- enable remembering of device memory ranges set by PCI and
told to kernel
- makes VM ask the kernel if a certain process is allowed
to map in a range of physical memory (VM rounds it to page
boundaries afterwards - but it's impossible to map anything
smaller otherwise so I assume this is safe, i.e. there won't
be anything else in that page; certainly no regular memory)
- VM permission check cleanup (no more hardcoded calls, less
hardcoded logic, more readable main loop), a loose end left
by GQ
- remove do_copy warning, as the ipc server triggers this but
it's no more harmful than the special cases already excluded
explicitly (VFS, PM, etc).
This commit is contained in:
@@ -10,3 +10,15 @@ int sys_privctl(endpoint_t proc_ep, int request, void *p)
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return _taskcall(SYSTASK, SYS_PRIVCTL, &m);
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}
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int sys_privquery_mem(endpoint_t proc_ep, phys_bytes start, phys_bytes len)
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{
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message m;
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m.CTL_ENDPT = proc_ep;
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m.CTL_REQUEST = SYS_PRIV_QUERY_MEM;
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m.CTL_PHYSSTART = start;
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m.CTL_PHYSLEN = len;
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return _taskcall(SYSTASK, SYS_PRIVCTL, &m);
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}
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