Remove gmake support for cross-compilation

Change-Id: I41d5aec5e11df6c44438501b09f85c6ad5eba096

README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+# Build MINIX/arm with clang
+
+It is now possible to build a full minix distribution for BeaglBone White/Black and BeagleBoardxM using clang instead of GCC.
+
+This also add support to run the Kuya tests on ARM, which was not possible when GCC was used, because of problems in the C++ exception handling.
+
+## Known Bugs
+
+The following tests still fails:
+ 1. 53: Division by zero does not trigger exceptions
+ 2. 75: ru.tv_secs can't be zero (and is zero)
+ 3. 85: hangs
+ 4. isofs: Fails because of an out of memory condition
+ 5. vnd: crash
+ 6. Running two times the kyua tests in a row, without rebooting in between will lead to a mostly failed second run because of copy-on-write errors.
+
+ 

bin/cat/cat.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $NetBSD: cat.c,v 1.55 2015/07/25 16:17:01 sevan Exp $	*/
+/* $NetBSD: cat.c,v 1.57 2016/06/16 00:52:37 sevan Exp $	*/
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 1989, 1993
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ __COPYRIGHT(
 #if 0
 static char sccsid[] = "@(#)cat.c	8.2 (Berkeley) 4/27/95";
 #else
-__RCSID("$NetBSD: cat.c,v 1.55 2015/07/25 16:17:01 sevan Exp $");
+__RCSID("$NetBSD: cat.c,v 1.57 2016/06/16 00:52:37 sevan Exp $");
 #endif
 #endif /* not lint */
 
@@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ main(int argc, char *argv[])
 			vflag = 1;
 			break;
 		default:
+		case '?':
 			(void)fprintf(stderr,
 			    "Usage: %s [-beflnstuv] [-B bsize] [-] "
 			    "[file ...]\n", getprogname());
@@ -174,18 +175,16 @@ cook_buf(FILE *fp)
 	line = gobble = 0;
 	for (prev = '\n'; (ch = getc(fp)) != EOF; prev = ch) {
 		if (prev == '\n') {
-			if (ch == '\n') {
-				if (sflag) {
-					if (!gobble && nflag && !bflag)
-						(void)fprintf(stdout,
-							"%6d\t\n", ++line);
-					else if (!gobble && putchar(ch) == EOF)
-						break;
+			if (sflag) {
+				if (ch == '\n') {
+					if (gobble)
+						continue;
 					gobble = 1;
-					continue;
+				} else
+					gobble = 0;
 				}
 				if (nflag) {
-					if (!bflag) {
+					if (!bflag || ch != '\n') {
 						(void)fprintf(stdout,
 						    "%6d\t", ++line);
 						if (ferror(stdout))
@@ -197,13 +196,7 @@ cook_buf(FILE *fp)
 							break;
 					}
 				}
-			} else if (nflag) {
-				(void)fprintf(stdout, "%6d\t", ++line);
-				if (ferror(stdout))
-					break;
 			}
-		}
-		gobble = 0;
 		if (ch == '\n') {
 			if (eflag)
 				if (putchar('$') == EOF)

bin/chmod/chmod.1

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\"	$NetBSD: chmod.1,v 1.25 2013/12/17 09:54:08 apb Exp $
+.\"	$NetBSD: chmod.1,v 1.26 2016/08/11 00:10:42 sevan Exp $
 .\"
 .\" Copyright (c) 1989, 1990, 1993, 1994
 .\"	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
 .\"
 .\"	@(#)chmod.1	8.4 (Berkeley) 3/31/94
 .\"
-.Dd October 22, 2012
+.Dd August 11, 2016
 .Dt CHMOD 1
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -304,6 +304,11 @@ compatible with the exception of the
 symbol
 .Dq t
 which is not included in that standard.
+.Sh HISTORY
+A
+.Nm
+utility appeared in
+.At v1 .
 .Sh BUGS
 There's no
 .Ar perm

bin/cp/cp.1

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\"	$NetBSD: cp.1,v 1.44 2015/06/28 16:22:54 wiz Exp $
+.\"	$NetBSD: cp.1,v 1.45 2016/08/11 00:17:23 sevan Exp $
 .\"
 .\" Copyright (c) 1989, 1990, 1993, 1994
 .\"	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
 .\"
 .\"	@(#)cp.1	8.3 (Berkeley) 4/18/94
 .\"
-.Dd March 25, 2012
+.Dd August 11, 2016
 .Dt CP 1
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -255,3 +255,8 @@ The
 .Fl v
 option is an extension to
 .St -p1003.2 .
+.Sh HISTORY
+A
+.Nm
+utility appeared in
+.At v1 .

bin/csh/csh.1

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\"	$NetBSD: csh.1,v 1.52 2013/01/22 21:20:26 wiz Exp $
+.\"	$NetBSD: csh.1,v 1.53 2016/08/10 17:16:47 sevan Exp $
 .\"
 .\" Copyright (c) 1980, 1990, 1993
 .\"	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
 .\"
 .\"	@(#)csh.1	8.2 (Berkeley) 1/21/94
 .\"
-.Dd January 22, 2013
+.Dd August 8, 2016
 .Dt CSH 1
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -2233,7 +2233,7 @@ substitutions on a single line to 20.
 .Sh HISTORY
 .Nm
 appeared in
-.Bx 3 .
+.Bx 2 .
 It was a first implementation of a command language interpreter
 incorporating a history mechanism (see
 .Sx History substitutions ) ,

bin/date/date.1

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\"	$NetBSD: date.1,v 1.42 2012/04/06 11:36:56 wiz Exp $
+.\"	$NetBSD: date.1,v 1.44 2017/01/03 16:01:05 abhinav Exp $
 .\"
 .\" Copyright (c) 1980, 1990, 1993
 .\"	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
 .\"
 .\"     @(#)date.1	8.3 (Berkeley) 4/28/95
 .\"
-.Dd November 15, 2006
+.Dd August 11, 2016
 .Dt DATE 1
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ The hour of the day, from 00 to 23.
 .It Ar MM
 The minute of the hour, from 00 to 59.
 .It Ar SS
-The second of the minute, from 00 to 61.
+The second of the minute, from 00 to 60.
 .El
 .Pp
 Everything but the minutes is optional.
@@ -244,3 +244,8 @@ The
 .Nm
 utility is expected to be compatible with
 .St -p1003.2 .
+.Sh HISTORY
+A
+.Nm
+utility appeared in
+.At v1 .

bin/dd/dd.1

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\"	$NetBSD: dd.1,v 1.27 2015/03/18 13:30:13 wiz Exp $
+.\"	$NetBSD: dd.1,v 1.32 2016/08/18 22:43:49 sevan Exp $
 .\"
 .\" Copyright (c) 1990, 1993
 .\"	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
 .\"
 .\"	@(#)dd.1	8.2 (Berkeley) 1/13/94
 .\"
-.Dd March 18, 2015
+.Dd August 18, 2016
 .Dt DD 1
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ in order to output to a nonexistent file.
 The default or specified value is or'ed with
 .Va rdwr
 for a first
-.Xt open 2
+.Xr open 2
 attempt, then on failure with
 .Va wronly
 on a second attempt.
@@ -486,7 +486,6 @@ To print summary information in human-readable form:
 .Pp
 To customize the information summary output and print it through
 .Xr unvis 3 :
-.Pp
 .Bd -literal -offset indent
 dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/null count=1 \e
      msgfmt='speed:%E, in %s seconds\en' 2\*[Gt]\*[Am]1 | unvis
@@ -516,3 +515,8 @@ and
 values are extensions to the
 .Tn POSIX
 standard.
+.Sh HISTORY
+A
+.Nm
+utility appeared in
+.At v5 .

bin/df/df.1

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\"	$NetBSD: df.1,v 1.44 2010/04/05 21:17:28 joerg Exp $
+.\"	$NetBSD: df.1,v 1.46 2016/08/10 23:48:14 sevan Exp $
 .\"
 .\" Copyright (c) 1989, 1990, 1993
 .\"	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
 .\"
 .\"	@(#)df.1	8.2 (Berkeley) 1/13/92
 .\"
-.Dd March 4, 2008
+.Dd August 10, 2016
 .Dt DF 1
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -203,4 +203,4 @@ size block.
 A
 .Nm
 utility appeared in
-.At v6 .
+.At v1 .

bin/echo/echo.1

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\"	$NetBSD: echo.1,v 1.13 2003/08/07 09:05:12 agc Exp $
+.\"	$NetBSD: echo.1,v 1.15 2016/08/14 22:59:22 sevan Exp $
 .\"
 .\" Copyright (c) 1990, 1993
 .\"	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
 .\"
 .\"	@(#)echo.1	8.1 (Berkeley) 7/22/93
 .\"
-.Dd July 22, 1993
+.Dd August 14, 2016
 .Dt ECHO 1
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -66,3 +66,8 @@ The
 utility is expected to be
 .St -p1003.2
 compatible.
+.Sh HISTORY
+An
+.Nm
+utility appeared in
+.At v2 .

bin/expr/expr.1

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\"	$NetBSD: expr.1,v 1.33 2012/08/12 17:27:04 wiz Exp $
+.\"	$NetBSD: expr.1,v 1.36 2016/08/23 20:34:23 sevan Exp $
 .\"
 .\" Copyright (c) 2000,2003 The NetBSD Foundation, Inc.
 .\" All rights reserved.
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
 .\" ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
 .\" POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.Dd April 20, 2004
+.Dd August 23, 2016
 .Dt EXPR 1
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ treat it as a delimiter to mark the end of command
 line options, and ignore it.
 Some
 .Nm
-implementations don't recognize it at all; others
+implementations do not recognize it at all; others
 might ignore it even in cases where doing so results in syntax
 error.
 There should be same result for both following examples,
@@ -242,15 +242,28 @@ The
 .Ar length
 keyword is an extension for compatibility with GNU
 .Nm .
+.Sh HISTORY
+An
+.Nm
+utility first appeared in the Programmer's Workbench (PWB/UNIX).
+A public domain version of
+.Nm
+written by
+.An Pace Willisson
+.Aq pace@blitz.com
+appeared in
+.Bx 386 0.1 .
 .Sh AUTHORS
-Original implementation was written by
-.An J.T. Conklin
-.Aq jtc@NetBSD.org .
-It was rewritten for
+Initial implementation by
+.An Pace Willisson Aq Mt pace@blitz.com
+was largely rewritten by
+.An -nosplit
+.An J.T. Conklin Aq Mt jtc@NetBSD.org .
+It was rewritten again for
 .Nx 1.6
 by
-.An Jaromir Dolecek
-.Aq jdolecek@NetBSD.org .
+.An -nosplit
+.An Jaromir Dolecek Aq Mt jdolecek@NetBSD.org .
 .Sh NOTES
 The empty string
 .Do Dc

bin/kill/kill.1

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\"	$NetBSD: kill.1,v 1.22 2012/03/22 07:58:17 wiz Exp $
+.\"	$NetBSD: kill.1,v 1.28 2017/04/22 23:01:36 christos Exp $
 .\"
 .\" Copyright (c) 1980, 1990, 1993
 .\"	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
 .\"
 .\"	@(#)kill.1	8.2 (Berkeley) 4/28/95
 .\"
-.Dd April 28, 1995
+.Dd April 22, 2017
 .Dt KILL 1
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -63,7 +63,6 @@ by the pid operand(s).
 Only the super-user may send signals to other users' processes.
 .Pp
 The options are as follows:
-.Pp
 .Bl -tag -width Ds
 .It Fl s Ar signal_name
 A symbolic signal name specifying the signal to be sent instead of the
@@ -104,6 +103,9 @@ belonging to the user.
 .Pp
 Some of the more commonly used signals:
 .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
+.It 0
+0 (does not affect the process; can be used to test whether the
+process exists)
 .It 1
 HUP (hang up)
 .It 2
@@ -130,6 +132,8 @@ arguments.
 See
 .Xr csh 1
 for details.
+.Sh DIAGNOSTICS
+.Ex -std
 .Sh SEE ALSO
 .Xr csh 1 ,
 .Xr pgrep 1 ,
@@ -141,11 +145,12 @@ for details.
 .Sh STANDARDS
 The
 .Nm
-function is expected to be
+utility is expected to be
 .St -p1003.2
 compatible.
 .Sh HISTORY
 A
 .Nm
 command appeared in
-.At v6 .
+.At v3
+in section 8 of the manual.

bin/ls/ls.1

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\"	$NetBSD: ls.1,v 1.78 2014/10/18 01:49:01 jschauma Exp $
+.\"	$NetBSD: ls.1,v 1.79 2016/08/10 17:45:12 sevan Exp $
 .\"
 .\" Copyright (c) 1980, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994
 .\"	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
 .\"
 .\"     @(#)ls.1	8.7 (Berkeley) 7/29/94
 .\"
-.Dd October 17, 2014
+.Dd August 10, 2016
 .Dt LS 1
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -513,4 +513,4 @@ specification.
 An
 .Nm
 utility appeared in
-.At v5 .
+.At v1 .

bin/mkdir/mkdir.1

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\"	$NetBSD: mkdir.1,v 1.17 2012/03/22 07:58:17 wiz Exp $
+.\"	$NetBSD: mkdir.1,v 1.19 2016/08/10 18:42:00 sevan Exp $
 .\"
 .\" Copyright (c) 1989, 1990, 1993
 .\"	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
 .\"
 .\"	@(#)mkdir.1	8.2 (Berkeley) 1/25/94
 .\"
-.Dd January 25, 1994
+.Dd August 10, 2016
 .Dt MKDIR 1
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -92,3 +92,8 @@ The
 utility is expected to be
 .St -p1003.2
 compatible.
+.Sh HISTORY
+A
+.Nm
+utility appeared in
+.At v1 .

bin/mv/mv.1

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\"	$NetBSD: mv.1,v 1.26 2012/03/22 07:58:17 wiz Exp $
+.\"	$NetBSD: mv.1,v 1.28 2016/08/10 18:08:14 sevan Exp $
 .\"
 .\" Copyright (c) 1989, 1990, 1993
 .\"	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
 .\"
 .\"	@(#)mv.1	8.1 (Berkeley) 5/31/93
 .\"
-.Dd December 26, 2002
+.Dd August 10, 2016
 .Dt MV 1
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -144,3 +144,8 @@ The
 .Fl v
 option is an extension to
 .St -p1003.2 .
+.Sh HISTORY
+An
+.Nm
+utility appeared in
+.At v1 .

bin/pax/cpio.1

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\" $NetBSD: cpio.1,v 1.13 2011/06/19 07:34:24 wiz Exp $
+.\" $NetBSD: cpio.1,v 1.14 2015/12/19 18:48:33 wiz Exp $
 .\"
 .\" Copyright (c) 1997 SigmaSoft, Th. Lockert
 .\" All rights reserved.
@@ -297,7 +297,8 @@ specific archive format specification.
 .Xr pax 1 ,
 .Xr tar 1
 .Sh AUTHORS
-Keith Muller at the University of California, San Diego.
+.An Keith Muller
+at the University of California, San Diego.
 .Sh BUGS
 The
 .Fl s

bin/pwd/pwd.1

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\"	$NetBSD: pwd.1,v 1.24 2003/10/30 14:58:23 wiz Exp $
+.\"	$NetBSD: pwd.1,v 1.25 2016/08/12 02:03:26 sevan Exp $
 .\"
 .\" Copyright (c) 1990, 1993
 .\"	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
 .\"
 .\"     @(#)pwd.1	8.2 (Berkeley) 4/28/95
 .\"
-.Dd October 30, 2003
+.Dd August 12, 2016
 .Dt PWD 1
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -87,6 +87,11 @@ except that the default is
 .Fl P
 not
 .Fl L .
+.Sh HISTORY
+A
+.Nm
+utility appeared in
+.At v5 .
 .Sh BUGS
 In
 .Xr csh 1

bin/rm/rm.1

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\"	$NetBSD: rm.1,v 1.27 2013/04/26 19:34:34 wiz Exp $
+.\"	$NetBSD: rm.1,v 1.28 2016/08/12 02:26:42 sevan Exp $
 .\"
 .\" Copyright (c) 1990, 1993, 1994, 2003
 .\"	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
 .\"
 .\"	@(#)rm.1	8.5 (Berkeley) 12/5/94
 .\"
-.Dd April 26, 2013
+.Dd August 12, 2016
 .Dt RM 1
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -190,6 +190,11 @@ magnetic disk.
 .Em Because these requirements are not met, the
 .Fl P
 .Em option does not conform to the standard .
+.Sh HISTORY
+An
+.Nm
+utility appeared in
+.At v1 .
 .Sh BUGS
 The
 .Fl P

bin/rmdir/rmdir.1

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\"	$NetBSD: rmdir.1,v 1.15 2003/08/07 09:05:29 agc Exp $
+.\"	$NetBSD: rmdir.1,v 1.16 2016/08/12 02:30:37 sevan Exp $
 .\"
 .\" Copyright (c) 1990, 1993
 .\"	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
 .\"
 .\"	@(#)rmdir.1	8.1 (Berkeley) 5/31/93
 .\"
-.Dd May 31, 1993
+.Dd August 12, 2016
 .Dt RMDIR 1
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -88,3 +88,8 @@ The
 utility is expected to be
 .St -p1003.2
 compatible.
+.Sh HISTORY
+An
+.Nm
+utility appeared in
+.At v1 .

bin/sleep/sleep.1

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\"	$NetBSD: sleep.1,v 1.22 2011/08/15 14:45:36 wiz Exp $
+.\"	$NetBSD: sleep.1,v 1.23 2016/08/12 02:36:38 sevan Exp $
 .\"
 .\" Copyright (c) 1990, 1993, 1994
 .\"	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
 .\"
 .\"	@(#)sleep.1	8.3 (Berkeley) 4/18/94
 .\"
-.Dd August 13, 2011
+.Dd August 12, 2016
 .Dt SLEEP 1
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -121,3 +121,8 @@ The
 command is expected to be
 .St -p1003.2
 compatible.
+.Sh HISTORY
+A
+.Nm
+utility appeared in
+.At v4 .

bin/stty/stty.1

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\"	$NetBSD: stty.1,v 1.41 2012/06/20 14:19:39 wiz Exp $
+.\"	$NetBSD: stty.1,v 1.43 2016/08/14 23:29:43 sevan Exp $
 .\"
 .\" Copyright (c) 1990, 1993, 1994
 .\"	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
 .\"
 .\"     @(#)stty.1	8.5 (Berkeley) 6/1/94
 .\"
-.Dd June 16, 2012
+.Dd August 15, 2016
 .Dt STTY 1
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -633,3 +633,8 @@ and
 flags are
 extensions to the standard, as are the operands mentioned in the control
 operations section.
+.Sh HISTORY
+An
+.Nm
+utility appeared in
+.At v2 .

crypto/external/bsd/Makefile

@@ -2,6 +2,10 @@
 
 .include <bsd.own.mk>
 
+.if defined(__MINIX)
+SUBDIR+= openssl .WAIT heimdal netpgp .WAIT libsaslc
+.else
 SUBDIR+= openssl .WAIT heimdal netpgp .WAIT openssh libsaslc
+.endif # defined(__MINIX)
 
 .include <bsd.subdir.mk>

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/Makefile

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-#	$NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.1 2009/06/07 22:38:44 christos Exp $
-
-SUBDIR=		lib .WAIT bin
-
-.include <bsd.subdir.mk>

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/Makefile.inc

@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
-#	$NetBSD: Makefile.inc,v 1.9 2015/07/23 08:03:25 mrg Exp $
-
-WARNS?=	4
-
-.include <bsd.own.mk>
-
-USE_FORT?= yes	# network client/server
-WITH_OPENSSL=1
-
-SSHDIST?= ${NETBSDSRCDIR}/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist
-
-CPPFLAGS+=-I${SSHDIST}
-
-CPPFLAGS+=-DHAVE_DLOPEN
-CPPFLAGS+=-DHAVE_HEADER_AD
-CPPFLAGS+=-DHAVE_STDLIB_H
-
-.if !defined(NOPIC)
-CPPFLAGS+=-DHAVE_DLOPEN
-.endif
-.PATH: ${SSHDIST}
-
-.if (${USE_PAM} != "no")
-CPPFLAGS+=-DUSE_PAM
-.else	# USE_PAM == no
-.if (${USE_SKEY} != "no")
-CPPFLAGS+=-DSKEY
-.endif
-.endif	# USE_PAM == no
-
-.if (${USE_KERBEROS} != "no")
-CPPFLAGS+=-DGSSAPI
-CPPFLAGS+=-DKRB5 -DHEIMDAL
-.endif
-
-.if (${USE_LDAP} != "no")
-CPPFLAGS+=-DWITH_LDAP_PUBKEY
-.endif
-
-CPPFLAGS+=-DX11BASE=\"/usr/X11R7\"
-
-CPPFLAGS+=-DSUPPORT_UTMP -DSUPPORT_UTMPX
-.if defined(__MINIX)
-CPPFLAGS+=-DWITH_SSH1 -DWITH_OPENSSL -D_OPENBSD_SOURCE
-CPPFLAGS+=-g -O2 -Wall -Wpointer-arith -Wuninitialized -Wsign-compare -Wformat-security -Wno-pointer-sign -Wno-unused-result -fno-strict-aliasing -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 -ftrapv -fno-builtin-memset -Wno-error
-CPPFLAGS+=-I. -I$(srcdir)  $(PATHS) -DHAVE_CONFIG_H
-.else
-CPPFLAGS+=-DWITH_SSH1 -DWITH_OPENSSL -DENABLE_PKCS11 -D_OPENBSD_SOURCE
-CPPFLAGS+=-DHAVE_LOGIN_CAP
-CPPFLAGS+=-DLIBWRAP
-.endif

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/bin/Makefile

@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
-#	$NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.3 2010/11/21 19:19:21 adam Exp $
-
-.include <bsd.own.mk>
-
-SSHDIST?= ${NETBSDSRCDIR}/crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist
-
-SUBDIR=	ssh sshd ssh-add ssh-keygen ssh-agent scp sftp-server \
-	ssh-keysign ssh-keyscan sftp ssh-pkcs11-helper
-
-.PATH: ${SSHDIST}
-.MADE: moduli
-CONFIGFILES=	ssh_config sshd_config moduli
-FILESDIR=	/etc/ssh
-FILESDIR_moduli=/etc
-
-.include <bsd.files.mk>
-.include <bsd.subdir.mk>

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/bin/Makefile.inc

@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
-#	$NetBSD: Makefile.inc,v 1.3 2014/10/19 16:30:58 christos Exp $
-
-CPPFLAGS+=-DWITH_OPENSSL
-LDADD+=	-lssh -lcrypto -lcrypt -lz
-DPADD+=	${LIBSSH} ${LIBCRYPTO} ${LIBCRYPT} ${LIBZ}
-
-.include "${.PARSEDIR}/../Makefile.inc"

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/bin/scp/Makefile

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-#	$NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.1 2009/06/07 22:38:45 christos Exp $
-
-BINDIR=/usr/bin
-
-PROG=	scp
-SRCS=	scp.c
-
-.include <bsd.prog.mk>

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/bin/sftp-server/Makefile

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-#	$NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.1 2009/06/07 22:38:45 christos Exp $
-
-BINDIR=	/usr/libexec
-
-PROG=	sftp-server
-SRCS=	sftp-server.c sftp-common.c sftp-server-main.c
-MAN=	sftp-server.8
-
-.include <bsd.prog.mk>

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/bin/sftp/Makefile

@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-#	$NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.5 2012/08/10 12:20:11 joerg Exp $
-
-BINDIR=	/usr/bin
-
-PROG=	sftp
-SRCS=	sftp.c sftp-client.c sftp-common.c sftp-glob.c
-MAN=	sftp.1
-
-LDADD+=	-ledit -lterminfo
-DPADD+=	${LIBEDIT} ${LIBTERMINFO}
-
-COPTS.sftp.c+=		-Wno-pointer-sign
-COPTS.sftp-client.c+=	-Wno-pointer-sign
-
-.include <bsd.prog.mk>

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/bin/ssh-add/Makefile

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-#	$NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.1 2009/06/07 22:38:45 christos Exp $
-
-BINDIR=/usr/bin
-
-PROG=	ssh-add
-SRCS=	ssh-add.c
-
-.include <bsd.prog.mk>

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/bin/ssh-agent/Makefile

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-#	$NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.2 2010/11/21 19:19:22 adam Exp $
-
-BINDIR=/usr/bin
-
-PROG=	ssh-agent
-SRCS=	ssh-agent.c ssh-pkcs11-client.c
-
-.include <bsd.prog.mk>

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/bin/ssh-keygen/Makefile

@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-#	$NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.4 2012/08/10 12:20:12 joerg Exp $
-
-BINDIR=	/usr/bin
-
-PROG=	ssh-keygen
-SRCS=	ssh-keygen.c moduli.c
-
-COPTS.ssh-keygen.c=	-Wno-pointer-sign
-
-.include <bsd.prog.mk>

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/bin/ssh-keyscan/Makefile

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-#	$NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.2 2015/04/03 23:58:19 christos Exp $
-
-BINDIR=	/usr/bin
-
-PROG=	ssh-keyscan
-SRCS=	ssh-keyscan.c ssh_api.c kexdhs.c kexgexs.c kexecdhs.c
-MAN=	ssh-keyscan.1
-
-.include <bsd.prog.mk>

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/bin/ssh-keysign/Makefile

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-#	$NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.1 2009/06/07 22:38:46 christos Exp $
-
-BINOWN=	root
-BINMODE=4555
-BINDIR=	/usr/libexec
-
-PROG=	ssh-keysign
-SRCS=	ssh-keysign.c readconf.c
-MAN=	ssh-keysign.8
-
-.include <bsd.prog.mk>

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/bin/ssh-pkcs11-helper/Makefile

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-#	$NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.1 2010/11/21 19:19:22 adam Exp $
-
-BINOWN= root
-BINMODE=555
-BINDIR= /usr/libexec
-
-PROG=	ssh-pkcs11-helper
-SRCS=	ssh-pkcs11-helper.c
-MAN=	ssh-pkcs11-helper.8
-
-.include <bsd.prog.mk>

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/bin/ssh/Makefile

@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-#	$NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.8 2012/08/10 12:20:12 joerg Exp $
-
-.include <bsd.own.mk>
-
-BINDIR = /usr/bin
-
-PROG=	ssh
-SRCS=	ssh.c readconf.c clientloop.c sshtty.c \
-	sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c mux.c \
-	roaming_common.c roaming_client.c
-
-COPTS.sshconnect1.c=	-fno-strict-aliasing
-COPTS.mux.c=		-Wno-pointer-sign
-COPTS.sshconnect2.c=	-Wno-pointer-sign
-
-LINKS=	${BINDIR}/ssh ${BINDIR}/slogin
-MAN=	ssh.1 ssh_config.5
-MLINKS=	ssh.1 slogin.1
-
-.if (${USE_KERBEROS} != "no")
-# this is not entirely true, libgssapi might be independent of krb5
-SRCS +=	gss-genr.c
-LDADD+=	-lgssapi -lheimntlm
-DPADD+=	${LIBGSSAPI} ${LIBHEIMNTLM}
-
-LDADD+=	-lkrb5 -lhx509 -lheimbase -lwind
-DPADD+=	${LIBKRB5} ${LIBHX509} ${LIBHEIMBASE} ${LIBWIND}
-
-LDADD+=	-lkafs -lasn1 -lcrypt
-DPADD+=	${LIBKAFS} ${LIBASN1} ${LIBCRYPT}
-
-LDADD+=	-lcom_err -lroken -lutil
-DPADD+=	${LIBCOM_ERR} ${LIBROKEN} ${LIBUTIL}
-.endif
-
-.include <bsd.prog.mk>

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/bin/sshd/Makefile

@@ -1,100 +0,0 @@
-#	$NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.12 2015/01/26 03:57:17 christos Exp $
-
-.include <bsd.own.mk>
-
-PROG=	sshd
-MAN=	sshd.8 sshd_config.5 moduli.5
-
-BINDIR=	/usr/sbin
-
-
-.if defined(__MINIX)
-SRCS=   sshd.c auth-rhosts.c auth-passwd.c auth-rsa.c auth-rh-rsa.c \
-        audit.c audit-bsm.c audit-linux.c platform.c \
-        sshpty.c sshlogin.c servconf.c serverloop.c \
-        auth.c auth1.c auth2.c auth-options.c session.c \
-        auth-chall.c auth2-chall.c groupaccess.c \
-        auth-skey.c auth-bsdauth.c auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c \
-        auth2-none.c auth2-passwd.c auth2-pubkey.c \
-        monitor_mm.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c auth-krb5.c \
-        auth2-gss.c gss-serv.c gss-serv-krb5.c \
-        loginrec.c auth-pam.c auth-shadow.c auth-sia.c md5crypt.c \
-        sftp-server.c sftp-common.c \
-        roaming_common.c roaming_serv.c \
-        sandbox-null.c sandbox-rlimit.c sandbox-systrace.c sandbox-darwin.c \
-        sandbox-seccomp-filter.c sandbox-capsicum.c
-.else
-SRCS=	sshd.c auth-rhosts.c auth-passwd.c auth-rsa.c auth-rh-rsa.c \
-	sshpty.c sshlogin.c servconf.c serverloop.c \
-	auth.c auth1.c auth2.c auth-options.c session.c \
-	auth-chall.c auth2-chall.c groupaccess.c \
-	auth-skey.c auth-bsdauth.c auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c \
-	auth2-none.c auth2-passwd.c auth2-pubkey.c \
-	monitor_mm.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c \
-	kexdhs.c kexgexs.c kexecdhs.c sftp-server.c sftp-common.c \
-        roaming_common.c roaming_serv.c sandbox-rlimit.c pfilter.c
-.endif
-
-COPTS.auth-options.c=	-Wno-pointer-sign
-COPTS.ldapauth.c=	-Wno-format-nonliteral	# XXX: should fix
-
-.if (${USE_PAM} != "no")
-SRCS+=	auth-pam.c
-LDADD+=	-lpam ${PAM_STATIC_LDADD}
-DPADD+=	${LIBPAM} ${PAM_STATIC_DPADD}
-
-.if ${USE_YP} != "no"
-LDADD+= -lrpcsvc
-DPADD+= ${LIBRPCSVC}
-.endif
-
-.else	# USE_PAM == no
-
-.if (${USE_SKEY} != "no")
-LDADD+=	-lskey
-DPADD+=	${LIBSKEY}
-.endif
-
-.endif	# USE_PAM == no
-
-.if (${USE_KERBEROS} != "no")
-SRCS+=	gss-genr.c auth2-gss.c gss-serv.c gss-serv-krb5.c
-LDADD+=	-lgssapi -lheimntlm
-DPADD+=	${LIBGSSAPI} ${LIBHEIMNTLM}
-
-LDADD+=	-lkafs
-DPADD+= ${LIBKAFS}
-
-SRCS+=	auth-krb5.c auth2-krb5.c
-LDADD+=	-lkrb5 -lasn1
-DPADD+=	${LIBKRB5} ${LIBASN1}
-
-LDADD+=	-lcom_err -lroken
-DPADD+=	${LIBCOM_ERR} ${LIBROKEN}
-.endif
-
-.if (${USE_LDAP} != "no")
-SRCS+=	ldapauth.c
-LDADD+=	-lldap -lssl -llber
-DPADD+=	${LIBLDAP} ${LIBSSL} ${LIBLBER}
-.endif
-
-.include <bsd.prog.mk>
-
-LDADD+=	-lcrypt -lutil
-DPADD+=	${LIBCRYPT} ${LIBUTIL}
-
-.if defined(__MINIX)
-LDADD+=
-DPADD+=
-.else
-LDADD+=	-lwrap
-DPADD+=	${LIBWRAP}
-
-.ifdef CRUNCHEDPROG
-CPPFLAGS+=-DSMALL
-.else
-LDADD+=	-lblacklist
-DPADD+=	${LIBBLACKLIST}
-.endif
-.endif

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/CREDITS

@@ -1,105 +0,0 @@
-Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> - Creator of SSH
-
-Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
-Theo de Raadt, and Dug Song - Creators of OpenSSH
-
-Ahsan Rashid <arms@sco.com> - UnixWare long passwords
-Alain St-Denis <Alain.St-Denis@ec.gc.ca> - Irix fix
-Alexandre Oliva <oliva@lsd.ic.unicamp.br> - AIX fixes
-Andre Lucas <andre@ae-35.com> - new login code, many fixes
-Andreas Steinmetz <ast@domdv.de> - Shadow password expiry support
-Andrew McGill <andrewm@datrix.co.za> - SCO fixes
-Andrew Morgan <morgan@transmeta.com> - PAM bugfixes
-Andrew Stribblehill <a.d.stribblehill@durham.ac.uk> - Bugfixes
-Andy Sloane <andy@guildsoftware.com> - bugfixes
-Aran Cox <acox@cv.telegroup.com> - SCO bugfixes
-Arkadiusz Miskiewicz <misiek@pld.org.pl> - IPv6 compat fixes
-Ben Lindstrom <mouring@eviladmin.org> - NeXT support
-Ben Taylor <bent@clark.net> - Solaris debugging and fixes
-Bratislav ILICH <bilic@zepter.ru> - Configure fix
-Charles Levert <charles@comm.polymtl.ca> - SunOS 4 & bug fixes
-Chip Salzenberg <chip@valinux.com> - Assorted patches
-Chris Adams <cmadams@hiwaay.net> - OSF SIA support
-Chris Saia <csaia@wtower.com> - SuSE packaging
-Chris, the Young One <cky@pobox.com> - Password auth fixes
-Christos Zoulas <christos@zoulas.com> - Autoconf fixes
-Chun-Chung Chen <cjj@u.washington.edu> - RPM fixes
-Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com> - Cygwin support
-Chad Mynhier <mynhier@interstel.net> - Solaris Process Contract support
-Dan Brosemer <odin@linuxfreak.com> - Autoconf support, build fixes
-Darren Hall <dhall@virage.org> - AIX patches
-Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> - AIX BFF package scripts
-David Agraz <dagraz@jahoopa.com> - Build fixes
-David Del Piero <David.DelPiero@qed.qld.gov.au> - bug fixes
-David Hesprich <darkgrue@gue-tech.org> - Configure fixes
-David Rankin <drankin@bohemians.lexington.ky.us> - libwrap, AIX, NetBSD fixes
-Dag-Erling Smørgrav <des at freebsd.org> - Challenge-Response PAM code.
-Dhiraj Gulati <dgulati@sco.com> - UnixWare long passwords
-Ed Eden <ede370@stl.rural.usda.gov> - configure fixes
-Garrick James <garrick@james.net> - configure fixes
-Gary E. Miller <gem@rellim.com> - SCO support
-Ged Lodder <lodder@yacc.com.au> - HPUX fixes and enhancements
-Gert Doering <gd@hilb1.medat.de> - bug and portability fixes
-HARUYAMA Seigo <haruyama@unixuser.org> - Translations & doc fixes
-Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@ecei.tohoku.ac.jp> - IPv6 and bug fixes
-Hiroshi Takekawa <takekawa@sr3.t.u-tokyo.ac.jp> - Configure fixes
-Holger Trapp <Holger.Trapp@Informatik.TU-Chemnitz.DE> - KRB4/AFS config patch
-IWAMURO Motonori <iwa@mmp.fujitsu.co.jp> - bugfixes
-Jani Hakala <jahakala@cc.jyu.fi> - Patches
-Jarno Huuskonen <jhuuskon@hytti.uku.fi> - Bugfixes
-Jim Knoble <jmknoble@pobox.com> - Many patches
-Jonchen (email unknown) - the original author of PAM support of SSH
-Juergen Keil <jk@tools.de> - scp bugfixing
-KAMAHARA Junzo <kamahara@cc.kshosen.ac.jp> - Configure fixes
-Kees Cook <cook@cpoint.net> - scp fixes
-Kenji Miyake <kenji@miyake.org> - Configure fixes
-Kevin Cawlfield <cawlfiel@us.ibm.com> - AIX fixes.
-Kevin O'Connor <kevin_oconnor@standardandpoors.com> - RSAless operation
-Kevin Steves <stevesk@pobox.com> - HP support, bugfixes, improvements
-Kiyokazu SUTO <suto@ks-and-ks.ne.jp> - Bugfixes
-Larry Jones <larry.jones@sdrc.com> - Bugfixes
-Lutz Jaenicke <Lutz.Jaenicke@aet.TU-Cottbus.DE> - Bugfixes
-Marc G. Fournier <marc.fournier@acadiau.ca> - Solaris patches
-Mark D. Baushke <mdb@juniper.net> - bug fixes
-Martin Johansson <fatbob@acc.umu.se> - Linux fixes
-Mark D. Roth <roth+openssh@feep.net> - Features, bug fixes
-Mark Miller <markm@swoon.net> - Bugfixes
-Matt Richards <v2matt@btv.ibm.com> - AIX patches
-Michael Steffens <michael_steffens at hp.com> - HP-UX fixes
-Michael Stone <mstone@cs.loyola.edu> - Irix enhancements
-Nakaji Hiroyuki <nakaji@tutrp.tut.ac.jp> - Sony News-OS patch
-Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin.dahyabhai@pobox.com> - PAM environment patch
-Nate Itkin <nitkin@europa.com> - SunOS 4.1.x fixes
-Niels Kristian Bech Jensen <nkbj@image.dk> - Assorted patches
-Pavel Kankovsky <peak@argo.troja.mff.cuni.cz> - Security fixes
-Pavel Troller <patrol@omni.sinus.cz> - Bugfixes
-Pekka Savola <pekkas@netcore.fi> - Bugfixes
-Peter Kocks <peter.kocks@baygate.com> - Makefile fixes
-Peter Stuge <stuge@cdy.org> - mdoc2man.awk script
-Phil Hands <phil@hands.com> - Debian scripts, assorted patches
-Phil Karn <karn@ka9q.ampr.org> - Autoconf fixes
-Philippe WILLEM <Philippe.WILLEM@urssaf.fr> - Bugfixes
-Phill Camp <P.S.S.Camp@ukc.ac.uk> - login code fix
-Rip Loomis <loomisg@cist.saic.com> - Solaris package support, fixes
-Robert Dahlem <Robert.Dahlem at siemens.com> - Reliant Unix fixes
-Roumen Petrov <openssh@roumenpetrov.info> - Compile & configure fixes
-SAKAI Kiyotaka <ksakai@kso.netwk.ntt-at.co.jp> - Multiple bugfixes
-Simon Wilkinson <sxw@dcs.ed.ac.uk> - PAM fixes, Compat with MIT KrbV
-Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com> - many patches and technical assistance
-Svante Signell <svante.signell@telia.com> - Bugfixes
-Thomas Neumann <tom@smart.ruhr.de> - Shadow passwords
-Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net> - Portability & SCO fixes
-Tobias Oetiker <oetiker@ee.ethz.ch> - Bugfixes
-Tom Bertelson's <tbert@abac.com> - AIX auth fixes
-Tor-Ake Fransson <torake@hotmail.com> - AIX support
-Tudor Bosman <tudorb@jm.nu> - MD5 password support
-Udo Schweigert <ust@cert.siemens.de> - ReliantUNIX support
-Wendy Palm <wendyp at cray.com> - Cray support.
-Zack Weinberg <zack@wolery.cumb.org> - GNOME askpass enhancement
-
-Apologies to anyone I have missed.
-
-Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-
-$Id: CREDITS,v 1.81 2006/08/30 17:24:41 djm Exp $
-

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/INSTALL

@@ -1,262 +0,0 @@
-1. Prerequisites
-----------------
-
-You will need working installations of Zlib and libcrypto (LibreSSL /
-OpenSSL)
-
-Zlib 1.1.4 or 1.2.1.2 or greater (ealier 1.2.x versions have problems):
-http://www.gzip.org/zlib/
-
-libcrypto (LibreSSL or OpenSSL >= 0.9.8f)
-LibreSSL http://www.libressl.org/ ; or
-OpenSSL http://www.openssl.org/
-
-LibreSSL/OpenSSL should be compiled as a position-independent library
-(i.e. with -fPIC) otherwise OpenSSH will not be able to link with it.
-If you must use a non-position-independent libcrypto, then you may need
-to configure OpenSSH --without-pie.
-
-The remaining items are optional.
-
-NB. If you operating system supports /dev/random, you should configure
-libcrypto (LibreSSL/OpenSSL) to use it. OpenSSH relies on libcrypto's
-direct support of /dev/random, or failing that, either prngd or egd
-
-PRNGD:
-
-If your system lacks kernel-based random collection, the use of Lutz
-Jaenicke's PRNGd is recommended.
-
-http://prngd.sourceforge.net/
-
-EGD:
-
-If the kernel lacks /dev/random the Entropy Gathering Daemon (EGD) is
-supported only if libcrypto supports it.
-
-http://egd.sourceforge.net/
-
-PAM:
-
-OpenSSH can utilise Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM) if your
-system supports it. PAM is standard most Linux distributions, Solaris,
-HP-UX 11, AIX >= 5.2, FreeBSD and NetBSD.
-
-Information about the various PAM implementations are available:
-
-Solaris PAM:	http://www.sun.com/software/solaris/pam/
-Linux PAM:	http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/pam/
-OpenPAM:	http://www.openpam.org/
-
-If you wish to build the GNOME passphrase requester, you will need the GNOME
-libraries and headers.
-
-GNOME:
-http://www.gnome.org/
-
-Alternatively, Jim Knoble <jmknoble@pobox.com> has written an excellent X11
-passphrase requester. This is maintained separately at:
-
-http://www.jmknoble.net/software/x11-ssh-askpass/
-
-S/Key Libraries:
-
-If you wish to use --with-skey then you will need the library below
-installed.  No other S/Key library is currently known to be supported.
-
-http://www.sparc.spb.su/solaris/skey/
-
-LibEdit:
-
-sftp supports command-line editing via NetBSD's libedit.  If your platform
-has it available natively you can use that, alternatively you might try
-these multi-platform ports:
-
-http://www.thrysoee.dk/editline/
-http://sourceforge.net/projects/libedit/
-
-LDNS:
-
-LDNS is a DNS BSD-licensed resolver library which supports DNSSEC.
-
-http://nlnetlabs.nl/projects/ldns/
-
-Autoconf:
-
-If you modify configure.ac or configure doesn't exist (eg if you checked
-the code out of CVS yourself) then you will need autoconf-2.68 to rebuild
-the automatically generated files by running "autoreconf".  Earlier
-versions may also work but this is not guaranteed.
-
-http://www.gnu.org/software/autoconf/
-
-Basic Security Module (BSM):
-
-Native BSM support is know to exist in Solaris from at least 2.5.1,
-FreeBSD 6.1 and OS X.  Alternatively, you may use the OpenBSM
-implementation (http://www.openbsm.org).
-
-
-2. Building / Installation
---------------------------
-
-To install OpenSSH with default options:
-
-./configure
-make
-make install
-
-This will install the OpenSSH binaries in /usr/local/bin, configuration files
-in /usr/local/etc, the server in /usr/local/sbin, etc. To specify a different
-installation prefix, use the --prefix option to configure:
-
-./configure --prefix=/opt
-make
-make install
-
-Will install OpenSSH in /opt/{bin,etc,lib,sbin}. You can also override
-specific paths, for example:
-
-./configure --prefix=/opt --sysconfdir=/etc/ssh
-make
-make install
-
-This will install the binaries in /opt/{bin,lib,sbin}, but will place the
-configuration files in /etc/ssh.
-
-If you are using Privilege Separation (which is enabled by default)
-then you will also need to create the user, group and directory used by
-sshd for privilege separation.  See README.privsep for details.
-
-If you are using PAM, you may need to manually install a PAM control
-file as "/etc/pam.d/sshd" (or wherever your system prefers to keep
-them).  Note that the service name used to start PAM is __progname,
-which is the basename of the path of your sshd (e.g., the service name
-for /usr/sbin/osshd will be osshd).  If you have renamed your sshd
-executable, your PAM configuration may need to be modified.
-
-A generic PAM configuration is included as "contrib/sshd.pam.generic",
-you may need to edit it before using it on your system. If you are
-using a recent version of Red Hat Linux, the config file in
-contrib/redhat/sshd.pam should be more useful.  Failure to install a
-valid PAM file may result in an inability to use password
-authentication.  On HP-UX 11 and Solaris, the standard /etc/pam.conf
-configuration will work with sshd (sshd will match the other service
-name).
-
-There are a few other options to the configure script:
-
---with-audit=[module] enable additional auditing via the specified module.
-Currently, drivers for "debug" (additional info via syslog) and "bsm"
-(Sun's Basic Security Module) are supported.
-
---with-pam enables PAM support. If PAM support is compiled in, it must
-also be enabled in sshd_config (refer to the UsePAM directive).
-
---with-prngd-socket=/some/file allows you to enable EGD or PRNGD
-support and to specify a PRNGd socket. Use this if your Unix lacks
-/dev/random and you don't want to use OpenSSH's builtin entropy
-collection support.
-
---with-prngd-port=portnum allows you to enable EGD or PRNGD support
-and to specify a EGD localhost TCP port. Use this if your Unix lacks
-/dev/random and you don't want to use OpenSSH's builtin entropy
-collection support.
-
---with-lastlog=FILE will specify the location of the lastlog file.
-./configure searches a few locations for lastlog, but may not find
-it if lastlog is installed in a different place.
-
---without-lastlog will disable lastlog support entirely.
-
---with-osfsia, --without-osfsia will enable or disable OSF1's Security
-Integration Architecture.  The default for OSF1 machines is enable.
-
---with-skey=PATH will enable S/Key one time password support. You will
-need the S/Key libraries and header files installed for this to work.
-
---with-md5-passwords will enable the use of MD5 passwords. Enable this
-if your operating system uses MD5 passwords and the system crypt() does
-not support them directly (see the crypt(3/3c) man page). If enabled, the
-resulting binary will support both MD5 and traditional crypt passwords.
-
---with-utmpx enables utmpx support. utmpx support is automatic for
-some platforms.
-
---without-shadow disables shadow password support.
-
---with-ipaddr-display forces the use of a numeric IP address in the
-$DISPLAY environment variable. Some broken systems need this.
-
---with-default-path=PATH allows you to specify a default $PATH for sessions
-started by sshd. This replaces the standard path entirely.
-
---with-pid-dir=PATH specifies the directory in which the sshd.pid file is
-created.
-
---with-xauth=PATH specifies the location of the xauth binary
-
---with-ssl-dir=DIR allows you to specify where your Libre/OpenSSL
-libraries
-are installed.
-
---with-ssl-engine enables Libre/OpenSSL's (hardware) ENGINE support
-
---with-4in6 Check for IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses and convert them to
-real (AF_INET) IPv4 addresses. Works around some quirks on Linux.
-
-If you need to pass special options to the compiler or linker, you
-can specify these as environment variables before running ./configure.
-For example:
-
-CFLAGS="-O -m486" LDFLAGS="-s" LIBS="-lrubbish" LD="/usr/foo/ld" ./configure
-
-3. Configuration
-----------------
-
-The runtime configuration files are installed by in ${prefix}/etc or
-whatever you specified as your --sysconfdir (/usr/local/etc by default).
-
-The default configuration should be instantly usable, though you should
-review it to ensure that it matches your security requirements.
-
-To generate a host key, run "make host-key". Alternately you can do so
-manually using the following commands:
-
-    ssh-keygen -t rsa1 -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key -N ""
-    ssh-keygen -t rsa -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key -N ""
-    ssh-keygen -t dsa -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key -N ""
-
-Replacing /etc/ssh with the correct path to the configuration directory.
-(${prefix}/etc or whatever you specified with --sysconfdir during
-configuration)
-
-If you have configured OpenSSH with EGD support, ensure that EGD is
-running and has collected some Entropy.
-
-For more information on configuration, please refer to the manual pages
-for sshd, ssh and ssh-agent.
-
-4. (Optional) Send survey
--------------------------
-
-$ make survey
-[check the contents of the file "survey" to ensure there's no information
-that you consider sensitive]
-$ make send-survey
-
-This will send configuration information for the currently configured
-host to a survey address.  This will help determine which configurations
-are actually in use, and what valid combinations of configure options
-exist.  The raw data is available only to the OpenSSH developers, however
-summary data may be published.
-
-5. Problems?
-------------
-
-If you experience problems compiling, installing or running OpenSSH.
-Please refer to the "reporting bugs" section of the webpage at
-http://www.openssh.com/
-
-
-$Id: INSTALL,v 1.91 2014/09/09 02:23:11 dtucker Exp $

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/LICENCE

@@ -1,340 +0,0 @@
-This file is part of the OpenSSH software.
-
-The licences which components of this software fall under are as
-follows.  First, we will summarize and say that all components
-are under a BSD licence, or a licence more free than that.
-
-OpenSSH contains no GPL code.
-
-1)
-     * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
-     *                    All rights reserved
-     *
-     * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
-     * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
-     * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
-     * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
-     * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
-
-    [Tatu continues]
-     *  However, I am not implying to give any licenses to any patents or
-     * copyrights held by third parties, and the software includes parts that
-     * are not under my direct control.  As far as I know, all included
-     * source code is used in accordance with the relevant license agreements
-     * and can be used freely for any purpose (the GNU license being the most
-     * restrictive); see below for details.
-
-    [However, none of that term is relevant at this point in time.  All of
-    these restrictively licenced software components which he talks about
-    have been removed from OpenSSH, i.e.,
-
-     - RSA is no longer included, found in the OpenSSL library
-     - IDEA is no longer included, its use is deprecated
-     - DES is now external, in the OpenSSL library
-     - GMP is no longer used, and instead we call BN code from OpenSSL
-     - Zlib is now external, in a library
-     - The make-ssh-known-hosts script is no longer included
-     - TSS has been removed
-     - MD5 is now external, in the OpenSSL library
-     - RC4 support has been replaced with ARC4 support from OpenSSL
-     - Blowfish is now external, in the OpenSSL library
-
-    [The licence continues]
-
-    Note that any information and cryptographic algorithms used in this
-    software are publicly available on the Internet and at any major
-    bookstore, scientific library, and patent office worldwide.  More
-    information can be found e.g. at "http://www.cs.hut.fi/crypto".
-
-    The legal status of this program is some combination of all these
-    permissions and restrictions.  Use only at your own responsibility.
-    You will be responsible for any legal consequences yourself; I am not
-    making any claims whether possessing or using this is legal or not in
-    your country, and I am not taking any responsibility on your behalf.
-
-
-			    NO WARRANTY
-
-    BECAUSE THE PROGRAM IS LICENSED FREE OF CHARGE, THERE IS NO WARRANTY
-    FOR THE PROGRAM, TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE LAW.  EXCEPT WHEN
-    OTHERWISE STATED IN WRITING THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND/OR OTHER PARTIES
-    PROVIDE THE PROGRAM "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED
-    OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
-    MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  THE ENTIRE RISK AS
-    TO THE QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE OF THE PROGRAM IS WITH YOU.  SHOULD THE
-    PROGRAM PROVE DEFECTIVE, YOU ASSUME THE COST OF ALL NECESSARY SERVICING,
-    REPAIR OR CORRECTION.
-
-    IN NO EVENT UNLESS REQUIRED BY APPLICABLE LAW OR AGREED TO IN WRITING
-    WILL ANY COPYRIGHT HOLDER, OR ANY OTHER PARTY WHO MAY MODIFY AND/OR
-    REDISTRIBUTE THE PROGRAM AS PERMITTED ABOVE, BE LIABLE TO YOU FOR DAMAGES,
-    INCLUDING ANY GENERAL, SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES ARISING
-    OUT OF THE USE OR INABILITY TO USE THE PROGRAM (INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED
-    TO LOSS OF DATA OR DATA BEING RENDERED INACCURATE OR LOSSES SUSTAINED BY
-    YOU OR THIRD PARTIES OR A FAILURE OF THE PROGRAM TO OPERATE WITH ANY OTHER
-    PROGRAMS), EVEN IF SUCH HOLDER OR OTHER PARTY HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE
-    POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.
-
-2)
-    The 32-bit CRC compensation attack detector in deattack.c was
-    contributed by CORE SDI S.A. under a BSD-style license.
-
-     * Cryptographic attack detector for ssh - source code
-     *
-     * Copyright (c) 1998 CORE SDI S.A., Buenos Aires, Argentina.
-     *
-     * All rights reserved. Redistribution and use in source and binary
-     * forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that
-     * this copyright notice is retained.
-     *
-     * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
-     * WARRANTIES ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL CORE SDI S.A. BE
-     * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY OR
-     * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES RESULTING FROM THE USE OR MISUSE OF THIS
-     * SOFTWARE.
-     *
-     * Ariel Futoransky <futo@core-sdi.com>
-     * <http://www.core-sdi.com>
-
-3)
-    ssh-keyscan was contributed by David Mazieres under a BSD-style
-    license.
-
-     * Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres <dm@lcs.mit.edu>.
-     *
-     * Modification and redistribution in source and binary forms is
-     * permitted provided that due credit is given to the author and the
-     * OpenBSD project by leaving this copyright notice intact.
-
-4)
-    The Rijndael implementation by Vincent Rijmen, Antoon Bosselaers
-    and Paulo Barreto is in the public domain and distributed
-    with the following license:
-
-     * @version 3.0 (December 2000)
-     *
-     * Optimised ANSI C code for the Rijndael cipher (now AES)
-     *
-     * @author Vincent Rijmen <vincent.rijmen@esat.kuleuven.ac.be>
-     * @author Antoon Bosselaers <antoon.bosselaers@esat.kuleuven.ac.be>
-     * @author Paulo Barreto <paulo.barreto@terra.com.br>
-     *
-     * This code is hereby placed in the public domain.
-     *
-     * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS ''AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS
-     * OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED
-     * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
-     * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
-     * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
-     * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
-     * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
-     * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY,
-     * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE
-     * OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE,
-     * EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-
-5)
-    One component of the ssh source code is under a 3-clause BSD license,
-    held by the University of California, since we pulled these parts from
-    original Berkeley code.
-
-     * Copyright (c) 1983, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1995
-     *      The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
-     *
-     * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-     * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-     * are met:
-     * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-     *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-     * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-     *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-     *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-     * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
-     *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
-     *    without specific prior written permission.
-     *
-     * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
-     * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
-     * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
-     * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
-     * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
-     * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
-     * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
-     * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
-     * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
-     * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
-     * SUCH DAMAGE.
-
-6)
-    Remaining components of the software are provided under a standard
-    2-term BSD licence with the following names as copyright holders:
-
-	Markus Friedl
-	Theo de Raadt
-	Niels Provos
-	Dug Song
-	Aaron Campbell
-	Damien Miller
-	Kevin Steves
-	Daniel Kouril
-	Wesley Griffin
-	Per Allansson
-	Nils Nordman
-	Simon Wilkinson
-
-    Portable OpenSSH additionally includes code from the following copyright
-    holders, also under the 2-term BSD license:
-
-	Ben Lindstrom
-	Tim Rice
-	Andre Lucas
-	Chris Adams
-	Corinna Vinschen
-	Cray Inc.
-	Denis Parker
-	Gert Doering
-	Jakob Schlyter
-	Jason Downs
-	Juha Yrjölä
-	Michael Stone
-	Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
-	Solar Designer
-	Todd C. Miller
-	Wayne Schroeder
-	William Jones
-	Darren Tucker
-	Sun Microsystems
-	The SCO Group
-	Daniel Walsh
-	Red Hat, Inc
-	Simon Vallet / Genoscope
-
-     * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-     * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-     * are met:
-     * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-     *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-     * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-     *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-     *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-     *
-     * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
-     * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
-     * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
-     * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
-     * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-     * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
-     * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
-     * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
-     * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
-     * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-
-8) Portable OpenSSH contains the following additional licenses:
-
-    a) md5crypt.c, md5crypt.h
-
-	 * "THE BEER-WARE LICENSE" (Revision 42):
-	 * <phk@login.dknet.dk> wrote this file.  As long as you retain this
-	 * notice you can do whatever you want with this stuff. If we meet
-	 * some day, and you think this stuff is worth it, you can buy me a
-	 * beer in return.   Poul-Henning Kamp
-
-    b) snprintf replacement
-
-	* Copyright Patrick Powell 1995
-	* This code is based on code written by Patrick Powell
-	* (papowell@astart.com) It may be used for any purpose as long as this
-	* notice remains intact on all source code distributions
-
-    c) Compatibility code (openbsd-compat)
-
-       Apart from the previously mentioned licenses, various pieces of code
-       in the openbsd-compat/ subdirectory are licensed as follows:
-
-       Some code is licensed under a 3-term BSD license, to the following
-       copyright holders:
-
-	Todd C. Miller
-	Theo de Raadt
-	Damien Miller
-	Eric P. Allman
-	The Regents of the University of California
-	Constantin S. Svintsoff
-
-	* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-	* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-	* are met:
-	* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-	*    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-	* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-	*    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-	*    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-	* 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
-	*    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
-	*    without specific prior written permission.
-	*
-	* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
-	* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
-	* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
-	* ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
-	* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
-	* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
-	* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
-	* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
-	* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
-	* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
-	* SUCH DAMAGE.
-
-       Some code is licensed under an ISC-style license, to the following
-       copyright holders:
-
-	Internet Software Consortium.
-	Todd C. Miller
-	Reyk Floeter
-	Chad Mynhier
-
-	* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
-	* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
-	* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
-	*
-	* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND TODD C. MILLER DISCLAIMS ALL
-	* WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES
-	* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL TODD C. MILLER BE LIABLE
-	* FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
-	* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
-	* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
-	* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
-
-       Some code is licensed under a MIT-style license to the following
-       copyright holders:
-
-	Free Software Foundation, Inc.
-
-	* Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a  *
-	* copy of this software and associated documentation files (the            *
-	* "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including      *
-	* without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,      *
-	* distribute, distribute with modifications, sublicense, and/or sell       *
-	* copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is    *
-	* furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:                 *
-	*                                                                          *
-	* The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included  *
-	* in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.                   *
-	*                                                                          *
-	* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS  *
-	* OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF               *
-	* MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT.   *
-	* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE ABOVE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM,   *
-	* DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR    *
-	* OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR    *
-	* THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.                               *
-	*                                                                          *
-	* Except as contained in this notice, the name(s) of the above copyright   *
-	* holders shall not be used in advertising or otherwise to promote the     *
-	* sale, use or other dealings in this Software without prior written       *
-	* authorization.                                                           *
-	****************************************************************************/
-
-
-------
-$OpenBSD: LICENCE,v 1.19 2004/08/30 09:18:08 markus Exp $

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/OVERVIEW

@@ -1,168 +0,0 @@
-[Note: This file has not been updated for OpenSSH versions after
-OpenSSH-1.2 and should be considered OBSOLETE.  It has been left in
-the distribution because some of its information may still be useful
-to developers.]
-
-This document is intended for those who wish to read the ssh source
-code.  This tries to give an overview of the structure of the code.
-
-Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
-Updated 17 Nov 1995.
-Updated 19 Oct 1999 for OpenSSH-1.2
-Updated 20 May 2001 note obsolete for > OpenSSH-1.2
-
-The software consists of ssh (client), sshd (server), scp, sdist, and
-the auxiliary programs ssh-keygen, ssh-agent, ssh-add, and
-make-ssh-known-hosts.  The main program for each of these is in a .c
-file with the same name.
-
-There are some subsystems/abstractions that are used by a number of
-these programs.
-
-  Buffer manipulation routines
-
-    - These provide an arbitrary size buffer, where data can be appended.
-      Data can be consumed from either end.  The code is used heavily
-      throughout ssh.  The basic buffer manipulation functions are in
-      buffer.c (header buffer.h), and additional code to manipulate specific
-      data types is in bufaux.c.
-
-  Compression Library
-
-    - Ssh uses the GNU GZIP compression library (ZLIB).
-
-  Encryption/Decryption
-
-    - Ssh contains several encryption algorithms.  These are all
-      accessed through the cipher.h interface.  The interface code is
-      in cipher.c, and the implementations are in libc.
-
-  Multiple Precision Integer Library
-
-    - Uses the SSLeay BIGNUM sublibrary.
-
-  Random Numbers
-
-    - Uses arc4random() and such.
-
-  RSA key generation, encryption, decryption
-
-    - Ssh uses the RSA routines in libssl.
-
-  RSA key files
-
-    - RSA keys are stored in files with a special format.  The code to
-      read/write these files is in authfile.c.  The files are normally
-      encrypted with a passphrase.  The functions to read passphrases
-      are in readpass.c (the same code is used to read passwords).
-
-  Binary packet protocol
-
-    - The ssh binary packet protocol is implemented in packet.c.  The
-      code in packet.c does not concern itself with packet types or their
-      execution; it contains code to build packets, to receive them and
-      extract data from them, and the code to compress and/or encrypt
-      packets.  CRC code comes from crc32.c.
-
-    - The code in packet.c calls the buffer manipulation routines
-      (buffer.c, bufaux.c), compression routines (zlib), and the
-      encryption routines.
-
-  X11, TCP/IP, and Agent forwarding
-
-    - Code for various types of channel forwarding is in channels.c.
-      The file defines a generic framework for arbitrary communication
-      channels inside the secure channel, and uses this framework to
-      implement X11 forwarding, TCP/IP forwarding, and authentication
-      agent forwarding.
-      The new, Protocol 1.5, channel close implementation is in nchan.c
-
-  Authentication agent
-
-    - Code to communicate with the authentication agent is in authfd.c.
-
-  Authentication methods
-
-    - Code for various authentication methods resides in auth-*.c
-      (auth-passwd.c, auth-rh-rsa.c, auth-rhosts.c, auth-rsa.c).  This
-      code is linked into the server.  The routines also manipulate
-      known hosts files using code in hostfile.c.  Code in canohost.c
-      is used to retrieve the canonical host name of the remote host.
-      Code in match.c is used to match host names.
-
-    - In the client end, authentication code is in sshconnect.c.  It
-      reads Passwords/passphrases using code in readpass.c.  It reads
-      RSA key files with authfile.c.  It communicates the
-      authentication agent using authfd.c.
-
-  The ssh client
-
-    - The client main program is in ssh.c.  It first parses arguments
-      and reads configuration (readconf.c), then calls ssh_connect (in
-      sshconnect.c) to open a connection to the server (possibly via a
-      proxy), and performs authentication (ssh_login in sshconnect.c).
-      It then makes any pty, forwarding, etc. requests.  It may call
-      code in ttymodes.c to encode current tty modes.  Finally it
-      calls client_loop in clientloop.c.  This does the real work for
-      the session.
-
-    - The client is suid root.  It tries to temporarily give up this
-      rights while reading the configuration data.  The root
-      privileges are only used to make the connection (from a
-      privileged socket).  Any extra privileges are dropped before
-      calling ssh_login.
-
-  Pseudo-tty manipulation and tty modes
-
-    - Code to allocate and use a pseudo tty is in pty.c.  Code to
-      encode and set terminal modes is in ttymodes.c.
-
-  Logging in (updating utmp, lastlog, etc.)
-
-    - The code to do things that are done when a user logs in are in
-      login.c.  This includes things such as updating the utmp, wtmp,
-      and lastlog files.  Some of the code is in sshd.c.
-
-  Writing to the system log and terminal
-
-    - The programs use the functions fatal(), log(), debug(), error()
-      in many places to write messages to system log or user's
-      terminal.  The implementation that logs to system log is in
-      log-server.c; it is used in the server program.  The other
-      programs use an implementation that sends output to stderr; it
-      is in log-client.c.  The definitions are in ssh.h.
-
-  The sshd server (daemon)
-
-    - The sshd daemon starts by processing arguments and reading the
-      configuration file (servconf.c).  It then reads the host key,
-      starts listening for connections, and generates the server key.
-      The server key will be regenerated every hour by an alarm.
-
-    - When the server receives a connection, it forks, disables the
-      regeneration alarm, and starts communicating with the client.
-      They first perform identification string exchange, then
-      negotiate encryption, then perform authentication, preparatory
-      operations, and finally the server enters the normal session
-      mode by calling server_loop in serverloop.c.  This does the real
-      work, calling functions in other modules.
-
-    - The code for the server is in sshd.c.  It contains a lot of
-      stuff, including:
-	- server main program
-	- waiting for connections
-	- processing new connection
-	- authentication
-	- preparatory operations
-	- building up the execution environment for the user program
-	- starting the user program.
-
-  Auxiliary files
-
-    - There are several other files in the distribution that contain
-      various auxiliary routines:
-	ssh.h	     the main header file for ssh (various definitions)
-	uidswap.c    uid-swapping
-	xmalloc.c    "safe" malloc routines
-
-$OpenBSD: OVERVIEW,v 1.12 2015/07/08 19:01:15 markus Exp $

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL

@@ -1,455 +0,0 @@
-This documents OpenSSH's deviations and extensions to the published SSH
-protocol.
-
-Note that OpenSSH's sftp and sftp-server implement revision 3 of the SSH
-filexfer protocol described in:
-
-http://www.openssh.com/txt/draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-02.txt
-
-Newer versions of the draft will not be supported, though some features
-are individually implemented as extensions described below.
-
-The protocol used by OpenSSH's ssh-agent is described in the file
-PROTOCOL.agent
-
-1. Transport protocol changes
-
-1.1. transport: Protocol 2 MAC algorithm "umac-64@openssh.com"
-
-This is a new transport-layer MAC method using the UMAC algorithm
-(rfc4418). This method is identical to the "umac-64" method documented
-in:
-
-http://www.openssh.com/txt/draft-miller-secsh-umac-01.txt
-
-1.2. transport: Protocol 2 compression algorithm "zlib@openssh.com"
-
-This transport-layer compression method uses the zlib compression
-algorithm (identical to the "zlib" method in rfc4253), but delays the
-start of compression until after authentication has completed. This
-avoids exposing compression code to attacks from unauthenticated users.
-
-The method is documented in:
-
-http://www.openssh.com/txt/draft-miller-secsh-compression-delayed-00.txt
-
-1.3. transport: New public key algorithms "ssh-rsa-cert-v00@openssh.com",
-     "ssh-dsa-cert-v00@openssh.com",
-     "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com",
-     "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com" and
-     "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com"
-
-OpenSSH introduces new public key algorithms to support certificate
-authentication for users and host keys. These methods are documented
-in the file PROTOCOL.certkeys
-
-1.4. transport: Elliptic Curve cryptography
-
-OpenSSH supports ECC key exchange and public key authentication as
-specified in RFC5656. Only the ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384
-and ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 curves over GF(p) are supported. Elliptic
-curve points encoded using point compression are NOT accepted or
-generated.
-
-1.5 transport: Protocol 2 Encrypt-then-MAC MAC algorithms
-
-OpenSSH supports MAC algorithms, whose names contain "-etm", that
-perform the calculations in a different order to that defined in RFC
-4253. These variants use the so-called "encrypt then MAC" ordering,
-calculating the MAC over the packet ciphertext rather than the
-plaintext. This ordering closes a security flaw in the SSH transport
-protocol, where decryption of unauthenticated ciphertext provided a
-"decryption oracle" that could, in conjunction with cipher flaws, reveal
-session plaintext.
-
-Specifically, the "-etm" MAC algorithms modify the transport protocol
-to calculate the MAC over the packet ciphertext and to send the packet
-length unencrypted. This is necessary for the transport to obtain the
-length of the packet and location of the MAC tag so that it may be
-verified without decrypting unauthenticated data.
-
-As such, the MAC covers:
-
-      mac = MAC(key, sequence_number || packet_length || encrypted_packet)
-
-where "packet_length" is encoded as a uint32 and "encrypted_packet"
-contains:
-
-      byte      padding_length
-      byte[n1]  payload; n1 = packet_length - padding_length - 1
-      byte[n2]  random padding; n2 = padding_length
-
-1.6 transport: AES-GCM
-
-OpenSSH supports the AES-GCM algorithm as specified in RFC 5647.
-Because of problems with the specification of the key exchange
-the behaviour of OpenSSH differs from the RFC as follows:
-
-AES-GCM is only negotiated as the cipher algorithms
-"aes128-gcm@openssh.com" or "aes256-gcm@openssh.com" and never as
-an MAC algorithm. Additionally, if AES-GCM is selected as the cipher
-the exchanged MAC algorithms are ignored and there doesn't have to be
-a matching MAC.
-
-1.7 transport: chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com authenticated encryption
-
-OpenSSH supports authenticated encryption using ChaCha20 and Poly1305
-as described in PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305.
-
-1.8 transport: curve25519-sha256@libssh.org key exchange algorithm
-
-OpenSSH supports the use of ECDH in Curve25519 for key exchange as
-described at:
-http://git.libssh.org/users/aris/libssh.git/plain/doc/curve25519-sha256@libssh.org.txt?h=curve25519
-
-2. Connection protocol changes
-
-2.1. connection: Channel write close extension "eow@openssh.com"
-
-The SSH connection protocol (rfc4254) provides the SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF
-message to allow an endpoint to signal its peer that it will send no
-more data over a channel. Unfortunately, there is no symmetric way for
-an endpoint to request that its peer should cease sending data to it
-while still keeping the channel open for the endpoint to send data to
-the peer.
-
-This is desirable, since it saves the transmission of data that would
-otherwise need to be discarded and it allows an endpoint to signal local
-processes of the condition, e.g. by closing the corresponding file
-descriptor.
-
-OpenSSH implements a channel extension message to perform this
-signalling: "eow@openssh.com" (End Of Write). This message is sent by
-an endpoint when the local output of a session channel is closed or
-experiences a write error. The message is formatted as follows:
-
-	byte		SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
-	uint32		recipient channel
-	string		"eow@openssh.com"
-	boolean		FALSE
-
-On receiving this message, the peer SHOULD cease sending data of
-the channel and MAY signal the process from which the channel data
-originates (e.g. by closing its read file descriptor).
-
-As with the symmetric SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF message, the channel does
-remain open after a "eow@openssh.com" has been sent and more data may
-still be sent in the other direction. This message does not consume
-window space and may be sent even if no window space is available.
-
-NB. due to certain broken SSH implementations aborting upon receipt
-of this message (in contravention of RFC4254 section 5.4), this
-message is only sent to OpenSSH peers (identified by banner).
-Other SSH implementations may be whitelisted to receive this message
-upon request.
-
-2.2. connection: disallow additional sessions extension
-     "no-more-sessions@openssh.com"
-
-Most SSH connections will only ever request a single session, but a
-attacker may abuse a running ssh client to surreptitiously open
-additional sessions under their control. OpenSSH provides a global
-request "no-more-sessions@openssh.com" to mitigate this attack.
-
-When an OpenSSH client expects that it will never open another session
-(i.e. it has been started with connection multiplexing disabled), it
-will send the following global request:
-
-	byte		SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
-	string		"no-more-sessions@openssh.com"
-	char		want-reply
-
-On receipt of such a message, an OpenSSH server will refuse to open
-future channels of type "session" and instead immediately abort the
-connection.
-
-Note that this is not a general defence against compromised clients
-(that is impossible), but it thwarts a simple attack.
-
-NB. due to certain broken SSH implementations aborting upon receipt
-of this message, the no-more-sessions request is only sent to OpenSSH
-servers (identified by banner). Other SSH implementations may be
-whitelisted to receive this message upon request.
-
-2.3. connection: Tunnel forward extension "tun@openssh.com"
-
-OpenSSH supports layer 2 and layer 3 tunnelling via the "tun@openssh.com"
-channel type. This channel type supports forwarding of network packets
-with datagram boundaries intact between endpoints equipped with
-interfaces like the BSD tun(4) device. Tunnel forwarding channels are
-requested by the client with the following packet:
-
-	byte		SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
-	string		"tun@openssh.com"
-	uint32		sender channel
-	uint32		initial window size
-	uint32		maximum packet size
-	uint32		tunnel mode
-	uint32		remote unit number
-
-The "tunnel mode" parameter specifies whether the tunnel should forward
-layer 2 frames or layer 3 packets. It may take one of the following values:
-
-	SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT  1		/* layer 3 packets */
-	SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET     2		/* layer 2 frames */
-
-The "tunnel unit number" specifies the remote interface number, or may
-be 0x7fffffff to allow the server to automatically chose an interface. A
-server that is not willing to open a client-specified unit should refuse
-the request with a SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE error. On successful
-open, the server should reply with SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_SUCCESS.
-
-Once established the client and server may exchange packet or frames
-over the tunnel channel by encapsulating them in SSH protocol strings
-and sending them as channel data. This ensures that packet boundaries
-are kept intact. Specifically, packets are transmitted using normal
-SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA packets:
-
-	byte		SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
-	uint32		recipient channel
-	string		data
-
-The contents of the "data" field for layer 3 packets is:
-
-	uint32			packet length
-	uint32			address family
-	byte[packet length - 4]	packet data
-
-The "address family" field identifies the type of packet in the message.
-It may be one of:
-
-	SSH_TUN_AF_INET		2		/* IPv4 */
-	SSH_TUN_AF_INET6	24		/* IPv6 */
-
-The "packet data" field consists of the IPv4/IPv6 datagram itself
-without any link layer header.
-
-The contents of the "data" field for layer 2 packets is:
-
-	uint32			packet length
-	byte[packet length]	frame
-
-The "frame" field contains an IEEE 802.3 Ethernet frame, including
-header.
-
-2.4. connection: Unix domain socket forwarding
-
-OpenSSH supports local and remote Unix domain socket forwarding
-using the "streamlocal" extension.  Forwarding is initiated as per
-TCP sockets but with a single path instead of a host and port.
-
-Similar to direct-tcpip, direct-streamlocal is sent by the client
-to request that the server make a connection to a Unix domain socket.
-
-	byte		SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
-	string		"direct-streamlocal@openssh.com"
-	uint32		sender channel
-	uint32		initial window size
-	uint32		maximum packet size
-	string		socket path
-
-Similar to forwarded-tcpip, forwarded-streamlocal is sent by the
-server when the client has previously send the server a streamlocal-forward
-GLOBAL_REQUEST.
-
-	byte		SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
-	string		"forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com"
-	uint32		sender channel
-	uint32		initial window size
-	uint32		maximum packet size
-	string		socket path
-	string		reserved for future use
-
-The reserved field is not currently defined and is ignored on the
-remote end.  It is intended to be used in the future to pass
-information about the socket file, such as ownership and mode.
-The client currently sends the empty string for this field.
-
-Similar to tcpip-forward, streamlocal-forward is sent by the client
-to request remote forwarding of a Unix domain socket.
-
-	byte		SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
-	string		"streamlocal-forward@openssh.com"
-	boolean		TRUE
-	string		socket path
-
-Similar to cancel-tcpip-forward, cancel-streamlocal-forward is sent
-by the client cancel the forwarding of a Unix domain socket.
-
-	byte		SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
-	string		"cancel-streamlocal-forward@openssh.com"
-	boolean		FALSE
-	string		socket path
-
-2.5. connection: hostkey update and rotation "hostkeys-00@openssh.com"
-and "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com"
-
-OpenSSH supports a protocol extension allowing a server to inform
-a client of all its protocol v.2 host keys after user-authentication
-has completed.
-
-	byte		SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
-	string		"hostkeys-00@openssh.com"
-	string[]	hostkeys
-
-Upon receiving this message, a client should check which of the
-supplied host keys are present in known_hosts. For keys that are
-not present, it should send a "hostkeys-prove@openssh.com" message
-to request the server prove ownership of the private half of the
-key.
-
-	byte		SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
-	string		"hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com"
-	char		1 /* want-reply */
-	string[]	hostkeys
-
-When a server receives this message, it should generate a signature
-using each requested key over the following:
-
-	string		"hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com"
-	string		session identifier
-	string		hostkey
-
-These signatures should be included in the reply, in the order matching
-the hostkeys in the request:
-
-	byte		SSH_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS
-	string[]	signatures
-
-When the client receives this reply (and not a failure), it should
-validate the signatures and may update its known_hosts file, adding keys
-that it has not seen before and deleting keys for the server host that
-are no longer offered.
-
-These extensions let a client learn key types that it had not previously
-encountered, thereby allowing it to potentially upgrade from weaker
-key algorithms to better ones. It also supports graceful key rotation:
-a server may offer multiple keys of the same type for a period (to
-give clients an opportunity to learn them using this extension) before
-removing the deprecated key from those offered.
-
-3. SFTP protocol changes
-
-3.1. sftp: Reversal of arguments to SSH_FXP_SYMLINK
-
-When OpenSSH's sftp-server was implemented, the order of the arguments
-to the SSH_FXP_SYMLINK method was inadvertently reversed. Unfortunately,
-the reversal was not noticed until the server was widely deployed. Since
-fixing this to follow the specification would cause incompatibility, the
-current order was retained. For correct operation, clients should send
-SSH_FXP_SYMLINK as follows:
-
-	uint32		id
-	string		targetpath
-	string		linkpath
-
-3.2. sftp: Server extension announcement in SSH_FXP_VERSION
-
-OpenSSH's sftp-server lists the extensions it supports using the
-standard extension announcement mechanism in the SSH_FXP_VERSION server
-hello packet:
-
-	uint32		3		/* protocol version */
-	string		ext1-name
-	string		ext1-version
-	string		ext2-name
-	string		ext2-version
-	...
-	string		extN-name
-	string		extN-version
-
-Each extension reports its integer version number as an ASCII encoded
-string, e.g. "1". The version will be incremented if the extension is
-ever changed in an incompatible way. The server MAY advertise the same
-extension with multiple versions (though this is unlikely). Clients MUST
-check the version number before attempting to use the extension.
-
-3.3. sftp: Extension request "posix-rename@openssh.com"
-
-This operation provides a rename operation with POSIX semantics, which
-are different to those provided by the standard SSH_FXP_RENAME in
-draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-02.txt. This request is implemented as a
-SSH_FXP_EXTENDED request with the following format:
-
-	uint32		id
-	string		"posix-rename@openssh.com"
-	string		oldpath
-	string		newpath
-
-On receiving this request the server will perform the POSIX operation
-rename(oldpath, newpath) and will respond with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message.
-This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version
-"1".
-
-3.4. sftp: Extension requests "statvfs@openssh.com" and
-         "fstatvfs@openssh.com"
-
-These requests correspond to the statvfs and fstatvfs POSIX system
-interfaces. The "statvfs@openssh.com" request operates on an explicit
-pathname, and is formatted as follows:
-
-	uint32		id
-	string		"statvfs@openssh.com"
-	string		path
-
-The "fstatvfs@openssh.com" operates on an open file handle:
-
-	uint32		id
-	string		"fstatvfs@openssh.com"
-	string		handle
-
-These requests return a SSH_FXP_STATUS reply on failure. On success they
-return the following SSH_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY reply:
-
-	uint32		id
-	uint64		f_bsize		/* file system block size */
-	uint64		f_frsize	/* fundamental fs block size */
-	uint64		f_blocks	/* number of blocks (unit f_frsize) */
-	uint64		f_bfree		/* free blocks in file system */
-	uint64		f_bavail	/* free blocks for non-root */
-	uint64		f_files		/* total file inodes */
-	uint64		f_ffree		/* free file inodes */
-	uint64		f_favail	/* free file inodes for to non-root */
-	uint64		f_fsid		/* file system id */
-	uint64		f_flag		/* bit mask of f_flag values */
-	uint64		f_namemax	/* maximum filename length */
-
-The values of the f_flag bitmask are as follows:
-
-	#define SSH_FXE_STATVFS_ST_RDONLY	0x1	/* read-only */
-	#define SSH_FXE_STATVFS_ST_NOSUID	0x2	/* no setuid */
-
-Both the "statvfs@openssh.com" and "fstatvfs@openssh.com" extensions are
-advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version "2".
-
-10. sftp: Extension request "hardlink@openssh.com"
-
-This request is for creating a hard link to a regular file. This
-request is implemented as a SSH_FXP_EXTENDED request with the
-following format:
-
-	uint32		id
-	string		"hardlink@openssh.com"
-	string		oldpath
-	string		newpath
-
-On receiving this request the server will perform the operation
-link(oldpath, newpath) and will respond with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message.
-This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version
-"1".
-
-10. sftp: Extension request "fsync@openssh.com"
-
-This request asks the server to call fsync(2) on an open file handle.
-
-	uint32		id
-	string		"fsync@openssh.com"
-	string		handle
-
-One receiving this request, a server will call fsync(handle_fd) and will
-respond with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message.
-
-This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version
-"1".
-
-$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL,v 1.29 2015/07/17 03:09:19 djm Exp $

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.agent

@@ -1,560 +0,0 @@
-This describes the protocol used by OpenSSH's ssh-agent.
-
-OpenSSH's agent supports managing keys for the standard SSH protocol
-2 as well as the legacy SSH protocol 1. Support for these key types
-is almost completely disjoint - in all but a few cases, operations on
-protocol 2 keys cannot see or affect protocol 1 keys and vice-versa.
-
-Protocol 1 and protocol 2 keys are separated because of the differing
-cryptographic usage: protocol 1 private RSA keys are used to decrypt
-challenges that were encrypted with the corresponding public key,
-whereas protocol 2 RSA private keys are used to sign challenges with
-a private key for verification with the corresponding public key. It
-is considered unsound practice to use the same key for signing and
-encryption.
-
-With a couple of exceptions, the protocol message names used in this
-document indicate which type of key the message relates to. SSH_*
-messages refer to protocol 1 keys only. SSH2_* messages refer to
-protocol 2 keys. Furthermore, the names also indicate whether the
-message is a request to the agent (*_AGENTC_*) or a reply from the
-agent (*_AGENT_*). Section 3 below contains the mapping of the
-protocol message names to their integer values.
-
-1. Data types
-
-Because of support for legacy SSH protocol 1 keys, OpenSSH's agent
-protocol makes use of some data types not defined in RFC 4251.
-
-1.1 uint16
-
-The "uint16" data type is a simple MSB-first 16 bit unsigned integer
-encoded in two bytes.
-
-1.2 mpint1
-
-The "mpint1" type represents an arbitrary precision integer (bignum).
-Its format is as follows:
-
-	uint16			bits
-	byte[(bits + 7) / 8]	bignum
-
-"bignum" contains an unsigned arbitrary precision integer encoded as
-eight bits per byte in big-endian (MSB first) format.
-
-Note the difference between the "mpint1" encoding and the "mpint"
-encoding defined in RFC 4251. Also note that the length of the encoded
-integer is specified in bits, not bytes and that the byte length of
-the integer must be calculated by rounding up the number of bits to the
-nearest eight.
-
-2. Protocol Messages
-
-All protocol messages are prefixed with their length in bytes, encoded
-as a 32 bit unsigned integer. Specifically:
-
-	uint32			message_length
-	byte[message_length]	message
-
-The following message descriptions refer only to the content the
-"message" field.
-
-2.1 Generic server responses
-
-The following generic messages may be sent by the server in response to
-requests from the client. On success the agent may reply either with:
-
-	byte			SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS
-
-or a request-specific success message.
-
-On failure, the agent may reply with:
-
-	byte			SSH_AGENT_FAILURE
-
-SSH_AGENT_FAILURE messages are also sent in reply to unknown request
-types.
-
-2.2 Adding keys to the agent
-
-Keys are added to the agent using the SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY and
-SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY requests for protocol 1 and protocol 2 keys
-respectively.
-
-Two variants of these requests are SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED
-and SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED - these add keys with optional
-"constraints" on their usage.
-
-OpenSSH may be built with support for keys hosted on a smartcard
-or other hardware security module. These keys may be added
-to the agent using the SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY and
-SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED requests.
-
-2.2.1 Key constraints
-
-The OpenSSH agent supports some basic optional constraints on key usage.
-At present there are two constraints defined.
-
-The first constraint limits the validity duration of a key. It is
-encoded as:
-
-	byte			SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME
-	uint32			seconds
-
-Where "seconds" contains the number of seconds that the key shall remain
-valid measured from the moment that the agent receives it. After the
-validity period has expired, OpenSSH's agent will erase these keys from
-memory.
-
-The second constraint requires the agent to seek explicit user
-confirmation before performing private key operations with the loaded
-key. This constraint is encoded as:
-
-	byte			SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM
-
-Zero or more constraints may be specified when adding a key with one
-of the *_CONSTRAINED requests. Multiple constraints are appended
-consecutively to the end of the request:
-
-	byte			constraint1_type
-	....			constraint1_data
-	byte			constraint2_type
-	....			constraint2_data
-	....
-	byte			constraintN_type
-	....			constraintN_data
-
-Such a sequence of zero or more constraints will be referred to below
-as "constraint[]". Agents may determine whether there are constraints
-by checking whether additional data exists in the "add key" request
-after the key data itself. OpenSSH will refuse to add a key if it
-contains unknown constraints.
-
-2.2.2 Add protocol 1 key
-
-A client may add a protocol 1 key to an agent with the following
-request:
-
-	byte			SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY or
-				SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED
-	uint32			ignored
-	mpint1			rsa_n
-	mpint1			rsa_e
-	mpint1			rsa_d
-	mpint1			rsa_iqmp
-	mpint1			rsa_q
-	mpint1			rsa_p
-	string			key_comment
-	constraint[]		key_constraints
-
-Note that there is some redundancy in the key parameters; a key could be
-fully specified using just rsa_q, rsa_p and rsa_e at the cost of extra
-computation.
-
-"key_constraints" may only be present if the request type is
-SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED.
-
-The agent will reply with a SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS if the key has been
-successfully added or a SSH_AGENT_FAILURE if an error occurred.
-
-2.2.3 Add protocol 2 key
-
-The OpenSSH agent supports DSA, ECDSA and RSA keys for protocol 2. DSA
-keys may be added using the following request
-
-	byte			SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY or
-				SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED
-	string			"ssh-dss"
-	mpint			dsa_p
-	mpint			dsa_q
-	mpint			dsa_g
-	mpint			dsa_public_key
-	mpint			dsa_private_key
-	string			key_comment
-	constraint[]		key_constraints
-
-DSA certificates may be added with:
-	byte			SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY or
-				SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED
-	string			"ssh-dss-cert-v00@openssh.com"
-	string			certificate
-	mpint			dsa_private_key
-	string			key_comment
-	constraint[]		key_constraints
-
-ECDSA keys may be added using the following request
-
-	byte			SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY or
-				SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED
-	string			"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256" |
-				"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384" |
-				"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521"
-	string			ecdsa_curve_name
-	string			ecdsa_public_key
-	mpint			ecdsa_private
-	string			key_comment
-	constraint[]		key_constraints
-
-ECDSA certificates may be added with:
-	byte			SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY or
-				SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED
-	string			"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com" |
-				"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com" |
-				"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com"
-	string			certificate
-	mpint			ecdsa_private_key
-	string			key_comment
-	constraint[]		key_constraints
-
-RSA keys may be added with this request:
-
-	byte			SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY or
-				SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED
-	string			"ssh-rsa"
-	mpint			rsa_n
-	mpint			rsa_e
-	mpint			rsa_d
-	mpint			rsa_iqmp
-	mpint			rsa_p
-	mpint			rsa_q
-	string			key_comment
-	constraint[]		key_constraints
-
-RSA certificates may be added with this request:
-
-	byte			SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY or
-				SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED
-	string			"ssh-rsa-cert-v00@openssh.com"
-	string			certificate
-	mpint			rsa_d
-	mpint			rsa_iqmp
-	mpint			rsa_p
-	mpint			rsa_q
-	string			key_comment
-	constraint[]		key_constraints
-
-Note that the 'rsa_p' and 'rsa_q' parameters are sent in the reverse
-order to the protocol 1 add keys message. As with the corresponding
-protocol 1 "add key" request, the private key is overspecified to avoid
-redundant processing.
-
-For DSA, ECDSA and RSA key add requests, "key_constraints" may only be
-present if the request type is SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED.
-
-The agent will reply with a SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS if the key has been
-successfully added or a SSH_AGENT_FAILURE if an error occurred.
-
-2.2.4 Loading keys from a smartcard
-
-The OpenSSH agent may have optional smartcard support built in to it. If
-so, it supports an operation to load keys from a smartcard. Technically,
-only the public components of the keys are loaded into the agent so
-this operation really arranges for future private key operations to be
-delegated to the smartcard.
-
-	byte			SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY or
-				SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED
-	string			reader_id
-	string			pin
-	constraint[]		key_constraints
-
-"reader_id" is an identifier to a smartcard reader and "pin"
-is a PIN or passphrase used to unlock the private key(s) on the
-device. "key_constraints" may only be present if the request type is
-SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED.
-
-This operation may load all SSH keys that are unlocked using the
-"pin" on the specified reader. The type of key loaded (protocol 1
-or protocol 2) will be specified by the smartcard itself, it is not
-client-specified.
-
-The agent will reply with a SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS if one or more keys have
-been successfully loaded or a SSH_AGENT_FAILURE if an error occurred.
-The agent will also return SSH_AGENT_FAILURE if it does not support
-smartcards.
-
-2.3 Removing multiple keys
-
-A client may request that an agent delete all protocol 1 keys using the
-following request:
-
-	byte			SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES
-
-This message requests the deletion of all protocol 2 keys:
-
-	byte			SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES
-
-On success, the agent will delete all keys of the requested type and
-reply with a SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS message. If an error occurred, the agent
-will reply with SSH_AGENT_FAILURE.
-
-Note that, to delete all keys (both protocol 1 and 2), a client
-must send both a SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES and a
-SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES request.
-
-2.4 Removing specific keys
-
-2.4.1 Removing a protocol 1 key
-
-Removal of a protocol 1 key may be requested with the following message:
-
-	byte 			SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY
-	uint32			key_bits
-	mpint1			rsa_e
-	mpint1			rsa_n
-
-Note that key_bits is strictly redundant, as it may be inferred by the
-length of rsa_n.
-
-The agent will delete any private key matching the specified public key
-and return SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS. If no such key was found, the agent will
-return SSH_AGENT_FAILURE.
-
-2.4.2 Removing a protocol 2 key
-
-Protocol 2 keys may be removed with the following request:
-
-	byte			SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY
-	string			key_blob
-
-Where "key_blob" is encoded as per RFC 4253 section 6.6 "Public Key
-Algorithms" for any of the supported protocol 2 key types.
-
-The agent will delete any private key matching the specified public key
-and return SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS. If no such key was found, the agent will
-return SSH_AGENT_FAILURE.
-
-2.4.3 Removing keys loaded from a smartcard
-
-A client may request that a server remove one or more smartcard-hosted
-keys using this message:
-
-	byte			SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY
-	string			reader_id
-	string			pin
-
-"reader_id" the an identifier to a smartcard reader and "pin" is a PIN
-or passphrase used to unlock the private key(s) on the device.
-
-When this message is received, and if the agent supports
-smartcard-hosted keys, it will delete all keys that are hosted on the
-specified smartcard that may be accessed with the given "pin".
-
-The agent will reply with a SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS if one or more keys have
-been successfully removed or a SSH_AGENT_FAILURE if an error occurred.
-The agent will also return SSH_AGENT_FAILURE if it does not support
-smartcards.
-
-2.5 Requesting a list of known keys
-
-An agent may be requested to list which keys it holds. Different
-requests exist for protocol 1 and protocol 2 keys.
-
-2.5.1 Requesting a list of protocol 1 keys
-
-To request a list of protocol 1 keys that are held in the agent, a
-client may send the following message:
-
-	byte			SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES
-
-The agent will reply with the following message:
-
-	byte			SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER
-	uint32			num_keys
-
-Followed by zero or more consecutive keys, encoded as:
-
-	uint32			bits
-	mpint1			rsa_e
-	mpint1			rsa_n
-	string			key_comment
-
-2.5.2 Requesting a list of protocol 2 keys
-
-A client may send the following message to request a list of
-protocol 2 keys that are stored in the agent:
-
-	byte			SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES
-
-The agent will reply with the following message header:
-
-	byte			SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER
-	uint32			num_keys
-
-Followed by zero or more consecutive keys, encoded as:
-
-	string			key_blob
-	string			key_comment
-
-Where "key_blob" is encoded as per RFC 4253 section 6.6 "Public Key
-Algorithms" for any of the supported protocol 2 key types.
-
-2.6 Private key operations
-
-The purpose of the agent is to perform private key operations, such as
-signing and encryption without requiring a passphrase to unlock the
-key and without allowing the private key itself to be exposed. There
-are separate requests for the protocol 1 and protocol 2 private key
-operations.
-
-2.6.1 Protocol 1 private key challenge
-
-The private key operation used in version 1 of the SSH protocol is
-decrypting a challenge that has been encrypted with a public key.
-It may be requested using this message:
-
-	byte			SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE
-	uint32			ignored
-	mpint1			rsa_e
-	mpint1			rsa_n
-	mpint1			encrypted_challenge
-	byte[16]		session_id
-	uint32			response_type /* must be 1 */
-
-"rsa_e" and "rsa_n" are used to identify which private key to use.
-"encrypted_challenge" is a challenge blob that has (presumably)
-been encrypted with the public key and must be in the range
-1 <= encrypted_challenge < 2^256. "session_id" is the SSH protocol 1
-session ID (computed from the server host key, the server semi-ephemeral
-key and the session cookie).
-
-"ignored" and "response_type" exist for compatibility with legacy
-implementations. "response_type" must be equal to 1; other response
-types are not supported.
-
-On receiving this request, the server decrypts the "encrypted_challenge"
-using the private key matching the supplied (rsa_e, rsa_n) values. For
-the response derivation, the decrypted challenge is represented as an
-unsigned, big-endian integer encoded in a 32 byte buffer (i.e. values
-smaller than 2^248 will have leading 0 bytes).
-
-The response value is then calculated as:
-
-	response = MD5(decrypted_challenge || session_id)
-
-and returned in the following message
-
-	byte			SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE
-	byte[16]		response
-
-If the agent cannot find the key specified by the supplied (rsa_e,
-rsa_n) then it will return SSH_AGENT_FAILURE.
-
-2.6.2 Protocol 2 private key signature request
-
-A client may use the following message to request signing of data using
-a protocol 2 key:
-
-	byte			SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST
-	string			key_blob
-	string			data
-	uint32			flags
-
-Where "key_blob" is encoded as per RFC 4253 section 6.6 "Public Key
-Algorithms" for any of the supported protocol 2 key types. "flags" is
-a bit-mask, but at present only one possible value is defined (see below
-for its meaning):
-
-	SSH_AGENT_OLD_SIGNATURE		1
-
-Upon receiving this request, the agent will look up the private key that
-corresponds to the public key contained in key_blob. It will use this
-private key to sign the "data" and produce a signature blob using the
-key type-specific method described in RFC 4253 section 6.6 "Public Key
-Algorithms".
-
-An exception to this is for "ssh-dss" keys where the "flags" word
-contains the value SSH_AGENT_OLD_SIGNATURE. In this case, a legacy
-signature encoding is used in lieu of the standard one. In this case,
-the DSA signature blob is encoded as:
-
-	byte[40]		signature
-
-The signature will be returned in the response message:
-
-	byte			SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE
-	string			signature_blob
-
-If the agent cannot find the key specified by the supplied key_blob then
-it will return SSH_AGENT_FAILURE.
-
-2.7 Locking or unlocking an agent
-
-The agent supports temporary locking with a passphrase to suspend
-processing of sensitive operations until it has been unlocked with the
-same passphrase. To lock an agent, a client send the following request:
-
-	byte			SSH_AGENTC_LOCK
-	string			passphrase
-
-Upon receipt of this message and if the agent is not already locked,
-it will suspend processing requests and return a SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS
-reply. If the agent is already locked, it will return SSH_AGENT_FAILURE.
-
-While locked, the agent will refuse all requests except
-SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK, SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES and
-SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES. The "request identities" requests are
-treated specially by a locked agent: it will always return an empty list
-of keys.
-
-To unlock an agent, a client may request:
-
-	byte			SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK
-	string			passphrase
-
-If the passphrase matches and the agent is locked, then it will resume
-processing all requests and return SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS. If the agent
-is not locked or the passphrase does not match then it will return
-SSH_AGENT_FAILURE.
-
-Locking and unlocking affects both protocol 1 and protocol 2 keys.
-
-3. Protocol message numbers
-
-3.1 Requests from client to agent for protocol 1 key operations
-
-	SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES		1
-	SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE			3
-	SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY			7
-	SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY			8
-	SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES		9
-	SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED		24
-
-3.2 Requests from client to agent for protocol 2 key operations
-
-	SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES			11
-	SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST			13
-	SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY			17
-	SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY			18
-	SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES		19
-	SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED			25
-
-3.3 Key-type independent requests from client to agent
-
-	SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY			20
-	SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY			21
-	SSH_AGENTC_LOCK					22
-	SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK				23
-	SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED	26
-
-3.4 Generic replies from agent to client
-
-	SSH_AGENT_FAILURE				5
-	SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS				6
-
-3.5 Replies from agent to client for protocol 1 key operations
-
-	SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER			2
-	SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE				4
-
-3.6 Replies from agent to client for protocol 2 key operations
-
-	SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER			12
-	SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE			14
-
-3.7 Key constraint identifiers
-
-	SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME			1
-	SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM			2
-
-$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.agent,v 1.8 2015/05/08 03:56:51 djm Exp $

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.certkeys

@@ -1,265 +0,0 @@
-This document describes a simple public-key certificate authentication
-system for use by SSH.
-
-Background
-----------
-
-The SSH protocol currently supports a simple public key authentication
-mechanism. Unlike other public key implementations, SSH eschews the use
-of X.509 certificates and uses raw keys. This approach has some benefits
-relating to simplicity of configuration and minimisation of attack
-surface, but it does not support the important use-cases of centrally
-managed, passwordless authentication and centrally certified host keys.
-
-These protocol extensions build on the simple public key authentication
-system already in SSH to allow certificate-based authentication. The
-certificates used are not traditional X.509 certificates, with numerous
-options and complex encoding rules, but something rather more minimal: a
-key, some identity information and usage options that have been signed
-with some other trusted key.
-
-A sshd server may be configured to allow authentication via certified
-keys, by extending the existing ~/.ssh/authorized_keys mechanism to
-allow specification of certification authority keys in addition to
-raw user keys. The ssh client will support automatic verification of
-acceptance of certified host keys, by adding a similar ability to
-specify CA keys in ~/.ssh/known_hosts.
-
-Certified keys are represented using new key types:
-
-    ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com
-    ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com
-    ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com
-    ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com
-    ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com
-
-These include certification information along with the public key
-that is used to sign challenges. ssh-keygen performs the CA signing
-operation.
-
-Protocol extensions
--------------------
-
-The SSH wire protocol includes several extensibility mechanisms.
-These modifications shall take advantage of namespaced public key
-algorithm names to add support for certificate authentication without
-breaking the protocol - implementations that do not support the
-extensions will simply ignore them.
-
-Authentication using the new key formats described below proceeds
-using the existing SSH "publickey" authentication method described
-in RFC4252 section 7.
-
-New public key formats
-----------------------
-
-The certificate key types take a similar high-level format (note: data
-types and encoding are as per RFC4251 section 5). The serialised wire
-encoding of these certificates is also used for storing them on disk.
-
-#define SSH_CERT_TYPE_USER    1
-#define SSH_CERT_TYPE_HOST    2
-
-RSA certificate
-
-    string    "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com"
-    string    nonce
-    mpint     e
-    mpint     n
-    uint64    serial
-    uint32    type
-    string    key id
-    string    valid principals
-    uint64    valid after
-    uint64    valid before
-    string    critical options
-    string    extensions
-    string    reserved
-    string    signature key
-    string    signature
-
-DSA certificate
-
-    string    "ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com"
-    string    nonce
-    mpint     p
-    mpint     q
-    mpint     g
-    mpint     y
-    uint64    serial
-    uint32    type
-    string    key id
-    string    valid principals
-    uint64    valid after
-    uint64    valid before
-    string    critical options
-    string    extensions
-    string    reserved
-    string    signature key
-    string    signature
-
-ECDSA certificate
-
-    string    "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com" |
-              "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384@openssh.com" |
-              "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521@openssh.com"
-    string    nonce
-    string    curve
-    string    public_key
-    uint64    serial
-    uint32    type
-    string    key id
-    string    valid principals
-    uint64    valid after
-    uint64    valid before
-    string    critical options
-    string    extensions
-    string    reserved
-    string    signature key
-    string    signature
-
-The nonce field is a CA-provided random bitstring of arbitrary length
-(but typically 16 or 32 bytes) included to make attacks that depend on
-inducing collisions in the signature hash infeasible.
-
-e and n are the RSA exponent and public modulus respectively.
-
-p, q, g, y are the DSA parameters as described in FIPS-186-2.
-
-curve and public key are respectively the ECDSA "[identifier]" and "Q"
-defined in section 3.1 of RFC5656.
-
-serial is an optional certificate serial number set by the CA to
-provide an abbreviated way to refer to certificates from that CA.
-If a CA does not wish to number its certificates it must set this
-field to zero.
-
-type specifies whether this certificate is for identification of a user
-or a host using a SSH_CERT_TYPE_... value.
-
-key id is a free-form text field that is filled in by the CA at the time
-of signing; the intention is that the contents of this field are used to
-identify the identity principal in log messages.
-
-"valid principals" is a string containing zero or more principals as
-strings packed inside it. These principals list the names for which this
-certificate is valid; hostnames for SSH_CERT_TYPE_HOST certificates and
-usernames for SSH_CERT_TYPE_USER certificates. As a special case, a
-zero-length "valid principals" field means the certificate is valid for
-any principal of the specified type. XXX DNS wildcards?
-
-"valid after" and "valid before" specify a validity period for the
-certificate. Each represents a time in seconds since 1970-01-01
-00:00:00. A certificate is considered valid if:
-
-    valid after <= current time < valid before
-
-criticial options is a set of zero or more key options encoded as
-below. All such options are "critical" in the sense that an implementation
-must refuse to authorise a key that has an unrecognised option.
-
-extensions is a set of zero or more optional extensions. These extensions
-are not critical, and an implementation that encounters one that it does
-not recognise may safely ignore it.
-
-Generally, critical options are used to control features that restrict
-access where extensions are used to enable features that grant access.
-This ensures that certificates containing unknown restrictions do not
-inadvertently grant access while allowing new protocol features to be
-enabled via extensions without breaking certificates' backwards
-compatibility.
-
-The reserved field is currently unused and is ignored in this version of
-the protocol.
-
-signature key contains the CA key used to sign the certificate.
-The valid key types for CA keys are ssh-rsa, ssh-dss and the ECDSA types
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521. "Chained"
-certificates, where the signature key type is a certificate type itself
-are NOT supported. Note that it is possible for a RSA certificate key to
-be signed by a DSS or ECDSA CA key and vice-versa.
-
-signature is computed over all preceding fields from the initial string
-up to, and including the signature key. Signatures are computed and
-encoded according to the rules defined for the CA's public key algorithm
-(RFC4253 section 6.6 for ssh-rsa and ssh-dss, RFC5656 for the ECDSA
-types).
-
-Critical options
-----------------
-
-The critical options section of the certificate specifies zero or more
-options on the certificates validity. The format of this field
-is a sequence of zero or more tuples:
-
-    string       name
-    string       data
-
-Options must be lexically ordered by "name" if they appear in the
-sequence. Each named option may only appear once in a certificate.
-
-The name field identifies the option and the data field encodes
-option-specific information (see below). All options are
-"critical", if an implementation does not recognise a option
-then the validating party should refuse to accept the certificate.
-
-The supported options and the contents and structure of their
-data fields are:
-
-Name                    Format        Description
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-force-command           string        Specifies a command that is executed
-                                      (replacing any the user specified on the
-                                      ssh command-line) whenever this key is
-                                      used for authentication.
-
-source-address          string        Comma-separated list of source addresses
-                                      from which this certificate is accepted
-                                      for authentication. Addresses are
-                                      specified in CIDR format (nn.nn.nn.nn/nn
-                                      or hhhh::hhhh/nn).
-                                      If this option is not present then
-                                      certificates may be presented from any
-                                      source address.
-
-Extensions
-----------
-
-The extensions section of the certificate specifies zero or more
-non-critical certificate extensions. The encoding and ordering of
-extensions in this field is identical to that of the critical options,
-as is the requirement that each name appear only once.
-
-If an implementation does not recognise an extension, then it should
-ignore it.
-
-The supported extensions and the contents and structure of their data
-fields are:
-
-Name                    Format        Description
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-permit-X11-forwarding   empty         Flag indicating that X11 forwarding
-                                      should be permitted. X11 forwarding will
-                                      be refused if this option is absent.
-
-permit-agent-forwarding empty         Flag indicating that agent forwarding
-                                      should be allowed. Agent forwarding
-                                      must not be permitted unless this
-                                      option is present.
-
-permit-port-forwarding  empty         Flag indicating that port-forwarding
-                                      should be allowed. If this option is
-                                      not present then no port forwarding will
-                                      be allowed.
-
-permit-pty              empty         Flag indicating that PTY allocation
-                                      should be permitted. In the absence of
-                                      this option PTY allocation will be
-                                      disabled.
-
-permit-user-rc          empty         Flag indicating that execution of
-                                      ~/.ssh/rc should be permitted. Execution
-                                      of this script will not be permitted if
-                                      this option is not present.
-
-$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.certkeys,v 1.9 2012/03/28 07:23:22 djm Exp $

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305

@@ -1,105 +0,0 @@
-This document describes the chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com authenticated
-encryption cipher supported by OpenSSH.
-
-Background
-----------
-
-ChaCha20 is a stream cipher designed by Daniel Bernstein and described
-in [1]. It operates by permuting 128 fixed bits, 128 or 256 bits of key,
-a 64 bit nonce and a 64 bit counter into 64 bytes of output. This output
-is used as a keystream, with any unused bytes simply discarded.
-
-Poly1305[2], also by Daniel Bernstein, is a one-time Carter-Wegman MAC
-that computes a 128 bit integrity tag given a message and a single-use
-256 bit secret key.
-
-The chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com combines these two primitives into an
-authenticated encryption mode. The construction used is based on that
-proposed for TLS by Adam Langley in [3], but differs in the layout of
-data passed to the MAC and in the addition of encyption of the packet
-lengths.
-
-Negotiation
------------
-
-The chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com offers both encryption and
-authentication. As such, no separate MAC is required. If the
-chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com cipher is selected in key exchange,
-the offered MAC algorithms are ignored and no MAC is required to be
-negotiated.
-
-Detailed Construction
----------------------
-
-The chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com cipher requires 512 bits of key
-material as output from the SSH key exchange. This forms two 256 bit
-keys (K_1 and K_2), used by two separate instances of chacha20.
-
-The instance keyed by K_1 is a stream cipher that is used only
-to encrypt the 4 byte packet length field. The second instance,
-keyed by K_2, is used in conjunction with poly1305 to build an AEAD
-(Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data) that is used to encrypt
-and authenticate the entire packet.
-
-Two separate cipher instances are used here so as to keep the packet
-lengths confidential but not create an oracle for the packet payload
-cipher by decrypting and using the packet length prior to checking
-the MAC. By using an independently-keyed cipher instance to encrypt the
-length, an active attacker seeking to exploit the packet input handling
-as a decryption oracle can learn nothing about the payload contents or
-its MAC (assuming key derivation, ChaCha20 and Poly1305 are secure).
-
-The AEAD is constructed as follows: for each packet, generate a Poly1305
-key by taking the first 256 bits of ChaCha20 stream output generated
-using K_2, an IV consisting of the packet sequence number encoded as an
-uint64 under the SSH wire encoding rules and a ChaCha20 block counter of
-zero. The K_2 ChaCha20 block counter is then set to the little-endian
-encoding of 1 (i.e. {1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}) and this instance is used
-for encryption of the packet payload.
-
-Packet Handling
----------------
-
-When receiving a packet, the length must be decrypted first. When 4
-bytes of ciphertext length have been received, they may be decrypted
-using the K_1 key, a nonce consisting of the packet sequence number
-encoded as a uint64 under the usual SSH wire encoding and a zero block
-counter to obtain the plaintext length.
-
-Once the entire packet has been received, the MAC MUST be checked
-before decryption. A per-packet Poly1305 key is generated as described
-above and the MAC tag calculated using Poly1305 with this key over the
-ciphertext of the packet length and the payload together. The calculated
-MAC is then compared in constant time with the one appended to the
-packet and the packet decrypted using ChaCha20 as described above (with
-K_2, the packet sequence number as nonce and a starting block counter of
-1).
-
-To send a packet, first encode the 4 byte length and encrypt it using
-K_1. Encrypt the packet payload (using K_2) and append it to the
-encrypted length. Finally, calculate a MAC tag and append it.
-
-Rekeying
---------
-
-ChaCha20 must never reuse a {key, nonce} for encryption nor may it be
-used to encrypt more than 2^70 bytes under the same {key, nonce}. The
-SSH Transport protocol (RFC4253) recommends a far more conservative
-rekeying every 1GB of data sent or received. If this recommendation
-is followed, then chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com requires no special
-handling in this area.
-
-References
-----------
-
-[1] "ChaCha, a variant of Salsa20", Daniel Bernstein
-    http://cr.yp.to/chacha/chacha-20080128.pdf
-
-[2] "The Poly1305-AES message-authentication code", Daniel Bernstein
-    http://cr.yp.to/mac/poly1305-20050329.pdf
-
-[3] "ChaCha20 and Poly1305 based Cipher Suites for TLS", Adam Langley
-    http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-03
-
-$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305,v 1.2 2013/12/02 02:50:27 djm Exp $
-

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.key

@@ -1,68 +0,0 @@
-This document describes the private key format for OpenSSH.
-
-1. Overall format
-
-The key consists of a header, a list of public keys, and
-an encrypted list of matching private keys.
-
-#define AUTH_MAGIC      "openssh-key-v1"
-
-	byte[]	AUTH_MAGIC
-	string	ciphername
-	string	kdfname
-	string	kdfoptions
-	int	number of keys N
-	string	publickey1
-	string	publickey2
-	...
-	string	publickeyN
-	string	encrypted, padded list of private keys
-
-2. KDF options for kdfname "bcrypt"
-
-The options:
-
-	string salt
-	uint32 rounds
-
-are concatenated and represented as a string.
-
-3. Unencrypted list of N private keys
-
-The list of privatekey/comment pairs is padded with the
-bytes 1, 2, 3, ... until the total length is a multiple
-of the cipher block size.
-
-	uint32	checkint
-	uint32	checkint
-	string	privatekey1
-	string	comment1
-	string	privatekey2
-	string	comment2
-	...
-	string	privatekeyN
-	string	commentN
-	char	1
-	char	2
-	char	3
-	...
-	char	padlen % 255
-
-Before the key is encrypted, a random integer is assigned
-to both checkint fields so successful decryption can be
-quickly checked by verifying that both checkint fields
-hold the same value.
-
-4. Encryption
-
-The KDF is used to derive a key, IV (and other values required by
-the cipher) from the passphrase. These values are then used to
-encrypt the unencrypted list of private keys.
-
-5. No encryption
-
-For unencrypted keys the cipher "none" and the KDF "none"
-are used with empty passphrases. The options if the KDF "none"
-are the empty string.
-
-$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.key,v 1.1 2013/12/06 13:34:54 markus Exp $

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.krl

@@ -1,169 +0,0 @@
-This describes the key/certificate revocation list format for OpenSSH.
-
-1. Overall format
-
-The KRL consists of a header and zero or more sections. The header is:
-
-#define KRL_MAGIC		0x5353484b524c0a00ULL  /* "SSHKRL\n\0" */
-#define KRL_FORMAT_VERSION	1
-
-	uint64	KRL_MAGIC
-	uint32	KRL_FORMAT_VERSION
-	uint64	krl_version
-	uint64	generated_date
-	uint64	flags
-	string	reserved
-	string	comment
-
-Where "krl_version" is a version number that increases each time the KRL
-is modified, "generated_date" is the time in seconds since 1970-01-01
-00:00:00 UTC that the KRL was generated, "comment" is an optional comment
-and "reserved" an extension field whose contents are currently ignored.
-No "flags" are currently defined.
-
-Following the header are zero or more sections, each consisting of:
-
-	byte	section_type
-	string	section_data
-
-Where "section_type" indicates the type of the "section_data". An exception
-to this is the KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE section, that has a slightly different
-format (see below).
-
-The available section types are:
-
-#define KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES		1
-#define KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY		2
-#define KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1		3
-#define KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE			4
-
-2. Certificate section
-
-These sections use type KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES to revoke certificates by
-serial number or key ID. The consist of the CA key that issued the
-certificates to be revoked and a reserved field whose contents is currently
-ignored.
-
-	string ca_key
-	string reserved
-
-Where "ca_key" is the standard SSH wire serialisation of the CA's
-public key. Alternately, "ca_key" may be an empty string to indicate
-the certificate section applies to all CAs (this is most useful when
-revoking key IDs).
-
-Followed by one or more sections:
-
-	byte	cert_section_type
-	string	cert_section_data
-
-The certificate section types are:
-
-#define KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST	0x20
-#define KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE	0x21
-#define KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP	0x22
-#define KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID		0x23
-
-2.1 Certificate serial list section
-
-This section is identified as KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST. It revokes
-certificates by listing their serial numbers. The cert_section_data in this
-case contains:
-
-	uint64	revoked_cert_serial
-	uint64	...
-
-This section may appear multiple times.
-
-2.2. Certificate serial range section
-
-These sections use type KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE and hold
-a range of serial numbers of certificates:
-
-	uint64	serial_min
-	uint64	serial_max
-
-All certificates in the range serial_min <= serial <= serial_max are
-revoked.
-
-This section may appear multiple times.
-
-2.3. Certificate serial bitmap section
-
-Bitmap sections use type KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP and revoke keys
-by listing their serial number in a bitmap.
-
-	uint64	serial_offset
-	mpint	revoked_keys_bitmap
-
-A bit set at index N in the bitmap corresponds to revocation of a keys with
-serial number (serial_offset + N).
-
-This section may appear multiple times.
-
-2.4. Revoked key ID sections
-
-KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID sections revoke particular certificate "key
-ID" strings. This may be useful in revoking all certificates
-associated with a particular identity, e.g. a host or a user.
-
-	string	key_id[0]
-	...
-
-This section must contain at least one "key_id". This section may appear
-multiple times.
-
-3. Explicit key sections
-
-These sections, identified as KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY, revoke keys
-(not certificates). They are less space efficient than serial numbers,
-but are able to revoke plain keys.
-
-	string	public_key_blob[0]
-	....
-
-This section must contain at least one "public_key_blob". The blob
-must be a raw key (i.e. not a certificate).
-
-This section may appear multiple times.
-
-4. SHA1 fingerprint sections
-
-These sections, identified as KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1, revoke
-plain keys (i.e. not certificates) by listing their SHA1 hashes:
-
-	string	public_key_hash[0]
-	....
-
-This section must contain at least one "public_key_hash". The hash blob
-is obtained by taking the SHA1 hash of the public key blob. Hashes in
-this section must appear in numeric order, treating each hash as a big-
-endian integer.
-
-This section may appear multiple times.
-
-5. KRL signature sections
-
-The KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE section serves a different purpose to the
-preceeding ones: to provide cryptographic authentication of a KRL that
-is retrieved over a channel that does not provide integrity protection.
-Its format is slightly different to the previously-described sections:
-in order to simplify the signature generation, it includes as a "body"
-two string components instead of one.
-
-	byte	KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE
-	string	signature_key
-	string	signature
-
-The signature is calculated over the entire KRL from the KRL_MAGIC
-to this subsection's "signature_key", including both and using the
-signature generation rules appropriate for the type of "signature_key".
-
-This section must appear last in the KRL. If multiple signature sections
-appear, they must appear consecutively at the end of the KRL file.
-
-Implementations that retrieve KRLs over untrusted channels must verify
-signatures. Signature sections are optional for KRLs distributed by
-trusted means.
-
-$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.krl,v 1.3 2015/01/30 01:10:33 djm Exp $

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/PROTOCOL.mux

@@ -1,228 +0,0 @@
-This document describes the multiplexing protocol used by ssh(1)'s
-ControlMaster connection-sharing.
-
-Most messages from the client to the server contain a "request id" field.
-This field is returned in replies as "client request id" to facilitate
-matching of responses to requests.
-
-1. Connection setup
-
-When a multiplexing connection is made to a ssh(1) operating as a
-ControlMaster from a ssh(1) in multiplex slave mode, the first
-action of each is to exchange hello messages:
-
-	uint32	MUX_MSG_HELLO
-	uint32  protocol version
-	string  extension name [optional]
-	string  extension value [optional]
-	...
-
-The current version of the mux protocol is 4. A slave should refuse
-to connect to a master that speaks an unsupported protocol version.
-Following the version identifier are zero or more extensions
-represented as a name/value pair. No extensions are currently
-defined.
-
-2. Opening sessions
-
-To open a new multiplexed session, a client may send the following
-request:
-
-	uint32	MUX_C_NEW_SESSION
-	uint32  request id
-	string	reserved
-	bool	want tty flag
-	bool	want X11 forwarding flag
-	bool	want agent flag
-	bool	subsystem flag
-	uint32	escape char
-	string	terminal type
-	string	command
-	string	environment string 0 [optional]
-	...
-
-To disable the use of an escape character, "escape char" may be set
-to 0xffffffff. "terminal type" is generally set to the value of
-$TERM. zero or more environment strings may follow the command.
-
-The client then sends its standard input, output and error file
-descriptors (in that order) using Unix domain socket control messages.
-
-The contents of "reserved" are currently ignored.
-
-If successful, the server will reply with MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED
-
-	uint32	MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED
-	uint32	client request id
-	uint32	session id
-
-Otherwise it will reply with an error: MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED or
-MUX_S_FAILURE.
-
-Once the server has received the fds, it will respond with MUX_S_OK
-indicating that the session is up. The client now waits for the
-session to end. When it does, the server will send an exit status
-message:
-
-	uint32	MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE
-	uint32	session id
-	uint32	exit value
-
-The client should exit with this value to mimic the behaviour of a
-non-multiplexed ssh(1) connection. Two additional cases that the
-client must cope with are it receiving a signal itself and the
-server disconnecting without sending an exit message.
-
-A master may also send a MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL before MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE
-if remote TTY allocation was unsuccessful. The client may use this to
-return its local tty to "cooked" mode.
-
-	uint32	MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL
-	uint32	session id
-
-3. Health checks
-
-The client may request a health check/PID report from a server:
-
-	uint32	MUX_C_ALIVE_CHECK
-	uint32	request id
-
-The server replies with:
-
-	uint32	MUX_S_ALIVE
-	uint32	client request id
-	uint32	server pid
-
-4. Remotely terminating a master
-
-A client may request that a master terminate immediately:
-
-	uint32	MUX_C_TERMINATE
-	uint32	request id
-
-The server will reply with one of MUX_S_OK or MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED.
-
-5. Requesting establishment of port forwards
-
-A client may request the master to establish a port forward:
-
-	uint32	MUX_C_OPEN_FWD
-	uint32	request id
-	uint32	forwarding type
-	string	listen host
-	uint32	listen port
-	string	connect host
-	uint32	connect port
-
-forwarding type may be MUX_FWD_LOCAL, MUX_FWD_REMOTE, MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC.
-
-If listen port is (unsigned int) -2, then the listen host is treated as
-a unix socket path name.
-
-If connect port is (unsigned int) -2, then the connect host is treated
-as a unix socket path name.
-
-A server may reply with a MUX_S_OK, a MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT, a
-MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED or a MUX_S_FAILURE.
-
-For dynamically allocated listen port the server replies with
-
-	uint32	MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT
-	uint32	client request id
-	uint32	allocated remote listen port
-
-6. Requesting closure of port forwards
-
-Note: currently unimplemented (server will always reply with MUX_S_FAILURE).
-
-A client may request the master to close a port forward:
-
-	uint32	MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD
-	uint32	request id
-	uint32	forwarding type
-	string	listen host
-	uint32	listen port
-	string	connect host
-	uint32	connect port
-
-A server may reply with a MUX_S_OK, a MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED or a
-MUX_S_FAILURE.
-
-7. Requesting stdio forwarding
-
-A client may request the master to establish a stdio forwarding:
-
-	uint32	MUX_C_NEW_STDIO_FWD
-	uint32	request id
-	string	reserved
-	string	connect host
-	string	connect port
-
-The client then sends its standard input and output file descriptors
-(in that order) using Unix domain socket control messages.
-
-The contents of "reserved" are currently ignored.
-
-A server may reply with a MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED, a MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED
-or a MUX_S_FAILURE.
-
-8. Requesting shutdown of mux listener
-
-A client may request the master to stop accepting new multiplexing requests
-and remove its listener socket.
-
-	uint32	MUX_C_STOP_LISTENING
-	uint32	request id
-
-A server may reply with a MUX_S_OK, a MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED or a
-MUX_S_FAILURE.
-
-9. Status messages
-
-The MUX_S_OK message is empty:
-
-	uint32	MUX_S_OK
-	uint32	client request id
-
-The MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED and MUX_S_FAILURE include a reason:
-
-	uint32	MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED
-	uint32	client request id
-	string	reason
-
-	uint32	MUX_S_FAILURE
-	uint32	client request id
-	string	reason
-
-10. Protocol numbers
-
-#define MUX_MSG_HELLO		0x00000001
-#define MUX_C_NEW_SESSION	0x10000002
-#define MUX_C_ALIVE_CHECK	0x10000004
-#define MUX_C_TERMINATE		0x10000005
-#define MUX_C_OPEN_FWD		0x10000006
-#define MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD		0x10000007
-#define MUX_C_NEW_STDIO_FWD	0x10000008
-#define MUX_C_STOP_LISTENING	0x10000009
-#define MUX_S_OK		0x80000001
-#define MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED	0x80000002
-#define MUX_S_FAILURE		0x80000003
-#define MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE	0x80000004
-#define MUX_S_ALIVE		0x80000005
-#define MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED	0x80000006
-#define MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT	0x80000007
-#define MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL	0x80000008
-
-#define MUX_FWD_LOCAL	1
-#define MUX_FWD_REMOTE	2
-#define MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC	3
-
-XXX TODO
-XXX extended status (e.g. report open channels / forwards)
-XXX lock (maybe)
-XXX watch in/out traffic (pre/post crypto)
-XXX inject packet (what about replies)
-XXX server->client error/warning notifications
-XXX send signals via mux
-
-$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.mux,v 1.10 2015/07/17 03:04:27 djm Exp $

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/README

@@ -1,69 +0,0 @@
-See http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-7.1 for the release notes.
-
-Please read http://www.openssh.com/report.html for bug reporting
-instructions and note that we do not use Github for bug reporting or
-patch/pull-request management.
-
-- A Japanese translation of this document and of the OpenSSH FAQ is
-- available at http://www.unixuser.org/~haruyama/security/openssh/index.html
-- Thanks to HARUYAMA Seigo <haruyama@unixuser.org>
-
-This is the port of OpenBSD's excellent OpenSSH[0] to Linux and other
-Unices.
-
-OpenSSH is based on the last free version of Tatu Ylonen's sample
-implementation with all patent-encumbered algorithms removed (to
-external libraries), all known security bugs fixed, new features
-reintroduced and many other clean-ups.  OpenSSH has been created by
-Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt,
-and Dug Song. It has a homepage at http://www.openssh.com/
-
-This port consists of the re-introduction of autoconf support, PAM
-support, EGD[1]/PRNGD[2] support and replacements for OpenBSD library
-functions that are (regrettably) absent from other unices. This port
-has been best tested on AIX, Cygwin, HP-UX, Linux, MacOS/X,
-NetBSD, OpenBSD, OpenServer, Solaris, Unicos, and UnixWare.
-
-This version actively tracks changes in the OpenBSD CVS repository.
-
-The PAM support is now more functional than the popular packages of
-commercial ssh-1.2.x. It checks "account" and "session" modules for
-all logins, not just when using password authentication.
-
-OpenSSH depends on Zlib[3], OpenSSL[4] and optionally PAM[5].
-
-There is now several mailing lists for this port of OpenSSH. Please
-refer to http://www.openssh.com/list.html for details on how to join.
-
-Please send bug reports and patches to the mailing list
-openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org. The list is open to posting by
-unsubscribed users.Code contribution are welcomed, but please follow the 
-OpenBSD style guidelines[6].
-
-Please refer to the INSTALL document for information on how to install
-OpenSSH on your system. There are a number of differences between this
-port of OpenSSH and F-Secure SSH 1.x, please refer to the OpenSSH FAQ[7]
-for details and general tips.
-
-Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-
-Miscellania -
-
-This version of OpenSSH is based upon code retrieved from the OpenBSD
-CVS repository which in turn was based on the last free sample
-implementation released by Tatu Ylonen.
-
-References -
-
-[0] http://www.openssh.com/faq.html
-[1] http://www.lothar.com/tech/crypto/
-[2] http://www.aet.tu-cottbus.de/personen/jaenicke/postfix_tls/prngd.html
-[3] http://www.gzip.org/zlib/
-[4] http://www.openssl.org/
-[5] http://www.openpam.org
-    http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/pam/ 
-    (PAM also is standard on Solaris and HP-UX 11)
-[6] http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=style&sektion=9
-[7] http://www.openssh.com/faq.html
-
-$Id: README,v 1.87 2014/08/10 01:35:06 djm Exp $

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/README.dns

@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
-How to verify host keys using OpenSSH and DNS
----------------------------------------------
-
-OpenSSH contains support for verifying host keys using DNS as described in
-draft-ietf-secsh-dns-05.txt. The document contains very brief instructions
-on how to use this feature. Configuring DNS is out of the scope of this
-document.
-
-
-(1) Server: Generate and publish the DNS RR
-
-To create a DNS resource record (RR) containing a fingerprint of the
-public host key, use the following command:
-
-	ssh-keygen -r hostname -f keyfile -g
-
-where "hostname" is your fully qualified hostname and "keyfile" is the
-file containing the public host key file. If you have multiple keys,
-you should generate one RR for each key.
-
-In the example above, ssh-keygen will print the fingerprint in a
-generic DNS RR format parsable by most modern name server
-implementations. If your nameserver has support for the SSHFP RR
-you can omit the -g flag and ssh-keygen will print a standard SSHFP RR.
-
-To publish the fingerprint using the DNS you must add the generated RR
-to your DNS zone file and sign your zone.
-
-
-(2) Client: Enable ssh to verify host keys using DNS
-
-To enable the ssh client to verify host keys using DNS, you have to
-add the following option to the ssh configuration file
-($HOME/.ssh/config or /etc/ssh/ssh_config):
-
-    VerifyHostKeyDNS yes
-
-Upon connection the client will try to look up the fingerprint RR
-using DNS. If the fingerprint received from the DNS server matches
-the remote host key, the user will be notified.
-
-
-	Jakob Schlyter
-	Wesley Griffin
-
-
-$OpenBSD: README.dns,v 1.2 2003/10/14 19:43:23 jakob Exp $

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/README.lpk

@@ -1,267 +0,0 @@
-OpenSSH LDAP PUBLIC KEY PATCH 
-Copyright (c) 2003 Eric AUGE (eau@phear.org)
-All rights reserved.
-
-Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-are met:
-1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-   notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-   notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-   documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products
-   derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
-
-THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
-IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
-OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
-IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
-INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
-DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
-THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
-(INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
-THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-
-purposes of this patch:
-
-This patch would help to have authentication centralization policy
-using ssh public key authentication.
-This patch could be an alternative to other "secure" authentication system
-working in a similar way (Kerberos, SecurID, etc...), except the fact 
-that it's based on OpenSSH and its public key abilities.
-
->> FYI: <<
-'uid': means unix accounts existing on the current server
-'lpkServerGroup:' mean server group configured on the current server ('lpkServerGroup' in sshd_config)
-
-example schema:
-
-
-                                  server1 (uid: eau,rival,toto) (lpkServerGroup: unix)
-                ___________      /
-               /           \ --- - server3 (uid: eau, titi) (lpkServerGroup: unix)
-              | LDAP Server |    \
-	      | eau  ,rival |     server2 (uid: rival, eau) (lpkServerGroup: unix)
-	      | titi ,toto  |
-	      | userx,....  |         server5 (uid: eau)  (lpkServerGroup: mail)
-               \___________/ \       /
-	                       ----- - server4 (uid: eau, rival)  (no group configured)
-			             \
-				        etc...
-
-- WHAT WE NEED :
-
-  * configured LDAP server somewhere on the network (i.e. OpenLDAP)
-  * patched sshd (with this patch ;)
-  * LDAP user(/group) entry (look at users.ldif (& groups.ldif)):
-        User entry:
-	- attached to the 'ldapPublicKey' objectclass
-	- attached to the 'posixAccount' objectclass
-	- with a filled 'sshPublicKey' attribute 
-	Example:
-		dn: uid=eau,ou=users,dc=cuckoos,dc=net
-		objectclass: top
-		objectclass: person
-		objectclass: organizationalPerson
-		objectclass: posixAccount
-		objectclass: ldapPublicKey
-		description: Eric AUGE Account
-		userPassword: blah
-		cn: Eric AUGE
-		sn: Eric AUGE
-		uid: eau
-		uidNumber: 1034
-		gidNumber: 1
-		homeDirectory: /export/home/eau
-		sshPublicKey: ssh-dss AAAAB3...
-		sshPublicKey: ssh-dss AAAAM5...
-
-	Group entry:
-	- attached to the 'posixGroup' objectclass
-	- with a 'cn' groupname attribute
-	- with multiple 'memberUid' attributes filled with usernames allowed in this group
-	Example:
-		# few members
-		dn: cn=unix,ou=groups,dc=cuckoos,dc=net
-		objectclass: top
-		objectclass: posixGroup
-		description: Unix based servers group
-		cn: unix
-		gidNumber: 1002
-		memberUid: eau
-		memberUid: user1
-		memberUid: user2
-
-
-- HOW IT WORKS :
-
-  * without patch
-  If a user wants to authenticate to log in a server the sshd, will first look for authentication method allowed (RSAauth,kerberos,etc..)
-  and if RSAauth and tickets based auth fails, it will fallback to standard password authentication (if enabled).
-
-  * with the patch
-  If a user want to authenticate to log in a server, the sshd will first look for auth method including LDAP pubkey, if the ldappubkey options is enabled.
-  It will do an ldapsearch to get the public key directly from the LDAP instead of reading it from the server filesystem. 
-  (usually in $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys)
-
-  If groups are enabled, it will also check if the user that wants to login is in the group of the server he is trying to log into.
-  If it fails, it falls back on RSA auth files ($HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys), etc.. and finally to standard password authentication (if enabled).
-
-  7 tokens are added to sshd_config :
-  # here is the new patched ldap related tokens
-  # entries in your LDAP must be posixAccount & strongAuthenticationUser & posixGroup
-  UseLPK yes								# look the pub key into LDAP
-  LpkServers ldap://10.31.32.5/ ldap://10.31.32.4 ldap://10.31.32.3	# which LDAP server for users ? (URL format)
-  LpkUserDN  ou=users,dc=foobar,dc=net					# which base DN for users ?
-  LpkGroupDN ou=groups,dc=foobar,dc=net					# which base DN for groups ? 
-  LpkBindDN cn=manager,dc=foobar,dc=net					# which bind DN ?
-  LpkBindPw asecret							# bind DN credidentials
-  LpkServerGroup agroupname						# the group the server is part of
-
-  Right now i'm using anonymous binding to get public keys, because getting public keys of someone doesn't impersonate him¸ but there is some
-  flaws you have to take care of.
-
-- HOW TO INSERT A USER/KEY INTO AN LDAP ENTRY
-
-  * my way (there is plenty :)
-  - create ldif file (i.e. users.ldif)
-  - cat ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub OR cat ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub OR cat ~/.ssh/identity.pub
-  - my way in 4 steps :
-  Example:
-
-  # you add this to the user entry in the LDIF file :
-  [...]
-  objectclass: posixAccount
-  objectclass: ldapPublicKey
-  [...]
-  sshPubliKey: ssh-dss AAAABDh12DDUR2...
-  [...]
-
-  # insert your entry and you're done :)
-  ldapadd -D balblabla -w bleh < file.ldif 
-  
-  all standard options can be present in the 'sshPublicKey' attribute.
-
-- WHY :
-
-  Simply because, i was looking for a way to centralize all sysadmins authentication, easily,  without completely using LDAP 
-  as authentication method (like pam_ldap etc..).  
-  
-  After looking into Kerberos, SecurID, and other centralized secure authentications systems, the use of RSA and LDAP to get 
-  public key for authentication allows us to control who has access to which server (the user needs an account and to be in 'strongAuthenticationUser'
-  objectclass within LDAP and part of the group the SSH server is in). 
-
-  Passwords update are no longer a nightmare for a server farm (key pair passphrase is stored on each user's box and private key is locally encrypted using his passphrase 
-  so each user can change it as much as he wants). 
-
-  Blocking a user account can be done directly from the LDAP (if sshd is using RSAAuth + ldap only).
-
-- RULES :  
-  Entry in the LDAP server must respect 'posixAccount' and 'ldapPublicKey' which are defined in core.schema. 
-  and the additionnal lpk.schema.
-
-  This patch could allow a smooth transition between standard auth (/etc/passwd) and complete LDAP based authentication 
-  (pamldap, nss_ldap, etc..).
-
-  This can be an alternative to other (old?/expensive?) authentication methods (Kerberos/SecurID/..).
-  
-  Referring to schema at the beginning of this file if user 'eau' is only in group 'unix'
-  'eau' would ONLY access 'server1', 'server2', 'server3' AND 'server4' BUT NOT 'server5'.
-  If you then modify the LDAP 'mail' group entry to add 'memberUid: eau' THEN user 'eau' would be able
-  to log in 'server5' (i hope you got the idea, my english is bad :).
-
-  Each server's sshd is patched and configured to ask the public key and the group infos in the LDAP
-  server.
-  When you want to allow a new user to have access to the server parc, you just add him an account on 
-  your servers, you add his public key into his entry on the LDAP server, it's done. 
-
-  Because sshds are looking public keys into the LDAP directly instead of a file ($HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys).
-
-  When the user needs to change his passphrase he can do it directly from his workstation by changing 
-  his own key set lock passphrase, and all servers are automatically aware.
- 
-  With a CAREFUL LDAP server configuration you could allow a user to add/delete/modify his own entry himself
-  so he can add/modify/delete himself his public key when needed.
-
-­ FLAWS :
-  LDAP must be well configured, getting the public key of some user is not a problem, but if anonymous LDAP 
-  allow write to users dn, somebody could replace someuser's public key by its own and impersonate some 
-  of your users in all your server farm be VERY CAREFUL.
-  
-  MITM attack when sshd is requesting the public key, could lead to a compromise of your servers allowing login 
-  as the impersonnated user.
-
-  If LDAP server is down then, fallback on passwd auth.
-  
-  the ldap code part has not been well audited yet.
-
-- LDAP USER ENTRY EXAMPLES (LDIF Format, look in users.ldif)
-    --- CUT HERE ---
-    dn: uid=jdoe,ou=users,dc=foobar,dc=net
-    objectclass: top
-    objectclass: person
-    objectclass: organizationalPerson
-    objectclass: posixAccount
-    objectclass: ldapPublicKey
-    description: My account
-    cn: John Doe
-    sn: John Doe
-    uid: jdoe
-    uidNumber: 100
-    gidNumber: 100
-    homeDirectory: /home/jdoe
-    sshPublicKey: ssh-dss AAAAB3NzaC1kc3MAAAEBAOvL8pREUg9wSy/8+hQJ54YF3AXkB0OZrXB....
-    [...]
-    --- CUT HERE ---
-
-- LDAP GROUP ENTRY EXAMPLES (LDIF Format, look in groups.ldif)
-    --- CUT HERE ---
-    dn: cn=unix,ou=groups,dc=cuckoos,dc=net
-    objectclass: top
-    objectclass: posixGroup
-    description: Unix based servers group
-    cn: unix
-    gidNumber: 1002
-    memberUid: jdoe
-    memberUid: user1
-    memberUid: user2
-    [...]
-    --- CUT HERE ---
-
->> FYI: << 
-Multiple 'sshPublicKey' in a user entry are allowed, as well as multiple 'memberUid' attributes in a group entry
-
-- COMPILING:
-  1. Apply the patch
-  2. ./configure --with-your-options --with-ldap=/prefix/to/ldap_libs_and_includes
-  3. make
-  4. it's done.
-
-- BLA :
-  I hope this could help, and i hope to be clear enough,, or give ideas.  questions/comments/improvements are welcome.
-  
-- TODO :
-  Redesign differently.
-
-- DOCS/LINK :
-  http://pacsec.jp/core05/psj05-barisani-en.pdf
-  http://fritz.potsdam.edu/projects/openssh-lpk/
-  http://fritz.potsdam.edu/projects/sshgate/
-  http://dev.inversepath.com/trac/openssh-lpk
-  http://lam.sf.net/ ( http://lam.sourceforge.net/documentation/supportedSchemas.htm )
-
-- CONTRIBUTORS/IDEAS/GREETS :
-  - Falk Siemonsmeier.
-  - Jacob Rief.
-  - Michael Durchgraf.
-  - frederic peters.
-  - Finlay dobbie.
-  - Stefan Fisher.
-  - Robin H. Johnson.
-  - Adrian Bridgett.
-
-- CONTACT :
-  - Eric AUGE <eau@phear.org>
-  - Andrea Barisani <andrea@inversepath.com>

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/README.platform

@@ -1,96 +0,0 @@
-This file contains notes about OpenSSH on specific platforms.
-
-AIX
----
-As of OpenSSH 3.8p1, sshd will now honour an accounts password expiry
-settings, where previously it did not.  Because of this, it's possible for
-sites that have used OpenSSH's sshd exclusively to have accounts which
-have passwords expired longer than the inactive time (ie the "Weeks between
-password EXPIRATION and LOCKOUT" setting in SMIT or the maxexpired
-chuser attribute).
-
-Accounts in this state must have their passwords reset manually by the
-administrator.  As a precaution, it is recommended that the administrative
-passwords be reset before upgrading from OpenSSH <3.8.
-
-As of OpenSSH 4.0, configure will attempt to detect if your version
-and maintenance level of AIX has a working getaddrinfo, and will use it
-if found.  This will enable IPv6 support.  If for some reason configure
-gets it wrong, or if you want to build binaries to work on earlier MLs
-than the build host then you can add "-DBROKEN_GETADDRINFO" to CFLAGS
-to force the previous IPv4-only behaviour.
-
-IPv6 known to work: 5.1ML7 5.2ML2 5.2ML5
-IPv6 known broken: 4.3.3ML11 5.1ML4
-
-If you wish to use dynamic libraries that aren't in the normal system
-locations (eg IBM's OpenSSL and zlib packages) then you will need to
-define the environment variable blibpath before running configure, eg
-
-blibpath=/lib:/usr/lib:/opt/freeware/lib ./configure \
-  --with-ssl-dir=/opt/freeware --with-zlib=/opt/freeware
-
-If sshd is built with the WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE option (which is enabled
-by default) then sshd checks that users are permitted via the
-loginrestrictions() function, in particular that the user has the
-"rlogin" attribute set.  This check is not done for the root account,
-instead the PermitRootLogin setting in sshd_config is used.
-
-
-Cygwin
-------
-To build on Cygwin, OpenSSH requires the following packages:
-gcc, gcc-mingw-core, mingw-runtime, binutils, make, openssl,
-openssl-devel, zlib, minres, minires-devel.
-
-
-Darwin and MacOS X
-------------------
-Darwin does not provide a tun(4) driver required for OpenSSH-based
-virtual private networks. The BSD manpage still exists, but the driver
-has been removed in recent releases of Darwin and MacOS X.
-
-Nevertheless, tunnel support is known to work with Darwin 8 and
-MacOS X 10.4 in Point-to-Point (Layer 3) and Ethernet (Layer 2) mode
-using a third party driver. More information is available at:
-	http://www-user.rhrk.uni-kl.de/~nissler/tuntap/
-
-
-Linux
------
-
-Some Linux distributions (including Red Hat/Fedora/CentOS) include
-headers and library links in the -devel RPMs rather than the main
-binary RPMs. If you get an error about headers, or complaining about a
-missing prerequisite then you may need to install the equivalent
-development packages.  On Redhat based distros these may be openssl-devel,
-zlib-devel and pam-devel, on Debian based distros these may be
-libssl-dev, libz-dev and libpam-dev.
-
-
-Solaris
--------
-If you enable BSM auditing on Solaris, you need to update audit_event(4)
-for praudit(1m) to give sensible output.  The following line needs to be
-added to /etc/security/audit_event:
-
-	32800:AUE_openssh:OpenSSH login:lo
-
-The BSM audit event range available for third party TCB applications is
-32768 - 65535.  Event number 32800 has been choosen for AUE_openssh.
-There is no official registry of 3rd party event numbers, so if this
-number is already in use on your system, you may change it at build time
-by configure'ing --with-cflags=-DAUE_openssh=32801 then rebuilding.
-
-
-Platforms using PAM
--------------------
-As of OpenSSH 4.3p1, sshd will no longer check /etc/nologin itself when
-PAM is enabled.  To maintain existing behaviour, pam_nologin should be
-added to sshd's session stack which will prevent users from starting shell
-sessions.  Alternatively, pam_nologin can be added to either the auth or
-account stacks which will prevent authentication entirely, but will still
-return the output from pam_nologin to the client.
-
-
-$Id: README.platform,v 1.10 2009/08/28 23:14:48 dtucker Exp $

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/README.privsep

@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
-Privilege separation, or privsep, is method in OpenSSH by which
-operations that require root privilege are performed by a separate
-privileged monitor process.  Its purpose is to prevent privilege
-escalation by containing corruption to an unprivileged process.
-More information is available at:
-	http://www.citi.umich.edu/u/provos/ssh/privsep.html
-
-Privilege separation is now enabled by default; see the
-UsePrivilegeSeparation option in sshd_config(5).
-
-On systems which lack mmap or anonymous (MAP_ANON) memory mapping,
-compression must be disabled in order for privilege separation to
-function.
-
-When privsep is enabled, during the pre-authentication phase sshd will
-chroot(2) to "/var/empty" and change its privileges to the "sshd" user
-and its primary group.  sshd is a pseudo-account that should not be
-used by other daemons, and must be locked and should contain a
-"nologin" or invalid shell.
-
-You should do something like the following to prepare the privsep
-preauth environment:
-
-	# mkdir /var/empty
-	# chown root:sys /var/empty
-	# chmod 755 /var/empty
-	# groupadd sshd
-	# useradd -g sshd -c 'sshd privsep' -d /var/empty -s /bin/false sshd
-
-/var/empty should not contain any files.
-
-configure supports the following options to change the default
-privsep user and chroot directory:
-
-  --with-privsep-path=xxx Path for privilege separation chroot
-  --with-privsep-user=user Specify non-privileged user for privilege separation
-
-Privsep requires operating system support for file descriptor passing.
-Compression will be disabled on systems without a working mmap MAP_ANON.
-
-PAM-enabled OpenSSH is known to function with privsep on AIX, FreeBSD, 
-HP-UX (including Trusted Mode), Linux, NetBSD and Solaris.
-
-On Cygwin, Tru64 Unix, OpenServer, and Unicos only the pre-authentication
-part of privsep is supported.  Post-authentication privsep is disabled
-automatically (so you won't see the additional process mentioned below).
-
-Note that for a normal interactive login with a shell, enabling privsep
-will require 1 additional process per login session.
-
-Given the following process listing (from HP-UX):
-
-     UID   PID  PPID  C    STIME TTY       TIME COMMAND
-    root  1005     1  0 10:45:17 ?         0:08 /opt/openssh/sbin/sshd -u0
-    root  6917  1005  0 15:19:16 ?         0:00 sshd: stevesk [priv]
- stevesk  6919  6917  0 15:19:17 ?         0:03 sshd: stevesk@2
- stevesk  6921  6919  0 15:19:17 pts/2     0:00 -bash
-
-process 1005 is the sshd process listening for new connections.
-process 6917 is the privileged monitor process, 6919 is the user owned
-sshd process and 6921 is the shell process.
-
-$Id: README.privsep,v 1.16 2005/06/04 23:21:41 djm Exp $

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/README.tun

@@ -1,132 +0,0 @@
-How to use OpenSSH-based virtual private networks
--------------------------------------------------
-
-OpenSSH contains support for VPN tunneling using the tun(4) network
-tunnel pseudo-device which is available on most platforms, either for
-layer 2 or 3 traffic.
-
-The following brief instructions on how to use this feature use
-a network configuration specific to the OpenBSD operating system.
-
-(1) Server: Enable support for SSH tunneling
-
-To enable the ssh server to accept tunnel requests from the client, you
-have to add the following option to the ssh server configuration file
-(/etc/ssh/sshd_config):
-
-	PermitTunnel yes
-
-Restart the server or send the hangup signal (SIGHUP) to let the server
-reread it's configuration.
-
-(2) Server: Restrict client access and assign the tunnel
-
-The OpenSSH server simply uses the file /root/.ssh/authorized_keys to
-restrict the client to connect to a specified tunnel and to
-automatically start the related interface configuration command. These
-settings are optional but recommended:
-
-	tunnel="1",command="sh /etc/netstart tun1" ssh-rsa ... reyk@openbsd.org
-
-(3) Client: Configure the local network tunnel interface
-
-Use the hostname.if(5) interface-specific configuration file to set up
-the network tunnel configuration with OpenBSD. For example, use the
-following configuration in /etc/hostname.tun0 to set up the layer 3
-tunnel on the client:
-
-	inet 192.168.5.1 255.255.255.252 192.168.5.2
-
-OpenBSD also supports layer 2 tunneling over the tun device by adding
-the link0 flag:
-
-	inet 192.168.1.78 255.255.255.0 192.168.1.255 link0
-
-Layer 2 tunnels can be used in combination with an Ethernet bridge(4)
-interface, like the following example for /etc/bridgename.bridge0:
-
-	add tun0
-	add sis0
-	up
-
-(4) Client: Configure the OpenSSH client
-
-To establish tunnel forwarding for connections to a specified
-remote host by default, use the following ssh client configuration for
-the privileged user (in /root/.ssh/config):
-
-	Host sshgateway
-		Tunnel yes
-		TunnelDevice 0:any
-		PermitLocalCommand yes
-	        LocalCommand sh /etc/netstart tun0
-
-A more complicated configuration is possible to establish a tunnel to
-a remote host which is not directly accessible by the client.
-The following example describes a client configuration to connect to
-the remote host over two ssh hops in between. It uses the OpenSSH
-ProxyCommand in combination with the nc(1) program to forward the final
-ssh tunnel destination over multiple ssh sessions.
-
-	Host access.somewhere.net
-	        User puffy
-	Host dmzgw
-	        User puffy
-	        ProxyCommand ssh access.somewhere.net nc dmzgw 22
-	Host sshgateway
-	        Tunnel Ethernet
-	        TunnelDevice 0:any
-	        PermitLocalCommand yes
-	        LocalCommand sh /etc/netstart tun0
-	        ProxyCommand ssh dmzgw nc sshgateway 22
-
-The following network plan illustrates the previous configuration in
-combination with layer 2 tunneling and Ethernet bridging.
-
-+--------+       (          )      +----------------------+
-| Client |------(  Internet  )-----| access.somewhere.net |
-+--------+       (          )      +----------------------+
-    : 192.168.1.78                             |
-    :.............................         +-------+
-     Forwarded ssh connection    :         | dmzgw |
-     Layer 2 tunnel              :         +-------+
-                                 :             |
-                                 :             |
-                                 :      +------------+
-                                 :......| sshgateway |
-                                      | +------------+
---- real connection                 Bridge ->  |          +----------+
-... "virtual connection"                     [ X ]--------| somehost |
-[X] switch                                                +----------+
-                                                          192.168.1.25
-
-(5) Client: Connect to the server and establish the tunnel
-
-Finally connect to the OpenSSH server to establish the tunnel by using
-the following command:
-
-	ssh sshgateway
-
-It is also possible to tell the client to fork into the background after
-the connection has been successfully established:
-
-	ssh -f sshgateway true
-
-Without the ssh configuration done in step (4), it is also possible
-to use the following command lines:
-
-	ssh -fw 0:1 sshgateway true
-	ifconfig tun0 192.168.5.1 192.168.5.2 netmask 255.255.255.252
-
-Using OpenSSH tunnel forwarding is a simple way to establish secure
-and ad hoc virtual private networks. Possible fields of application
-could be wireless networks or administrative VPN tunnels.
-
-Nevertheless, ssh tunneling requires some packet header overhead and
-runs on top of TCP. It is still suggested to use the IP Security
-Protocol (IPSec) for robust and permanent VPN connections and to
-interconnect corporate networks.
-
-	Reyk Floeter
-
-$OpenBSD: README.tun,v 1.4 2006/03/28 00:12:31 deraadt Exp $

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/TODO

@@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
-Documentation:
-
-- Update the docs
-  - Update README
-  - Update INSTALL
-  - Merge INSTALL & README.privsep
-
-- Install FAQ?
-
-- General FAQ on S/Key, TIS, RSA, RSA2, DSA, etc and suggestions on when it
-  would be best to use them.
-
-- Create a Documentation/ directory?
-
-Programming:
-
-- Grep for 'XXX' comments and fix
-
-- Link order is incorrect for some systems using Kerberos 4 and AFS. Result
-  is multiple inclusion of DES symbols. Holger Trapp
-  <holger.trapp@hrz.tu-chemnitz.de> reports that changing the configure
-  generated link order from:
-	-lresolv -lkrb -lz -lnsl  -lutil -lkafs -lkrb -ldes -lcrypto
-  to:
-	-lresolv -lkrb -lz -lnsl  -lutil -lcrypto -lkafs -lkrb -ldes
-  fixing the problem.
-
-- Write a test program that calls stat() to search for EGD/PRNGd socket
-  rather than use the (non-portable) "test -S".
-
-- More platforms for for setproctitle() emulation (testing needed)
-
-- Improve PAM ChallengeResponseAuthentication
- - Informational messages
- - Use different PAM service name for kbdint vs regular auth (suggest from
-   Solar Designer)
- - Ability to select which ChallengeResponseAuthentications may be used
-   and order to try them in e.g. "ChallengeResponseAuthentication skey, pam"
-
-- Complete Tru64 SIA support
- - It looks like we could merge it into the password auth code to cut down
-   on diff size. Maybe PAM password auth too?
-
-- Finish integrating kernel-level auditing code for IRIX and SOLARIS
-  (Gilbert.r.loomis@saic.com)
-
-- 64-bit builds on HP-UX 11.X (stevesk@pobox.com):
-  - utmp/wtmp get corrupted (something in loginrec?)
-  - can't build with PAM (no 64-bit libpam yet)
-
-Clean up configure/makefiles:
-- Clean up configure.ac - There are a few double #defined variables
-  left to do.  HAVE_LOGIN is one of them.  Consider NOT looking for
-  information in wtmpx or utmpx or any of that stuff if it's not detected
-  from the start
-
-- Replace the whole u_intXX_t evilness in acconfig.h with something better???
- - Do it in configure.ac
-
-- Consider splitting the u_intXX_t test for sys/bitype.h  into seperate test
-  to allow people to (right/wrongfully) link against Bind directly.
-
-- Consider splitting configure.ac into seperate files which do logically
-  similar tests. E.g move all the type detection stuff into one file,
-  entropy related stuff into another.
-
-Packaging:
-- HP-UX: Provide DEPOT package scripts.
-  (gilbert.r.loomis@saic.com)
-
-PrivSep Issues:
-- mmap() issues.
-  + /dev/zero solution (Solaris)
-  + No/broken MAP_ANON (Irix)
-  + broken /dev/zero parse (Linux)
-- PAM
-  + See above PAM notes
-- AIX
-  + usrinfo() does not set TTY, but only required for legacy systems.  Works
-    with PrivSep.
-- OSF
-  + SIA is broken
-- Cygwin
-  + Privsep for Pre-auth only (no fd passing)
-
-$Id: TODO,v 1.58 2004/12/06 11:40:11 dtucker Exp $

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/addrmatch.c

@@ -1,499 +0,0 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: addrmatch.c,v 1.10 2015/07/08 19:04:21 markus Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2004-2008 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-#include <arpa/inet.h>
-
-#include <netdb.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-
-#include "match.h"
-#include "log.h"
-
-struct xaddr {
-	sa_family_t	af;
-	union {
-		struct in_addr		v4;
-		struct in6_addr		v6;
-		u_int8_t		addr8[16];
-		u_int32_t		addr32[4];
-	} xa;		    /* 128-bit address */
-	u_int32_t	scope_id;	/* iface scope id for v6 */
-#define v4	xa.v4
-#define v6	xa.v6
-#define addr8	xa.addr8
-#define addr32	xa.addr32
-};
-
-static int
-addr_unicast_masklen(int af)
-{
-	switch (af) {
-	case AF_INET:
-		return 32;
-	case AF_INET6:
-		return 128;
-	default:
-		return -1;
-	}
-}
-
-static inline int
-masklen_valid(int af, u_int masklen)
-{
-	switch (af) {
-	case AF_INET:
-		return masklen <= 32 ? 0 : -1;
-	case AF_INET6:
-		return masklen <= 128 ? 0 : -1;
-	default:
-		return -1;
-	}
-}
-
-/*
- * Convert struct sockaddr to struct xaddr
- * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
- */
-static int
-addr_sa_to_xaddr(struct sockaddr *sa, socklen_t slen, struct xaddr *xa)
-{
-	struct sockaddr_in *in4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa;
-	struct sockaddr_in6 *in6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa;
-
-	memset(xa, '\0', sizeof(*xa));
-
-	switch (sa->sa_family) {
-	case AF_INET:
-		if (slen < (socklen_t)sizeof(*in4))
-			return -1;
-		xa->af = AF_INET;
-		memcpy(&xa->v4, &in4->sin_addr, sizeof(xa->v4));
-		break;
-	case AF_INET6:
-		if (slen < (socklen_t)sizeof(*in6))
-			return -1;
-		xa->af = AF_INET6;
-		memcpy(&xa->v6, &in6->sin6_addr, sizeof(xa->v6));
-#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6_SIN6_SCOPE_ID
-		xa->scope_id = in6->sin6_scope_id;
-#endif
-		break;
-	default:
-		return -1;
-	}
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Calculate a netmask of length 'l' for address family 'af' and
- * store it in 'n'.
- * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
- */
-static int
-addr_netmask(int af, u_int l, struct xaddr *n)
-{
-	int i;
-
-	if (masklen_valid(af, l) != 0 || n == NULL)
-		return -1;
-
-	memset(n, '\0', sizeof(*n));
-	switch (af) {
-	case AF_INET:
-		n->af = AF_INET;
-		if (l == 0)
-			return 0;
-		n->v4.s_addr = htonl((0xffffffff << (32 - l)) & 0xffffffff);
-		return 0;
-	case AF_INET6:
-		n->af = AF_INET6;
-		for (i = 0; i < 4 && l >= 32; i++, l -= 32)
-			n->addr32[i] = 0xffffffffU;
-		if (i < 4 && l != 0)
-			n->addr32[i] = htonl((0xffffffff << (32 - l)) &
-			    0xffffffff);
-		return 0;
-	default:
-		return -1;
-	}
-}
-
-/*
- * Perform logical AND of addresses 'a' and 'b', storing result in 'dst'.
- * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
- */
-static int
-addr_and(struct xaddr *dst, const struct xaddr *a, const struct xaddr *b)
-{
-	int i;
-
-	if (dst == NULL || a == NULL || b == NULL || a->af != b->af)
-		return -1;
-
-	memcpy(dst, a, sizeof(*dst));
-	switch (a->af) {
-	case AF_INET:
-		dst->v4.s_addr &= b->v4.s_addr;
-		return 0;
-	case AF_INET6:
-		dst->scope_id = a->scope_id;
-		for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
-			dst->addr32[i] &= b->addr32[i];
-		return 0;
-	default:
-		return -1;
-	}
-}
-
-/*
- * Compare addresses 'a' and 'b'
- * Return 0 if addresses are identical, -1 if (a < b) or 1 if (a > b)
- */
-static int
-addr_cmp(const struct xaddr *a, const struct xaddr *b)
-{
-	int i;
-
-	if (a->af != b->af)
-		return a->af == AF_INET6 ? 1 : -1;
-
-	switch (a->af) {
-	case AF_INET:
-		if (a->v4.s_addr == b->v4.s_addr)
-			return 0;
-		return ntohl(a->v4.s_addr) > ntohl(b->v4.s_addr) ? 1 : -1;
-	case AF_INET6:
-		for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
-			if (a->addr8[i] - b->addr8[i] != 0)
-				return a->addr8[i] > b->addr8[i] ? 1 : -1;
-		if (a->scope_id == b->scope_id)
-			return 0;
-		return a->scope_id > b->scope_id ? 1 : -1;
-	default:
-		return -1;
-	}
-}
-
-/*
- * Parse string address 'p' into 'n'
- * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
- */
-static int
-addr_pton(const char *p, struct xaddr *n)
-{
-	struct addrinfo hints, *ai;
-
-	memset(&hints, '\0', sizeof(hints));
-	hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
-
-	if (p == NULL || getaddrinfo(p, NULL, &hints, &ai) != 0)
-		return -1;
-
-	if (ai == NULL || ai->ai_addr == NULL)
-		return -1;
-
-	if (n != NULL &&
-	    addr_sa_to_xaddr(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, n) == -1) {
-		freeaddrinfo(ai);
-		return -1;
-	}
-
-	freeaddrinfo(ai);
-	return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Perform bitwise negation of address
- * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
- */
-static int
-addr_invert(struct xaddr *n)
-{
-	int i;
-
-	if (n == NULL)
-		return (-1);
-
-	switch (n->af) {
-	case AF_INET:
-		n->v4.s_addr = ~n->v4.s_addr;
-		return (0);
-	case AF_INET6:
-		for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
-			n->addr32[i] = ~n->addr32[i];
-		return (0);
-	default:
-		return (-1);
-	}
-}
-
-/*
- * Calculate a netmask of length 'l' for address family 'af' and
- * store it in 'n'.
- * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
- */
-static int
-addr_hostmask(int af, u_int l, struct xaddr *n)
-{
-	if (addr_netmask(af, l, n) == -1 || addr_invert(n) == -1)
-		return (-1);
-	return (0);
-}
-
-/*
- * Test whether address 'a' is all zeros (i.e. 0.0.0.0 or ::)
- * Returns 0 on if address is all-zeros, -1 if not all zeros or on failure.
- */
-static int
-addr_is_all0s(const struct xaddr *a)
-{
-	int i;
-
-	switch (a->af) {
-	case AF_INET:
-		return (a->v4.s_addr == 0 ? 0 : -1);
-	case AF_INET6:;
-		for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
-			if (a->addr32[i] != 0)
-				return (-1);
-		return (0);
-	default:
-		return (-1);
-	}
-}
-
-/*
- * Test whether host portion of address 'a', as determined by 'masklen'
- * is all zeros.
- * Returns 0 on if host portion of address is all-zeros,
- * -1 if not all zeros or on failure.
- */
-static int
-addr_host_is_all0s(const struct xaddr *a, u_int masklen)
-{
-	struct xaddr tmp_addr, tmp_mask, tmp_result;
-
-	memcpy(&tmp_addr, a, sizeof(tmp_addr));
-	if (addr_hostmask(a->af, masklen, &tmp_mask) == -1)
-		return (-1);
-	if (addr_and(&tmp_result, &tmp_addr, &tmp_mask) == -1)
-		return (-1);
-	return (addr_is_all0s(&tmp_result));
-}
-
-/*
- * Parse a CIDR address (x.x.x.x/y or xxxx:yyyy::/z).
- * Return -1 on parse error, -2 on inconsistency or 0 on success.
- */
-static int
-addr_pton_cidr(const char *p, struct xaddr *n, u_int *l)
-{
-	struct xaddr tmp;
-	long unsigned int masklen = 999;
-	char addrbuf[64], *mp, *cp;
-
-	/* Don't modify argument */
-	if (p == NULL || strlcpy(addrbuf, p, sizeof(addrbuf)) >= sizeof(addrbuf))
-		return -1;
-
-	if ((mp = strchr(addrbuf, '/')) != NULL) {
-		*mp = '\0';
-		mp++;
-		masklen = strtoul(mp, &cp, 10);
-		if (*mp == '\0' || *cp != '\0' || masklen > 128)
-			return -1;
-	}
-
-	if (addr_pton(addrbuf, &tmp) == -1)
-		return -1;
-
-	if (mp == NULL)
-		masklen = addr_unicast_masklen(tmp.af);
-	if (masklen_valid(tmp.af, masklen) == -1)
-		return -2;
-	if (addr_host_is_all0s(&tmp, masklen) != 0)
-		return -2;
-
-	if (n != NULL)
-		memcpy(n, &tmp, sizeof(*n));
-	if (l != NULL)
-		*l = masklen;
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int
-addr_netmatch(const struct xaddr *host, const struct xaddr *net, u_int masklen)
-{
-	struct xaddr tmp_mask, tmp_result;
-
-	if (host->af != net->af)
-		return -1;
-
-	if (addr_netmask(host->af, masklen, &tmp_mask) == -1)
-		return -1;
-	if (addr_and(&tmp_result, host, &tmp_mask) == -1)
-		return -1;
-	return addr_cmp(&tmp_result, net);
-}
-
-/*
- * Match "addr" against list pattern list "_list", which may contain a
- * mix of CIDR addresses and old-school wildcards.
- *
- * If addr is NULL, then no matching is performed, but _list is parsed
- * and checked for well-formedness.
- *
- * Returns 1 on match found (never returned when addr == NULL).
- * Returns 0 on if no match found, or no errors found when addr == NULL.
- * Returns -1 on negated match found (never returned when addr == NULL).
- * Returns -2 on invalid list entry.
- */
-int
-addr_match_list(const char *addr, const char *_list)
-{
-	char *list, *cp, *o;
-	struct xaddr try_addr, match_addr;
-	u_int masklen, neg;
-	int ret = 0, r;
-
-	if (addr != NULL && addr_pton(addr, &try_addr) != 0) {
-		debug2("%s: couldn't parse address %.100s", __func__, addr);
-		return 0;
-	}
-	if ((o = list = strdup(_list)) == NULL)
-		return -1;
-	while ((cp = strsep(&list, ",")) != NULL) {
-		neg = *cp == '!';
-		if (neg)
-			cp++;
-		if (*cp == '\0') {
-			ret = -2;
-			break;
-		}
-		/* Prefer CIDR address matching */
-		r = addr_pton_cidr(cp, &match_addr, &masklen);
-		if (r == -2) {
-			error("Inconsistent mask length for "
-			    "network \"%.100s\"", cp);
-			ret = -2;
-			break;
-		} else if (r == 0) {
-			if (addr != NULL && addr_netmatch(&try_addr,
-                           &match_addr, masklen) == 0) {
- foundit:
-				if (neg) {
-					ret = -1;
-					break;
-				}
-				ret = 1;
-			}
-			continue;
-		} else {
-			/* If CIDR parse failed, try wildcard string match */
-			if (addr != NULL && match_pattern(addr, cp) == 1)
-				goto foundit;
-		}
-	}
-	free(o);
-
-	return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Match "addr" against list CIDR list "_list". Lexical wildcards and
- * negation are not supported. If "addr" == NULL, will verify structure
- * of "_list".
- *
- * Returns 1 on match found (never returned when addr == NULL).
- * Returns 0 on if no match found, or no errors found when addr == NULL.
- * Returns -1 on error
- */
-int
-addr_match_cidr_list(const char *addr, const char *_list)
-{
-	char *list, *cp, *o;
-	struct xaddr try_addr, match_addr;
-	u_int masklen;
-	int ret = 0, r;
-
-	if (addr != NULL && addr_pton(addr, &try_addr) != 0) {
-		debug2("%s: couldn't parse address %.100s", __func__, addr);
-		return 0;
-	}
-	if ((o = list = strdup(_list)) == NULL)
-		return -1;
-	while ((cp = strsep(&list, ",")) != NULL) {
-		if (*cp == '\0') {
-			error("%s: empty entry in list \"%.100s\"",
-			    __func__, o);
-			ret = -1;
-			break;
-		}
-
-		/*
-		 * NB. This function is called in pre-auth with untrusted data,
-		 * so be extra paranoid about junk reaching getaddrino (via
-		 * addr_pton_cidr).
-		 */
-
-		/* Stop junk from reaching getaddrinfo. +3 is for masklen */
-		if (strlen(cp) > INET6_ADDRSTRLEN + 3) {
-			error("%s: list entry \"%.100s\" too long",
-			    __func__, cp);
-			ret = -1;
-			break;
-		}
-#define VALID_CIDR_CHARS "0123456789abcdefABCDEF.:/"
-		if (strspn(cp, VALID_CIDR_CHARS) != strlen(cp)) {
-			error("%s: list entry \"%.100s\" contains invalid "
-			    "characters", __func__, cp);
-			ret = -1;
-		}
-
-		/* Prefer CIDR address matching */
-		r = addr_pton_cidr(cp, &match_addr, &masklen);
-		if (r == -1) {
-			error("Invalid network entry \"%.100s\"", cp);
-			ret = -1;
-			break;
-		} else if (r == -2) {
-			error("Inconsistent mask length for "
-			    "network \"%.100s\"", cp);
-			ret = -1;
-			break;
-		} else if (r == 0 && addr != NULL) {
-			if (addr_netmatch(&try_addr, &match_addr,
-			    masklen) == 0)
-				ret = 1;
-			continue;
-		}
-	}
-	free(o);
-
-	return ret;
-}

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/atomicio.c

@@ -1,170 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: atomicio.c,v 1.27 2015/01/16 06:40:12 deraadt Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2006 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 2005 Anil Madhavapeddy. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 1995,1999 Theo de Raadt.  All rights reserved.
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/param.h>
-#include <sys/uio.h>
-
-#include <errno.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
-#include <poll.h>
-#else
-# ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H
-#  include <sys/poll.h>
-# endif
-#endif
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <limits.h>
-
-#include "atomicio.h"
-
-/*
- * ensure all of data on socket comes through. f==read || f==vwrite
- */
-size_t
-atomicio6(ssize_t (*f) (int, void *, size_t), int fd, void *_s, size_t n,
-    int (*cb)(void *, size_t), void *cb_arg)
-{
-	char *s = _s;
-	size_t pos = 0;
-	ssize_t res;
-	struct pollfd pfd;
-
-#ifndef BROKEN_READ_COMPARISON
-	pfd.fd = fd;
-	pfd.events = f == read ? POLLIN : POLLOUT;
-#endif
-	while (n > pos) {
-		res = (f) (fd, s + pos, n - pos);
-		switch (res) {
-		case -1:
-			if (errno == EINTR)
-				continue;
-			if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) {
-#ifndef BROKEN_READ_COMPARISON
-				(void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1);
-#endif
-				continue;
-			}
-			return 0;
-		case 0:
-			errno = EPIPE;
-			return pos;
-		default:
-			pos += (size_t)res;
-			if (cb != NULL && cb(cb_arg, (size_t)res) == -1) {
-				errno = EINTR;
-				return pos;
-			}
-		}
-	}
-	return pos;
-}
-
-size_t
-atomicio(ssize_t (*f) (int, void *, size_t), int fd, void *_s, size_t n)
-{
-	return atomicio6(f, fd, _s, n, NULL, NULL);
-}
-
-/*
- * ensure all of data on socket comes through. f==readv || f==writev
- */
-size_t
-atomiciov6(ssize_t (*f) (int, const struct iovec *, int), int fd,
-    const struct iovec *_iov, int iovcnt,
-    int (*cb)(void *, size_t), void *cb_arg)
-{
-	size_t pos = 0, rem;
-	ssize_t res;
-	struct iovec iov_array[IOV_MAX], *iov = iov_array;
-	struct pollfd pfd;
-
-	if (iovcnt > IOV_MAX) {
-		errno = EINVAL;
-		return 0;
-	}
-	/* Make a copy of the iov array because we may modify it below */
-	memcpy(iov, _iov, iovcnt * sizeof(*_iov));
-
-#ifndef BROKEN_READV_COMPARISON
-	pfd.fd = fd;
-	pfd.events = f == readv ? POLLIN : POLLOUT;
-#endif
-	for (; iovcnt > 0 && iov[0].iov_len > 0;) {
-		res = (f) (fd, iov, iovcnt);
-		switch (res) {
-		case -1:
-			if (errno == EINTR)
-				continue;
-			if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) {
-#ifndef BROKEN_READV_COMPARISON
-				(void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1);
-#endif
-				continue;
-			}
-			return 0;
-		case 0:
-			errno = EPIPE;
-			return pos;
-		default:
-			rem = (size_t)res;
-			pos += rem;
-			/* skip completed iov entries */
-			while (iovcnt > 0 && rem >= iov[0].iov_len) {
-				rem -= iov[0].iov_len;
-				iov++;
-				iovcnt--;
-			}
-			/* This shouldn't happen... */
-			if (rem > 0 && (iovcnt <= 0 || rem > iov[0].iov_len)) {
-				errno = EFAULT;
-				return 0;
-			}
-			if (iovcnt == 0)
-				break;
-			/* update pointer in partially complete iov */
-			iov[0].iov_base = ((char *)iov[0].iov_base) + rem;
-			iov[0].iov_len -= rem;
-		}
-		if (cb != NULL && cb(cb_arg, (size_t)res) == -1) {
-			errno = EINTR;
-			return pos;
-		}
-	}
-	return pos;
-}
-
-size_t
-atomiciov(ssize_t (*f) (int, const struct iovec *, int), int fd,
-    const struct iovec *_iov, int iovcnt)
-{
-	return atomiciov6(f, fd, _iov, iovcnt, NULL, NULL);
-}

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/atomicio.h

@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: atomicio.h,v 1.11 2010/09/22 22:58:51 djm Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2006 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 1995,1999 Theo de Raadt.  All rights reserved.
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#ifndef _ATOMICIO_H
-#define _ATOMICIO_H
-
-/*
- * Ensure all of data on socket comes through. f==read || f==vwrite
- */
-size_t
-atomicio6(ssize_t (*f) (int, void *, size_t), int fd, void *_s, size_t n,
-    int (*cb)(void *, size_t), void *);
-size_t	atomicio(ssize_t (*)(int, void *, size_t), int, void *, size_t);
-
-#define vwrite (ssize_t (*)(int, void *, size_t))write
-
-/*
- * ensure all of data on socket comes through. f==readv || f==writev
- */
-size_t
-atomiciov6(ssize_t (*f) (int, const struct iovec *, int), int fd,
-    const struct iovec *_iov, int iovcnt, int (*cb)(void *, size_t), void *);
-size_t	atomiciov(ssize_t (*)(int, const struct iovec *, int),
-    int, const struct iovec *, int);
-
-#endif /* _ATOMICIO_H */

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/audit-bsm.c

@@ -1,457 +0,0 @@
-/* $Id: audit-bsm.c,v 1.8 2012/02/23 23:40:43 dtucker Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * TODO
- *
- * - deal with overlap between this and sys_auth_allowed_user
- *   sys_auth_record_login and record_failed_login.
- */
-
-/*
- * Copyright 1988-2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc.  All rights reserved.
- * Use is subject to license terms.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- */
-/* #pragma ident	"@(#)bsmaudit.c	1.1	01/09/17 SMI" */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-#if defined(USE_BSM_AUDIT)
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <netdb.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#ifdef BROKEN_BSM_API
-#include <libscf.h>
-#endif
-
-#include "ssh.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-
-#ifndef AUE_openssh
-# define AUE_openssh     32800
-#endif
-#include <bsm/audit.h>
-#include <bsm/libbsm.h>
-#include <bsm/audit_uevents.h>
-#include <bsm/audit_record.h>
-#include <locale.h>
-
-#if defined(HAVE_GETAUDIT_ADDR)
-#define	AuditInfoStruct		auditinfo_addr
-#define AuditInfoTermID		au_tid_addr_t
-#define SetAuditFunc(a,b)	setaudit_addr((a),(b))
-#define SetAuditFuncText	"setaudit_addr"
-#define AUToSubjectFunc		au_to_subject_ex
-#define AUToReturnFunc(a,b)	au_to_return32((a), (int32_t)(b))
-#else
-#define	AuditInfoStruct		auditinfo
-#define AuditInfoTermID		au_tid_t
-#define SetAuditFunc(a,b)	setaudit(a)
-#define SetAuditFuncText	"setaudit"
-#define AUToSubjectFunc		au_to_subject
-#define AUToReturnFunc(a,b)	au_to_return((a), (u_int)(b))
-#endif
-
-#ifndef cannot_audit
-extern int	cannot_audit(int);
-#endif
-extern void	aug_init(void);
-extern void	aug_save_auid(au_id_t);
-extern void	aug_save_uid(uid_t);
-extern void	aug_save_euid(uid_t);
-extern void	aug_save_gid(gid_t);
-extern void	aug_save_egid(gid_t);
-extern void	aug_save_pid(pid_t);
-extern void	aug_save_asid(au_asid_t);
-extern void	aug_save_tid(dev_t, unsigned int);
-extern void	aug_save_tid_ex(dev_t, u_int32_t *, u_int32_t);
-extern int	aug_save_me(void);
-extern int	aug_save_namask(void);
-extern void	aug_save_event(au_event_t);
-extern void	aug_save_sorf(int);
-extern void	aug_save_text(char *);
-extern void	aug_save_text1(char *);
-extern void	aug_save_text2(char *);
-extern void	aug_save_na(int);
-extern void	aug_save_user(char *);
-extern void	aug_save_path(char *);
-extern int	aug_save_policy(void);
-extern void	aug_save_afunc(int (*)(int));
-extern int	aug_audit(void);
-extern int	aug_na_selected(void);
-extern int	aug_selected(void);
-extern int	aug_daemon_session(void);
-
-#ifndef HAVE_GETTEXT
-# define gettext(a)	(a)
-#endif
-
-extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
-static AuditInfoTermID ssh_bsm_tid;
-
-#ifdef BROKEN_BSM_API
-/* For some reason this constant is no longer defined
-   in Solaris 11. */
-#define BSM_TEXTBUFSZ 256
-#endif
-
-/* Below is the low-level BSM interface code */
-
-/*
- * aug_get_machine is only required on IPv6 capable machines, we use a
- * different mechanism in audit_connection_from() for IPv4-only machines.
- * getaudit_addr() is only present on IPv6 capable machines.
- */
-#if defined(HAVE_AUG_GET_MACHINE) || !defined(HAVE_GETAUDIT_ADDR)
-extern int 	aug_get_machine(char *, u_int32_t *, u_int32_t *);
-#else
-static int
-aug_get_machine(char *host, u_int32_t *addr, u_int32_t *type)
-{
-	struct addrinfo *ai; 
-	struct sockaddr_in *in4;
-	struct sockaddr_in6 *in6;
-	int ret = 0, r;
-
-	if ((r = getaddrinfo(host, NULL, NULL, &ai)) != 0) {
-		error("BSM audit: getaddrinfo failed for %.100s: %.100s", host,
-		    r == EAI_SYSTEM ? strerror(errno) : gai_strerror(r));
-		return -1;
-	}
-	
-	switch (ai->ai_family) {
-	case AF_INET:
-		in4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)ai->ai_addr;
-		*type = AU_IPv4;
-		memcpy(addr, &in4->sin_addr, sizeof(struct in_addr));
-		break;
-#ifdef AU_IPv6
-	case AF_INET6: 
-		in6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)ai->ai_addr;
-		*type = AU_IPv6;
-		memcpy(addr, &in6->sin6_addr, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
-		break;
-#endif
-	default:
-		error("BSM audit: unknown address family for %.100s: %d",
-		    host, ai->ai_family);
-		ret = -1;
-	}
-	freeaddrinfo(ai);
-	return ret;
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifdef BROKEN_BSM_API
-/*
-  In Solaris 11 the audit daemon has been moved to SMF. In the process
-  they simply dropped getacna() from the API, since it read from a now
-  non-existent config file. This function re-implements getacna() to
-  read from the SMF repository instead.
- */
-int
-getacna(char *auditstring, int len)
-{
-	scf_handle_t *handle = NULL;
-	scf_property_t *property = NULL;
-	scf_value_t *value = NULL;
-	int ret = 0;
-
-	handle = scf_handle_create(SCF_VERSION);
-	if (handle == NULL) 
-	        return -2; /* The man page for getacna on Solaris 10 states
-			      we should return -2 in case of error and set
-			      errno to indicate the error. We don't bother
-			      with errno here, though, since the only use
-			      of this function below doesn't check for errors
-			      anyway. 
-			   */
-
-	ret = scf_handle_bind(handle);
-	if (ret == -1) 
-	        return -2;
-
-	property = scf_property_create(handle);
-	if (property == NULL) 
-	        return -2;
-
-	ret = scf_handle_decode_fmri(handle, 
-	     "svc:/system/auditd:default/:properties/preselection/naflags",
-				     NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, property, 0);
-	if (ret == -1) 
-	        return -2;
-
-	value = scf_value_create(handle);
-	if (value == NULL) 
-	        return -2;
-
-	ret = scf_property_get_value(property, value);
-	if (ret == -1) 
-	        return -2;
-
-	ret = scf_value_get_astring(value, auditstring, len);
-	if (ret == -1) 
-	        return -2;
-
-	scf_value_destroy(value);
-	scf_property_destroy(property);
-	scf_handle_destroy(handle);
-
-	return 0;
-}
-#endif
-
-/*
- * Check if the specified event is selected (enabled) for auditing.
- * Returns 1 if the event is selected, 0 if not and -1 on failure.
- */
-static int
-selected(char *username, uid_t uid, au_event_t event, int sf)
-{
-	int rc, sorf;
-	char naflags[512];
-	struct au_mask mask;
-
-	mask.am_success = mask.am_failure = 0;
-	if (uid < 0) {
-		/* get flags for non-attributable (to a real user) events */
-		rc = getacna(naflags, sizeof(naflags));
-		if (rc == 0)
-			(void) getauditflagsbin(naflags, &mask);
-	} else
-		rc = au_user_mask(username, &mask);
-
-	sorf = (sf == 0) ? AU_PRS_SUCCESS : AU_PRS_FAILURE;
-	return(au_preselect(event, &mask, sorf, AU_PRS_REREAD));
-}
-
-static void
-bsm_audit_record(int typ, char *string, au_event_t event_no)
-{
-	int		ad, rc, sel;
-	uid_t		uid = -1;
-	gid_t		gid = -1;
-	pid_t		pid = getpid();
-	AuditInfoTermID	tid = ssh_bsm_tid;
-
-	if (the_authctxt != NULL && the_authctxt->valid) {
-		uid = the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid;
-		gid = the_authctxt->pw->pw_gid;
-	}
-
-	rc = (typ == 0) ? 0 : -1;
-	sel = selected(the_authctxt->user, uid, event_no, rc);
-	debug3("BSM audit: typ %d rc %d \"%s\"", typ, rc, string);
-	if (!sel)
-		return;	/* audit event does not match mask, do not write */
-
-	debug3("BSM audit: writing audit new record");
-	ad = au_open();
-
-	(void) au_write(ad, AUToSubjectFunc(uid, uid, gid, uid, gid,
-	    pid, pid, &tid));
-	(void) au_write(ad, au_to_text(string));
-	(void) au_write(ad, AUToReturnFunc(typ, rc));
-
-#ifdef BROKEN_BSM_API
-	/* The last argument is the event modifier flags. For
-	   some seemingly undocumented reason it was added in
-	   Solaris 11. */
-	rc = au_close(ad, AU_TO_WRITE, event_no, 0);
-#else
-	rc = au_close(ad, AU_TO_WRITE, event_no);
-#endif
-
-	if (rc < 0)
-		error("BSM audit: %s failed to write \"%s\" record: %s",
-		    __func__, string, strerror(errno));
-}
-
-static void
-bsm_audit_session_setup(void)
-{
-	int rc;
-	struct AuditInfoStruct info;
-	au_mask_t mask;
-
-	if (the_authctxt == NULL) {
-		error("BSM audit: session setup internal error (NULL ctxt)");
-		return;
-	}
-
-	if (the_authctxt->valid)
-		info.ai_auid = the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid;
-	else
-		info.ai_auid = -1;
-	info.ai_asid = getpid();
-	mask.am_success = 0;
-	mask.am_failure = 0;
-
-	(void) au_user_mask(the_authctxt->user, &mask);
-
-	info.ai_mask.am_success  = mask.am_success;
-	info.ai_mask.am_failure  = mask.am_failure;
-
-	info.ai_termid = ssh_bsm_tid;
-
-	rc = SetAuditFunc(&info, sizeof(info));
-	if (rc < 0)
-		error("BSM audit: %s: %s failed: %s", __func__,
-		    SetAuditFuncText, strerror(errno));
-}
-
-static void
-bsm_audit_bad_login(const char *what)
-{
-	char textbuf[BSM_TEXTBUFSZ];
-
-	if (the_authctxt->valid) {
-		(void) snprintf(textbuf, sizeof (textbuf),
-			gettext("invalid %s for user %s"),
-			    what, the_authctxt->user);
-		bsm_audit_record(4, textbuf, AUE_openssh);
-	} else {
-		(void) snprintf(textbuf, sizeof (textbuf),
-			gettext("invalid user name \"%s\""),
-			    the_authctxt->user);
-		bsm_audit_record(3, textbuf, AUE_openssh);
-	}
-}
-
-/* Below is the sshd audit API code */
-
-void
-audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port)
-{
-	AuditInfoTermID *tid = &ssh_bsm_tid;
-	char buf[1024];
-
-	if (cannot_audit(0))
-		return;
-	debug3("BSM audit: connection from %.100s port %d", host, port);
-
-	/* populate our terminal id structure */
-#if defined(HAVE_GETAUDIT_ADDR)
-	tid->at_port = (dev_t)port;
-	aug_get_machine((char *)host, &(tid->at_addr[0]), &(tid->at_type));
-	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%08x %08x %08x %08x", tid->at_addr[0],
-	    tid->at_addr[1], tid->at_addr[2], tid->at_addr[3]);
-	debug3("BSM audit: iptype %d machine ID %s", (int)tid->at_type, buf);
-#else
-	/* this is used on IPv4-only machines */
-	tid->port = (dev_t)port;
-	tid->machine = inet_addr(host);
-	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%08x", tid->machine);
-	debug3("BSM audit: machine ID %s", buf);
-#endif
-}
-
-void
-audit_run_command(const char *command)
-{
-	/* not implemented */
-}
-
-void
-audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li)
-{
-	/* not implemented */
-}
-
-void
-audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li)
-{
-	/* not implemented */
-}
-
-void
-audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
-{
-	char    textbuf[BSM_TEXTBUFSZ];
-	static int logged_in = 0;
-	const char *user = the_authctxt ? the_authctxt->user : "(unknown user)";
-
-	if (cannot_audit(0))
-		return;
-
-	switch(event) {
-	case SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS:
-		logged_in = 1;
-		bsm_audit_session_setup();
-		snprintf(textbuf, sizeof(textbuf),
-		    gettext("successful login %s"), user);
-		bsm_audit_record(0, textbuf, AUE_openssh);
-		break;
-
-	case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE:
-		/*
-		 * We can also get a close event if the user attempted auth
-		 * but never succeeded.
-		 */
-		if (logged_in) {
-			snprintf(textbuf, sizeof(textbuf),
-			    gettext("sshd logout %s"), the_authctxt->user);
-			bsm_audit_record(0, textbuf, AUE_logout);
-		} else {
-			debug("%s: connection closed without authentication",
-			    __func__);
-		}
-		break;
-
-	case SSH_NOLOGIN:
-		bsm_audit_record(1,
-		    gettext("logins disabled by /etc/nologin"), AUE_openssh);
-		break;
-
-	case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
-		snprintf(textbuf, sizeof(textbuf),
-		    gettext("too many tries for user %s"), the_authctxt->user);
-		bsm_audit_record(1, textbuf, AUE_openssh);
-		break;
-
-	case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED:
-		bsm_audit_record(2, gettext("not_console"), AUE_openssh);
-		break;
-
-	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD:
-		bsm_audit_bad_login("password");
-		break;
-
-	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT:
-		bsm_audit_bad_login("interactive password entry");
-		break;
-
-	default:
-		debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event);
-	}
-}
-#endif /* BSM */

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/audit-linux.c

@@ -1,126 +0,0 @@
-/* $Id: audit-linux.c,v 1.1 2011/01/17 10:15:30 dtucker Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Copyright 2010 Red Hat, Inc.  All rights reserved.
- * Use is subject to license terms.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * Red Hat author: Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com>
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-#if defined(USE_LINUX_AUDIT)
-#include <libaudit.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include "log.h"
-#include "audit.h"
-#include "canohost.h"
-
-const char* audit_username(void);
-
-int
-linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const char *username,
-    const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success)
-{
-	int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;
-
-	audit_fd = audit_open();
-	if (audit_fd < 0) {
-		if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
-		    errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
-			return 1; /* No audit support in kernel */
-		else
-			return 0; /* Must prevent login */
-	}
-	rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN,
-	    NULL, "login", username ? username : "(unknown)",
-	    username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success);
-	saved_errno = errno;
-	close(audit_fd);
-	/*
-	 * Do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non
-	 * root user.
-	 */
-	if ((rc == -EPERM) && (geteuid() != 0))
-		rc = 0;
-	errno = saved_errno;
-	return (rc >= 0);
-}
-
-/* Below is the sshd audit API code */
-
-void
-audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port)
-{
-}
-	/* not implemented */
-
-void
-audit_run_command(const char *command)
-{
-	/* not implemented */
-}
-
-void
-audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li)
-{
-	if (linux_audit_record_event(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
-	    NULL, li->line, 1) == 0)
-		fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno));
-}
-
-void
-audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li)
-{
-	/* not implemented */
-}
-
-void
-audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
-{
-	switch(event) {
-	case SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS:
-	case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE:
-	case SSH_NOLOGIN:
-	case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
-	case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED:
-		break;
-
-	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE:
-	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD:
-	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT:
-	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY:
-	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED:
-	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI:
-	case SSH_INVALID_USER:
-		linux_audit_record_event(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
-			get_remote_ipaddr(), "sshd", 0);
-		break;
-
-	default:
-		debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event);
-	}
-}
-
-#endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/audit.c

@@ -1,186 +0,0 @@
-/* $Id: audit.c,v 1.6 2011/01/17 10:15:30 dtucker Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2004, 2005 Darren Tucker.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-
-#include "audit.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-
-/*
- * Care must be taken when using this since it WILL NOT be initialized when
- * audit_connection_from() is called and MAY NOT be initialized when
- * audit_event(CONNECTION_ABANDON) is called.  Test for NULL before using.
- */
-extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
-
-/* Maybe add the audit class to struct Authmethod? */
-ssh_audit_event_t
-audit_classify_auth(const char *method)
-{
-	if (strcmp(method, "none") == 0)
-		return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE;
-	else if (strcmp(method, "password") == 0)
-		return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD;
-	else if (strcmp(method, "publickey") == 0 ||
-	    strcmp(method, "rsa") == 0)
-		return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY;
-	else if (strncmp(method, "keyboard-interactive", 20) == 0 ||
-	    strcmp(method, "challenge-response") == 0)
-		return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT;
-	else if (strcmp(method, "hostbased") == 0 ||
-	    strcmp(method, "rhosts-rsa") == 0)
-		return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED;
-	else if (strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0)
-		return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI;
-	else
-		return SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN;
-}
-
-/* helper to return supplied username */
-const char *
-audit_username(void)
-{
-	static const char unknownuser[] = "(unknown user)";
-	static const char invaliduser[] = "(invalid user)";
-
-	if (the_authctxt == NULL || the_authctxt->user == NULL)
-		return (unknownuser);
-	if (!the_authctxt->valid)
-		return (invaliduser);
-	return (the_authctxt->user);
-}
-
-const char *
-audit_event_lookup(ssh_audit_event_t ev)
-{
-	int i;
-	static struct event_lookup_struct {
-		ssh_audit_event_t event;
-		const char *name;
-	} event_lookup[] = {
-		{SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES,	"LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES"},
-		{SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED,		"LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED"},
-		{SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS,		"AUTH_SUCCESS"},
-		{SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE,		"AUTH_FAIL_NONE"},
-		{SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD,		"AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD"},
-		{SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT,		"AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT"},
-		{SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY,		"AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY"},
-		{SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED,	"AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED"},
-		{SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI,		"AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI"},
-		{SSH_INVALID_USER,		"INVALID_USER"},
-		{SSH_NOLOGIN,			"NOLOGIN"},
-		{SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE,		"CONNECTION_CLOSE"},
-		{SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON,	"CONNECTION_ABANDON"},
-		{SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN,		"AUDIT_UNKNOWN"}
-	};
-
-	for (i = 0; event_lookup[i].event != SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN; i++)
-		if (event_lookup[i].event == ev)
-			break;
-	return(event_lookup[i].name);
-}
-
-# ifndef CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-/*
- * Null implementations of audit functions.
- * These get used if SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS is defined but no audit module is enabled.
- */
-
-/*
- * Called after a connection has been accepted but before any authentication
- * has been attempted.
- */
-void
-audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port)
-{
-	debug("audit connection from %s port %d euid %d", host, port,
-	    (int)geteuid());
-}
-
-/*
- * Called when various events occur (see audit.h for a list of possible
- * events and what they mean).
- */
-void
-audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
-{
-	debug("audit event euid %d user %s event %d (%s)", geteuid(),
-	    audit_username(), event, audit_event_lookup(event));
-}
-
-/*
- * Called when a user session is started.  Argument is the tty allocated to
- * the session, or NULL if no tty was allocated.
- *
- * Note that this may be called multiple times if multiple sessions are used
- * within a single connection.
- */
-void
-audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li)
-{
-	const char *t = li->line ? li->line : "(no tty)";
-
-	debug("audit session open euid %d user %s tty name %s", geteuid(),
-	    audit_username(), t);
-}
-
-/*
- * Called when a user session is closed.  Argument is the tty allocated to
- * the session, or NULL if no tty was allocated.
- *
- * Note that this may be called multiple times if multiple sessions are used
- * within a single connection.
- */
-void
-audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li)
-{
-	const char *t = li->line ? li->line : "(no tty)";
-
-	debug("audit session close euid %d user %s tty name %s", geteuid(),
-	    audit_username(), t);
-}
-
-/*
- * This will be called when a user runs a non-interactive command.  Note that
- * it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows
- * multiple sessions within a single connection.
- */
-void
-audit_run_command(const char *command)
-{
-	debug("audit run command euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(),
-	    audit_username(), command);
-}
-# endif  /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
-#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/audit.h

@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
-/* $Id: audit.h,v 1.4 2011/01/17 10:15:30 dtucker Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2004, 2005 Darren Tucker.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#ifndef _SSH_AUDIT_H
-# define _SSH_AUDIT_H
-
-#include "loginrec.h"
-
-enum ssh_audit_event_type {
-	SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES,
-	SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED,
-	SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS,
-	SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE,
-	SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD,
-	SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT,	/* keyboard-interactive or challenge-response */
-	SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY,	/* ssh2 pubkey or ssh1 rsa */
-	SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED,	/* ssh2 hostbased or ssh1 rhostsrsa */
-	SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI,
-	SSH_INVALID_USER,
-	SSH_NOLOGIN,		/* denied by /etc/nologin, not implemented */
-	SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE,	/* closed after attempting auth or session */
-	SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON,	/* closed without completing auth */
-	SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN
-};
-typedef enum ssh_audit_event_type ssh_audit_event_t;
-
-void	audit_connection_from(const char *, int);
-void	audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
-void	audit_session_open(struct logininfo *);
-void	audit_session_close(struct logininfo *);
-void	audit_run_command(const char *);
-ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *);
-
-#endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-bsdauth.c

@@ -1,145 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-bsdauth.c,v 1.13 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-
-#include <stdarg.h>
-
-#ifdef BSD_AUTH
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-#include "ssh-gss.h"
-#endif
-#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-
-static void *
-bsdauth_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
-	return authctxt;
-}
-
-int
-bsdauth_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt,
-   u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
-{
-	Authctxt *authctxt = ctx;
-	char *challenge = NULL;
-
-	*infotxt = NULL;
-	*numprompts = 0;
-	*prompts = NULL;
-	*echo_on = NULL;
-
-	if (authctxt->as != NULL) {
-		debug2("bsdauth_query: try reuse session");
-		challenge = auth_getitem(authctxt->as, AUTHV_CHALLENGE);
-		if (challenge == NULL) {
-			auth_close(authctxt->as);
-			authctxt->as = NULL;
-		}
-	}
-
-	if (challenge == NULL) {
-		debug2("bsdauth_query: new bsd auth session");
-		debug3("bsdauth_query: style %s",
-		    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "<default>");
-		authctxt->as = auth_userchallenge(authctxt->user,
-		    authctxt->style, "auth-ssh", &challenge);
-		if (authctxt->as == NULL)
-			challenge = NULL;
-		debug2("bsdauth_query: <%s>", challenge ? challenge : "empty");
-	}
-
-	if (challenge == NULL)
-		return -1;
-
-	*name = xstrdup("");
-	*infotxt = xstrdup("");
-	*numprompts = 1;
-	*prompts = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(char *));
-	*echo_on = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(u_int));
-	(*prompts)[0] = xstrdup(challenge);
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-int
-bsdauth_respond(void *ctx, u_int numresponses, char **responses)
-{
-	Authctxt *authctxt = ctx;
-	int authok;
-
-	if (!authctxt->valid)
-		return -1;
-
-	if (authctxt->as == 0)
-		error("bsdauth_respond: no bsd auth session");
-
-	if (numresponses != 1)
-		return -1;
-
-	authok = auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, responses[0], 0);
-	authctxt->as = NULL;
-	debug3("bsdauth_respond: <%s> = <%d>", responses[0], authok);
-
-	return (authok == 0) ? -1 : 0;
-}
-
-static void
-bsdauth_free_ctx(void *ctx)
-{
-	Authctxt *authctxt = ctx;
-
-	if (authctxt && authctxt->as) {
-		auth_close(authctxt->as);
-		authctxt->as = NULL;
-	}
-}
-
-KbdintDevice bsdauth_device = {
-	"bsdauth",
-	bsdauth_init_ctx,
-	bsdauth_query,
-	bsdauth_respond,
-	bsdauth_free_ctx
-};
-
-KbdintDevice mm_bsdauth_device = {
-	"bsdauth",
-	bsdauth_init_ctx,
-	mm_bsdauth_query,
-	mm_bsdauth_respond,
-	bsdauth_free_ctx
-};
-#endif

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-chall.c

@@ -1,125 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-chall.c,v 1.14 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-
-/* limited protocol v1 interface to kbd-interactive authentication */
-
-extern KbdintDevice *devices[];
-static KbdintDevice *device;
-extern ServerOptions options;
-
-char *
-get_challenge(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
-	char *challenge, *name, *info, **prompts;
-	u_int i, numprompts;
-	u_int *echo_on;
-
-#ifdef USE_PAM
-	if (!options.use_pam)
-		remove_kbdint_device("pam");
-#endif
-
-	device = devices[0]; /* we always use the 1st device for protocol 1 */
-	if (device == NULL)
-		return NULL;
-	if ((authctxt->kbdintctxt = device->init_ctx(authctxt)) == NULL)
-		return NULL;
-	if (device->query(authctxt->kbdintctxt, &name, &info,
-	    &numprompts, &prompts, &echo_on)) {
-		device->free_ctx(authctxt->kbdintctxt);
-		authctxt->kbdintctxt = NULL;
-		return NULL;
-	}
-	if (numprompts < 1)
-		fatal("get_challenge: numprompts < 1");
-	challenge = xstrdup(prompts[0]);
-	for (i = 0; i < numprompts; i++)
-		free(prompts[i]);
-	free(prompts);
-	free(name);
-	free(echo_on);
-	free(info);
-
-	return (challenge);
-}
-int
-verify_response(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *response)
-{
-	char *resp[1], *name, *info, **prompts;
-	u_int i, numprompts, *echo_on;
-	int authenticated = 0;
-
-	if (device == NULL)
-		return 0;
-	if (authctxt->kbdintctxt == NULL)
-		return 0;
-	resp[0] = (char *)response;
-	switch (device->respond(authctxt->kbdintctxt, 1, resp)) {
-	case 0: /* Success */
-		authenticated = 1;
-		break;
-	case 1: /* Postponed - retry with empty query for PAM */
-		if ((device->query(authctxt->kbdintctxt, &name, &info,
-		    &numprompts, &prompts, &echo_on)) != 0)
-			break;
-		if (numprompts == 0 &&
-		    device->respond(authctxt->kbdintctxt, 0, resp) == 0)
-			authenticated = 1;
-
-		for (i = 0; i < numprompts; i++)
-			free(prompts[i]);
-		free(prompts);
-		free(name);
-		free(echo_on);
-		free(info);
-		break;
-	}
-	device->free_ctx(authctxt->kbdintctxt);
-	authctxt->kbdintctxt = NULL;
-	return authenticated;
-}
-void
-abandon_challenge_response(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
-	if (authctxt->kbdintctxt != NULL) {
-		device->free_ctx(authctxt->kbdintctxt);
-		authctxt->kbdintctxt = NULL;
-	}
-}

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-krb5.c

@@ -1,273 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-krb5.c,v 1.20 2013/07/20 01:55:13 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- *    Kerberos v5 authentication and ticket-passing routines.
- *
- * $FreeBSD: src/crypto/openssh/auth-krb5.c,v 1.6 2001/02/13 16:58:04 assar Exp $
- */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2002 Daniel Kouril.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <pwd.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "ssh.h"
-#include "ssh1.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-#include "uidswap.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-
-#ifdef KRB5
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <krb5.h>
-
-extern ServerOptions	 options;
-
-static int
-krb5_init(void *context)
-{
-	Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)context;
-	krb5_error_code problem;
-
-	if (authctxt->krb5_ctx == NULL) {
-		problem = krb5_init_context(&authctxt->krb5_ctx);
-		if (problem)
-			return (problem);
-	}
-	return (0);
-}
-
-int
-auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
-{
-#ifndef HEIMDAL
-	krb5_creds creds;
-	krb5_principal server;
-#endif
-	krb5_error_code problem;
-	krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
-	int len;
-	char *client, *platform_client;
-	const char *errmsg;
-
-	/* get platform-specific kerberos client principal name (if it exists) */
-	platform_client = platform_krb5_get_principal_name(authctxt->pw->pw_name);
-	client = platform_client ? platform_client : authctxt->pw->pw_name;
-
-	temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
-
-	problem = krb5_init(authctxt);
-	if (problem)
-		goto out;
-
-	problem = krb5_parse_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx, client,
-		    &authctxt->krb5_user);
-	if (problem)
-		goto out;
-
-#ifdef HEIMDAL
-# ifdef HAVE_KRB5_CC_NEW_UNIQUE
-	problem = krb5_cc_new_unique(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
-	     krb5_mcc_ops.prefix, NULL, &ccache);
-# else
-	problem = krb5_cc_gen_new(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &krb5_mcc_ops, &ccache);
-# endif
-	if (problem)
-		goto out;
-
-	problem = krb5_cc_initialize(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ccache,
-		authctxt->krb5_user);
-	if (problem)
-		goto out;
-
-	restore_uid();
-
-	problem = krb5_verify_user(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user,
-	    ccache, password, 1, NULL);
-
-	temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
-
-	if (problem)
-		goto out;
-
-# ifdef HAVE_KRB5_CC_NEW_UNIQUE
-	problem = krb5_cc_new_unique(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
-	     krb5_fcc_ops.prefix, NULL, &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
-# else
-	problem = krb5_cc_gen_new(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &krb5_fcc_ops,
-	    &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
-# endif
-	if (problem)
-		goto out;
-
-	problem = krb5_cc_copy_cache(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ccache,
-	    authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
-	krb5_cc_destroy(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ccache);
-	ccache = NULL;
-	if (problem)
-		goto out;
-
-#else
-	problem = krb5_get_init_creds_password(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &creds,
-	    authctxt->krb5_user, (char *)password, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
-	if (problem)
-		goto out;
-
-	problem = krb5_sname_to_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, NULL, NULL,
-	    KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, &server);
-	if (problem)
-		goto out;
-
-	restore_uid();
-	problem = krb5_verify_init_creds(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &creds, server,
-	    NULL, NULL, NULL);
-	krb5_free_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, server);
-	temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
-	if (problem)
-		goto out;
-
-	if (!krb5_kuserok(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user,
-	    authctxt->pw->pw_name)) {
-		problem = -1;
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	problem = ssh_krb5_cc_gen(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
-	if (problem)
-		goto out;
-
-	problem = krb5_cc_initialize(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache,
-				     authctxt->krb5_user);
-	if (problem)
-		goto out;
-
-	problem= krb5_cc_store_cred(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache,
-				 &creds);
-	if (problem)
-		goto out;
-#endif
-
-	authctxt->krb5_ticket_file = (char *)krb5_cc_get_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
-
-	len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6;
-	authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len);
-	snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s",
-	    authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
-
-#ifdef USE_PAM
-	if (options.use_pam)
-		do_pam_putenv("KRB5CCNAME", authctxt->krb5_ccname);
-#endif
-
- out:
-	restore_uid();
-	
-	free(platform_client);
-
-	if (problem) {
-		if (ccache)
-			krb5_cc_destroy(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ccache);
-
-		if (authctxt->krb5_ctx != NULL && problem!=-1) {
-			errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
-			    problem);
- 			debug("Kerberos password authentication failed: %s",
-			    errmsg);
-			krb5_free_error_message(authctxt->krb5_ctx, errmsg);
-		} else
-			debug("Kerberos password authentication failed: %d",
-			    problem);
-
-		krb5_cleanup_proc(authctxt);
-
-		if (options.kerberos_or_local_passwd)
-			return (-1);
-		else
-			return (0);
-	}
-	return (authctxt->valid ? 1 : 0);
-}
-
-void
-krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
-	debug("krb5_cleanup_proc called");
-	if (authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache) {
-		krb5_cc_destroy(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
-		authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache = NULL;
-	}
-	if (authctxt->krb5_user) {
-		krb5_free_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user);
-		authctxt->krb5_user = NULL;
-	}
-	if (authctxt->krb5_ctx) {
-		krb5_free_context(authctxt->krb5_ctx);
-		authctxt->krb5_ctx = NULL;
-	}
-}
-
-#ifndef HEIMDAL
-krb5_error_code
-ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
-	int tmpfd, ret, oerrno;
-	char ccname[40];
-	mode_t old_umask;
-
-	ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname),
-	    "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
-	if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname))
-		return ENOMEM;
-
-	old_umask = umask(0177);
-	tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
-	oerrno = errno;
-	umask(old_umask);
-	if (tmpfd == -1) {
-		logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
-		return oerrno;
-	}
-
-	if (fchmod(tmpfd,S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) == -1) {
-		oerrno = errno;
-		logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
-		close(tmpfd);
-		return oerrno;
-	}
-	close(tmpfd);
-
-	return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
-}
-#endif /* !HEIMDAL */
-#endif /* KRB5 */

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-options.c

@@ -1,620 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.68 2015/07/03 03:43:18 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- *                    All rights reserved
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <netdb.h>
-#include <pwd.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-
-#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
-
-#include "key.h"	/* XXX for typedef */
-#include "buffer.h"	/* XXX for typedef */
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "match.h"
-#include "ssherr.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "canohost.h"
-#include "sshbuf.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "channels.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-#include "sshkey.h"
-#include "auth-options.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-
-/* Flags set authorized_keys flags */
-int no_port_forwarding_flag = 0;
-int no_agent_forwarding_flag = 0;
-int no_x11_forwarding_flag = 0;
-int no_pty_flag = 0;
-int no_user_rc = 0;
-int key_is_cert_authority = 0;
-
-/* "command=" option. */
-char *forced_command = NULL;
-
-/* "environment=" options. */
-struct envstring *custom_environment = NULL;
-
-/* "tunnel=" option. */
-int forced_tun_device = -1;
-
-/* "principals=" option. */
-char *authorized_principals = NULL;
-
-extern ServerOptions options;
-
-void
-auth_clear_options(void)
-{
-	no_agent_forwarding_flag = 0;
-	no_port_forwarding_flag = 0;
-	no_pty_flag = 0;
-	no_x11_forwarding_flag = 0;
-	no_user_rc = 0;
-	key_is_cert_authority = 0;
-	while (custom_environment) {
-		struct envstring *ce = custom_environment;
-		custom_environment = ce->next;
-		free(ce->s);
-		free(ce);
-	}
-	if (forced_command) {
-		free(forced_command);
-		forced_command = NULL;
-	}
-	if (authorized_principals) {
-		free(authorized_principals);
-		authorized_principals = NULL;
-	}
-	forced_tun_device = -1;
-	channel_clear_permitted_opens();
-}
-
-/*
- * return 1 if access is granted, 0 if not.
- * side effect: sets key option flags
- */
-int
-auth_parse_options(struct passwd *pw, char *opts, char *file, u_long linenum)
-{
-	const char *cp;
-	int i;
-
-	/* reset options */
-	auth_clear_options();
-
-	if (!opts)
-		return 1;
-
-	while (*opts && *opts != ' ' && *opts != '\t') {
-		cp = "cert-authority";
-		if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
-			key_is_cert_authority = 1;
-			opts += strlen(cp);
-			goto next_option;
-		}
-		cp = "no-port-forwarding";
-		if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
-			auth_debug_add("Port forwarding disabled.");
-			no_port_forwarding_flag = 1;
-			opts += strlen(cp);
-			goto next_option;
-		}
-		cp = "no-agent-forwarding";
-		if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
-			auth_debug_add("Agent forwarding disabled.");
-			no_agent_forwarding_flag = 1;
-			opts += strlen(cp);
-			goto next_option;
-		}
-		cp = "no-X11-forwarding";
-		if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
-			auth_debug_add("X11 forwarding disabled.");
-			no_x11_forwarding_flag = 1;
-			opts += strlen(cp);
-			goto next_option;
-		}
-		cp = "no-pty";
-		if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
-			auth_debug_add("Pty allocation disabled.");
-			no_pty_flag = 1;
-			opts += strlen(cp);
-			goto next_option;
-		}
-		cp = "no-user-rc";
-		if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
-			auth_debug_add("User rc file execution disabled.");
-			no_user_rc = 1;
-			opts += strlen(cp);
-			goto next_option;
-		}
-		cp = "command=\"";
-		if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
-			opts += strlen(cp);
-			if (forced_command != NULL)
-				free(forced_command);
-			forced_command = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1);
-			i = 0;
-			while (*opts) {
-				if (*opts == '"')
-					break;
-				if (*opts == '\\' && opts[1] == '"') {
-					opts += 2;
-					forced_command[i++] = '"';
-					continue;
-				}
-				forced_command[i++] = *opts++;
-			}
-			if (!*opts) {
-				debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
-				    file, linenum);
-				auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
-				    file, linenum);
-				free(forced_command);
-				forced_command = NULL;
-				goto bad_option;
-			}
-			forced_command[i] = '\0';
-			auth_debug_add("Forced command.");
-			opts++;
-			goto next_option;
-		}
-		cp = "principals=\"";
-		if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
-			opts += strlen(cp);
-			if (authorized_principals != NULL)
-				free(authorized_principals);
-			authorized_principals = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1);
-			i = 0;
-			while (*opts) {
-				if (*opts == '"')
-					break;
-				if (*opts == '\\' && opts[1] == '"') {
-					opts += 2;
-					authorized_principals[i++] = '"';
-					continue;
-				}
-				authorized_principals[i++] = *opts++;
-			}
-			if (!*opts) {
-				debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
-				    file, linenum);
-				auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
-				    file, linenum);
-				free(authorized_principals);
-				authorized_principals = NULL;
-				goto bad_option;
-			}
-			authorized_principals[i] = '\0';
-			auth_debug_add("principals: %.900s",
-			    authorized_principals);
-			opts++;
-			goto next_option;
-		}
-		cp = "environment=\"";
-		if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
-			char *s;
-			struct envstring *new_envstring;
-
-			opts += strlen(cp);
-			s = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1);
-			i = 0;
-			while (*opts) {
-				if (*opts == '"')
-					break;
-				if (*opts == '\\' && opts[1] == '"') {
-					opts += 2;
-					s[i++] = '"';
-					continue;
-				}
-				s[i++] = *opts++;
-			}
-			if (!*opts) {
-				debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
-				    file, linenum);
-				auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
-				    file, linenum);
-				free(s);
-				goto bad_option;
-			}
-			s[i] = '\0';
-			opts++;
-			if (options.permit_user_env) {
-				auth_debug_add("Adding to environment: "
-				    "%.900s", s);
-				debug("Adding to environment: %.900s", s);
-				new_envstring = xcalloc(1,
-				    sizeof(*new_envstring));
-				new_envstring->s = s;
-				new_envstring->next = custom_environment;
-				custom_environment = new_envstring;
-				s = NULL;
-			}
-			free(s);
-			goto next_option;
-		}
-		cp = "from=\"";
-		if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
-			const char *remote_ip = get_remote_ipaddr();
-			const char *remote_host = get_canonical_hostname(
-			    options.use_dns);
-			char *patterns = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1);
-
-			opts += strlen(cp);
-			i = 0;
-			while (*opts) {
-				if (*opts == '"')
-					break;
-				if (*opts == '\\' && opts[1] == '"') {
-					opts += 2;
-					patterns[i++] = '"';
-					continue;
-				}
-				patterns[i++] = *opts++;
-			}
-			if (!*opts) {
-				debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
-				    file, linenum);
-				auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
-				    file, linenum);
-				free(patterns);
-				goto bad_option;
-			}
-			patterns[i] = '\0';
-			opts++;
-			switch (match_host_and_ip(remote_host, remote_ip,
-			    patterns)) {
-			case 1:
-				free(patterns);
-				/* Host name matches. */
-				goto next_option;
-			case -1:
-				debug("%.100s, line %lu: invalid criteria",
-				    file, linenum);
-				auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: "
-				    "invalid criteria", file, linenum);
-				/* FALLTHROUGH */
-			case 0:
-				free(patterns);
-				logit("Authentication tried for %.100s with "
-				    "correct key but not from a permitted "
-				    "host (host=%.200s, ip=%.200s).",
-				    pw->pw_name, remote_host, remote_ip);
-				auth_debug_add("Your host '%.200s' is not "
-				    "permitted to use this key for login.",
-				    remote_host);
-				break;
-			}
-			/* deny access */
-			return 0;
-		}
-		cp = "permitopen=\"";
-		if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
-			char *host, *p;
-			int port;
-			char *patterns = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1);
-
-			opts += strlen(cp);
-			i = 0;
-			while (*opts) {
-				if (*opts == '"')
-					break;
-				if (*opts == '\\' && opts[1] == '"') {
-					opts += 2;
-					patterns[i++] = '"';
-					continue;
-				}
-				patterns[i++] = *opts++;
-			}
-			if (!*opts) {
-				debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
-				    file, linenum);
-				auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: missing "
-				    "end quote", file, linenum);
-				free(patterns);
-				goto bad_option;
-			}
-			patterns[i] = '\0';
-			opts++;
-			p = patterns;
-			/* XXX - add streamlocal support */
-			host = hpdelim(&p);
-			if (host == NULL || strlen(host) >= NI_MAXHOST) {
-				debug("%.100s, line %lu: Bad permitopen "
-				    "specification <%.100s>", file, linenum,
-				    patterns);
-				auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: "
-				    "Bad permitopen specification", file,
-				    linenum);
-				free(patterns);
-				goto bad_option;
-			}
-			host = cleanhostname(host);
-			if (p == NULL || (port = permitopen_port(p)) < 0) {
-				debug("%.100s, line %lu: Bad permitopen port "
-				    "<%.100s>", file, linenum, p ? p : "");
-				auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: "
-				    "Bad permitopen port", file, linenum);
-				free(patterns);
-				goto bad_option;
-			}
-			if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0)
-				channel_add_permitted_opens(host, port);
-			free(patterns);
-			goto next_option;
-		}
-		cp = "tunnel=\"";
-		if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
-			char *tun = NULL;
-			opts += strlen(cp);
-			tun = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1);
-			i = 0;
-			while (*opts) {
-				if (*opts == '"')
-					break;
-				tun[i++] = *opts++;
-			}
-			if (!*opts) {
-				debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
-				    file, linenum);
-				auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
-				    file, linenum);
-				free(tun);
-				forced_tun_device = -1;
-				goto bad_option;
-			}
-			tun[i] = '\0';
-			forced_tun_device = a2tun(tun, NULL);
-			free(tun);
-			if (forced_tun_device == SSH_TUNID_ERR) {
-				debug("%.100s, line %lu: invalid tun device",
-				    file, linenum);
-				auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: invalid tun device",
-				    file, linenum);
-				forced_tun_device = -1;
-				goto bad_option;
-			}
-			auth_debug_add("Forced tun device: %d", forced_tun_device);
-			opts++;
-			goto next_option;
-		}
-next_option:
-		/*
-		 * Skip the comma, and move to the next option
-		 * (or break out if there are no more).
-		 */
-		if (!*opts)
-			fatal("Bugs in auth-options.c option processing.");
-		if (*opts == ' ' || *opts == '\t')
-			break;		/* End of options. */
-		if (*opts != ',')
-			goto bad_option;
-		opts++;
-		/* Process the next option. */
-	}
-
-	/* grant access */
-	return 1;
-
-bad_option:
-	logit("Bad options in %.100s file, line %lu: %.50s",
-	    file, linenum, opts);
-	auth_debug_add("Bad options in %.100s file, line %lu: %.50s",
-	    file, linenum, opts);
-
-	/* deny access */
-	return 0;
-}
-
-#define OPTIONS_CRITICAL	1
-#define OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS	2
-static int
-parse_option_list(struct sshbuf *oblob, struct passwd *pw,
-    u_int which, int crit,
-    int *cert_no_port_forwarding_flag,
-    int *cert_no_agent_forwarding_flag,
-    int *cert_no_x11_forwarding_flag,
-    int *cert_no_pty_flag,
-    int *cert_no_user_rc,
-    char **cert_forced_command,
-    int *cert_source_address_done)
-{
-	char *command, *allowed;
-	const char *remote_ip;
-	char *name = NULL;
-	struct sshbuf *c = NULL, *data = NULL;
-	int r, ret = -1, result, found;
-
-	if ((c = sshbuf_fromb(oblob)) == NULL) {
-		error("%s: sshbuf_fromb failed", __func__);
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	while (sshbuf_len(c) > 0) {
-		sshbuf_free(data);
-		data = NULL;
-		if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(c, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshbuf_froms(c, &data)) != 0) {
-			error("Unable to parse certificate options: %s",
-			    ssh_err(r));
-			goto out;
-		}
-		debug3("found certificate option \"%.100s\" len %zu",
-		    name, sshbuf_len(data));
-		found = 0;
-		if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0) {
-			if (strcmp(name, "permit-X11-forwarding") == 0) {
-				*cert_no_x11_forwarding_flag = 0;
-				found = 1;
-			} else if (strcmp(name,
-			    "permit-agent-forwarding") == 0) {
-				*cert_no_agent_forwarding_flag = 0;
-				found = 1;
-			} else if (strcmp(name,
-			    "permit-port-forwarding") == 0) {
-				*cert_no_port_forwarding_flag = 0;
-				found = 1;
-			} else if (strcmp(name, "permit-pty") == 0) {
-				*cert_no_pty_flag = 0;
-				found = 1;
-			} else if (strcmp(name, "permit-user-rc") == 0) {
-				*cert_no_user_rc = 0;
-				found = 1;
-			}
-		}
-		if (!found && (which & OPTIONS_CRITICAL) != 0) {
-			if (strcmp(name, "force-command") == 0) {
-				if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(data, &command,
-				    NULL)) != 0) {
-					error("Unable to parse \"%s\" "
-					    "section: %s", name, ssh_err(r));
-					goto out;
-				}
-				if (*cert_forced_command != NULL) {
-					error("Certificate has multiple "
-					    "force-command options");
-					free(command);
-					goto out;
-				}
-				*cert_forced_command = command;
-				found = 1;
-			}
-			if (strcmp(name, "source-address") == 0) {
-				if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(data, &allowed,
-				    NULL)) != 0) {
-					error("Unable to parse \"%s\" "
-					    "section: %s", name, ssh_err(r));
-					goto out;
-				}
-				if ((*cert_source_address_done)++) {
-					error("Certificate has multiple "
-					    "source-address options");
-					free(allowed);
-					goto out;
-				}
-				remote_ip = get_remote_ipaddr();
-				result = addr_match_cidr_list(remote_ip,
-				    allowed);
-				free(allowed);
-				switch (result) {
-				case 1:
-					/* accepted */
-					break;
-				case 0:
-					/* no match */
-					logit("Authentication tried for %.100s "
-					    "with valid certificate but not "
-					    "from a permitted host "
-					    "(ip=%.200s).", pw->pw_name,
-					    remote_ip);
-					auth_debug_add("Your address '%.200s' "
-					    "is not permitted to use this "
-					    "certificate for login.",
-					    remote_ip);
-					goto out;
-				case -1:
-				default:
-					error("Certificate source-address "
-					    "contents invalid");
-					goto out;
-				}
-				found = 1;
-			}
-		}
-
-		if (!found) {
-			if (crit) {
-				error("Certificate critical option \"%s\" "
-				    "is not supported", name);
-				goto out;
-			} else {
-				logit("Certificate extension \"%s\" "
-				    "is not supported", name);
-			}
-		} else if (sshbuf_len(data) != 0) {
-			error("Certificate option \"%s\" corrupt "
-			    "(extra data)", name);
-			goto out;
-		}
-		free(name);
-		name = NULL;
-	}
-	/* successfully parsed all options */
-	ret = 0;
-
- out:
-	if (ret != 0 &&
-	    cert_forced_command != NULL &&
-	    *cert_forced_command != NULL) {
-		free(*cert_forced_command);
-		*cert_forced_command = NULL;
-	}
-	if (name != NULL)
-		free(name);
-	sshbuf_free(data);
-	sshbuf_free(c);
-	return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Set options from critical certificate options. These supersede user key
- * options so this must be called after auth_parse_options().
- */
-int
-auth_cert_options(struct sshkey *k, struct passwd *pw)
-{
-	int cert_no_port_forwarding_flag = 1;
-	int cert_no_agent_forwarding_flag = 1;
-	int cert_no_x11_forwarding_flag = 1;
-	int cert_no_pty_flag = 1;
-	int cert_no_user_rc = 1;
-	char *cert_forced_command = NULL;
-	int cert_source_address_done = 0;
-
-	/* Separate options and extensions for v01 certs */
-	if (parse_option_list(k->cert->critical, pw,
-	    OPTIONS_CRITICAL, 1, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
-	    &cert_forced_command,
-	    &cert_source_address_done) == -1)
-		return -1;
-	if (parse_option_list(k->cert->extensions, pw,
-	    OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS, 0,
-	    &cert_no_port_forwarding_flag,
-	    &cert_no_agent_forwarding_flag,
-	    &cert_no_x11_forwarding_flag,
-	    &cert_no_pty_flag,
-	    &cert_no_user_rc,
-	    NULL, NULL) == -1)
-		return -1;
-
-	no_port_forwarding_flag |= cert_no_port_forwarding_flag;
-	no_agent_forwarding_flag |= cert_no_agent_forwarding_flag;
-	no_x11_forwarding_flag |= cert_no_x11_forwarding_flag;
-	no_pty_flag |= cert_no_pty_flag;
-	no_user_rc |= cert_no_user_rc;
-	/* CA-specified forced command supersedes key option */
-	if (cert_forced_command != NULL) {
-		if (forced_command != NULL)
-			free(forced_command);
-		forced_command = cert_forced_command;
-	}
-	return 0;
-}
-

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-options.h

@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.h,v 1.21 2015/01/14 10:30:34 markus Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- *                    All rights reserved
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-
-#ifndef AUTH_OPTIONS_H
-#define AUTH_OPTIONS_H
-
-/* Linked list of custom environment strings */
-struct envstring {
-	struct envstring *next;
-	char   *s;
-};
-
-/* Flags that may be set in authorized_keys options. */
-extern int no_port_forwarding_flag;
-extern int no_agent_forwarding_flag;
-extern int no_x11_forwarding_flag;
-extern int no_pty_flag;
-extern int no_user_rc;
-extern char *forced_command;
-extern struct envstring *custom_environment;
-extern int forced_tun_device;
-extern int key_is_cert_authority;
-extern char *authorized_principals;
-
-int	auth_parse_options(struct passwd *, char *, char *, u_long);
-void	auth_clear_options(void);
-int	auth_cert_options(struct sshkey *, struct passwd *);
-
-#endif

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-pam.h

@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
-/* $Id: auth-pam.h,v 1.27 2004/09/11 12:17:26 dtucker Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2000 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-#ifdef USE_PAM
-
-#if !defined(SSHD_PAM_SERVICE)
-# define SSHD_PAM_SERVICE		__progname
-#endif
-
-void start_pam(Authctxt *);
-void finish_pam(void);
-u_int do_pam_account(void);
-void do_pam_session(void);
-void do_pam_set_tty(const char *);
-void do_pam_setcred(int );
-void do_pam_chauthtok(void);
-int do_pam_putenv(char *, char *);
-char ** fetch_pam_environment(void);
-char ** fetch_pam_child_environment(void);
-void free_pam_environment(char **);
-void sshpam_thread_cleanup(void);
-void sshpam_cleanup(void);
-int sshpam_auth_passwd(Authctxt *, const char *);
-int is_pam_session_open(void);
-
-#endif /* USE_PAM */

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-passwd.c

@@ -1,216 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-passwd.c,v 1.44 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- *                    All rights reserved
- * Password authentication.  This file contains the functions to check whether
- * the password is valid for the user.
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- *
- * Copyright (c) 1999 Dug Song.  All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <pwd.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "auth-options.h"
-
-extern Buffer loginmsg;
-extern ServerOptions options;
-
-#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
-extern login_cap_t *lc;
-#endif
-
-
-#define DAY		(24L * 60 * 60) /* 1 day in seconds */
-#define TWO_WEEKS	(2L * 7 * DAY)	/* 2 weeks in seconds */
-
-void
-disable_forwarding(void)
-{
-	no_port_forwarding_flag = 1;
-	no_agent_forwarding_flag = 1;
-	no_x11_forwarding_flag = 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * Tries to authenticate the user using password.  Returns true if
- * authentication succeeds.
- */
-int
-auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
-{
-	struct passwd * pw = authctxt->pw;
-	int result, ok = authctxt->valid;
-#if defined(USE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE)
-	static int expire_checked = 0;
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
-	if (pw->pw_uid == 0 && options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES)
-		ok = 0;
-#endif
-	if (*password == '\0' && options.permit_empty_passwd == 0)
-		return 0;
-
-#ifdef KRB5
-	if (options.kerberos_authentication == 1) {
-		int ret = auth_krb5_password(authctxt, password);
-		if (ret == 1 || ret == 0)
-			return ret && ok;
-		/* Fall back to ordinary passwd authentication. */
-	}
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
-	{
-		HANDLE hToken = cygwin_logon_user(pw, password);
-
-		if (hToken == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
-			return 0;
-		cygwin_set_impersonation_token(hToken);
-		return ok;
-	}
-#endif
-#ifdef USE_PAM
-	if (options.use_pam)
-		return (sshpam_auth_passwd(authctxt, password) && ok);
-#endif
-#if defined(USE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE)
-	if (!expire_checked) {
-		expire_checked = 1;
-		if (auth_shadow_pwexpired(authctxt))
-			authctxt->force_pwchange = 1;
-	}
-#endif
-	result = sys_auth_passwd(authctxt, password);
-	if (authctxt->force_pwchange)
-		disable_forwarding();
-	return (result && ok);
-}
-
-#ifdef BSD_AUTH
-static void
-warn_expiry(Authctxt *authctxt, auth_session_t *as)
-{
-	char buf[256];
-	quad_t pwtimeleft, actimeleft, daysleft, pwwarntime, acwarntime;
-
-	pwwarntime = acwarntime = TWO_WEEKS;
-
-	pwtimeleft = auth_check_change(as);
-	actimeleft = auth_check_expire(as);
-#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
-	if (authctxt->valid) {
-		pwwarntime = login_getcaptime(lc, "password-warn", TWO_WEEKS,
-		    TWO_WEEKS);
-		acwarntime = login_getcaptime(lc, "expire-warn", TWO_WEEKS,
-		    TWO_WEEKS);
-	}
-#endif
-	if (pwtimeleft != 0 && pwtimeleft < pwwarntime) {
-		daysleft = pwtimeleft / DAY + 1;
-		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
-		    "Your password will expire in %lld day%s.\n",
-		    daysleft, daysleft == 1 ? "" : "s");
-		buffer_append(&loginmsg, buf, strlen(buf));
-	}
-	if (actimeleft != 0 && actimeleft < acwarntime) {
-		daysleft = actimeleft / DAY + 1;
-		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
-		    "Your account will expire in %lld day%s.\n",
-		    daysleft, daysleft == 1 ? "" : "s");
-		buffer_append(&loginmsg, buf, strlen(buf));
-	}
-}
-
-int
-sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
-{
-	struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
-	auth_session_t *as;
-	static int expire_checked = 0;
-
-	as = auth_usercheck(pw->pw_name, authctxt->style, "auth-ssh",
-	    (char *)password);
-	if (as == NULL)
-		return (0);
-	if (auth_getstate(as) & AUTH_PWEXPIRED) {
-		auth_close(as);
-		disable_forwarding();
-		authctxt->force_pwchange = 1;
-		return (1);
-	} else {
-		if (!expire_checked) {
-			expire_checked = 1;
-			warn_expiry(authctxt, as);
-		}
-		return (auth_close(as));
-	}
-}
-#elif !defined(CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_PASSWD)
-int
-sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
-{
-	struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
-	char *encrypted_password;
-
-	/* Just use the supplied fake password if authctxt is invalid */
-	char *pw_password = authctxt->valid ? shadow_pw(pw) : pw->pw_passwd;
-
-	/* Check for users with no password. */
-	if (strcmp(pw_password, "") == 0 && strcmp(password, "") == 0)
-		return (1);
-
-	/* Encrypt the candidate password using the proper salt. */
-	encrypted_password = xcrypt(password,
-	    (pw_password[0] && pw_password[1]) ? pw_password : "xx");
-
-	/*
-	 * Authentication is accepted if the encrypted passwords
-	 * are identical.
-	 */
-	return encrypted_password != NULL &&
-	    strcmp(encrypted_password, pw_password) == 0;
-}
-#endif

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-rh-rsa.c

@@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-rh-rsa.c,v 1.44 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- *                    All rights reserved
- * Rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication combined with RSA host
- * authentication.
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <pwd.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "uidswap.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "pathnames.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "canohost.h"
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-#include "ssh-gss.h"
-#endif
-#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-
-/* import */
-extern ServerOptions options;
-
-int
-auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, char *cuser, char *chost,
-    Key *client_host_key)
-{
-	HostStatus host_status;
-
-	if (auth_key_is_revoked(client_host_key))
-		return 0;
-
-	/* Check if we would accept it using rhosts authentication. */
-	if (!auth_rhosts(pw, cuser))
-		return 0;
-
-	host_status = check_key_in_hostfiles(pw, client_host_key,
-	    chost, _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE,
-	    options.ignore_user_known_hosts ? NULL : _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE);
-
-	return (host_status == HOST_OK);
-}
-
-/*
- * Tries to authenticate the user using the .rhosts file and the host using
- * its host key.  Returns true if authentication succeeds.
- */
-int
-auth_rhosts_rsa(Authctxt *authctxt, char *cuser, Key *client_host_key)
-{
-	char *chost;
-	struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
-
-	debug("Trying rhosts with RSA host authentication for client user %.100s",
-	    cuser);
-
-	if (!authctxt->valid || client_host_key == NULL ||
-	    client_host_key->rsa == NULL)
-		return 0;
-
-	chost = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns);
-	debug("Rhosts RSA authentication: canonical host %.900s", chost);
-
-	if (!PRIVSEP(auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(pw, cuser, chost, client_host_key))) {
-		debug("Rhosts with RSA host authentication denied: unknown or invalid host key");
-		packet_send_debug("Your host key cannot be verified: unknown or invalid host key.");
-		return 0;
-	}
-	/* A matching host key was found and is known. */
-
-	/* Perform the challenge-response dialog with the client for the host key. */
-	if (!auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(client_host_key)) {
-		logit("Client on %.800s failed to respond correctly to host authentication.",
-		    chost);
-		return 0;
-	}
-	/*
-	 * We have authenticated the user using .rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv,
-	 * and the host using RSA. We accept the authentication.
-	 */
-
-	verbose("Rhosts with RSA host authentication accepted for %.100s, %.100s on %.700s.",
-	    pw->pw_name, cuser, chost);
-	packet_send_debug("Rhosts with RSA host authentication accepted.");
-	return 1;
-}
-
-#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-rhosts.c

@@ -1,341 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-rhosts.c,v 1.46 2014/12/23 22:42:48 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- *                    All rights reserved
- * Rhosts authentication.  This file contains code to check whether to admit
- * the login based on rhosts authentication.  This file also processes
- * /etc/hosts.equiv.
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-
-#ifdef HAVE_NETGROUP_H
-# include <netgroup.h>
-#endif
-#include <pwd.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "uidswap.h"
-#include "pathnames.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-#include "canohost.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-
-/* import */
-extern ServerOptions options;
-extern int use_privsep;
-
-/*
- * This function processes an rhosts-style file (.rhosts, .shosts, or
- * /etc/hosts.equiv).  This returns true if authentication can be granted
- * based on the file, and returns zero otherwise.
- */
-
-static int
-check_rhosts_file(const char *filename, const char *hostname,
-		  const char *ipaddr, const char *client_user,
-		  const char *server_user)
-{
-	FILE *f;
-#define RBUFLN 1024
-	char buf[RBUFLN];/* Must not be larger than host, user, dummy below. */
-	int fd;
-	struct stat st;
-
-	/* Open the .rhosts file, deny if unreadable */
-	if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK)) == -1)
-		return 0;
-	if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1) {
-		close(fd);
-		return 0;
-	}
-	if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
-		logit("User %s hosts file %s is not a regular file",
-		    server_user, filename);
-		close(fd);
-		return 0;
-	}
-	unset_nonblock(fd);
-	if ((f = fdopen(fd, "r")) == NULL) {
-		close(fd);
-		return 0;
-	}
-	while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) {
-		/* All three must have length >= buf to avoid overflows. */
-		char hostbuf[RBUFLN], userbuf[RBUFLN], dummy[RBUFLN];
-		char *host, *user, *cp;
-		int negated;
-
-		for (cp = buf; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
-			;
-		if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\n' || !*cp)
-			continue;
-
-		/*
-		 * NO_PLUS is supported at least on OSF/1.  We skip it (we
-		 * don't ever support the plus syntax).
-		 */
-		if (strncmp(cp, "NO_PLUS", 7) == 0)
-			continue;
-
-		/*
-		 * This should be safe because each buffer is as big as the
-		 * whole string, and thus cannot be overwritten.
-		 */
-		switch (sscanf(buf, "%1023s %1023s %1023s", hostbuf, userbuf,
-		    dummy)) {
-		case 0:
-			auth_debug_add("Found empty line in %.100s.", filename);
-			continue;
-		case 1:
-			/* Host name only. */
-			strlcpy(userbuf, server_user, sizeof(userbuf));
-			break;
-		case 2:
-			/* Got both host and user name. */
-			break;
-		case 3:
-			auth_debug_add("Found garbage in %.100s.", filename);
-			continue;
-		default:
-			/* Weird... */
-			continue;
-		}
-
-		host = hostbuf;
-		user = userbuf;
-		negated = 0;
-
-		/* Process negated host names, or positive netgroups. */
-		if (host[0] == '-') {
-			negated = 1;
-			host++;
-		} else if (host[0] == '+')
-			host++;
-
-		if (user[0] == '-') {
-			negated = 1;
-			user++;
-		} else if (user[0] == '+')
-			user++;
-
-		/* Check for empty host/user names (particularly '+'). */
-		if (!host[0] || !user[0]) {
-			/* We come here if either was '+' or '-'. */
-			auth_debug_add("Ignoring wild host/user names "
-			    "in %.100s.", filename);
-			continue;
-		}
-		/* Verify that host name matches. */
-		if (host[0] == '@') {
-			if (!innetgr(host + 1, hostname, NULL, NULL) &&
-			    !innetgr(host + 1, ipaddr, NULL, NULL))
-				continue;
-		} else if (strcasecmp(host, hostname) &&
-		    strcmp(host, ipaddr) != 0)
-			continue;	/* Different hostname. */
-
-		/* Verify that user name matches. */
-		if (user[0] == '@') {
-			if (!innetgr(user + 1, NULL, client_user, NULL))
-				continue;
-		} else if (strcmp(user, client_user) != 0)
-			continue;	/* Different username. */
-
-		/* Found the user and host. */
-		fclose(f);
-
-		/* If the entry was negated, deny access. */
-		if (negated) {
-			auth_debug_add("Matched negative entry in %.100s.",
-			    filename);
-			return 0;
-		}
-		/* Accept authentication. */
-		return 1;
-	}
-
-	/* Authentication using this file denied. */
-	fclose(f);
-	return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Tries to authenticate the user using the .shosts or .rhosts file. Returns
- * true if authentication succeeds.  If ignore_rhosts is true, only
- * /etc/hosts.equiv will be considered (.rhosts and .shosts are ignored).
- */
-
-int
-auth_rhosts(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user)
-{
-	const char *hostname, *ipaddr;
-
-	hostname = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns);
-	ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr();
-	return auth_rhosts2(pw, client_user, hostname, ipaddr);
-}
-
-static int
-auth_rhosts2_raw(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostname,
-    const char *ipaddr)
-{
-	char buf[1024];
-	struct stat st;
-	static const char *rhosts_files[] = {".shosts", ".rhosts", NULL};
-	u_int rhosts_file_index;
-
-	debug2("auth_rhosts2: clientuser %s hostname %s ipaddr %s",
-	    client_user, hostname, ipaddr);
-
-	/* Switch to the user's uid. */
-	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
-	/*
-	 * Quick check: if the user has no .shosts or .rhosts files and
-	 * no system hosts.equiv/shosts.equiv files exist then return
-	 * failure immediately without doing costly lookups from name
-	 * servers.
-	 */
-	for (rhosts_file_index = 0; rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index];
-	    rhosts_file_index++) {
-		/* Check users .rhosts or .shosts. */
-		snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.500s/%.100s",
-			 pw->pw_dir, rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]);
-		if (stat(buf, &st) >= 0)
-			break;
-	}
-	/* Switch back to privileged uid. */
-	restore_uid();
-
-	/*
-	 * Deny if The user has no .shosts or .rhosts file and there
-	 * are no system-wide files.
-	 */
-	if (!rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index] &&
-	    stat(_PATH_RHOSTS_EQUIV, &st) < 0 &&
-	    stat(_PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV, &st) < 0) {
-		debug3("%s: no hosts access files exist", __func__);
-		return 0;
-	}
-
-	/*
-	 * If not logging in as superuser, try /etc/hosts.equiv and
-	 * shosts.equiv.
-	 */
-	if (pw->pw_uid == 0)
-		debug3("%s: root user, ignoring system hosts files", __func__);
-	else {
-		if (check_rhosts_file(_PATH_RHOSTS_EQUIV, hostname, ipaddr,
-		    client_user, pw->pw_name)) {
-			auth_debug_add("Accepted for %.100s [%.100s] by "
-			    "/etc/hosts.equiv.", hostname, ipaddr);
-			return 1;
-		}
-		if (check_rhosts_file(_PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV, hostname, ipaddr,
-		    client_user, pw->pw_name)) {
-			auth_debug_add("Accepted for %.100s [%.100s] by "
-			    "%.100s.", hostname, ipaddr, _PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV);
-			return 1;
-		}
-	}
-
-	/*
-	 * Check that the home directory is owned by root or the user, and is
-	 * not group or world writable.
-	 */
-	if (stat(pw->pw_dir, &st) < 0) {
-		logit("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: "
-		    "no home directory %.200s", pw->pw_name, pw->pw_dir);
-		auth_debug_add("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: "
-		    "no home directory %.200s", pw->pw_name, pw->pw_dir);
-		return 0;
-	}
-	if (options.strict_modes &&
-	    ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
-	    (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
-		logit("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: "
-		    "bad ownership or modes for home directory.", pw->pw_name);
-		auth_debug_add("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: "
-		    "bad ownership or modes for home directory.", pw->pw_name);
-		return 0;
-	}
-	/* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
-	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
-
-	/* Check all .rhosts files (currently .shosts and .rhosts). */
-	for (rhosts_file_index = 0; rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index];
-	    rhosts_file_index++) {
-		/* Check users .rhosts or .shosts. */
-		snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.500s/%.100s",
-			 pw->pw_dir, rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]);
-		if (stat(buf, &st) < 0)
-			continue;
-
-		/*
-		 * Make sure that the file is either owned by the user or by
-		 * root, and make sure it is not writable by anyone but the
-		 * owner.  This is to help avoid novices accidentally
-		 * allowing access to their account by anyone.
-		 */
-		if (options.strict_modes &&
-		    ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
-		    (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
-			logit("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: bad modes for %.200s",
-			    pw->pw_name, buf);
-			auth_debug_add("Bad file modes for %.200s", buf);
-			continue;
-		}
-		/*
-		 * Check if we have been configured to ignore .rhosts
-		 * and .shosts files.
-		 */
-		if (options.ignore_rhosts) {
-			auth_debug_add("Server has been configured to "
-			    "ignore %.100s.", rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]);
-			continue;
-		}
-		/* Check if authentication is permitted by the file. */
-		if (check_rhosts_file(buf, hostname, ipaddr,
-		    client_user, pw->pw_name)) {
-			auth_debug_add("Accepted by %.100s.",
-			    rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]);
-			/* Restore the privileged uid. */
-			restore_uid();
-			auth_debug_add("Accepted host %s ip %s client_user "
-			    "%s server_user %s", hostname, ipaddr,
-			    client_user, pw->pw_name);
-			return 1;
-		}
-	}
-
-	/* Restore the privileged uid. */
-	restore_uid();
-	return 0;
-}
-
-int
-auth_rhosts2(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostname,
-    const char *ipaddr)
-{
-       return auth_rhosts2_raw(pw, client_user, hostname, ipaddr);
-}

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-rsa.c

@@ -1,349 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.90 2015/01/28 22:36:00 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- *                    All rights reserved
- * RSA-based authentication.  This code determines whether to admit a login
- * based on RSA authentication.  This file also contains functions to check
- * validity of the host key.
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-
-#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-
-#include <pwd.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "rsa.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "ssh1.h"
-#include "uidswap.h"
-#include "match.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "pathnames.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "auth-options.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-#include "ssh-gss.h"
-#endif
-#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-#include "ssh.h"
-
-#include "digest.h"
-
-/* import */
-extern ServerOptions options;
-
-/*
- * Session identifier that is used to bind key exchange and authentication
- * responses to a particular session.
- */
-extern u_char session_id[16];
-
-/*
- * The .ssh/authorized_keys file contains public keys, one per line, in the
- * following format:
- *   options bits e n comment
- * where bits, e and n are decimal numbers,
- * and comment is any string of characters up to newline.  The maximum
- * length of a line is SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES characters.  See sshd(8) for a
- * description of the options.
- */
-
-BIGNUM *
-auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *key)
-{
-	BIGNUM *challenge;
-	BN_CTX *ctx;
-
-	if ((challenge = BN_new()) == NULL)
-		fatal("auth_rsa_generate_challenge: BN_new() failed");
-	/* Generate a random challenge. */
-	if (BN_rand(challenge, 256, 0, 0) == 0)
-		fatal("auth_rsa_generate_challenge: BN_rand failed");
-	if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
-		fatal("auth_rsa_generate_challenge: BN_CTX_new failed");
-	if (BN_mod(challenge, challenge, key->rsa->n, ctx) == 0)
-		fatal("auth_rsa_generate_challenge: BN_mod failed");
-	BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-
-	return challenge;
-}
-
-int
-auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *challenge, u_char response[16])
-{
-	u_char buf[32], mdbuf[16];
-	struct ssh_digest_ctx *md;
-	int len;
-
-	/* don't allow short keys */
-	if (BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) {
-		error("%s: RSA modulus too small: %d < minimum %d bits",
-		    __func__,
-		    BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE);
-		return (0);
-	}
-
-	/* The response is MD5 of decrypted challenge plus session id. */
-	len = BN_num_bytes(challenge);
-	if (len <= 0 || len > 32)
-		fatal("%s: bad challenge length %d", __func__, len);
-	memset(buf, 0, 32);
-	BN_bn2bin(challenge, buf + 32 - len);
-	if ((md = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)) == NULL ||
-	    ssh_digest_update(md, buf, 32) < 0 ||
-	    ssh_digest_update(md, session_id, 16) < 0 ||
-	    ssh_digest_final(md, mdbuf, sizeof(mdbuf)) < 0)
-		fatal("%s: md5 failed", __func__);
-	ssh_digest_free(md);
-
-	/* Verify that the response is the original challenge. */
-	if (timingsafe_bcmp(response, mdbuf, 16) != 0) {
-		/* Wrong answer. */
-		return (0);
-	}
-	/* Correct answer. */
-	return (1);
-}
-
-/*
- * Performs the RSA authentication challenge-response dialog with the client,
- * and returns true (non-zero) if the client gave the correct answer to
- * our challenge; returns zero if the client gives a wrong answer.
- */
-
-int
-auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(Key *key)
-{
-	BIGNUM *challenge, *encrypted_challenge;
-	u_char response[16];
-	int i, success;
-
-	if ((encrypted_challenge = BN_new()) == NULL)
-		fatal("auth_rsa_challenge_dialog: BN_new() failed");
-
-	challenge = PRIVSEP(auth_rsa_generate_challenge(key));
-
-	/* Encrypt the challenge with the public key. */
-	if (rsa_public_encrypt(encrypted_challenge, challenge, key->rsa) != 0)
-		fatal("%s: rsa_public_encrypt failed", __func__);
-
-	/* Send the encrypted challenge to the client. */
-	packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE);
-	packet_put_bignum(encrypted_challenge);
-	packet_send();
-	BN_clear_free(encrypted_challenge);
-	packet_write_wait();
-
-	/* Wait for a response. */
-	packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE);
-	for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
-		response[i] = (u_char)packet_get_char();
-	packet_check_eom();
-
-	success = PRIVSEP(auth_rsa_verify_response(key, challenge, response));
-	BN_clear_free(challenge);
-	return (success);
-}
-
-static int
-rsa_key_allowed_in_file(struct passwd *pw, char *file,
-    const BIGNUM *client_n, Key **rkey)
-{
-	char *fp, line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
-	int allowed = 0, bits;
-	FILE *f;
-	u_long linenum = 0;
-	Key *key;
-
-	debug("trying public RSA key file %s", file);
-	if ((f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) == NULL)
-		return 0;
-
-	/*
-	 * Go though the accepted keys, looking for the current key.  If
-	 * found, perform a challenge-response dialog to verify that the
-	 * user really has the corresponding private key.
-	 */
-	key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
-	while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
-		char *cp;
-		char *key_options;
-		int keybits;
-
-		/* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
-		for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
-			;
-		if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
-			continue;
-
-		/*
-		 * Check if there are options for this key, and if so,
-		 * save their starting address and skip the option part
-		 * for now.  If there are no options, set the starting
-		 * address to NULL.
-		 */
-		if (*cp < '0' || *cp > '9') {
-			int quoted = 0;
-			key_options = cp;
-			for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
-				if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
-					cp++;	/* Skip both */
-				else if (*cp == '"')
-					quoted = !quoted;
-			}
-		} else
-			key_options = NULL;
-
-		/* Parse the key from the line. */
-		if (hostfile_read_key(&cp, &bits, key) == 0) {
-			debug("%.100s, line %lu: non ssh1 key syntax",
-			    file, linenum);
-			continue;
-		}
-		/* cp now points to the comment part. */
-
-		/*
-		 * Check if the we have found the desired key (identified
-		 * by its modulus).
-		 */
-		if (BN_cmp(key->rsa->n, client_n) != 0)
-			continue;
-
-		/* check the real bits  */
-		keybits = BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n);
-		if (keybits < 0 || bits != keybits)
-			logit("Warning: %s, line %lu: keysize mismatch: "
-			    "actual %d vs. announced %d.",
-			    file, linenum, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits);
-
-		if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
-		    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
-			continue;
-		debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu %s %s",
-		    file, linenum, key_type(key), fp);
-		free(fp);
-
-		/* Never accept a revoked key */
-		if (auth_key_is_revoked(key))
-			break;
-
-		/* We have found the desired key. */
-		/*
-		 * If our options do not allow this key to be used,
-		 * do not send challenge.
-		 */
-		if (!auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file, linenum))
-			continue;
-		if (key_is_cert_authority)
-			continue;
-		/* break out, this key is allowed */
-		allowed = 1;
-		break;
-	}
-
-	/* Close the file. */
-	fclose(f);
-
-	/* return key if allowed */
-	if (allowed && rkey != NULL)
-		*rkey = key;
-	else
-		key_free(key);
-
-	return allowed;
-}
-
-/*
- * check if there's user key matching client_n,
- * return key if login is allowed, NULL otherwise
- */
-
-int
-auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n, Key **rkey)
-{
-	char *file;
-	u_int i, allowed = 0;
-
-	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
-
-	for (i = 0; !allowed && i < options.num_authkeys_files; i++) {
-		if (strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_files[i], "none") == 0)
-			continue;
-		file = expand_authorized_keys(
-		    options.authorized_keys_files[i], pw);
-		allowed = rsa_key_allowed_in_file(pw, file, client_n, rkey);
-		free(file);
-	}
-
-	restore_uid();
-
-	return allowed;
-}
-
-/*
- * Performs the RSA authentication dialog with the client.  This returns
- * 0 if the client could not be authenticated, and 1 if authentication was
- * successful.  This may exit if there is a serious protocol violation.
- */
-int
-auth_rsa(Authctxt *authctxt, BIGNUM *client_n)
-{
-	Key *key;
-	struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
-
-	/* no user given */
-	if (!authctxt->valid)
-		return 0;
-
-	if (!PRIVSEP(auth_rsa_key_allowed(pw, client_n, &key))) {
-		auth_clear_options();
-		return (0);
-	}
-
-	/* Perform the challenge-response dialog for this key. */
-	if (!auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(key)) {
-		/* Wrong response. */
-		verbose("Wrong response to RSA authentication challenge.");
-		packet_send_debug("Wrong response to RSA authentication challenge.");
-		/*
-		 * Break out of the loop. Otherwise we might send
-		 * another challenge and break the protocol.
-		 */
-		key_free(key);
-		return (0);
-	}
-	/*
-	 * Correct response.  The client has been successfully
-	 * authenticated. Note that we have not yet processed the
-	 * options; this will be reset if the options cause the
-	 * authentication to be rejected.
-	 */
-	pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, NULL);
-
-	packet_send_debug("RSA authentication accepted.");
-	return (1);
-}
-
-#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-shadow.c

@@ -1,142 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2004 Darren Tucker.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#if defined(USE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE)
-#include <shadow.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <time.h>
-
-#include "key.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "log.h"
-
-#ifdef DAY
-# undef DAY
-#endif
-#define DAY	(24L * 60 * 60) /* 1 day in seconds */
-
-extern Buffer loginmsg;
-
-/*
- * For the account and password expiration functions, we assume the expiry
- * occurs the day after the day specified.
- */
-
-/*
- * Check if specified account is expired.  Returns 1 if account is expired,
- * 0 otherwise.
- */
-int
-auth_shadow_acctexpired(struct spwd *spw)
-{
-	time_t today;
-	int daysleft;
-	char buf[256];
-
-	today = time(NULL) / DAY;
-	daysleft = spw->sp_expire - today;
-	debug3("%s: today %d sp_expire %d days left %d", __func__, (int)today,
-	    (int)spw->sp_expire, daysleft);
-
-	if (spw->sp_expire == -1) {
-		debug3("account expiration disabled");
-	} else if (daysleft < 0) {
-		logit("Account %.100s has expired", spw->sp_namp);
-		return 1;
-	} else if (daysleft <= spw->sp_warn) {
-		debug3("account will expire in %d days", daysleft);
-		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
-		    "Your account will expire in %d day%s.\n", daysleft,
-		    daysleft == 1 ? "" : "s");
-		buffer_append(&loginmsg, buf, strlen(buf));
-	}
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Checks password expiry for platforms that use shadow passwd files.
- * Returns: 1 = password expired, 0 = password not expired
- */
-int
-auth_shadow_pwexpired(Authctxt *ctxt)
-{
-	struct spwd *spw = NULL;
-	const char *user = ctxt->pw->pw_name;
-	char buf[256];
-	time_t today;
-	int daysleft, disabled = 0;
-
-	if ((spw = getspnam((char *)user)) == NULL) {
-		error("Could not get shadow information for %.100s", user);
-		return 0;
-	}
-
-	today = time(NULL) / DAY;
-	debug3("%s: today %d sp_lstchg %d sp_max %d", __func__, (int)today,
-	    (int)spw->sp_lstchg, (int)spw->sp_max);
-
-#if defined(__hpux) && !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
-	if (iscomsec()) {
-		struct pr_passwd *pr;
-
-		pr = getprpwnam((char *)user);
-
-		/* Test for Trusted Mode expiry disabled */
-		if (pr != NULL && pr->ufld.fd_min == 0 &&
-		    pr->ufld.fd_lifetime == 0 && pr->ufld.fd_expire == 0 &&
-		    pr->ufld.fd_pw_expire_warning == 0 &&
-		    pr->ufld.fd_schange != 0)
-			disabled = 1;
-	}
-#endif
-
-	/* TODO: check sp_inact */
-	daysleft = spw->sp_lstchg + spw->sp_max - today;
-	if (disabled) {
-		debug3("password expiration disabled");
-	} else if (spw->sp_lstchg == 0) {
-		logit("User %.100s password has expired (root forced)", user);
-		return 1;
-	} else if (spw->sp_max == -1) {
-		debug3("password expiration disabled");
-	} else if (daysleft < 0) {
-		logit("User %.100s password has expired (password aged)", user);
-		return 1;
-	} else if (daysleft <= spw->sp_warn) {
-		debug3("password will expire in %d days", daysleft);
-		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
-		    "Your password will expire in %d day%s.\n", daysleft,
-		    daysleft == 1 ? "" : "s");
-		buffer_append(&loginmsg, buf, strlen(buf));
-	}
-
-	return 0;
-}
-#endif	/* USE_SHADOW && HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE */

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-sia.c

@@ -1,114 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2002 Chris Adams.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#ifdef HAVE_OSF_SIA
-#include <sia.h>
-#include <siad.h>
-#include <pwd.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-#include <setjmp.h>
-#include <sys/resource.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include "ssh.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "auth-sia.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-#include "canohost.h"
-#include "uidswap.h"
-
-extern ServerOptions options;
-extern int saved_argc;
-extern char **saved_argv;
-
-int
-sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *pass)
-{
-	int ret;
-	SIAENTITY *ent = NULL;
-	const char *host;
-
-	host = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns);
-
-	if (!authctxt->user || pass == NULL || pass[0] == '\0')
-		return (0);
-
-	if (sia_ses_init(&ent, saved_argc, saved_argv, host, authctxt->user,
-	    NULL, 0, NULL) != SIASUCCESS)
-		return (0);
-
-	if ((ret = sia_ses_authent(NULL, pass, ent)) != SIASUCCESS) {
-		error("Couldn't authenticate %s from %s",
-		    authctxt->user, host);
-		if (ret & SIASTOP)
-			sia_ses_release(&ent);
-
-		return (0);
-	}
-
-	sia_ses_release(&ent);
-
-	return (1);
-}
-
-void
-session_setup_sia(struct passwd *pw, char *tty)
-{
-	SIAENTITY *ent = NULL;
-	const char *host;
-
-	host = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns);
-
-	if (sia_ses_init(&ent, saved_argc, saved_argv, host, pw->pw_name,
-	    tty, 0, NULL) != SIASUCCESS)
-		fatal("sia_ses_init failed");
-
-	if (sia_make_entity_pwd(pw, ent) != SIASUCCESS) {
-		sia_ses_release(&ent);
-		fatal("sia_make_entity_pwd failed");
-	}
-
-	ent->authtype = SIA_A_NONE;
-	if (sia_ses_estab(sia_collect_trm, ent) != SIASUCCESS)
-		fatal("Couldn't establish session for %s from %s",
-		    pw->pw_name, host);
-
-	if (sia_ses_launch(sia_collect_trm, ent) != SIASUCCESS)
-		fatal("Couldn't launch session for %s from %s",
-		    pw->pw_name, host);
-
-	sia_ses_release(&ent);
-
-	setuid(0);
-	permanently_set_uid(pw);
-}
-
-#endif /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-sia.h

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2002 Chris Adams.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#ifdef HAVE_OSF_SIA
-
-void	session_setup_sia(struct passwd *, char *);
-
-#endif /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-skey.c

@@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-skey.c,v 1.27 2007/01/21 01:41:54 stevesk Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#ifdef SKEY
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <pwd.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-
-#include <skey.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "ssh-gss.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-
-static void *
-skey_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
-	return authctxt;
-}
-
-int
-skey_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt,
-    u_int* numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
-{
-	Authctxt *authctxt = ctx;
-	char challenge[1024];
-	struct skey skey;
-
-	if (_compat_skeychallenge(&skey, authctxt->user, challenge,
-	    sizeof(challenge)) == -1)
-		return -1;
-
-	*name = xstrdup("");
-	*infotxt = xstrdup("");
-	*numprompts = 1;
-	*prompts = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(char *));
-	*echo_on = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(u_int));
-
-	xasprintf(*prompts, "%s%s", challenge, SKEY_PROMPT);
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-int
-skey_respond(void *ctx, u_int numresponses, char **responses)
-{
-	Authctxt *authctxt = ctx;
-
-	if (authctxt->valid &&
-	    numresponses == 1 &&
-	    skey_haskey(authctxt->pw->pw_name) == 0 &&
-	    skey_passcheck(authctxt->pw->pw_name, responses[0]) != -1)
-	    return 0;
-	return -1;
-}
-
-static void
-skey_free_ctx(void *ctx)
-{
-	/* we don't have a special context */
-}
-
-KbdintDevice skey_device = {
-	"skey",
-	skey_init_ctx,
-	skey_query,
-	skey_respond,
-	skey_free_ctx
-};
-
-KbdintDevice mm_skey_device = {
-	"skey",
-	skey_init_ctx,
-	mm_skey_query,
-	mm_skey_respond,
-	skey_free_ctx
-};
-#endif /* SKEY */

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth.c

@@ -1,775 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.113 2015/08/21 03:42:19 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
-# include <paths.h>
-#endif
-#include <pwd.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
-#include <login.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef USE_SHADOW
-#include <shadow.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H
-#include <libgen.h>
-#endif
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <limits.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "match.h"
-#include "groupaccess.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "auth-options.h"
-#include "canohost.h"
-#include "uidswap.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "loginrec.h"
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-#include "ssh-gss.h"
-#endif
-#include "authfile.h"
-#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-#include "authfile.h"
-#include "ssherr.h"
-#include "compat.h"
-
-/* import */
-extern ServerOptions options;
-extern int use_privsep;
-extern Buffer loginmsg;
-extern struct passwd *privsep_pw;
-
-/* Debugging messages */
-Buffer auth_debug;
-int auth_debug_init;
-
-/*
- * Check if the user is allowed to log in via ssh. If user is listed
- * in DenyUsers or one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups, false
- * will be returned. If AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed
- * there, or if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups isn't
- * listed there, false will be returned.
- * If the user's shell is not executable, false will be returned.
- * Otherwise true is returned.
- */
-int
-allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
-{
-	struct stat st;
-	const char *hostname = NULL, *ipaddr = NULL, *passwd = NULL;
-	u_int i;
-#ifdef USE_SHADOW
-	struct spwd *spw = NULL;
-#endif
-
-	/* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */
-	if (!pw || !pw->pw_name)
-		return 0;
-
-#ifdef USE_SHADOW
-	if (!options.use_pam)
-		spw = getspnam(pw->pw_name);
-#ifdef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE
-	if (!options.use_pam && spw != NULL && auth_shadow_acctexpired(spw))
-		return 0;
-#endif /* HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE */
-#endif /* USE_SHADOW */
-
-	/* grab passwd field for locked account check */
-	passwd = pw->pw_passwd;
-#ifdef USE_SHADOW
-	if (spw != NULL)
-#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
-		passwd = get_iaf_password(pw);
-#else
-		passwd = spw->sp_pwdp;
-#endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
-#endif
-
-	/* check for locked account */
-	if (!options.use_pam && passwd && *passwd) {
-		int locked = 0;
-
-#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING
-		if (strcmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING) == 0)
-			 locked = 1;
-#endif
-#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX
-		if (strncmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX,
-		    strlen(LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX)) == 0)
-			 locked = 1;
-#endif
-#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR
-		if (strstr(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR))
-			locked = 1;
-#endif
-#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
-		free((void *) passwd);
-#endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
-		if (locked) {
-			logit("User %.100s not allowed because account is locked",
-			    pw->pw_name);
-			return 0;
-		}
-	}
-
-	/*
-	 * Deny if shell does not exist or is not executable unless we
-	 * are chrooting.
-	 */
-	if (options.chroot_directory == NULL ||
-	    strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") == 0) {
-		char *shell = xstrdup((pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ?
-		    _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell); /* empty = /bin/sh */
-
-		if (stat(shell, &st) != 0) {
-			logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s "
-			    "does not exist", pw->pw_name, shell);
-			free(shell);
-			return 0;
-		}
-		if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode) == 0 ||
-		    (st.st_mode & (S_IXOTH|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP)) == 0) {
-			logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s "
-			    "is not executable", pw->pw_name, shell);
-			free(shell);
-			return 0;
-		}
-		free(shell);
-	}
-
-	if (options.num_deny_users > 0 || options.num_allow_users > 0 ||
-	    options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
-		hostname = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns);
-		ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr();
-	}
-
-	/* Return false if user is listed in DenyUsers */
-	if (options.num_deny_users > 0) {
-		for (i = 0; i < options.num_deny_users; i++)
-			if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
-			    options.deny_users[i])) {
-				logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
-				    "because listed in DenyUsers",
-				    pw->pw_name, hostname);
-				return 0;
-			}
-	}
-	/* Return false if AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed there */
-	if (options.num_allow_users > 0) {
-		for (i = 0; i < options.num_allow_users; i++)
-			if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
-			    options.allow_users[i]))
-				break;
-		/* i < options.num_allow_users iff we break for loop */
-		if (i >= options.num_allow_users) {
-			logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
-			    "not listed in AllowUsers", pw->pw_name, hostname);
-			return 0;
-		}
-	}
-	if (options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
-		/* Get the user's group access list (primary and supplementary) */
-		if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0) {
-			logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
-			    "not in any group", pw->pw_name, hostname);
-			return 0;
-		}
-
-		/* Return false if one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups */
-		if (options.num_deny_groups > 0)
-			if (ga_match(options.deny_groups,
-			    options.num_deny_groups)) {
-				ga_free();
-				logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
-				    "because a group is listed in DenyGroups",
-				    pw->pw_name, hostname);
-				return 0;
-			}
-		/*
-		 * Return false if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups
-		 * isn't listed there
-		 */
-		if (options.num_allow_groups > 0)
-			if (!ga_match(options.allow_groups,
-			    options.num_allow_groups)) {
-				ga_free();
-				logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
-				    "because none of user's groups are listed "
-				    "in AllowGroups", pw->pw_name, hostname);
-				return 0;
-			}
-		ga_free();
-	}
-
-#ifdef CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_ALLOWED_USER
-	if (!sys_auth_allowed_user(pw, &loginmsg))
-		return 0;
-#endif
-
-	/* We found no reason not to let this user try to log on... */
-	return 1;
-}
-
-void
-auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *fmt, ...)
-{
-	va_list ap;
-        int i;
-
-	free(authctxt->info);
-	authctxt->info = NULL;
-
-	va_start(ap, fmt);
-	i = vasprintf(&authctxt->info, fmt, ap);
-	va_end(ap);
-
-	if (i < 0 || authctxt->info == NULL)
-		fatal("vasprintf failed");
-}
-
-void
-auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, int partial,
-    const char *method, const char *submethod)
-{
-	void (*authlog) (const char *fmt,...) = verbose;
-	char *authmsg;
-
-	if (use_privsep && !mm_is_monitor() && !authctxt->postponed)
-		return;
-
-	/* Raise logging level */
-	if (authenticated == 1 ||
-	    !authctxt->valid ||
-	    authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries / 2 ||
-	    strcmp(method, "password") == 0)
-		authlog = logit;
-
-	if (authctxt->postponed)
-		authmsg = "Postponed";
-	else if (partial)
-		authmsg = "Partial";
-	else
-		authmsg = authenticated ? "Accepted" : "Failed";
-
-	authlog("%s %s%s%s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d %s%s%s",
-	    authmsg,
-	    method,
-	    submethod != NULL ? "/" : "", submethod == NULL ? "" : submethod,
-	    authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
-	    authctxt->user,
-	    get_remote_ipaddr(),
-	    get_remote_port(),
-	    compat20 ? "ssh2" : "ssh1",
-	    authctxt->info != NULL ? ": " : "",
-	    authctxt->info != NULL ? authctxt->info : "");
-	free(authctxt->info);
-	authctxt->info = NULL;
-
-#ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
-	if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed &&
-	    (strcmp(method, "password") == 0 ||
-	    strncmp(method, "keyboard-interactive", 20) == 0 ||
-	    strcmp(method, "challenge-response") == 0))
-		record_failed_login(authctxt->user,
-		    get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh");
-# ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
-	if (authenticated)
-		sys_auth_record_login(authctxt->user,
-		    get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh", &loginmsg);
-# endif
-#endif
-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-	if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed)
-		audit_event(audit_classify_auth(method));
-#endif
-}
-
-
-void
-auth_maxtries_exceeded(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
-	error("maximum authentication attempts exceeded for "
-	    "%s%.100s from %.200s port %d %s",
-	    authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
-	    authctxt->user,
-	    get_remote_ipaddr(),
-	    get_remote_port(),
-	    compat20 ? "ssh2" : "ssh1");
-	packet_disconnect("Too many authentication failures");
-	/* NOTREACHED */
-}
-
-/*
- * Check whether root logins are disallowed.
- */
-int
-auth_root_allowed(const char *method)
-{
-	switch (options.permit_root_login) {
-	case PERMIT_YES:
-		return 1;
-	case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD:
-		if (strcmp(method, "publickey") == 0 ||
-		    strcmp(method, "hostbased") == 0 ||
-		    strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0)
-			return 1;
-		break;
-	case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY:
-		if (forced_command) {
-			logit("Root login accepted for forced command.");
-			return 1;
-		}
-		break;
-	}
-	logit("ROOT LOGIN REFUSED FROM %.200s", get_remote_ipaddr());
-	return 0;
-}
-
-
-/*
- * Given a template and a passwd structure, build a filename
- * by substituting % tokenised options. Currently, %% becomes '%',
- * %h becomes the home directory and %u the username.
- *
- * This returns a buffer allocated by xmalloc.
- */
-char *
-expand_authorized_keys(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw)
-{
-	char *file, ret[PATH_MAX];
-	int i;
-
-	file = percent_expand(filename, "h", pw->pw_dir,
-	    "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
-
-	/*
-	 * Ensure that filename starts anchored. If not, be backward
-	 * compatible and prepend the '%h/'
-	 */
-	if (*file == '/')
-		return (file);
-
-	i = snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, file);
-	if (i < 0 || (size_t)i >= sizeof(ret))
-		fatal("expand_authorized_keys: path too long");
-	free(file);
-	return (xstrdup(ret));
-}
-
-char *
-authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *pw)
-{
-	if (options.authorized_principals_file == NULL)
-		return NULL;
-	return expand_authorized_keys(options.authorized_principals_file, pw);
-}
-
-/* return ok if key exists in sysfile or userfile */
-HostStatus
-check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, const char *host,
-    const char *sysfile, const char *userfile)
-{
-	char *user_hostfile;
-	struct stat st;
-	HostStatus host_status;
-	struct hostkeys *hostkeys;
-	const struct hostkey_entry *found;
-
-	hostkeys = init_hostkeys();
-	load_hostkeys(hostkeys, host, sysfile);
-	if (userfile != NULL) {
-		user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(userfile, pw->pw_uid);
-		if (options.strict_modes &&
-		    (stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) &&
-		    ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
-		    (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
-			logit("Authentication refused for %.100s: "
-			    "bad owner or modes for %.200s",
-			    pw->pw_name, user_hostfile);
-			auth_debug_add("Ignored %.200s: bad ownership or modes",
-			    user_hostfile);
-		} else {
-			temporarily_use_uid(pw);
-			load_hostkeys(hostkeys, host, user_hostfile);
-			restore_uid();
-		}
-		free(user_hostfile);
-	}
-	host_status = check_key_in_hostkeys(hostkeys, key, &found);
-	if (host_status == HOST_REVOKED)
-		error("WARNING: revoked key for %s attempted authentication",
-		    found->host);
-	else if (host_status == HOST_OK)
-		debug("%s: key for %s found at %s:%ld", __func__,
-		    found->host, found->file, found->line);
-	else
-		debug("%s: key for host %s not found", __func__, host);
-
-	free_hostkeys(hostkeys);
-
-	return host_status;
-}
-
-/*
- * Check a given path for security. This is defined as all components
- * of the path to the file must be owned by either the owner of
- * of the file or root and no directories must be group or world writable.
- *
- * XXX Should any specific check be done for sym links ?
- *
- * Takes a file name, its stat information (preferably from fstat() to
- * avoid races), the uid of the expected owner, their home directory and an
- * error buffer plus max size as arguments.
- *
- * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure
- */
-int
-auth_secure_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir,
-    uid_t uid, char *err, size_t errlen)
-{
-	char buf[PATH_MAX], homedir[PATH_MAX];
-	char *cp;
-	int comparehome = 0;
-	struct stat st;
-
-	if (realpath(name, buf) == NULL) {
-		snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", name,
-		    strerror(errno));
-		return -1;
-	}
-	if (pw_dir != NULL && realpath(pw_dir, homedir) != NULL)
-		comparehome = 1;
-
-	if (!S_ISREG(stp->st_mode)) {
-		snprintf(err, errlen, "%s is not a regular file", buf);
-		return -1;
-	}
-	if ((!platform_sys_dir_uid(stp->st_uid) && stp->st_uid != uid) ||
-	    (stp->st_mode & 022) != 0) {
-		snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s",
-		    buf);
-		return -1;
-	}
-
-	/* for each component of the canonical path, walking upwards */
-	for (;;) {
-		if ((cp = dirname(buf)) == NULL) {
-			snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed");
-			return -1;
-		}
-		strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
-
-		if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 ||
-		    (!platform_sys_dir_uid(st.st_uid) && st.st_uid != uid) ||
-		    (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
-			snprintf(err, errlen,
-			    "bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf);
-			return -1;
-		}
-
-		/* If are past the homedir then we can stop */
-		if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0)
-			break;
-
-		/*
-		 * dirname should always complete with a "/" path,
-		 * but we can be paranoid and check for "." too
-		 */
-		if ((strcmp("/", buf) == 0) || (strcmp(".", buf) == 0))
-			break;
-	}
-	return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Version of secure_path() that accepts an open file descriptor to
- * avoid races.
- *
- * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure
- */
-static int
-secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
-    char *err, size_t errlen)
-{
-	struct stat st;
-
-	/* check the open file to avoid races */
-	if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) < 0) {
-		snprintf(err, errlen, "cannot stat file %s: %s",
-		    file, strerror(errno));
-		return -1;
-	}
-	return auth_secure_path(file, &st, pw->pw_dir, pw->pw_uid, err, errlen);
-}
-
-static FILE *
-auth_openfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes,
-    int log_missing, char *file_type)
-{
-	char line[1024];
-	struct stat st;
-	int fd;
-	FILE *f;
-
-	if ((fd = open(file, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK)) == -1) {
-		if (log_missing || errno != ENOENT)
-			debug("Could not open %s '%s': %s", file_type, file,
-			   strerror(errno));
-		return NULL;
-	}
-
-	if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) {
-		close(fd);
-		return NULL;
-	}
-	if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
-		logit("User %s %s %s is not a regular file",
-		    pw->pw_name, file_type, file);
-		close(fd);
-		return NULL;
-	}
-	unset_nonblock(fd);
-	if ((f = fdopen(fd, "r")) == NULL) {
-		close(fd);
-		return NULL;
-	}
-	if (strict_modes &&
-	    secure_filename(f, file, pw, line, sizeof(line)) != 0) {
-		fclose(f);
-		logit("Authentication refused: %s", line);
-		auth_debug_add("Ignored %s: %s", file_type, line);
-		return NULL;
-	}
-
-	return f;
-}
-
-
-FILE *
-auth_openkeyfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes)
-{
-	return auth_openfile(file, pw, strict_modes, 1, "authorized keys");
-}
-
-FILE *
-auth_openprincipals(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes)
-{
-	return auth_openfile(file, pw, strict_modes, 0,
-	    "authorized principals");
-}
-
-struct passwd *
-getpwnamallow(const char *user)
-{
-#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
-	extern login_cap_t *lc;
-#ifdef BSD_AUTH
-	auth_session_t *as;
-#endif
-#endif
-	struct passwd *pw;
-	struct connection_info *ci = get_connection_info(1, options.use_dns);
-
-	ci->user = user;
-	parse_server_match_config(&options, ci);
-
-#if defined(_AIX) && defined(HAVE_SETAUTHDB)
-	aix_setauthdb(user);
-#endif
-
-	pw = getpwnam(user);
-
-#if defined(_AIX) && defined(HAVE_SETAUTHDB)
-	aix_restoreauthdb();
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
-	/*
-	 * Windows usernames are case-insensitive.  To avoid later problems
-	 * when trying to match the username, the user is only allowed to
-	 * login if the username is given in the same case as stored in the
-	 * user database.
-	 */
-	if (pw != NULL && strcmp(user, pw->pw_name) != 0) {
-		logit("Login name %.100s does not match stored username %.100s",
-		    user, pw->pw_name);
-		pw = NULL;
-	}
-#endif
-	if (pw == NULL) {
-		logit("Invalid user %.100s from %.100s",
-		    user, get_remote_ipaddr());
-#ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
-		record_failed_login(user,
-		    get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh");
-#endif
-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-		audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER);
-#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
-		return (NULL);
-	}
-	if (!allowed_user(pw))
-		return (NULL);
-#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
-	if ((lc = login_getclass(pw->pw_class)) == NULL) {
-		debug("unable to get login class: %s", user);
-		return (NULL);
-	}
-#ifdef BSD_AUTH
-	if ((as = auth_open()) == NULL || auth_setpwd(as, pw) != 0 ||
-	    auth_approval(as, lc, pw->pw_name, "ssh") <= 0) {
-		debug("Approval failure for %s", user);
-		pw = NULL;
-	}
-	if (as != NULL)
-		auth_close(as);
-#endif
-#endif
-	if (pw != NULL)
-		return (pwcopy(pw));
-	return (NULL);
-}
-
-/* Returns 1 if key is revoked by revoked_keys_file, 0 otherwise */
-int
-auth_key_is_revoked(Key *key)
-{
-	char *fp = NULL;
-	int r;
-
-	if (options.revoked_keys_file == NULL)
-		return 0;
-	if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
-	    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
-		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-		error("%s: fingerprint key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	r = sshkey_check_revoked(key, options.revoked_keys_file);
-	switch (r) {
-	case 0:
-		break; /* not revoked */
-	case SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED:
-		error("Authentication key %s %s revoked by file %s",
-		    sshkey_type(key), fp, options.revoked_keys_file);
-		goto out;
-	default:
-		error("Error checking authentication key %s %s in "
-		    "revoked keys file %s: %s", sshkey_type(key), fp,
-		    options.revoked_keys_file, ssh_err(r));
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	/* Success */
-	r = 0;
-
- out:
-	free(fp);
-	return r == 0 ? 0 : 1;
-}
-
-void
-auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...)
-{
-	char buf[1024];
-	va_list args;
-
-	if (!auth_debug_init)
-		return;
-
-	va_start(args, fmt);
-	vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
-	va_end(args);
-	buffer_put_cstring(&auth_debug, buf);
-}
-
-void
-auth_debug_send(void)
-{
-	char *msg;
-
-	if (!auth_debug_init)
-		return;
-	while (buffer_len(&auth_debug)) {
-		msg = buffer_get_string(&auth_debug, NULL);
-		packet_send_debug("%s", msg);
-		free(msg);
-	}
-}
-
-void
-auth_debug_reset(void)
-{
-	if (auth_debug_init)
-		buffer_clear(&auth_debug);
-	else {
-		buffer_init(&auth_debug);
-		auth_debug_init = 1;
-	}
-}
-
-struct passwd *
-fakepw(void)
-{
-	static struct passwd fake;
-
-	memset(&fake, 0, sizeof(fake));
-	fake.pw_name = "NOUSER";
-	fake.pw_passwd =
-	    "$2a$06$r3.juUaHZDlIbQaO2dS9FuYxL1W9M81R1Tc92PoSNmzvpEqLkLGrK";
-#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS
-	fake.pw_gecos = "NOUSER";
-#endif
-	fake.pw_uid = privsep_pw == NULL ? (uid_t)-1 : privsep_pw->pw_uid;
-	fake.pw_gid = privsep_pw == NULL ? (gid_t)-1 : privsep_pw->pw_gid;
-#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS
-	fake.pw_class = "";
-#endif
-	fake.pw_dir = "/nonexist";
-	fake.pw_shell = "/nonexist";
-
-	return (&fake);
-}

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth.h

@@ -1,229 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.84 2015/05/08 06:41:56 djm Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- */
-
-#ifndef AUTH_H
-#define AUTH_H
-
-#include <signal.h>
-
-#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-
-#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
-#include <login_cap.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef BSD_AUTH
-#include <bsd_auth.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef KRB5
-#include <krb5.h>
-#endif
-
-struct ssh;
-struct sshkey;
-
-typedef struct Authctxt Authctxt;
-typedef struct Authmethod Authmethod;
-typedef struct KbdintDevice KbdintDevice;
-
-struct Authctxt {
-	sig_atomic_t	 success;
-	int		 authenticated;	/* authenticated and alarms cancelled */
-	int		 postponed;	/* authentication needs another step */
-	int		 valid;		/* user exists and is allowed to login */
-	int		 attempt;
-	int		 failures;
-	int		 server_caused_failure;
-	int		 force_pwchange;
-	char		*user;		/* username sent by the client */
-	char		*service;
-	struct passwd	*pw;		/* set if 'valid' */
-	char		*style;
-	void		*kbdintctxt;
-	char		*info;		/* Extra info for next auth_log */
-#ifdef BSD_AUTH
-	auth_session_t	*as;
-#endif
-	char		**auth_methods;	/* modified from server config */
-	u_int		 num_auth_methods;
-#ifdef KRB5
-	krb5_context	 krb5_ctx;
-	krb5_ccache	 krb5_fwd_ccache;
-	krb5_principal	 krb5_user;
-	char		*krb5_ticket_file;
-	char		*krb5_ccname;
-#endif
-	Buffer		*loginmsg;
-	void		*methoddata;
-
-	struct sshkey	**prev_userkeys;
-	u_int		 nprev_userkeys;
-};
-/*
- * Every authentication method has to handle authentication requests for
- * non-existing users, or for users that are not allowed to login. In this
- * case 'valid' is set to 0, but 'user' points to the username requested by
- * the client.
- */
-
-struct Authmethod {
-	char	*name;
-	int	(*userauth)(Authctxt *authctxt);
-	int	*enabled;
-};
-
-/*
- * Keyboard interactive device:
- * init_ctx	returns: non NULL upon success
- * query	returns: 0 - success, otherwise failure
- * respond	returns: 0 - success, 1 - need further interaction,
- *		otherwise - failure
- */
-struct KbdintDevice
-{
-	const char *name;
-	void*	(*init_ctx)(Authctxt*);
-	int	(*query)(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt,
-		    u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on);
-	int	(*respond)(void *ctx, u_int numresp, char **responses);
-	void	(*free_ctx)(void *ctx);
-};
-
-int      auth_rhosts(struct passwd *, const char *);
-int
-auth_rhosts2(struct passwd *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
-
-int	 auth_rhosts_rsa(Authctxt *, char *, Key *);
-int      auth_password(Authctxt *, const char *);
-int      auth_rsa(Authctxt *, BIGNUM *);
-int      auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(Key *);
-BIGNUM	*auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *);
-int	 auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *, BIGNUM *, u_char[]);
-int	 auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, BIGNUM *, Key **);
-
-int	 auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *);
-int	 hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, const char *, char *, Key *);
-int	 user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *, int);
-void	 pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *, const Key *, const char *, ...)
-	    __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 3, 4)));
-void	 auth2_record_userkey(Authctxt *, struct sshkey *);
-int	 auth2_userkey_already_used(Authctxt *, struct sshkey *);
-
-struct stat;
-int	 auth_secure_path(const char *, struct stat *, const char *, uid_t,
-    char *, size_t);
-
-#ifdef KRB5
-int	auth_krb5(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *auth, char **client, krb5_data *);
-int	auth_krb5_tgt(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *tgt);
-int	auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password);
-void	krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt);
-#endif /* KRB5 */
-
-#if defined(USE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE)
-#include <shadow.h>
-int auth_shadow_acctexpired(struct spwd *);
-int auth_shadow_pwexpired(Authctxt *);
-#endif
-
-#include "auth-pam.h"
-#include "audit.h"
-void remove_kbdint_device(const char *);
-
-void disable_forwarding(void);
-
-void	do_authentication(Authctxt *);
-void	do_authentication2(Authctxt *);
-
-void	auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *, ...)
-	    __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 2, 3)))
-	    __attribute__((__nonnull__ (2)));
-void	auth_log(Authctxt *, int, int, const char *, const char *);
-void	auth_maxtries_exceeded(Authctxt *) __attribute__((noreturn));
-void	userauth_finish(Authctxt *, int, const char *, const char *);
-int	auth_root_allowed(const char *);
-
-void	userauth_send_banner(const char *);
-
-char	*auth2_read_banner(void);
-int	 auth2_methods_valid(const char *, int);
-int	 auth2_update_methods_lists(Authctxt *, const char *, const char *);
-int	 auth2_setup_methods_lists(Authctxt *);
-int	 auth2_method_allowed(Authctxt *, const char *, const char *);
-
-void	privsep_challenge_enable(void);
-
-int	auth2_challenge(Authctxt *, char *);
-void	auth2_challenge_stop(Authctxt *);
-int	bsdauth_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **);
-int	bsdauth_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
-int	skey_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **);
-int	skey_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
-
-int	allowed_user(struct passwd *);
-struct passwd * getpwnamallow(const char *user);
-
-char	*get_challenge(Authctxt *);
-int	verify_response(Authctxt *, const char *);
-void	abandon_challenge_response(Authctxt *);
-
-char	*expand_authorized_keys(const char *, struct passwd *pw);
-char	*authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *);
-
-FILE	*auth_openkeyfile(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
-FILE	*auth_openprincipals(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
-int	 auth_key_is_revoked(Key *);
-
-HostStatus
-check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *, Key *, const char *,
-    const char *, const char *);
-
-/* hostkey handling */
-Key	*get_hostkey_by_index(int);
-Key	*get_hostkey_public_by_index(int, struct ssh *);
-Key	*get_hostkey_public_by_type(int, int, struct ssh *);
-Key	*get_hostkey_private_by_type(int, int, struct ssh *);
-int	 get_hostkey_index(Key *, int, struct ssh *);
-int	 ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *);
-int	 sshd_hostkey_sign(Key *, Key *, u_char **, size_t *,
-	     const u_char *, size_t, u_int);
-
-/* debug messages during authentication */
-void	 auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
-void	 auth_debug_send(void);
-void	 auth_debug_reset(void);
-
-struct passwd *fakepw(void);
-
-int	 sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *, const char *);
-
-#define SKEY_PROMPT "\nS/Key Password: "
-
-#if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
-#include <krb5.h>
-krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *);
-#endif
-#endif

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth1.c

@@ -1,444 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth1.c,v 1.82 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- *                    All rights reserved
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <pwd.h>
-
-#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "rsa.h"
-#include "ssh1.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-#include "compat.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "channels.h"
-#include "session.h"
-#include "uidswap.h"
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-#include "ssh-gss.h"
-#endif
-#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-
-/* import */
-extern ServerOptions options;
-extern Buffer loginmsg;
-
-static int auth1_process_password(Authctxt *);
-static int auth1_process_rsa(Authctxt *);
-static int auth1_process_rhosts_rsa(Authctxt *);
-static int auth1_process_tis_challenge(Authctxt *);
-static int auth1_process_tis_response(Authctxt *);
-
-static char *client_user = NULL;    /* Used to fill in remote user for PAM */
-
-struct AuthMethod1 {
-	int type;
-	char *name;
-	int *enabled;
-	int (*method)(Authctxt *);
-};
-
-const struct AuthMethod1 auth1_methods[] = {
-	{
-		SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD, "password",
-		&options.password_authentication, auth1_process_password
-	},
-	{
-		SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA, "rsa",
-		&options.rsa_authentication, auth1_process_rsa
-	},
-	{
-		SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA, "rhosts-rsa",
-		&options.rhosts_rsa_authentication, auth1_process_rhosts_rsa
-	},
-	{
-		SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS, "challenge-response",
-		&options.challenge_response_authentication,
-		auth1_process_tis_challenge
-	},
-	{
-		SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE, "challenge-response",
-		&options.challenge_response_authentication,
-		auth1_process_tis_response
-	},
-	{ -1, NULL, NULL, NULL}
-};
-
-static const struct AuthMethod1
-*lookup_authmethod1(int type)
-{
-	int i;
-
-	for (i = 0; auth1_methods[i].name != NULL; i++)
-		if (auth1_methods[i].type == type)
-			return (&(auth1_methods[i]));
-
-	return (NULL);
-}
-
-static char *
-get_authname(int type)
-{
-	const struct AuthMethod1 *a;
-	static char buf[64];
-
-	if ((a = lookup_authmethod1(type)) != NULL)
-		return (a->name);
-	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "bad-auth-msg-%d", type);
-	return (buf);
-}
-
-/*ARGSUSED*/
-static int
-auth1_process_password(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
-	int authenticated = 0;
-	char *password;
-	u_int dlen;
-
-	/*
-	 * Read user password.  It is in plain text, but was
-	 * transmitted over the encrypted channel so it is
-	 * not visible to an outside observer.
-	 */
-	password = packet_get_string(&dlen);
-	packet_check_eom();
-
-	/* Try authentication with the password. */
-	authenticated = PRIVSEP(auth_password(authctxt, password));
-
-	explicit_bzero(password, dlen);
-	free(password);
-
-	return (authenticated);
-}
-
-/*ARGSUSED*/
-static int
-auth1_process_rsa(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
-	int authenticated = 0;
-	BIGNUM *n;
-
-	/* RSA authentication requested. */
-	if ((n = BN_new()) == NULL)
-		fatal("do_authloop: BN_new failed");
-	packet_get_bignum(n);
-	packet_check_eom();
-	authenticated = auth_rsa(authctxt, n);
-	BN_clear_free(n);
-
-	return (authenticated);
-}
-
-/*ARGSUSED*/
-static int
-auth1_process_rhosts_rsa(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
-	int keybits, authenticated = 0;
-	u_int bits;
-	Key *client_host_key;
-	u_int ulen;
-
-	/*
-	 * Get client user name.  Note that we just have to
-	 * trust the client; root on the client machine can
-	 * claim to be any user.
-	 */
-	client_user = packet_get_cstring(&ulen);
-
-	/* Get the client host key. */
-	client_host_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
-	bits = packet_get_int();
-	packet_get_bignum(client_host_key->rsa->e);
-	packet_get_bignum(client_host_key->rsa->n);
-
-	keybits = BN_num_bits(client_host_key->rsa->n);
-	if (keybits < 0 || bits != (u_int)keybits) {
-		verbose("Warning: keysize mismatch for client_host_key: "
-		    "actual %d, announced %d",
-		    BN_num_bits(client_host_key->rsa->n), bits);
-	}
-	packet_check_eom();
-
-	authenticated = auth_rhosts_rsa(authctxt, client_user,
-	    client_host_key);
-	key_free(client_host_key);
-
-	auth_info(authctxt, "ruser %.100s", client_user);
-
-	return (authenticated);
-}
-
-/*ARGSUSED*/
-static int
-auth1_process_tis_challenge(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
-	char *challenge;
-
-	if ((challenge = get_challenge(authctxt)) == NULL)
-		return (0);
-
-	debug("sending challenge '%s'", challenge);
-	packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE);
-	packet_put_cstring(challenge);
-	free(challenge);
-	packet_send();
-	packet_write_wait();
-
-	return (-1);
-}
-
-/*ARGSUSED*/
-static int
-auth1_process_tis_response(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
-	int authenticated = 0;
-	char *response;
-	u_int dlen;
-
-	response = packet_get_string(&dlen);
-	packet_check_eom();
-	authenticated = verify_response(authctxt, response);
-	explicit_bzero(response, dlen);
-	free(response);
-
-	return (authenticated);
-}
-
-/*
- * read packets, try to authenticate the user and
- * return only if authentication is successful
- */
-static void
-do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
-	int authenticated = 0;
-	int prev = 0, type = 0;
-	const struct AuthMethod1 *meth;
-
-	debug("Attempting authentication for %s%.100s.",
-	    authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ", authctxt->user);
-
-	/* If the user has no password, accept authentication immediately. */
-	if (options.permit_empty_passwd && options.password_authentication &&
-#ifdef KRB5
-	    (!options.kerberos_authentication || options.kerberos_or_local_passwd) &&
-#endif
-	    PRIVSEP(auth_password(authctxt, ""))) {
-#ifdef USE_PAM
-		if (options.use_pam && (PRIVSEP(do_pam_account())))
-#endif
-		{
-			auth_log(authctxt, 1, 0, "without authentication",
-			    NULL);
-			return;
-		}
-	}
-
-	/* Indicate that authentication is needed. */
-	packet_start(SSH_SMSG_FAILURE);
-	packet_send();
-	packet_write_wait();
-
-	for (;;) {
-		/* default to fail */
-		authenticated = 0;
-
-
-		/* Get a packet from the client. */
-		prev = type;
-		type = packet_read();
-
-		/*
-		 * If we started challenge-response authentication but the
-		 * next packet is not a response to our challenge, release
-		 * the resources allocated by get_challenge() (which would
-		 * normally have been released by verify_response() had we
-		 * received such a response)
-		 */
-		if (prev == SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS &&
-		    type != SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE)
-			abandon_challenge_response(authctxt);
-
-		if (authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries)
-			goto skip;
-		if ((meth = lookup_authmethod1(type)) == NULL) {
-			logit("Unknown message during authentication: "
-			    "type %d", type);
-			goto skip;
-		}
-
-		if (!*(meth->enabled)) {
-			verbose("%s authentication disabled.", meth->name);
-			goto skip;
-		}
-
-		authenticated = meth->method(authctxt);
-		if (authenticated == -1)
-			continue; /* "postponed" */
-
-#ifdef BSD_AUTH
-		if (authctxt->as) {
-			auth_close(authctxt->as);
-			authctxt->as = NULL;
-		}
-#endif
-		if (!authctxt->valid && authenticated)
-			fatal("INTERNAL ERROR: authenticated invalid user %s",
-			    authctxt->user);
-
-#ifdef _UNICOS
-		if (authenticated && cray_access_denied(authctxt->user)) {
-			authenticated = 0;
-			fatal("Access denied for user %s.",authctxt->user);
-		}
-#endif /* _UNICOS */
-
-#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
-		/* Special handling for root */
-		if (authenticated && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
-		    !auth_root_allowed(meth->name)) {
- 			authenticated = 0;
-# ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-			PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED));
-# endif
-		}
-#endif
-
-#ifdef USE_PAM
-		if (options.use_pam && authenticated &&
-		    !PRIVSEP(do_pam_account())) {
-			char *msg;
-			size_t len;
-
-			error("Access denied for user %s by PAM account "
-			    "configuration", authctxt->user);
-			len = buffer_len(&loginmsg);
-			buffer_append(&loginmsg, "\0", 1);
-			msg = buffer_ptr(&loginmsg);
-			/* strip trailing newlines */
-			if (len > 0)
-				while (len > 0 && msg[--len] == '\n')
-					msg[len] = '\0';
-			else
-				msg = "Access denied.";
-			packet_disconnect("%s", msg);
-		}
-#endif
-
- skip:
-		/* Log before sending the reply */
-		auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, 0, get_authname(type), NULL);
-
-		free(client_user);
-		client_user = NULL;
-
-		if (authenticated)
-			return;
-
-		if (++authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries) {
-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-			PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES));
-#endif
-			auth_maxtries_exceeded(authctxt);
-		}
-
-		packet_start(SSH_SMSG_FAILURE);
-		packet_send();
-		packet_write_wait();
-	}
-}
-
-/*
- * Performs authentication of an incoming connection.  Session key has already
- * been exchanged and encryption is enabled.
- */
-void
-do_authentication(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
-	u_int ulen;
-	char *user, *style = NULL;
-
-	/* Get the name of the user that we wish to log in as. */
-	packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_USER);
-
-	/* Get the user name. */
-	user = packet_get_cstring(&ulen);
-	packet_check_eom();
-
-	if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
-		*style++ = '\0';
-
-	authctxt->user = user;
-	authctxt->style = style;
-
-	/* Verify that the user is a valid user. */
-	if ((authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(user))) != NULL)
-		authctxt->valid = 1;
-	else {
-		debug("do_authentication: invalid user %s", user);
-		authctxt->pw = fakepw();
-	}
-
-	/* Configuration may have changed as a result of Match */
-	if (options.num_auth_methods != 0)
-		fatal("AuthenticationMethods is not supported with SSH "
-		    "protocol 1");
-
-	setproctitle("%s%s", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown",
-	    use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
-
-#ifdef USE_PAM
-	if (options.use_pam)
-		PRIVSEP(start_pam(authctxt));
-#endif
-
-	/*
-	 * If we are not running as root, the user must have the same uid as
-	 * the server.
-	 */
-#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
-	if (!use_privsep && getuid() != 0 && authctxt->pw &&
-	    authctxt->pw->pw_uid != getuid())
-		packet_disconnect("Cannot change user when server not running as root.");
-#endif
-
-	/*
-	 * Loop until the user has been authenticated or the connection is
-	 * closed, do_authloop() returns only if authentication is successful
-	 */
-	do_authloop(authctxt);
-
-	/* The user has been authenticated and accepted. */
-	packet_start(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS);
-	packet_send();
-	packet_write_wait();
-}
-
-#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-chall.c

@@ -1,381 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-chall.c,v 1.43 2015/07/18 07:57:14 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 2001 Per Allansson.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "dispatch.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-
-/* import */
-extern ServerOptions options;
-
-static int auth2_challenge_start(Authctxt *);
-static int send_userauth_info_request(Authctxt *);
-static int input_userauth_info_response(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-
-#ifdef BSD_AUTH
-extern KbdintDevice bsdauth_device;
-#else
-#ifdef USE_PAM
-extern KbdintDevice sshpam_device;
-#endif
-#ifdef SKEY
-extern KbdintDevice skey_device;
-#endif
-#endif
-
-KbdintDevice *devices[] = {
-#ifdef BSD_AUTH
-	&bsdauth_device,
-#else
-#ifdef USE_PAM
-	&sshpam_device,
-#endif
-#ifdef SKEY
-	&skey_device,
-#endif
-#endif
-	NULL
-};
-
-typedef struct KbdintAuthctxt KbdintAuthctxt;
-struct KbdintAuthctxt
-{
-	char *devices;
-	void *ctxt;
-	KbdintDevice *device;
-	u_int nreq;
-	u_int devices_done;
-};
-
-#ifdef USE_PAM
-void
-remove_kbdint_device(const char *devname)
-{
-	int i, j;
-
-	for (i = 0; devices[i] != NULL; i++)
-		if (strcmp(devices[i]->name, devname) == 0) {
-			for (j = i; devices[j] != NULL; j++)
-				devices[j] = devices[j+1];
-			i--;
-		}
-}
-#endif
-
-static KbdintAuthctxt *
-kbdint_alloc(const char *devs)
-{
-	KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt;
-	Buffer b;
-	int i;
-
-#ifdef USE_PAM
-	if (!options.use_pam)
-		remove_kbdint_device("pam");
-#endif
-
-	kbdintctxt = xcalloc(1, sizeof(KbdintAuthctxt));
-	if (strcmp(devs, "") == 0) {
-		buffer_init(&b);
-		for (i = 0; devices[i]; i++) {
-			if (buffer_len(&b) > 0)
-				buffer_append(&b, ",", 1);
-			buffer_append(&b, devices[i]->name,
-			    strlen(devices[i]->name));
-		}
-		buffer_append(&b, "\0", 1);
-		kbdintctxt->devices = xstrdup(buffer_ptr(&b));
-		buffer_free(&b);
-	} else {
-		kbdintctxt->devices = xstrdup(devs);
-	}
-	debug("kbdint_alloc: devices '%s'", kbdintctxt->devices);
-	kbdintctxt->ctxt = NULL;
-	kbdintctxt->device = NULL;
-	kbdintctxt->nreq = 0;
-
-	return kbdintctxt;
-}
-static void
-kbdint_reset_device(KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt)
-{
-	if (kbdintctxt->ctxt) {
-		kbdintctxt->device->free_ctx(kbdintctxt->ctxt);
-		kbdintctxt->ctxt = NULL;
-	}
-	kbdintctxt->device = NULL;
-}
-static void
-kbdint_free(KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt)
-{
-	if (kbdintctxt->device)
-		kbdint_reset_device(kbdintctxt);
-	free(kbdintctxt->devices);
-	explicit_bzero(kbdintctxt, sizeof(*kbdintctxt));
-	free(kbdintctxt);
-}
-/* get next device */
-static int
-kbdint_next_device(Authctxt *authctxt, KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt)
-{
-	size_t len;
-	char *t;
-	int i;
-
-	if (kbdintctxt->device)
-		kbdint_reset_device(kbdintctxt);
-	do {
-		len = kbdintctxt->devices ?
-		    strcspn(kbdintctxt->devices, ",") : 0;
-
-		if (len == 0)
-			break;
-		for (i = 0; devices[i]; i++) {
-			if ((kbdintctxt->devices_done & (1 << i)) != 0 ||
-			    !auth2_method_allowed(authctxt,
-			    "keyboard-interactive", devices[i]->name))
-				continue;
-			if (strncmp(kbdintctxt->devices, devices[i]->name,
-			    len) == 0) {
-				kbdintctxt->device = devices[i];
-				kbdintctxt->devices_done |= 1 << i;
-			}
-		}
-		t = kbdintctxt->devices;
-		kbdintctxt->devices = t[len] ? xstrdup(t+len+1) : NULL;
-		free(t);
-		debug2("kbdint_next_device: devices %s", kbdintctxt->devices ?
-		    kbdintctxt->devices : "<empty>");
-	} while (kbdintctxt->devices && !kbdintctxt->device);
-
-	return kbdintctxt->device ? 1 : 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * try challenge-response, set authctxt->postponed if we have to
- * wait for the response.
- */
-int
-auth2_challenge(Authctxt *authctxt, char *devs)
-{
-	debug("auth2_challenge: user=%s devs=%s",
-	    authctxt->user ? authctxt->user : "<nouser>",
-	    devs ? devs : "<no devs>");
-
-	if (authctxt->user == NULL || !devs)
-		return 0;
-	if (authctxt->kbdintctxt == NULL)
-		authctxt->kbdintctxt = kbdint_alloc(devs);
-	return auth2_challenge_start(authctxt);
-}
-
-/* unregister kbd-int callbacks and context */
-void
-auth2_challenge_stop(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
-	/* unregister callback */
-	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE, NULL);
-	if (authctxt->kbdintctxt != NULL) {
-		kbdint_free(authctxt->kbdintctxt);
-		authctxt->kbdintctxt = NULL;
-	}
-}
-
-/* side effect: sets authctxt->postponed if a reply was sent*/
-static int
-auth2_challenge_start(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
-	KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt = authctxt->kbdintctxt;
-
-	debug2("auth2_challenge_start: devices %s",
-	    kbdintctxt->devices ?  kbdintctxt->devices : "<empty>");
-
-	if (kbdint_next_device(authctxt, kbdintctxt) == 0) {
-		auth2_challenge_stop(authctxt);
-		return 0;
-	}
-	debug("auth2_challenge_start: trying authentication method '%s'",
-	    kbdintctxt->device->name);
-
-	if ((kbdintctxt->ctxt = kbdintctxt->device->init_ctx(authctxt)) == NULL) {
-		auth2_challenge_stop(authctxt);
-		return 0;
-	}
-	if (send_userauth_info_request(authctxt) == 0) {
-		auth2_challenge_stop(authctxt);
-		return 0;
-	}
-	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE,
-	    &input_userauth_info_response);
-
-	authctxt->postponed = 1;
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int
-send_userauth_info_request(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
-	KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt;
-	char *name, *instr, **prompts;
-	u_int i, *echo_on;
-
-	kbdintctxt = authctxt->kbdintctxt;
-	if (kbdintctxt->device->query(kbdintctxt->ctxt,
-	    &name, &instr, &kbdintctxt->nreq, &prompts, &echo_on))
-		return 0;
-
-	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST);
-	packet_put_cstring(name);
-	packet_put_cstring(instr);
-	packet_put_cstring("");		/* language not used */
-	packet_put_int(kbdintctxt->nreq);
-	for (i = 0; i < kbdintctxt->nreq; i++) {
-		packet_put_cstring(prompts[i]);
-		packet_put_char(echo_on[i]);
-	}
-	packet_send();
-	packet_write_wait();
-
-	for (i = 0; i < kbdintctxt->nreq; i++)
-		free(prompts[i]);
-	free(prompts);
-	free(echo_on);
-	free(name);
-	free(instr);
-	return 1;
-}
-
-static int
-input_userauth_info_response(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
-	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
-	KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt;
-	int authenticated = 0, res;
-	u_int i, nresp;
-	const char *devicename = NULL;
-	char **response = NULL;
-
-	if (authctxt == NULL)
-		fatal("input_userauth_info_response: no authctxt");
-	kbdintctxt = authctxt->kbdintctxt;
-	if (kbdintctxt == NULL || kbdintctxt->ctxt == NULL)
-		fatal("input_userauth_info_response: no kbdintctxt");
-	if (kbdintctxt->device == NULL)
-		fatal("input_userauth_info_response: no device");
-
-	authctxt->postponed = 0;	/* reset */
-	nresp = packet_get_int();
-	if (nresp != kbdintctxt->nreq)
-		fatal("input_userauth_info_response: wrong number of replies");
-	if (nresp > 100)
-		fatal("input_userauth_info_response: too many replies");
-	if (nresp > 0) {
-		response = xcalloc(nresp, sizeof(char *));
-		for (i = 0; i < nresp; i++)
-			response[i] = packet_get_string(NULL);
-	}
-	packet_check_eom();
-
-	res = kbdintctxt->device->respond(kbdintctxt->ctxt, nresp, response);
-
-	for (i = 0; i < nresp; i++) {
-		explicit_bzero(response[i], strlen(response[i]));
-		free(response[i]);
-	}
-	free(response);
-
-	switch (res) {
-	case 0:
-		/* Success! */
-		authenticated = authctxt->valid ? 1 : 0;
-		break;
-	case 1:
-		/* Authentication needs further interaction */
-		if (send_userauth_info_request(authctxt) == 1)
-			authctxt->postponed = 1;
-		break;
-	default:
-		/* Failure! */
-		break;
-	}
-	devicename = kbdintctxt->device->name;
-	if (!authctxt->postponed) {
-		if (authenticated) {
-			auth2_challenge_stop(authctxt);
-		} else {
-			/* start next device */
-			/* may set authctxt->postponed */
-			auth2_challenge_start(authctxt);
-		}
-	}
-	userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "keyboard-interactive",
-	    devicename);
-	return 0;
-}
-
-void
-privsep_challenge_enable(void)
-{
-#if defined(BSD_AUTH) || defined(USE_PAM) || defined(SKEY)
-	int n = 0;
-#endif
-#ifdef BSD_AUTH
-	extern KbdintDevice mm_bsdauth_device;
-#endif
-#ifdef USE_PAM
-	extern KbdintDevice mm_sshpam_device;
-#endif
-#ifdef SKEY
-	extern KbdintDevice mm_skey_device;
-#endif
-
-#ifdef BSD_AUTH
-	devices[n++] = &mm_bsdauth_device;
-#else
-#ifdef USE_PAM
-	devices[n++] = &mm_sshpam_device;
-#endif
-#ifdef SKEY
-	devices[n++] = &mm_skey_device;
-#endif
-#endif
-}

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-gss.c

@@ -1,299 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.22 2015/01/19 20:07:45 markus Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <stdarg.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "dispatch.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "ssh-gss.h"
-#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-
-extern ServerOptions options;
-
-static int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt);
-static int input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt);
-static int input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt);
-static int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-
-/*
- * We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know
- * how to check local user kuserok and the like)
- */
-static int
-userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
-	gss_OID_desc goid = {0, NULL};
-	Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL;
-	int mechs;
-	int present;
-	OM_uint32 ms;
-	u_int len;
-	u_char *doid = NULL;
-
-	if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL)
-		return (0);
-
-	mechs = packet_get_int();
-	if (mechs == 0) {
-		debug("Mechanism negotiation is not supported");
-		return (0);
-	}
-
-	do {
-		mechs--;
-
-		free(doid);
-
-		present = 0;
-		doid = packet_get_string(&len);
-
-		if (len > 2 && doid[0] == SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE &&
-		    doid[1] == len - 2) {
-			goid.elements = doid + 2;
-			goid.length   = len - 2;
-			ssh_gssapi_test_oid_supported(&ms, &goid, &present);
-		} else {
-			logit("Badly formed OID received");
-		}
-	} while (mechs > 0 && !present);
-
-	if (!present) {
-		free(doid);
-		authctxt->server_caused_failure = 1;
-		return (0);
-	}
-
-	if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, &goid)))) {
-		if (ctxt != NULL)
-			ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
-		free(doid);
-		authctxt->server_caused_failure = 1;
-		return (0);
-	}
-
-	authctxt->methoddata = (void *)ctxt;
-
-	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE);
-
-	/* Return the OID that we received */
-	packet_put_string(doid, len);
-
-	packet_send();
-	free(doid);
-
-	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, &input_gssapi_token);
-	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, &input_gssapi_errtok);
-	authctxt->postponed = 1;
-
-	return (0);
-}
-
-static int
-input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
-{
-	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
-	Gssctxt *gssctxt;
-	gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-	gss_buffer_desc recv_tok;
-	OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, flags;
-	u_int len;
-
-	if (authctxt == NULL || (authctxt->methoddata == NULL && !use_privsep))
-		fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context");
-
-	gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
-	recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&len);
-	recv_tok.length = len; /* u_int vs. size_t */
-
-	packet_check_eom();
-
-	maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gssctxt, &recv_tok,
-	    &send_tok, &flags));
-
-	free(recv_tok.value);
-
-	if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
-		if (send_tok.length != 0) {
-			packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK);
-			packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
-			packet_send();
-		}
-		authctxt->postponed = 0;
-		dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
-		userauth_finish(authctxt, 0, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL);
-	} else {
-		if (send_tok.length != 0) {
-			packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN);
-			packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
-			packet_send();
-		}
-		if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
-			dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
-			if (flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)
-				dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC,
-				    &input_gssapi_mic);
-			else
-				dispatch_set(
-				    SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE,
-				    &input_gssapi_exchange_complete);
-		}
-	}
-
-	gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int
-input_gssapi_errtok(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
-{
-	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
-	Gssctxt *gssctxt;
-	gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-	gss_buffer_desc recv_tok;
-	OM_uint32 maj_status;
-	u_int len;
-
-	if (authctxt == NULL || (authctxt->methoddata == NULL && !use_privsep))
-		fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context");
-
-	gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
-	recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&len);
-	recv_tok.length = len;
-
-	packet_check_eom();
-
-	/* Push the error token into GSSAPI to see what it says */
-	maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gssctxt, &recv_tok,
-	    &send_tok, NULL));
-
-	free(recv_tok.value);
-
-	/* We can't return anything to the client, even if we wanted to */
-	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
-	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL);
-
-	/* The client will have already moved on to the next auth */
-
-	gss_release_buffer(&maj_status, &send_tok);
-	return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * This is called when the client thinks we've completed authentication.
- * It should only be enabled in the dispatch handler by the function above,
- * which only enables it once the GSSAPI exchange is complete.
- */
-
-static int
-input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
-{
-	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
-	int authenticated;
-
-	if (authctxt == NULL || (authctxt->methoddata == NULL && !use_privsep))
-		fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context");
-
-	/*
-	 * We don't need to check the status, because we're only enabled in
-	 * the dispatcher once the exchange is complete
-	 */
-
-	packet_check_eom();
-
-	authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
-
-	authctxt->postponed = 0;
-	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
-	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL);
-	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, NULL);
-	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL);
-	userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL);
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int
-input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
-{
-	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
-	Gssctxt *gssctxt;
-	int authenticated = 0;
-	Buffer b;
-	gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
-	u_int len;
-
-	if (authctxt == NULL || (authctxt->methoddata == NULL && !use_privsep))
-		fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context");
-
-	gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
-
-	mic.value = packet_get_string(&len);
-	mic.length = len;
-
-	ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
-	    "gssapi-with-mic");
-
-	gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
-	gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
-
-	if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic))))
-		authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
-	else
-		logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
-
-	buffer_free(&b);
-	free(mic.value);
-
-	authctxt->postponed = 0;
-	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
-	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL);
-	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, NULL);
-	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL);
-	userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL);
-	return 0;
-}
-
-Authmethod method_gssapi = {
-	"gssapi-with-mic",
-	userauth_gssapi,
-	&options.gss_authentication
-};
-
-#endif /* GSSAPI */

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-hostbased.c

@@ -1,250 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-hostbased.c,v 1.25 2015/05/04 06:10:48 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <pwd.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-#include "compat.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "canohost.h"
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-#include "ssh-gss.h"
-#endif
-#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-#include "pathnames.h"
-#include "match.h"
-
-/* import */
-extern ServerOptions options;
-extern u_char *session_id2;
-extern u_int session_id2_len;
-
-static int
-userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
-	Buffer b;
-	Key *key = NULL;
-	char *pkalg, *cuser, *chost, *service;
-	u_char *pkblob, *sig;
-	u_int alen, blen, slen;
-	int pktype;
-	int authenticated = 0;
-
-	if (!authctxt->valid) {
-		debug2("userauth_hostbased: disabled because of invalid user");
-		return 0;
-	}
-	pkalg = packet_get_string(&alen);
-	pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen);
-	chost = packet_get_string(NULL);
-	cuser = packet_get_string(NULL);
-	sig = packet_get_string(&slen);
-
-	debug("userauth_hostbased: cuser %s chost %s pkalg %s slen %d",
-	    cuser, chost, pkalg, slen);
-#ifdef DEBUG_PK
-	debug("signature:");
-	buffer_init(&b);
-	buffer_append(&b, sig, slen);
-	buffer_dump(&b);
-	buffer_free(&b);
-#endif
-	pktype = key_type_from_name(pkalg);
-	if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) {
-		/* this is perfectly legal */
-		logit("userauth_hostbased: unsupported "
-		    "public key algorithm: %s", pkalg);
-		goto done;
-	}
-	key = key_from_blob(pkblob, blen);
-	if (key == NULL) {
-		error("userauth_hostbased: cannot decode key: %s", pkalg);
-		goto done;
-	}
-	if (key->type != pktype) {
-		error("userauth_hostbased: type mismatch for decoded key "
-		    "(received %d, expected %d)", key->type, pktype);
-		goto done;
-	}
-	if (key_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
-	    (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) {
-		error("Refusing RSA key because peer uses unsafe "
-		    "signature format");
-		goto done;
-	}
-	if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
-	    options.hostbased_key_types, 0) != 1) {
-		logit("%s: key type %s not in HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes",
-		    __func__, sshkey_type(key));
-		goto done;
-	}
-
-	service = datafellows & SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE ? "ssh-userauth" :
-	    authctxt->service;
-	buffer_init(&b);
-	buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
-	/* reconstruct packet */
-	buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
-	buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->user);
-	buffer_put_cstring(&b, service);
-	buffer_put_cstring(&b, "hostbased");
-	buffer_put_string(&b, pkalg, alen);
-	buffer_put_string(&b, pkblob, blen);
-	buffer_put_cstring(&b, chost);
-	buffer_put_cstring(&b, cuser);
-#ifdef DEBUG_PK
-	buffer_dump(&b);
-#endif
-
-	pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key,
-	    "client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"", cuser, chost);
-
-	/* test for allowed key and correct signature */
-	authenticated = 0;
-	if (PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, cuser, chost, key)) &&
-	    PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
-			buffer_len(&b))) == 1)
-		authenticated = 1;
-
-	buffer_free(&b);
-done:
-	debug2("userauth_hostbased: authenticated %d", authenticated);
-	if (key != NULL)
-		key_free(key);
-	free(pkalg);
-	free(pkblob);
-	free(cuser);
-	free(chost);
-	free(sig);
-	return authenticated;
-}
-
-/* return 1 if given hostkey is allowed */
-int
-hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *cuser, char *chost,
-    Key *key)
-{
-	const char *resolvedname, *ipaddr, *lookup, *reason;
-	HostStatus host_status;
-	int len;
-	char *fp;
-
-	if (auth_key_is_revoked(key))
-		return 0;
-
-	resolvedname = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns);
-	ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr();
-
-	debug2("%s: chost %s resolvedname %s ipaddr %s", __func__,
-	    chost, resolvedname, ipaddr);
-
-	if (((len = strlen(chost)) > 0) && chost[len - 1] == '.') {
-		debug2("stripping trailing dot from chost %s", chost);
-		chost[len - 1] = '\0';
-	}
-
-	if (options.hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only) {
-		if (auth_rhosts2(pw, cuser, chost, chost) == 0) {
-			debug2("%s: auth_rhosts2 refused "
-			    "user \"%.100s\" host \"%.100s\" (from packet)",
-			    __func__, cuser, chost);
-			return 0;
-		}
-		lookup = chost;
-	} else {
-		if (strcasecmp(resolvedname, chost) != 0)
-			logit("userauth_hostbased mismatch: "
-			    "client sends %s, but we resolve %s to %s",
-			    chost, ipaddr, resolvedname);
-		if (auth_rhosts2(pw, cuser, resolvedname, ipaddr) == 0) {
-			debug2("%s: auth_rhosts2 refused "
-			    "user \"%.100s\" host \"%.100s\" addr \"%.100s\"",
-			    __func__, cuser, resolvedname, ipaddr);
-			return 0;
-		}
-		lookup = resolvedname;
-	}
-	debug2("%s: access allowed by auth_rhosts2", __func__);
-
-	if (key_is_cert(key) && 
-	    key_cert_check_authority(key, 1, 0, lookup, &reason)) {
-		error("%s", reason);
-		auth_debug_add("%s", reason);
-		return 0;
-	}
-
-	host_status = check_key_in_hostfiles(pw, key, lookup,
-	    _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE,
-	    options.ignore_user_known_hosts ? NULL : _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE);
-
-	/* backward compat if no key has been found. */
-	if (host_status == HOST_NEW) {
-		host_status = check_key_in_hostfiles(pw, key, lookup,
-		    _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE2,
-		    options.ignore_user_known_hosts ? NULL :
-		    _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE2);
-	}
-
-	if (host_status == HOST_OK) {
-		if (key_is_cert(key)) {
-			if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
-			    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
-				fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__);
-			verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" signed by "
-			    "%s CA %s from %s@%s", key->cert->key_id,
-			    key_type(key->cert->signature_key), fp,
-			    cuser, lookup);
-		} else {
-			if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key,
-			    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
-				fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__);
-			verbose("Accepted %s public key %s from %s@%s",
-			    key_type(key), fp, cuser, lookup);
-		}
-		free(fp);
-	}
-
-	return (host_status == HOST_OK);
-}
-
-Authmethod method_hostbased = {
-	"hostbased",
-	userauth_hostbased,
-	&options.hostbased_authentication
-};

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-kbdint.c

@@ -1,69 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-kbdint.c,v 1.7 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <stdarg.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-
-/* import */
-extern ServerOptions options;
-
-static int
-userauth_kbdint(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
-	int authenticated = 0;
-	char *lang, *devs;
-
-	lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
-	devs = packet_get_string(NULL);
-	packet_check_eom();
-
-	debug("keyboard-interactive devs %s", devs);
-
-	if (options.challenge_response_authentication)
-		authenticated = auth2_challenge(authctxt, devs);
-
-	free(devs);
-	free(lang);
-	return authenticated;
-}
-
-Authmethod method_kbdint = {
-	"keyboard-interactive",
-	userauth_kbdint,
-	&options.kbd_interactive_authentication
-};

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-krb5.c

@@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
-/*	$NetBSD: auth2-krb5.c,v 1.4 2015/04/03 23:58:19 christos Exp $	*/
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-__RCSID("$NetBSD: auth2-krb5.c,v 1.4 2015/04/03 23:58:19 christos Exp $");
-
-#include <krb5.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-
-#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-#include "ssh-gss.h"
-#endif
-#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-
-/* import */
-extern ServerOptions options;
-
-static int
-userauth_kerberos(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
-	krb5_data tkt, reply;
-	u_int dlen;
-	char *client = NULL;
-	int authenticated = 0;
-
-	tkt.data = packet_get_string(&dlen);
-	tkt.length = dlen;
-	packet_check_eom();
-
-	if (PRIVSEP(auth_krb5(authctxt, &tkt, &client, &reply))) {
-		authenticated = 1;
-		if (reply.length)
-			free(reply.data);
-	}
-	if (client)
-		free(client);
-	free(tkt.data);
-	return (authenticated);
-}
-
-Authmethod method_kerberos = {
-	"kerberos-2@ssh.com",
-	userauth_kerberos,
-	&options.kerberos_authentication
-};

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-none.c

@@ -1,75 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-none.c,v 1.18 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <sys/uio.h>
-
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-
-#include "atomicio.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-#include "compat.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-#include "ssh-gss.h"
-#endif
-#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-
-/* import */
-extern ServerOptions options;
-
-/* "none" is allowed only one time */
-static int none_enabled = 1;
-
-static int
-userauth_none(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
-	none_enabled = 0;
-	packet_check_eom();
-	if (options.permit_empty_passwd && options.password_authentication)
-		return (PRIVSEP(auth_password(authctxt, "")));
-	return (0);
-}
-
-Authmethod method_none = {
-	"none",
-	userauth_none,
-	&none_enabled
-};

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-passwd.c

@@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-passwd.c,v 1.12 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <string.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-#include "ssh-gss.h"
-#endif
-#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-
-/* import */
-extern ServerOptions options;
-
-static int
-userauth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
-	char *password, *newpass;
-	int authenticated = 0;
-	int change;
-	u_int len, newlen;
-
-	change = packet_get_char();
-	password = packet_get_string(&len);
-	if (change) {
-		/* discard new password from packet */
-		newpass = packet_get_string(&newlen);
-		explicit_bzero(newpass, newlen);
-		free(newpass);
-	}
-	packet_check_eom();
-
-	if (change)
-		logit("password change not supported");
-	else if (PRIVSEP(auth_password(authctxt, password)) == 1)
-		authenticated = 1;
-	explicit_bzero(password, len);
-	free(password);
-	return authenticated;
-}
-
-Authmethod method_passwd = {
-	"password",
-	userauth_passwd,
-	&options.password_authentication
-};

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2.c

@@ -1,619 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.135 2015/01/19 20:07:45 markus Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <sys/uio.h>
-
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <pwd.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#include "atomicio.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-#include "compat.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "dispatch.h"
-#include "pathnames.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-#include "ssh-gss.h"
-#endif
-#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-
-/* import */
-extern ServerOptions options;
-extern u_char *session_id2;
-extern u_int session_id2_len;
-extern Buffer loginmsg;
-
-/* methods */
-
-extern Authmethod method_none;
-extern Authmethod method_pubkey;
-extern Authmethod method_passwd;
-extern Authmethod method_kbdint;
-extern Authmethod method_hostbased;
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-extern Authmethod method_gssapi;
-#endif
-
-Authmethod *authmethods[] = {
-	&method_none,
-	&method_pubkey,
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-	&method_gssapi,
-#endif
-	&method_passwd,
-	&method_kbdint,
-	&method_hostbased,
-	NULL
-};
-
-/* protocol */
-
-static int input_service_request(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-static int input_userauth_request(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-
-/* helper */
-static Authmethod *authmethod_lookup(Authctxt *, const char *);
-static char *authmethods_get(Authctxt *authctxt);
-
-#define MATCH_NONE	0	/* method or submethod mismatch */
-#define MATCH_METHOD	1	/* method matches (no submethod specified) */
-#define MATCH_BOTH	2	/* method and submethod match */
-#define MATCH_PARTIAL	3	/* method matches, submethod can't be checked */
-static int list_starts_with(const char *, const char *, const char *);
-
-char *
-auth2_read_banner(void)
-{
-	struct stat st;
-	char *banner = NULL;
-	size_t len, n;
-	int fd;
-
-	if ((fd = open(options.banner, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
-		return (NULL);
-	if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1) {
-		close(fd);
-		return (NULL);
-	}
-	if (st.st_size <= 0 || st.st_size > 1*1024*1024) {
-		close(fd);
-		return (NULL);
-	}
-
-	len = (size_t)st.st_size;		/* truncate */
-	banner = xmalloc(len + 1);
-	n = atomicio(read, fd, banner, len);
-	close(fd);
-
-	if (n != len) {
-		free(banner);
-		return (NULL);
-	}
-	banner[n] = '\0';
-
-	return (banner);
-}
-
-void
-userauth_send_banner(const char *msg)
-{
-	if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_BANNER)
-		return;
-
-	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER);
-	packet_put_cstring(msg);
-	packet_put_cstring("");		/* language, unused */
-	packet_send();
-	debug("%s: sent", __func__);
-}
-
-static void
-userauth_banner(void)
-{
-	char *banner = NULL;
-
-	if (options.banner == NULL || (datafellows & SSH_BUG_BANNER) != 0)
-		return;
-
-	if ((banner = PRIVSEP(auth2_read_banner())) == NULL)
-		goto done;
-	userauth_send_banner(banner);
-
-done:
-	free(banner);
-}
-
-/*
- * loop until authctxt->success == TRUE
- */
-void
-do_authentication2(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
-	dispatch_init(&dispatch_protocol_error);
-	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST, &input_service_request);
-	dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt->success, authctxt);
-}
-
-/*ARGSUSED*/
-static int
-input_service_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
-	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
-	u_int len;
-	int acceptit = 0;
-	char *service = packet_get_cstring(&len);
-	packet_check_eom();
-
-	if (authctxt == NULL)
-		fatal("input_service_request: no authctxt");
-
-	if (strcmp(service, "ssh-userauth") == 0) {
-		if (!authctxt->success) {
-			acceptit = 1;
-			/* now we can handle user-auth requests */
-			dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST, &input_userauth_request);
-		}
-	}
-	/* XXX all other service requests are denied */
-
-	if (acceptit) {
-		packet_start(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT);
-		packet_put_cstring(service);
-		packet_send();
-		packet_write_wait();
-	} else {
-		debug("bad service request %s", service);
-		packet_disconnect("bad service request %s", service);
-	}
-	free(service);
-	return 0;
-}
-
-/*ARGSUSED*/
-static int
-input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
-	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
-	Authmethod *m = NULL;
-	char *user, *service, *method, *style = NULL;
-	int authenticated = 0;
-
-	if (authctxt == NULL)
-		fatal("input_userauth_request: no authctxt");
-
-	user = packet_get_cstring(NULL);
-	service = packet_get_cstring(NULL);
-	method = packet_get_cstring(NULL);
-	debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method);
-	debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures);
-
-	if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
-		*style++ = 0;
-
-	if (authctxt->attempt++ == 0) {
-		/* setup auth context */
-		authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(user));
-		authctxt->user = xstrdup(user);
-		if (authctxt->pw && strcmp(service, "ssh-connection")==0) {
-			authctxt->valid = 1;
-			debug2("input_userauth_request: setting up authctxt for %s", user);
-		} else {
-			logit("input_userauth_request: invalid user %s", user);
-			authctxt->pw = fakepw();
-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-			PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER));
-#endif
-		}
-#ifdef USE_PAM
-		if (options.use_pam)
-			PRIVSEP(start_pam(authctxt));
-#endif
-		setproctitle("%s%s", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown",
-		    use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
-		authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
-		authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL;
-		if (use_privsep)
-			mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
-		userauth_banner();
-		if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0)
-			packet_disconnect("no authentication methods enabled");
-	} else if (strcmp(user, authctxt->user) != 0 ||
-	    strcmp(service, authctxt->service) != 0) {
-		packet_disconnect("Change of username or service not allowed: "
-		    "(%s,%s) -> (%s,%s)",
-		    authctxt->user, authctxt->service, user, service);
-	}
-	/* reset state */
-	auth2_challenge_stop(authctxt);
-
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-	/* XXX move to auth2_gssapi_stop() */
-	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
-	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL);
-#endif
-
-	authctxt->postponed = 0;
-	authctxt->server_caused_failure = 0;
-
-	/* try to authenticate user */
-	m = authmethod_lookup(authctxt, method);
-	if (m != NULL && authctxt->failures < options.max_authtries) {
-		debug2("input_userauth_request: try method %s", method);
-		authenticated =	m->userauth(authctxt);
-	}
-	userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, method, NULL);
-
-	free(service);
-	free(user);
-	free(method);
-	return 0;
-}
-
-void
-userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, const char *method,
-    const char *submethod)
-{
-	char *methods;
-	int partial = 0;
-
-	if (!authctxt->valid && authenticated)
-		fatal("INTERNAL ERROR: authenticated invalid user %s",
-		    authctxt->user);
-	if (authenticated && authctxt->postponed)
-		fatal("INTERNAL ERROR: authenticated and postponed");
-
-	/* Special handling for root */
-	if (authenticated && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
-	    !auth_root_allowed(method)) {
-		authenticated = 0;
-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-		PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED));
-#endif
-	}
-
-	if (authenticated && options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
-		if (!auth2_update_methods_lists(authctxt, method, submethod)) {
-			authenticated = 0;
-			partial = 1;
-		}
-	}
-
-	/* Log before sending the reply */
-	auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, partial, method, submethod);
-
-	if (authctxt->postponed)
-		return;
-
-#ifdef USE_PAM
-	if (options.use_pam && authenticated) {
-		if (!PRIVSEP(do_pam_account())) {
-			/* if PAM returned a message, send it to the user */
-			if (buffer_len(&loginmsg) > 0) {
-				buffer_append(&loginmsg, "\0", 1);
-				userauth_send_banner(buffer_ptr(&loginmsg));
-				packet_write_wait();
-			}
-			fatal("Access denied for user %s by PAM account "
-			    "configuration", authctxt->user);
-		}
-	}
-#endif
-
-#ifdef _UNICOS
-	if (authenticated && cray_access_denied(authctxt->user)) {
-		authenticated = 0;
-		fatal("Access denied for user %s.", authctxt->user);
-	}
-#endif /* _UNICOS */
-
-	if (authenticated == 1) {
-		/* turn off userauth */
-		dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST, &dispatch_protocol_ignore);
-		packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS);
-		packet_send();
-		packet_write_wait();
-		/* now we can break out */
-		authctxt->success = 1;
-	} else {
-
-		/* Allow initial try of "none" auth without failure penalty */
-		if (!partial && !authctxt->server_caused_failure &&
-		    (authctxt->attempt > 1 || strcmp(method, "none") != 0))
-			authctxt->failures++;
-		if (authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries) {
-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-			PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES));
-#endif
-			auth_maxtries_exceeded(authctxt);
-		}
-		methods = authmethods_get(authctxt);
-		debug3("%s: failure partial=%d next methods=\"%s\"", __func__,
-		    partial, methods);
-		packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE);
-		packet_put_cstring(methods);
-		packet_put_char(partial);
-		packet_send();
-		packet_write_wait();
-		free(methods);
-	}
-}
-
-/*
- * Checks whether method is allowed by at least one AuthenticationMethods
- * methods list. Returns 1 if allowed, or no methods lists configured.
- * 0 otherwise.
- */
-int
-auth2_method_allowed(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *method,
-    const char *submethod)
-{
-	u_int i;
-
-	/*
-	 * NB. authctxt->num_auth_methods might be zero as a result of
-	 * auth2_setup_methods_lists(), so check the configuration.
-	 */
-	if (options.num_auth_methods == 0)
-		return 1;
-	for (i = 0; i < authctxt->num_auth_methods; i++) {
-		if (list_starts_with(authctxt->auth_methods[i], method,
-		    submethod) != MATCH_NONE)
-			return 1;
-	}
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static char *
-authmethods_get(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
-	Buffer b;
-	char *list;
-	u_int i;
-
-	buffer_init(&b);
-	for (i = 0; authmethods[i] != NULL; i++) {
-		if (strcmp(authmethods[i]->name, "none") == 0)
-			continue;
-		if (authmethods[i]->enabled == NULL ||
-		    *(authmethods[i]->enabled) == 0)
-			continue;
-		if (!auth2_method_allowed(authctxt, authmethods[i]->name,
-		    NULL))
-			continue;
-		if (buffer_len(&b) > 0)
-			buffer_append(&b, ",", 1);
-		buffer_append(&b, authmethods[i]->name,
-		    strlen(authmethods[i]->name));
-	}
-	buffer_append(&b, "\0", 1);
-	list = xstrdup(buffer_ptr(&b));
-	buffer_free(&b);
-	return list;
-}
-
-static Authmethod *
-authmethod_lookup(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *name)
-{
-	int i;
-
-	if (name != NULL)
-		for (i = 0; authmethods[i] != NULL; i++)
-			if (authmethods[i]->enabled != NULL &&
-			    *(authmethods[i]->enabled) != 0 &&
-			    strcmp(name, authmethods[i]->name) == 0 &&
-			    auth2_method_allowed(authctxt,
-			    authmethods[i]->name, NULL))
-				return authmethods[i];
-	debug2("Unrecognized authentication method name: %s",
-	    name ? name : "NULL");
-	return NULL;
-}
-
-/*
- * Check a comma-separated list of methods for validity. Is need_enable is
- * non-zero, then also require that the methods are enabled.
- * Returns 0 on success or -1 if the methods list is invalid.
- */
-int
-auth2_methods_valid(const char *_methods, int need_enable)
-{
-	char *methods, *omethods, *method, *p;
-	u_int i, found;
-	int ret = -1;
-
-	if (*_methods == '\0') {
-		error("empty authentication method list");
-		return -1;
-	}
-	omethods = methods = xstrdup(_methods);
-	while ((method = strsep(&methods, ",")) != NULL) {
-		for (found = i = 0; !found && authmethods[i] != NULL; i++) {
-			if ((p = strchr(method, ':')) != NULL)
-				*p = '\0';
-			if (strcmp(method, authmethods[i]->name) != 0)
-				continue;
-			if (need_enable) {
-				if (authmethods[i]->enabled == NULL ||
-				    *(authmethods[i]->enabled) == 0) {
-					error("Disabled method \"%s\" in "
-					    "AuthenticationMethods list \"%s\"",
-					    method, _methods);
-					goto out;
-				}
-			}
-			found = 1;
-			break;
-		}
-		if (!found) {
-			error("Unknown authentication method \"%s\" in list",
-			    method);
-			goto out;
-		}
-	}
-	ret = 0;
- out:
-	free(omethods);
-	return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Prune the AuthenticationMethods supplied in the configuration, removing
- * any methods lists that include disabled methods. Note that this might
- * leave authctxt->num_auth_methods == 0, even when multiple required auth
- * has been requested. For this reason, all tests for whether multiple is
- * enabled should consult options.num_auth_methods directly.
- */
-int
-auth2_setup_methods_lists(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
-	u_int i;
-
-	if (options.num_auth_methods == 0)
-		return 0;
-	debug3("%s: checking methods", __func__);
-	authctxt->auth_methods = xcalloc(options.num_auth_methods,
-	    sizeof(*authctxt->auth_methods));
-	authctxt->num_auth_methods = 0;
-	for (i = 0; i < options.num_auth_methods; i++) {
-		if (auth2_methods_valid(options.auth_methods[i], 1) != 0) {
-			logit("Authentication methods list \"%s\" contains "
-			    "disabled method, skipping",
-			    options.auth_methods[i]);
-			continue;
-		}
-		debug("authentication methods list %d: %s",
-		    authctxt->num_auth_methods, options.auth_methods[i]);
-		authctxt->auth_methods[authctxt->num_auth_methods++] =
-		    xstrdup(options.auth_methods[i]);
-	}
-	if (authctxt->num_auth_methods == 0) {
-		error("No AuthenticationMethods left after eliminating "
-		    "disabled methods");
-		return -1;
-	}
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int
-list_starts_with(const char *methods, const char *method,
-    const char *submethod)
-{
-	size_t l = strlen(method);
-	int match;
-	const char *p;
-
-	if (strncmp(methods, method, l) != 0)
-		return MATCH_NONE;
-	p = methods + l;
-	match = MATCH_METHOD;
-	if (*p == ':') {
-		if (!submethod)
-			return MATCH_PARTIAL;
-		l = strlen(submethod);
-		p += 1;
-		if (strncmp(submethod, p, l))
-			return MATCH_NONE;
-		p += l;
-		match = MATCH_BOTH;
-	}
-	if (*p != ',' && *p != '\0')
-		return MATCH_NONE;
-	return match;
-}
-
-/*
- * Remove method from the start of a comma-separated list of methods.
- * Returns 0 if the list of methods did not start with that method or 1
- * if it did.
- */
-static int
-remove_method(char **methods, const char *method, const char *submethod)
-{
-	char *omethods = *methods, *p;
-	size_t l = strlen(method);
-	int match;
-
-	match = list_starts_with(omethods, method, submethod);
-	if (match != MATCH_METHOD && match != MATCH_BOTH)
-		return 0;
-	p = omethods + l;
-	if (submethod && match == MATCH_BOTH)
-		p += 1 + strlen(submethod); /* include colon */
-	if (*p == ',')
-		p++;
-	*methods = xstrdup(p);
-	free(omethods);
-	return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * Called after successful authentication. Will remove the successful method
- * from the start of each list in which it occurs. If it was the last method
- * in any list, then authentication is deemed successful.
- * Returns 1 if the method completed any authentication list or 0 otherwise.
- */
-int
-auth2_update_methods_lists(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *method,
-    const char *submethod)
-{
-	u_int i, found = 0;
-
-	debug3("%s: updating methods list after \"%s\"", __func__, method);
-	for (i = 0; i < authctxt->num_auth_methods; i++) {
-		if (!remove_method(&(authctxt->auth_methods[i]), method,
-		    submethod))
-			continue;
-		found = 1;
-		if (*authctxt->auth_methods[i] == '\0') {
-			debug2("authentication methods list %d complete", i);
-			return 1;
-		}
-		debug3("authentication methods list %d remaining: \"%s\"",
-		    i, authctxt->auth_methods[i]);
-	}
-	/* This should not happen, but would be bad if it did */
-	if (!found)
-		fatal("%s: method not in AuthenticationMethods", __func__);
-	return 0;
-}
-
-

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/authfd.c

@@ -1,707 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.98 2015/07/03 03:43:18 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- *                    All rights reserved
- * Functions for connecting the local authentication agent.
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- *
- * SSH2 implementation,
- * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/un.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "ssh.h"
-#include "rsa.h"
-#include "sshbuf.h"
-#include "sshkey.h"
-#include "authfd.h"
-#include "cipher.h"
-#include "compat.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "atomicio.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "ssherr.h"
-
-#define MAX_AGENT_IDENTITIES	2048		/* Max keys in agent reply */
-#define MAX_AGENT_REPLY_LEN	(256 * 1024) 	/* Max bytes in agent reply */
-
-/* macro to check for "agent failure" message */
-#define agent_failed(x) \
-    ((x == SSH_AGENT_FAILURE) || \
-    (x == SSH_COM_AGENT2_FAILURE) || \
-    (x == SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE))
-
-/* Convert success/failure response from agent to a err.h status */
-static int
-decode_reply(u_char type)
-{
-	if (agent_failed(type))
-		return SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE;
-	else if (type == SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS)
-		return 0;
-	else
-		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
-}
-
-/* Returns the number of the authentication fd, or -1 if there is none. */
-int
-ssh_get_authentication_socket(int *fdp)
-{
-	const char *authsocket;
-	int sock, oerrno;
-	struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
-
-	if (fdp != NULL)
-		*fdp = -1;
-
-	authsocket = getenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
-	if (!authsocket)
-		return SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT;
-
-	memset(&sunaddr, 0, sizeof(sunaddr));
-	sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
-	strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, authsocket, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path));
-
-	if ((sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0)
-		return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
-
-	/* close on exec */
-	if (fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1 ||
-	    connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof(sunaddr)) < 0) {
-		oerrno = errno;
-		close(sock);
-		errno = oerrno;
-		return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
-	}
-	if (fdp != NULL)
-		*fdp = sock;
-	else
-		close(sock);
-	return 0;
-}
-
-/* Communicate with agent: send request and read reply */
-static int
-ssh_request_reply(int sock, struct sshbuf *request, struct sshbuf *reply)
-{
-	int r;
-	size_t l, len;
-	char buf[1024];
-
-	/* Get the length of the message, and format it in the buffer. */
-	len = sshbuf_len(request);
-	put_u32(buf, len);
-
-	/* Send the length and then the packet to the agent. */
-	if (atomicio(vwrite, sock, buf, 4) != 4 ||
-	    atomicio(vwrite, sock, (u_char *)sshbuf_ptr(request),
-	    sshbuf_len(request)) != sshbuf_len(request))
-		return SSH_ERR_AGENT_COMMUNICATION;
-	/*
-	 * Wait for response from the agent.  First read the length of the
-	 * response packet.
-	 */
-	if (atomicio(read, sock, buf, 4) != 4)
-	    return SSH_ERR_AGENT_COMMUNICATION;
-
-	/* Extract the length, and check it for sanity. */
-	len = get_u32(buf);
-	if (len > MAX_AGENT_REPLY_LEN)
-		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
-
-	/* Read the rest of the response in to the buffer. */
-	sshbuf_reset(reply);
-	while (len > 0) {
-		l = len;
-		if (l > sizeof(buf))
-			l = sizeof(buf);
-		if (atomicio(read, sock, buf, l) != l)
-			return SSH_ERR_AGENT_COMMUNICATION;
-		if ((r = sshbuf_put(reply, buf, l)) != 0)
-			return r;
-		len -= l;
-	}
-	return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Closes the agent socket if it should be closed (depends on how it was
- * obtained).  The argument must have been returned by
- * ssh_get_authentication_socket().
- */
-void
-ssh_close_authentication_socket(int sock)
-{
-	if (getenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME))
-		close(sock);
-}
-
-/* Lock/unlock agent */
-int
-ssh_lock_agent(int sock, int lock, const char *password)
-{
-	int r;
-	u_char type = lock ? SSH_AGENTC_LOCK : SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK;
-	struct sshbuf *msg;
-
-	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, password)) != 0)
-		goto out;
-	if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0)
-		goto out;
-	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0)
-		goto out;
-	r = decode_reply(type);
- out:
-	sshbuf_free(msg);
-	return r;
-}
-
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
-static int
-deserialise_identity1(struct sshbuf *ids, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
-{
-	struct sshkey *key;
-	int r, keybits;
-	u_int32_t bits;
-	char *comment = NULL;
-
-	if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL)
-		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(ids, &bits)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(ids, key->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(ids, key->rsa->n)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(ids, &comment, NULL)) != 0)
-		goto out;
-	keybits = BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n);
-	/* XXX previously we just warned here. I think we should be strict */
-	if (keybits < 0 || bits != (u_int)keybits) {
-		r = SSH_ERR_KEY_BITS_MISMATCH;
-		goto out;
-	}
-	if (keyp != NULL) {
-		*keyp = key;
-		key = NULL;
-	}
-	if (commentp != NULL) {
-		*commentp = comment;
-		comment = NULL;
-	}
-	r = 0;
- out:
-	sshkey_free(key);
-	free(comment);
-	return r;
-}
-#endif
-
-static int
-deserialise_identity2(struct sshbuf *ids, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
-{
-	int r;
-	char *comment = NULL;
-	const u_char *blob;
-	size_t blen;
-
-	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(ids, &blob, &blen)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(ids, &comment, NULL)) != 0)
-		goto out;
-	if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, keyp)) != 0)
-		goto out;
-	if (commentp != NULL) {
-		*commentp = comment;
-		comment = NULL;
-	}
-	r = 0;
- out:
-	free(comment);
-	return r;
-}
-
-/*
- * Fetch list of identities held by the agent.
- */
-int
-ssh_fetch_identitylist(int sock, int version, struct ssh_identitylist **idlp)
-{
-	u_char type, code1 = 0, code2 = 0;
-	u_int32_t num, i;
-	struct sshbuf *msg;
-	struct ssh_identitylist *idl = NULL;
-	int r;
-
-	/* Determine request and expected response types */
-	switch (version) {
-	case 1:
-		code1 = SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES;
-		code2 = SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER;
-		break;
-	case 2:
-		code1 = SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES;
-		code2 = SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER;
-		break;
-	default:
-		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-	}
-
-	/*
-	 * Send a message to the agent requesting for a list of the
-	 * identities it can represent.
-	 */
-	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, code1)) != 0)
-		goto out;
-
-	if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0)
-		goto out;
-
-	/* Get message type, and verify that we got a proper answer. */
-	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0)
-		goto out;
-	if (agent_failed(type)) {
-		r = SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE;
-		goto out;
-	} else if (type != code2) {
-		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	/* Get the number of entries in the response and check it for sanity. */
-	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &num)) != 0)
-		goto out;
-	if (num > MAX_AGENT_IDENTITIES) {
-		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
-		goto out;
-	}
-	if (num == 0) {
-		r = SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES;
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	/* Deserialise the response into a list of keys/comments */
-	if ((idl = calloc(1, sizeof(*idl))) == NULL ||
-	    (idl->keys = calloc(num, sizeof(*idl->keys))) == NULL ||
-	    (idl->comments = calloc(num, sizeof(*idl->comments))) == NULL) {
-		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-		goto out;
-	}
-	for (i = 0; i < num;) {
-		switch (version) {
-		case 1:
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
-			if ((r = deserialise_identity1(msg,
-			    &(idl->keys[i]), &(idl->comments[i]))) != 0)
-				goto out;
-#endif
-			break;
-		case 2:
-			if ((r = deserialise_identity2(msg,
-			    &(idl->keys[i]), &(idl->comments[i]))) != 0) {
-				if (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN) {
-					/* Gracefully skip unknown key types */
-					num--;
-					continue;
-				} else
-					goto out;
-			}
-			break;
-		}
-		i++;
-	}
-	idl->nkeys = num;
-	*idlp = idl;
-	idl = NULL;
-	r = 0;
- out:
-	sshbuf_free(msg);
-	if (idl != NULL)
-		ssh_free_identitylist(idl);
-	return r;
-}
-
-void
-ssh_free_identitylist(struct ssh_identitylist *idl)
-{
-	size_t i;
-
-	if (idl == NULL)
-		return;
-	for (i = 0; i < idl->nkeys; i++) {
-		if (idl->keys != NULL)
-			sshkey_free(idl->keys[i]);
-		if (idl->comments != NULL)
-			free(idl->comments[i]);
-	}
-	free(idl);
-}
-
-/*
- * Sends a challenge (typically from a server via ssh(1)) to the agent,
- * and waits for a response from the agent.
- * Returns true (non-zero) if the agent gave the correct answer, zero
- * otherwise.
- */
-
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
-int
-ssh_decrypt_challenge(int sock, struct sshkey* key, BIGNUM *challenge,
-    u_char session_id[16], u_char response[16])
-{
-	struct sshbuf *msg;
-	int r;
-	u_char type;
-
-	if (key->type != KEY_RSA1)
-		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n))) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, key->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, key->rsa->n)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, challenge)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_put(msg, session_id, 16)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, 1)) != 0) /* Response type for proto 1.1 */
-		goto out;
-	if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0)
-		goto out;
-	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0)
-		goto out;
-	if (agent_failed(type)) {
-		r = SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE;
-		goto out;
-	} else if (type != SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE) {
-		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
-		goto out;
-	}
-	if ((r = sshbuf_get(msg, response, 16)) != 0)
-		goto out;
-	r = 0;
- out:
-	sshbuf_free(msg);
-	return r;
-}
-#endif
-
-/* ask agent to sign data, returns err.h code on error, 0 on success */
-int
-ssh_agent_sign(int sock, struct sshkey *key,
-    u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
-    const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
-{
-	struct sshbuf *msg;
-	u_char *blob = NULL, type;
-	size_t blen = 0, len = 0;
-	u_int flags = 0;
-	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-
-	*sigp = NULL;
-	*lenp = 0;
-
-	if (datalen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE)
-		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-	if (compat & SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB)
-		flags |= SSH_AGENT_OLD_SIGNATURE;
-	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-	if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen)) != 0)
-		goto out;
-	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, blob, blen)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, data, datalen)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, flags)) != 0)
-		goto out;
-	if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg) != 0))
-		goto out;
-	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0)
-		goto out;
-	if (agent_failed(type)) {
-		r = SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE;
-		goto out;
-	} else if (type != SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) {
-		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
-		goto out;
-	}
-	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, sigp, &len)) != 0)
-		goto out;
-	*lenp = len;
-	r = 0;
- out:
-	if (blob != NULL) {
-		explicit_bzero(blob, blen);
-		free(blob);
-	}
-	sshbuf_free(msg);
-	return r;
-}
-
-/* Encode key for a message to the agent. */
-
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
-static int
-ssh_encode_identity_rsa1(struct sshbuf *b, RSA *key, const char *comment)
-{
-	int r;
-
-	/* To keep within the protocol: p < q for ssh. in SSL p > q */
-	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, BN_num_bits(key->n))) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, key->n)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, key->e)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, key->d)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, key->iqmp)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, key->q)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, key->p)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, comment)) != 0)
-		return r;
-	return 0;
-}
-#endif
-
-static int
-ssh_encode_identity_ssh2(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey *key,
-    const char *comment)
-{
-	int r;
-
-	if ((r = sshkey_private_serialize(key, b)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, comment)) != 0)
-		return r;
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int
-encode_constraints(struct sshbuf *m, u_int life, u_int confirm)
-{
-	int r;
-
-	if (life != 0) {
-		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, life)) != 0)
-			goto out;
-	}
-	if (confirm != 0) {
-		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM)) != 0)
-			goto out;
-	}
-	r = 0;
- out:
-	return r;
-}
-
-/*
- * Adds an identity to the authentication server.
- * This call is intended only for use by ssh-add(1) and like applications.
- */
-int
-ssh_add_identity_constrained(int sock, struct sshkey *key, const char *comment,
-    u_int life, u_int confirm)
-{
-	struct sshbuf *msg;
-	int r, constrained = (life || confirm);
-	u_char type;
-
-	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-
-	switch (key->type) {
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
-	case KEY_RSA1:
-		type = constrained ?
-		    SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED :
-		    SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY;
-		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = ssh_encode_identity_rsa1(msg, key->rsa, comment)) != 0)
-			goto out;
-		break;
-#endif
-#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-	case KEY_RSA:
-	case KEY_RSA_CERT:
-	case KEY_DSA:
-	case KEY_DSA_CERT:
-	case KEY_ECDSA:
-	case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
-#endif
-	case KEY_ED25519:
-	case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
-		type = constrained ?
-		    SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED :
-		    SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY;
-		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = ssh_encode_identity_ssh2(msg, key, comment)) != 0)
-			goto out;
-		break;
-	default:
-		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-		goto out;
-	}
-	if (constrained &&
-	    (r = encode_constraints(msg, life, confirm)) != 0)
-		goto out;
-	if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0)
-		goto out;
-	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0)
-		goto out;
-	r = decode_reply(type);
- out:
-	sshbuf_free(msg);
-	return r;
-}
-
-/*
- * Removes an identity from the authentication server.
- * This call is intended only for use by ssh-add(1) and like applications.
- */
-int
-ssh_remove_identity(int sock, struct sshkey *key)
-{
-	struct sshbuf *msg;
-	int r;
-	u_char type, *blob = NULL;
-	size_t blen;
-
-	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
-	if (key->type == KEY_RSA1) {
-		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg,
-		    SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n))) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, key->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, key->rsa->n)) != 0)
-			goto out;
-	} else
-#endif
-	if (key->type != KEY_UNSPEC) {
-		if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen)) != 0)
-			goto out;
-		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg,
-		    SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, blob, blen)) != 0)
-			goto out;
-	} else {
-		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-		goto out;
-	}
-	if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0)
-		goto out;
-	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0)
-		goto out;
-	r = decode_reply(type);
- out:
-	if (blob != NULL) {
-		explicit_bzero(blob, blen);
-		free(blob);
-	}
-	sshbuf_free(msg);
-	return r;
-}
-
-/*
- * Add/remove an token-based identity from the authentication server.
- * This call is intended only for use by ssh-add(1) and like applications.
- */
-int
-ssh_update_card(int sock, int add, const char *reader_id, const char *pin,
-    u_int life, u_int confirm)
-{
-	struct sshbuf *msg;
-	int r, constrained = (life || confirm);
-	u_char type;
-
-	if (add) {
-		type = constrained ?
-		    SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED :
-		    SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY;
-	} else
-		type = SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY;
-
-	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, reader_id)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, pin)) != 0)
-		goto out;
-	if (constrained &&
-	    (r = encode_constraints(msg, life, confirm)) != 0)
-		goto out;
-	if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0)
-		goto out;
-	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0)
-		goto out;
-	r = decode_reply(type);
- out:
-	sshbuf_free(msg);
-	return r;
-}
-
-/*
- * Removes all identities from the agent.
- * This call is intended only for use by ssh-add(1) and like applications.
- */
-int
-ssh_remove_all_identities(int sock, int version)
-{
-	struct sshbuf *msg;
-	u_char type = (version == 1) ?
-	    SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES :
-	    SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES;
-	int r;
-
-	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0)
-		goto out;
-	if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0)
-		goto out;
-	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0)
-		goto out;
-	r = decode_reply(type);
- out:
-	sshbuf_free(msg);
-	return r;
-}

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/authfd.h

@@ -1,90 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: authfd.h,v 1.38 2015/01/14 20:05:27 djm Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- *                    All rights reserved
- * Functions to interface with the SSH_AUTHENTICATION_FD socket.
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-
-#ifndef AUTHFD_H
-#define AUTHFD_H
-
-/* List of identities returned by ssh_fetch_identitylist() */
-struct ssh_identitylist {
-	size_t nkeys;
-	struct sshkey **keys;
-	char **comments;
-};
-
-int	ssh_get_authentication_socket(int *fdp);
-void	ssh_close_authentication_socket(int sock);
-
-int	ssh_lock_agent(int sock, int lock, const char *password);
-int	ssh_fetch_identitylist(int sock, int version,
-	    struct ssh_identitylist **idlp);
-void	ssh_free_identitylist(struct ssh_identitylist *idl);
-int	ssh_add_identity_constrained(int sock, struct sshkey *key,
-	    const char *comment, u_int life, u_int confirm);
-int	ssh_remove_identity(int sock, struct sshkey *key);
-int	ssh_update_card(int sock, int add, const char *reader_id,
-	    const char *pin, u_int life, u_int confirm);
-int	ssh_remove_all_identities(int sock, int version);
-
-int	ssh_decrypt_challenge(int sock, struct sshkey* key, BIGNUM *challenge,
-	    u_char session_id[16], u_char response[16]);
-int	ssh_agent_sign(int sock, struct sshkey *key,
-	    u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
-	    const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat);
-
-/* Messages for the authentication agent connection. */
-#define SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES	1
-#define SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER		2
-#define SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE		3
-#define SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE			4
-#define SSH_AGENT_FAILURE			5
-#define SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS			6
-#define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY		7
-#define SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY		8
-#define SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES	9
-
-/* private OpenSSH extensions for SSH2 */
-#define SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES		11
-#define SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER		12
-#define SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST		13
-#define SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE		14
-#define SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY		17
-#define SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY		18
-#define SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES	19
-
-/* smartcard */
-#define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY		20
-#define SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY		21
-
-/* lock/unlock the agent */
-#define SSH_AGENTC_LOCK				22
-#define SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK			23
-
-/* add key with constraints */
-#define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED	24
-#define SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED		25
-#define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED 26
-
-#define	SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME		1
-#define	SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM		2
-
-/* extended failure messages */
-#define SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE			30
-
-/* additional error code for ssh.com's ssh-agent2 */
-#define SSH_COM_AGENT2_FAILURE			102
-
-#define	SSH_AGENT_OLD_SIGNATURE			0x01
-
-#endif				/* AUTHFD_H */

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/authfile.c

@@ -1,580 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.116 2015/07/09 09:49:46 markus Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2000, 2013 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <sys/uio.h>
-
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <limits.h>
-
-#include "cipher.h"
-#include "ssh.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "authfile.h"
-#include "rsa.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "atomicio.h"
-#include "sshkey.h"
-#include "sshbuf.h"
-#include "ssherr.h"
-#include "krl.h"
-
-#define MAX_KEY_FILE_SIZE	(1024 * 1024)
-
-/* Save a key blob to a file */
-static int
-sshkey_save_private_blob(struct sshbuf *keybuf, const char *filename)
-{
-	int fd, oerrno;
-
-	if ((fd = open(filename, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0600)) < 0)
-		return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
-	if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, (u_char *)sshbuf_ptr(keybuf),
-	    sshbuf_len(keybuf)) != sshbuf_len(keybuf)) {
-		oerrno = errno;
-		close(fd);
-		unlink(filename);
-		errno = oerrno;
-		return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
-	}
-	close(fd);
-	return 0;
-}
-
-int
-sshkey_save_private(struct sshkey *key, const char *filename,
-    const char *passphrase, const char *comment,
-    int force_new_format, const char *new_format_cipher, int new_format_rounds)
-{
-	struct sshbuf *keyblob = NULL;
-	int r;
-
-	if ((keyblob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-	if ((r = sshkey_private_to_fileblob(key, keyblob, passphrase, comment,
-	    force_new_format, new_format_cipher, new_format_rounds)) != 0)
-		goto out;
-	if ((r = sshkey_save_private_blob(keyblob, filename)) != 0)
-		goto out;
-	r = 0;
- out:
-	sshbuf_free(keyblob);
-	return r;
-}
-
-/* Load a key from a fd into a buffer */
-int
-sshkey_load_file(int fd, struct sshbuf *blob)
-{
-	u_char buf[1024];
-	size_t len;
-	struct stat st;
-	int r;
-
-	if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0)
-		return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
-	if ((st.st_mode & (S_IFSOCK|S_IFCHR|S_IFIFO)) == 0 &&
-	    st.st_size > MAX_KEY_FILE_SIZE)
-		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
-	for (;;) {
-		if ((len = atomicio(read, fd, buf, sizeof(buf))) == 0) {
-			if (errno == EPIPE)
-				break;
-			r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
-			goto out;
-		}
-		if ((r = sshbuf_put(blob, buf, len)) != 0)
-			goto out;
-		if (sshbuf_len(blob) > MAX_KEY_FILE_SIZE) {
-			r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
-			goto out;
-		}
-	}
-	if ((st.st_mode & (S_IFSOCK|S_IFCHR|S_IFIFO)) == 0 &&
-	    st.st_size != (off_t)sshbuf_len(blob)) {
-		r = SSH_ERR_FILE_CHANGED;
-		goto out;
-	}
-	r = 0;
-
- out:
-	explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
-	if (r != 0)
-		sshbuf_reset(blob);
-	return r;
-}
-
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
-/*
- * Loads the public part of the ssh v1 key file.  Returns NULL if an error was
- * encountered (the file does not exist or is not readable), and the key
- * otherwise.
- */
-static int
-sshkey_load_public_rsa1(int fd, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
-{
-	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
-	int r;
-
-	*keyp = NULL;
-	if (commentp != NULL)
-		*commentp = NULL;
-
-	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-	if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, b)) != 0)
-		goto out;
-	if ((r = sshkey_parse_public_rsa1_fileblob(b, keyp, commentp)) != 0)
-		goto out;
-	r = 0;
- out:
-	sshbuf_free(b);
-	return r;
-}
-#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
-
-/* XXX remove error() calls from here? */
-int
-sshkey_perm_ok(int fd, const char *filename)
-{
-	struct stat st;
-
-	if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0)
-		return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
-	/*
-	 * if a key owned by the user is accessed, then we check the
-	 * permissions of the file. if the key owned by a different user,
-	 * then we don't care.
-	 */
-#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
-	if (check_ntsec(filename))
-#endif
-	if ((st.st_uid == getuid()) && (st.st_mode & 077) != 0) {
-		error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
-		error("@         WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE!          @");
-		error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
-		error("Permissions 0%3.3o for '%s' are too open.",
-		    (u_int)st.st_mode & 0777, filename);
-		error("It is required that your private key files are NOT accessible by others.");
-		error("This private key will be ignored.");
-		return SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS;
-	}
-	return 0;
-}
-
-/* XXX kill perm_ok now that we have SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS? */
-int
-sshkey_load_private_type(int type, const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
-    struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp, int *perm_ok)
-{
-	int fd, r;
-
-	*keyp = NULL;
-	if (commentp != NULL)
-		*commentp = NULL;
-
-	if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
-		if (perm_ok != NULL)
-			*perm_ok = 0;
-		return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
-	}
-	if (sshkey_perm_ok(fd, filename) != 0) {
-		if (perm_ok != NULL)
-			*perm_ok = 0;
-		r = SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS;
-		goto out;
-	}
-	if (perm_ok != NULL)
-		*perm_ok = 1;
-
-	r = sshkey_load_private_type_fd(fd, type, passphrase, keyp, commentp);
- out:
-	close(fd);
-	return r;
-}
-
-int
-sshkey_load_private_type_fd(int fd, int type, const char *passphrase,
-    struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
-{
-	struct sshbuf *buffer = NULL;
-	int r;
-
-	if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
-		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-		goto out;
-	}
-	if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, buffer)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(buffer, type,
-	    passphrase, keyp, commentp)) != 0)
-		goto out;
-
-	/* success */
-	r = 0;
- out:
-	if (buffer != NULL)
-		sshbuf_free(buffer);
-	return r;
-}
-
-/* XXX this is almost identical to sshkey_load_private_type() */
-int
-sshkey_load_private(const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
-    struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
-{
-	struct sshbuf *buffer = NULL;
-	int r, fd;
-
-	*keyp = NULL;
-	if (commentp != NULL)
-		*commentp = NULL;
-
-	if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) < 0)
-		return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
-	if (sshkey_perm_ok(fd, filename) != 0) {
-		r = SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS;
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
-		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-		goto out;
-	}
-	if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, buffer)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buffer, passphrase, filename,
-	    keyp, commentp)) != 0)
-		goto out;
-	r = 0;
- out:
-	close(fd);
-	if (buffer != NULL)
-		sshbuf_free(buffer);
-	return r;
-}
-
-static int
-sshkey_try_load_public(struct sshkey *k, const char *filename, char **commentp)
-{
-	FILE *f;
-	char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
-	char *cp;
-	u_long linenum = 0;
-	int r;
-
-	if (commentp != NULL)
-		*commentp = NULL;
-	if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL)
-		return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
-	while (read_keyfile_line(f, filename, line, sizeof(line),
-		    &linenum) != -1) {
-		cp = line;
-		switch (*cp) {
-		case '#':
-		case '\n':
-		case '\0':
-			continue;
-		}
-		/* Abort loading if this looks like a private key */
-		if (strncmp(cp, "-----BEGIN", 10) == 0 ||
-		    strcmp(cp, "SSH PRIVATE KEY FILE") == 0)
-			break;
-		/* Skip leading whitespace. */
-		for (; *cp && (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'); cp++)
-			;
-		if (*cp) {
-			if ((r = sshkey_read(k, &cp)) == 0) {
-				cp[strcspn(cp, "\r\n")] = '\0';
-				if (commentp) {
-					*commentp = strdup(*cp ?
-					    cp : filename);
-					if (*commentp == NULL)
-						r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-				}
-				fclose(f);
-				return r;
-			}
-		}
-	}
-	fclose(f);
-	return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
-}
-
-/* load public key from ssh v1 private or any pubkey file */
-int
-sshkey_load_public(const char *filename, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
-{
-	struct sshkey *pub = NULL;
-	char file[PATH_MAX];
-	int r, fd;
-
-	if (keyp != NULL)
-		*keyp = NULL;
-	if (commentp != NULL)
-		*commentp = NULL;
-
-	/* XXX should load file once and attempt to parse each format */
-
-	if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) < 0)
-		goto skip;
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
-	/* try rsa1 private key */
-	r = sshkey_load_public_rsa1(fd, keyp, commentp);
-	close(fd);
-	switch (r) {
-	case SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR:
-	case SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL:
-	case SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:
-	case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR:
-	case 0:
-		return r;
-	}
-#else /* WITH_SSH1 */
-	close(fd);
-#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
-
-	/* try ssh2 public key */
-	if ((pub = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
-		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-	if ((r = sshkey_try_load_public(pub, filename, commentp)) == 0) {
-		if (keyp != NULL)
-			*keyp = pub;
-		return 0;
-	}
-	sshkey_free(pub);
-
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
-	/* try rsa1 public key */
-	if ((pub = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL)
-		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-	if ((r = sshkey_try_load_public(pub, filename, commentp)) == 0) {
-		if (keyp != NULL)
-			*keyp = pub;
-		return 0;
-	}
-	sshkey_free(pub);
-#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
-
- skip:
-	/* try .pub suffix */
-	if ((pub = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
-		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-	r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;	/* in case strlcpy or strlcat fail */
-	if ((strlcpy(file, filename, sizeof file) < sizeof(file)) &&
-	    (strlcat(file, ".pub", sizeof file) < sizeof(file)) &&
-	    (r = sshkey_try_load_public(pub, file, commentp)) == 0) {
-		if (keyp != NULL)
-			*keyp = pub;
-		return 0;
-	}
-	sshkey_free(pub);
-
-	return r;
-}
-
-/* Load the certificate associated with the named private key */
-int
-sshkey_load_cert(const char *filename, struct sshkey **keyp)
-{
-	struct sshkey *pub = NULL;
-	char *file = NULL;
-	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-
-	*keyp = NULL;
-
-	if (asprintf(&file, "%s-cert.pub", filename) == -1)
-		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-
-	if ((pub = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) {
-		goto out;
-	}
-	if ((r = sshkey_try_load_public(pub, file, NULL)) != 0)
-		goto out;
-
-	*keyp = pub;
-	pub = NULL;
-	r = 0;
-
- out:
-	if (file != NULL)
-		free(file);
-	if (pub != NULL)
-		sshkey_free(pub);
-	return r;
-}
-
-/* Load private key and certificate */
-int
-sshkey_load_private_cert(int type, const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
-    struct sshkey **keyp, int *perm_ok)
-{
-	struct sshkey *key = NULL, *cert = NULL;
-	int r;
-
-	*keyp = NULL;
-
-	switch (type) {
-#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-	case KEY_RSA:
-	case KEY_DSA:
-	case KEY_ECDSA:
-#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
-	case KEY_ED25519:
-	case KEY_UNSPEC:
-		break;
-	default:
-		return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
-	}
-
-	if ((r = sshkey_load_private_type(type, filename,
-	    passphrase, &key, NULL, perm_ok)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshkey_load_cert(filename, &cert)) != 0)
-		goto out;
-
-	/* Make sure the private key matches the certificate */
-	if (sshkey_equal_public(key, cert) == 0) {
-		r = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_MISMATCH;
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	if ((r = sshkey_to_certified(key)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshkey_cert_copy(cert, key)) != 0)
-		goto out;
-	r = 0;
-	*keyp = key;
-	key = NULL;
- out:
-	if (key != NULL)
-		sshkey_free(key);
-	if (cert != NULL)
-		sshkey_free(cert);
-	return r;
-}
-
-/*
- * Returns success if the specified "key" is listed in the file "filename",
- * SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND: if the key is not listed or another error.
- * If "strict_type" is set then the key type must match exactly,
- * otherwise a comparison that ignores certficiate data is performed.
- * If "check_ca" is set and "key" is a certificate, then its CA key is
- * also checked and sshkey_in_file() will return success if either is found.
- */
-int
-sshkey_in_file(struct sshkey *key, const char *filename, int strict_type,
-    int check_ca)
-{
-	FILE *f;
-	char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
-	char *cp;
-	u_long linenum = 0;
-	int r = 0;
-	struct sshkey *pub = NULL;
-	int (*sshkey_compare)(const struct sshkey *, const struct sshkey *) =
-	    strict_type ?  sshkey_equal : sshkey_equal_public;
-
-	if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL)
-		return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
-
-	while (read_keyfile_line(f, filename, line, sizeof(line),
-	    &linenum) != -1) {
-		cp = line;
-
-		/* Skip leading whitespace. */
-		for (; *cp && (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'); cp++)
-			;
-
-		/* Skip comments and empty lines */
-		switch (*cp) {
-		case '#':
-		case '\n':
-		case '\0':
-			continue;
-		}
-
-		if ((pub = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) {
-			r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-			goto out;
-		}
-		if ((r = sshkey_read(pub, &cp)) != 0)
-			goto out;
-		if (sshkey_compare(key, pub) ||
-		    (check_ca && sshkey_is_cert(key) &&
-		    sshkey_compare(key->cert->signature_key, pub))) {
-			r = 0;
-			goto out;
-		}
-		sshkey_free(pub);
-		pub = NULL;
-	}
-	r = SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND;
- out:
-	if (pub != NULL)
-		sshkey_free(pub);
-	fclose(f);
-	return r;
-}
-
-/*
- * Checks whether the specified key is revoked, returning 0 if not,
- * SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED if it is or another error code if something
- * unexpected happened.
- * This will check both the key and, if it is a certificate, its CA key too.
- * "revoked_keys_file" may be a KRL or a one-per-line list of public keys.
- */
-int
-sshkey_check_revoked(struct sshkey *key, const char *revoked_keys_file)
-{
-	int r;
-
-	r = ssh_krl_file_contains_key(revoked_keys_file, key);
-	/* If this was not a KRL to begin with then continue below */
-	if (r != SSH_ERR_KRL_BAD_MAGIC)
-		return r;
-
-	/*
-	 * If the file is not a KRL or we can't handle KRLs then attempt to
-	 * parse the file as a flat list of keys.
-	 */
-	switch ((r = sshkey_in_file(key, revoked_keys_file, 0, 1))) {
-	case 0:
-		/* Key found => revoked */
-		return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
-	case SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND:
-		/* Key not found => not revoked */
-		return 0;
-	default:
-		/* Some other error occurred */
-		return r;
-	}
-}
-

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/authfile.h

@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: authfile.h,v 1.21 2015/01/08 10:14:08 djm Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2000, 2013 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#ifndef AUTHFILE_H
-#define AUTHFILE_H
-
-struct sshbuf;
-struct sshkey;
-
-/* XXX document these */
-/* XXX some of these could probably be merged/retired */
-
-int sshkey_save_private(struct sshkey *, const char *,
-    const char *, const char *, int, const char *, int);
-int sshkey_load_file(int, struct sshbuf *);
-int sshkey_load_cert(const char *, struct sshkey **);
-int sshkey_load_public(const char *, struct sshkey **, char **);
-int sshkey_load_private(const char *, const char *, struct sshkey **, char **);
-int sshkey_load_private_cert(int, const char *, const char *,
-    struct sshkey **, int *);
-int sshkey_load_private_type(int, const char *, const char *,
-    struct sshkey **, char **, int *);
-int sshkey_load_private_type_fd(int fd, int type, const char *passphrase,
-    struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp);
-int sshkey_perm_ok(int, const char *);
-int sshkey_in_file(struct sshkey *, const char *, int, int);
-int sshkey_check_revoked(struct sshkey *key, const char *revoked_keys_file);
-
-#endif

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/bcrypt_pbkdf.c

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-openbsd-compat/bcrypt_pbkdf.c

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/bindresvport.c

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/bitmap.c

@@ -1,212 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2015 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-
-#include "bitmap.h"
-
-#define BITMAP_WTYPE	u_int
-#define BITMAP_MAX	(1<<24)
-#define BITMAP_BYTES	(sizeof(BITMAP_WTYPE))
-#define BITMAP_BITS	(sizeof(BITMAP_WTYPE) * 8)
-#define BITMAP_WMASK	((BITMAP_WTYPE)BITMAP_BITS - 1)
-struct bitmap {
-	BITMAP_WTYPE *d;
-	size_t len; /* number of words allocated */
-	size_t top; /* index of top word allocated */
-};
-
-struct bitmap *
-bitmap_new(void)
-{
-	struct bitmap *ret;
-
-	if ((ret = calloc(1, sizeof(*ret))) == NULL)
-		return NULL;
-	if ((ret->d = calloc(1, BITMAP_BYTES)) == NULL) {
-		free(ret);
-		return NULL;
-	}
-	ret->len = 1;
-	ret->top = 0;
-	return ret;
-}
-
-void
-bitmap_free(struct bitmap *b)
-{
-	if (b != NULL && b->d != NULL) {
-		memset(b->d, 0, b->len);
-		free(b->d);
-	}
-	free(b);
-}
-
-void
-bitmap_zero(struct bitmap *b)
-{
-	memset(b->d, 0, b->len * BITMAP_BYTES);
-	b->top = 0;
-}
-
-int
-bitmap_test_bit(struct bitmap *b, u_int n)
-{
-	if (b->top >= b->len)
-		return 0; /* invalid */
-	if (b->len == 0 || (n / BITMAP_BITS) > b->top)
-		return 0;
-	return (b->d[n / BITMAP_BITS] >> (n & BITMAP_WMASK)) & 1;
-}
-
-static int
-reserve(struct bitmap *b, u_int n)
-{
-	BITMAP_WTYPE *tmp;
-	size_t nlen;
-
-	if (b->top >= b->len || n > BITMAP_MAX)
-		return -1; /* invalid */
-	nlen = (n / BITMAP_BITS) + 1;
-	if (b->len < nlen) {
-		if ((tmp = reallocarray(b->d, nlen, BITMAP_BYTES)) == NULL)
-			return -1;
-		b->d = tmp;
-		memset(b->d + b->len, 0, (nlen - b->len) * BITMAP_BYTES);
-		b->len = nlen;
-	}
-	return 0;
-}
-
-int
-bitmap_set_bit(struct bitmap *b, u_int n)
-{
-	int r;
-	size_t offset;
-
-	if ((r = reserve(b, n)) != 0)
-		return r;
-	offset = n / BITMAP_BITS;
-	if (offset > b->top)
-		b->top = offset;
-	b->d[offset] |= (BITMAP_WTYPE)1 << (n & BITMAP_WMASK);
-	return 0;
-}
-
-/* Resets b->top to point to the most significant bit set in b->d */
-static void
-retop(struct bitmap *b)
-{
-	if (b->top >= b->len)
-		return;
-	while (b->top > 0 && b->d[b->top] == 0)
-		b->top--;
-}
-
-void
-bitmap_clear_bit(struct bitmap *b, u_int n)
-{
-	size_t offset;
-
-	if (b->top >= b->len || n > BITMAP_MAX)
-		return; /* invalid */
-	offset = n / BITMAP_BITS;
-	if (offset > b->top)
-		return;
-	b->d[offset] &= ~((BITMAP_WTYPE)1 << (n & BITMAP_WMASK));
-	/* The top may have changed as a result of the clear */
-	retop(b);
-}
-
-size_t
-bitmap_nbits(struct bitmap *b)
-{
-	size_t bits;
-	BITMAP_WTYPE w;
-
-	retop(b);
-	if (b->top >= b->len)
-		return 0; /* invalid */
-	if (b->len == 0 || (b->top == 0 && b->d[0] == 0))
-		return 0;
-	/* Find MSB set */
-	w = b->d[b->top];
-	bits = (b->top + 1) * BITMAP_BITS;
-	while (!(w & ((BITMAP_WTYPE)1 << (BITMAP_BITS - 1)))) {
-		w <<= 1;
-		bits--;
-	}
-	return bits;
-}
-
-size_t
-bitmap_nbytes(struct bitmap *b)
-{
-	return (bitmap_nbits(b) + 7) / 8;
-}
-
-int
-bitmap_to_string(struct bitmap *b, void *p, size_t l)
-{
-	u_char *s = (u_char *)p;
-	size_t i, j, k, need = bitmap_nbytes(b);
-
-	if (l < need || b->top >= b->len)
-		return -1;
-	if (l > need)
-		l = need;
-	/* Put the bytes from LSB backwards */
-	for (i = k = 0; i < b->top + 1; i++) {
-		for (j = 0; j < BITMAP_BYTES; j++) {
-			if (k >= l)
-				break;
-			s[need - 1 - k++] = (b->d[i] >> (j * 8)) & 0xff;
-		}
-	}
-	return 0;
-}
-
-int
-bitmap_from_string(struct bitmap *b, const void *p, size_t l)
-{
-	int r;
-	size_t i, offset, shift;
-	u_char *s = (u_char *)p;
-
-	if (l > BITMAP_MAX / 8)
-		return -1;
-	if ((r = reserve(b, l * 8)) != 0)
-		return r;
-	bitmap_zero(b);
-	if (l == 0)
-		return 0;
-	b->top = offset = ((l + (BITMAP_BYTES - 1)) / BITMAP_BYTES) - 1;
-	shift = ((l + (BITMAP_BYTES - 1)) % BITMAP_BYTES) * 8;
-	for (i = 0; i < l; i++) {
-		b->d[offset] |= (BITMAP_WTYPE)s[i] << shift;
-		if (shift == 0) {
-			offset--;
-			shift = BITMAP_BITS - 8;
-		} else
-			shift -= 8;
-	}
-	retop(b);
-	return 0;
-}

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/bitmap.h

@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2015 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-#ifndef _BITMAP_H
-#define _BITMAP_H
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-/* Simple bit vector routines */
-
-struct bitmap;
-
-/* Allocate a new bitmap. Returns NULL on allocation failure. */
-struct bitmap *bitmap_new(void);
-
-/* Free a bitmap */
-void bitmap_free(struct bitmap *b);
-
-/* Zero an existing bitmap */
-void bitmap_zero(struct bitmap *b);
-
-/* Test whether a bit is set in a bitmap. */
-int bitmap_test_bit(struct bitmap *b, u_int n);
-
-/* Set a bit in a bitmap. Returns 0 on success or -1 on error */
-int bitmap_set_bit(struct bitmap *b, u_int n);
-
-/* Clear a bit in a bitmap */
-void bitmap_clear_bit(struct bitmap *b, u_int n);
-
-/* Return the number of bits in a bitmap (i.e. the position of the MSB) */
-size_t bitmap_nbits(struct bitmap *b);
-
-/* Return the number of bytes needed to represent a bitmap */
-size_t bitmap_nbytes(struct bitmap *b);
-
-/* Convert a bitmap to a big endian byte string */
-int bitmap_to_string(struct bitmap *b, void *p, size_t l);
-
-/* Convert a big endian byte string to a bitmap */
-int bitmap_from_string(struct bitmap *b, const void *p, size_t l);
-
-#endif /* _BITMAP_H */

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/blf.h

@@ -1,88 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: blf.h,v 1.7 2007/03/14 17:59:41 grunk Exp $ */
-/*
- * Blowfish - a fast block cipher designed by Bruce Schneier
- *
- * Copyright 1997 Niels Provos <provos@physnet.uni-hamburg.de>
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *      This product includes software developed by Niels Provos.
- * 4. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products
- *    derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#ifndef _BLF_H_
-#define _BLF_H_
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#if !defined(HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF) && !defined(HAVE_BLH_H)
-
-/* Schneier specifies a maximum key length of 56 bytes.
- * This ensures that every key bit affects every cipher
- * bit.  However, the subkeys can hold up to 72 bytes.
- * Warning: For normal blowfish encryption only 56 bytes
- * of the key affect all cipherbits.
- */
-
-#define BLF_N	16			/* Number of Subkeys */
-#define BLF_MAXKEYLEN ((BLF_N-2)*4)	/* 448 bits */
-#define BLF_MAXUTILIZED ((BLF_N+2)*4)	/* 576 bits */
-
-/* Blowfish context */
-typedef struct BlowfishContext {
-	u_int32_t S[4][256];	/* S-Boxes */
-	u_int32_t P[BLF_N + 2];	/* Subkeys */
-} blf_ctx;
-
-/* Raw access to customized Blowfish
- *	blf_key is just:
- *	Blowfish_initstate( state )
- *	Blowfish_expand0state( state, key, keylen )
- */
-
-void Blowfish_encipher(blf_ctx *, u_int32_t *, u_int32_t *);
-void Blowfish_decipher(blf_ctx *, u_int32_t *, u_int32_t *);
-void Blowfish_initstate(blf_ctx *);
-void Blowfish_expand0state(blf_ctx *, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t);
-void Blowfish_expandstate
-(blf_ctx *, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t);
-
-/* Standard Blowfish */
-
-void blf_key(blf_ctx *, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t);
-void blf_enc(blf_ctx *, u_int32_t *, u_int16_t);
-void blf_dec(blf_ctx *, u_int32_t *, u_int16_t);
-
-void blf_ecb_encrypt(blf_ctx *, u_int8_t *, u_int32_t);
-void blf_ecb_decrypt(blf_ctx *, u_int8_t *, u_int32_t);
-
-void blf_cbc_encrypt(blf_ctx *, u_int8_t *, u_int8_t *, u_int32_t);
-void blf_cbc_decrypt(blf_ctx *, u_int8_t *, u_int8_t *, u_int32_t);
-
-/* Converts u_int8_t to u_int32_t */
-u_int32_t Blowfish_stream2word(const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t , u_int16_t *);
-
-#endif /* !defined(HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF) && !defined(HAVE_BLH_H) */
-#endif /* _BLF_H */
-

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/blocks.c

@@ -1,248 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: blocks.c,v 1.3 2013/12/09 11:03:45 markus Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Public Domain, Author: Daniel J. Bernstein
- * Copied from nacl-20110221/crypto_hashblocks/sha512/ref/blocks.c
- */
-#include "includes.h"
-__RCSID("$NetBSD: blocks.c,v 1.3 2015/04/03 23:58:19 christos Exp $");
-
-#include "crypto_api.h"
-
-typedef unsigned long long uint64;
-
-static uint64 load_bigendian(const unsigned char *x)
-{
-  return
-      (uint64) (x[7]) \
-  | (((uint64) (x[6])) << 8) \
-  | (((uint64) (x[5])) << 16) \
-  | (((uint64) (x[4])) << 24) \
-  | (((uint64) (x[3])) << 32) \
-  | (((uint64) (x[2])) << 40) \
-  | (((uint64) (x[1])) << 48) \
-  | (((uint64) (x[0])) << 56)
-  ;
-}
-
-static void store_bigendian(unsigned char *x,uint64 u)
-{
-  x[7] = u; u >>= 8;
-  x[6] = u; u >>= 8;
-  x[5] = u; u >>= 8;
-  x[4] = u; u >>= 8;
-  x[3] = u; u >>= 8;
-  x[2] = u; u >>= 8;
-  x[1] = u; u >>= 8;
-  x[0] = u;
-}
-
-#define SHR(x,c) ((x) >> (c))
-#define ROTR(x,c) (((x) >> (c)) | ((x) << (64 - (c))))
-
-#define Ch(x,y,z) ((x & y) ^ (~x & z))
-#define Maj(x,y,z) ((x & y) ^ (x & z) ^ (y & z))
-#define Sigma0(x) (ROTR(x,28) ^ ROTR(x,34) ^ ROTR(x,39))
-#define Sigma1(x) (ROTR(x,14) ^ ROTR(x,18) ^ ROTR(x,41))
-#define sigma0(x) (ROTR(x, 1) ^ ROTR(x, 8) ^ SHR(x,7))
-#define sigma1(x) (ROTR(x,19) ^ ROTR(x,61) ^ SHR(x,6))
-
-#define M(w0,w14,w9,w1) w0 = sigma1(w14) + w9 + sigma0(w1) + w0;
-
-#define EXPAND \
-  M(w0 ,w14,w9 ,w1 ) \
-  M(w1 ,w15,w10,w2 ) \
-  M(w2 ,w0 ,w11,w3 ) \
-  M(w3 ,w1 ,w12,w4 ) \
-  M(w4 ,w2 ,w13,w5 ) \
-  M(w5 ,w3 ,w14,w6 ) \
-  M(w6 ,w4 ,w15,w7 ) \
-  M(w7 ,w5 ,w0 ,w8 ) \
-  M(w8 ,w6 ,w1 ,w9 ) \
-  M(w9 ,w7 ,w2 ,w10) \
-  M(w10,w8 ,w3 ,w11) \
-  M(w11,w9 ,w4 ,w12) \
-  M(w12,w10,w5 ,w13) \
-  M(w13,w11,w6 ,w14) \
-  M(w14,w12,w7 ,w15) \
-  M(w15,w13,w8 ,w0 )
-
-#define F(w,k) \
-  T1 = h + Sigma1(e) + Ch(e,f,g) + k + w; \
-  T2 = Sigma0(a) + Maj(a,b,c); \
-  h = g; \
-  g = f; \
-  f = e; \
-  e = d + T1; \
-  d = c; \
-  c = b; \
-  b = a; \
-  a = T1 + T2;
-
-int crypto_hashblocks_sha512(unsigned char *statebytes,const unsigned char *in,unsigned long long inlen)
-{
-  uint64 state[8];
-  uint64 a;
-  uint64 b;
-  uint64 c;
-  uint64 d;
-  uint64 e;
-  uint64 f;
-  uint64 g;
-  uint64 h;
-  uint64 T1;
-  uint64 T2;
-
-  a = load_bigendian(statebytes +  0); state[0] = a;
-  b = load_bigendian(statebytes +  8); state[1] = b;
-  c = load_bigendian(statebytes + 16); state[2] = c;
-  d = load_bigendian(statebytes + 24); state[3] = d;
-  e = load_bigendian(statebytes + 32); state[4] = e;
-  f = load_bigendian(statebytes + 40); state[5] = f;
-  g = load_bigendian(statebytes + 48); state[6] = g;
-  h = load_bigendian(statebytes + 56); state[7] = h;
-
-  while (inlen >= 128) {
-    uint64 w0  = load_bigendian(in +   0);
-    uint64 w1  = load_bigendian(in +   8);
-    uint64 w2  = load_bigendian(in +  16);
-    uint64 w3  = load_bigendian(in +  24);
-    uint64 w4  = load_bigendian(in +  32);
-    uint64 w5  = load_bigendian(in +  40);
-    uint64 w6  = load_bigendian(in +  48);
-    uint64 w7  = load_bigendian(in +  56);
-    uint64 w8  = load_bigendian(in +  64);
-    uint64 w9  = load_bigendian(in +  72);
-    uint64 w10 = load_bigendian(in +  80);
-    uint64 w11 = load_bigendian(in +  88);
-    uint64 w12 = load_bigendian(in +  96);
-    uint64 w13 = load_bigendian(in + 104);
-    uint64 w14 = load_bigendian(in + 112);
-    uint64 w15 = load_bigendian(in + 120);
-
-    F(w0 ,0x428a2f98d728ae22ULL)
-    F(w1 ,0x7137449123ef65cdULL)
-    F(w2 ,0xb5c0fbcfec4d3b2fULL)
-    F(w3 ,0xe9b5dba58189dbbcULL)
-    F(w4 ,0x3956c25bf348b538ULL)
-    F(w5 ,0x59f111f1b605d019ULL)
-    F(w6 ,0x923f82a4af194f9bULL)
-    F(w7 ,0xab1c5ed5da6d8118ULL)
-    F(w8 ,0xd807aa98a3030242ULL)
-    F(w9 ,0x12835b0145706fbeULL)
-    F(w10,0x243185be4ee4b28cULL)
-    F(w11,0x550c7dc3d5ffb4e2ULL)
-    F(w12,0x72be5d74f27b896fULL)
-    F(w13,0x80deb1fe3b1696b1ULL)
-    F(w14,0x9bdc06a725c71235ULL)
-    F(w15,0xc19bf174cf692694ULL)
-
-    EXPAND
-
-    F(w0 ,0xe49b69c19ef14ad2ULL)
-    F(w1 ,0xefbe4786384f25e3ULL)
-    F(w2 ,0x0fc19dc68b8cd5b5ULL)
-    F(w3 ,0x240ca1cc77ac9c65ULL)
-    F(w4 ,0x2de92c6f592b0275ULL)
-    F(w5 ,0x4a7484aa6ea6e483ULL)
-    F(w6 ,0x5cb0a9dcbd41fbd4ULL)
-    F(w7 ,0x76f988da831153b5ULL)
-    F(w8 ,0x983e5152ee66dfabULL)
-    F(w9 ,0xa831c66d2db43210ULL)
-    F(w10,0xb00327c898fb213fULL)
-    F(w11,0xbf597fc7beef0ee4ULL)
-    F(w12,0xc6e00bf33da88fc2ULL)
-    F(w13,0xd5a79147930aa725ULL)
-    F(w14,0x06ca6351e003826fULL)
-    F(w15,0x142929670a0e6e70ULL)
-
-    EXPAND
-
-    F(w0 ,0x27b70a8546d22ffcULL)
-    F(w1 ,0x2e1b21385c26c926ULL)
-    F(w2 ,0x4d2c6dfc5ac42aedULL)
-    F(w3 ,0x53380d139d95b3dfULL)
-    F(w4 ,0x650a73548baf63deULL)
-    F(w5 ,0x766a0abb3c77b2a8ULL)
-    F(w6 ,0x81c2c92e47edaee6ULL)
-    F(w7 ,0x92722c851482353bULL)
-    F(w8 ,0xa2bfe8a14cf10364ULL)
-    F(w9 ,0xa81a664bbc423001ULL)
-    F(w10,0xc24b8b70d0f89791ULL)
-    F(w11,0xc76c51a30654be30ULL)
-    F(w12,0xd192e819d6ef5218ULL)
-    F(w13,0xd69906245565a910ULL)
-    F(w14,0xf40e35855771202aULL)
-    F(w15,0x106aa07032bbd1b8ULL)
-
-    EXPAND
-
-    F(w0 ,0x19a4c116b8d2d0c8ULL)
-    F(w1 ,0x1e376c085141ab53ULL)
-    F(w2 ,0x2748774cdf8eeb99ULL)
-    F(w3 ,0x34b0bcb5e19b48a8ULL)
-    F(w4 ,0x391c0cb3c5c95a63ULL)
-    F(w5 ,0x4ed8aa4ae3418acbULL)
-    F(w6 ,0x5b9cca4f7763e373ULL)
-    F(w7 ,0x682e6ff3d6b2b8a3ULL)
-    F(w8 ,0x748f82ee5defb2fcULL)
-    F(w9 ,0x78a5636f43172f60ULL)
-    F(w10,0x84c87814a1f0ab72ULL)
-    F(w11,0x8cc702081a6439ecULL)
-    F(w12,0x90befffa23631e28ULL)
-    F(w13,0xa4506cebde82bde9ULL)
-    F(w14,0xbef9a3f7b2c67915ULL)
-    F(w15,0xc67178f2e372532bULL)
-
-    EXPAND
-
-    F(w0 ,0xca273eceea26619cULL)
-    F(w1 ,0xd186b8c721c0c207ULL)
-    F(w2 ,0xeada7dd6cde0eb1eULL)
-    F(w3 ,0xf57d4f7fee6ed178ULL)
-    F(w4 ,0x06f067aa72176fbaULL)
-    F(w5 ,0x0a637dc5a2c898a6ULL)
-    F(w6 ,0x113f9804bef90daeULL)
-    F(w7 ,0x1b710b35131c471bULL)
-    F(w8 ,0x28db77f523047d84ULL)
-    F(w9 ,0x32caab7b40c72493ULL)
-    F(w10,0x3c9ebe0a15c9bebcULL)
-    F(w11,0x431d67c49c100d4cULL)
-    F(w12,0x4cc5d4becb3e42b6ULL)
-    F(w13,0x597f299cfc657e2aULL)
-    F(w14,0x5fcb6fab3ad6faecULL)
-    F(w15,0x6c44198c4a475817ULL)
-
-    a += state[0];
-    b += state[1];
-    c += state[2];
-    d += state[3];
-    e += state[4];
-    f += state[5];
-    g += state[6];
-    h += state[7];
-  
-    state[0] = a;
-    state[1] = b;
-    state[2] = c;
-    state[3] = d;
-    state[4] = e;
-    state[5] = f;
-    state[6] = g;
-    state[7] = h;
-
-    in += 128;
-    inlen -= 128;
-  }
-
-  store_bigendian(statebytes +  0,state[0]);
-  store_bigendian(statebytes +  8,state[1]);
-  store_bigendian(statebytes + 16,state[2]);
-  store_bigendian(statebytes + 24,state[3]);
-  store_bigendian(statebytes + 32,state[4]);
-  store_bigendian(statebytes + 40,state[5]);
-  store_bigendian(statebytes + 48,state[6]);
-  store_bigendian(statebytes + 56,state[7]);
-
-  return inlen;
-}

crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/blowfish.c

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-openbsd-compat/blowfish.c