUL_OKAY;
}

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@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
$NetBSD: patch-CVE-2015-2045,v 1.1 2015/03/05 14:21:31 spz Exp $
pre-fill structures for certain HYPERVISOR_xen_version sub-ops
... avoiding to pass hypervisor stack contents back to the caller
through space unused by the respective strings.
This is CVE-2015-2045 / XSA-122.
Signed-off-by: Aaron Adams <Aaron.Adams@nccgroup.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
--- xen/common/kernel.c.orig 2014-09-02 06:22:57.000000000 +0000
+++ xen/common/kernel.c
@@ -240,6 +240,8 @@ DO(xen_version)(int cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDL
case XENVER_extraversion:
{
xen_extraversion_t extraversion;
+
+ memset(extraversion, 0, sizeof(extraversion));
safe_strcpy(extraversion, xen_extra_version());
if ( copy_to_guest(arg, extraversion, ARRAY_SIZE(extraversion)) )
return -EFAULT;
@@ -249,6 +251,8 @@ DO(xen_version)(int cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDL
case XENVER_compile_info:
{
struct xen_compile_info info;
+
+ memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info));
safe_strcpy(info.compiler, xen_compiler());
safe_strcpy(info.compile_by, xen_compile_by());
safe_strcpy(info.compile_domain, xen_compile_domain());
@@ -284,6 +288,8 @@ DO(xen_version)(int cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDL
case XENVER_changeset:
{
xen_changeset_info_t chgset;
+
+ memset(chgset, 0, sizeof(chgset));
safe_strcpy(chgset, xen_changeset());
if ( copy_to_guest(arg, chgset, ARRAY_SIZE(chgset)) )
return -EFAULT;

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@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
$NetBSD: patch-CVE-2015-2151,v 1.1 2015/03/10 20:08:44 spz Exp $
xsa123.patch from upstream:
For ModRM encoded instructions with register operands we must not
overwrite ea.mem.seg (if a - bogus in that case - segment override was
present) as it aliases with ea.reg.
This is CVE-2015-2151 / XSA-123.
--- xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c.orig 2015-01-12 16:53:24.000000000 +0000
+++ xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
@@ -1756,7 +1756,7 @@ x86_emulate(
}
}
- if ( override_seg != -1 )
+ if ( override_seg != -1 && ea.type == OP_MEM )
ea.mem.seg = override_seg;
/* Early operand adjustments. */

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@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
$NetBSD: patch-xen_include_xen_lib.h,v 1.1 2015/01/20 16:42:13 bouyer Exp $
$NetBSD: patch-xen_include_xen_lib.h,v 1.2 2015/06/23 17:45:33 bouyer Exp $
--- xen/include/xen/lib.h.orig 2015-01-12 17:53:24.000000000 +0100
+++ xen/include/xen/lib.h 2015-01-19 12:30:35.000000000 +0100
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@
do { if ( unlikely(!(p)) ) assert_failed(#p); } while (0)
--- xen/include/xen/lib.h.orig 2015-06-22 15:41:35.000000000 +0200
+++ xen/include/xen/lib.h 2015-06-23 18:32:26.000000000 +0200
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@
#define ASSERT_UNREACHABLE() assert_failed("unreachable")
#define debug_build() 1
#else
-#define ASSERT(p) do { if ( 0 && (p) ); } while (0)
+#define ASSERT(p) do { if ( 0 && (p) ) (void)0; } while (0)
#define ASSERT_UNREACHABLE() do { } while (0)
#define debug_build() 0
#endif